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Anthropomorphism and Anthropodenial: Consistency in Our Thinking about Humans and Other
Animals
Author(s): Frans B. M. de Waal
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27, No. 1, Zoological Philosophy (SPRING 1999), pp. 255-280
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43154308
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PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS
VOL.
27,NO.1,SPRING
1999
and Anthropodenial :
Anthropomorphism
Frans B. M. de Waal
Emory University
I amafirm
believerthatwithout there
speculation is no
goodandoriginal
observation.
- Darwin,18571
Ifwefeelourselves bythebehavior
affected
emotionally
ofan animal thatwehaveintu-
, itis a clearindication
discovered
itively a similarity
between and
itsbehavior
humanbehavior. Weshouldnotconcealthisin our
description.
- K. Lorenz, HereamI- Where AreYou?1991,260
255
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DOMAINS OF PARSIMONY
256
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Serpell,5 thehuman-animal relationship musthavebeenrelatively egalitar-
ianduringthisperiod.Hunters exerciselittlecontrol: theyneedtoanticipate
themovesoftheirprey,andfeelrespectfortheircunningiftheyescape.A
morepracticalkindof knowledgebecamenecessarywhenourancestors
tookup agriculture andbeganto domesticate animalsforfoodandmuscle
power. Animals became dependent on us and subservient to ourwill.The
hunter's orientation tonatural behavior, and the farmer's utilitarian
andhus-
bandry perspective, are still
recognizable today in the two traditionalscien-
tificapproachesto animalbehavior:thatof thezoologistand thatof the
psychologist.
The imageof KonradLorenzbeingfollowedby a cohortofhonking
geese,orcallinghistameravenoutofthesky,is quitedifferent fromthatof
B. F. Skinnerwithhishandaroundthewingsofa pigeon,placingthebird
in a so-calledSkinnerbox. The contrast is notmerelyin thepersonalrela-
tionwiththesubjectofstudy, butalso inthewaybehavioralinformation is
being extracted. Observing animals under natural or naturalisticconditions,
ethologists (behavioralzoologists)areinterested in lifecyclesandspecies-
typicalbehavior, suchas howanimalsdefendterritories, courttheopposite
sex, evade predators, raise their young, communicate with one another, and
so on.Theytryto meettheanimalon itsownterms, comparing behavioral
characteristics alongphylogenetic lines.As pointedoutbyTinbergen,6 the
ethologist takes a distinctly functional and evolutionary perspective.Given
the millionsof species on earth,the groundsforcomparisonare inex-
haustible.
Behaviorists (psychologists), on theotherhand,oftenhavelittleinter-
est in theanimalper se. Theystudyanimalsto discovergenerallaws of
behaviorand,ultimately, tounderstand ourselves. Theirmainfocusis onthe
of
acquisition stimulus-response contingencies, theprediction
and andcon-
trolofbehavior. the
Thus, comparative of
aspect comparative psychology is
essentiallyanthropocentric: are
extrapolations generally from animals to
humansalong a linearprogressionfrom"lower" to "higher"forms.7
Domesticated animals,suchas whiteratsandpigeons,areraisedinthelab-
oratory as models forthe"highest"formoflife.Theseso-calledphyloge-
neticscales havenothingto do withactualphylogeny, however,whichis
manifestly nonlinear.8
In bothapproaches,anthropomorphism is an issue of concernand
but
debate, only the behaviorists have erected a formal obstacletoit.Thisfol-
lows logicallyfrom their drive to explain behavior - animalas well as
human - without "resorting" to mentalistic concepts.Although ethologists
haveoccasionally fallenforthepositivistic appealofthisposition,9 theynever
made it a formal component of their discipline. The behaviorist positionis
commonly to
traced C. LloydMorgan,10 dampenedwho the enthusiasm for
257
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introspectiveandsubjectivistic approaches to animalbehaviorbyformulat-
inghis famouscanon:"In no case maywe interpret an actionas theout-
comeoftheexerciseofa higherpsychicalfaculty, ifitcanbe interpreted as
theoutcomeoftheexerciseofonewhichstandsloweron thepsychological
scale."Thisposition, withitsnullhypothesis thatmentaloperations in ani-
malsarerelatively simple,willbe referred tohereas cognitive parsimony .u
All fundamental positions have their counterparts, however. Even
thoughthisis notuniversally acknowledged, thedebateaboutanthropo-
morphism is essentiallysymmetrical (table1). Atthesametimethatanthro-
pomorphism is rejectedon thegroundsthatittendsto overestimate animal
mentalcomplexity, shouldnotwe be equallyworriedaboutthepossible
underestimation ofsimilaritiesbetweenhumansandanimals,andthepossi-
ble underestimation ofanimalmentalcomplexity? Alternatively,coulditbe
thatwe routinely overestimate humanmentalcomplexity? Thelackofterms
to describetheseparticular sourcesofinaccuracyatteststo thebias in the
debatethusfar.WhereasLehmanproposesto expand the meaningof
"anthropomorphism" to coverthiskindof error,I have coinedtheterm
anthropodenial forthea priorirejectionof sharedcharacteristics between
humansand animalswhenin facttheymayexist.12 Anthropodenial is a
blindnessto thehuman-like characteristicsof animals,or theanimal-like
characteristicsofourselves.
Anthropomorphism is generally considered a worsesinthananthropo-
denialmainlybecausethefirst tendstoviolatetheprinciple ofcognitive par-
simony, whereas thesecond rarelydoes so. Yet, parsimony can be sought in
variousdomains,andthecognitive domainis notinherently moreimportant
TABLE1
PARSIMONY
Domainof Default
Position Risk
Inherent Concerns
Parsimony
Cognitive Thesimplest False Anthropomorphism
possible
cognitive simplicity
explanation
applies
Evolutionary related
Closely False Anthropodenial
are
species similarity
similar
cognitively
canbepursued
Parsimony inthecognitive
aswellastheevolutionary Ifthesearch
domain. for
inonedomain
parsimony conflicts
with
thesearch weneedtochoose
inanother, between
risks.
acceptable Critics warn
ofanthropomorphism against ofanimal
theoverestimation men-
talcomplexity,
whereas
critics warn
ofanthropodenial thepostulation
against ofdifferences
wherenonemayexist.
258
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thananyother.As a biologist,I attachthegreatest possibleimportance to
economyin explanations ofhowandwhendifferences arosein evolution-
arytime.The implications ofthisposition,calledevolutionary parsimony,
arefeltstrongestwhenthecomparisonconcernshumansandtheirclosest
theanthropoid
relatives, apes.As summarized before:
Byfarthesimplest assumption thesocialbehavior
regarding of
thechimpanzee ... is thatifthisspecies'behavior resembles
thatofourselvesthentheunderlying psychological andmental
mustbe similar
processes too.To proposeotherwise requires
thatweassume theevolution ofdivergentprocesses forthepro-
ductionof similarbehavior. Whileacceptable in connection
withdistantlyrelatedspecies,thisassumption is nevermade
whenthecomparison concerns nonhuman organisms withonly
a fewmillionyearsofseparate evolution.
