RULE 13: Notice of Lis Pendens
Certification dated from the Postmaster that the pleading in question had been
225.) G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007
MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO Petitioners, v. MACROSMAN
DONA, Respondent.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance filed with
the MTC by Macrosman Dona (respondent) against the petitioners, which was
tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent alleged
that he is the owner of a house and lot located at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
that in front of the house and lot is a barangay road where the petitioners
constructed their house against the objections of the respondent; and that the
house of the petitioners constituted a public nuisance.
The petitioners, in their defense, contended that their house was constructed
by the late Praxido Peoso, Martins father and Elizabeths husband, way ahead
before the respondent arrived; that their house constitutes no public nuisance;
that the respondent cannot demand a right of way; that the continued existence
of their house brings no harm to the respondent; and that the respondent is not
authorized to file the instant Complaint.
The MTC rendered its Decision, in 1avour of the petitioners and against the
respondent on the ground that respondent has no cause of action against the
petitioners. It ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
house in question was constructed on a public property which may be abated
only by the Municipal Mayor, unless it is specially injurious to a private
person. Respondent appealed the Decision of the MTC to the RTC.
The RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MTC. The RTC declared the house
erected by the petitioners on a portion of the road fronting the house of the
respondent as a nuisance; ordered the petitioners to immediately remove the
said house at their own expense. The RTC denied the petitioners’ MR.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed the
Petition for failure of the petitioners to include in their petition the
required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was
not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners attaching a
actually received by the respondent. However, the CA issued denied the petition
for lack of merit and ruled that petitioners’ subsequent compliance with
the rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity.
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical
grounds.
Ruling: Yes.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing
was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause
to consider the paper as not filed.
Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is
mandatory.
However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the circumstances when
the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Rule 13, viz:
However, such discretionary power of the court must be
exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the
following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service; (2)
the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein; and (3) the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
x x x[
Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues whether
the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject house is
constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged nuisance is
specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC
and the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to refrain
from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds.
Page 1 of 56
Rules of procedure being designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their
rigid application resulting in technicalities that tend to delay or frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Thus, in view of the foregoing jurisprudential trend to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for a just determination of his case, free from
the severities of technicalities; the prima facie merit of the pleading;
and, especially considering the conflicting rulings of the MTC and the RTC, the
CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical grounds.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals
is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
69472, for further proceedings.
226.) G.R. No. 104769 March 3, 2000
AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 135016 March 3, 2000
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
INVESTCO, INC., substituted by AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION,
INC., respondent.
Petition: The above cases were consolidated and are appeals via certiorari
Facts:
Investco, Inc. was the owner of 6 parcels of land, located in Quezon City and
Marikina. Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the 6 parcels of land to Solid Homes
payable in 2nstalments. The Register of Deeds of Marikina issued in 2nstal of
Investco, Inc. TCTs covering the Marikina portion of the property. The contract
of sale to Solid Homes was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
nor annotated on the original titles issued in the name of Investco, Inc.
However, after paying the downpayment, Solid Homes made no further
payment to Investco, Inc.. Subsequently, Investco, Inc. filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, an action for specific performance and damages
against Solid Homes, Inc.. Solid Homes prayed for dismissal of Investco, Inc.’s
complaint alleging that the purchase price under the contract was “not yet due”.
Solid Homes then filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina a notice of lis
pendens requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.’s
name. On the same date, the notice of lis pendens was recorded. However, the
notice of lis pendens was not actually annotated on the titles in the name of
Investco, Inc.
The trial court rendered judgment in 2nstal of Investco, Inc. ordering Solid
Homes to pay plaintiffs. In the meantime, Investco, Inc. offered to sell the
property to AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., payable in 2nstalments.
Investco, Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the titles
covering the Marikina property.
AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc. gave were genuine
and faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with the Register of
Deeds. AFP MBAI noted that there were no liens or encumbrances
annotated on the titles.
After determining that the titles covering the Investco property were “clean”
and “genuine,” AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from Investco, Inc. The
Register of Deeds of Marikina issued TCTs in the name of AFP MBAI. The titles
issued were “clean” and contained no annotation of any lien, encumbrance, or
adverse claim by a third party.
Solid Homes commenced action before the RTC, Marikina, against the Register
of Deeds, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. for “annotation of lis pendens and
damages” with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In its
verified complaint, Solid Homes prayed, among others, that (a) the Register of
Deeds be ordered to annotate on the titles registered in the name of Investco,
Inc. the notice of lis pendens and to carry over the same to the titles in the name
of AFP MBAI; (b) alternatively, to declare AFP MBAI as a buyer in bad faith,
bound by the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 40615
In due time, the trial court rendered decision ordering the Register of Deeds for
Marikina to annotate the Notice of Lis Pendens, on the titles registered in the
name of defendant AFP MBAI, and declaring defendant AFP MBAI as a buyer in
bad faith.
Page 2 of 56
Aggrieved thereby, AFP MBAI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which sustained the decision of the trial court. AFP MBAI filed a motion for
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis
pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc.
Ruling: No.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending
litigation while a notice of lis pendensis an announcement to the whole world
that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to
the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the
prospect or non-prospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his
money.”
A notice of lis pendens is not and cannot be sought as a principal action for
relief. The notice is but an incident to an action, an extra-judicial one to be sure.
It does not affect the merits thereof. The notice of lis pendens — that real
property is involved in an action — is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. As a settled rule, notice
of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in
court which affects title to or possession of real property.
Investco’s complaint was an action for collection of sums of money, damages
and attorney’s fees to recover from Solid Homes unpaid 3nstalments on the
purchase price of the subject property. To emphasize, the case was an action for
collection of unpaid 3nstalments on the purchase price of subject real property. In
such case, the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the property
was not proper as the action was in personam.
Consequently, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to this case. The
Register of Deeds of Marikina correctly denied the annotation of the
notice of lis pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. and the AFP MBAI.
Even on the basis of Solid Homes’ counterclaim, which is disregarded in
determining the nature of the action, notice of lis pendens is improper as the
counterclaim was also for sums of money — alleged excess payment and for
damages — not one affecting title to or possession of real property. Such
counterclaim did not convert the nature of the action into a real action involving
title to or possession of subject property.
