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Chapter 15 Secured Transaction. Priority creditors and perfected security interests

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124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
United States Bankruptcy Court,
D. Maryland.
In re GREENBELT COOPERATIVE, INC., Debt-
or.
GREENBELT COOPERATIVE, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
WERRES CORPORATION and Raymond Leasing
Corporation, Defendants.
Bankruptcy No. 88-5-3199-SD.
Adv. No. A89-0186-SD.
Feb. 12, 1991.
Chapter 11 debtor filed complaint to avoid lien of
secured creditor and certain equipment and pro-
ceeds. The Bankruptcy Court, E. Stephen Derby, J.,
held that: (1) financing statements filed by secured
creditor under debtor's trade name were not suffi-
cient to perfect its security interest in debtor's assets
against claims of others, and (2) debtor-
in-possession's use of trustee's power to avoid cred-
itor's unperfected security interest, after confirma-
tion of Chapter 11 case, would promote success of
reorganization plan, rather than merely benefiting
debtor, and thus, strong arm provision could be ap-
plied by debtor-in-possession postconfirmation.
So ordered.
West Headnotes
[1] Secured Transactions 349A 92.1
349A Secured Transactions
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak92.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 349Ak92)
No per se rule under Maryland law precludes filing
of financing statement under trade name of debtor,
as opposed to its legal name, from being sufficient
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
to perfect security interest; however, filing of finan-
cing statement under trade name of debtor is suffi-
cient to perfect security interest of creditor only in
limited situations where legal name of debtor and
trade or other name under which financing state-
ment is filed are sufficiently similar to subsequent
creditor searching records with reference to debtor's
legal name would find financing statement or in-
formation which would put creditor on notice that
more thorough search should be conducted.
Md.Code, Commercial Law, §§ 9-401(1), 9-402,
9-402(8), 9-402 comment.
[2] Secured Transactions 349A 92.1
349A Secured Transactions
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak92.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 349Ak92)
Where filing of defective financing statement is not
misleading, it may be effective to perfect security
interest under Maryland law. Md.Code, Commer-
cial Law, § 9-402(8).
[3] Secured Transactions 349A 92.1
349A Secured Transactions
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak92.1 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 349Ak92)
Financing statements filed by secured creditor un-
der debtor's trade name were not sufficient to per-
fect its security interest in debtor's assets against
claims of others, under Maryland law; trade name
was not remotely similar to legal name, so that fil-
ing under trade name would be found by those
looking for security interests in debtor's legal name.
Md.Code, Commercial Law, §§ 9-401(1), 9-402,
9-402(8), 9-402 comment.

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
[4] Bankruptcy 51 2705
51 Bankruptcy
51V The Estate
51V(H) Avoidance Rights
51V(H)1 In General
51k2705 k. Bona Fide Purchasers and
Rights Thereof. Most Cited Cases
Chapter 11 debtor's actual knowledge of secured
creditor's security interest, which was not perfected
under Maryland law because secured creditor filed
financing statement under debtor's trade name
rather than legal name, was not imputed to debtor-
in-possession so as to defeat avoidance power of
debtor-in-possession, as hypothetical judicial lien
creditor. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(1);
Md.Code, Commercial Law, §§ 9-301(1)(b),
9-401(1), 9-402; § 9-301(1)(b) (1979).
[5] Bankruptcy 51 2722
51 Bankruptcy
51V The Estate
51V(H) Avoidance Rights
51V(H)2 Proceedings
51k2722 k. Time Limitations; Compu-
tation. Most Cited Cases
Debtor-in-possession's use of trustee's power to
avoid creditor's unperfected security interest, after
confirmation of Chapter 11 case, would promote
success of reorganization plan, rather than merely
benefiting debtor, and thus, strong arm provision
could be applied by debtor-in-possession postcon-
firmation; recovery by debtor would improve debt-
or's financial health to extent of recovery, increas-
ing likelihood that debtor's reorganization would be
successful and that debtor would be able to make
deferred plan payments. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 544(a)(1), 1107(a).
[6] Secured Transactions 349A 92.1
349A Secured Transactions
349AII Perfection of Security Interest
349Ak92 Financing Statement
349Ak92.1 k. In General. Most Cited
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
Cases
(Formerly 349Ak92)
Even if reservation of title in lease, which was in-
tended as security agreement, were security in-
terest, financing statement would still be required in
order to perfect creditor's security interest under
Maryland law. Md.Code, Commercial Law, §§
201(37), 9-402.
*466 James A. Vidmar, Jr., Silver Spring, Md.,
Lawrence D. Coppel, and Jonathan N. Portner, Gor-
don, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander,
Baltimore, Md., for debtor.
Lawrence F. Regan, Jr., Garza and Regan, P.A.,
Rockville, Md., for defendants.
*467 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
E. STEPHEN DERBY, Bankruptcy Judge.
The issues raised by this adversary proceeding in-
volve the effect on perfection of a security interest
in equipment, vis a vis the debtor-in-possession, of
a UCC financing statement filed under a trade name
of the debtor.
The Debtor, Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc., has filed a
complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) to avoid a lien
of defendant Raymond Leasing Corporation
(“Raymond”) in certain equipment, and proceeds
thereof. Debtor contends the lien was not perfected
prepetition and is therefore void against Debtor, as
representative of its bankruptcy estate. Raymond
offers several defenses in the alternative:
First, the filing of a UCC financing statement under
a principal trade name of the Debtor can operate to
perfect a security interest under Maryland law;
Second, the Debtor's actual knowledge of the secur-
ity interest is imputed to the debtor-in-possession
and defeats Debtor's avoidance power under 11
U.S.C. § 544(a);
Third, since Debtor's reorganization plan has been

