Greenland and Sovereignty:

Past and Present

years

Polar
Initiative
Index
Introduction / 1

Early History and Culture / 1

History of Colonial Governance / 2

The Language Dilemma / 4

Domestic Relationship With Denmark / 6

Greenlandic Political Parties and their

Independence Positions / 8

The Constitutional Commission / 10

Addendum / 13

US-Greenland Relationship / 13

Hans Island Dispute and Arctic

Territorial Claims / 14
Introduction
I
n the 21st century, there have been only
five new nations to emerge: South Sudan
in 2011, Kosovo in 2008, Serbia and Monte-
negro in 2006, and Timor-Leste in 2002.1 While
there are several ongoing separatist movements
throughout the world vying to gain indepen-
dence, the case of Greenland stands out due to
the peaceful and cooperative nature of its long
journey towards statehood. The prospect of an
independent Greenland has become even more
important to the United States and other world
actors due to its critical place at one of the two
junctures between the North American and
Eurasian Arctic. Greenland has ahead of it both
significant opportunity and risk as climate change
Early History and Culture
T
he history of Greenland as a part of the
Kingdom of Denmark began in 1721 with
its official establishment of it as a colony
and the emergence of several colonies along
the coast.2 However, indigenous Inuit peoples
occupied the island well before the arrival of the
Danes. The concept of a Greenlandic indigenous
identity only coalesced with the arrival of the
“wallunaat,” white people, and the Danes who
effectively made themselves the “Naalagaat,”
decision makers.3 The Danes embodied many
traditional aspects of discrimination common for
the colonial period, including largely restricting
exposes new economic opportunities and also
utterly disrupts a way of life that has existed for
hundreds of years. These issues make the ques-
tions surrounding independence more relevant
than ever, as they have the potential to both be
significantly be affected by the changes occurring
in the region, and the potential to create a new
actor to shape the region itself. This article will lay
out the history and current shape of the indepen-
dence movement in Greenland, and examine a
few of the ways the environmental and economic
changes are in turn affecting the movement.
native Greenlanders to their traditional econom-
ic pursuit of seal hunting while letting Danes
monopolize the trade of the resulting furs.4 One
notable difference was the focus on continuing
education of the indigenous language as well, as
it was thought this was the best way to spread
Christianity throughout the land.5 This would be
key when the first “Kalaaliussuseq” debates
emerged on what it meant to be a Greenlander,
as ultimately it would be fluency in the indige-
nous language that became the marker for the
Greenlandic ethnic identity.6
Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 1
 History of Colonial Governance
W
hile during the initial colonial period
from 1721 Greenland was directly
governed by the Danish Govern-
ment, in the middle of the 19th century, the first
vestiges of local participation and governance
emerged. These took the form of assemblies
where elected managers had some minimal local
authority.7 Greenlandic governance was further
expanded in 1911 with the creation of numerous
local councils and two provincial councils. The
local councils had authority over administering
social assistance, and maintaining public order
and the rule of law while the provincial councils
had a slightly broader authority to discuss issues
and bring them before the Danish authorities.8 In
1925, municipal councils were created to pro-
mote Greenlandic businesses and labor.9 During
the Second World War, Greenland experienced a
period of separation due to the German takeover
of Denmark and the subsequent US control of
the territory. This separation led to increased ex-
pectations for self-governance, and would serve
as the initial catalyst for much of the change to
come.
These various councils were consolidated in 1951
into a new system of municipal councils and a
single provincial council that acted as the first
form of self-governance that was responsible for
the entirety of Greenland. While the council had
the ability to act in an advisory capacity to Danish
authorities in Greenland, it had very limited pow-
er to actually govern within Greenland.10 In the
1970’s, certain governing authorities underwent
the process of being transferred to Greenlandic
municipalities for the first time.11 However, at
the same time, the first real fissures in gover-
2 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
nance began to emerge. A catalyzing event was
Denmark’s vote to join the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1973. In Greenland, over
70% of voters rejected the proposal to join out of
fears of European boats flooding their fisheries,
but this was not enough to outweigh the support
for joining in Denmark.12 That same year, the first
commission on the concept of home rule, the
Home Rule Committee, was set up by Green-
landic authorities. Following a proposal in 1975
and three years of negotiation, the Greenland
Home Rule Arrangement was accepted by the
Danish Parliament (the Folketing) and the people
of Greenland.13 Under the Greenland Home Rule
Act of 1978, two bodies, the Landsting and the
Landsstyre, were set up to function as the legis-
lative assembly and executive respectively.14 The
Act also acknowledged the people’s of Greenland
“fundamental rights in respect of Greenland’s
natural resources,” a statement which, while
recognizing the importance of natural resource
to the people of Greenland, failed to actually
transfer ownership or control.15 The Danish Gov-
ernment was noted as having the authority to
regulate the “preliminary study, prospecting and
exploitation of those resources.”16 Greenlandic
was also declared to be the official language in
