Case Digests: Medico-legal Aspect of Drugs 9. Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained 4.
t, which contained 4. Precila did not give any statement due to her weak condition
People v. Farhad Hatani
G.R. No. 78813-14, November 8, 1993
Facts:
1. In the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her
camadre, Maura Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves
as medication for her 16-year old daughter Precila, who had
high fever and LBM
2. Upon learning that Precila was sick, Marita, Maura's
daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant
herein, whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita
suggested that her husband treat Precila and Agustina
agreed
3. Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he
examined Precila. He gave her tablets to take and
administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and
the second at noon. After each injection, Precila would feel
dizzy and fall asleep.
4. It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict
and required further observation and treatment. Appellant
offered to attend to Precila at his house and again, Agustina
agreed in the belief that her daughter was a drug addict.
5. In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by
appellant and Marita and was brought to appellant's house.
Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to
sleep. When she awoke, she realized that she was naked and
her entire body was in pain. Appellant was seated on the
bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked, Precila
called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant,
however, punched her on the chest and forced her to lie
down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her
again, causing her to fall asleep.
6. When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in
bed with her. He was naked and fondling her private parts.
The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched
her private parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She
tried to stand up but she was too weak. Appellant gave her
another injection rendering her unconscious.
7. The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon
reaching the Fontreras' residence, she went straight to the
bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found Precila and
appellant both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up
Precila and brought her home
8. That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by
profession, came home and saw Precila looking very weak.
Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had
witnessed that morning. She also told Josefina that
appellant was in the other bedroom, treating another sister,
Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina
immediately proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant
about to inject Wilma.
empty capsules of dalmane and empty vials of valium. She
inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied
that a second shot of plain distilled water was required to
cure Wilma of her drug addiction. Josefina told appellant to
stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she would call
the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then
left the Borja residence.
10. The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and
Wilma to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp
Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma gave their
statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically
examined by a doctor, whose medical report stated that
Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and that
"subject is in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several
needle puncture marks were also found on Precila's arms
and buttocks. A physical examination was likewise done on
Wilma, which showed that she too had a needle puncture,
as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").
11. Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), a surveillance of appellant's
residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant
was secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. Armed with the warrant, CANU
agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.
12. Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as
well as prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap and
other medical instruments, such as a "thermometer, a
"hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles,
were seized.
13. The Handwriting Identification Report on the prescription
slips showed that these were written by the appellant
himself. The report on the chemistry examination of the
seized tablets and capsules confirmed the presence of
mogadon, dalmane and valium.
14. After the preliminary investigation, separate informations
for (1) rape and violation of R.A. No. 2382 were filed.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.
15. The RTC convicted the appellant of both crimes
16. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of both crimes
Held:
1. In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
2. Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only
after four years when she took the witness stand. This
argument is misleading.
3. The record shows that the day after the rape, Josefina and
Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued
their statements at Camp Crame. Agustina gave her
statement twice on separate days.
but it cannot be denied that she was instead physically
examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report
indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that
Precila was no longer a virgin.
5. Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by
Precila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her
mother, her two sisters and the medico-legal report are
sufficient to show probable cause of rape
6. Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was
sexually abused. We find her testimony consistent and
credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when
she would gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such
traumatic incidents would still be engraved on her mind
even four years after.
7. Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family
of his misdeeds is explainable. As correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and incoherent as
a consequence of the injections administered by appellant.
In fact, when Precila was physically examined by the doctor
the day after, she was still sleepy and groggy
8. Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts
allegedly committed by him against Precila, the medico-legal
report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila.
Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the
simple reason that she was under sedation. The absence of
the injuries does not negate the commission of rape, for
rape may be committed after rendering a woman
unconscious
9. Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that
fateful day and that her bleeding was actually the start of
her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity
is not an essential element of rape. To claim that Precila's
menstrual cycle began on that day is highly speculative.
10. Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas
were antedated and were prepared after the illegal search
was conducted in his residence. He also cites some
inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be
devoid of merit. It is only now on appeal that appellant
disputes the execution of these affidavits. When they were
presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise
such objections and to refute them.
11. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses merely refer to minor details, which
cannot destroy their credibility. This is also true where
statements made while on the witness stand are claimed to
be inconsistent with the affidavit, which are generally
incomplete
12. With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant
insists that his conviction arose from insufficient evidence
and his failure to prove his innocence.
13. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial
are more than sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant.
14. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours
from the commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had
 "deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and
Precila was "in non-virgin state physically". Furthermore, the
report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture
marks and swellings, which confirm that appellant had
injected her several times.
15. On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively
stated that appellant was with her on the bed and that they
were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both
attempts from accused, but, he made her unconscious
through injections. This is corroborated by the testimony of
Agustina, who saw her daughter and accused together
naked on bed. This unbroken chain of events leads one to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that accused actually raped
Precila.
16. As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the
findings of the trial court where the rape victim's testimony
is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the mother
and the medico-legal report, as well as the report of the
police investigator.
17. It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the
commission of the crime, Precila was just sixteen years old.
No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her intimate
parts and later bare herself to the disgrace brought to her
honor in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a
desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to
justice.
18. Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was
violated. He cites the trial court's decision holding that it. —
. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced
together the prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the
burden shifted on the defense to show the contrary
19. Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of
surrebuttal evidence. The statement of the trial court, as
correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support appellant's
conviction unless the defense is able to provide evidence to
the contrary.
20. With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine,
appellant presented inconsistent claims. On one hand, he
claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were planted
by the raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that
these were seized without any warrant.
21. If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant
explain his handwriting on the prescription pads in the
name of Dr. Jesus Yap?