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
confirmed, avoidance of Raymond's security in-
terest would create a windfall for Debtor and would
not benefit creditors. Therefore, Raymond's secur-
ity interest should be enforced as between Ray-
mond and Debtor; and
Fourth, reservation of title in the lease agreement
with Debtor was sufficient to establish an enforce-
able security interest.
I.
Findings of Fact
At all times in 1987 and 1988 prior to filing its peti-
tion initiating this case, Debtor was a consumer
owned cooperative engaged in the retail furniture
business with 15 stores and 3 warehouses. It en-
gaged in business under the trade name of SCAN,
and it was well known among consumers by the
name SCAN. Debtor's written promotional material
identified it as SCAN, a division of Greenbelt Co-
operative, Inc. Its order forms, stationery, and busi-
ness cards, as well as the name on its headquarters
building in Savage, Maryland, carried similar dual
identification. Checks used to pay vendors carried
the name Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc., and the tele-
phones were answered by operators who recited
Greenbelt Cooperative. Debtor's annual report for
1987 identified it as Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc.
and contained text references to SCAN's activities.
This report was circulated to all 115,000 of Debt-
or's members and any vendors who requested it.
Under date of May 4, 1987, Debtor executed a con-
tract denominated an equipment lease with defend-
ant Werres Corporation (“Werres”). At the conclu-
sion of the lease term, Debtor could purchase the
equipment, which consisted of forklifts, racking
and related items, for $1.00. The court has previ-
ously granted partial summary judgment for Debtor
that this contract was intended as a security agree-
ment for the purchase price, and it was not a true
lease. On July 6, 1987 a financing statement was
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Page 3
filed with the proper office, namely, the Maryland
State Department of Assessments and Taxation, in
favor of Werres as secured party and Raymond as
assignee. Werres has duly assigned the contract to
Raymond, and in fact originally entered into the
agreement for Raymond and with Raymond's ap-
proval.
The contract forwarded to Debtor by Werres for ex-
ecution identified the lessee on the heading and sig-
nature line as Scan Furniture. Likewise, on the fin-
ancing statement Scan Furniture was listed as the
debtor. When the signature lines on an addendum to
the lease and on the financing statement were com-
pleted, it appears someone at Debtor's offices typed
in SCAN Furniture, Inc., since the type face is dif-
ferent and these portions had not been completed
when the documents were forwarded to Debtor for
signature.
Apparently, Raymond and then Werres became
concerned about what entity was responsible for the
debt. Raymond's credit department reported intern-
ally that it had no financial information other than
sales *468 figures on Scan Furniture, and thus it
would require individual financials on Scan Fur-
niture or a guarantee from Greenbelt Cooperative,
which it described as the parent company. At the
request of Werres, by letter dated June 16, 1987,
Debtor confirmed to Werres “that Greenbelt Co-
operative, Inc. is responsible for the obligations of
Scan Furniture as related to the Raymond Leasing
Agreement”. Thereafter, the financing statement
was filed listing Scan Furniture as the debtor, and
there was never an additional filing which in any
way identified Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc. as the
debtor.
Two gentlemen with extensive experience in equip-
ment leasing, William Single, Esquire, for Debtor
and George L. Beck, for defendants, were in sub-
stantial agreement. Each testified that his practice
in searching liens was to obtain a debtor/lessee's
legal name and to check both the legal name and
known trade names. Mr. Single testified further that
his practice was to file financing statements under

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
both the legal and trade names of a lessee. Werres
and Raymond knew an entity known as Greenbelt
Cooperative, Inc. was involved in the subject trans-
action and that Scan Furniture was lacking finan-
cials. The court concludes that a careful lessor
would have inquired as to the legal name of the en-
tity with which it was dealing and would have filed
a financing statement in that name. Defendants did
not exercise the degree of care in documenting this
transaction which is recommended by experienced
equipment lessors.
As between the parties, Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc.
knew it had by agreement pledged the equipment to
secure payment of a debt to Raymond. There were
no intervening claimants prepetition, and Raymond
could have enforced its security interest in the
equipment as against a claim of Greenbelt Cooper-
ative, Inc. prior to the filing of the petition institut-
ing this case. The questions raised here involve the
effect of the bankruptcy filing on Raymond's secur-
ity interest, which was perfected in the name of
Scan Furniture and not in the name of Greenbelt
Cooperative, Inc., the legal entity.
The Debtor filed this case on November 4, 1988.
After filing Debtor and Raymond agreed to sell the
equipment at public auction and to hold the pro-
ceeds in escrow. The sale was on February 22,
1989. Thereafter, on June 2, 1989 Debtor filed this
complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) seeking a de-
termination, inter alia, that the recorded financing
statement in a trade name was not sufficient to cre-
ate a perfected lien or security interest in the equip-
ment as against the debtor-in-possession, as trustee
of the bankruptcy estate. On November 20, 1989
Debtor's Second Amended Joint Plan, as interlin-
eated, which had been filed on September 26, 1989,
was confirmed.
II.
Conclusions of Law
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Page 4
A.
[1] Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc. argues that a finan-
cing statement filed under the trade name of a debt-
or, as opposed to its legal name, can never be suffi-
cient to perfect a security interest under Maryland
law. Such a conclusion would amount to a per se
rule, and it is not accepted by this court as an accur-
ate statement of the rule which Maryland courts
would apply. This court envisions limited situations
in which the filing of a financing statement under
the trade name of a debtor may perfect the security
interest of a creditor. These occasions, however,
would be limited to situations where the legal name
of a debtor and the trade or other name under which
the financing statement is filed are sufficiently sim-
ilar that a subsequent creditor searching with refer-
ence to the debtor's legal name would find the fin-
ancing statement or information which would put
the creditor on notice that a more thorough search
should be conducted.
The provision of the Uniform Commercial Code
which describes financing statements is ambiguous
and left to the courts to construe. Maryland Com-
mercial Law Code Ann. § 9-402 (1990 Cum.Supp.),
which recites the formal requisites of a financing
statement and was in effect at all times applicable,
states in part:
*469 (1) A financing statement is sufficient if it
gives the names of the debtor and the secured
party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of
the secured party from which information con-
cerning the security interest may be obtained,
gives a mailing address of the debtor and con-
tains a statement indicating the types, or describ-
ing the items, of collateral.
******
(8) A financing statement substantially comply-
ing with the requirements of this section is effect-
ive even though it contains minor errors which
are not seriously misleading. (Emphasis sup-

