G.R. No. 147437 May 8, 2009 LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
A vehicular collision happened at 7:45 pm of 21 June 1988 at the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street in Mandaluyong Cit.
That night, the road was wet. Arnold prepared to make a left turn as he reached the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and
as soon as he had maneuvered the turn through the break in the traffic island the Mitsubishi car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming
into his car from his right-hand side. The force exerted by petitioner’s car heaved Arnold’s car several feet away from the break in the island,
sent it turning 180 degrees until it finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue.
At the time of the collision, Arnold’s car, which had "no right of way," was "turning left" whereas petitioner’s car was "going straight" and was
"exceeding lawful speed." It also indicated that the vision of the drivers was obstructed by the "center island flower bed."

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner liable?

RULING:
Yes. Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been
reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate
of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect to reckless driving from proof of
excessive speed under the circumstances —as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of
lawful speed—such proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence, or, as otherwise stated, shifts the
burden of proof so as to require the accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner. The
facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the junction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently
fixed in his testimony. Insofar as such facts are consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.

LYDIO ALVERO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 145209 June 8, 2006
FACTS:
In the afternoon of September 9, 1991, accused being then the driver of a Jeepney Type vehicle owned by Yellow Bus Line, Inc., bumped a
HONDA 155 TMX motorcycle owned by Liberato Filizarta then being driven by Wilfredo Alferez and which bumping resulted in the death
of Paulino Rondina, a passenger of the Honda 155 TMX motorcycle and inflicted serious physical injuries on Wilfredo Alferez and Nestor Villa,
another passenger of the latter vehicle. The said bumping further resulted in destructions and losses of various personal properties belonging to
the herein named victims and to Liberato Felizarta.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of gross negligence?

RULING:
Yes.
The circumstances in a situation wherein a person is driving a vehicle overtaking another require of that person a greater amount of diligence
for the following reasons: (1) it was the overtakers decision to assume the risks involved in overtaking another; and (2) the overtaker, being
behind the vehicle sought to be overtaken, is in a better position to ensure the safety of the vehicles concerned. It is therefore the responsibility
of the person driving a vehicle overtaking another to ensure the safety of all the vehicles, passengers, and pedestrians in the immediate
vicinity.
G.R. No. 152133 February 9, 2006 ROLLIE CALIMUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
FACTS:
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree
at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to
go home to their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with Calimutan and a Michael Bulalacao. Cantre was harboring a
grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus,
upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim
Cantre and witness Sañano. Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left
side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back. Cantre died the next day with cause of death
as traumatic injury of the abdomen. Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning incident.

ISSUE:
Should petitioner be charged and held guilty for the intentional crime of homicide?

RULING:
No. The Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown
at him by petitioner Calimutan.
The court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

ACE HAULERS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA ABIVA G.R. No. 127934 August 23, 2000
FACTS:
"The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap involving a truck owned by petitioner driven by its employee, Jesus dela
Cruz, and a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by the
jeepney, and its rider, Fidel Abiva, was run over by the truck causing his death.
A criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the two drivers, While the criminal action was pending,
respondent Ederlinda Abiva filed a separate civil action for damages against the two accused in the criminal case, as well as against Isabelito
Rivera and petitioner, the owners of the vehicles involved in the accident and employers of the accused.

ISSUE:
May plaintiff recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case and the civil case for damages based on
quasi delict?

RULING:
Yes. A separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.