Historically, ourown
specieshasbeenconsidered an exception in thisregard, yet
argumentsforthisposition haveneverbeenpurely or even
scientific.13
largely
In otherwords,similarity betweenanimalspeciesrequiresa unitary
explanation unlessthe species under consideration havebeenseparated by
enoughevolutionary time to seriously consider evolutionaryconvergence.
Thus,ifwolvesandcoyotessharea largenumberofbehaviorpatterns, the
logical assumption is that these are
patterns causally and functionally
related.Theyprobably derivedfromthecommonancestor ofbothspecies.14
The same cladisticrationaleappliedto humansand theirclose relatives
shouldlead us to adoptcognitivesimilarity as thedefaultposition,thus
makinganthropomorphism a virtualnonissue. Withthephylogenetic split
betweenhumansandchimpanzees assumedtohavebeena merefiveto six
millionyearsago,byfarthegreater riskwouldbe anthropodenial.
Thispositionis,ofcourse,notentirely new.One ofthefirst to advocate
cross-specificuniformity in behavioral explanations was David Hume, who
formulated thefollowing touchstone inA TreatiseofHumanNature:
Tis from theresemblance oftheexternal ofanimals
actions to
thosewe ourselves perform, thatwejudgetheir internal
like-
wisetoresemble ours;andthesameprinciple car-
ofreasoning,
ry'd one stepfarther, willmakeus concludethatsinceour
internalactionsresemble eachother, thecauses,from which
theyarederiv'd, mustalsoberesembling. Whenanyhypothe-
is advanc'd
sis,therefore, toexplain a mental which
operation,
is common tomenandbeasts, wemustapplythesamehypoth-
esistoboth.15
It is important totheAmerican
to addthat,incontrast who
behaviorists
twocenturies laterwouldaccommodate animalsandhumanswithina sin-
gleframework byseriouslydowngrading andrel-
humanmentalcomplexity
Humeheldanimals
egatingconsciousnessto thedomainof superstition,16
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appearsto me moreevidentthanthatbeastsare
in highesteem:"No truth
endow'dwiththought andreasonas wellas men."17
ANTHROPOCENTRIC ANTHROPOMORPHISM
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treatjuvenilesdifferently thannonfathers - butneverbasedon an explicit
understanding ofthelinkbetweensex andreproduction.
A published exampleofanthropomorphism fromthehumanrather than
theanimalpointofviewis MarshallThomas'ssuggestion, in TheHidden
LifeofDogs, thatvirginbitches"save" themselves forfuture "husbands,"
thusassuminga degreeof foresight, notto mentionpuritanvalues,for
whichthereis no indication in caninelife.211 recalla newspaper interview
witha womanwhoclaimedthatthesquirrelsin herbackyardlovedherto
an extraordinary degree.The rodentsvisitedhereveryday,cameindoors,
andacceptedfooddirectly fromherhand.She spentovera thousand dollars
per year on nuts.When the interviewer put the information together, dis-
creetly suggesting thatperhapstheabundant goodiesexplainedtheanimals'
fondness forher,thewomandeniedanyconnection.
Less naivelydone- butperhapsnaivelyswallowed - is a recentadver-
tisementforsupposedlyclean fossilfuel.The ad depictsa grizzlybear
enjoyinga pristine landscapewithhisarmdrapedaroundhismate'sshoul-
ders.In fact,bearsarenearsighted anddo notformpairbonds;theimageis
nothing but ourown behavior projectedontotheseanimals.
All suchinstancesof anthropomorphism areprofoundly anthropocen-
tric.The talkinganimalson television, thesatiricaldepictionofpublicfig-
ures,andthenaiveattribution ofhumanqualitiesto animalsareto a large
extent independent of what we know abouttheanimalsthemselves. In a tra-
ditiongoingback to thefolktales, Aesop, and La Fontaine, this kindof
anthropomorphism serves human socialpurposes: to mock, educate, moral-
ize, andrecreate.Mostofitsatisfies thepicture, cherished bymany,ofthe
animalkingdomas a peaceableandcozyplace.22The factthatanimalskill
anddevourone another, die of starvation anddisease,or areindifferent to
one another does notfittheincreasingly popularimage of animals as noble
savages.The generalpublicis less andless awareofthediscrepancies with
thereal worldas fewerpeople growup on farmsor otherwiseclose to
nature.Eventhoughhavinga petprovidesa realitycheck(dogsaregener-
allynice,butnottotheirpreynortoinvadersoftheirterritory), thefullpic-
tureofnature - itsglory, itshorror- escapesthemoderncitydweller.
In science,we tryto move awayfromanthropocentric anthropomor-
phism.Thegoalis nottofindsomequality inananimalthatis precisely equiv-
alenttoourowninnerlives.Instead,thefactthatwe areanimalsis exploited
todeveloptestable ideas(see HeuristicAnthropomorphism). Anthropocentric
anthropomorphism doesplaya rolein all ofthis,however, inthatitservesto
firmly planttheidea thatwe are animals.At an intuitive level,everychild
knowsthis,andwe reinforce thisknowledge withanimalstories, fairytales,
animatedmovies,andso on. Thus,a bondis createdwithall livingthings,
whichbondis critically examined onlylaterinlife.As notedbyShepard:
261
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Theimaginary continuitybetween animals'
livesandourown
reinforcesa profoundandenduring metonymy, a lifelong
shield
againstalienation.Especiallyattheendofpuberty, theendof
innocence, webegina lifelongworkofdifferentiating ourselves
fromthem. Butthisgrows from anearlier,unbreakable founda-
tionofcontiguity. a rigorous
Alternatively, insistenceofour-
selvessimply as different
deniestheshared underpinnings and
destroysa deeper senseofcohesion thatsustainsoursanityand
keepsourworld from disintegrating.
Anthropomorphism binds
ourcontinuitywith therestofthenaturalworld. Itgeneratesour
desiretoidentifywiththem andlearntheirnatural even
history,
though itis motivatedbya fantasy thattheyareno different
from ourselves.23
In thislast sentence,Shepardhintsat a morematureanthropomor-
phism,inwhichthehumanperspective is replaced,howeverimperfectly,
by
theanimal's.Lookedatthisway,onecouldarguethatanthropodenial results
froma differentiationbetweentheselfandtheanimalworldso complete
thatthebondis disrupted,whereasanimalcentric reflects
anthropomorphism
a differentiation
in whichthebondis preserved(fig.1).
Humans
set
Anthropodenial from
apart
nature
(dualism)
Nohuman-animal
I Concio"
Anthropocentric between
distinction
inchildhood | an
Anthropomorphism
animals
Understanding
. Animalcentricanimals
Humans
asAnimals Anthropomorphism
^ K ontheir
own
terms
I
TÜ Identification
with
ř""8"0 animal*»
Anthropomorphismdevelop
»stable
Ideas
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ANIMALCENTRIC ANTHROPOMORPHISM
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notgoingto eat itas itwouldprey.The distinction betweenthesubstitute
andtherealthingrestson a cognitive operation thatmaybe crucialinrela-
tionto anthropomorphism. When grapplingwithcomplexrealities,we
adoptanthropomorphic labelsbecauseourmindmosteasilyarrangesthe
worldin thoseterms.But we do notabandonall criticaldistance:we can
call a dog"jealous"without necessarily assuming thatthefeelingsinvolved
arethesameas whenwe arejealous.28We areperfectly capableofdrawing
parallelswithourown experiencewithoutdenyingpossibledifferences.