The rule that “all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate
of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
title” applies herein with full vigor. In the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, the buyer is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate
the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate.
“Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part
of a possessor rests the burden of proof.” Here, Solid Homes alleged that
Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI “confederated with each other in entering into the
aforementioned sale in order to deprive herein plaintiff (Solid Homes) of its
rights over subject properties under the Contract to Sell and to Buy. . .”
However, Solid Homes adduced no evidence to
In the absence of a valid notice of lis pendens annotated in the titles, AFP MBAI is
a buyer in good faith and for value, and thus acquired clean and valid titles to
the property in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
(1) In G. R. No. 104769, GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the Court of
Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27398 and, in lieu thereof, renders
judgment:
(a) dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 52999 of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig Branch 165;
(b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Marikina to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-104941, N-
104942, N-104943, N-104944, N-104945 and N-104946 of the Register
of Deeds for Marikina, Metro Manila;
© Ordering respondent Solid Homes, Inc. to pay AFP MBAI P300,000.00
as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and costs.
(2) In G.R. No. 135016, DENIES the petition, for lack of merit.
With costs against Solid Homes, Inc.
Page 3 of 56
227.) G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
Petition:
This is a petition for review to reverse the Decision dated 29 November
2000 of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration
of title before RTC of Pasig City (land registration court) which was granted.
Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and
Presentacion L. Psinakis, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC. The
motion alleged that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application
to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the
land registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by
Sandoval and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
Petitioners also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their
names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The land registration
court gave due course to the motion and conducted hearings.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-
1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses, hence,
petitioners filed another motion to declare the same void.
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA
to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration
court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. In a letter, the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice
of lis pendens.
Three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial
in consulta to the LRA. In its resolution, the LRA stated that the sole question for
resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to
declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of
Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable.
Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a
party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to
the pending case. The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties but mere
movants whose personality the court has not admitted.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of
the LRAs decision. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the
legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal
personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order of general
default in the land registration case.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ motion to declare void the decrees issued by the
land registration authority is a proper basis for filing the notice of lis pendens
Ruling: NO. The petition has no merit.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative
relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds
of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties
designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate,
or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for
partition or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment,
and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon
registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and
the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall
have been filed and registered.
Page 4 of 56
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to
the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved
in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or
contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the
result of the pending litigation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of
the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a
right or lien that previously did not exist.
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after
relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such
third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former
is not bound by the property owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer
certificate of title. Thus, we have consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of
the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action,
an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is
intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be
ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or
possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. The
litigation must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected
by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the
title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings
thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the
following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money
judgment.[27]
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens
because the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon
which this office will base its action.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice
of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in
LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in
Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly
denied the application for a notice of lis pendens.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
RULE 14: SUMMONS (SECTIONS 1 – 14)
228.) Cathay Metal Corporation vs. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. No. 172204. July 2, 2014
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
FACTS:
This case involves an action for cancellation of adverse claims upon certain real
properties.
Page 5 of 56
Cathay, herein petitioner, was in possession of TCTs over certain parcels of land
against which, respondent Laguna West had adverse claims. Petitioner then
filed a complaint to cancel said adverse claims with the RTC.
Laguna West was a cooperative and the official address indicated both in its
Articles of Incorporation and Cooperative Development Authority Certificate Of
Registration was Brgy Mayapa, Calamba Laguna. But subsequent
representative appearances in behalf of Laguna West indicated that it has
already moved to Brgy Looc Calamba, Laguna, there being no amendment
made in the AOI nor in the CDACOR.
The summons was first served in the official address of Laguna West in Brgy
Mayapa, but it was returned unserved. In the postal return, the postman
certified that the service was not successful because the “cooperative was not
existing”. Substituted service by regular mail was resorted and upon motion of
the petitioner, the RTC declared the service as successful. In view thereof,
respondent was declared in default and petitioner was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
Upon learning of the case, respondent manifested that it did not receive a copy
of the summons and moved for the service of the same to its address in Brgy
Looc. RTC granted the motion of the respondent. Instead of sending a copy of
the petition, the petitioner filed an MR. The MR was set for hearing but the
respondent did not appear during the hearing of the MR.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ruled that petitioner complied with the
Cooperative Code which requires that the official address of the cooperative
shall be used in sending notices. The CA ruled that there was no valid service of
summons as the Rules of Court were not complied. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether the provisions of a substantive law on service of summons may prevail
over that of the Rules of Court.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Promulgation of rules of procedure is vested by the Constitution with the
Supreme Court. Service of summons is a matter of procedure. Hence, the Rules
of Court must necessarily prevail over substantive law.
Long Answer
The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in
this court. Article VIII, Section 5(5). This means that on matters relating to
procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern.
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or
special proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules
of Procedure. The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to
cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot
take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning a
court proceeding.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on service of
summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served upon
a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.
—When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel.
We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is
exclusive. Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is not
sufficient service of summons. This provision of the rule does not limit service
to the officers’ places of residence or offices. If summons may not be served
upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may be
served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.
The Rules of Court provides that notices should be sent to the enumerated
officers. Petitioner failed to do this. No notice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers. This case involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that
parties are accorded due process. In this case, petitioner served summons upon
respondent by registered mail and, allegedly, by personal service at the office
address indicated in respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not
served upon respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with
the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to
present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial
Court an order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims.
229.) RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs.
ORLANDO VILLA and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA
Page 6 of 56
G.R. No. 184197. February 11, 2010
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
FACTS:
This case involves action for annulment of subdivision plans. The petitioner
filed the action with the RTC against the respondents. With the personal service
of summons returning unsuccessful, substituted service was resorted to.
Summons was served upon the respondents’ house help. In view thereof, upon
motion of the petitioner, the respondents were declared in default.
After 8 long months, respondents filed a motion to lift order in default alleging
that there was improper service of summons. RTC granted the motion and lifted
the order of default and gave respondents 5 days to file the Answer. The
respondents failed to file their Answer. Upon motion of the petitioner, the
respondent was again declared in default.
Respondents filed certiorari with CA insisting that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over their person due to improper service of summons. The CA
granted the petition. Hence, this present petition.
