A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. vs. CA
,
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and,
in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case1 on the
ground of newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael C.
Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was found guilty2 of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as
The Bouncing Checks Law, by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case No. 21238.
The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed
by Dinglasan are the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in
her capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer
of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, the
wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was
the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company.
These affidavits, together with the transmittal letter dated
8 October 1985 attached to Solidbank Manager's Check
No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena
Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made
good of the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor. He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential
elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and
refused to make good the said check within five banking
days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.
ISSUE: Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the
case based on newly discovered evidence should be
allowed.
HELD: Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion
for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned
from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the
second motion for reconsideration would result to an
absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue
orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion
in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of
judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of
cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to
forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments
by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is
not only illogical but also unjust to the winning party.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for
new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence
he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to
justify the holding of a new trial.28
The threshold question in resolving a motion for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether
the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered by due
diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly
discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when
was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e.
when should or could it have been discovered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
Neypes vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for the
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the RTC against private respondents. In May 16,
1997 order, RTC denied respondent’s complaint based on
prescription. Respondent filed MR. In an order received
by the Petitioner on March 3, 1998, RTC dismissed
petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. On the 15th day thereafter, (March 18)
Petitioner filed MR which was later dismissed by the RTC.
On July 27, 1998, Petitioner filed notice of appeal and
paid appeal fees on August 8, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the
notice of appeal holding that it was filed 8 days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed MR but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of notice of appeal before the CA.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that
they have seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22 since this was the last day
they receive the “final” order of the trial court denying their
MR. When they filed their appeal on July 27, 1998, only 5
days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period
for appeal should have reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. Accordingly, the order was the
“final order” appealable under the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed their notice of
appeal on time.
RULING: First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither
a natural right nor part of due process. It is merely
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the rules. Failure to do
so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The right to
appeal was fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. A final order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing for the court to do with
respect to it.
To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh start of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from the
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial of
motion for reconsideration. The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from the
receipt of order denying the motion for new trial, MR or
any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed
their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their MR). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41 Sec 3, of the Rules which states
that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive “or” signifies disassociation and independence
of one thing from another. It should as a rule, be construed
in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use
of the “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order”
Petitioner here filed their notice of appeal July 27,
1998 or five days from the receipt of the order denying
their MR on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal
was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days.
SAN LORENZO BUILDERS vs BAYANG
ThFacts: On February 16, 2004, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board decided in favour of Ma. Cristina
(Bayang), in her case filed against San Lorenzo Builders
Inc., (San Lorenzo), for specific performance and
damages. San Lorenzo’s appeal and motion for
reconsideration to the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
were also denied. Hence, San Lorenzo elevated its
appeal to the Office of the President (OP). By Resolution
of November 17, 2006, the OP denied San Lorenzo’s
appeal, stating that San Lorenzo received the order of the
Board of Commissioners affirming that of the Arbiter
decision on July 27, 2005. When they filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the order on August 10, 2005,
fourteen (14) days have elapsed. Upon their receipt of
the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on April
17, 2006, they had only one day, or on April 18, 2006 to
file their notice of appeal before the OP. They filed it only
on April 27, 2006 or nine days late, hence the appeal was
filed out of time. San Lorenzo moved to reconsider, citing
the “fresh period rule” enunciated in the case of Neypes
vs. CA, but the OP denied it, ruling that the “fresh period
rule” applies only in judicial appeals, not administrative
appeals. Their petition for review with the Court of
Appeals was also denied, hence they elevated their case
to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the “fresh period rule” also apply to
administrative appeals.
Ruling: We DENY the petition. It is settled that the “fresh
period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and
not to administrative appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala,⁠1 the Court was confronted with a
similar issue of whether the “fresh period rule” applies to
an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is
administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the
“fresh period rule” only covers judicial proceedings under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The “fresh period rule” in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision
in Neypes, the “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule
40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45
(appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court). Obviously,these Rules cover judicial proceedings
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature 2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the Court
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such
appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section
1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration
is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal “during the
remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt
of the resolution of denial;” whereas if the decision
is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period
to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a

decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the
“fresh period rule” in Neypes does not apply.

As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations

governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of
HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to
Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987:
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765,
series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently
reads:
Section 2. Appeal. – Any party may, upon notice to the
Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by
the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance
with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall

suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office
of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of

Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides
that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for
reconsideration from an adverse decision of any
agency/office, the said party has the only remaining
balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal,
reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying
his/her motion for reconsideration.⁠2 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the
present case, we find that the CA correctly affirmed the
OP in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal for having been
filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review

on certiorari andAFFIRM the decision dated July 23,