Like themetaphor in science,anthropomorphism oftenpretend-plays with
theidea ofsimilitude. Unfortunately, thisplayfulelementof anthropomor-
phismis generally missedbyitscritics.
In a recentassaulton the"delusions"of anthropomorphism in the
behavioral sciences,Kennedytreatsbehaviorism andanthropomorphism as
antithetical.In theprefacetohisbook,theauthorconfidently claimsvictory
forthebehaviorists: "Once a liveissue,a buttforbehaviourists, it [anthro-
pomorphism] nowgetslittlemorethanan occasionalwordofconsensual
disapproval(and exceptionally, a spiriteddefence)."In almostthesame
breath, however, Kennedyinforms us that"anthropomorphic thinking about
animalbehaviour is builtintous. We couldnotabandonitevenifwe wished
to.Besides,we do notwishto."29On theone hand,then,theauthoradmits
thatanthropomorphism is partandparcelofthewaythehumanmindworks.
On theotherhand,he claimsthatwe have all butwonthebattleagainstit.
Did we reallyavoidtheinevitable, oris thisa behaviorist delusion?
In fact,theanthropomorphism of students ofanimalbehavioris rarely
a straightforward projection ofhumanexperienceontotheanimal.Rather
thanbeinganthropomorphistic froma narrowly humanperspective, etholo-
gistsmostlyinterpret behavior within the wider context of species'habits
andnatural history.
They thus avoid uninformed interpretations,suchas that
a grinning rhesusmonkeymustbe delighted, orthata chimpanzee running
towardanotherwithloud gruntsmustbe in an aggressivemood.Anyone
whohas watchedtheseanimalsfortheamountoftimethatprimatologists
typically devoteto theirworkknowsthatrhesusmonkeysbaretheirteeth
whenintimidated, and thatchimpanzeesoftengruntwhentheymeetand
embrace.In otherwords,a grinning rhesusmonkeysignalssubmission, and
grunting a
by chimpanzeeusually serves as a greeting.Hence, the careful
observermayarriveat insightsthatare at odds withextrapolations from
humanbehavior.
WhenSofie,a six-month-old kitten, bouncestowardme sideways,with
wideeyes,archedback,andfluffy tail,I recognizethisas playful bluff. This
judgment is notbased on me knowinganypeople who act this I
way. just
knowhowSofie'sbehaviorfitswithall theotherthingscatsdo. Or,whenan
animalcaretakersays "yummy"whilefeedingmealwormsto a squirrel
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monkey, sheis speakingfortheanimal,notforherself. Suchanimalcentric
anthropomorphism mustbe sharplydistinguished fromanthropocentric
anthropomorphism.30
Notall animalslendthemselves equallytotheanimalcentric approach,
however.How to identify withan animalsuchas, say,thestarnosed mole,
withtwenty-two pink,writhing tentaclesarounditsnostrils? Able to feel
microscopic textures on smallobjectsin themud,thismolemusthavethe
keenestsenseoftouchof anyanimalon earth.The problemofsharingthe
experiences oforganisms thatrelyon different senseswas expressedmost
famously inNagel'squestion"Whatis itliketobe a bat?"31 A batperceives
itsworldin pulsesofreflected sound,something mostofus, creatures of
vision,havea hardtimeimagining. Nagel's answerto hisownquestion -
thatwe willneverknow- mayhavebeenoverlypessimistic. Some blind
personsmanageto avoidcollisionswithobjectsbymeansofa crudeform
ofecholocation.32
Similarly, Sacks describesa medicalstudenton amphetamine highs
who wentthrough a periodof severalweeksin whichhis worldbecame
incrediblyrichin smells.He saidhe couldsmellhumanemotions (fear,con-
tentment, sexuality),andrecognizeeverystreet, everyshopby smell.He
couldolfactorily distinguish people:"I wentintotheclinic,I sniffed likea
dog,and in thatsniffrecognized,beforeseeingthem,thetwenty patients
whowerethere.Each hadhisownolfactory physiognomy, a smell-face,far
morevividandevocative,moreredolent, thananysightface."33 Of course,
thisyoungmandid notsuddenlydevelopa betternose: thechangedper-
ceptionwas duetothedisinhibition ofa sensethatis normally pushedtothe
backgroundby other senses. In the same work, Sacks also describesa
who
patient entirely losthis smell in order to make the point a senseto
that
whichwe rarelygivea secondthought is extremely important in"coloring"
everything around us.
We orientourselvesin theenvironment throughsensoryinputthat
muchofthetimefailstoenterourconsciousness. We maybe awareofsome
visualandauditory stimuli, butmoststimuliaffect us without ourknowing.
We realizetheirimportance only when they either fullydisappearor are
selectivelyintensified.We do, to some degree, share theworldsofbatsand
but
dogs, mostly in the background of our sensoryexperience.
The goal tounderstand animalsfromtheinside-out maybe considered
naive;itcertainly is notanthropocentric. Thisgoal,reflected in thetitleof
Cheney and Seyfarth's How Monkeys See theWorld , may fairlywide-
be
spreadamongethologists.34 The mere projection ofhuman experiences onto
animalsis obviouslytobe avoidedin suchan endeavor.Ideally,we under-
standanimalsbasedon whatwe knowabouttheirUmwelt - a Germanterm
introduced byvon Uexküll for the environment as perceived bytheanimal.35
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In the same way thatparentslearnto see throughchildren'seyes, the
empathieethologist learnswhatis important to his or heranimals,what
frightens them, under which circumstances they feelatease, andso on.
Numerousfurther illustrationsof animalcentric anthropomorphism
couldbe given,butletmeendwithonethatrecently reachedthebest-seller
lists.In TheMan WhoListenstoHorses,Roberts freelyemploys whatappears
hopelesslyanthropomorphic language to describe his animals' reactions.
Whenthehorsesmakelickingandchewingmovements, forexample,they
aresaidtobe negotiating withtheirtrainer: "I ama herbivore; I am a grazer,
andI'm makingthiseatingactionwithmymouthnowbecauseI'm consid-
eringwhether ornotto trustyou.Help me outwiththatdecision,can you,
please?"36 Ratherthanattributing humantendencies tohisanimals,however,
Roberts'sinterpretations arefromtheanimal'sperspective. His extraordi-
nary success as trainer restson the factthathe treats
the horseas a flight
ani-
malinneedoftrusting relations.A horsehas a fear-based psychology totally
different fromthatofa predator. "The horse,then,sitsat thefarendofthe
flight animalspectrum, whilehumankind, thesupremefightanimal,is his
clearopposite."37
Is it reallyanthropomorphic to look at theworldfromtheanimal's
viewpoint,taking its Umwelt , intelligence,and naturaltendenciesinto
account?If thedefinition of anthropomorphism is, as Asquithsays,"the
ascription of human mental experiences to animals,"38 Robertsis, strictly
speaking, anthropomorphizing:explicitlypostulatesmajordiffer-
not he
encesin thepsychological makeupofhorsesandpeople.Whereashe does
put human words in the horse's mouth, thisseemsdoneforthesakeofcom-
munication withhisreaders, notbecauseofanyconfusion betweenthetwo
species.
