Is Gender like Ethnicity?

The Political Representation of Identity Groups

Author(s): Mala Htun
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 439-458
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles

Is Gender
Ethnicity? like The Political
of
RepresentationIdentity Groups
Mala Htun

Some 50 countriesofficiallyallocateaccessto politicalpowerby gender,ethnicity,or both.Yetin theworld'selectoraldemocracies,

the policiesusedforwomendiffersystematically fromthoseusedforethnicgroups.The formerreceivecandidatequotasin parties;
the latter,reservedseatsin legislatures.
Why?My explanationfocuseson thevaryingwaysthatgenderandethnicidentitiesintersect
with partisancleavagesand on the distinct"work"performedby the differentremediesfor underrepresentation. Quotas,which
makespacewithin existingparties,areappropriatefor groupswhose boundariescrosscutpartisandivisions.Reservations, which
createincentivesfor the formationof group-specificpartiesand permitthem directrepresentation, suit groupswhoseboundaries
coincidewith politicalcleavages.Sincegenderis crosscuttingwhileethnicitytendsto be coinciding,womenreceivecandidatequo-
taswhileethnicgroupsget legislativereservations.Claimsforinclusionviaquotasposelessof a challengeto liberalinstitutionsthan
claimsto differencethroughlegislativereservations.Casestudiesof representational
politicsin France,India,andPeruillustratethe
argument.

Political leaderstakeourmoney,leadus to war,andwrite majorities)assumedistinct forms.Women tend to receivecan-

the laws that govern our lives. Must their ranksinclude
men and women, rich and poor, mastersand slaves?For
most of world history,the answerwas no. Men ruled;women
worked at home. Female interests were representedby hus-
bands and fathers.The same was true for membersof subordi-
nate ethnic groups:conquerorswould carefor colonialsubjects,
the rich for the poor, whites for browns, and so on.
As the twentieth century progressed,however,a consensus
emerged in internationalsociety and within democraticpoli-
ties that one social segment should not monopolize political
power.Specialeffortsweremade to includepreviouslyexcluded
groups-generally defined in terms of gender and ethnicity.
Today,some 50 countries officially allocate access to political
power along the lines of gender,ethnicity,1or both: they have
lawson the books reservinga fixednumberof electoralcandida-
cies or legislativeseats.Narrowingthe focus to electoraldemoc-
racies revealsa fascinatingpattern:institutional remedies for
the underrepresentationof women and ethnic minorities (or
Mala Htun is assistantprofessorofpolitical scienceat the New
Schoolfor Social Research(htunm@newschool.edu) and
authorof Sex and the State:Abortion, Divorce, and the
Familyunder LatinAmericanDictatorshipsand Democra-
cies. Theauthorgratefullyacknowledges theassistanceand advice
of Kanchan Chandra, JorgeDominguez,JenniferHochschild,
MarkJones,Courtneyung,Jim Miller,VictoriaMurillo,JackSny-
der,Donna Lee VanCott,MyraWaterbury, participantsin col-
at the New School and Columbia
loquia University,and
anonymous reviewers.
didate quotas in political parties, whereas ethnic groups are
grantedreservedseats in legislatures.
How does gender differ from ethnicity?Why do democra-
cies apply distinct policies to different previously excluded
groups?What does this imply about the normativestatus of
variousclaims to representationand the appropriateresponse
of liberalstates?
This article argues that different remedies for underrepre-
sentation are logically appropriatefor differentgroups. Quo-
tas, which make space within existing parties, suit groups
whose boundaries crosscut partisan divisions. Reservations,
which create incentives for the formation of group-specific
parties and permit them direct legislative representation,
suit groups whose boundaries coincide with political cleav-
ages.Whereasgender tends to be crosscutting,ethnicity tends
to be coinciding. Women and men belong to all political
parties; members of ethnic groups, by contrast, frequently
belong to one only. In countries where it is mobilized, eth-
nicity is a central, if not the central principle of political
behavior;gender,though occasionallya consideration,almost
never defines how individuals vote and what parties they
affiliatewith.
Of course, actual politics do not always conform to func-
tional requirements.Historicallegaciesmay get in the way of
matchinggroupcharacteristics with suitablepolicies.Thus coun-
tries with traditionsof ethnic reservationshave given reserved
seats to women; one with a gender candidate quota applied
similar quotas to ethnic minorities. Yet when it applies the
"wrong"remedy, the state neglects the true causes of under-
representationand fails to grant group membersrealaccessto
power. As we see in the Indian and Peruviancases discussed

September 2004 i Vol. 2/No. 3 439

Articles I Is Genderlike Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups
'
below, supposed beneficiariesof .. .
these unwelcome remedies may i-
protest them and demand alter-
native policies.
Though the divergence be-
tween the modes of gender and !:
ethnic representationcuts across
many countries, it has received
no scholarlyattention.We know
a great deal about women's
movements and women in pol- _
itics, and a growing number of
8
works focus on gender quotas. |
Hundredsof scholarshave stud- 0

ied ethnicidentityformationand ,.:.. 4e

Is
0.
mobilization; the causes and
consequences of conflict; and 0

institutional solutions for i.

dividedsocieties.Fewworksana-
lyze representational politics
acrossidentities.2Such a compar-
ison is needed, however, if we are to understandwhy policy
solutions to women's underrepresentationdivergeso dramati-
cally from those applied to ethnic groups. Comparing gender
and ethnicity also revealsthat claims made on these differing
bases have different implications for the liberalstate.
Group Representation Policies
Table 1 identifies countries with statutory gender quotas or
reservations,ethnic quotas or reservations,or both. (For des-
criptions of these policies, see tables la and lb at the end of
this article.)3As table 1 shows, about 50 countries use such
mechanisms, including old and new democracies; rich and
poor countries;Catholic, Protestant,Islamic, Confucian, and
Hindu societies; federaland unitary systems;and presidential
and parliamentaryregimes. Dozens of other countries with-
out statutory measures uphold effective political arrange-
ments to guarantee group representation, such as quotas
used voluntarily by political parties in over 30 countries; the
race-consciousdistricting practiced in the United States;and
the applicationof lower electoralthresholdsfor minority polit-
ical organizationsin Denmark, Germany,Poland, and Roma-
nia. Notwithstanding the importance of these voluntary
arrangements,this paper is concerned exclusivelywith statu-
tory mechanisms. Reliable cross-nationaldata on party stat-
utes, their interpretation, and their enforcement were not
available.This is a fertile area for future research,since addi-
tional data have the potential to change the findings reported
here.4
Policiesto guaranteegroup representationgenerallyassume
one of two forms: candidate nomination quotas in political
partiesor legislativereservations.Quotas requirethat a mini-
mum number of candidatesfielded by political partiesfor gen-
eral election have certain demographic characteristics.The
ArgentineLeyde Cupos(or Quota Law of 1991), for example,
requiresthat women comprise a minimum of 30 percent of
political party lists. Reservationsor reservedseats set aside a
fixed percentageof legislative seats for members of a certain
group. These may be filled through competitive election in
specially created districts (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribesin India), through election by voters registeredon sep-
arate rolls (Maoris in New Zealand), by the group member
receiving the most votes in general elections (constitutionally
recognized ethnic groups in Mauritius), or through designa-
tion by political parties (minorities in Pakistan).
Statesadopted these policies at differenthistoricalmoments.
In some countries, collective representationalrights constitute
part of the bargainstruck to ensure the viability of democracy
in a plural society. In such "consociational"or "consensus"
polities, each group is guaranteeda shareof power to preclude
secession and civil war. Other countries introduced collective
rights rather recently in response to the growth of identity-
basedsocial movementsand their demandsfor the recognition
of culturaldiversity.These claims have mobilized concern for
the question of whether elites in power resemble,in their per-
sonal characteristicsand life experiences,the people they rep-
resent, thus transforminggroup representationfrom a matter
of state survivalinto a question of democraticlegitimacy and
social justice.
Considerabledebate surroundsthese policies. Liberalcritics
argue that granting rights to identity groups treats them as
essential givens, failing to acknowledge their dynamism and
fluidity, as well as internal injustices suffered by some mem-
bers. Existing liberal institutions, moreover, can resolve the
domination and oppression inflicted on social groups since
these wrongs are ultimately suffered by individuals.5 Civic
republicansclaim that group-differentiatedrights undermine
common citizenship and rendersuspect a public good toward
which society could be oriented,6 while libertarians allege
that collective rights benefit the already privileged, increase
in-group inequality, and aggravatesocial divisions.7 Finally,