Petitioner argued that the motion by the respondents to lift order of default
constituted voluntary appearance.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents’ motion to lift default order constitutes voluntary
appearance.
RULING:
Short Answer
Yes. The motion to lift default order is an affirmative relief. The general rule is
that when a party seeks affirmative relief from the court, he submits to the
authority of the court, thereby constituting voluntary appearance, granting the
court jurisdiction over his person. This is only exempted in the case of special or
conditional appearance, which in this case was not done.
Long Answer
Jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance
in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that
we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.”
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special
appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.
Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
230.) Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Japzon
G.R. No. 68037. July 29, 1992
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review
the decision of the Regional Trial
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
FACTS:
Japzon is the public respondent judge so do not mind him.
This case involves a vehicular accident between a jeepney and a truck. Private
respondents were passengers of a jeepney which was side-swept by the truck.
Petitioner was the insurer of the truck.
Respondents filed an independent civil action for damages against the drivers
and owners of both the jeepney and the truck. In the action for damages, Atty
Gloria filed a notice of appearance informing the court that he was the counsel
of the driver, the owner of the truck, and Paramount Insurance.
The RTC ruled in favor of the injured private respondents, which ruling became
final and executory. Here came Paramount, asking the same court to set aside its
ruling raising the issue that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over its
person, as it has not been validly served with summons and that the appearance
Page 7 of 56
of Atty Gloria on its behalf was not authorized. RTC dismissed the motion, hence
this present petition directly with the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
RULING:
Short Answer
Yes. First, the irregularity of service of summons was merely alleged, but not
substantiated. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumption of
regularity prevails. Second, the filing of an answer with cross claim made by
Atty Gloria in behalf of Paramount raises a presumption of authority. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, presumption of authority prevails.
Long Answer
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by
his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by
service of summons. The service of summons is intended to give notice to the
defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The
defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff
or the petitioner.
In the case at bar, although petitioner questioned the propriety of the service of
summons, it however failed to substantiate its allegation that it was not
properly served with summons. Hence, the disputable presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed prevails.
The records of the case, however, showed that all the pleadings, including the
answer with crossclaim and counterclaim filed by Atty Gloria stated that he
represented Paramount. In fact, he even filed a notice of appearance informing
the court that he is representing the said defendants.
The mere filing of the answer with crossclaim raised a presumption of authority
to appear for petitioner Paramount in accordance with Section 21, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Such presumption is rebuttable, but only by clear and
positive proof. In the absence of such clear and positive proof, the presumption
of authority should prevail over the petitioner’s self-serving denial of such
authority.
It strains credulity that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case
would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he has not been
authorized or employed by the party concerned.
231.) Boticano vs. Chu, Jr.
No. L-58036. March 16,1987
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE
FACTS
This case involves vehicular accident between 2 trucks. The truck owned by
petitioner Boticano was properly parked along the shoulder of the national
highway when it was bumped by another truck owned by respondent Chu. Chu
promised to pay for the expenses for the repair of the truck but subsequently
failed to comply with said promise. Boticano then filed a complaint for damages
with the CFI.
Summons was served upon Chu thru his wife in their house. Chu failed to
answer the complaint within the reglementary period hence he was declared in
default upon motion of Boticano. CFI ruled in favor of Boticano.
Chu appealed with the CA. For the first time, he raised the issue on lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. CA agreed
with Chu, remanded the case to the CFI, and ordered the proper service of
summons.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
despite irregularity in the service of summons.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, irregularity in the service of summons may be waived when the party
fails to make timely objections. Second, assuming there was indeed irregularity
in the service of summons, the court still acquired jurisdiction on account of the
voluntary appearance of the defendant.
Long Answer
One of the circumstances considered by the Court as indicative of waiver by the
defendant of any alleged defect of jurisdiction over his person arising from
defective or even want of process, is his failure to raise the question of
jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance and at the first opportunity. It has
Page 8 of 56
been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from
irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or
even absence of process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable
objections.
Coming to the case at bar, it has been pointed out that during the stages of the
proceedings in the court below, defendant could have questioned the
jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not. On the contrary, private
respondent voluntarily appeared thru counsel in the trial court. Not only did he
submit pleadings and motions, but he likewise appeared in person, thru counsel
in the hearing held on May 14, 1979 at 8:30 a.m. and orally argued in open court
on the pending incident.
Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service. Thus, under this
principle, it has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that the defect of
summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of the defendant.
232.) Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-62781. August 19, 1988
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. 7.
Purisima, J.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
FACTS
Destinations Travel (Destinations), herein private respondent, filed a complaint
for the refund amounting to 48k of unutilized airplane tickets issued by Pan-
Asiatic Travel (Panasiatic), herein petitioner.
Respondent Destinations filed a motion to declare Panasiatic in default.
Panasiatic filed a motion to dismiss to question the jurisdiction of the court over
its person.
Destinations filed an amended complaint increasing the amount to be recovered
from 48k to 100k upon. A copy of the amended complaint AND summons were
served upon Panasiatic. Thereafter, Panasiatic filed several motions for
extension for filing of answer. Instead of filing its answer though, Panasiatic
filed a motion for bill of particulars.
Instead of answering the bill of particulars, respondent Destinations filed a
second amended complaint. The second amended complaint contained
additional causes of actions. In addition to claim of refund, it also claimed
commissions and incentives. The copy of the second amended complaint was
served upon Panasiatic, however no summons was served in relation to the
second amended complaint.
Panasiatic was declared in default for failure to file an answer. Panasiatic then
filed a motion to lift order of default, which was denied by the court.
Respondent Destinations was allowed to present evidence ex parte and the
decision was rendered in its favor and became final and executory.
Panasiatic filed a notice of appeal with the CA which was dismissed for being
filed out of time and that the decision has become final and executory.
Panasiatic filed a petition for certiorari, but the CA similarly dismissed the
petition. Hence this present petition.
It is the argument of the petitioner that it was not served with new summons in
relation to the second amended complaint which introduced new causes of
actions.
ISSUE
Whether a new summons must be served upon the defendant whenever an
amendment to the complaint introduces new causes of actions.
RULING
Short Answer
No. The petitioner already appeared before the amendment of the complaint,
therefore no new service of summons is required. Service of summons in
relation to amended complaints is only proper when the complaint is amended
at the time the defendant has not yet appeared in court.
