Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Section 2
Sec. 2. Art. Ill: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue, except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by a judge, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, particularly describing the place to be searched, or the persons
or things to the seized.”
DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBIT ALL TYPES OF
SERCHES AND SEIZURES?
- No. Only unreasonable SS.
WHAT ARE THE 2 Parts of Sec. 2, Art. III?
1. Constitutional guarantee
2. Requisites of search warrant
WHAT IS A WARRANT?
- Warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer.
WHAT IS A SEARCH WARRANT?
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and
bring it before the court.
MAY A SEARCH WARRANT BE ISSUED FOR THE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE OF REAL PROPERTY?
- No. Real property cannot be a subject of a search warrant because of
physical impossibility to bring the property before the court. Under RoC,
only personal property may be subject of search warrant, which may be:
a. Subject of offense.
b. Stolen or embezzled and its fruits.
c. Used or intended to be used for the
commission of the offense.
WHAT IS THE LIFETIME OF A SEARCH WARRANT?
• - A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its
date. Thereafter it shall be void. (Sec. 10, Rule 126)
HYPO:
DAR EMPLOYEE SEARCHED THE CLOSET OF HER FRIEND
AND FOUND SHABU, CAN HER FRIEND INVOKE RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SS AGAINST THE STATE?
- No. It may be invoked only if the search is made by law enforcement
agencies and the State itself.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid basis for issuance of the warrant
of arrest
Ruling: No. The issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest
requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of
search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that:
(1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and
(2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a
particular person be implicated.
On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is
based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested has committed it. It is now settled that in issuing warrants
of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching
questions and answers;
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and
(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
In this case the respondent judge ordered the issuance of warrant of
arrest solely
on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third
requirement that
there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody
“in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.”
Mantaring vs. Roman
Silva vs. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros Oriental [G.R. No. 81756,
October 21, 1991]
FOR SEARCH WARRANTS, THE JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY
EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES
THROUGH SEARCHING QUESTIONS. The purpose of the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted.
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
"SECTION 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
"SECTION 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted."
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge
must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is
probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through
searching questions and answers.
HARVEY VS SANTIAGO
An aberrant case is Harvey v. Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, where the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arrest of pedophiles on orders
of Immigration Commissioner Santiago because there was probable
cause, occasioned by months of surveillance made by CID agents on the
suspected pedophiles. According to the Court, the requirement that
probable cause is to be determined only by a judge does not extend to
deportation cases which are not criminal but purely administrative in
nature. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest, as well as the
seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
Furthermore, petitioners were found with young boys in their respective
rooms, and under the circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable
ground to believe that petitioners had committed “pedophilia” which,
though not punished under the Revised Penal Code, is behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social
wellbeing of our youth. [Note that this case was decided prior to the
enactment of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act)].
WARRANTS FOR THE ARREST OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS
MAY BE ISSUED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION TO ENFORCE A FINAL DECISION OF
DEPORTATION. Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed
(Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific
constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are
substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in
nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in
character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It
is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. It is of course well-settled
that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The
order of deportation is not a punishment, it being merely the return to his
country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could
continue to reside within our borders. The deportation proceedings are
administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings. It
is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien
sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts
relied upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators.
However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies
do not need to be observed; only such as are fundamental and essential,
like the right of cross- examination. Hearsay evidence may even be
admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut
it.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14
MAR 1990]
People vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
THE OFFICERS WARRANT MAY ONLY SEIZE THE OBJECTS
DESCRIBED IN THE WARRANT. The search warrant implemented
by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ".. the
described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
known as shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record).
Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and
paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or
articles relating to a crime.
SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR SS OF SHABU, BUT IN
SERVICE, ALSO FOUND AN UNLICENSED FIREARM. IS IS
ADMISSIBLE?
- No. Only those objects described. Thus, the phrase “particularly
describe the things to be seized”. Moreover, it must be issued for one
offense only. SW “not a sweeping authority.”
WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL WARRANT
AND SCATTER- SHOT WARRANT?
- “General warrants” are proscribed and unconstitutional [Nolasco v.
Pano, 139 SCRA 152; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800], In
Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184, where the search warrant charged
violations of two special laws, it was considered “scatter-shot
warrant”, and was declared null and void.
Indeed, as held in People v. Tee, supra., what the Constitution seeks to
avoid are search warrants of broad and general characterization or
sweeping descriptions which will authorize police officers to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence
or articles relating to an offense.
PEOPLE VS GERENTE
Held:
The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in
his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful
warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide that "A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;"
The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments
of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have
fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted on
Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident
to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that "A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The
frisk and search of Gerente's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the
person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed. - There is continuity.
Umil vs. Ramos [G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990]
ARREST MAY BE MADE ANYTIME AGAINST PERSONS
CHARGED WITH CONTUNUING CRIMES. However, Rolando
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested.
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997]
INVALID APPLICATION OF SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST AND STOP AND FRISK. Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a
"stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused
[as] an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief
discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-andfrisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part
of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the
invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry; thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-
fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while
that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."
a "stopand- frisk" serves a TWO-FOLD INTEREST:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that
group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise
diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest
and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's
testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had
to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest expressly
declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers,
petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his
eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner
and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-
examination:
Q And what were they doing? A They were merely standing. Q You are
sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not
create any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu , for
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner
was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact,
as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they
were not yet aware that a hand grenade was tucked inside his waistline.
They did not see any bulging object in his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of
petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article
III of the Constitution. INVALID APPLICATION OF SEARCH
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST AND STOP AND FRISK -
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches;(5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest and (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a
stop and frisk with the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an
appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion
on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a
"stop-and- frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be
used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part
of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case,
plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-
and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,"
as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment ***
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-
fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach
a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.
Difference between stop and frisk and search incidental to lawful
arrest.
- In search incidental to lawful arrest, there must be prior lawful arrest
before search is made, but in stop and frisk search is made first before
arrest.
What are the 2 objectives of Search and Frisk?
(1) General interest of effective crime prevention and detection, and
(2) safety and self-preservation. So if drugs were found during stop and
frisk, still valid because of crime prevention.
Ruling/Doctrines:
WHAT IS ARREST? - Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required.
It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
ARREST IS NOT ALLOWED IN CASES OF TRAFFIC
VIOLATIONS - there was no valid arrest of petitioner. Under R.A.
4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau
therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a
period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue
of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended,
and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of
his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual
provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While
in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot
pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following,
when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any
of the vehicles occupants;
MANIFESTATION OF CONSENT IN A CONSENTED
WARRANTLESS SEARCH - Whether consent to the search was in
fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the
defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)
the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
Can the accused raise the issue of the irregularity of his arrest only
during trial?
No, “Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived.”
Espano vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998]
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST MAY EXTEND
TO PREMISES WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF THE
PERSON ARRESTED. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the
ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his
arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held: "As regards the brick of
marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly
ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the
arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search
made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police
operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot
fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being
limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the
person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping.
In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he
was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his
house was within his reach or control. The articles seized from petitioner
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental
to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since
the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
What is the Extent of permissible warrantless searches incidental to
lawful arrest?
- May be subject to bodily search and extends to area within his
immediate control. If arrested in the street, may not extend to his house.
If suspect does not object, can it be considered consented search?
- A: No. Consent must be made voluntarily and knowingly.
UNITED LABORATORIES VS ISIP
"The oak fought the wind and was broken, the willow bent when it must
and survived.”
violating fishery laws be without a warrant?
seized
- Yes, on two grounds:
1) they are unusually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to
elude pursuit. 2) the seizure would be incidental to the lawful arrest of
the crew (Roldan, Jr. vs. Arca)
HYPO: Warehouse serves as a dwelling of caretaker, may it be
subject to warrantless search?
- No. Because it is strictly construes against the state
PEOPLE VS PERALTA