440 Perspectives on Politics

 representation. Quotas and
Table 1 reserved seats differ in degree,
Statutory group representation policies but not in kind, from the every-
For gender For ethnicity For both gender and ethnicity day work states alreadyperform
on politically-relevant social
Argentina Bhutan Belgium
Armenia Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina identities.
Bangladesh Cyprus Colombia
Bolivia Ethiopia India Gender Quotas and
Brazil Fiji Jordan Ethnic Reservations
Costa Rica Kiribati Pakistan in Electoral
Djibouti Lebanon Peru
DominicanRepublic Mauritius Serbia and Montenegro Democracies
Ecuador New Zealand Taiwan When we consider only elec-
France Niger toral democracies, the follow-
Greece Samoa
ing pattern emerges:states give
Guyana Singapore candidatequotasin politicalpar-
Macedonia Slovenia
Mexico Switzerlanda ties to women and reservedseats
Morocco Venezuela in legislatures to members of
Namibia ethnic groups. As table 2 dem-
Nepal onstrates, there are only four
NorthKorea
Panama exceptions to this rule. The
Paraguay probability that a democracy
Peru with group rights for women
Rwanda will have candidate quotas is
Sudan 0.86; in countries with mea-
Tanzania suresguaranteeingethnic repre-
Uganda
sentation,the probabilityis 0.94
NOTE:Electoral democraciesare in italics(FreedomHouse2003). that these take the form of leg-
aSwitzerland's
practiceof distributing
cabinetseats by languagegroupis nottechnically
required
by islative reservations.
law,butis a deeplyentrenchedcustom(Steiner1990;Steiner2002).
What accounts for this diver-
gencein modalitiesof genderand
ethnic representation?My argu-
socialscientistshavefound that policiespromotingthe descrip- ment can be summarizedin the following syllogism: (1) can-
tive representationof minorities may actuallyend up harming didate quotas are more appropriatefor groups that crosscut
their substantiverepresentation:for example, the creation of partisancleavages,while reservationssuit groups that coincide
so-called majority-minoritydistrictshelps to put more blacks with them; (2) gender identities tend to cut across parties,
and Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives,but it may whereas ethnic identities often overlap with partisan affilia-
also facilitatethe election of legislatorselsewherewho areideo- tions; (3) consequently,disadvantagedgroups that aredefined
logically hostile to their interests.8 by gender demand, and are granted,candidatequotas;ethnic
Defenders of quotas and reservationspoint out that group groups prefer,and receive,legislativereservations.
rights do not constitute a majordeparturefrom existing dem-
ocratic practices.After all, some form of collective represen- Quotasfor crosscuttinggroups; reservationsfor
tation is inherent to the political process.As Justice Lewis E coinciding ones
Powell put it in a 1968 voting rights opinion, "The concept To understandthe differentuses of the two types of policies,
of representationnecessarilyapplies to groups;groups of vot- we must first explore the distinct means they use to improve
ers elect representatives;individualsdo not."9 Single-member the representationof identitygroups.Quotas intervenein party
district systems define such groups by territory;other elec- nomination proceduresby requiringthat a certainpercentage
toral regimes, such as national-list proportional representa- of the candidatesfielded by a party be of a certaingroup. For
tion, accommodate non-geographicallybased constituencies. example, the quota may demand that around one-third of
Liberal polities such as the United States and Canada have positions on party lists be occupied by women and that they
traditionallydrawn geographicaldistrict boundaries around alternatewith men in the rankorderingof candidates,as is the
"communitiesof interest,"be they regional, economic, envi- casein Argentina,Costa Rica,Belgium,and Guyana.1'A quota
ronmental, or historical; by granting an equal number of policy may thereforeprovokesome changesin the ways parties
seats to states regardlessof population, the U.S. and Austra- go about nominating candidates,formulatinglists, and decid-
lian Senatesoffer privilegesto residentsof smaller,potentially ing who runs in what district. However, it does not alter the
disadvantagedstates.10The point is that political institutions overallstructureof incentives governing the political system.
inevitablymake decisions about the types of groups that gain Specifically,quotas do not affect issuessuch as counting rules,

September 2004 1 Vol. 2/No. 3 441

Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups

trast, guaranteegroup members

Table 2 ~a shareof power independently,
Group representation rights in electoral democraci as> ~a
if need be, of existing parties.
Candidatequotas in parties Legislativereservations Their objective is to facilitate
Ethnic Peru Belgium autonomy of political commu-
Colombia nities and electoral success of
Croatia group-specificparties.
Cyprus Figure 1 depicts the location
Fdii
India
of crosscutting and coinciding
Kiribati groups in the party system. We
Mauritius see that members of a crosscut-
New Zealand ting group belong to all parties,
Niger whereas those of a coinciding
Samoa tend to belong to a single
Serbia and Montenegro group
Slovenia party, a set of political organi-
Switzerland zations, or no party. Figure 2
Taiwan illustratesthe "work"done by a
Venezuela well-designed candidate quota.
Gender Argentina Bangladesh The policy attacksthe discrimi-
Armenia India(local) nation sufferedby group mem-
Belgium Taiwan
Tai~wan ~bers in the party but permits
Bolivia
Brazil them to continue militating in
Costa Rica it. Meanwhile, the party gains
DominicanRepublic representation in legislatures
Ecuador
France through regularelectoralproce-
Greece (local) dures. The demographiccharac-
Guyana teristics of its delegations may
Macedonia change, but the rules of inter-
Mexico party competition remain the
Namibia(local) same.
Panama
Paraguay Figure 1 helps us see why a
Peru candidatequotawould makelit-
Serbia and Montenegro tle sense for a coinciding group.
aAs identifiedby FreedomHouse in 2003. The table includesonly 1those countriesconsidered What is gained by makingspace
electoraldemocracies. for group members within all
partieswhen they tend to clus-
ter at one end of the political
spectrum? In fact, a candidate
timing, the circumscriptionof electoraldistricts, the structure quota might undermine a minority group'spolitical organiza-
of the ballot, and so on that have been shown to exertthe most tions as its partisanopponents snatch up groupleadersin order
powerfuleffectson voter behavior,the partysystem, and inter- to complywith the quota. Finally,figure3 clarifiesthe mechan-
nal party structure.12 ics of legislativereservations.They permita group'sparty,orga-
Reservationstakea differentapproach.They introducegroup- nizations, or independent representativesto gain power on
specific avenuesof representationthat circumventthe existing their own and may furnishadditionalincentivesfor formation
partysystemand createnew electoralincentives.These include of minority parties.
the creation of: separateelectoral rolls, special electoral dis- In theory, a proportionalrepresentation(PR) electoralsys-
tricts that limit competition to group members,exceptions to tem, particularlyone with low thresholds,would facilitatethe
counting rules, and provisions for direct appointment to the representationof group-specificpartiesand organizations.PR
legislature. also avoidsa situation in which the state is compelled to assign
Candidate quotas thus presume a differentsort of problem individualsto specific groups (as requiredby the maintenance
from that addressedby reservations.The goal of quotas is to of ethnic voter rolls or the reservationof certain districts for
take a categoryof people who belong to, but suffer from dis- group members), a practice that contradicts the fluidity and
crimination in, mainstreamparties and propel them to posi- contextual nature of many ethnic identities. In addition, PR
tions wherein they stand a chance of popularelection. Quotas is flexible, permitting the automatic adjustment of represen-
thereforeprovidea means of assimilationand integrationinto tational relationshipsto changing demographicsand political
already existing political institutions. Reservations,by con- interests. Divided legislatures and reserved seat ratios, by

442 Perspectives on Politics

Figure 1 ties.16Partypositions may differon women'srightsissuessuch
Cross-cutting versus coinciding groups as abortion, but are converging-at least in theory-on the
goal of gender parityin representationalpolitics.
Cross-cutting groups What about the gender gap? In advanced democracies,
women tend to vote for leftist partiesin greaternumbersthan
men. A few decadesago (and in many partsof the developing
QO 0Q @? world today) the opposite transpired:support for the Right
was greateramong women.17Though analysesof these phe-
0? Qo nomena tend to center on women's views, there is evidence
O@ that men are the ones changing:in the United States at least,
@0 QO transpositionof the gender gap is due to majorshifts in men's
The gap peakedin the U.S. presidential
_ I *Q
partisanpreferences.18
of
elections 1996, when 54 percentof women voted for Dem-
ocrat Bill Clinton, as opposed to 43 percent of men.19While
Party A Party B Party C
significant for party strategy,these percentage point differ-
Coinciding groups ences are small comparedto the overallvolume of female and
male support for variouspartiesand candidates.
The size of genderdifferencesin partysupportcontrastsviv-
P0 idly with the ethnicallyinflectedpoliticaldivisionscharacteriz-
ing manypluralsocieties.In patronagedemocraciessuchasIndia,
00 politics is driven by ethnic head counting.20Linguistic divi-
sions in heterogeneousEuropeancountriessuch as Belgiumand
Switzerlandmap onto party-and party system-divisions.21
00 A largenumber of postcolonialsocieties in Africaand Asia are
dominatedby partieswhose relianceon the supportof exclusive
00 ethnicgroupslendsa "census-likequality"to elections.22In these
Party A Party B Party C contexts and in the post-communist world, progresstoward
democratizationoften exacerbatedthe ethnic characterof pol-
itics, sometimeswith violent consequences.23Nine Israelipar-
ties representingdistinct ethnic and religiousgroups came to
contrast,often containno provisionfor periodicupdatingbased
on new census data.13Some countries, however,may opt for occupy nearlyhalf of the Knessetseats in the 1990s.24African
Americansin the United Statesidentify overwhelminglywith
reservedseatsin orderto preservean existingtwo-partysystem
the DemocraticPartyand evidenceof the salienceof racein pre-
(unlikelyto be maintainedunderPR), to overrepresent a minor-
to offer access to as dicting voting behaviorlies behind U.S. federalcourts'valida-
ity, privileged power compensation for tion of districtingarrangementsdesignedto permit all citizens
historicaldisadvantage,or to name a particulargroupas deserv-
to "electa candidateof their choice."25Even LatinAmericais
ing unique status.14
witnessingthe growthof ethnicparties:in the 1990s, thosemobi-
lizing indigenous voters successfullycontested national elec-
Crosscuttinggender versus coinciding ethnicity tions in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,Guyana, and Venezuela
The next step is to examine variation in the extent to which and local contests in Argentinaand Nicaragua.26
gender and ethnic identities actually correspond to partisan Ethnic boundariesare not always politically loaded, how-
cleavages. For much of world history, politics has been the ever, and not everyonehas a communal experienceof ethnic-
exclusivedomain of men. Women gained the right to vote and ity. Its coincidencewith partisanand ideologicalcleavagesand
stand for office only in the twentieth century.Since the early geographicconcentration is the effect of historical construc-
daysof genderintegrationin politics, however,politicalparties tion as well as political manipulation. Ethnic groups in some
have counted on both men and women as supporters.There countries, such as Afro-descendentsin Brazil, have features
are few instancesof partiesdefined by gender, and none have usuallyassociatedwith genderidentity,such as low geographic
consistently won elections. To be sure, different parties send segregationand little correlationwith voting behavioror party
men and women to office to varyingdegrees:women comprise affiliation.Consequently,the affirmativeaction bill undercon-
a largerportion of legislativedelegationsof the Left than those sideration in the BrazilianCongress calls for racialquotas in
of the Right. One reason is that the former have been more parties,not for reservedseats in the legislature.27The stacking
likely to adopt voluntarycandidatequotas than the latter. 5 To of ethnicity on salient social divisions is the product, not the
reduce the electoral advantagesuch policies may provide to premise, of a political process, an outcome to which the allo-
their opponents, partiesof the Right in severalcountrieshave cation of specific representationalrights surelycontributes.
respondedby introducing, if not alwaysexplicit quotas, other For these reasons,there is an active debate among political
forms of affirmativeaction to improve women's opportuni- scientists about which types of institutions can best mold