the act, with the provision that Danish was to be
thoroughly taught as well and be available for use
in official documents.17
At this point the Greenlandic authorities were not
given the right to independently conduct foreign
affairs and were in fact obligated to abide by
the treaty and other international obligations of
Denmark. However, this did not mean Greenland
was entirely restricted to following Denmark’s
lead in international matters, as they had the right
to demand a representative in Danish diplomatic
offices in countries where Greenland had special
commercial interests. Additionally, Greenland
was also given the right to seek permission to
engage in international negotiations of impor-
tance to Greenland’s commercial life.18 In 1982, a
52% majority voted in a referendum to leave the
EEC. While the vote was not binding, over the
course of several years, the “Greenland Treaty”
was negotiated between Greenland, Denmark
and the EEC whereby Greenland was no longer
a part of the Danish membership of the EEC and
instead joined the treaty concerning the commu-
nity of Overseas Countries and Territories.19 This
gave Greenland access to the European free-mar-
ket on the condition of appropriate opening of its
fisheries to Europe. Under the treaty, Greenland
also continued receiving social and structural
funds from the European Commission20
The next development was the establishment
of the Greenland Self-Government Act in 2009,
which further enhanced the domestic powers of
Greenland’s government. Under the Act, Green-
land officially gained control of all three branches
of government, as it was authorized to establish
courts of law with the authority to “exercise
judicial power in Greenland in all fields of re-
sponsibility”.21 While Greenland remains under
the Danish constitution, it now has the ability to
determine cases and set judicial precedent for
areas governed by the Inatsisartut. Greenland
also gained increased ability to control its own
revenue streams while still maintaining its sup-
port from the Danish Government, as it agreed
to provide an annual subsidy of 3,439.6 million
Danish Kroner, adjusted annually for inflation, that
is slowly phased out at a 1-2 ratio as the Green-
land Self-Government increases its revenue from
mineral resource activities.22 However, the most
important sections of the Act came in two short
sections at the very end, as Section 20 declares
Greenlandic to be the official language in Green-
land, with no provision for Danish, and Section 21
delineates the right of the peoples of Greenland
to pursue independence. The act came into force
on June 21, 2009, a day that is now celebrated
as a national holiday.
Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 3
 The Language Dilemma
A
n important question to be answered
here is why language has become such
an important issue for Greenlandic sover-
eignty and independence. Language has become
a significant issue in Greenland over the course
of the preceding decade due to the way in which
it has become the ethnic identity marker for who
qualifies as Greenlandic. Furthermore, as Green-
land approaches independence, the decisions
made around official state support of languages
will have significant impact on the political and
economic nature of a future Greenland.
As stated previously, in the early part of the 20th
century, the Greenlandic language, Kalaallit, be-
came the marker for determining ethnic identity
instead of other cultural practices such as seal
hunting. Today, this has led to a massive value
being placed on the position and use of the Ka-
laallit in society. Languages that appear to threat-
4 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
en that place, primarily Danish, are thus subject
to the securitization process outlined in the
Copenhagen School of thought where they are
labelled and accepted as security threats in order
to justify the use of extraordinary measures. The
integration of Danish into daily life is presented
as a threat to the cultural security of Greenland.23
The threat on a societal level is manifested as
an impediment to the relevancy of Greenlandic
speaking society. If Danish remains an important
element of government and developed business,
it can lead to discrimination against monolingual
Greenlanders, the very people the concept of a
sovereign Greenland is built around.
However, the apparent solution, restricting the
use of Danish in government and other settings,
leads to problems itself, as it would conflict with
the ideals of a civic democracy that have come to
be ingrained in Greenlandic political life. In fact,
the two concepts that Greenland is built on, that
of an ethno-cultural democracy and civil democ-
racy, are directly in conflict with one another.24
For Greenland to protect the cultural identity of
its society, it may feel the need to take measures
to protect the use of Greenlandic from Danish.
However, to do so would break with the com-
monly accepted norms of modern liberal democ-
racy, that it cannot restrict the rights or means
of citizens to express themselves in the manner
of their choosing.25 Additionally, the restriction
of Danish would likely be an impediment to the
economy, as Denmark is key to Greenland’s
economy. Any language restriction around Danish
would likely hamper the ability of private and pub-
lic actors on both sides to conduct business with
the other. This debate is unlikely to be solved rap-
idly, and will most likely continue to be an issue
for Greenland no matter its sovereignty status.
Recent efforts by the parties forming the 2018
coalition government have indicated that efforts
are underway to explore a third option: the
promotion of English. In the Coalition Agreement
following the elections of 2018, the parties set as
a goal working towards making English the “first
foreign language” in order to bring Greenland
more in line with the UN Children’s Convention
on Children’s Rights and encourage the study