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
plied.)
Section 9-401(1) says explicitly only what is suffi-
cient, and not what is necessary, to perfect a secur-
ity interest. See, e.g., Note, Trade Name Filing:
Should It Be Sufficient to Perfect A Security Interest
Under U.C.C. Section 9-402?, 35 Case
W.Res.L.Rev. 51 (1984). This court is not aware of
reported Maryland cases which have addressed the
specific issue presented here.
In construing the statute, the court should be sensit-
ive to its intended purpose and administration. The
purpose of the statute is to give notice to third
parties of a security interest held by a creditor in
the assets of a particular debtor. Official Comment
No. 2, Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 9-402 (1975);
Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, 244 Md. 556, 563, 224
A.2d 464 (1966). If a filing fails of this purpose,
then it should not be effective. However, if a filing
under a trade name actually would put a creditor on
notice of a security interest in the assets of the debt-
or, then that filing, having fulfilled its purpose un-
der the statute, may be effective. Thus, courts have
held that a filing under a trade name, if sufficient to
put a reasonably diligent creditor on notice of a se-
curity interest, may be effective, although it other-
wise would not be. For example, in the case of In re
Platt, 257 F.Supp. 478 (E.D.Pa.1966), the legal
name was the personal name of the debtor, Henry
Platt. Mr. Platt used two trade names, Platt Fur Co.
and Kenwell Fur Novelty Co. Id. at 482. The court
distinguished between the two trade names, noting
that:
The use of Kenwell as the debtor would clearly
have left F.C.A. without a perfected security in-
terest. However, the name Platt Fur Co. is suffi-
ciently related to the name of the debtor, Henry
Platt, to require those who search the records to
make further investigation. Furthermore, the Ref-
eree found that the name was “not seriously mis-
leading,” the criterion for effectiveness under §
9-402(5).
Id.
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Page 5
[2] Maryland's version of the Uniform Commercial
Code is consistent when it incorporates a substan-
tial compliance test for financing statements.
Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 9-402(8), quoted above.
Thus, where a filing is not misleading, it may be ef-
fective to perfect a security interest. Cf., Plemens,
244 Md. at 566, 224 A.2d 464 (where Maryland's
Court of Appeals, in rejecting the challenge of a
trustee for the benefit of creditors to a financing
statement claiming the signature was ineffective,
stated: “There is nothing in the evidence to indicate
that any one searching the records would be misled
by the fact that the signature did not relate to the
representative capacity of Mr. Slatkoff.”)
While there is authority that where a business has
been conducted in a community consistently under
a trade name for an extended period, a financing
statement filed under that trade name is sufficient to
perfect a security interest, see In re McBee, 714
F.2d 1316 (5th Cir.1983), the weight of authority is
that a financing statement must be filed under the
legal name of the debtor to be sufficient, unless the
names are so close that a filing under the trade
name of the debtor is a minor error. See In re
Leichter, 471 F.2d 785 (2nd Cir.1972) (where the
court held that, since Leichter and not Landman
was the legal debtor, omitting to file under Leichter
was not simply a minor error within § 9-402(5));
and In re Hill, 363 F.Supp. 1205 (N.D.Miss.1973)
(holding that although a store had been doing busi-
ness under the same trade name in the same loca-
tion for two years prior to bankruptcy, a financing
statement which was filed only *470 under the
debtor's trade name rendered the creditor's claim
unenforceable against the trustee).
Raymond urges the court to follow Matter of
Glasco, Inc., 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1981). The
standard adopted by the court in Glasco was “...
whether potential creditors would have been misled
as a result of the name the debtor was listed by in
the bank's financing statement.” Id. at 796.
However, the court imposed a further requirement
that potential creditors also be reasonably prudent.