September 2004 Vol. 2/No. 3 443

Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentation of IdentityGroups
Figure 2 ethnic boundariescorrespondto
What quotas do other salient cleavages.Gender
identities, however, almost al-
Step 1: Parties to lists ways cut across them.

Party lists > Q @? Q i rWomen

' receive quotas; ethnic
groups receive reserved seats
Finally, we must establish that
Party 6 m O -Q V1 , gender-baseddemandscenteron
members - quotas and that this is relatedto
*
fi the fact that women are spread
Q
throughoutthe partysystem.We
^ also need to show that the pref-
?O,
Party B * Jy (~erence of ethnic groups for
reserved seats flows from their
Party A Party B
tendency to cluster in a single
party or organization.
Let us begin by analyzingcan-
Step 2: Parties to legislature didate quotas.Their diffusion is
a relativelyrecent phenomenon
resultingfromseveraltrends.The
first is the growth of the second-
Legislature wavefeminist movement,which
identified male dominance in
political life as a problem and
questionedthe legitimacyof pol-
ities that tolerate it. Feminist
activismhelped forge new inter-
national norms of genderequal-
ity.Majoragreements,suchasthe
^^??~
? ~ Convention on the Elimination
Q EJ~ Oof All Forms of Discrimination
AgainstWomen (CEDAW) and
^O *e the Platformfor Action adopted
by governments at the 1995
(O? @ Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing,endorseaffir-
* (*) mativeaction. Internationaland
regionalorganizations,suchasthe
Party A PartyC United Nations, the European
Union, the Southern African
Development Community, the
ethnicity to promote democratic stability.Arend Lijpharthas Summitof the Americas,and the Associationof SoutheastAsian
long advocated proportional representationand power shar- Nations, have declaredthat growth in women'sleadershipcon-
ing, policies that preservegroup identity but encouragecoop- tributesto democraticconsolidation and economic and social
erationamong ethnic elites. Donald Horowitz favorselectoral progress.
rules that encouragepoliticians to make appealsacrossethnic Another factor was the development of normative argu-
lines. And KanchanChandrahas found that when state insti- ments that identified the gender composition of legislaturesas
tutions create incentives for politicians to mobilize different an indicator of justice and the quality of democracy.Quota
dimensions of ethnic identity-by authorizing positive dis- advocates reconceptualizedpolitical equality to include not
crimination by caste, granting access to government jobs by just the right to vote and stand for office, but to bepresentin
language, or recognition of statehood by tribe-ethnic par- office. A homogeneous legislatureof men, they argued, vio-
ties will compete to occupy the center, thus avertingthe cen- lates this fundamentalright. Meanwhile, partisansof deliber-
trifugal spiral that undermines democracy.28Depending on ative democracystressedthe need for representativesto share
these institutional configurationsand other factors, ethnicity experienceswith their constituentsin orderto adequatelycom-
is manifestin variedways in differentsocieties. Often enough, municate citizen views in open-ended political deliberation.

444 Perspectives on Politics

Figure 3 onist and Radical parties in
What reservations do Argentina; the Party of the
Democratic Revolution and
National Action Party in Mex-
ico; and the socialists, Rally for
the Republic,and the Union for
French Democracy in France
Legislature *l ~
5^ joined together to defeat the
arguments of male colleagues
that quotas were undemocratic
and unconstitutional."Although
all women may not agree on
the substance of specific policy
outcomes, they do have a com-
mon interest in being present
when policy is being made."31
These politicians did not seek
^ ,p\ to form a separate women's
0@ 0@ '_~{} {? ~party. Rather, they united in
temporary alliances to maxi-
mize their leveragein demand-
ing greater power within their
Party A Party B Party C No Party respectiveparties.
Second,mostpoliticiansregard
quotas as a temporarymeasure.
As morewomen gainpower,they
Finally, feminists maintained that having more women in power )reak down the obstaclesholding others back. Over time,
would introduce additional perspectivesto decision making uota will become obsolete.
and tailor policy outcomes to suit a broadervarietyof citizen nally,women'sactivismaroundquotas has been episodic.
interests.Ann Phillips sums up these variousdevelopmentsas the adoption of quota laws, women'scoalitions have dis-
a reorientationof democratictheory and practicefrom a "pol- ed as their membersreturnedto their priorcommitments
itics of ideas"to a "politicsof presence."29 )ecamereabsorbedinto their parties.In some countries-
Argentinapioneered a candidate quota law in 1991. Influ- bly Argentina, Costa Rica, Belgium, and Guyana-
enced by the successof candidatequotas in the SpanishSocial- en'spresencein power increasedsignificantlyas a resultof
ist Party,Argentine female politicians from different parties uota. Yet the feminization of legislativedelegations has
united behind the proposal.Though it was initially ridiculed roducedmajorchangesin whatpartiesactuallydo. Though
by men, last-minute persuasionby PresidentCarlos Menem women politicians have introducedfresh items to polit-
and his interior minister helped to overcome this resistance. igendas, their collective presence has thus far failed to
Subsequently, the policy snowballed across the region. By uce major shifts in policy and practice.32
the end of the decade, ten other Latin American countries hnic demands for reservations have followed a quite
had adopted legislative quotas, and an eleventh, Colombia, *entpolitical logic. Ratherthan improvingthe legitimacy
introduced them for senior executiveappointments. Belgium ready existing democracies, the granting of reserved
introduced a law in 1994 that states that a maximum of has tended to occur as part of a founding compromise
two-thirdsof all candidatescould be of the same sex; in 1999 nsociational or consensus polities. In these countries,
France modified its constitution to call for gender parity in legislatures, the allocation of ministerial portfolios
political office and enacted legislation requiring parties to hnicity, or fixed ratios of parliamentaryseats form part
field an equal number of men and women candidates.Mean- e elite bargainsnecessaryto make democracy possible.
while, under the influence of the United Nations, the Orga- group has a constitutional share of power, giving it an
nization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), tive not to defect from the existing political regime and
and the Stability Pact for South-CentralEurope, quota rules rmine the survival of the state. As opposed to quotas,
were inserted into the electorallaws of most countries of the h improve the leadership prospects of group members
former Yugoslavia,including Bosnia and Herzegovina,Mac- n existing parties, reservationspresume the existence of
edonia, and Serbia, including Kosovo.30 p-specificparties or organizations. Groups demanding
Three aspects of women's mobilization for gender quotas vationsdo not want to be integrated into mainstream
stand out. First, multipartisanand ideologicallydiversecoali- es. They want access to political power in their own
tions have backed the new policies. Women from the Per-