22. A perusal of the photographs showing accused during the
raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the
other photographs do not bear any sign of disorder, in
contrast to appellant's testimony that his room was made
into a mess during the raid.
23. The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant.
However, the prosecution was able to present its return and
we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search warrant was
obtained.
24. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the
same judge who initially heard both criminal cases. It can
therefore be presumed, that the search was made with a
search warrant and absent of any showing that it was
procured maliciously, the items seized are admissible in
evidence.
25. The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually
treated and diagnosed Precila and Wilma Borja. The positive
testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the
medico-legal reports which attest to the needle marks; the
Handwriting Identification Report showing assorted drugs
and medical equipment in appellant's room; and the
chemistry reports prove that appellant was engaged in the
practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was
no proof of payment, the law specifically punishes said act
whether or not done for a fee.
26. Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-
examination that she was in school the whole day of July 6,
1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have
treated and diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading
of the transcript, however, will show that Precila's testimony
was in response to a question regarding her school schedule
for that day.
27. Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions
was not the trial judge, ergo said judge was thus deprived of
the opportunity to assess the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
28. Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the
resolution of the cases. The fact that the judge who heard
the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment,
and for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial
but merely relied on the records of the case, does not
render the judgment erroneous especially where the
evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.
29. WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED
in toto.
People v. Juan Mendoza
G.R. No. 186387, August 31, 2011
J. Mendoza
Facts:
Prosecution Version
1. SPO4 Edelfonso Sison received information from an
informant of the Baguio City Police Office-Drug Enforcement
Section (BCPO-DES) that the accused contacted him and
offered to sell shabu worth P1,000 to any interested buyer.
The accused then suggested that they meet at the stairs of
the Cresencia Brgy. Hall along Bokawkan Road.
2. After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector
Myles Pascual (PSI Pascual) decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation to entrap the accused.
3. PSI Pascual made arrangements for the informant, the
accused, and the poseur buyer officer to meet on April 14,
2005 around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon at the stairs
below the Cresencia Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road.
4. He planned for an entrapment operation and put together a
team, with SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky
Calamiong (PO3 Calamiong) and PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3
Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police Officer 2 Edgar
Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the poseur buyer.
5. In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the entrapment team proceeded to the area
at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, half an hour before the
scheduled time. The team parked their vehicle 20 to 30
meters away from the designated transaction area. PO2
Antolin and the informant alighted and proceeded to the
stairway to wait for the accused.
6. Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached
the informant. The latter introduced PO2 Antolin as the
buyer. After the accused asked if the buyer had the money,
PO2 Antolin handed over P1,000.00. The accused then gave
him two (2) sachets containing white crystalline substance.
PO2 Antolin raised his right hand, the pre-arranged signal,
signifying to the other team members that the transaction
had been consummated. The team rushed to assist PO2
Antolin, who arrested the accused and recovered the buy-
bust-money. PO2 Antolin frisked the accused and recovered
five (5) more small transparent sachets with white
crystalline substance from the pants pocket of the accused.
He turned over the same to the team leader, SPO4 Sison.
7. SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why
he was being arrested and apprised him of his constitutional
rights. The accused merely nodded but otherwise kept
silent. The buy-bust team then took the accused to the
BCPO, where PO2 Antolin identified him as Juan Mendoza,
alias "Ampi."
8. In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance
recovered from the accused tested positive for the presence
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug. The case records state that after the conduct of such
preliminary test, the items confiscated from the accused
were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further analysis and disposition.
9. A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police
Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan
Bullong yielded the same result.
Version of the Accused
10. According the accused, he was questioned by a SPO4 Sison
on the identity of a certain Gary Chua which he had no
knowledge.
11. He was then invited to the BCPO and was subjected to a
drug test.
12. Again, unable to refuse, he was subjected to a drug test at
the BCPO Station 7 laboratory, in front of the DES. He was
then brought to the Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for a
medical examination, and later back to the police station.
13. During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have
a counsel present.7 SPO4 Sison did not inform him that he
was being arrested for the possession of the 5 heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing shabu.
14. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
15. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Issue:
(1) WON the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 were
not complied with
(2) WON the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
1. The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of
merit.
2. In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential
elements must be satisfied: (1) identities of the buyer, the
seller, the object, and the consideration (BSOC); and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
3. In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
on the other hand, it must be shown that: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
4. In this case, all these elements were satisfactorily proven
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through
testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented
during the trial.
5. PO2 Antolin, the designated poseur-buyer, testified as to the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the accused,
and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered
from the accused.
6. Then, SPO4 Sison corroborated PO2 Antolin’s testimony and
confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the
accused were turned over to him as team leader.
7. The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody
and disposition of the dangerous drugs was not observed.
The Court finds, however, that the compliance with the
chain of custody rule was sufficiently established in this
case.
8. In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following
links must be established: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
9. Regarding the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination, the parties admitted the following facts during
pre-trial:
a. The fact that the forensic chemist examined the drugs and
prepared the report thereon but qualified that it did not
come from the accused;
b. Medico-legal Report;
c. The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory
taking, signed the inventory but they have no knowledge
that the drugs came from the accused.
d. Order of detention, booking sheet and preliminary test;
e. Existence of the pre-operation report and the request for
drug test.
10. The prosecution also presented several documents that
traced how the evidence changed hands.
11. The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses listed six small
transparent heat-sealed plastic sachets, each weighing
approximately 0.3g and containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, previously marked as "ECA"
04/14/0521, and showed the corresponding photos taken
during the inventory.