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
In Glasco, the court held that where a debtor held
itself out to creditors as “Elite Boats, Division of
Glasco, Inc.” reasonably prudent creditors would be
required to search under the trade name, “Elite
Boats” in addition to its legal name, “Glasco, Inc.”
Id.
A rule such as that articulated by the Fifth Circuit
in Glasco, and followed in McBee, would introduce
uncertainty into commercial transactions. A secured
creditor, to be assured of protection for its security
interest priority, would be at risk to identify and
search under all trade names by which a corporate
entity might be known. This is a particularly oner-
ous and unrealistic for nonlocal financial institu-
tions, such as Raymond in this case, which are not
familiar with the conduct of local businesses.
Considering ease of administration of the statute, it
would appear much more efficient and certain to re-
quire all concerned parties to operate with reference
to the legal name of the debtor. If a creditor is al-
lowed to file the financing statement under a trade
name of the debtor, then each subsequent creditor
will need to determine and check under both the
trade name, perhaps more than one, and the legal
name of a debtor. It would be more straight forward
for the original creditor and each subsequent credit-
or to determine the legal name of the debtor and file
and search under that one name.
This court concludes a Maryland court would apply
a rule which requires, for it to be effective, that a
financing statement be filed either under the legal
name of the debtor or under a name which is sub-
stantially similar to the legal name of the debtor, so
that it would not mislead a reasonably diligent cred-
itor searching the financing records. A creditor
should only be required to search under the legal
name of a debtor to obtain notice of a security in-
terest or to be put on notice to inquire further. Such
a rule follows the weight of authority, it makes
commercial sense, it promotes uniformity, and it is
sufficiently flexible to accommodate minor errors
and oversights which are not misleading.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 6
The conclusion here is consistent with dictum of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the
recent case of In re Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d
1430 (4th Cir.1990) where the court held under Vir-
ginia law that the secured creditor's use of its trade
name on the financing statement was not seriously
misleading. Id. at 1435. After quoting from Sec-
tions 9-402(1) and 9-402(8) of Virginia's Uniform
Commercial Code, which are worded identically to
the comparable Maryland sections quoted above, in
considering the name used by the secured party the
court explained:
The issue is “whether or not ‘a reasonably dili-
gent searcher’ would be misled by the irregular-
ity.” In re Bosson, 432 F.Supp. 1013, 1017
(D.Conn.1977) (quoting J. White & R. Summers,
Handbook of the Law Under The Uniform Com-
mercial Code 839 (1972)). This is determined on
a case by case basis. The rationale for this min-
imal threshold is that the financing statement is
designed to “indicate[ ] merely that the secured
party who has filed may have a security interest
in the collateral described. Further inquiry from
the parties concerned will be necessary to dis-
close the complete state of affairs.” Official
Comment # 2, Va.Code § 8.9-402. See also In re
Varney Wood Prods., Inc., 458 F.2d 435 (4th
Cir.1972); Hixon v. Credit Alliance Corp., 235
Va. 466, 369 S.E.2d 169 (1988).
Some courts have found that the use of the
debtor's trade name on the financing statement
is “seriously misleading” and not “minor er-
ror.” See, e.g., Pearson v. Salina Coffee House,
Inc., 831 F.2d 1531 (10th Cir.1987); In *471 re
Thomas, 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.1972); and Greg
Restaurant Equipment & Supplies, Inc. v. Val-
way, 144 Vt. 59, 472 A.2d 1241 (1984).
However, others have upheld the use of a debt-
or's trade name. See, e.g., In re Glasco, Inc.,
642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.1981). The court's con-
cern is understandable, because a prospective
creditor checking to see if a financing state-
ment has been filed may look only under the

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
debtor's real name, not the debtor's trade
name, and thereby miss the filing altogether.
However, the use of the secured party's (as op-
posed to the debtor's) trade name is much less
troubling, in part because the financing state-
ment still gives notice that the debtor's assets
may be encumbered and that further inquiry is
warranted.
Id. at 1434-1435. (Emphasis supplied.)
[3] Although courts, under Maryland law, may on
some occasions accept a filing under a variation on
a debtor's legal name which would put a reasonably
diligent creditor on inquiry notice of a possible se-
curity interest, a filing under SCAN would not be
found by those looking for security interests in the
assets of Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc. Consequently,
Raymond's financing statement was not sufficient
to perfect its security interest in Debtor's assets
against the claims of others.
B.
[4] The Debtor's actual knowledge of Raymond's
security interest is not imputed to the debtor-
in-possession and does not defeat the avoidance
power of Greenbelt Cooperative, Inc., as debtor-
in-possession, under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). The
contrary position asserted by Raymond is squarely
in conflict with the language of Section 544(a):
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commence-
ment of the case, and without regard to any
knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer
of property of the debtor or any obligation in-
curred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at
the time of the commencement of the case, and
that obtains, at such time and with respect to
such credit, a judicial lien on all property on
which a creditor on a simple contract could
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or
not such a creditor exists; .... (Emphasis sup-
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Page 7
plied.)
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a), the debtor-
in-possession has all the rights and powers, and
shall perform all the functions and duties of a trust-
ee, with certain exceptions not material here.
Section 544(a) is often referred to as the strong arm
clause. The reason for this term is that the trustee in
bankruptcy stands in the shoes of a hypothetical ju-
dicial lien creditor.
The reason for the trustee's enhanced position is
due to the trustee's unique position as the caretaker
of the estate and the trustee's responsibility to pre-
serve the estate's assets for the benefit of all credit-
ors. See In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.,
Inc., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied sub
nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct.
147, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987). The trustee is thus giv-
en the power and ability to avoid all unperfected se-
curity interests. The trustee is an entity distinct
from the debtor, even where the debtor, as debtor-
in-possession, is acting as trustee and the debtor
had actual knowledge of an unperfected security in-
terest. If a case concludes unsuccessfully with a
dismissal, so that the avoidance of a transfer is no
longer beneficial to creditors, but only to the debt-
or, a transfer avoided under Section 544(a) is rein-
stated. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B). This prevents a
windfall for a debtor outside a bankruptcy case.
Raymond's reliance on In re Hartman Paving, Inc.,
745 F.2d 307 (4th Cir.1984) (Winter, C.J., dissent-
ing) is misplaced because the issues in Hartman in-
volved: (1) avoidance powers of a bona fide pur-
chaser under Section 544(a)(3); and (2) intricacies
of West Virginia real property conveyance law. See
*472In re Millerburg, 61 B.R. 125, 127-28
(Bankr.E.D.N.C.1986). Contra Hartman Paving,
see In re Probasco, 839 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 n. 2
(9th Cir.1988). This adversary proceeding was
brought pursuant to Section 544(a)(1), and it con-
cerns the status of a hypothetical judicial lien cred-
itor on the petition date. Under Maryland law a ju-
dicial lien creditor would have priority over an un-