September 2004 1Vol. 2/No, 3 445

Articles | Is Genderlike Ethnicity?
The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups
In Belgium, the constitution requiresthat there be an equal
number of French- and Dutch-speakingministers in the fed-
eralgovernmentand in the governmentof the Brusselsregion,
with the parliamentdivided between these two languagecom-
munities and their respectiveparty systems. In Switzerland,
language group quotas are used not only in the federalcoun-
cil,33 but in other areas of government (such as the armed
forces) and in society as a whole (such as the executive com-
mittee of the Swiss soccer association).3 Lebanon is another
classic story of how ethnic reservationshelped forge the state.
The National Pact of 1943 reserved all major offices-the
president was to be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni;
the speakerof the house a Shiite; and so on-and fixed the
ethnic composition of the parliamentat a 6:5 ratio of Chris-
tians to Muslims.35
Elsewhere,the ethnic allocation of political power was cod-
ified in peace agreementsfollowing civil wars. International
mediators, with an eye toward establishing pluralist polities,
helped installforms of powersharingin virtuallyall of the new
statesformedafterthe breakupof Yugoslavia.Bosniaand Herze-
govina has a three-memberpresidency comprised of a Bos-
niak, Serb,and Croat,aswell as a bicamerallegislativeassembly
dividedbetweenthesethreecommunities.In Serbiaand Monte-
negro, the bicameralfederallegislatureis divided between Ser-
bians and Montenegrans. In Kosovo, seats are reserved in
parliamentfor Serbs, Roma, and other ethnic groups. (In less
polarizedCroatia and Slovenia, a smallernumber of seats are
reservedfor minorities.)36Other countries inherited power-
sharingfrom formercolonial rulers.In Fiji, the ethnic reserva-
tion of parliamentaryseats dates from colonial times, when
the British authorities sought to separateindigenous Fijians
from Indo-Fijiansand install themselves as mediators.After
the country'sindependence,the vast majorityof parliamentary
seats continued to be reservedby ethnicity.37
Some reservationspolicies reflect attempts to compensate
victims of slavery,colonialism,or a castesystemfor pastoppres-
sion. India'sreservationsfor Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes are intended to amelioratethe historic discrimination
sufferedby those at the lowest rungs of the caste system. New
Zealand'swhite rulersmade a similar attempt to compensate
oppressed minorities: the Maori RepresentationAct of 1867
installed four representativesin a legislatureof over 70 mem-
bers.The number of seats laterincreasedto seven (representa-
tives areelected by voterswho voluntarilyregisterfor a separate
Maori roll).38
In the late twentieth century, some disadvantagedethnic
groups demanded rights during constitutional reforms.
Respondingto indigenous mobilization, the Colombian Con-
stitution (1991) createda two-seat senatorialdistrict for Indi-
ans and permitted the reservationof up to five seats in the
lower house for ethnic groups and other political minorities.
Venezuela had a similar experience:the 1999 constitutional
reform establishedthree reservedseats for "indigenouscom-
munities"in the nationalassemblyand permittedsocial move-
ment organizationsto contest them, thus eliminatingthe party
registration barrier. In both countries, these seats granted
446 Perspectives on Politics
resourcesand visibility to indigenous partiesand movements;
as a result, they successfullycontested general elections and
gained power in local governance.39With the exception of
Peru, democratic states have always conferred ethnic group
rights in the form of reservations.
The Argument in Action
France,India, and Peruillustratethe theoreticalpropositionsI
haveadvanced.FranceandIndiashowus politicalactorsengaged
in pragmaticdebates,ponderingthe differencebetweengender
and ethnicity,though to opposite ends. Both honed in on the
crosscuttingnatureofgender.In France,thissupportedwomen's
claimsto representation;in India,it underminedit. Comparing
Indiaand Peruemphasizesa differentpoint. Though the coun-
triesseem like exceptionsto my argument(see their location in
table 2), in fact they support it. India initially grantedreserva-
tionsto ethnicminorities,andPeruintroducedquotasforwomen.
Both governmentslatertried to apply the same policy to a dif-
ferenttype of group:Indianwomen got reservationsand Peru-
vian indigenouspeoples receivedquotas.The two policieswere
subsequentlycriticizedby their alleged beneficiaries.By mis-
matching groupsand remedies,the Indian and Peruvianstates
not only failedto addressthe underlyingcausesof disadvantage,
but arguablyjeopardizedwomen'sand indigenouspeople'squest
for political equality.
Parite in France
In June 2000 the Frenchparliamentapproveda law requiring
that parties field an equal number of male and female candi-
dates in legislativeelections. This turn of events is surprising
in a country that has prided itself on a republicantraditionof
an indivisible body politic and has long forbidden official
distinctions among citizens in terms of sex, race, ethnicity,
and religion. In fact, these nondiscriminationprincipleswere
invoked by the SupremeCourt in a 1982 decision that struck
down a quota law passed by Congress (the law would have
banned one sex from occupying more than 75 percent of the
places on lists of candidates for municipal elections). The
French court claimed that gender preferencescontradicted
republicanprinciplesof equalityand unity, which dictate that
citizens representthe nation as a whole, not discrete groups
or categories.40
Advocates of women's representationthus had to make a
case that their preferredpolicies were compatiblewith repub-
lican universalism.This requireddemonstratingthat the exist-
ing model was flawed for failing to incorporatesex differences
and that gender parity would not legitimize representational
rightsfor other social groups.Gender,they argued,is a unique
form of social difference.
Unlike ethnicity, race, and religion, which are socially con-
structed and changeable categories, sex is universal and
permanent:
Women do not constitute a category analogous to minorities, but half
of humanity, and their status is immutable. The young grow older,
one can change one's religion, people of color can intermix with
 others-miscegenation is widespread-,workersmayswitchprofes-
sions,andso on. Butonceoneis borna manorwoman,onedoesnot
change(savein theextremely rarecaseof transsexuals).41
Both traditionalFrench"universalism," which stressesthe unity
of men and women, and contemporaryAmerican"particular-
ism," which collapses sex into other forms of difference, are
thereforemisguided. PhilosopherSylviaAgacinski,wife of for-
mer Socialist PremierLionel Jospin, arguesthat both political
traditionshave denied the real natureof sex:
The"French"
effacement bothsexesinanabstract
byengulfing
proceeds
humanism, modelof a sexually
fromwhichonlythesingular neutral
human being can surface.... The "American"
effacementproceeds
womenin a systematic in whichminori-
by drowning particularism
tiesof allsorts(ethnic,religious, etc.)aregroupedtogether,
cultural,
and bothsexesend up beingconsidered pure"constructions." ...
Today,thenewFrench feminism simultaneouslychallengesboththese
typesof sexualneutralization in affirmingsexualdualityas the only
universal withinhumanity.
difference Thisis whyit wasableto con-
ceiveof thepariteidealin politics.42
The fact of sexual differencedivides humanity in two. As a
result, a republicanpolity that claims to include all citizens,
but in which only men hold power,unjustlyprivilegesone half
over the other. Parityfeminists did not want their arguments
to be leveled againsta legislatureof white Catholics, however.
Since sex is the only universalcategory,women arenot like any
other social group.
With this stance, parityadvocateswere able to anchor their
movement within republican discourse and find allies from
the mainstreamof Frenchpolitics.By denyingthat paritywould
or should lead to a cascadeof demands for other representa-
tional rights, they made their case more palatable.What is
more, they focused on the narrow objective of getting the
paritybill passed,and not broaderconsiderations,such as socio-
economic equality and policy change. By avoiding questions
aboutthe substantiverepresentation of women'sinterests,French
feminists of diversepolitical and ideological stripeswere able
to smooth over their differencesand unite in a nonpartisan
movement. This also helped defray fears that right-wing and
conservativewomen would be attackedor disqualified,and by
the mid-1990s, most politicians had jumped on the parity
bandwagon.When it came to a vote in the national assembly,
the parityproposals-both the constitutionalamendmentand
the implementing legislation-were approved unanimously.
Following promulgation of the law, however, the large and
diverse movement began to disperse.What had held partici-
pants togetherwas support for parity,not a more comprehen-
sive policy agenda or a sharedhistory of activism.43
The parity law worked well in the 2001 municipal elec-
tions, since municipal councilorsare elected under a semipro-
portionalclosed-listsystemand partieswererequiredto include
threewomen for every three men on the list. In cities of more
than 3,500 inhabitants where the parity law was applied,
women's presence on municipal councils rose to 48 percent.
Yet at the national level, where deputies are elected by the
first-past-the-postsystemin single-memberdistricts,the results
weredisappointing.Preferringto sufferfinancialpenaltiesrather
than comply with the quota, the center Right UMP nomi-
nated women to less than 20 percent of the districtswhere it
rana candidate,and even the SocialistPartynominatedwomen
to only 36 percent of districts.Most of these were losing dis-
trictsand the numberof women in the assemblybarelyincreased
(from 62 to 71 out of 576, or to 12 percent of the total).44
Reservationspolicy in India
Whereas the French state acknowledgedsocial difference in
the law only at the end of the twentieth century,in India such
recognition has a long tradition. Legislativereservationsfor
minoritieswere introducedduring Britishrule. FirstMuslims
(in 1909), then Christiansand Sikhs (in 1919) were granted
separateelectorates;at the same time, nominated seats were
granted to "untouchables"or dalits to offset inequities of the
caste system. The British had originally proposed that these
lower castes vote on separaterolls; a 21-day hunger strike by
Mohandas Gandhi, however, led to compromise. The 1932
agreement,known as the Poona Pact, reservedseats for dalit
candidatesto be elected by everyone.The Britishalso reserved
a number for women within these communal seat allocations
in provincial and national legislatures.Although favored by
British feminist Eleanor Rathbone, such reservationswere
opposed by the largestnationalIndianwomen'sassociationsas
well as the Indian National Congress, which contested the
introduction of any distinctions (whetherby gender,religion,
or caste) among Indians. Both groupsviewed Britishpolicy as
part of a divide-and-rule strategy against the nationalist
movement.45
The constitution promulgatedin 1950 rejectedcommunal
quotas as an organizingprinciple in favor of formal equality
and individual rights, with two exceptions. Recognizing that
equal treatment would be insufficient to amelioratehistoric
discriminationsufferedby the lowest social groups, the con-
stitution upheld the British legacy of legislative reservations
for untouchables(ScheduledCastes)and introducedthem for
indigenous groups (ScheduledTribes).Similarconsideration,
however,was not extended to Muslims or women. Delimita-
tion commissionsin each statedesignatedsingle-membercon-
stituencies in which only members of Scheduled Castes and
ScheduledTribescould stand for office, even though the elec-
torate as a whole would vote for them (the number was pro-
portionalto their shareof the population).The text authorized
a range of other policies to advance"backwardclasses"of cit-
izens, including:reservedposts in governmentserviceand uni-
versity admissions;scholarships,meals, supplies, and special
schools;and preferencefor economic developmentassistance.46
The debateover women'srepresentationdied down for sev-
eraldecades,but it was revivedin the 1970s when the govern-
ment of India formed the Committee on the Statusof Women
to propose recommendationsfor improving their rights and
opportunities.Its reportwas to be launched in time for Inter-
national Women'sYearin 1975. One of the thorniest issues
considered by the committee was gender reservations.After
weighing arguments for and against, it declined to recom-
mend such policies at the national or state level, though it
September 2004 I Vol. 2/No. 3 447
Articles I| s Genderlike Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups
recognizedwomen's political underrepresentationas a serious