Long Answer
If he (defendant) had not yet appeared, a new summons must be served upon
him as regards the amended complaint, otherwise the court would have no
power to try the new causes of action alleged therein, unless he had lodged an
answer thereto. Simply sending a copy of the amended complaint to the
defendant by registered mail is not equivalent to service of summons in such
case. However, if the defendant had already appeared in response to the first
summons, so that he was already in court when the amended complaint was filed,
then ordinary service of that pleading upon him, personally or by mail, would be
sufficient, and no new summons need be served upon him.
In the instant case, summons on the first amended complaint was properly
served on PAN-ASIATIC. After which, the company filed several motions for
extension of time within which to file responsive pleading, and then a Motion
for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions were granted by the trial court. With
Page 9 of 56
the filing of these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively appeared in the case
and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Hence, no new summons on the Second Amended Complaint was necessary,
ordinary service being sufficient. There is no question that PAN-ASIATIC was
properly served with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint and that it
received a copy of the Order admitting said Second Amended Complaint. Since it
failed to serve and file its Answer within fifteen (15) days, the trial court was
correct in declaring the company in default, in holding trial ex parte, and in
eventually rendering judgment by default.
233.)Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 149380. July 3, 2002
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED
FACTS
Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were congressional candidates.
Sandoval emerged victorious. However, Oreta filed a protest with the HRET
anchored on allegations of irregularity in the election.
Summons was served upon Sandoval, at his office, thru Maga, a freelance
maintenance employee. Hence, Sandoval interposed the irregularity of the
service of summons, the employee being neither a regular employee nor
responsible officer at the petitioner’s office.
HRET disagreed with the position of Sandoval. SolGen agrees with Sandoval.
ISSUE
Whether service of summons thru a maintenance employee was proper.
RULING
At the outset, let us note that ROC finds suppletory application to the House
Rules.
Short Answer
No. First, there was no showing that personal service was attempted. Second, a
maintenance employee is not a competent person nor a person in charge of the
office for purposes of the substituted service of summons. He is not competet
because he is not expected to understand the repercussions of the summons. He
is not person in charge because he is neither granted authority nor possesses
custody or management of the office.
Long Answer
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e.,
petitioner herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person
or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of
summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the
constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to
find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be
completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his
dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an
extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to
the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon
him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings.
As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer
for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must
be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our jurisdiction, for service of
summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following
circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person
of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in
charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or
officer’s return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by
evidence aliunde. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the
substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.
Granting that Maga was an employee of petitioner at his district office, an
assumption that we stress is contrary to the evidence on record, still it cannot
be said that he was qualified to receive the summons. To be a “competent”
person to receive the summons means that he should be “duly qualified” and
“having sufficient capacity, ability or authority.
“The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the
person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes
that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him
notice thereof.”
Page 10 of 56
Clearly, in being assigned to do maintenance work and by ordinary human
understanding, Maga could not be presumed to appreciate the importance of
the papers delivered to him.
Not only was Maga an incompetent person to receive the summons, he was also,
more plainly, not in charge of petitioner’s office. To be “in charge” means to
have “care and custody of, under control of, or entrusted to the management or
direction of.
We would not dare establish a precedent whereby any employee or anyone who
pretends to be an employee, although found in the office of his employer, could
validly receive summons for him.
234.) HENRY S. OAMINAL Vs.PABLITO M. CASTILLO and GUIA S. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 152776; October 8, 2003
In the instant case, the receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the
defendants -- respondents herein -- is deemed proper, because they admit the
actual receipt thereof, but merely question the manner of service. Moreover,
when they asked for affirmative reliefs in several motions and thereby
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, whatever defects the
service of summons may have had were cured.
FACTS:
Oaminal filed a complaint for collection against Pablito and Guia Castillo with
RTC QC. The summons with complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal,
secretary of Mrs. Castillo.
Defendants filed an urgent motion to declare service of summons improper and
legally defective. They alleged that Sheriff failed to comply with Sec 1, Rule 14 of
the ROC or the substituted service of summons. No hearing was conducted for
the said motion.
Oaminal filed an Omnibus Motion to declare defendant in default and to render
judgment because defendant failed to file an answer within the reglementary
period.
Defendants filed Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and
Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim. Further, it also filed an Urgent Motion
to dismiss. All of which were filed on the same day.
RTC denied the motion the dismiss and admitted defendant’s Answer then set
the case for pre-trial.
Defendants filed an 'Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration with the
Accompanying Plea to Reset'.
RTC ruled that the 'Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss
and Answer with Counterclaim' was filed outside the period to file answer,
hence he (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2)
declared [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present
evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of [the] order, [failing] which,
the case will be dismissed.
RTC ruled on the merits of the case which were made in favor of the plaintiffs.
Defendants filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction,
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order (TRO). In the main, they raised the issue of whether the trial court had
validly acquired jurisdiction over them.
The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them. It
based its finding on the Sheriff's Return, which did not contain any averment
that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on them before
substituted service was resorted to.
Issue:
Whether or not receipt by a legal secretary of a summons is deemed receipt by a
lawyer in contemplation of law.
Ruling:
NO. However, the lower court still acquired jurisdiction over the defendants
when they submit themselves voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was
cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the
Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with
Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to
Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration --
are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Having invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief,
Page 11 of 56
respondents cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the
very same authority they have invoked.
235.) SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON Vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003
Facts:
Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land which Columbus Philippines
leased per agreement it entered with the plaintiffs. Under the lease agreement,
Columbus Philippines undertook to construct a building at the end of the third
year. Columbus failed to comply and hence the spouses filed a complaint for
rescission of the agreement with damages in RTC of Pasay.
Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen
Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a
secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to
the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.
Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence
petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondent in default. The motion
was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
That decision became final however, the following day, private respondent filed
a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by petitioners. The trial
court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However,
without waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion
to lift order of default.
The Order of this Court on May 21, 1999 allowing the parties to file their
respective memoranda within ten (10) days from May 21, 1999 is hereby
revoked and set aside, since the incidents can be resolved based on the records.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ
of execution. It suffered the same fate as the motion for reconsideration for
being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement
of the decision.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favor. It
reasoned out that the trial court erred when it denied private respondent’s
motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that private
respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if
it failed to file an Answer. Since service upon private respondent was made
through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk in private respondent’s
office, as evidenced by the latter’s employment record, such service cannot be
considered valid.