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
perfected security interest in personal property, and
knowledge is not a factor. Md.Com.Law Code Ann.
§ 9-301(1)(b) (1990 Cum.Supp.). Compare
Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 9-301(1)(b) (1975), be-
fore it was amended by Md.Laws 1980, Ch. 824 to
delete the phrase “without knowledge of the secur-
ity interest.”
C.
[5] Raymond's third argument is that the trustee's
power of avoidance may not be used by a debtor-
in-possession under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) to glean a
windfall for the debtor, but it should only be used
in furtherance of equitable distribution of the debt-
or's assets among creditors. A leading case support-
ing this proposition is Matter of Vintero Corp., 735
F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S.
1087, 105 S.Ct. 592, 83 L.Ed.2d 702 (1984), which
involved a filing lapse under Maryland law of a
creditor's security interest in a ship.
In Vintero, the court began with the premise that a
debtor-in-possession under the former Bankruptcy
Act was given the right of an ideal judicial lien
creditor to avoid an unperfected security interest.
Id. at 741-42. However, the purpose of this power
was to benefit third party creditors, not to create a
windfall for the debtor itself. Id. at 742. The Second
Circuit held that a nonrecourse secured creditor's
failure to file a financing statement in Maryland,
after the debtor, Vintero, moved a ship in which the
creditor had a security interest to Maryland, did not
preclude the creditor from making a claim in the es-
tate of the Chapter XI debtor. Although “[w]hen
Vintero assumed the status of a debtor-
in-possession, it became vested with the rights and
powers of a trustee,” and “had all the rights that an
ideal judicial lien creditor would have as of the fil-
ing of Vintero's petition,” Vintero was not itself an
ideal judicial lien creditor, although it could exer-
cise the rights of one. 735 F.2d at 741-742. The
court reasoned that “[f]iling requirements are for
the benefit of third parties, not the debtor. U.C.C. §
9-301.” Id. at 742.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 8
The court continued, quoting Clark, The Law of Se-
cured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code Paragraph 3.2[2], at 3-8 (1980): “ ‘The secur-
ity interest need not be perfected to be enforceable
against the debtor; perfection is important only in-
sofar as adverse third parties have entered the pic-
ture.’ ” Id. at 742. The analysis of the court is set
forth below:
Vintero was given the right to avoid CVF's secur-
ity interest in order to protect such third parties,
not to create a windfall for Vintero itself. See
Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 179
F.2d 582, 584 (2d. Cir.1950). Vintero suffered no
prejudice because of the lapse in filing, and we
see no reason why it should benefit from such
lapse. See In re Fried Furniture Corp., 293
F.Supp. 92, 93 (E.D.N.Y.1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d
360 (2d. Cir.1969) (per curiam). To the extent
that other creditors of Vintero are not affected ad-
versely by enforcement of CVF's security in-
terest, there is no reason why such interest should
not be enforced. Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, supra, 179 F.2d at 584.
******
A bankruptcy court has broad equitable powers
which may be invoked to see “that substance will
not give way to form, that technical considera-
tions will not prevent substantial justice from be-
ing done.”
Id. If the lien was avoided, the claim against Vin-
tero would have been extinguished in its entirety
because of its nonrecourse nature. Therefore, while
Vintero could assert the rights of an ideal judicial
lien creditor to prevent the secured creditor from
obtaining priority of payment over other, unsecured
creditors, the unperfected secured creditor was en-
titled to share pro rata with them and the creditor's
claim was *473 recognized to “... preclude the pos-
sibility of Vintero reaping an undeserved windfall.”
Id. at 743.
While the equitable principles enunciated in Vin-

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
tero have not been altered by the Bankruptcy Code,
the court does not find them applicable in this case.
The controlling standard is not, as Raymond con-
tends, whether the avoidance of Raymond's lien
either will result in a greater promised payment to
other creditors or is necessary to make promised
plan payments. Rather, the controlling standard is
whether there will be some benefit to creditors from
the avoidance. The latter standard has been satisfied
here.
This is a case under Chapter 11, where the acknow-
ledged purpose is a successful reorganization. As
stated in the House Report for the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978:
The purpose of a business reorganization case,
unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a busi-
ness's finances so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors,
and produce a return for its stockholders. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets
that are used for production in the industry for
which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap. Often, the return
on assets that a business can produce is inad-
equate to compensate those who have invested in
the business. Cash flow problems may develop,
and require creditors of the business, both trade
creditors and long-term lenders, to wait for pay-
ment of their claims. If the business can extend or
reduce its debts, it often can be returned to a vi-
able state. It is more economically efficient to re-
organize than to liquidate, because it preserves
jobs and assets.
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., Ch. 5,
Pt. I at 220. (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-
min.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6179. Debtor's plan re-
quires deferred payments to certain classes of cred-
itors. It also provided substantial cash payments to
creditors on its effective date. A recovery by Debt-
or in this proceeding will improve Debtor's finan-
cial health to the extent of the recovery. It will
thereby increase the likelihood that Debtor's reor-
ganization will be successful and that Debtor will
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 9
be able to make its deferred plan payments.
Further, the possibility of recovery in this proceed-
ing was a factor available to creditors in negotiating
or eliciting more favorable plan terms than Debtor
might otherwise have proposed. There was an act-
ive committee of creditors, and Debtor's complaint
was filed before the confirmation hearing. The
postpetition timing of the hearing and decision in
this case should not affect the merits of Debtor's
avoidance claim. It is benefit to Debtor's successful
reorganization which is the determinative element.
A case which contains many similarities to the in-
stant proceeding is In re Funding Systems Asset
Management Corp., 111 B.R. 500
(Bankr.W.D.Pa.1990). In Funding Systems, the
debtor equipment lessor sought, under 11 U.S.C. §
544(a)(1), to avoid security interests it had granted
to Chemical in several computer leases because
Chemical had failed to perfect its security interests
as of the petition date. Id. at 502. The adversary
proceeding was commenced before confirmation of
Funding Systems' plan, but it was decided after
confirmation. The court found Chemical had failed
to perfect its security interest in most of the leases
prepetition. Therefore, the court held, inter alia,
that Chemical became an unsecured creditor as to
those leases on the petition date because of its fail-
ure to perfect; its rights in the leases became subor-
dinate to those of Funding Systems; and its security
interests could be avoided under Section 544(a)(1).
Id. at 522.
Chemical maintained, nevertheless, that lien avoid-
ance should not be permitted where it benefited
only the debtor and was not necessary for the debt-
or to meet its obligations to other creditors. Id. at
523. The court in Funding Systems rejected Chem-
ical's contention. Id. Its explanation is applicable in
the instant situation.
This is not the appropriate standard for determ-
ining whether recovery by *474 Debtor in this in-
stance would benefit its unsecured creditors. The
necessity of such recovery in order for Debtor to