problem.
To justify its position, the committee drew a distinction
betweenwomen, who area "category,"and minority "commu-
nities," including those based on caste and religion. "There
can be no rationalbasisfor reservationsfor women," since "the
minority argumentcannot be applied to women. Women are
not a community, they area category.Though they have some
realproblemsof their own, they sharewith men the problems
of their groups, locality and community.Women are not con-
centrated in certain areas [or] confined to particularfields of
activity."47"Women'sinterestsas such,"the committee wrote,
"cannot be isolated from the economic, social, and political
interestsof groups, strataand classesin the society."48
Anticipating arguments made by French feminists in the
1990s, Indian expertsstressedthe differencebetween women
and ethnic minority communities, but as an argumentagainst
women'srepresentation,not in favorof it. The Committee on
the Status of Women did, however, borrow the institutional
model the state had used for Scheduled Castes and Tribesand
endorsed reservedseats for women in local governments.This
appearsto havebeen a compromisebetweenthose who rejected
women's representationaltogether and those who wanted to
recommend reservationsat all levels.49Indeed, many features
of the official reportarecontradictory,seeminglyreflectingthe
amount of dissentoverthe issue.Forexample,though it declares
that "the minority argument cannot be applied to women,"
the reportalso states that "thoughwomen do not numerically
constitute a minority,they arebeginning to acquirefeaturesof
a minority community"becauseof continued gender inequal-
ities in class, status, and power.50The local-level recommen-
dationswereadoptedin 1992 as the 73rd and 74th amendments
to the Indian Constitution, reservingfor women one-third of
the seats at the three tiers of the PanchayatiRaj institutions of
ruralself-governance,as well as in elected urbancouncils.51
The debatewas revivedin 1996 when MP and formerMin-
ister for Women MargaretAlva proposed to amend the con-
stitution to extend the women's reservationssystem to the
national and state legislatures.A lottery system would deter-
mine the single-memberdistrictsin which only women could
run, and thesewould rotateeverytwo elections.The bill would
also reserveone-thirdof the seatsallocatedto ScheduledCastes
and Tribesfor women of those communities.Though virtually
every political party supported the bill in their 1996 electoral
platforms, the parliamentarydebates over it were ferocious,
with some MPs almost coming to blows and others rushingto
the podium to tear up copies of the text.52
One of the main parliamentaryconcerns was the relation-
ship between women's reservationsand rights for membersof
"otherbackwardclasses"(OBCs, a group the 1950 constitu-
tion had recognized as entitled to special protections). In a
1990 decision that provokedmassivecontroversy,the govern-
ment had granted OBCs reservationsin its central bureau-
cracy,but not in nationaland statelegislatures.Entrepreneurial
MPs from the Hindu nationalistBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)
demanded that the women's bill include subreservationsfor
448 Perspectives on Politics
lowercastes,a move that allowedthem to appearas champions
of the OBCs, but which mired the gender proposalin polem-
ics surroundingcasterights.In addition, some legislatorscalled
for specialprovisionsin the bill for Muslims.As LauraDudley
Jenkins notes, "by endorsing the bill in party platforms and
then failing to pass it out of a sudden concern for backward
citizens or Muslims, politicians court the women's vote, the
backwardsvote, and the Muslim vote and simultaneouslypro-
tect their own hopes of reelection."53
Popularviews of the elitist natureof the women'smovement
also did not help the cause of the bill. Middle-classwomen
had assumed visible roles in protests against the decision to
grant OBCs central government reservationsand most femi-
nist organizationshad failedto build ties to lowercastegroups.
During the debate, a prominent OBC politician declaredthat
the reservationbill was for "balkatiauraten"or short-haired
women, a referenceto upperclassurbanfeminists.54The com-
ment tapped an underlyingfearthat, without subreservations,
the women's bill would end up benefiting only high-caste
Hindus.
As in France,political actorsin India highlighted the cross-
cutting nature of gender.Unlike ethnic groups, women tran-
scend geographic, occupational, language, and religious
categories.In France,this meant that, in theory,women'srep-
resentationwould not threatenthe republicanuniversalisttra-
dition. In India, by contrast,women'scrosscuttingstatusmade
it less likely that they would representthe caste and socioeco-
nomic intereststhe reservationssystemwas supposedto advance.
Meanwhile, a group of dissidents argued that rather than
reservedseats,the bill shouldintroducea candidatequotawithin
political parties.The Forum for Democratic Reforms argued
that the reservationsproposal was seriously and inherently
flawed. By mechanicallyprovidingfor the entranceof women
into one-thirdof the seatsin the nationaland statelegislatures,
the bill failed to addressthe main problem impeding women's
effectiveparticipationin politics:genderdiscriminationin polit-
icalparties.55 These activistsviewedasdisingenuousthoseIndian
politicians who endorsed the bill while doing nothing for
women within their respectiveparties:
The verysamemalepartyleaderswho competewitheachotherin
announcing theirsupport ofspecialreservations forwomenhaveshown
littlewillingnessto includewomenin partydecisionmaking,oreven
to helpcreatea conduciveatmosphere forwomen'sparticipation in
theirownorganizations. Infact,women's marginalizationisevenmore
pronounced in theday-to-dayfunctioning of almostallpoliticalpar-
tiesthanin theLokSabha.Therefore, it is urgentlyrequiredthatwe
makespecialmeasures to enhancewomen'spoliticalparticipation in
decisionmakingatalllevelsof our
waysthatwillhelptheminfluence
societyandpolity.Ourdemocracy will remainseriously flawedif it
failsto yield adequatespaceto women.56
Furthermore,the Forum argued,a system of women'sreserva-
tions would enable patriarchalleaders to solidify their posi-
tions. At the local level, political bosses regularlycompel their
wives, sisters,and daughtersto contest reservedseats.National
politicianswould duplicatethis strategyand the women enter-
ing politics would be mere fronts for male power.57
 Pointing out that those countrieswith the highest levels of
women'srepresentationuse candidatequotas,not reservedseats,
these critics proposedan alternativebill. It would requirethat
one-third of candidatesnominated by political partiesfor gen-
eral elections be women, though each party would be free to
choosethe constituencieswherethesewomen would run. Rather
than contesting women'sseats, female candidateswould com-
pete against men and other women in general elections. To
ensure their success, partieswould need to nurturethese can-
didates.Women might thereforebecome legitimateleadersand
have a greaterpolitical base from which to advancewomen's
interests in parliament.58The Indian government has not
resolved these issues, so it is not yet clear whether quotas or
reservationswill emerge as the preferredremedy.
Quotas in Peru
While some Indian authoritieshave sought to apply to women
the samesystemthey had used for ScheduledCastesandTribes,
Peruvianofficials have employed a women's policy for indig-
enous peoples. In 1997 the Congressapprovedan electorallaw
requiringthat female candidatesmake up no less than 25 per-
cent of the slots on party lists contesting national legislative
elections (the quota was later increasedto 30 percent). Several
years later, Peruvian leaders introduced the same remedy-
party candidate quotas-for indigenous communities of the
Amazon region. Though intended as a response to their
demandsfor representation,the policy was criticizedby indig-
enous leaders for undermining their political organizations.
Like their ethnic counterpartselsewherein the world, Peru's
Amazonianand highlandIndianswanted reservedseatsin par-
liament, not quotas.
In a process of coalition building similar to what occurred
in France,Peruvianwomen politicians-representing both the
governing and opposition parties-initially joined forces in
the mid-90s to lobby for a quota law.Five congresswomenhad
attendedthe 1995 FourthWorldConferenceon Women, where
they debated the policy with delegates from other countries.
Upon theirreturn,a specialcommissionon women was installed
in parliament and quotas were the first item on its agenda.
Although the proposalinitially met with overwhelmingskep-
ticism from other legislators, it eventually received a boost
from an unexpectedally: the President.Alberto Fujimori,the
only head of state to have attended the 1995 conference,
declaredhis support for quotas and the majorityin Congress
immediatelyfell in line. As in France,the proposalwas approved
unanimously.59Its effectson women'spresencein power,how-
ever, were more dramatic:in the first national election held
after the quota, the percentageof congressionalseats held by
women jumped from 11 to 20 percent.
Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed the growing ethnic politi-
cization of indigenous peoples in various Andean countries,
including Peru. Previously,a "peasant"or "poor"conscious-
ness had tended to prevailover an indigenous one, and ethnic
prejudicewas perceived-and disguised-as class discrimina-
tion. The decreasingviability of class affiliationslike peasant
in the neoliberalera, combined with opportunitiesoffered by
global discoursesof multiculturalism,helped spawn mobiliza-
tion along ethnic lines.60In 1998, organizationsfrom the Ama-
zon and highland regions formed the PermanentConference
of PeruvianIndigenous Peoples, uniting previouslydisparate
organizationsto forge a common political platformand lobby
congressto recognizeIndian rights.61
After the 2001 election of PresidentAlejandroToledo, the
state became increasingly receptive to indigenous claims.
Though he frequentlydonned a poncho and espoused a pop-
ulist discourse, former President Fujimori had undermined
indigenousland rights,and his effortsto centralizepower-he
canceled regionalelections-reduced Indian opportunitiesto
participatein politics. Toledo pledged to expand the rights of
indigenous peoples and createda high-level commission pre-
sided over by his wife, Belgian anthropologistElaine Karp,to
representtheirinterestsin the state.Fulfillinga campaignprom-
ise, he also reinstatedregionalelections.62
The law regulatingthese elections, approvedby Congressin
early2002, declaredthatlistsof candidatesfor regionaland local
councils compriseno less than 30 percentwomen and a mini-
mum of 15 percentof representativesof "nativecommunities"
or "originalpeoples"in those regionswherethey lived. Accord-
ing to the nationalelectiontribunal,the indigenousquotawould
be appliedin 11 (ofa total of 25) regions.63The groupstargeted
by the law include some 350,000 people speakingover40 lan-
guages,mostly residentsof the lowlandAmazon region.
Peru'sethnic quotas apply only to those Indiansconsidered
membersof "nativecommunities."What is the origin of this
term? In 1969 military ruler General Juan Velasco declared
that, "asan act of liberation,"the words indigenousand Indian
be purgedfrom official discourseand all peoples incorporated
into a "modern"class-basedsociety.64A 1974 law then reclas-
sified the entireindigenouspopulationinto two groups:"native
communities"and "peasantcommunities."The formerbenefit
from the 2002 quota law, but the latter, who are far more
numerous, do not. "Peasantcommunities," or those indig-
enous peoples inhabitingthe country'shighland regions,com-
prise over 40 percent of Peru's28 million people.
Although it was designed to help them, severalAmazonian
Indian organizationscriticizedthe way the 2002 electorallaw
channeled their representationthrough existing political par-
ties. These indigenous movements preferredinstead to form
their own autonomous organizationsand political platforms.
Emulating the success of similar organizationsin Bolivia and
Ecuador,where ethnic partieshad made majorelectoralgains
in the 1990s, representativesof various Peruviannative com-
munities formed the Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian
Amazon (MIAP) and attemptedto field candidatesfor several
elections in the late 1990s and early2000s. The quota posed a
threat to this group, however, since its leaders were being
recruitedby mainstreamparties seeking to comply with the
law.65 One activist complained that, though the intention
behind the quota was good, the result was bad, for it would
only cause Indians to become more divided.66
Indians from both the Amazon and the highlands want
the Peruvianstate to guaranteetheir representationthrough
September 2004 Vol. 2/No. 3 449
Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups

legislativereservations,not can- Table 3

didate quotas. The programfor
constitutional reform advanced
Forms of gender representation in democracies and nondemocracies
by indigenous organizationsin Women's legislative
2003 calls for the creation of Gender quotas in parties reservations
special electoral districts, from ElectoralDemocracy Yes Argentina Bangladesh
which Indians would directly Armenia India(local)
elect 30 percent of seats in the Belgium Taiwan
national congress and regional Bolivia
Brazil
and municipal councils.67The Costa Rica
reservation of seats conforms DominicanRepublic
to the notions held by many Ecuador
indigenous organizations that France
Greece (local)
political participationis not just
an individual but a collective Guyana
Indonesia
right.68 Macedonia
Reservationsare but one ele- Mexico
ment in the broader agenda Namibia(local)
advanced by indigenous peo- Panama
Paraguay
ples in Peru. Indians want col- Peru
lectivepropertyrights,territorial Serbia and Montenegro
and cultural autonomy, defer- No Nepal (national5%) Djibouti
ence to customary law, and Jordan
bilingualeducation.These goals Morocco
contradict the model of the Nepal (local)
mestizo nation NorthKorea
homogeneous, Pakistan
and comprehensive legal order Rwanda
installedin the Americanrepub- Sudan
lics after their independence Tanzania
from Spain in the early nine- Uganda
teenth century. They challenge
the liberal state and its tradi-
tions of individual rights, since
completing the indigenous agendawould requirethe state to mote the substantiverepresentationof the interestsof a disad-
recognize multiple, collective forms of citizenship as well as vantagedor excludedgroup.The agentsof such representation
tolerate a pluralityof legal regimes.69 should thereforeexercisenot just symbolicbut effectivepower.
The Peruviancase helps show how legislative reservations Partof the motive for choosing the right remedyis to reinforce
advance group rights and reinforcedifferencesin a way that connections between leadersand the base that nourishesthem
candidate quotas do not. Quotas attack the discrimination politically.Quotas improvethe position of women within those
suffered by individuals within parties to give them a better partiesthat get them elected and advancetheir agendas;reser-
chance of getting elected. A regime of reserved seats more vations strengthenthose groupswhose very existenceis crucial
directlyempowers the whole group. When legislators are cho- for the promotion of the rightsand interestsof their members.
sen from separateelectorates and specially created districts, the Regimesthat lack a commitment to substantiverepresenta-
policy confers on group members the right to be represented tion have little incentive to promote the right remedy.In states
not just by one of their kind, but by a candidate of their with military governments, one-party states, no-party states,
choice. This mechanism strengthens the links between repre- and other countriesthat fail to respectcivil liberties,legislative
sentatives and their ethnic kin constituents while distancing powers are subject to arbitrarydictatorialwill. Such polities
them from others. Reservations thus bestow a distinctive sta- lack competitive party politics and the links of accountability
tus on the group as a political community. Quotas, by con- that they provide. Consequently, representationpatterns in
trast, collapse the group into the rest of political society. authoritarian polities differ from those observedin democra-
cies. Women get reservedseats in legislatures,not candidate
Authoritarian Exceptions quotas (see table 3), as do ethnic groups.Tolerationof demo-
The storiesof France,India, and Peru illuminate another aspect cratic parties-which the quota remedy presumes-would
of quotas and reservations. Their purpose is not merely to undermine the survivalof these regimes.
insert differentlyconfigured, colored, or cultured bodies into We could also speculate that in extremely oppressive
legislatures.Rather, advocates of these measures aim to pro- societies-which correlate,albeit imperfectly,to those without