12. The Certificate of Preliminary Test prepared under the
signature of Marites Vizcara Tamio of the BCPO DES and
addressed to the Baguio City Prosecutor, certified that on
April 14, 2005, at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she
conducted a preliminary test on the same marked items by
using Simons reagent on the white crystalline substance
contained in the individually heat-sealed plastic sachets.
13. All the items yielded a "dark blue color," indicating the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. The same certificate stated that the alleged
confiscated pieces of evidence were turned over the to the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for chemistry analysis and disposition.
14. Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-200525 issued by the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet stated that following a
qualitative examination conducted on the same marked
items, it was found that the specimens produced a positive
result for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug.
15. The illegal drugs subject of the buy-bust transaction and
those recovered from the person of the accused were
positively identified by PO2 Antolin, marked and presented
as evidence during trial
16. From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that
there is no break in the chain of custody of the seized
dangerous drugs from the time that it came to the
possession of PO2 Antolin to the point when such items
were presented and identified during trial. Clearly, there is
no doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized dangerous drug were properly preserved, in
compliance with what the law requires.
17. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
People v. John Brian Amarillo (Jao Mapa)
G.R. No. 194721, August 15, 2012
J. Perez
Facts:
1. Accused-appellant identified himself as "John Brian
Amarillo”, 25 years old, a resident of Laperal Compound,
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, single, a washing boy." The
records do not indicate when, how and upon whose liking
the a.k.a. "Jao Mapa" came to be associated with the
accused (LOL).
2. "Jao Mapa," the "washing boy" who was acquitted for
violation of Sec. 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
in Criminal Case in 2004, and whose name appeared in the
drugs Watchlist of Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, was
again charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of
shabu this time allegedly committed in 2006.
3. On 8 May 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
4. During pre-trial, the forensic chemist and PO2 Rafael
Castillo, the police investigator assigned to the case,
appeared in court.
5. The parties stipulated on the following: "qualification of the
forensic chemist as an expert witness; existence of the
documents relative to the examination conducted by the
forensic chemist; substance, subject matter of [the] case;
existence of the Final Investigation [R]eport; and
Acknowledgement Receipt," after which, the court ordered
that the testimony of the forensic chemist and the police
investigator be dispensed with.
6. After the trial, the RTC found Jao Mapa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
7. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
8. Hence, this automatic review of the accused decision
Issue: WON the chain of custody was followed
Held:
1. To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
be present: "(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.
2. And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the
transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the
court the corpus delicti as evidence.
3. In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, not being
authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza
in a buy-bust operation.
4. PO1 Mendoza testified that, during the buy-bust operation,
the informant introduced him to accused-appellant; that
informant asked accused-appellant if he could help PO1
Mendoza buy shabu; that accused-appellant agreed to sell
him Three Hundred Peso-worth of shabu; that PO1
Mendoza, counted the pre-marked bills in front of accused-
appellant and gave them to him; and that accused-
appellant, in turn, handed him a small transparent plastic
sachet, which he took from the pocket of his short pants,
and which tested for shabu based on the result of the
laboratory examination.
5. PO1 Lique corroborated the testimony of PO1 Mendoza by
stating that he saw accused-appellant hand something to
the poseur-buyer.
6. Further, the seized items, together with the result of the
laboratory examination and the marked money were all
presented in court.
7. As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, the
prosecution clearly proved the presence of the following
essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession [was] not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug."
8. After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen (17)
heat-sealed sachets of white substance were found in his
possession.
9. The chemistry report showed that the white substance in
the plastic sachets tested for shabu. And, there was no
showing that such possession was authorized by law.
10. We find no merit in the arguments of the defense that the
arresting officers did not testify that the marking of the
seized items were done in the presence of the persons
mentioned by the law and its implementing rules; and that
testimonies on how the confiscated items were turned over
to the investigator for examination were lacking.
11. The Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO1 Mendoza and
PO1 Randy C. Santos, the allegations of which PO1 Mendoza
affirmed and confirmed during his direct testimony, is clear
on two points: (1) that the seized items were marked and
inventoried at the place where accused-appellant was
arrested; and (2) that the integrity of the seized items was
preserved. Thus:
4. That immediately thereafter, together with the confiscated
pieces of evidence marked and inventoried at the place of
suspect’s apprehension, the confiscated pieces of evidence,
together with suspect AMARILLO, were immediately brought at
SAID SOTF office, for formal dispositions and proper
investigations.
5. That, before the SAID SOTF office, the investigator on case
acknowledge the complaint, and in preparation for the formal
filing of formal charges against herein suspects, same was
subjected to the procedural Drug Test at SOCO/SPD and
mandatory MEDICO LEGAL examinations at OSMAK Malugay as
assisted by the same arresting officers, xxx. The confiscated pieces
of evidence, only in so far with the suspected illegal drugs and the
small white plastic Mercury Drug were referred at SOCO SPD for
laboratory examinations and safe keeping.
12. The testimony, in turn, is well-supported by a copy of the
Request for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit "A") showing
that it was PO1 Mendoza himself who brought the request
to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
13. As to the required "presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official," Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 specifically provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – x x x:
1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;
14. This has been substantially complied with after the
prosecution was able to show that the accused, the
arresting officers and a public official were all present during
the inventory of the seized items as evidenced by the
testimonies of the witnesses, the photographs, and the
Acknowledgement Receipt of the items seized.
15. Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of these
were defective for one reason or another, the defense failed
to consider the following well-settled principle:
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and
does not automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
16. The Court has long settled that an accused may still be found
guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, for as long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken.
17. As to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies,
we hold, as we have done time and again, that "the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded
full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect" and that "findings of the trial courts which
are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings."