124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)
be able to meet its obligation to unsecured credit-
ors is not relevant. What matters is whether unse-
cured creditors will receive “... some benefit from
the recovery of the preferences, even if it is not
an increase in the amount the creditors will re-
ceive.” In re Centennial Industries, Inc., 12 B.R.
99, 102 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981). All that is re-
quired is that recovery by Debtor will increase its
assets and improve its financial health to the ex-
tent that the likelihood is improved of its being
able to satisfy its obligations to its creditors un-
der the Plan. In re Tennesse Wheel & Rubber Co.,
64 B.R. 721, 724 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1986), aff'd
mem., 75 B.R. 1 (M.D.Tenn.1987), citing, In re
Southern Indus. Banking Corp., 59 B.R. 638
(Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1986).
Id.
The equitable principles applied in the Vintero case
were followed in In re Chapman, 51 B.R. 663
(Bankr.D.C.1985) where a Chapter 13 debtor was
not allowed to apply the strong arm clause of 11
U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) to avoid a third trust lien on the
debtor's residence. The debtor's plan proposed to
pay the only unsecured creditor just $1.00; but be-
cause the unsecured creditor had not filed a claim
before the bar date, it in fact would receive nothing.
Id. at 665. Since debtor's plan provided only de
minimis benefit, if any, to only one general creditor,
and since avoidance of the lien would benefit only
the debtor, the court found Section 544(a)(3) should
not be applied to invalidate the third trust. Id. at
666. Further, in Chapman, and as the court stated in
Vintero, 735 F.2d at 742, no creditor would be ad-
versely affected by enforcement of the unperfected
lien against the debtor. Chapman, 51 B.R. at 666.
Another situation where Vintero's equitable prin-
ciples might be applicable suggested in In re
Howard's Appliance Corp., 874 F.2d 88, 95 (2nd
Cir.1989) is where the debtor is estopped by its
own misconduct from seeking lien avoidance for its
own benefit.
None of these considerations for not applying the
strong arm clause of 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) are ap-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 10
plicable in the instant proceeding. Rather, permit-
ting debtor to exercise its avoidance powers will
promote the success of the reorganization plan.
D.
[6] Raymond argues finally that a reservation of
title under a lease is a security interest. Maryland
Commercial Law Code Ann. § 1-201(37)
(Supp.1990) defines the term “security interest” in
part as:
[A]n agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has
the option to become the owner of the property
for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended
for security.
The argument that the lease created a security in-
terest does not bolster Raymond's position. What
the cases cited by Raymond do not contradict is that
where a lease is intended as a security agreement, a
financing statement still must be filed in order to
perfect the creditor's security interest.
Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 9-402. Consequently,
the question still remains whether Raymond's se-
curity interest was perfected, and for the reasons
previously set forth, the court finds it was not.
III.
Summary
In summary, Raymond's security interest in the
equipment under lease to Greenbelt Cooperative,
Inc. is valid against that company, but it was not
perfected under Maryland law against third party
creditors. Therefore, it may be avoided by Debtor,
in its capacity as debtor-in-possession, under 11
U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). Since avoidance of Raymond's
security interest will enhance the likelihood of
Debtor's successful reorganization, avoidance does
not constitute a windfall to Debtor without benefit
 Page 11
124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Cite as: 124 B.R. 465)

to creditors, and equitable principles do not bar

avoidance. As the assets in which Raymond had an
unperfected security interest were sold and the pro-
ceeds put in escrow, *475 the proceeds of the es-
crow account should be distributed to Debtor.

Counsel for Debtor is requested to submit a form of

order to implement this decision.

Bkrtcy.D.Md.,1991.
In re Greenbelt Co-op., Inc.
124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC
Rep.Serv.2d 920

END OF DOCUMENT

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Chapter 15 Secured Transaction. Priority creditors and perfected security interests

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 Date of Printing: Oct 26, 2010

KEYCITE

In re Greenbelt Co-op., Inc., 124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Bankr.D.Md.,Feb 12, 1991) (NO. 88-5-3199-SD, A89-0186-SD)
History

Direct History

=> 1 In re Greenbelt Co-op., Inc., 124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Bankr.D.Md. Feb 12, 1991) (NO. 88-5-3199-SD, A89-0186-SD)

Negative Citing References (U.S.A.)

Declined to Extend by
2 Rinn v. First Union Nat. Bank of Maryland, 176 B.R. 401, 25 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1057 (D.Md. Jan
05, 1995) (NO. CIV. A. MJG-94-2030) HN: 4 (B.R.)
3 In re Coleman, 285 B.R. 892, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6819 (Bankr.W.D.Va. Sep 17, 2002) (NO.
7-01-00047, 7-01-01199-WSB-11) HN: 5 (B.R.)
Distinguished by
4 Dunes Hotel Associates v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492 (D.S.C. Feb 18, 2000) (NO. C/A
2:98-535-18) HN: 5 (B.R.)
5 In re Levitsky, 401 B.R. 695 (Bankr.D.Md. Sep 30, 2008) (NO. 04-16203-JS, ADV. 04-2024,
ADV.05-1254) HN: 1,3,4 (B.R.)