TABLE2
CANBEAPPLIED
ANTHROPOMORPHISM TOANIMAL
BEHAVIOR
FROMTWO
CONTRASTING
PERSPECTIVES
Perspective Informed
by Anthropomorphic
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HEURISTIC ANTHROPOMORPHISM
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A commonbehavioralcategorythatwould escape the mechanical
observer is play.Playis recognizedin a widevariety ofspeciesdespitethe
virtualimpossibility ofpinpointing itsdistinguishing features.43Itresembles
fighting,includesenergetic locomotion, andsometimes has sexualelements.
Yet,itis quitedistinct in meaningandconsequencefromseriousfighting,
merelocomotion, orsex.Coulditbe that,whenidentifying playas play,we
relyinparton oursensitivity tointent, andon ourabilitytoempathize with
theelementof"fun"thatis said to defybothdefinition andlogicalanaly-
sis?44Adopting a descriptiveterm,suchas "rearranged elements drawnfrom
othertypesof behavior"(partof a definition by Marlerand Hamilton)45
does nothelp.The problemwouldthenbe to decidewhichrearrangements
of behaviorto include,and whichto exclude.But remember, thecentral
issueis nottheconcreteness ofourdefinitions, oreventheroleofsubjective
judgement, butthereplicability ofbehavioral codification.Sincecompetent
observersare knownto reliablymake extremely complexjudgements,
BakemanandGottman considerita fallacytoequateobjectivity withphys-
icallybasedobservation schemes.46
Wordsconveythestructure thatwe imposeupontheworld.Insofaras
thestructuring is donesecondarily, afterdatahasbeencollectedwiththeaid
ofa well-defined ethogram, thisform ofanthropomorphism doesnotburden
theobserver withimpossible judgment calls.Forexample,"reconciliation"
is a label introduced by de Waal and van Roosmalenforaffiliative body
contactbetweenindividuals notlongafteran aggressiveconflictin which
theyopposedone another.47 The label's emotionalandcognitiveconnota-
tionsdo notprecludea straightforward behavioraldefinition. As Cords
observesaboutresearchon thistopicsinceitsdiscovery:"All determina-
tionsof thefrequency of reconciliation have in factbeen madeusingan
operational definitionof this behavior, despitethefunction impliedbyits
name."48
Thebestwaytolookatthiskindoflabelsis as heuristic devicesthatre-
orientour views and providenew frameworks forresearch.Burghardt
explainstheirpurpose:
WhatI amcallingforis a critical anthropomorphism, andpre-
dictiveinference thatencourages theuse ofdatafrom many
sources(priorexperiments, anecdotes, publications, one's
thoughts andfeelings, neuroscience, imagining beingtheani-
mal,naturalisticobservations. . . etc.).Buthowever eclecticin
theproduct
origin, mustbe aninference thatcanbe tested or,
canleadtopredictions
that,
failing supportablebypublicdata.49
The otherside to thisheuristiccoin is, of course,thatinterpretative
labelsareonlyas good as thehypotheses thattheygenerate. We shouldbe
preparedtodiscardlabelswhenever predictions derivedfromthemarecon-
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tradicted. Thusfar,thishasnotbeenthecase withthe"reconciliation" label.
Let me briefly reviewtheevidence,whichalso servesto illustrate how a
heuristic conceptcan be testedfromdifferent angles.
The firstaimofreconciliation researchhas beento comparetwoalter-
nativeexpectations concerning theeffect ofaggression on socialrelations.
The traditional notion,thataggression servesa spacingfunction, was based
on the experienceof earlyethologistswithterritorial species,and on
Hediger'sconcept of individual distance.50 It predicts decreased contact
betweenindividualsfollowingaggressiveconflict.The reconciliation
hypothesis, on theotherhand,predicts theexactopposite,namelythatindi-
vidualstryto undothedamageinflicted by aggressionon social relation-
ships. Here we expect (a) increased contact followingaggression, and (b)
theuse ofspecialreassuring andappeasinggestures during these contacts.
The reconciliation conceptis supported, therefore, ifindividuals con-
tact each othermorefrequently and withmorecalminggesturesafter
aggressionthanin theabsenceof precedingaggression.Studieson over
twenty differentspeciesofnonhuman primates support thisprediction.51 In
addition,thereconciliation is
hypothesis supportedby the fact that the
observedcontact-increase is selective(i.e.,doesnotindiscriminately involve
all possiblepartners butspecifically theformer opponent), and the proba-
bilityofrenewedaggression is reducedandtolerance is restored following
post-conflict contact.52
Strictlyspeaking,theseresultsstilldo notdemonstrate thespecific
function suggested by the "reconciliation" label, which is to repairdamaged
relationships. Otherevidenceexists,however.Eventhoughprimate species
varydramatically in conciliatory behaviorand generalconciliatory ten-
all
dency, species seem to follow one rule: reconciliation is most common
afterfights betweenpartners withclose socialties.53 Thisis consistent with
theidea thatreconciliation aims at restoring relationships. Experimental
support hasbeenproducedbyCordsandThurnheer,54 whotrained monkeys
tocooperate during feeding. Thisway,theexperimenters increased thevalue
ofthemonkeys'relationships. They confirmed a dramatic increase in rec-
onciliation afterconflict betweenpartners thathadcometodependon each
otherforfood-acquisition.55
In sum,eventhoughthereconciliation concept'sconnotations derive
fromhumansocialinteraction, theconcepthasprompted a freshlookatani-
mal aggressionand conflictresolutionby generating new and testable
The
hypotheses. ensuing research has undermined the traditional view in
biology that intraspecific aggression is constrained byinjury risks only.56
Social animalsseem to take social relationships intoaccount,whichis
understandable inasmuchas theirsurvivaldependson cooperationand
group life.57
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The reconciliation conceptillustrates how anthropomorphism may
servescientificexploration, similarto the way in whichintuitionand
informed "hunches"function in all ofscience,frommathematics topaleon-
tology.I willspeakofheuristic anthropomorphism to denotethisscientific
use. Eventhoughheuristic anthropomorphism mayoccasionallybe anthro-
pocentric, mostofthetimeitwillbe animalcentric (fig.1). The categoryis
identicalto Burghardt's "criticalanthropomorphism,"58 and relatedto
Kennedy's"mockanthropomorphism":
Infactallstudents
ofwholeanimal behaviour
regularlypractise
such'mockanthropomorphism, ' whatananimal
byimagining
todo,orguessing
is 'trying' whatitwilldoonthebasisofwhat
wewouldthink itbestforittodo.Inthiswaywecanguessthe
functionofitsbehaviour.Thatis tosaywehabituallyanthropo-
morphize aboutanimalbehaviour, usingourownmental pro-
cesses as modelsto 'explain'thebehaviour in termsof
andagain,thisis veryuseful.59
intentions;
The criticalunaskedquestionhereis: Whyis anthropomorphism so
useful,andwhydoesitpredictbehaviorso well?Ifthemodelingofanimal
behavioron ourownexperiences is moresuccessful thanpredictions based
on existing formaltheories,60does notthisimplythattheanthropomorphic
modelingtoucheson organizational principlesthatareabsentfromcurrent
theories?As notedlongago byHebb:"The objectivecategorization missed
something in the behaviorof the chimpanzee thatthe ill-definedcategories
ofemotionandthelikedidnot- someorder,orrelationship betweeniso-
latedactsthatis essentialtocomprehension ofthebehavior."61
Kennedywarns,however,thateven if hypotheses derivedfromthis
kindofanthropomorphism arewell-supported by research thisbyno means
proves thatthe assumed intentions or motivations reallyexistin theani-
mal.62In thesame way,computer programmers debate theusefulnessof
anthropomorphism in human-machine interactions not because machines
shareourexperiences, butbecausewe finditeasiertodeal withmachinesin
humanterms. We developanthropomorphic hypotheses aboutthem,suchas
"mycomputer is confused" or"itrefuses to do thesethings." Thisis indeed,
to use Kennedy'swords,mockanthropomorphism: we realize thatit is
merelya matter ofspeaking.