450 Perspectives on Politics

democratic governance-gender is not crosscutting enough
for candidate quotas. With their roles limited exclusively to
biologicalfunctions,women have not spreadout into the econ-
omy, society,and partysystemin ways characteristicof wealthy
democraticstates.Theircommon experiencesand interestscause
them to resemble a coinciding group more than a cross-
cutting category.This suggests there may be an inverse rela-
tionship between the collective identity of women and their
degree of liberation: the greater the success of the feminist
movement in pushing women in to the public sphere,the less
they have in common.
In any event, the introduction of women's reservationsin
some nondemocracies shows that even these states are not
immune to argumentsconnecting regimelegitimacywith gen-
der diversity.In Morocco, partiesdecidedto reservethe 30-seat
national list for women after a three-yearprocessof mobiliza-
tion and consultation in which internationalorganizations-
particularlythe United Nations DevelopmentFundforWomen
(UNIFEM)-played important roles.70 Subsequently,hun-
dredsof delegatesattending the ArabWomen'sSummit in late
2002 approveda declarationcalling on Arab states to follow
Morocco'slead. In Pakistan,feminist mobilization and inter-
national benchmarkshelped provoke an expansionof the res-
ervationssysteminheritedfrom the colonial period. (Unlike in
India,wherewomen'sseatswere abolishedafterindependence,
Pakistanupheld reservationsof between 5 and 10 percent in
national and provincial assemblies in various constitutions
adopted into the 1980s.) In 2000 the militarygovernmentof
GeneralPervezMusharrafexpandedthe reservationssystem to
17 percent at the national and provinciallevels and one-third
at the local level.71
Granting reservedseats to women allows nondemocracies
to respond to popular pressureand conform to international
norms without ceding ground to the competitivepartypolitics
presumed by candidate quotas. Yet the very nature of such
regimes prevents female-and male-legislators from repre-
senting citizen interestsand wielding effectivepower.
Conclusion
Advocatesand criticsof group representationfrequentlyfail to
distinguishbetweentypes of policies and the groupsthey apply
to. Yetthesedistinctionsareconsequentialfor normativedebates
about social differencein a liberalpolity. Gender- and ethnic-
based demands present unique challengesto the liberaltradi-
tion. Becausethey areselfcanceling,quotasproducethe opposite
effect on group differencethan the self-reinforcingremedyof
reservations.
As a first cut at disaggregatinggroup claims to representa-
tion, I suggest that gender quotas be seen as analogous to a
class action and ethnic reservationsas a group right.72A class
action is a legal suit initiated by some plaintiffson behalf of a
largercollective of people in orderto vindicate a particularset
of rights.The classis constituted by virtue of having suffereda
similarwrong.The objectiveof the suit is to identifythis wrong
and put the plaintiffsin a position to recoverfor the individual
harms they have suffered.That is, a class action aims at the
erasureof an externallyimposed disability.A class action is
self-canceling:achievementof the claim extinguishesthe legal
identity of the class.
The logic of a class action correspondsclosely to that of
women'smobilizationfor genderquotas.They unite to contest
common experiences of political exclusion and discrimina-
tion. The quota remedyaims to transcendthese gender-based
disabilities, thereby erasing the conditions giving rise to the
claim in the firstplace. Once women enter political office, the
reasonsmotivating the quota movement disappear.The logic
of the quota is "toput the group out of businessas a group."73
As the Frenchcase shows, women from all partiesand ide-
ologies united in the strugglefor quotas, but revertedto their
priorideologicaland politicalcommitmentsonce this goal was
achieved.This trajectoryparallelsthe cyclicalpatternsobserved
in women'smovementsmore generally:they emergeto oppose
problems(denialof voting rights,militaryrule, discriminatory
legislation)but dissipateonce the situation has been resolved.
Women may act like a group in order to get something, but
realign themselves as a category once they have it. Being
excludedfrom power makeswomen conscious of belonging to
a group; once they have power, this group identity tends to
weaken and dissipate.74
Ethnic reservations,by contrast,are a group right. Claimed
in orderto guaranteethe continued existenceof the group,they
areexercisedcollectivelyby groupmembers.Suchrightsareself-
reinforcingratherthan self-canceling. Organizationsof Chi-
nese in Mauritius, Croats in Bosnia, and Italian-speakersin
Switzerlandwill not dissipateonce representationalrightshave
been granted.On the contrary,sincelegislativereservationscre-
ate incentivesfor the developmentof group-specificorganiza-
tions, their boundarieswill be strengthened.
Self-cancelingclaims for political inclusion have the reverse
effect of self-reinforcinggroup rights.Women seeking quotas
aim to have their differentposition absorbedby universalistic
institutions. Ethnic minorities demanding reservationswant
theirparticularismrecognizedand legitimized.These areoppo-
site trajectories:women sufferfrom too much difference;eth-
nic groups, from too little. Claims for inclusion pose less of a
challenge to contemporaryliberal institutions than claims to
difference.75
The distinction between a class action and a group right is
an analyticalone I inferredfrom this study of representation
policies in contemporarydemocracies.It does not describeall
claims made on behalf of genderand ethnic identities. In fact,
gender claims may on occasion be self-reinforcing: some
women'smovementsaim at separatism;others arguethat their
essentialdifferencesfrom men requiredissimilartreatmentover
the long term. And ethnic claims may sometimes be self-
canceling:part of the rationalebehind reservationsin India is
to help break down caste distinctions; likewise, affirmative
action in the United States and Brazilseeks to make race less
determining for political opportunities, occupational status,
and social experience.
Nevertheless,selecting one remedyfor underrepresentation
over otherswill generallyshape the futuretrajectoryof a social
September 2004 I Vol. 2/No. 3 451
Articles I Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups
group. A candidate quota promotes the integrationof group reservationshave the potential to magnify intergroupdiffer-
members into existing political parties. Beneficiariesof the ences and impede development of the overlappingaffiliations
quota may lateract to advancegroup interests,but they will do that underliea successfuldemocracy.The choice betweensoft-
so-save at episodic moments-as individuals,not as a group. ening or hardeningdifferenceinevitablyarisesin the quest for
A legislativereservationproducesthe oppositeeffect:it strength- political justice. Policymakersdesigning institutions and the
ens ties among group members by connecting them through scholarsadvisingthem should take notice lest they unwittingly
channels of representationdistinct from those used for every- trade a legislatureof white men for a fragmented,even polar-
one else.Though moreconduciveto continuedcollectiveaction, ized political society.

Table la
Gender quotas and reservations
Country Policy
National and local levels
Argentina 30% of candidates
Armenia 5% of partylists for PR elections
Bangladesh 45 of 345 seats reserved forwomen in unicameralparliament;some seats reserved at local level
Belgium 33% of candidates
Bolivia 30% of candidates for Chamber;25% for Senate; 30% for local councils
Bosnia and Herzegovina 33% of candidates
Brazil 30% of candidates
Colombia 33% of executive appointments
Costa Rica 40% of candidates
Djibouti 7 of 65 parliamentaryseats reserved
DominicanRepublic 33% of candidates
Ecuador 35% of candidates
France 50% of candidates
Guyana 33% of candidates
Jordan 6 of 110 seats reserved in House of Representatives
Kosovo 33% of candidates
Macedonia 30% of candidates
Mexico 30% of candidates
Morocco 30 of 325 parliamentaryseats reserved
Nepal 5% of candidates for lower house; 3 of 60 seats reserved in upper house; 20% of local seats
reserved
NorthKorea 20% of 687 parliamentaryseats reserved
Pakistan 17% of seats reserved in nationalassembly (60 of 342) and Senate (17 of 100); 33% at local
level
Panama 30% of candidates
Paraguay 20% of candidates
Peru 30% of candidates
Philippines 2 of 5 PR list seats reserved of a total of 220 in parliament;1 seat reserved on each local and
provincialcouncila
Rwanda 24 of 80 seats reserved in Chamberof Deputies
Serbia and Montenegro 30% of nationaland local candidates in Serbia
Sudan 35 of 360 nationalassembly seats reserved
Taiwan Approximately10% of seats reserved in LegislativeYuan;25% at local level
Tanzania 48 of 295 (16%) of parliamentaryseats reserved; 25% of local councils
Uganda 56 of 214 parliamentaryseats reserved; 33% of local councils
Local level only
Greece 33% of candidates
India 33% of seats reserved
Namibia 33% of candidates
is excludedfromtables1, 2, and3 becauseof smallnumberof reservedseats.
aPhilippines
Sources: InternationalIDEA2003; Htunand Jones 2002; Electionworld2003; Republicof Rwanda2003; BBC News 2004.

452 Perspectives on Politics

Table lb
Ethnic reservations
Country Policy
Belgium Halfof cabinet ministriesreserved for Frenchspeakers and half for Dutchspeakers; parliament
divides into Frenchand Dutchculturalcouncils when dealing withregionaland culturalissues.
Bhutan 10 of 150 seats reserved for representativesof Buddhistgroups
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 memberpresidency(Bosniak,Croat,Serb); in 42-memberNationalHouse of Representatives,
28 seats are allocated to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 14 seats to the
RepublikaSrpska;the 15-memberHouse of Peoples consists of 5 Bosniaks, 5 Croats, and 5
Serbs
Colombia 5 of 166 seats reserved for Afro-Colombians,indigenous peoples, and other politicalminorities
in Chamber;2 of 102 seats reserved for indigenous peoples in Senate
Croatia 5 of 153 seats in unicameralassembly reserved for ethnic minorities
Cyprus 24 seats reserved for Turks (unfilled)and 1 seat each for Maronite, Roman-Catholicand
Goumenianminoritiesof 80 in nationalassembly
Ethiopia 22 of 117 upperhouse seats (Councilof the Federation)reserved for representativesof minority
nationalities
Fiji 23 and 19 of 71 seats reserved for Fijiansand Indo-Fijians,respectively
India 79 seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and 41 for Scheduled Tribes of 543 in the LokSabha
(lower house of parliament);Prime Ministerhas the rightto appoint up to 2 Anglo-Indiansto
the same chamber
Jordan 12 of 110 seats for Christiansand Chechens/Circassians
Kiribati 1 of 39 seats for Banabans
Kosovo 20 of 120 seats reserved for minoritycommunities
Lebanon Of 128 nationalassembly seats: Maronites(34), Sunnis (27), Shiites (27), Greek Orthodox(14),
Greek Catholics(8), Druzes (8), ArmenianOrthodox(5), Alaouites(2), ArmenianCatholics(1),
Protestants (1), ChristianMinorities(1)
Mauritius 8 of 70 seats are filled by the "best losers" representingthe four constitutionally-recognized
ethnic communities(Hindus,Muslims,Chinese, and Franco-Mauritian/Creole Christians)
New Zealand 7 of 120 seats reserved for Maorisin unicameralparliament
Niger 8 of 83 seats reserved for nationalminoritiesin unicameralparliament
Pakistan 10 of 342 lower house seats reserved for minorities
Peru 15% of candidates in 11 (of 25) regions must be members of "nativecommunities"
Samoa 2 of 49 seats in unicameralassembly (Fono) reserved for part-or non-Samoans
Serbia and Montenegro 91 seats reserved for Serbs and 35 for Montenegrinsof 126 in unicameralassembly; 4 reserved
seats for Albaniansin Montenegroelections
Singapore Parties and alliances contesting the 14 multimemberGroup Representation Constituencies
must includean ethnic minoritycandidateon the ticket;the policyguarantees that 9 seats will
be occupied by Malays and 5 by Indiansor other minoritiesof a total of 93 in parliament
Slovenia 2 seats of 90 in unicameralassembly reserved for Hungariansand Italians
Switzerland 4 seats for Germanspeakers, 2 for Frenchspeakers, and one for Italian-speakersin 7-member
Federal Cabinet
Taiwan 8 seats reserved for overseas Chinese and 8 for aboriginalgroups in 225-seat LegislativeYuan
Venezuela 3 of 165 seats in unicameralnationalassembly reserved for indigenous peoples
Sources: Reynolds n.d.; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003; CIA 2003; Electionworld 2003; Carr 2003; Republic of Singapore 2003.