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Database: KEYCITE-HIST-IMG
Citation Text: 124 B.R. 465
Service: KeyCite
Lines: 1
Documents: 1
Images: 1

Chapter 15 Secured Transaction. Priority creditors and perfected security interests

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West and their affiliates.
 Date of Printing: Oct 26, 2010

KEYCITE

In re Greenbelt Co-op., Inc., 124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Bankr.D.Md., Feb 12, 1991) (NO. 88-5-3199-SD, A89-0186-SD)

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Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for PATRON ACCESS,-

Date/Time of Request: Tuesday, October 26, 2010 13:08 Eastern

Client Identifier: PATRON ACCESS
Database: KEYCITE-REFS
Citation Text: 124 B.R. 465
Service: KeyCite
Lines: 219
Documents: 1
Images: 0

Chapter 15 Secured Transaction. Priority creditors and perfected security interests

The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters,
West and their affiliates.
 Date of Printing: Oct 26, 2010

KEYCITE

In re Greenbelt Co-op., Inc., 124 B.R. 465, Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,853, 14 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 920
(Bankr.D.Md. Feb 12, 1991) (NO. 88-5-3199-SD, A89-0186-SD)
Citing References

Negative Cases (U.S.A.)

Declined to Extend by
1 In re Coleman, 285 B.R. 892, 911+, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6819, 2002-6819+ (Bankr.W.D.Va. Sep
17, 2002) (NO. 7-01-00047, 7-01-01199-WSB-11) HN: 5 (B.R.)
2 Rinn v. First Union Nat. Bank of Maryland, 176 B.R. 401, 411, 25 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1057, 1057
(D.Md. Jan 05, 1995) (NO. CIV. A. MJG-94-2030) HN: 4 (B.R.)

Distinguished by
3 In re Levitsky, 401 B.R. 695, 717+ (Bankr.D.Md. Sep 30, 2008) (NO. 04-16203-JS, ADV.
04-2024, ADV.05-1254) HN: 1,3,4 (B.R.)
4 Dunes Hotel Associates v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492, 508+ (D.S.C. Feb 18, 2000) (NO. C/A
2:98-535-18) " HN: 5 (B.R.)

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

Examined
5 In re Glanz, 205 B.R. 750, 753+, 30 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 618, 618+ (Bankr.D.Md. Feb 26, 1997) (NO.
95-1-6794-DK, 96-1-A198-DK) " HN: 4,5 (B.R.)

Discussed
6 In re Derrick, 190 B.R. 346, 351+, 34 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 1429, 1429+ (Bankr.W.D.Wis. Oct
13, 1995) (NO. 93-10404-12, A93-1028-12) " HN: 4 (B.R.)
7 In re Smith, 155 B.R. 145, 148+ (Bankr.S.D.W.Va. Jun 01, 1993) (NO. 92-0114, 92-20159) "
HN: 4,5 (B.R.)

Cited
8 In re CL Furniture Galleries, Inc., 1995 WL 756853, *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec 20, 1995) (NO. 95 C
50103) HN: 1 (B.R.)
9 In re Harstad, 1994 WL 526013, *1 (D.Minn. Jan 20, 1994) (NO. BKY 4-90-869, CIV. 3-93-512)
HN: 5 (B.R.)
10 In re Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc., 159 B.R. 948, 952, 22 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 605, 605 (W.D.Okla.
Oct 19, 1993) (NO. BK-93-1054-BH, CIV-93-1560-A) HN: 1 (B.R.)

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

11 In re Wilkinson, 186 B.R. 186, 192+, 8 Fourth Cir. & D.C. Bankr. 134, 134+ (Bankr.D.Md. Jul
12, 1995) (NO. 94-1-3079-DK, 94-1A-794-DK) HN: 4 (B.R.)
12 In re Cumberland Management Group, Inc., 276 B.R. 127, 132 (Bankr.N.D.Miss. Dec 28, 2000)
(NO. 00-1072) HN: 4 (B.R.)
13 In re Kennedy Inn Associates, 221 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Jun 12, 1998) (NO. 97 B
40148 (TLB), 97-8646A) HN: 4 (B.R.)
14 In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 203 B.R. 30, 36, 32 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 331, 331
(Bankr.N.D.N.Y. Oct 22, 1996) (NO. 96-61376, 96-61377, 96-61378, 96-61379)
15 In re Dunes Hotel Associates, 194 B.R. 967, 980 (Bankr.D.S.C. Aug 25, 1995) (NO. 95-8042,
CIV. A. 94-75715) HN: 4 (B.R.)
16 In re Wellington Apartment, LLC, 350 B.R. 213, 243+ (Bankr.E.D.Va. Aug 24, 2006) (NO.
04-50301-DHA, 05-5029) " HN: 4 (B.R.)

Mentioned
17 In re Chama, Inc., 265 B.R. 662, 668, 46 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 278, 278 (Bankr.D.Del. Apr 26,
2000) (NO. 98-2252 (MFW), A-99-301 (MFW)) HN: 5 (B.R.)

Secondary Sources (U.S.A.)