Issue:
a. Whether or not there is valid service of summons for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the defendants.
b. Whether private respondent’s motion to lift order of default was in
order.
Ruling;
a. No. SC ruled in favor of the respondents and affirmed the decision of CA
that there was no valid service of summons.
SC agreed to respondent’s arguments that the designation of persons or officers
who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or
partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager"
instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and
"treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The service of summons through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private
respondent and not one of those enumerated above, is invalid.
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in
Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office
address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View
Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with private
respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply
with its contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of
contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together
Page 12 of 56
with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance
with Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack
of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over
Villarosa. The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari.
We decided in Villarosa’s favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case.1awphi1.nét We held that there was no valid
service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not
included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We
discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely,
private respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s assertions that the enumeration
under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules
of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their
position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress
that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and
effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases15
cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance
must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to
be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in
any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital
and indispensable ingredient of due process.16 We will deprive private
respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we
disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
b. Yes. Since we have ruled that service of summons upon private
respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it
necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
did not acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all
the subsequent proceedings held before it, including the order of
default, are null and void. As private respondent points out, the second
issue has become moot and academic.
236.) Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE Vs.
Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369; October 23, 2003
FACTS:
Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against
[respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer
of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was
lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa.
As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed.
[Petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to
Effect Summons by Publication.
RTC issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect
Summons by Publication.
Afterwards, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for
failure to file their respective answers.
As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to
submit their evidence ex-parte and RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was
surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by
the respondent court.
Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the
validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo.
RTC denied said motion.
Respondents once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court (RTC).
Page 13 of 56
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned
Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is valid service of summons hence, RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.
RULING:
NO, the service of summons is defective and therefore RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents, Boyon.
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously
resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any
genuine effort to locate respondents. A review of the records9 reveals that the
only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang
on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While
the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and
unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was
in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to
find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the
process server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent
portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced as follows:
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen
and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual and unavailing for
the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of
America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted service was
made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court."
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no
positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and
serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely
states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly,
without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts
exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made
will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service
of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process server’s Return or Proof of Service the
material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of substituted service
was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy, from which we quote:
"x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise,
any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This
is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such
explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective."
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of
noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor were discussed in
Madrigal v. Court of Appeals as follows:
"In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of
service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts
and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the
proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be
upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions
in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure
to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person; in the
latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that
individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally
involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in
issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court
has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in
personam.
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process
Page 14 of 56
demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be
deemed null and void.
237.) FILOMENA DOMAGAS Vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407; January 17, 2005
FACTS:
Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in
her complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Calasiao, Pangasinan. By means of force, strategy and stealth, the respondent
gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and
thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of
a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because
the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by
her (the respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s
house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the
summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same.
Nonetheless, MTC ruled in favor of plaintiff.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution
was issued.
the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of
Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that
due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because
she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons
through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because
of the following: (a) when the complaint was filed, she was not a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo, Norway, and although she
owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the complaint,
she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the
time the summons and the complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno,
was merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor
an occupant thereof when he received the complaint and summons; and (d)
Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons and the complaint
for and in her behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the
subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons
and complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted
service on the respondent, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident
and registered voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the
complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
The petitioner appended the following to her answer: (a) a copy13 of the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Jose Layno in her favor, dated August 26, 1992,
showing that the respondent was a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan; (b) a Real Estate Mortgage14 executed by the respondent, dated
February 9, 1999 showing that she was a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan; (c) the Joint Affidavit15 of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando
Macalanda, both residents of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, declaring
that the respondent and her brother Oscar Layno were their neighbors; that the
respondent and her brother had been residents of Barangay Buenlag since their
childhood; that although the respondent left the country on several occasions,
she returned to the Philippines and resided in her house at No. 572 located in
the said barangay; and (d) the Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno,
approved on June 15, 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent. It thus decided that the MTC decision was null and void. The trial
court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on
the respondent.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment
affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the first
complaint was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate
court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country,
the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial
service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no
prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of
Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no
valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent.
Issue:
Page 15 of 56
 1. Whether the action is the first complaint is an action quasi in rem or in
personam.
2. Whether there is proper service of summons.
Ruling:
1. The action is an action in personam. The ruling of the CA that the
petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the
respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous.
The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in
personam.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character.
An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against
the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations;
such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive
relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which
personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the
discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.
Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties
who joined in the action.
2. None. There is no valid service of summons as the action is in
personam.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction
over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily
appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as
provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service
may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by
publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court
may deem sufficient.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said
barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9,
1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the
petitioner categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo,
Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.34 The statutory
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and
any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered
ineffective.35 As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :36
… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons
must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any
substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
Page 16 of 56
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such
explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the
requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective.37
In Keister v. Narcereo,38 the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or
"residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not
sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or
place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the
place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that
must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house
of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is
as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
PER SHERIFF’S RETURN, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house
where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the
respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to
ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned
out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that
Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The
service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not
considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has
another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno dated June 15, 1997 wherein he
declared that he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, as well as the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando
Macasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had
executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and
occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and
the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said
house on April 5, 1999.
The decision of of the MTC is null and void as there is no valid service of
summons.
238.) MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO VS. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL
BANK
G.R. NO. 161417 : February 8, 2007
FACTS:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While
employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager,
Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by
separate promissory notes.
Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel
of land described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real
estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date,
respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand.
However, demand was unheeded.
The Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses
Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was
served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry
Bank) located at Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City.
Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an
answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon motion of the
respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex
parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was then appointed by the court as
Commissioner.
Arturo Toring, the branch manager of the respondent bank, testified that the
spouses Biaco had been obtaining loans from the bank since 1996 to 1998. The
loans for the years 1996-1997 had already been paid by the spouses Biaco,
leaving behind a balance of P1,260,304.33 representing the 1998 loans. The
amount being claimed is inclusive of interests, penalties and service charges as
agreed upon by the parties. The appraisal value of the land subject of the
mortgage is only P150,000.00 as reported by the Assessor's Office.