of internationally used languages.26 Later in the
coalition agreement, when discussing integra-
tion of individuals into Greenland, it is noted that
efforts are to be made to make this integration
available to Danish and English speakers.27 Based
on these indicators, it is likely that English has
been chosen as a middle ground between the
cultural issues that come with using Danish,
and the isolation issues that come with focusing
solely on Kalallit. By promoting the use of English
as the primary foreign language, a language that
is importantly not historically associated with the
exclusion of Kalallit from public life, Greenland is
still able to promote language skills that encour-
age and enable international business engage-
ment on the island.
Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 5
 Domestic Relationship with Denmark
T
he relationship between the self-gov-
erning authorities in Greenland and the
Danish Government can be considered
incredibly positive, especially in comparison with
other regions seeking autonomy and/or inde-
pendence such as Catalonia. While the Danish
authorities certainly engaged in oppressive
colonial practices during the first period of Danish
control, beginning in the 1950s with the reorga-
nization of the self-governance council system
in Greenland, there has existed an increasingly
collaborative nature between the two authorities.
While Denmark has generally kept control of
the conduct of international affairs and security
matters, even in these areas they have demon-
strated a willingness to work with Greenlandic
authorities. Under the 2009 Self-Rule Agreement,
Greenland was given the authority to conduct
negotiations on issues exclusively concerning the
island.28 Although Denmark retains the right to
conduct negotiations and conclude international
agreements, this is a significant level of authority
in international matters for what is effectively an
autonomous region within Denmark.
The greatest risk to the relationship in the years
ahead is the possibility of Greenland seeking
independence. While such a possibility is likely to
not occur until significantly into the future, Green-
land retains the right to seek independence at
any time. Furthermore, any agreement must be
approved not only by referendum in Greenland,
but also by the Inatsisartut (Greenlandic Parlia-
ment) as well as the Folketing (Danish Parlia-
ment).29 Each of these elements poses a unique
set of risks and potential fault lines in the rela-
tionship should Greenland seek independence.
On the level of the referendum, populations have
6 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
shown a unique tendency in recent years to
demonstrate unpredictably when voting in refer-
endums on national issues, and the potential for
the population of Greenland to reject an agreed
upon independence deal cannot be discounted.
Recent examples of such unexpected referen-
dum results include the Brexit vote in the United
Kingdom, and the referendum on the peace
agreement between the government of Colom-
bia and FARC. Any rejection of an agreed upon in-
dependence deal by the people in a referendum
would significantly set back negotiations and
strain the relationship between the Greenlandic
and Danish negotiators. The risk from a rejection
is similar for the Inatsisartut and Folketing, but
such risk also extends into the negotiation period
for these bodies. Elected bodies in Europe have
proven in recent years to be undergoing a na-
tionalist and populist surge. Should such a wave
of politicians be present in either or both bodies
during negotiations on independence, it would
likely lead to significantly impaired negotiations
and perhaps completely stall the independence
process. For these reasons, the risks inherent to
the independence process must be fully appreci-
ated and accounted for before it is initiated.
The current political makeup of both the Inatsis-
artut and the Folketing lends itself to a continu-
ing positive trend in relations between the two
countries. The Premier of Greenland, as of the
publication date, is Kim Kielson of the Siumut
party. While the Siumut party supports seeking
independence, their position does not appear
to be one of a radical pursuit of separation from
Denmark. Their page on the subject, roughly
translated, is titled “We Work for your Country
to be a Self State.”30 The entire first section of
the page is dedicated to promoting Siumut’s
participation in bringing about home rule and self
government. The party then spends the next two
sentences calling for a “society [that] has the
right to decide on its own circumstances” and
“that our country becomes an autonomous state
and that in all our circumstances we take full
responsibility - without being ruled by an outside
person who sees himself as chieftains.”31 As far
as calls for independence go, these could be
considered relatively muted.
In the coalition agreement signed by the major
parties in May of 2018, actually achieving inde-
pendence is not mentioned as an immediate
goal.. Instead, the document refers to certain
goals such as cultural development and eco-
nomic education as steps for a society on the
path towards independence.32 Collaboration with
Denmark in achieving increasing levels of partic-
ipation is also explicitly stated as a policy.33 This
indicates an appreciation for the inherent risks
mentioned above that come with the process of
seeking the final step of independence. With the
ten year anniversary of self-governance occur-
ring in 2019, and considering the forty year gap
between the introduction of home rule and self-
rule, it is likely that Greenlandic institutions are
still gaining experience and knowledge in their
new areas of responsibility and will be opposed
to immediately seeking independence until they
are comfortable with the governing authorities
they already possess.
While the subject of Greenland and its sovereign-
ty is not mentioned on the website of the Ven-