18 Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition s 31:67, In Chapter 11 (2010) HN: 5 (B.R.)
19 Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition s 31:73, Actual notice or knowledge--Imputation of notice
or knowledge (2010)
20 Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition s 42:338, Rights as bona fide purchaser and hypothetical li-
en creditor; strong-arm clause of Code s544(a), generally--Standards pursuant to which avoid-
ance power may be utilized (2010) HN: 4 (B.R.)
21 Chapter 11: Reorganizations, Second Edition s 9:18, Avoidance powers--Trustee as hypothetical
creditor or purchaser (2010) HN: 4 (B.R.)
22 Commercial Bankruptcy Litigation s 11:5, Trustee's status as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor
(2010) HN: 4 (B.R.)
23 Corporate Counsel's Guide to Uniform Commercial Code s 24:27, Financing statements--Debtor's
name (2009) HN: 1,3 (B.R.)
24 Documenting Secured Transactions s 9:3.2, Prior Law (2010) HN: 1,3,4 (B.R.)
25 1992 Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 19, SECTIONS 544, 545, 546, 547, 549 AND
550-THE AVOIDANCE POWERS (1992)
26 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3d s 63:4, Standing to bring Code s544 avoidance action
(2010) HN: 4 (B.R.)
27 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 3d s 63:5, Hypothetical lien creditor (Code s544(a)) (2010)
HN: 5 (B.R.)
28 Maryland Law Encyclopedia Secured Transactions s 11, Filing and perfection -- Filing under
trade name of debtor (2010)
29 U.C.C. ARTICLE 9-PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURED TRANSACTIONS, 47 Bus. Law.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 1593, 1644+ (1992) HN: 1,3,4 (B.R.)
30 RECOVERING AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS UNDER SECTION 550 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: DEFINING "FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ESTATE", 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 591, 610+
(1996) HN: 5 (B.R.)
31 BANKRUPTCY'S ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 549, 623 (1999) HN: 5
(B.R.)
32 Lien Avoidance "for the Benefit of the Estate": Textualism, Equitable Powers, and Code Com-
mon Law, 26 Bankruptcy Law Letter 1+ (2006) HN: 4,5 (B.R.)
33 207 BNA Daily Report for Executives K-6, 2002, BANKRUPTCY: FACTS. (2002) HN: 5
(B.R.)
34 207 BNA Daily Tax Report K-6, 2002, BANKRUPTCY: FACTS. (2002) HN: 5 (B.R.)
35 GOMF MD. Inst. for Contin. Prof. Educ. of Lawyers 1079, EXCEPTIONS (2004) HN: 4 (B.R.)
36 BKR MD. Inst. for Contin. Prof. Educ. of Lawyers S-259, PART 6 TRUSTEE IN BANK-
RUPTCY (1999) HN: 4 (B.R.)
37 GOMF MD. Inst. for Contin. Prof. Educ. of Lawyers S-261, EXCEPTIONS (1999) HN: 4 (B.R.)
38 PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, 665 Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice 65 (1993) HN:
1,3 (B.R.)

Court Documents

Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Appellate Briefs
39 In Re: Molly Jane COLEMAN, Debtor; Roger Coleman, Plaintiff, Molly Jane Coleman, Debtor-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Community Trust Bank dba Pikeville National Bank & Trust, De-
fendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Internal Revenue Service, Claimant-Appellee, United States
Trustee for the District of Maryland, Trustee., 2004 WL 3489016, *3489016+ (Appellate Brief)
(4th Cir. Sep 29, 2004) Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant (NO. 03-2328(L)) HN: 4,5
(B.R.)
40 In Re: Molly Jane COLEMAN, Debtor; Roger Coleman, Plaintiff, Molly Jane Coleman, Debtor-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Community Trust Bank dba Pikeville National Bank & Trust, De-
fendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Internal Revenue Service, Claimant-Appellee, United States
Trustee for the District of Maryland, Trustee., 2004 WL 3489017, *3489017+ (Appellate Brief)
(4th Cir. Aug 27, 2004) Brief Of Appellant/Cross-Appellee Molly Jane Coleman (NO.
03-2328(L)03-2347) HN: 5 (B.R.)
41 DUNES HOTEL ASSOCIATES a South Carolina general partnership, in its capacity as the Debt-
or-in-Possession, representative of its Estate, Appellant, v. HYATT CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation; and S.C. Hyatt Corporation, a South Carolina corporation, Appellees.,
1997 WL 33619042, *33619042+ (Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. Sep 15, 1997) Appellees' Respons-
ive Brief on Appeal Submitted by Hyatt Corporation and S.C. Hyatt Corporation (NO.
97-1774(L), 97-1943) " HN: 5 (B.R.)

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 42 DUNES HOTEL ASSOCIATES, a South Carolina general partnership, Debtor and Debtor-
In-Possession, Appellant, v. HYATT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, and S.C. Hyatt
Corporation, a South Carolina corporation, Appellees., 1997 WL 33618988, *33618988+
(Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. Aug 11, 1997) Opening Brief Submitted by the Appellant Dunes
Hotel Associates (NO. 97-1774/97-1943) HN: 5 (B.R.)
43 Michael G. RINN, Trustee, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND,
Appellee., 1995 WL 17063737, *17063737+ (Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. Apr 20, 1995) Reply
Brief of Appellant (NO. 95-1197) HN: 5 (B.R.)
44 Michael G. RINN, Trustee, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND,
Appellee., 1995 WL 17169141, *17169141+ (Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. 1995) Brief of Appel-
lant (NO. 95-1197) HN: 4 (B.R.)
45 Stanley F. BOYDSTUN d/b/a Max'S, Ltd., Appellant, v. Hossam MAKKAR, Appellee., 2000
WL 34522071, *34522071+ (Appellate Brief) (Md.App. May 12, 2000) Brief of Appellee (NO.
2262)
46 Stanley F. BOYDSTUN d/b/a Max's, Ltd., Appellant, v. Hossam MAKKAR, Appellee., 2000 WL
34522073, *34522073+ (Appellate Brief) (Md.App. May 12, 2000) Brief of Appellee (NO.
2262)

Trial Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Trial Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits

47 MECCO, INC., Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL HARDWARE SUPPLY, INC. et al., Defendants., 2005
WL 2097061, *2097061 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Md. Jul 06, 2005)
Mecco Inc's Opposition to Colombo Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment and Request
for Discovery to Be Obtained Pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 56(f) (NO. 105-CV-540)
48 In Re: FURLEY'S TRANSPORT, INC., Debtor, Zvi Guttman, Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff/Ap-
pellee, v. CitiCapital Commercial Corporation f/k/a Associates Commercial Corporation, De-
fendant/Appellant., 2001 WL 34882746, *34882746+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affi-
davit) (D.Md. Nov 13, 2001) Brief of Zvi Guttman, Trustee, Appellee (NO. L01-2963)
49 In Re: FURLEY'S TRANSPORT, INC., Debtor(s), Zvi Guttman, Trustee, Plaintiff, v. Associates
Commercial Corp., Defendant., 2001 WL 34883242, *34883242 (Trial Motion, Memorandum
and Affidavit) (D.Md. Oct 05, 2001) Trustee's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment (NO. 01-CV-02963)

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