Based on the report of the Commissioner, the respondent judge ordered
Spouses to pay the plaintiff.
The sheriff personally served the above-mentioned judgment to Ernesto Biaco
at his office at Export and Industry Bank. The spouses Biaco did not appeal from
the adverse decision of the trial court. On October 13, 2000, the respondent
bank filed an ex parte motion for execution to direct the sheriff to sell the
Page 17 of 56
mortgaged lot at public auction. The respondent bank alleged that the order of
the court requiring the spouses Biaco to pay within a period of 90 days had
passed, thus making it necessary to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction, as
previously mentioned in the order of the court. The motion for execution was
granted by the trial court.
The sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their
residence in #92 9th Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of
execution was personally received by Ernesto. By virtue of the writ of execution
issued by the trial court, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction in
favor of the respondent bank.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending
that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure
proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case
only after the lapse of more than six (6) months after its finality. She claimed
that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against her because the bank failed to
verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate mortgage and did not
inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory
notes. She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction
because summons were served on her through her husband without any
explanation as to why personal service could not be made.
The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner in
the dark about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the failure of the sheriff
to personally serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioner's husband's
concealment of his knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings. On the validity of
the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial foreclosure
proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court
of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by one against the other
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review,4 asserting that even if the action is quasi in rem, personal
service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The
substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband's office cannot be
deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to
personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Petitioner
contends that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated not so much by her husband, who
did not inform her of the judicial foreclosure proceedings, but by the sheriff who
allegedly connived with her husband to just leave a copy of the summons
intended for her at the latter's office.
Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment
which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teresa
Biaco.
RULING:
NO. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem
or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.15
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB
undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial
foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner
avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead, summons was
served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to
why the particular surrogate service was resorted to.
Page 18 of 56
Without ruling on petitioner's allegation that her husband and the sheriff
connived to prevent summons from being served upon her personally, we can
see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in
the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a consequence. The violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid
service of summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial
court.
There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRB's ex-parte motion for
deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution against the
spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial
court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal
judgment against the spouses Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.
Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos, et. al.20
and Perkins v. Dizon, et al.21 that in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only
relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it
has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary
submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its
jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its
jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner's personal
liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due
process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.
239. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sps. Ireneo M. Santiago and
Liwanag P. Santiago, Centrogen, Inc. represented by Edwin Santiago
G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 22007
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari. Centrogen on different occasions
obtained loans from FEBTC, the total of which reached the sum of P4.65M, as
evidenced by a PN executed by Edwin Santiago. As security for a fraction of the
loan, Ireneo Santigao executed a REM. The REM secured the principal loan in
the amount of P490k. Later on, the same property secure another loan
obligation in the amount of P1, 504, 280.00. Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with BPI
with the latter as the surviving corporation. BPI filed an Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of REM for Centrogen’s default in the payment of the loan
obligation. Upon receipt of the notice of Sale, Sps. Santiago and Centrogen filed a
complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injuction
and in the alternative, for the annulment of the REM with BPI. The complaint
alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490, 000, including
interest thereon was fully paid. In addition, Sps. Santiago and Centrogen argued
that the original loan agreement was for the amount of P5M. Such amount will
be supppsedly utilized to finance the squalene project of the company.
However, after the P2M was released, FEBTC in violation of the agreement did
not release the balance of P3M. As a result, the squalene project failed and the
company groped for funds to pay its obligations.
BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by Sps.
Santiago and Centrogen. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a MD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It claimed that
the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz Branch was not one of those authorized by
Sec. 11, Rule 14 to receive the summons on behalf of the corporation. It also
alleged that the complaint lacked a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
The RTC denied the MD and emphasized that the nature of the case merited its
removal from the purview of Section 11, Rule 14. That based on the provisions
of Sec 5, Rule 58 the RTC declared that the instant Order is still valid and
binding despite non-compliance with Sec.11 of Rule 14. The RTC also issued an
Order enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the extra-judicial
foreclosure sale of the subject property until the propriety of granting a
preliminary injunction is ascertained.
The RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI to avoid further argument
as regards the proper service of summons. It also issued an order granting the
Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original
summons was served upon the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch.
DECISION
Yes. Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service is
necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon
whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise, the
service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
Page 19 of 56
on him. Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the
service of summons on BPI’s Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for
the branch manager is not included in the enumeration of the statute of the
persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made in behalf of the
corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual. However, upon the
issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect
attended the service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly
cured.
In explaining the test on the validity of service of summons, Justice Florenz
Regalado stressed that substantial justice must take precedence over
technicality and thus stated: The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on
service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto were
ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue
prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full
opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the
entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated
to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within
the factual milieu peculiar to it. Prescinding from the above, we deem it best to
underscore that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of
service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should
be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each.
An injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive
right or interest; it is not a cause of action by itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to the main suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully. The issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights
of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, the only limitation being that the discretion should be
exercised based upon the grounds and in a manner provided by law. Before a
writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, the following requisites must be
complied with: (1) a right in esse or a clear or unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) violation of that right; and (3) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
240. The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company vs. Hon.
Augusto Breva in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regionla Trial Court,
Davao City, Branch 10, and Milagro P. Morales
G.R. No. 147937, November 11, 2004 Callejo, Sr. J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review. Milagros filed a complaint for damages and
reimbursement of insurance premiums against The Philippine American Life &
General Insurance Company (PALGIC) before the RTC of Davao City. The
complaint stated that the complaint could be served with summons and other
court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St.,
Davao City.
Summons together with the complaint was served and received by its Insurance
Service Officer, Ruthie Babael. PALGIC filed a MD on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person since Babael was not among those named under
Sec. 11, Rule 14 which could properly receive the summons. Milagros filed an
Amended complaint, alleging that summons could also be served at its principal
office at Manila, through its president or any of its officers authorized to receive
summons.
RTC denied the MD and directed the issuance of an alias summons in its main
office. It ruled that the improper service of summons is not a ground for
dismissal of the complaint considering the case was still in its initial stage. It
ruled that the remedy was to issue an alias summons in Manila. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC. It ruled that the service of the alias summons on the
amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its
principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over the person.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed GAD when it denied the MD on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner due to improper service of
summons
DECISION.
No. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was
wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a
defendant personally appears before a Court complaining that he had not been
validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias
summons can be actually served on said defendant.
Page 20 of 56
It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an “original” or an
“alias” summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is
essential is that the summons complies with the require ments under the Rules
of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the
prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements
under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all
the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons
authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal
office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias
summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a
continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the
amended complaint and not to the original complaint
241. SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN and DOMINGA P. BELEN, Vs. HON. PABLO R.
CHAVEZ, Presiding Judge
G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008, Tinja, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The instant petition
originated from the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment against
Sps. Domingo and Dominga Belen, filed by Sps. Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Joselito Riveros, before the RTC of
Batangas. The complaint alleged that Sps. Pacleb secured at judgement of
default before the Superior Court of the State of California. The judgement
ordered Sps. Belen to pay the amount of $56, 204.09 representing loan
repayment. The summons was served on Sps. Belen’s address in Laguna and
received by a certain Marcelo M. Belen. Atty. Alcantara entered his appearance
for petitioners. In his Answer, he alleged that Sps. Belen were actually residents
of California and their liability had been extinguished via a release of abstract
judgement issued in the same collection case.
RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence since Sps. Belen failed to
attend the pre-trial conference. Before the scheduled ex parte presentation of
evidence, Atty. Alcantara filed a MD, citing the judgement of dismissal issued by
the Superior Court of the State of California, which allegedly dismissed the case.
The RTC held in abeyance the ex parte presentation of evidence pending the
submission of a copy of judgement of dismissal. The RTC denied the MD for his
failure to present eh alleged judgement of dismissal. Atty. Alcantara, sought the
reinstatement of the MD by attaching a copy of the said foreign judgement.
Sps. Pacleb filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint. It averred that
they were constrained to withdraw their complaint against Sps. Belen because
of the prohibitive cost of litigation. The amended complaint prayed for
judgement ordering petitioner to satisfy their obligation to private responded in
the amount of P2, 810, 234.50. The Answer to the amended complaint raised the
following defenses: (1) lack of cause of action; (2) res judicata; and (3) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants. Sps.
Belen and Atty. Alcantra (passed away) failed to appear at the rescheduled pre-
trial conference. Thus, the RTC declared them in default and allowed the ex
parte presentation of evidence. A copy off the RTC decision intended for Atty.
Alcantara was returned with the notation Addressee Deceased. A copy of the
RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of Sps. Belen and was
received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
Sps. Pacleb immediately filed an ex parte preliminary attachment with the RTC.
It also filed a writ of execution of the RTC decision. Atty. Culvera entered in his
appearance for Sps. Belen. He filed a MQ the writ of execution. The RTC denied
the motion.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps. Belen through
their proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty.
Alcantara on behalf of petitioners.
2. WON there is a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on Sps. Belen
DECISION
1. YES. The appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleading
were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the person of petitioners. Courts
acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either
through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, if
defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over
their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subject to the court’s jurisdiction. In
Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539 (1998), the Court
underscored the necessity of determining first whether the action is in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons
Page 21 of 56
under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippine apply according to the
nature of the action.
The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract
whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the monetary
award. It is in the nature of an action in personam because private respondents
are suing to enforce their personal rights under said judgment. Applying the
foregoing rules on the service of summons to the instant case, in an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case through personal service or, if this is not
possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service as provided in
Rule 14, Sections 6-7.
In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person. If the defendant, for justifiable reasons, cannot be served
with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.” If
defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad,
but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be effected out of the Philippines under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these
cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines,
otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over
his person is essential to make a binding decision
The records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have been permanent
residents of California, U.S.A. since the filing of the action up to the present.
From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an answer purportedly at the instance of
petitioners’ relatives, it has been consistently maintained that petitioners were
not physically present in the Philippines. In the answer, Atty. Alcantara had
already averred that petitioners were residents of California, U.S.A. and that he
was appearing only upon the instance of petitioners’ relatives. In addition,
private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, Joselito Rioveros, testified during the ex
parte presentation of evidence that he knew petitioners to be former residents
of Alaminos, Laguna but are now living in California, U.S.A. That being the case,
the service of summons on petitioners’ purported address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction
over their persons. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were
sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. Through certain
acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized by petitioners to appear on their
behalf. For instance, in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint, Atty.
Alcantara attached thereto a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of
dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of petitioner Domingo
Belen’s U.S. passport. These documents could have been supplied only by
petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the appearance of Atty.
Alcantara on their behalf. In sum, petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves
through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of
orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and
to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The
exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has been ordered
by the court. In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his
given address, notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary.
2.NO. In the instant case, a copy of the RTC decision was sent first to Atty.
Alcantara, petitioners’ counsel of record. However, the same was returned
unserved in view of the demise of Atty. Alcantara. Thus, a copy was
subsequently sent to petitioners’ “last known address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna,” which was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship
between him and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on
him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners.
The subsequent service on petitioners’ purported “last known address” by
registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites
under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail.
Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party
and not at any other address of the party. Service at the party’s former address
or his last known address or any address other than his present address does
not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule
13. Therefore, service by registered mail presupposes that the present address
of the party is known and if the person who receives the same is not the
addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on
behalf of the party.
242. Pedro T. Santos, Jr. vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008, Corona, J.
Page 22 of 56
FACTS:
This is a petition for review. PNOC filed a complaint for a sum of money against
Santos in the amount of P698, 502.10 representing Santos’ unpaid balance of
the car loan advanced to him by PNOC when he was still a member of its BOD.
Despite earnest efforts, personal service of summon failed because he could not
be located. Hence, the trial court allowed summons by publication in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent
submitted the affidavit of publication of the advertising manager of Remate and
an affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to effect that he sent a copy off
the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address
When petitioner failed to file his Answer, respondent moved that the case be set
for ex parte presentation of evidence. The motion was granted. The case was
then submitted for decision after the ex parte presentation of evidence. Santos
filed an Omnibus MR and to Admit Attached Answer. He alleged that the
affidavit of service submitted by PNOC failed to comply with Sec 19, Rule 14 as
it was not executed by a Clerk of Court.