stre party, which leads the ruling coalition in the
Folketing, there is at least one positive indication
that support remains in the Danish Government
for increased levels of Greenlandic sovereignty.
Specifically, it is that the current Prime Minister
of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, was in fact
the prime minister at the time that the Self-Gov-
ernance Act came into effect. Thus, while he was
not leading Denmark during the majority of the
negotiation period, he was nevertheless prime
minister when the law was passed in the Folket-
ing and was present in Greenland when it came
into effect. This means he has a clear history of
working with Greenland on its sovereignty issues
in a positive manner.
The Premier of Greenland, as of the publication date,
is Kim Kielson of the Siumut party
Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 7
 Greenlandic Political Parties and
Their Independence Positions
T
his section will examine not only the sov-
ereignty policy of modern political parties
in Greenland, but also their vision of what
an independent Greenland might look like. founding of the organization to the Second World
As aforementioned the current head of the coali-
tion government of the Inatsisartut is the Siumut
Party. Siumut currently controls 10 out of the 31
seats in the Inatsisartut. The Siumut party sup-
ports independence, but has a non-radical stance
on the subject in that it views independence as
a process, rather than a goal to be immediately
accomplished. Therefore, while it has been in
power for several years, it has not called for a
referendum on independence. Siumut’s vision
for an independent Greenland is modeled off
of the Scandinavian system with slight differ-
ences. Centrally, Siumut is looking to create a
“welfare-based society” similar to that which
exists already in Denmark, Norway, Sweden
and Finland with similarly modern conception
of rights, freedoms and opportunities.34 Siumut
also strongly supports the use and promotion of
Kalaallit. This includes the goal of having Kalaallit
be the official language of all public companies
by 2025.35 On a foreign policy level, Siumut’s
vision for Greenland could actually be considered
closest to that of Norway’s. This is largely due to
their desire to remain outside of the European
Union, but become a member of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization.36 The reasoning behind
both of these decisions is similar between the
two countries. Both are attempting to gain a
higher level of protection for their fisheries from
EU regulations on shared fishing access, while
gaining the advantages of the security guaran-
8 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
tees that come along with NATO. Greenland has
a longstanding security relationship with NATO
and the US that actually goes back to before the
War. This vision for Greenland’s future foreign
policy also prevailed in the previously mentioned
coalition agreement, where NATO membership is
explicitly mentioned as an objective for a sover-
eign Greenland.37
The largest opposition party in Greenland is Inuit
Ataqatigiit, which controls 8 out of the 31 seats
in the Inatsisartut. Like Siumut, Inuit Ataqatiggit
generally appears to have a measured view of
independence, supporting it as a concept but not
pushing for its immediate introduction due to the
potential consequences of such an action.38 The
party does push for a greater role for Greenland-
ers in negotiations that impact the country. The
Inuit Ataqatiggit appears to diverge significantly
from Siumut in its view of the Greenlandic lan-
guage and membership to NATO. On the subject
of language, while Siumut focuses on solely
promoting the Greenlandic language, Inuit Ataqa-
tiggit’s mission statement declares its intention
to not only promote kalaallit, but Danish and
English as well.39 Inuit Ataqatiggit also declares
in its mission statement that under its vision,
Greenland would never participate in any war.40
Such a policy would likely preclude membership
in NATO due to the requirements under Article 5
of the treaty. A strict interpretation of this section
could also potentially lead to the loss of military
access to Thule Airbase in northern Greenland
for the United States, an asset that would not be
easily replaced.
The second largest opposition party is the
Demokraatit party, and in comparison to the two
leading parties, it takes the most conservative
approach to the sovereignty issues facing Green-
land. It notes on its party platform that it sup-
ports self-determination, but it views indepen-
dence as a much more distant goal with multiple
obstacles and steps to make it through before
that point.41 The party also differs significantly
from the first two parties in that it does not
envision creating a welfare state based off of the
Nordic model, but rather a liberal open market
economy characterized by minimal government
intervention.42
The following four are the remaining parties with
representation in the Inatsisartut. Their positions
on sovereignty issues are less clear due to either
only having documents in Greenlandic or a lack
of an online presence. Partii Naleraq is the 4th
largest party in the Inatsisartut and the second
largest coalition party that was formed in 2014
as a breakaway party from Siumut.43 While the
party controlled 4 seats, one of their members is
switching his party allegiance to Siumut, leaving
the party with 3 seats.44 Their party document is
only in Kalaallit. The third largest coalition partner
is the Atassut party, which controls 2 seats. It
does not have an online presence. The fourth and
smallest coalition party is Nunatta Qitornai, which
controls 1 seat. It also does not have an online
presence. The final and smallest opposition party
is Suleqatigiissitsisut which controls a single seat
in parliament. It in fact has an online presence,
where it generally supports cooperation with
Denmark over independence.45