Butis notthesituationwithregardsto animalsquitedifferent, espe-
ciallywithregardsto animalsclose enoughto us thatwe recognizeemo-
tionsintheirfacesandintentions intheiractions?If a chimpanzee, whosits
huddledin a cornerafterhavinglostherinfant, is said to look depressed,
thisis notjusta matter of speaking,a spuriousanthropomorphism, unless
one is convincedthatapes,likemachines,lack an emotionallife.Animals
aremadeoffleshandblood,havelimbicsystems, andsharethousands upon
thousandsof features withus thatare absentin computers androbots.As
270
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soonas we admitthatanimalsarenotautomatons, car-
anthropomorphism
thatthepostulated
riestheimplication aremorethanskin-deep.
similarities
271
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evidence,reviewedby de Waal and de Waal and Aureli,is in line with
Binti's assistancetotheunfortunate boy.In otherwords,we arenotdealing
withan isolatedincident, buthaveconvergent evidencewhichmakessym-
pathyin apes a seriouspossibility.64
An entire rangeofexplanations presents itself.Ourfirst taskis to elim-
inatetheonesthatareeithertoo simpleortoo complex.For example,the
above flour-sack explanation failsto tellus whyBintiso carefully trans-
portedtheboy onlyto leave himnearthekeeper'sdoor.65On theother
hand,we cannotassumethatBintihad an understanding of whatkindof
care theboy required.Once we have determined the cognitively least-
demanding explanation thatcannotbe rejectedas well as thecognitively
most-demanding explanation consistent withourgeneralknowledgeofthe
species,we findbetweentheseextremesa "workspace"withinwhich
hypotheses canbe compared. Thiscomparison cannotbe conclusively made
on thebasisofa singleincident, buttherecertainly is no a priorireasonto
restricttheworkspace to a fewsimpleexplanations (fig.2).
Exploration ofthefullworkspaceis oftendiscouragedby chargesof
anthropomorphism. Thisrepresents a misuseoftheterm:warnings against
overestimation ofanimalcapacitiesareunderstandable, butwhether ornot
explanations arephrasedin anthropomorphic languageis immaterial. All
thatmatters is thatwe knowwhatis meantandhowtheseexplanations may
be verified.Originally, thetermanthropomorphism referred toendowing the
godswithhumanformsandhabits,whichdoes represent a misdemeanor.
Therehas neverbeena compelling justification,however,forretention of
theterm'snegativeconnotation onceitwas adoptedfora different domain.
The geneticist Darbishiresaw thislack ofjustification as an underhanded
maneuver bythepowersopposinga cognitive perspective:
Butthosewhowereresponsible ... forapplying theword
anthropomorphic toanentirely different
thing- thegranting of
intelligence,
purpose, design,andhuman attributes tononhuman
animals, inorder tostigmatize a concession tothe4lowerani-
mals'which wasrepugnant tothem - weretheunconscious per-
petratorsofa successfulfraud.66 ^
Thus,whilewe shouldbe reluctant to postulatecapacitiesforwhich
thereis no evidenceanywhere in a species'behavior, chargesofanthropo-
are
morphism meaningless without a precisecritiqueof thehypotheses
underconsideration. In a Darwinianframework, thereis no goodreasonto
avoidconceptsmerely becausetheyderivefromthebehaviorofthespecies
to whichwe belong.Applicationof theseconceptsto animalsnot only
enrichestherangeofhypotheses to be considered, butitalso changesthe
viewofourselves:themorehuman-like we permitanimalsto becomethe
moreanimal-likewe becomein theprocess.A permissivetreatment of
272
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anthropomorphism will hastenthe demiseof dualism,and- as argued
throughoutthispaper- ultimately
itis theattitude
towarddualismbetween
humansand animals,ratherthana concernwithscientific validity,that
underlies
thedebateaboutanthropomorphism.
CONCLUSION
273
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usefulinformation or generateusefulhypotheses, butthefactthatwe are
animalsourselvesalso providesus withan immenseadvantage.The full
exploitationof thisadvantagerequiresa tolerant attitude
towardthebor-
rowingof humanconceptsto explainanimalbehavior.Afterall, with
respectto speciesclose to us themostparsimonious froman
explanation,
evolutionaryperspective,is thattheysharenumerous emotionalandcogni-
tiveprocesseswithus. Thus,anthropomorphism oughtto be a nonissuein
thecase of anthropoid apes. Butevenin thecase ofmoredistantspecies,
anthropomorphic explanations deserveseriousattention.
We shouldnever
acceptexplanations without butthereis nothingwrong
criticalreflection,
withwideningtheworkspaceof permissiblehypotheseswhileretaining
highstandards ofreplicability andscientific
scrutiny.
NOTES
274
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whereas inbiology theunderstanding ofhumans ispart ofa much larger endeavor to
understand nature.
9. See,for example, H.Kummer, V.Dasser, andP.Hoyningen-Huene, "Exploring Primate
SocialCognition: SomeCritical Remarks," Behaviour 112(1990):84-98. Atthe1989
InternationalEtiological Conference, HansKummer advocated parsimony intheexpla-
nationofprimate behavior inorder togetaway from "ouranthropomorphic first
choice"
ofoverly demanding cognitive hypotheses. Hecriticized theuseoffunctional asopposed
todescriptive labelsforbehavior (ibid.).Ina reply (F.B.M.deWaal, "Complementary
Methods andConvergent Evidence intheStudy ofPrimate SocialCognition," Behaviour
118[1991]: 297-320), I reminded ethologiststhat oneofthemore powerful metaphors
inourfield camefrom a hard-nosed experimentalist whoreferred toa special form of
insectlocomotion asTanzsprache, ordance language (K.vonFrisch, Tanzsprache und
Orientierung derBienen [Heidelberg: Springer, 1965]). Contrary tothesuggestion that
functionallanguage isa recent vice,ithasa venerable history. Functional terms such as
"appeasement," "warning call,""greeting," "courtship," andsoon,differ from more
recentfunctional labelsonly byourgreater familiaritywith them. SeeP.J.Asquith, "The
InevitabilityandUtility ofAnthropomorphism inDescription ofPrimate Behaviour," in
TheMeaning ofPrimate Signals, ed.R.Harré andV.Reynolds (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), 138-76.