18. Also, after a thorough examination of the records, we find
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
credible. For instance, after the cross examination of
Barangay Captain Gatchalian, the presiding judge asked him
a number of clarificatory questions, which he readily
answered in a straightforward manner.
19. PO3 Lique corroborated material facts in the testimony of
PO1 Mendoza, to the effect that the sale of shabu between
accused-appellant and PO1 Mendoza was consummated,
and that Barangay Captain Gatchalian was present during
the inventory of the seized items.
20. The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is likewise applicable in the
instant case there being no showing of any ill motive on the
part of the arresting officers to falsely accuse accused-
appellant of the crimes charged. In fact, he himself testified
that "he did not know any of the persons who arrested him
and that he did not also have any misunderstanding with
any one of them." The Court elucidated:
And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police
authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against
appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, must prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed.
21. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED
 People v. Domingo Sabardan
G.R. No. 132135, May 21, 2004
Facts:
1. An information was filed against accused for serious illegal
detention committed against Richelle Banluta and had
carnal knowledge with the latter.
2. Accused detained Richelle for 15 days and made her drink
either beer or juice which made her dizzy.
3. On Sept. 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed
the door outside with three padlocks. At about 5:00 a.m. on
that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife who lived
about thirty meters away from the appellant, heard
someone hysterically shouting, "Mang Domeng!" Elizabeth
sensed that the voice was that of Richelle’s. She looked out
of the window of her house and saw the appellant in the
upper floor of his apartment, walking to and from
4. This eventually led to the rescue of Richelle
5. Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for
investigation. There, she executed a written sworn
statement dated October 2, 1991. She also signed a criminal
complaint charging the appellant of serious illegal detention
with rape.
6. Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, conducted a physical and medical
examination on the private complainant on October 3, 1991
7. For his defense, appellant raised that he did not know
Richelle and the latter was only trying to exact money from
him.
8. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
9. Hence, this appeal
Issue: WON the appellant is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
1. Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant
contends that he was deprived of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him because
he was charged of detaining and raping the private
complainant in his apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street, San
Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal.
2. However, the prosecution’s evidence shows that she was
detained and raped at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos
Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal.
3. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that under the
allegations of the Information, the private complainant was
raped when she was "deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious by reason of a drug" which the appellant
supposedly administered to her.
4. The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he
administered any drug to the private complainant before
she was raped.
5. If this were true, Richelle could not have known that she was
raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy
and lost consciousness after drinking beer and juice.
6. The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove
that Richelle was illegally detained by the appellant in his
apartment, and that he forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him.
7. The evidence on record, the appellant insists, shows that
Richelle agreed to stay with him in his apartment after
leaving their house and consented to having sexual
intercourse with him. From the time Richelle arrived at his
apartment in the evening of September 15, 1991 up to
September 30, 1991, she never tried to escape, nor shouted
for help, despite the proximity of the appellant’s apartment
to their house and that of Elizabeth de Luna.
8. The contention of the appellant does not persuade.
9. The verisimilitude and probative weight of the testimony of
Richelle, that the appellant detained her against her will and
raped her in his apartment, were not debilitated by her
mistake in declaring that the apartment of the appellant was
at No. 5-C Linaluz Street, when, in fact, it was at No. 11-C Luz
Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman,
Binangonan, Rizal
10. It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an
essential element in rape. The gravamen of the felony is the
carnal knowledge by the accused of the private complainant
under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
11. Richelle’s mistake was only minor and collateral to the
gravamen of the crime charged. She consistently testified
that the appellant detained and raped her in his apartment,
only about thirty meters away from their house in San Carlos
Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. The
appellant admitted that he resided in the said apartment,
and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors.
12. In People vs. Monieva, we stressed that where the
inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such
inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on
the essential fact testified to. It has been held that
inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony, referring
to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime,
do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility.
13. The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure
to adduce in evidence the substance or drug which the
appellant forced Richelle to drink and which made her dizzy
and unconscious, or its failure to present an expert witness
to testify on the presence of any sedative in the beer and
juice which Richelle was made to drink.
14. First. The drug or substance in question is only
corroborative to Richelle’s testimony that she became dizzy
and unconscious when the appellant forced her to drink
beer and juice. There can be no other conclusion than that
the appellant mixed a sedative in the beverage which he
forced Richelle to drink. It must be stressed that Richelle
was then barely twelve years old. The alcoholic content of
the beer must have caused her to feel dizzy and lose
consciousness. She was rendered to such stupor, weakness
of body and mind as to prevent effectual resistance and
preclude the possibility of consent.
15. Second. In People vs. Del Rosario, we held that a test to
determine the presence of any sedative or drug in the drinks
given to a victim is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution for rape:
True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of
any sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which
caused them to lose momentary control of their faculties. But this
is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable
element in the prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it
suffices that the victim was found to have been unconscious at
the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.
16. Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her
captivity, before she was rescued on September 30, 1991,
the appellant forced her to drink beer or juice, threatening
to kill her if she refused.
17. Despite her resistance, the appellant succeeded in forcing
her to drink the beverage. Richelle felt dizzy and
unconscious as a consequence, and when she came to,
found herself completely naked with the appellant beside
her who was also completely nude.
18. Understandably, Richelle could not have seen the appellant
insert his penis into her vagina since she lost consciousness
after drinking the beer and juice.
19. However, in rape cases, carnal knowledge of the victim by
the accused may be proven not only by direct evidence but
also by circumstantial evidence, provided that there is
more than one circumstance; the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
20. In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that, on the
fourth and fifth day of Richelle’s captivity, and while seated
on the sofa in the sala of the ground floor of the appellant’s
apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer. She felt
dizzy and lost consciousness, and when she came to, found
herself in the room on the second floor of the apartment,
completely naked, with the appellant beside her. Richelle
felt severe pains in her vagina and was petrified when she
saw plenty of blood on it. She washed her bloodied vagina
with water.