Greenland’s top leaders square off in a televised debate on April 21, two days before the island’s
general election this Tuesday, April 24: Kim Kielsen, leader of the social democratic Siumut party,
and Sara Olsvig of the left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit party. Both are expected to win seats in the assem-
bly. (PHOTO BY LEIFF JOSEFSEN/SERMITSIAQ AG)

Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 9

 The Constitutional Commission
T
he Constitutional Commission was estab-
lished by the Inatsisartut in 2017 to study
the establishment of a constitution for
Greenland and represents the next step in the
independence process for Greenland. The com-
mission’s mission is to study such an implemen-
tation in two parts. First, the implementation of
a constitution while still within the Danish realm.
The second stage being studying is the imple-
mentation of a constitution under a state of inde-
pendence. The legislation calling for the creation
of a constitutional commission apparently was
first proposed in the Inatsisartut all the way back
in 2011. The consideration of a constitution has
thus been in progress for a significant amount
of the home rule period. The goal of drafting a
constitution was reaffirmed by the most recent
government in its coalition agreement.46
Under a situation whereby Greenland adopts a
constitution and it remains in the Danish realm
but outside the structure of the Danish Constitu-
tion, Greenland would be best considered a state
in free-association with Denmark, which could be
considered the next step towards independence
for Greenland. Based on the Constitutional Com-
mission’s goals, this is the outcome that currently
appears the most likely. This situation could be
considered extremely analogous to the case of
the Cooke Islands which currently operate under
free-association with New Zealand. Under such
a structure, the Cooke Islands operate under its
own constitution, but receives an annual grant
from New Zealand and generally is deferent on
matters of international affairs and security.47
While this seems unlikely to change the over-
all tempo of shift in domestic and international
10 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
responsibilities to Greenland, it would begin the
process of creating an indigenous/homegrown
rule-of-law structure native to Greenland. The
enactment of a constitution would most likely ne-
cessitate the creation of a high court system to
adjudicate the interpretation of the law. The Inat-
sisartut and the Naalakkersuisut already function
as the legislature and executive respectively, and
the creation of a constitution would both codify
those institutions outside of the Danish system
of law, and likely codify and require the new
high court system as well. The creation of such a
supreme court type system would bring Green-
land further in line with the western practice of
a three part governance structure split between
an equally powerful legislature, executive and
judicial system. Such a system could possibly
considered the next intermediate step towards
independence due to the increased number of
institutions Greenland would gain control of and
the further decreasing of Danish control over
the island. However, it should be noted that
Greenland is not limited from moving directly to
independence, as the committee is also charged
with examining how a constitution would look for
and independent Greenland.
In the event of a move directly to independence,
constitutional recommendations provided by the
commission would likely serve as the starting
point between the Inatsisartut and the Folketing.
This is due to the fact that any “special relation-
ship” desired by Denmark could be expected to
be embodied in constitutional law in Denmark. Is-
sues of citizenship of Danes in Greenland would
likely also require language to be included in the
constitution in order to resolve the issue prior
to any final declaration of independence. Other whether Greenland will abrogate the ability to go
issues that would have to be settled by the con- to war as well as language and cultural rights.
stitutional committee that would not necessarily
be subject to negotiation with Denmark include

City in Greenland

Parliment in Denmark

Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 11

 Addendum

12 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present

US-Greenland Relationship
T
he US has maintained a positive rela-
tionship with Greenland through both its
relations with Denmark, and the major
US military presence on the island with Thule
Air Force Base. As alluded to earlier, the United
States occupied Greenland following the Ger-
man invasion of Denmark in 1940. Following the
war, the US and Denmark signed an agreement
in 1951 which permitted the US to establish
bases in the region.48 This ultimately led to the
establishment of Thule Air Force Base in northern
Greenland. Thule AFB is the northernmost US
military outpost, and hosts important ballistic
missile warning and space tracking facilities. US
facilities in Greenland have been a major element