Kummer andhisstudents havebeennoexception, introducing useful non-descrip-
tivelabels, suchas"notification" fora baboon's presentation ofhishindquarters, and
"respect ofpossession" fortheabsence ofcontest over a resource possessed bya subor-
dinate (H.Kummer, SocialOrganization ofHamadryas Baboons [Chicago: University
ofChicago Press, 1968]; H.SiggandJ.Falett, "Experiments onRespect ofPossession
inHamadryas Baboons (Papiohamadryas)" Animal Behaviour 33[1985]:978-84).
Harré analyzed a sample ofKummer' s writing todemonstrate ambiguity between the
respectable language ofcausalmechanisms (terms suchas "inhibit," "release,"and
"elicit")andcognitive language (terms suchas "decide," "assess,"and"unwilling")
(R.Harré, "Vocabularies andTheories," inTheMeaning ofPrimate Signals,ed.Harré
andReynolds, 90-106). Atthetime, Kummer responded tothischallenge with theplea
that "everyday language must remain available forwhat hasyetescaped satisfactory
explanation" (H.Kummer, Comment, inTheMeaning ofPrimate Signals,ed.Harré and
Reynolds, 107).
10.C.L. Morgan, AnIntroduction toComparative Psychology (London: Scott, 1894).
11.Thisconventional interpretation ofMorgan's canon isprobably incorrect.Taken aback
byone-sided appeals tohiscanon, Morgan later added a little-known rider:"Tothis,
however, itshould beadded, lesttherange oftheprinciple bemisunderstood, thatthe
canon bynomeans excludes theinterpretation ofa particular activity interms ofthe
higher processes ifwealready haveindependent evidence oftheoccurrences ofthese
higher processes intheanimal under observation" (C.L. Morgan, AnIntroduction to
Comparative Psychology, 2ded.[London: Scott, 1903], 59).
Sober takes thistomean thatMorgan waslesssupportive ofthebehaviorist position
than commonly assumed: "Ifmethodological behaviorism istheviewthat human behav-
iorshould beexplained without appealing toinner mental states,eventhough weknow
that human beings infact occupy such states,then therider thatMorgan appended entails
thatthecanoncannot be usedtojustify methodological behaviorism" (E. Sober,
"Morgan's Canon," inTheEvolution ofMind, ed.andD. D. Cummins andC.Allen
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998], 224-42;quotation on240).Soberfurther
arguesthat Morgan didnotsee"lower" capacitiesasnecessarily providing simpleexpla-
nations,thesimplest viewbeing continuity andsimilarity between animals andhumans.
Cognitive parsimony didnotseem hisprincipal aim, therefore, andheshowed sensitiv-
itytothedanger ofanthropodenial.
Thegreat flaw inMorgan's approach remains hislinear, hierarchicalviewoftherela-
tionsamong species andtheir capacities rather than thecladistic perspective ofmodern
biology.Nevertheless, hisrider encourages ustoconsider a widearray ofhypotheses in
275
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caseofthementally more advanced species asdiscussed byG.M.Burghardt, "Animal
Awareness: Current Perceptions andHistorical Perspective," American Psychologist 40
(1985):905-19;D. Radner andM. Radner, Animal Consciousness (Buffalo, N.Y.:
Prometheus, 1989); anddeWaal, "Complementary Methods."
12.H.Lehman, "Anthropomorphism andScientific Evidence forAnimal Mental States,"in
Anthropomorphism , Anecdotes, andAnimals, ed.Mitchell, Thompson, andMiles,
104-15; F.B.M.deWaal, "Are WeinAnthropodenial?" Discover 18(7)(1997): 50-53.
13.DeWaal, "Complementary Methods," 298.
14.Inbiology, thisisknown asthehomology argument. Cross-specific inbehav-
similarities
iorareeither analogies (independently derived) orhomologies (derived through shared
phylogeny). Ofcourse, a third
possibility isthat behavioral areindependently
similarities
learned (ratherthan being genetically determined). Thedefault assumption usedtobe
that similaritiesbetween disparate animal orders represent mere analogies, butthis
assumption needs tobereconsidered given what weknow nowabout thegenetics of
anatomical features.There existsgrowing evidence thatwidespread anatomical traitsin
theanimal kingdom, suchaslegsandeyes, share thesamegenetic basisdespite major
structuraldifferences, suchasthecomposite insect eyeversus thesingle-pupil eyeof
mollusks andvertebrates. Apparently, thegenetic unityamong animals ismuch greater
than usedtobeassumed, andhomology may betherule ratherthan theexception.
15.D. Hume, ATreatise ofHuman Nature (1739;reprint, Harmondsworth, Eng.:Penguin,
1985), 226.
16.See,for example, J.B.Watson, Behaviorism (Chicago:University ofChicago Press, 1930).
17.Hume, TreatiseofHuman Nature, 226.Strictly speaking,onecannot boast a unifiedthe-
oryofallbehavior, human andanimal, while atthesametime decrying anthropomor-
phism. After all,anthropomorphism assumes similarexperiences inhumans andanimals,
which isexactly what onewould expect iftheunderlying behavioral processes aresimi-
lar.Thebehaviorists' strong opposition toanthropomorphism probably cameabout
because nosaneperson would take seriously theirclaimthat internalmental operations in
ourspecies area figment oftheimagination. Thisleftanimal behavior astheonly areain
which protestagainst cognitive assumptions remained effective.Iftrue, thebehaviorists'
focus onanthropomorphism represents a retreat from anearlier,more radical position.
18.S. J.Vicchio, "From Aristotle toDescartes: Making Animals Anthropomorphic," in
Animal Intelligence: Insights intotheAnimal Mind, ed.R.J.HoageandL. Goldman
(Washington, D.C.:Smithsonian Institution Press,1986), 187-207.
19.Chimpanzee Politics wasoneofthefirst accounts ofprimate behavior refusing tomake
excuses foranthropomorphism, saying: "These termsreflectmysubjective impressions
oftheapes.Itisanthropomorphism initspurest form" (F.B.M.deWaal, Chimpanzee
Politics [Baltimore, Md.:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982], 54).
20.Thisattitude wasexploited fordecades intheso-called "teaparties" atzoos,inwhich
apeswere dressed upinhuman clothes andshown around
sitting a table,smoking cigars,
andsipping from cups. Nationally famous representativesofthis genre were JoMendi,
a chimpanzee, whoperformed inthe1930s attheDetroit Zoo,andPetermann, a chim-
panzee inthe1980s attheCologne Zoo.Both apeshadhuge followings. JoMendi once
drew a crowd twice aslarge asthepresidential candidate (Franklin D. Roosevelt) visit-
ingthecity, anissueexploited byFDR'sopponents. Petermann wasshot bythepolice
after heseverely mauled thezoodirector, anevent that temporarily turned himintoa
martyr fortheanarchist movement.
Undignified circuslike actshavenowdisappeared from major zoos.Concurrently,
public reactions havechanged from amusement about the"antics" ofapestoa more
empathie response. Thisshift inattitude isalsoreflected inmodern ethics movements
(e.g.,P.Cavalieri andP.Singer, TheGreat ApeProject: Equality Beyond Humanity
[London: Fourth Estate, 1993]) andpopular works offiction(e.g.,P.H0eg, TheWoman
andtheApe[Harmondsworth, Eng.:Penguin, 1996];R.Cook,Chromosome 6 (New
York: Putnam, 1997]).