Notes parityand ethnic minority representation.See Phillips

1 Ethnicity is used here as an all-encompassingterm refer-
ring to social groups differentiatedby kinship, tribe, skin
color, religion, caste, language,race and other markers
of communal identity.This broad definition of ethnicity,
though somewhat at odds with the popular use of the
term, is becoming more common in socialscience as schol-
arsseekexplanationsfor the causes-and consequences-of
political phenomena motivated by ethnic identities.
See Chandra2004; Varshney2001; Horowitz 1985.
2 An exception is Anne Phillips's ThePoliticsof Presence,
which at severalpoints comparesthe pursuit of gender
1995.
3 Most of the data come from IDEA 2003; Reynolds n.d.;
Parline2003; Electionworld2003. I attempted to con-
firm each case in the country-specificscholarlyliterature
and in governmentwebsites, and made adjustments
accordingly.Some of these sources are mentioned in
footnotes.
4 The availabilityof more dataon formaland informalprac-
ticeswithin partiescould revealmorewidespreaduse of eth-
nic candidatequotas. Partiesin India, for instance,
regularlyapply ethnic quotas for leadershipposts. See

September 2004 1Vol. 2/No. 3 453

Articles | Is Gender like Ethnicity?The PoliticalRepresentationof IdentityGroups

Chandra2004. For more information about gender quo- 42 Agacinski2003, 18.

tas in parties,see IDEA 2003.
5 Kukathas1992; Okin 1999; Trebble2002; Miller 2002.
6 Elshtain 1995.
7 Sowell 1990.
8 Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996. For a critique
and response,see Lublin 1999 and Epsteinand O'Halloran
1999.
9 Quoted in Phillips 1995, 92.
10 Kymlicka 1995, 134-38.
11 Jones, forthcoming.
12 The literatureon how electoralrules affect the party sys-
tem and political behaviorbegins with Duverger'slaw
and is vast. See, for example,Cox 1997; Careyand Shugart
1992; Lijphart1990; Shugart 1995; Jones 1995; Ames
1995.
13 PR thus permits "self-determination" ratherthan the "pre-
determination"of ethnic groups. See Lijphart1985. Lani
Guinier also endorsesPR to allow for the representa-
tion of"voluntaryinterestconstituencies,"ethnic and other-
wise. See Guinier 1994.
14 Lijphart1985.
15 Reynolds 1999; Caul 2001.
16 Baldez2004; Matland and Studlar 1996.
17 Inglehartand Norris 2003.
18 Kaufmannand Petrocik 1999.
19 Center for AmericanWomen and Politics 1997.
20 Chandra2004.
21 Deschouwer 2002; Heisler 1990; Steiner 2002.
22 Horowitz 1985, 332.
23 Snyder2000.
24 Yishai 2001.
25 Dawson 1994; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1992.
26 Van Cott, n.d.
27 Telles 1999; Htun 2004; Samuels, n.d.
28 Lijphart1977; Horowitz 1985, 1991; Chandran.d..
29 Young 1990; Mansbridge1999; Williams 1998; Phillips
1995.
30 Htun andJones2002; Nordlund 2003; Carton 1999; Cor-
rin 2002; StabilityPact 2002; Dahlerup 2002.
31 Friedman2000, 291.
32 Rodriguez2003; Jenson and Valiente 2003; Htun and
Jones 2002.
33 The council is generallycomprisedof four German-
speakers,two French-speakers,and one Italian-speaker.
34 Deschouwer 2002; Heisler 1990; Steiner 1990; Steiner
2002.
35 Horowitz 1985; Lijphart1986.
36 Birch 2002; Birch et al 2002; Darmanovic 2003;
UNHCR and OSCE 2002; Embassyof Croatia,n.d.; Con-
stitution of the Republic of Slovenia, n.d.
37 Reilly 2001.
38 Galanter 1984; Walker 1992.
39 Van Cott 2003; EfrenAgudelo 2002.
40 Bird 2001; Sineau 2003.
41 Mossuz-Lavau1998, 83.
43 Giraud and Jenson 2001; Bird 2002; Jenson and Valiente
2003; Mazur 2001.
44 Bird 2002.
45 Galanter 1984; Jenkins 1999; Pedersen,forthcoming.
46 Galanter 1984; Wilkinson 2000.
47 Governmentof India 1974, 304.
48 Ibid.
49 The annex to the official reportcontains three notes of dis-
sent written by four committee members.Two of the
notes oppose reservationsaltogether;the other, signed by
two membersand running eleven paragraphs,supports
reservationsat the national and state levels. See Govern-
ment of India 1974.
50 Ibid., 301.
51 The seatsmay be allocatedby rotationto differentconstit-
uencies; one-third of council chairmanshipsmust also be
reservedfor women. For analysisof the local reserva-
tions see Tekchandani,Jyoti, and Sharma 1997; Lak-
shmi, Jyoti, and Sharma2000.
52 Keating 2002; Jenkins 1999.
53 Jenkins2003, 169. See also: Nath 1996.
54 Jenkins2003, 170.
55 This is the case not just in India but more generally.
Data from the United Statesshow that when they run,
women have as good a chance as men to get elected.Their
low numbersin power owe to the unwillingnessof par-
ties to nominate women as candidates,not discrimi-
nation in the electorate. See Darcy, Welch, and Clark
1994.
56 Forum for Democratic Reforms2000.
57 Kishwar1999, 126-27.
58 Forum for Democratic Reforms2000.
59 Promujer1998.
60 Yashar,forthcoming;Jung, n.d.
61 Van Cott, n.d.
62 Ibid.
63 JuradoNacional de Elecciones2002a; JuradoNacional
de Elecciones2002b.
64 Chase Smith 1982.
65 Van Cott, n.d.; Rice, forthcoming.
66 WraysPerezof the Inter-EthnicDevelopment Associa-
tion of the PeruvianForest (AIDESEP);interviewedby
Donna Lee Van Cott, July 11, 2002.
67 Comisi6n Organizadorade la Consulta Indigena sobre la
ReformaConstitucional 2003.
68 As mentioned earlier,Colombia and Venezuelahad
grantedthem legislativereservationsin the early 1990s.
69 Stavenhagen2002; Van Cott 2003; Yashar1999.
70 Rachida2002.
71 Pakistanalso reserves7 percentof seatsfor technocrats.Var-
ious national plans for women had endorsed a 30 per-
cent reservationsscheme, as did representativesof eleven
political parties.See Reyes 2002; Weiss and Bari 2002.
72 I am gratefulto John Comaroff for helping me with this
formulation.

454 Perspectives on Politics

73 Fraserarguesthat this logic characterizesredistributiverem-
edies for class-basedsocial injustice. See Fraser1997, 18.
74 Accordingto David Miller, a categoryconsists of all those
persons fitting a properdescription,while a group is "a
set of people who by virtue of their sharedcharacteristics
think of themselvesas forming a group."See David
Miller 2002, 178.
75 Brian Barry,for example, arguesthat classicalliberalism
is perfectlycompatiblewith special treatmentfor mem-
bers of disadvantagedgroups as long as the objective
of such treatmentis to make the need for it "disappearas
rapidlyas possible."He contrastssuch remedieswith
the permanentgroup rights favoredby those he deems
multiculturalists:"if the group [no longer needed] special
rights,that would not be regardedas a causefor celebra-
tion, because it would be taken to suggest that the sup-
port for the group'sculture had been insufficient to
prevent its membersfrom assimilatingto that of some
largeror more powerful group."See Barry2002, 13.
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