in two incidents during the Cold War. In 1958, the
US constructed Ice Camp Century, an experi-
mental base close to Thule AFB that was pow-
ered by a nuclear reactor and built without the
permission of the Danish government. Nuclear
weapons and nuclear power by extension was a
sensitive topic in Denmark at the time, and the
unilateral action put the Danish government in a
Thule Air Force Base
difficult position.49 In 1968 a B-52 bomber car-
rying nuclear weapons crashed on the island. It
was later revealed that local workers involved in
the cleanup had not been issued protective gear
despite the presence of radioactive material. The
Danish Government also eventually discovered
as an outgrowth of the crash that the US had
stored nuclear weapons in Greenland despite the
express prohibition against the stationing of nu-
clear weapons on Danish territory.50 While these
incidents marked major lows in the US-Green-
land relationship, the trend in relations otherwise
during the Cold War and into the present has
been generally positive. The US-Greenland rela-
tionship remains relatively positive, with Thule Air
Base continuing to be the centerpiece connec-
tion between the two countries. Over the course
of the next several years, based on the goals
of the new coalition government, it is likely that
Greenland will take an increasing, and potentially
exclusive, role in negotiating and determining
the terms of the U.S. military presence on the
island.51
Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 13
 Hans Island Dispute and Arctic
Territorial Claims
H
ans Island is a small island that sits in
the middle of the Nares Strait between
Greenland and Canada. The island per-
fectly straddles the maritime boundary line that
was set by treaty between the two countries in
1973. While the issue was known at the time,
the two countries were unable to resolve own-
ership of the island.52 As such, it remains one of
two territorial disputes Greenland is involved in.
While the question of the ownership of the island
remains unresolved between the two countries,
the parties involved have treated the issue with
relative humor, and little more than pride is
attached to the issue as the issue of maritime
boundaries in the straight has already been
settled by treaty in 1973 as already mentioned.
Beginning in 1984, the two nations have engaged
in a humorous diplomatic tit for tat, whereby sol-
diers or officials from one country visit the island
to raise their national flag and leave a bottle of
either Danish schnapps or Canadian whisky.53
The issue of the continental shelf dispute is
slightly more serious and more consequential
for Greenland. Under Article 76 and 77 of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, states
have the right to extend their maritime exclu-
sive economic zone out to the boundary of their
continental shelf.54 In August of 2016, Greenland
and Denmark jointly submitted a claim to a large
section of the Arctic Ocean that extended all the
way to the opposite Russian EEZ boundary to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continen-
tal Shelf. This claim overlapped with competing
claims from the Russian Federation, Canada,
14 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present
Iceland and Norway.55 The outcome of these will
likely be significant due to the projected reserves
of oil, natural gas, and other mineral resources
predicted to exist in the Arctic seabed, as the
EEZ claims will determine the ownership and
revenue control of these resources. Furthermore,
the competing claims carry with them an en-
hanced risk of conflict should various nations de-
cide to not abide by the ruling of the committee
and attempt to contest control over the waters.
This risk is greatest with the Russian Federation,
but the possibility of a dispute with Canada, Ice-
land and Norway cannot be ignored.
It is unknown when the Commission will make
its decision regarding the claims. However, the
Commission only has the authority to make
recommendations regarding the outer limits of
continental shelves and the corresponding mar-
itime boundaries. Therefore, the Arctic nations
that have submitted claims will need to negotiate
a diplomatic agreement following the release of
the Commission’s findings in order to bring the
issue to resolution. It should be noted that Rus-
sia and Norway as recently as 2010 successfully
resolved their maritime boundary dispute, setting
a precedent for peaceful and diplomatic deter-
mination of maritime boundaries in the Arctic.56
In the likely event of a multi-lateral agreement
becoming necessary to resolve the claims, the
Arctic Council will likely provide a useful forum
for engagement not only between the claimant
parties, but the other Arctic nations to engage in
the process as well.
Endnotes
1. Taylor, Adam “What South Sudan can teach Catalonia about creating a new country” The Washington
Post, October 2, 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/29/9-new-coun-
tries-were-founded-in-the-past-25-years-what-could-they-teach-catalonia/?utm_term=.af15b08c52b6