276
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21.Marshall Thomas, TheHidden LifeofDogs(Boston: Houghton Mifflin),6,56.
22.Atypical example istheanimated movie, TheLionKing:"Thecharacters . . . exhibit
behaviors thatareuncharacteristic oftheanimals theyportray. Theinterspecific rela-
tionshipsinthefilm alone justify theconclusion that realisticinteractionsbetween ani-
malsarenottaking place. From thescript ofthefilm, transcribed byBrian Tiemann, the
characterTimon, a meerkat, admits asmuch when hesays, 'We're talking about a lion.
Lionseatguys likeus.*Inspite oftheobvious truth ofthis statement, thelionprotago-
nist,Simba, develops a rather unnatural symbiotic friendship with Timon andhis
warthog companion, Pumbaa. Later inthefilm, asdepicted inTiemann's script, wesee
Timon, Pumbaa andSimba, lying ontheir backs, looking atthestars. Itwould appear
thatSimba hassomehow forgotten that heisa lion"(S.Key worth, Anthropomorphism
inTheLionKing ,www.gate.net/~bneufeld/lionking.html [1996]).
23.P.Shepard, TheOthers: HowAnimals MadeUsHuman (Washington, D.C.:Shearwater,
1996), 88.
24.C.Darwin, OntheOrigin ofSpecies byMeans ofNatural Selection orthePreservation
ofFavoured RacesintheStruggle forLife(1859;reprint, London: John Murray, 1967),
62.
25.M.Midgley, BeastandMan:TheRoots ofHuman Nature (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester,
1978).
26.Inthe1975Christmas season, millions ofAmericans spent fivedollarseachtopurchase
ordinaryrocks aspets. Therocks were soldinboxes withairholes andcame with a man-
ualexplaining howtotrain therock torollover, toplaydead, andtoprotect itsowner.
Tamagotchi isa popular Japanese electronicgadget thatmimics a chick.Iteats, sleeps,
defecates, getscranky, andbeepsforattention. Iftheowner doesnottakecareofit,
Tamagotchi dies.
27.R.A.Wrangham andD. Peterson, Demonic Males : ApesandtheOrigins ofHuman
Violence (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996),254.Playing with "dolls"isnotunusual in
nonhuman primates. In captivity, I haveseenyoung chimpanzees actthesameas
Kakama withpieces ofcloth, andoncewith a handbroom. Awildmountain gorilla was
seentopullupa massofsoft moss, which shecarried andheldfor many minutes likean
infantunder herchest, cuddling and"nursing" it(R.W.Byrne, TheThinking Ape:
Evolutionary Origins ofIntelligence [Oxford: Oxford University Press,1995]). Amon-
keyexample comes from Breuggeman, whosawa juvenile rhesus monkey follow her
mother while shecarried a newborn. Thedaughter picked upa pieceofcoconut shell,
carrying itventrally inexactly thesamemanner that hermother heldhernewbrother.
SeeJ.A. Breuggeman, "Parental Careina Group ofFree-ranging Rhesus Monkeys
(Macacamulatta ),"Foliaprimatologica 20(1973):178-210.
28.After a separation, elephants greet eachother with much spinning around, urinating,
earflapping,entwining oftrunks, clicking oftusks, anda chorus ofrumbles andpiercing
trumpets. Mossperceives thisasa joyful event,butinserts thefollowing qualification:
"Itmay notbesimilar tohuman joyorevencomparable, butitiselephantine joyandit
playsa very important part intheir whole socialsystem" (C.Moss, Elephant Memories:
Thirteen Years intheLifeofanElephant Family [New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988],
125).
29.J.S. Kennedy, TheNewAnthropomorphism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992),5.
30.Adistinction similar totheoneproposed herebetween anthropocentric andanimalcen-
tricanthropomorphism ismade inthefield ofhuman empathy. Batson etal.investigated
response patterns associated with twokinds ofempathy: onebasedonimagining how
onewould feelintheother person's theother
situation, basedonimagining howthe
otherfeels.SeeC.D. Batson, S.Early, andG.Salvarani, "Perspective Taking: Imagining
HowAnother Feelsversus Imagining HowYouWould Feel,"Personality andSocial
Psychology Bulletin 23(1990):751-58.
31.T.Nagel,What IsItLiketoBea Bat?Philosophical Review 83(1974): 435-50.
277
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32.Vermeij,a blind writes:
biologist, "IfI haddifficultyadjusting toblindness, thememory
hasfaded.Almost immediately ... I discovered thevalue ofechoes for mewhere
telling
I was.Sounds bouncing offobstructions provided cuestothesizeoftheroom, theposi-
tionofa tree, thespeed ofa car,thepresence ofa person, whether a doorwasopenor
closed,andmuch more.Itwasn't that theremaining senses became more acutenowthat
I wasblind; I simply relied
more onthem. Theinformation they conveyed nowmeant
something, whereas previouslyI could afford toignore it"(G.Vermeij, "TheTouch ofa
Discover
Shell," 17[8][1996]: 80).Further, seeK.A.Atkins, "ABatwithout Qualities?"
inReadings inAnimal Cognition, ed.M.Bekoff andD. Jamieson (Cambridge, Mass.:
MITPress, 1996), 345-58,for reflectionsonthelimitations ofNagel's question.
33.O.Sacks, TheManWho Mistook HisWife fora Hat(London: Picador, 1985),150.
34.D. L. Cheney andR.M.Seyfarth, HowMonkeys SeetheWorld : InsidetheMindof
Another Species (Chicago:University ofChicago Press, 1990);H.A.Herzog andS.
Galvin,"Common SenseandtheMental LivesofAnimals: AnEmpirical Approach," in
Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, andAnimals, ed.Mitchell, Thompson, andMiles,
237-53.
35.J.vonUexküll, Umwelt undInnenwelt derTiere (Berlin:Jena, 1909).
36.M.Roberts, TheManWho Listens toHorses (NewYork: Random House, 1997), 31.In
theideathat
fact, thehorse's chewing movements refertograzing isnotfarremoved
from theethological concept ofritualization. Evolution hasturned many aninstrumen-
talact(e.g.,preening, feeding) intoa communication signalthrough exaggeration and
increasedstereotypy. SeeD. McFarland, TheOxford Companion toAnimal Behaviour
(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress), 1987), 483-85.
37.Roberts,TheManWho ListenstoHorses, 10.
38.Asquith,"TheInevitability andUtility," 138.
39.Note thatthis isthemirrorimage oftheevolutionary parsimony argument made earlier.
Themore distant twospecies areinthephylogenetic tree,thelesslikely itisthat mor-
phologically similarbehavioriscausally andfunctionally equivalent.
