1. DOMINGO NEYPES, ET. AL vs.
CA
 15- DAY FRESH PERIOD RULE
 It is clear from Neypes that the ruling shall not be applied where no
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration has been filed in
which case the 15-day period for appeal shall run from notice of
judgment.
 In Neypes it was held that a litigant is given another fresh
period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of
denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/ new trial before the
RTC.
 It was said:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
 Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution. The Neypes principles applies to criminal cases.
(Yu v. Judge Tatad,
February 9, 2011).
 Order of denial, not appealable.
The fresh period rule does not refer to the period within which to appeal from the order
denying the motion for reconsideration but to the period within which to appeal from the
judgment itself because an order denying a motion for reconsideration or new trial is not
appealable (Section 9).
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 The remedy from an order denying a motion for reconsideration is
not to appeal from the order of denial because such order is not
appealable.
 The remedy is to appeal from the judgment or final
order itself subject of the motion (Sec. 9).
 Can an order of denial of a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
be assailed by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
Not anymore. Effective December 27, 2007, an order of denial is no longer
assailable by certiorari because of the amendment to Rule 41 by A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC. Deleted from those matters from which no appeal can be taken and from which
order Rule 65 petition may be availed of, is “an order denying a motion for new trial or
a econsideration”. The amendment obviously seeks to prevent the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 based on an order
denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration. The remedy available
therefore, would be that prescribed under Sec. 9,i.e., to appeal from the judgment or
final order.
2. CLEDERA et. al, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur, , et al.,
 To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections
4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are
clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of the
movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without
the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for
appeal.
 Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves
the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to determine
whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear
him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within
which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to
 serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37)
and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall estate the time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule
15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions.
 To deviate from the peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the
cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said
principle, the case at bar would be one step in the emasculation of the revised
rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence
thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested
persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such
an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule and when
their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line where and did
when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein
WE delineated in a language matchless in simplicity and clarity the essential
requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all
possibilities of equivocation or misunderstanding.
 WE have been so unyielding on this matter that even in the aforementioned
case of Manila Surety, 24 WE ruled that the filing of the requisite notice of
hearing one day before the expiration of the period to appeal, does not
retroact to the date of the filing of the motion for reconsideration, which
was filed much earlier or just ten days after receipt of the decision. In the
Fulton case, 25 wherein the movant therein filed the requisite notice of hearing
five days after the 30-day period for appeal had expired, although the motion
for reconsideration itself was filed five (5) days after receipt of the decisions,
WE maintained the same rule. In the case of Magno, 26 again WE reiterated the
same principle, even when the trial Judge himself caused to be served upon all
the parties a notice of hearing. The movant in the Magno case filed his motion
for reconsideration on the thirtieth day from his receipt of the decision
without the requisite notice of hearing, which he filed sixteen (16) days after
the expiration of the 30-day period for appeal.
3. GREGORIO TARCA ET. AL vs. ANGELES CASON VDA. DE
CARRETERO, Defendant-Appellee.
 the court found the motion to dismiss well taken on the ground that the
alleged fraud on which the cause of action of Plaintiffs is predicated, even if
committed, is not extrinsic or collateral to the issues involved in the former
case, but intrinsic or one which should have been raised therein because it
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was part and parcel of the defense that the Plaintiffs had set up to protect
their interest. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case without costs.
 But it appears on the very face of the complaint that those facts, which allegedly
constitute the fraud on which the action of Plaintiffs is predicated, are matters
which have transpired in the course of the ocular inspection made by the trial
judge in the former case and which said trial judge had already considered and
passed upon in his decision.
 It even appears that when the ocular inspection was made, both parties were
present with their counsel, and the objection of Plaintiffs to the indication of the
traces or remains of the old sugar mill and house determinative of Defendant’s
possession has been duly noted by the trial judge only that the same was not given
due consideration by him. And it likewise appears that these matters have also
been taken up by Plaintiffs in connection with their appeal to the Court of Appeals
but that said court did not decide them in their favor but instead affirmed the
findings of the trial court.
 It is therefore evident that the alleged fraud now advanced by Plaintiffs predicated
on those facts is not extrinsic or collateral but intrinsic in the sense that they have
not only been raised but were the subject of adjudication by both the former court
and the Court of Appeals and as such it cannot be considered as sufficient basis for
annulling the judgment rendered in the former case.
4. VICTORIANO SALAZAR, Plaintiff, v. CAYETANA SALAZAR, Defendant.
- GENERAL RULE: A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer
and he cannot file a motion for new trial on the ground of mistake
of his lawyer.
- The only EXCEPTION is based on equity decision
- “A new trial is sometimes granted where the
INCOMPETENCY or NEGLIGENCE of the party’s counsel in the
conduct of the case IS SO GREAT that party’s rights are prejudiced
and he is prevented from presenting his cause of action or
defense. (PEOPLE vs. MANZANILLA)
In view of the evidence showing a compromise between the parties, it was natural and
logical that the plaintiff herein believed that the action brought against him by the
defendant herein had been ended by the aforesaid compromise and that he was
relieved, therefore, from the duty of filing his answer. Such belief excusable and having
prevented the plaintiff herein from making a defense that would have been good and
efficacious, this case comes within the provisions of section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and the judgment by default must be set aside a new trial ordered.
discovered only if it satisfies the following requisites: (1) that such evidence has been
discovered after trial; (2) that it could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that if presented, it would
probably alter the result.

 Victoriano Salazar filed a complaint in this court alleging that he had been
unjustly deprived of the right of defense in the said case and asking that
the said judgment be annulled and that this court order a new trial by
virtue of the provisions of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Hence, the SC granted the petition of Victoriano Salazar.

5. AYLLON SR., (Deceased) ERLINDA S. AYLLON

vs. PRIMA A. SEVILLA, ET. AL

 The foregoing narration of facts and events illustrates once more an

instance where the client has to suffer due to the fault of counsel. But, as
held in several cases, 1 1 1 a client is bound by the mistakes and
omissions of his counsel, so that if an appeal is lost through the
unjustified neglect of counsel, as happened in the instant case, that
loss is binding upon the client. .

6. SEVERO ARCE ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs. EMPERATRIZ ARCE, ET. AL

 The SC said: New trial should be distinguished from the exercise of

the discretionary power of the court to REOPEN a trial for the
introduction of additional evidence, to clarify its doubts on material
points. This discretionary power is subject to no rule other than the
paramount interest of justice and will not be reviewed on appeal
unless the exercise thereof is abused. (Arce vs. Arce, L-13035, Nov.
28, 1959) So it is one of the inherent powers of the court.

 On the other hand the evidence appellants desire to introduce in the new trial
requested by them after rendition of the judgment, is an admission by Emperatriz Arce
that the contract was actually simulated and without consideration, as appearing in
the affidavit dated November 5, 1955 which was attached to plaintiffs' motion for new
trial. The trial court acted correctly in denying the motion, for certainly this kind of
evidence cannot be considered as newly discovered under Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court. For purposes of securing a new trail, evidence may be considered newly