2. Powel, Richard C.; Dodds, Klaus “Polar Geopolitics?: Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes” Eward
Elgar Publishing, 2014, 264

3. Pram Gad, Ulrik “What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for ana-
lyzing identity politics” Aalborg University 2017, 106

4. Ibid, 106

5. Ibid, 106

6. Ibid, 106

7. “The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in Greenland Execu-

tive Summary” April 2008, 2

8. Ibid, 2

9. Ibid, 2

10. “The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in Greenland Execu-

tive Summary” April 2008, 2

11. Ibid, 2

12. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca; Pram Gad, Ulrik “European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games:
The EU Overseas” 220 https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uU-QyS8_5zwC&oi=fnd&p-
g=PA217&dq=%22Greenland%22+AND+%22Sovereignty%22&ots=GMOGEVkLgI&sig=R95hl-
Fyha_7sP5PYDbInG3NRC6c#v=onepage&q=%22Greenland%22%20AND%20%22Sovereignty%22&f=-
false

13. “The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in Greenland Execu-

tive Summary” April 2008, 2

14. The Greenland Home Rule Act Section 1 (2)

15. The Greenland Home Rule Act Section 8 (1)

16. The Greenland Home Rule Act Section 8 (2)

17. The Greenland Home Rule Act Section 9 (1)(2)

18. The Greenland Home Rule Act Section 16 (1)(2)

19. Adler-Nissen, Rebecca; Pram Gad, Ulrik “European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The
EU Overseas” 220-221

20. Ibid, 221

21. Act on Greenland Self-Government Section 1 (1)

22. Act on Greenland Self-Government Section 5 (1) Section 8 (1)

23. Pram Gad, Ulrik “What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for ana-
lyzing identity politics” Aalborg University 2017, 113

Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 15

 24. Pram Gad, Ulrik “What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for
analyzing identity politics” Aalborg University 2017, 112