40.S.A.Altmann, "AFieldStudy oftheSociobiology ofRhesus Monkeys, Annals ofthe
NewYork Academy ofSciences 102(1962):338-435; J.A.R.A. M.vanHooff, "A
Comparative Approach tothePhylogeny ofLaughter andSmiling," inNon-verbal
Communication, ed.R.Hinde (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 209-41;
F.B. M.deWaalandL. M.Luttrell, "TheFormal Hierarchy ofRhesus Macaques: An
Investigation oftheBared-Teeth Display,"American Journal ofPrimatology 9 (1985):
73-85.
41.F.B.M.deWaal, "TheCommunicative Repertoire ofCaptive Bonobos (Panpaniscus),
Compared toThat ofChimpanzees," Behaviour 106(1988):183-251.
42.VanHooff, "AComparative Approach."
43.R.Fagen, Animal PlayBehavior (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1981).
44.J.Huizinga, Homo Ludens:AStudy ofthePlayElement inHuman Culture (Boston:
Beacon, 1950).
45.P.Marler andW.J.Hamilton, Mechanisms ofAnimal Behavior (NewYork: Wiley, 1966).
46.R.Bakeman andJ.M.Gottman, Observing Interaction:An Introduction toSequential
Analysis(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986).
47.F. B. M. deWaalandA. vanRoosmalen, "Reconciliation andConsolation among
Chimpanzees," BehavioralEcology & Sociobiology 5 (1979):55-66.
48.M. Cords andS. Thurnheer, "Reconciliation with Valuable Partners byLong-tailed
Macaques," Ethology 93(1993):256.
49.Burghardt, "Animal Awareness," 917.
50.H. Hediger, "Biologische Gesetzmäßigkeiten imVerhalten vonWirbeltieren," Mitt.
Naturforsch. GesellschaftBern(1940):37-55.
51.F.B.M.deWaal, "Reconciliationamong Primates: AReview ofEmpirical Evidence and
278
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Unresolved Issues," inPrimate SocialConflict, ed.W.A.Mason, andS. P.Mendoza
(Albany, N.Y.:SUNYPress, 1993), 111^4.
52.F.Aureli andC. P.vanSchaik, "Post-Conflict Behaviour inLong-tailed Macaques
(Macaca fascicularis): I. Thesocialevents," Ethology 89(1991):89-100; M.Cords,
"Post-Conflict Reunions andReconciliation in Long-tailed Macaques," Animal
Behaviour 44(1992):57-61.
53.See,forexample, P. M. Kappeler andC. P. vanSchaik, "Methodological and
Evolutionary Aspects ofReconciliation among Primates,"Ethology 92(1992):51-69.
54.Cords andThurnheer, "Reconciliation withValuable Partners."
55.Silkquestions whether reconciliation functionsattherelationship level:sheproposes that
post-conflict reunions serve short-term functionsonly(J.B. Silk,"Why Do Primates
Reconcile?" Evolutionary Anthropology 5 [1996]:39-42).Thishypothesis failsto
account,however, fortheelevated rates ofreconciliationamong individualswith close
ties.Italsofailstoexplain
affiliative Cords andThurnheer's experimental results that
werepredicted by therelationship-repair hypothesis (Cordsand Thurnheer,
"Reconciliation with Valuable Partners"). Asnoted byCords andAureli, short-term
effectsbynomeans exclude long-term andSilk'shypothesis
effects, maynotbea true
alternative,therefore (M.Cords andF.Aureli, "Reasons forReconciling," Evolutionary
Anthropology 5 [1996]: 42-45).
56.Forthetraditional view, seeJ.Maynard Smith andG.Price, "TheLogicofAnimal
Conflict,"Nature 246(1973): 15-18.
57.F.B.M.deWaal, "Dominance Style andPrimate SocialOrganization," inComparative
Socioecology: TheBehavioural Ecology ofHumans andOther Mammals, ed.V.Standen
andR.Foley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 243-64.
58.Burghardt, "Animal Awareness."
59.Kennedy, NewAnthropomorphism, 89.
60."[Anthropomorphism works: attributingmotives andstrategies isoften thebest wayfor
anobserver topredict what anindividual islikelytodonext" (Cheney andSeyfarth,
HowMonkeys SeetheWorld, 303).
61.D. O. Hebb, "Emotion inManandAnimal: AnAnalysis oftheIntuitive Processes of
Recognition," Psychological Review 53(1946):88.
62.Kennedy, NewAnthropomorphism.
63.SeeB. Azar, "Binti's Efforts toSaveBoyMayBe PartofHerBiology, American
Psychological Association Monitor (Nov.1996); K.Davidson, "ScientistDebate Animal
Motives," SanFrancisco Examiner, Aug.28,1996.
64.F.B.M.deWaal, GoodNatured : TheOrigins ofRight andWrong inHumans andOther
Animals (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress, 1996);deWaal, Bonobo : The
Forgotten Ape(Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press,1997);deWaalandF.Aureli,
"Consolation, Reconciliation, anda Possible Cognitive Difference between Macaque and
Chimpanzee," inReaching intoThought: TheMinds oftheGreat Apes, ed.A.E.Russon,
K.A.Bard, andS.T.Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1996), 80-110.
InBonobo, deWaalrelates a striking instanceofanimalcentric perspective-taking ina
bonobo: "Betty Walsh, a seasoned animal caretaker, observed thefollowing incident
between a seven-year-old female bonobo, named Kuni, anda bird. Basedonherfamil-
with
iarity feathered flying objects, Kuniseemed torealize what kind ofassistance the
birdneeded. Theincident occurred atTwycross Zoo,inEngland.
"Oneday, Kunicaptured a starling.Outoffear thatshemight molest thestunned
which
bird, appeared undamaged, thekeeper urgedtheapetoletitgo.Perhaps because
ofthisencouragement, Kunitook thebird outside andgently setitonto itsfeet,theright
wayup,where itstayed looking When
petrified. itdidn'tmove, shethrew ita little,but
itjustfluttered.Notsatisfied, Kunipicked upthestarling with onehand andclimbed to
thehighest point ofthehighest tree where shewrapped herlegsaround thetrunk sothat
shehadboth hands free tohold thebird. Shethen carefullyunfolded itswingsandspread
279
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
themwideopen, onewing ineachhand, beforethrowing thebirdas hardshecould
towardsthebarrier
oftheenclosure.
Unfortunately,itfellshort andlanded onto
thebank
ofthemoat where Kuniguardeditfora longtimeagainst a curious Bytheend
juvenile.
oftheday, thebirdwasgonewithout a traceorfeather. Itisassumed recovered
that,
fromitsshock,ithadflownaway" (156).
65.Ona videotape (andinStern
oftheincident ofSept.5,1996)onecanseeBinti sitdown
ona logina stream
upright whilecorrectly theunconscious
positioning boy,
cradling
himinherlap.Italmost seems asifsheistrying toputhimonhisfeet. Afterthisshe
giveshima brief,reassuring
back-pat beforecontinuing onherway.TheBrookfield
gorillas
mightnothavereacted thesametoanadult person (i.e.,theyprobably
recog-
nizedtheboyasa youngster),andthey would
certainly nothavereacted this
waytoa
sackofflour.
They wouldprobablyhavebeenafraid ofthesackatfirst, butthenhave
openedit,causinga mess(JayPeterson, curator
attheBrookfield com-
Zoo,personal
munication).
66.QuotedinRadner andRadner,Animal Consciousness, 140.
280
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