21. The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in
raping her, is corroborated by Dr. Jesusa Nieves’ medical
findings that Richelle was no longer in a virgin state
physically and that her hymen had a deep laceration at
seven o’clock when she was examined on October 3, 1991.
22. We reject the appellant’s submission that he could not have
raped Richelle during the period of September 17, 1991 to
September 30, 1991 because when she was examined by Dr.
 Nieves on October 3, 1991, the lacerations in her hymen had
already healed.
23. The appellant’s reliance on the testimony of Dr. Nieves, that
the healing period of the lacerations on the hymen was
seven (7) days from the infliction of such lacerations, is
misplaced. The doctor did not testify that the laceration in
the hymen of Richelle could not have been healed in less
than seven days.
24. Indeed, the healing of wounds is dependent on several
factors: (a) vascularity; (b) age of the person; (c) degree of
rest or immobilization; and (d) nature of injury.
25. In fine, although the lacerations were already healed by the
time Richelle was examined by Dr. Nieves on October 3,
1991, it is not impossible that Richelle was raped by the
appellant for the first time on the fourth day of her captivity.
It is well settled that healed lacerations do not necessarily
negate rape.
26. The appellant asserted that Richelle consented to having sex
with him, because she shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na,
ayaw ko na!," when he kissed and embraced her, and
mashed her breasts. The appellant asserts that, in saying,
"ayaw ko na," twelve-year-old Richelle was consenting to his
prior sexual assaults
27. The appellant’s contention deserves scant consideration. As
gleaned from Richelle’s testimony, she had been shouting
and pleading to the appellant everyday to stop the
lascivious acts and the sexual advances on her. She
resolutely fought back and even pulled the appellant’s hair.
In fine, when the appellant subjected Richelle to his bestial
desires, Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as claimed by the
appellant, Richelle had consented to having sexual
intercourse with him from September 16, 1991 to
September 30, 1991, there would no longer have been a
need for him to force her to drink beer and juice to render
her dizzy and unconscious.
28. The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its
truncated parts but in its entirety. The meaning of the words
in a portion of the testimony of a witness should be
considered, taking into account the entirety of the latter’s
testimony.
29. Besides, bearing in mind the chastity and bashfulness of a
typical Filipina, especially one in her tender years, it is highly
inconceivable for Richelle, a young girl, to consent to sexual
acts with the appellant. Richelle was barely in her teens
when the harrowing experience took place. We find it
deviant for a twelve-year-old naïve and unsophisticated
grade school student to be consenting to sexual intercourse
with the appellant. Richelle’s unwaivering sincerity and
candor while testifying in court convinces us that she was
constrained by her desire to seek justice for the bestial act
committed upon her person. In fact, Richelle cried while
recalling the sexual assaults on her.
30. The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral
character to escape conviction. This hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Indeed,
religiosity is not always a badge of good conduct and faith is
no guarantee against any sexual perversion.
31. In the case of People vs. Diopita, this Court pronounced that
an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because he
is of good moral character and exemplary conduct.
32. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is
more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of the
appellant’s good moral character cannot prevail.
33. The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his
apartment; hence, he cannot be convicted of serious illegal
detention. We agree with the appellant’s assertion that he is
not guilty of serious illegal detention, but we do not agree
that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment from
September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on September 30,
1991.
34. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellant’s
apartment on September 30, 1991. She had just
surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood and had
nowhere to go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe
with the appellant, who was their neighbor and her
brother’s friend. However, when the appellant sat on her
bed in the evening of the same day, completely naked,
Richelle decided to leave the next day. She balked at leaving
only when the appellant warned her that her mother, Nimfa,
would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in
warning Richelle of what to expect from her mother, the
appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force her to
remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the
apartment and returned home that day, and contend with
her mother’s anger for leaving their house and sleeping in
the appellant’s apartment.
35. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old and a mere
grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like
an adult would. She could not have foreseen the appellant’s
evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if she wanted to
leave the appellant’s apartment, she could not do so
because the appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated
in his first attempt, the appellant was determined to
deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on
the fourth day of Richelle’s stay in the appellant’s
apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer which
caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The
appellant forthwith raped her.
36. In light of the evidence on record, the original and
primordial intention of the appellant in keeping Richelle in
his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of
her liberty. Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape
under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
and not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention
with rape under Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and
48 of the Code. Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced
the appellant to reclusion perpetua.
37. Richelle could not have escaped from the appellant’s
apartment during her stay therein from September 17, 1991
until September 30, 1991, because the appellant locked the
door from the outside whenever he would go out. Richelle
could move around the house, but the windows on the
ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass.
Richelle tried to open the windows, but she could not.
38. We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story
of rape which would expose herself to a lifetime of shame,
allow an examination of her private parts and face public
trial.
39. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a
credible witness. The bare denial of the appellant cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of Richelle. Well-settled
is the rule that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve
full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a
mere fabrication.
40. In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of the
victim to be trustworthy and convincing. It has been held in
a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are afforded
great respect, since it is the trial judge who observes and
monitors the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses.
41. Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against
him was motivated by Richelle’s desire to extort money
from him is preposterous. The appellant’s testimony to
prove his claim is hearsay because he was merely told by his
counsel of Richelle’s desire for money. The appellant failed
to present his counsel to prove his claim. Besides, the
appellant was merely a catechist and had no apparent
sustainable means of livelihood, and only survived through
the support given to him by his siblings. We agree with the
findings of the trial court, viz:
The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on the
part of the complainant by alleging that complainant Richelle
charge[d] him with this offense because they are asking money as
told [to] him by Atty. Mendoza.