25. Pram Gad, Ulrik “What kind of nation state will Greenland be? Securitization theory as a strategy for ana-
lyzing identity politics” Aalborg University 2017, 112

26. Coalition Agreement Sections 1, 18

27. Coalition Agreement Section 255

28. Act on Greenland Self-Government Section 11 (1) Section 12 (1)

29. Act on Greenland Self Governance Section 21 (3)

30. “VI ARBEJDER FOR AT VORT LAND BLIVER EN SELVSTÆNDIG STAT” Siumut https://siumut.gl/da/home/
parti/sulissutigaarput-nunatta-naalagaaffinngornissaa/

31. “VI ARBEJDER FOR AT VORT LAND BLIVER EN SELVSTÆNDIG STAT” Siumut

32. “Koalitionsaftale 2018” Sections 187, 251 http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20

Files/Naalakkersuisut/DK/Koalitionsaftaler/040518%20Siumut_Naleraq_Atassut_Nunatta%20qitornai_Fi-
nal_da.pdf

33. “Koalitionsaftale 2018” Section 335

34. “VI ARBEJDER FOR AT VORT LAND BLIVER EN SELVSTÆNDIG STAT” Siumut

35. “DET GRØNLANDSKE FOLKS TRADITIONER/KULTUR” Siumut https://siumut.gl/da/home/parti/inuiat-

tut-ileqqut-piorsarsimassuseq-kulturi-timersorneq/

36. “UDENRIGSPOLITIK” Siumut https://siumut.gl/da/home/parti/nunanut-allanut-tunngasut-illersornissarlu/

37. “Koalitionsaftale 2018” Section 341

38. “Ilulissat Deklaration” Inuit Ataqatiggit 2017 http://ia.gl/google426c9ea506fcddea.html/gl/politik/deklara-

tion-fra-landsmode-2017/

39. Ibid

40. “Ilulissat Deklaration” Inuit Ataqatiggit 2017

41. “PARTIPROGRAM” Demokraatit 2018 https://www.demokraatit.gl/partiprogram-2018/

42. Ibid

43. “Tidligere landsstyreformand Enoksen stifter nyt parti”Information January 9, 2014 https://www.informa-
tion.dk/telegram/2014/01/tidligere-landsstyreformand-enoksen-stifter-nyt-parti

44. “Partihopper Fleischer: Jeg er ikke den første i historien til at skifte parti” Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa May 22
2018 https://knr.gl/da/nyheder/jeg-er-ikke-den-f%C3%B8rste-i-historien-til-skifte-parti

45. “Principprogram” Samarbejdspartiet http://sulesam.gl/principprogram/

46. “Koalitionsaftale 2018” Section 335

47. Østergaard, Mikkel U. “The Greenlandic wish for independence: An investigation of the possibilities

16 Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present

 within free association” 2017

48. “Defense of Greenland:Agreement Between the United Sates and the Kingdom of Denmark, April 27,
1951” The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, April 27, 1951 http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/20th_century/den001.asp

49. “How the US built a mysterious military camp under the Greenland ice sheet” ScienceNordic December
19, 2017 http://sciencenordic.com/how-us-built-mysterious-military-camp-under-greenland-ice-sheet

50. Mitchel, Robert “Cataclysmic cargo: The hunt for four missing nuclear bombs after a B-52 crash” The
Washington Post, January 21 2018 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/01/21/
cataclysmic-cargo-the-hunt-for-four-missing-nuclear-bombs-after-a-b-52-crash/?noredirect=on&utm_ter-
m=.0c431b00970c

51. Coalition Agreement Section 342

52. Levin, Dan “Canada and Denmark Fight Over Island With Whisky and Schnapps” The New York Times
November 7 2016 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/world/what-in-the-world/canada-denmark-hans-is
Ibid

53. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76, 77, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

54. “Greenland and Denmark present claims relating to the Continental Shelf to the United Nations in New
York” August 18, 2016 http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=3a2bd941-d477-4df9-8ad7-ef-
6f15ae9ec8

55. “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean” https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/
ud/vedlegg/folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf

Greenland and Sovereignty: Past and Present 17

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