42. This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be
given any value by the court, as it was hearsay, and Atty.
Mendoza was not presented to pursue or give light on this
allegation. At any rate, the mother of the offended party,
Nimfa Banluta, testified that she got the insinuation that the
sister of the accused was willing to settle the case through
her friend living near the street of the accused.
43. It is rudimentary that where there is no showing that the
private complainant was impelled by any improper motive in
making the accusation against the appellant, her complaint
is entitled to full faith and credit. Hence, when the appellant
could not present any sensible justification as to why the
private complainant had accused him, such fact logically
proves that no improper motive propelled the latter to
charge the former of such a serious offense as rape.
44. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision is
AFFIRMED
People v. Marco Alejandro
G.R. No. 205227, April 7, 2014
J. Villarama
Facts:
1. Appellant, along with Imelda Solema and Jenny del Rosario
were charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 for
selling shabu
2. When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon
demurrer to evidence filed by accused Jenny del Rosario, the
trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime
charged considering that her mere presence in the car used
by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in the sale of
illegal drugs
3. In the buy-bust operation conducted by PDEA, The seized
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was
marked by SPO1 Cariaso with his initials "EXH. A J.A.C. July
12, 2006" and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also
recovered the marked P500 bills and boodle money from
appellant. The three accused and the confiscated items were
brought to the PDEA Regional Office in Camp Vicente Lim.
4. For the defense, the appellant alleged that he went to
Imelda because he was trying to rent an apartment for his
girlfriend who was coming home from Japan
5. The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the
requirements in conducting the buy-bust operation. RTC
thus convicted Imelda and Marco
6. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
7. Hence, this petition
Issue: WON the accused-appellant is guilty of violation of R.A.
9165
Held:
1. The appeal lacks merit.
2. Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction
or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and
seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the need for
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated
prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.
3. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous
drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of
all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
4. The above elements were satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. Poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso identified appellant
as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were initially
unaware of the identity of appellant, as their CI had only
informed them about appellant’s co-accused, "Aida" (Imelda
Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug deal for 100
grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00, appellant’s
presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the
shabu directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly identified him as the
seller who himself demanded and received the payment
from SPO1 Cariaso after giving the shabu to the latter.
5. Appellant’s arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the
appointed time of the sale transaction arranged the
previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing
SPO1 Cariaso that they should wait for appellant after SPO1
Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear indications that they
acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of
shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to
be a police officer detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso
placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance sold to him by
appellant. After Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol,
Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the said specimen, the
result yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was
presented in court as evidence after it was properly
identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be
the same substance handed by appellant to SPO1 Cariaso
and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
6. SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso
that they conducted a buy-bust operation as he positioned
himself across the street 15 meters from the house of
Imelda Solema. From his vantage, SPO1 Platon saw the
following transpired: SPOI Cariaso accompanied by the CI in
front of the house of Imelda Solema; SPO1 Cariaso
conversing with Imelda Solema; the subsequent arrival of
appellant on board the Vios; appellant going inside the Revo
where SPO1 Cariaso and Imelda Solema waited for him;
appellant getting something from the Vios and returning to
the Revo carrying the said item. Upon hearing the call from
SPO1 Cariaso’s cellphone, SPO1 Platon immediately
proceeded to the scene and arrested Jenny del Rosario who
was still inside the Vios. At that moment, SPO1 Cariaso had
already arrested appellant and Imelda Solema, confiscated
the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance and recovered the marked money from appellant.
7. Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by
both the oral and object evidence presented in court.
8. It is settled that in cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the
presumption of having performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary
suggesting ill-motive on their part or deviation from the
regular performance of their duties.
9. Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part of the PDEA
buy-bust team was adduced by appellant, the RTC and CA
did not err in giving full faith and credence to the
prosecution’s account of the buy-bust operation. This Court
has repeatedly stressed that a buy-bust operation (which is
a form of entrapment) is a valid means of arresting violators
of R.A. No. 9165.
10. Appellant assails the CA in not correctly interpreting the
requirements set forth in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. He harps
on the failure to immediately mark the seized shabu at the
scene of the incident and photograph the same, and the
inventory of the confiscated items which was not shown to
have been done in the presence of the accused. As to the
absence of testimony by the investigator and the receiving
employee of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, appellant
argues this is fatal to the case of the prosecution. He thus
contends that the chain of custody was broken in this case.
11. We sustain the CA’s ruling on the chain of custody issue.
12. Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165,
"chain of custody" is defined as the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody (DRAMC) of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time
of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory
to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
13. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the
procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized or surrendered dangerous drugs.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results,
which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein
the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination
on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
xxxx
On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]
14. In this case, while SPO1 Cariaso testified that he
immediately marked the transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance sold to him by
appellant, there was no statement as to whether such
marking was made at the place of arrest. From the records it
is clear that such marking was done upon reaching the PDEA
office before its turnover to the investigator on duty. What
is important is that the seized specimen never left the
custody of SPO1 Cariaso as he was present throughout the
physical inventory being conducted by the said investigator.
15. This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure
of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photograph
of the evidence confiscated pursuant to the guidelines, is
not fatal. It does not automatically render accused-
appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible.
16. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of
the accused.
17. Records reveal that only the marked money was
photographed at the PDEA office. The Certificate of
Inventory, though not signed by the accused, was duly
signed by team leader PCI Ablang, a representative from the
media and a barangay councilor. We thus find substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 and IRR.
18. Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that
substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the
chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized
drug items inadmissible.
19. In the instant case, although the police officers did not
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, their noncompliance did not affect the
evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from appellant as
the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be
unbroken under the circumstances of the case.
20. In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court enumerated the
links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to
the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
21. The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure
of the transparent plastic sachet containing shabu during
the buy-bust operation. Records show that from the time
appellant handed to SPO1 Cariaso the said item, only SPO1
Cariaso was in possession of the same until it was brought to
the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso himself marked the said
sachet of shabu with his initials and date of buy-bust: "EXH A
J.A.C. July 12, 2006." While the marking was not
immediately made at the crime scene, it does not
automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items have been preserved.
22. The second link is the turnover of the shabu at the PDEA
office. SPO1 Cariaso testified that he turned over the seized
plastic sachet containing shabu with his markings "EXH A
J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the investigator who proceeded with
the inventory thereof, along with the marked money also
confiscated from appellant. He was present next to the
investigator while the latter was conducting the inventory.
23. The third link constitutes the delivery of the request for
laboratory examination and the specimen to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory. It was likewise SPO1 Cariaso who
brought the said request and the specimen to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory on the same day. He personally
turned over the specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12,
2006" to the receiving clerk as evidenced by the stamp
receipt on the said request bearing the time and date
received as "10:25 PM July 12, 2006."
24. The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination is the one presented
in court. Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
testified that the transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance which was marked "EXH A J.A.C. July
12, 2006", was given to him by the receiving clerk. Within
twenty-four hours, he conducted the chemical analysis by
taking a representative sample from the specimen, even
explaining in detail the process of testing the specimen for
shabu. He identified the specimen with markings "EXH. A
J.A.C. July 12, 2006" presented as evidence in court (Exhibit
"J") as the same specimen he examined and which he found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
25. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such
as the investigator and the receiving clerk of the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory is not a crucial point against the
prosecution.
26. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution
is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the
discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right
to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
27. Further, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in its
implementing rules, which requires each and every one who
came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court.
28. "As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was
clearly established to have not been broken and the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person
who came into possession of the drugs should take the
witness stand."
29. With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the
prosecution evidence, the CA did not err in giving the same
full credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who
failed to substantiate his allegation of frame-up and
extortion.
30. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the
Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions
of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
31. To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear
and convincing and should show that the members of the
buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or
were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the
 police officers' testimonies on the operation deserve full
faith and credit.
32. No such evidence was presented by appellant in this case.
The CA even quoted in part the decision of the RTC which
highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of defense witnesses on what transpired during
the buy-bust operation.
33. WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED
People v. Romeo Oniza v. Mercy Oniza
G.R. No. 202709, July 3, 2013
J. Abad
Facts:
1. On June 21, 2004, the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal file
charges of possession of dangerous drugs before the RTC of
Rizal, Br. 2 against the accused spouses Romeo and Mercy.
They were further charged with selling drugs.
2. Police officers of Rodriguez Police Station in Rizal received
information from a police asset that the accused Mercy was
selling dangerous drugs. They formed a team for a buy-bust
operation.
3. After 5 years of trial, RTC rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty of the crime charged
4. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Issue: WON the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
Held:
1. The law prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody
and disposition of seized dangerous drugs like the shabu
that the police supposedly confiscated from Romeo and
Mercy on June 16, 2004. Section 21 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9165 reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1)The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
2. Compliance with the above, especially the required physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in the
presence of the accused, the media, and responsible
government functionaries, would be clear evidence that the
police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation.
3. Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce such evidence,
indicating that the police officers did not at all comply with
prescribed procedures. Worse, they offered no excuse or
explanation at the hearing of the case for their blatant
omission of what the law required of them.
4. Apart from the above, the prosecution carried the burden of
establishing the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs
that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the
night of June 16, 2004.
5. It should establish the following links in that chain of custody
of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
6. Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with
respect to the first required link—immediate seizure and
marking of the seized items in the presence of the accused
and others—namely, that (a) there must be justifiable
grounds for non-compliance with the procedures; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.
7. Here, the prosecution’s own evidence as recited by the CA
and the RTC is that the police officers did not make a
physical inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a
picture of the same in the presence of the accused,
someone in the media, a Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative, and any elected public official.
8. All that Officer Albarico could say is that his companion,
Officer Jiro, marked the plastic sachets with the initials of
the accused already at the police station and then turned
over the same to the desk officer who prepared the Request
for Laboratory Examination.
9. Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of
reason or justification for their failure to make an inventory
and take pictures of the drugs immediately after their
seizure in the presence of the accused and the other persons
designated by the law.
10. Both the RTC and the CA misapprehended the significance of
such omission. It is imperative for the prosecution to
establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements set by law.
11. The procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165 are not
merely empty formalities—these are safeguards against
abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.
12. And what is the prosecution’s evidence that the substances,
which the police chemist examined and found to be shabu,
were the same substances that the police officers allegedly
seized from Romeo and Mercy? No such evidence exists.
13. As pointed out above, the prosecution stipulated with the
accused that the police chemist “could not testify on the
source and origin of the subject specimens that she had
examined.” No police officer testified out of personal
knowledge that the substances given to the police chemist
and examined by her were the very same substances seized
from the accused.
14. In regard to the required presence of representatives from
the DOJ and the media and an elective official, the
prosecution also did not bother to offer any justification,
even a hollow one, for failing to comply with such
requirement. What is more, the police officers could have
easily coordinated with any elected barangay official in the
conduct of the police operation in the locality.
15. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE Decision
of the CA, accused is ACQUITTED
People v. Jose Clara
G.R. No. 195528, July 24, 2013
J. Perez
Facts:
1. Joel was charged with the crime of Sale of illegal drugs
punishable under R.A. 9165
2. The RTC found the accused of the crime charged
3. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that all the
elements of an illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present
4. Hence, this appeal
Issue: WON Joel is guilty of illegal sale of drugs
Held:
1. After a careful review of the evidence, we resolve to reverse
the ruling of conviction and render a judgment of acquittal
in favor of the accused.
2. In his Brief, the accused-appellant contested his conviction
due to the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s presentation
of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure to
establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence. He
also argued against the presumption of regularity of
performance of duties. Finally, to substantiate his
innocence, he pointed out that he was not even the target
person in the PDEA Coordination Report and denied any
 conspiracy and involvement with such target person named
"Ningning."
3. Inspite of the imperfect narration of events by the accused
Joel, we are constrained to render a judgment of acquittal
due to the lapses of the prosecution that led to its failure
to discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused committed the crime.
4. In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must
first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
5. It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the
burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by
presenting the quantum of evidence required.
6. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
7. It must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the
weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the
required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not
even present evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.
8. In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such
presumption when it presented inconsistent versions of an
illegal sale.
9. PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the seller who sold to him a
small plastic sachet containing shabu in exchange of two
hundred pesos
10. The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given
as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of
drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the
recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1
Jimenez regarding the marking, handling and turnover of
the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of shabu.
11. Contradictory statements were further made as to who
between PO3 Ramos and PO1 Jimenez held the shabu from
the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station
12. Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the
events that transpired in the buy-bust operation can
overturn the judgment of conviction. As held in Zaragga v.
People, material inconsistencies with regard to when and
where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of
inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as
to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecution’s failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu led to the
acquittal of the accused in that case.
13. Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details
and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish
the witnesses’ credibility. If the cited inconsistency has
nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand
as a ground to reverse a conviction.
14. However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are
furthered by inconsistencies of the police officers on minor
details. Referring back to the narration of circumstances of
the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the
gender of the informant who went to their office to report
about the illegal activities committed by Ningning. He readily
answered that the informant was a female.
15. PO3 Ramos in turn, when asked to describe what happened
in the afternoon before the buy-bust operation, testified
that a male informant came to their office to report about a
person selling illegal drugs.
16. These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively
broke the chain of custody of evidence of the sale of
dangerous drug.
17. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides for the procedure to be
observed in preserving the integrity of chain of custody:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof.
Provided, that the physical inventory and the photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at
least the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team/officer, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and
finally for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.
18. To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation,
the prosecution must establish the following links, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.
19. The "objective test" in determining the credibility of
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust
operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to
present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust
operation—from the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration, until the consummation of
the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale.
20. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer
to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
21. In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the
prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the
police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered
by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was
turned over by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer.
22. As to the first link of marking, the three police officers failed
to agree on who among them marked the plastic sachet,
which is highly improbable if they really had a clear grasp on
what really transpired on the day of operation.
23. PO3 Ramos testified that he placed his marking on the small
plastic sachet but recanted his previous statement at the
latter part of the examination and pointed out that it was
the investigator PO1 Jimenez who put the marking in front
of him at the area of arrest.70 SPO2 Nagera in his testimony
confirmed that it was PO1 Jimenez who put marking on the
plastic sachet.71 However, PO1 Jimenez in his testimony
clarified that the item confiscated were already marked by
the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him in
their office.
24. Likewise, they cannot seem to agree on the second link on
who among them held the item confiscated from the time of
arrest and confiscation until it was turned over to the
investigator and the place where it was turned over.
25. PO3 Ramos positively pointed that it was PO1 Jimenez who
took possession of the item from the time of the arrest until
 arrival at the police station.73 However, when SPO2 Nagera events of buy-bust together and failure of observance of
was asked, he pointed out that it was PO3 Ramos who held chain of custody of evidence which effectively broke the
the item from the time of the arrest until they reached the links to sustain conviction, we rule for the acquittal of the
police where it was turned over to Jimenez for investigation. accused.
26. In Malillin v. People, it was explained that the chain of 35. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED
custody rule includes testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time
it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.
27. The inconsistent statements of the police officers generated
doubt on whether the identity of the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to marking
and inventory then given to the Jimenez for investigation
and eventually submitted by PO3 Ramos for examination by
the forensic chemist
28. The prosecution cannot rely on the saving clause provided
under Section 21(a) of the IRR that non-compliance with the
legal requirements shall not render void and invalid seizures
of and custody over said items. This saving clause is
applicable only if prosecution was able to prove the twin
conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds and (b)
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
items.77 The procedural lapses in this case put to doubt the
integrity of the items presented in court.
29. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is
adamant in its argument that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty by police officers
conducting buy-bust operation.
30. We agree but with qualification.
31. In numerous cases, we were inclined to uphold the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of
public officers. However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. It
does not mean that we straight away and without a blink of
the eye rule on the regularity of their performance of duties.
We at all times harmonize the interest of the accused
alongside the interest of the State.
32. Inconsistencies committed by the police officers amounting
to procedural lapses in observing the chain of custody of
evidence requirement effectively negated this presumption.
Their inaccurate recall of events amounted to irregularities
that affected the presumption and tilted the evidence in
favor of the accused. The absence of improper motive tends
to sustain inexistence but does not absolutely rule out false
charges.
33. In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of
police officers and the presumption of innocence of the
accused, we rule that the latter must prevail as the law
imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof
of evidence to sustain conviction.
34. Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies
of police officers which directly constitute the recollection of