The trial court denied the MR. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit
of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of
court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person
DECISION
Yes. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 14.
Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown.—In any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the
court may order. (emphasis supplied) Since petitioner could not be personally
served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts,
respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner
was properly served with summons by publication.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of
the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendant’s last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an
affidavit “showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.” The rules, however, do not require
that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
243. Aurora N. De Pedro vs Romasan Development Corporation
G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014, Leone, J
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45. This case originated from separate
complaint for nullifcaiton of free patent and OCT, filed against several
defendants. One of the defendants is De Pedro. The complaints were filed by
ROMASA were it alleged that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land
in Antipolo and that the government could not legally issue the free patents
because that the time of its issuance, the land was already released for
disposition for private individuals. Based on Mr. Ko’s narrative, Romasan’s
representative, he discovered that De Pero put up fences on a portion of its
property in Antipolo. Mr Ko. Confronted De Pedro, but she was able to show
title and documents evidencing her ownership. Upon checking with the CENRO-
DENR, it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of
its property to several persons.
Attempts to serve the summons to De Pedro failed, hence, the summons were
published in people’s Balita. Respondent moved to declare all defendants in
default in its complaints, including De Pedro, for failure to file its answers and to
be allowed to ex parte present evidence. The trial court granted the motions
The RTC issued an order declaring as nullity the titles and free patents. De
Pedrom file a motion for new trial, alleging that the counsel received notive of
the January 7, 2000 decision of March 16, 2000. De Pedro argued that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person because of improper and
defective service of summons. He pointed out that summons was not personally
served upon her “for reason that according to the messenger of Post Office of
Pasig there is no person in the said given address”. The RTC denied the motion.
Page 23 of 56
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC. It noted De Pedro’s belated filing of her MNT
and that he failed to allege any ground that would justify the grant of MNT
under Rule 37, Section 1. He also filed a petition for annulment of RTC’s decision
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and for having been
disposed of here property without due process. The CA denied the petition. It
ruled that since petitioner availed herself of the remedy of new trial, and raised
the case before the CA via petition for certiorari, she can no longer file a petition
for annulment of judgment
Issue: WON the trial court’s decision was void for failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner De Pedro
Decision
NO. Regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is
imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons suffers a
defect in jurisdiction. Respondent’s institution of a proceeding for annulment of
petitioner’s certificate of title is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over
the res, but it is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with
authority and competence.
Personal service of summons is the preferred mode of service of summons.
Thus, as a rule, summons must be served personally upon the defendant or
respondent wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or respondent
refuses to receive the summons, it shall be tendered to him or her. If the
defendant or respondent is a domestic juridical person, personal service of
summons shall be effected upon its president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel wherever he or
she may be found.
Other modes of serving summons may be done when justified. Service of
summons through other modes will not be effective without showing serious
attempts to serve summons through personal service. Thus, the rules allow
summons to be served by substituted service only for justifiable causes and if
the defendant or respondent cannot be served within reasonable time.
Substituted service is effected “(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”
Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner
or if his or her whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry.” It may only be effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve
the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry as to the defendant’s or
respondent’s whereabouts.
Service of summons by extraterritorial service is allowed after leave of court
when the defendant or respondent does not reside or is not found in the
country or is temporarily out of the country.
The issuance of a judgment without proper service of summons is a violation of
due process rights. The judgment, therefore, suffers a jurisdictional defect. The
case would have been dismissible had petitioner learned about the case while
trial was pending. At that time, a motion to dismiss would have been proper.
After the trial, the case would have been the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment. Petitioner learned about the action for annulment of
title only after trial. Instead of filing an action for annulment of judgment,
however, she filed a motion for new trial without alleging any proper ground.
Rule 37of the Rules of Court provides that a party may move and the court may
grant a new trial based on the following causes: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented
would probably alter the result.
Petitioner’s filing of the petition for annulment of judgment after she had filed a
motion for new trial and lost, with both actions raising the same grounds,
reveals an intent to secure a judgment in her favor by abusing and making a
mockery of the legal remedies provided by law. This kind of abuse is what this
court tries to guard against when it limited its application, and stated in some of
the cases that an action for annulment of judgment cannot be invoked when
other remedies had already been availed.
244.) ALEXANDER TAM WONG Vs. CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA
G.R. No. 183802; September 17, 2009
FACTS:
Catherine Factor-Koyoma filed an action for specific performance against
Alexander Tam Wong before RTC. Koyoma alleged that Wong refused to execute
a deed of absolute sale and surrender the Condominium Certificate Title of a
unit in California Garden Square (Mandaluyong). Koyama further averred that
she had been renting out the subject property to foreign tourists, but Wong
Page 24 of 56
padlocked the same while she was in Japan attending to her business. When she
requested him to open the subject property, he reportedly mauled her, causing
her physical injuries, and also took her personal belongings.
RTC issued summons at Wong’s residence in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon
City; however, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the
Complaint were returned to the RTC by Sheriff Sheriff Baloloy, who indicated in
his Sheriff’s Return that said court process should already be deemed "DULY
SERVED." According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to
serve the summons at Wong’s address but the latter was always not around
according He also attempted to leave the summons with Wong’s caretaker
(Mira) who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half
years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same.
Wong failed to file an answer. Koyoma filed a motion to declare him in default.
RTC then declared Wong in default.
Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail a Manifestation
claiming that he did not receive any summons from said court. According to
him, he was only informed unofficially by a tricycle driver regarding papers
from a court in Caloocan City, which the tricycle driver returned to the court
after failing to locate Wong. This prompted Wong to file an inquiry with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Caloocan City as regards any case that
might have been filed against him. In response, the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Caloocan City issued a Certification bearing the details of the civil
case against him. Wong asserted that he would not hesitate to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the RTC, should the proper procedure be observed.
By special appearance of counsel, Wong filed a motion to dismiss asserting that
there was no proper service of summons upon him. On the other hand, Koyama
maintained that there was a proper substituted service of the summons as
evidenced by the Registry Return Card. Wong filed a Reply alleging that said
housemaids stated above are fictitious.
The RTC denied Wong’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.It declared that the
sheriff validly resorted to a substituted service of the summons. Wong went
before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. CA
dismissed Wong’s petition for being the improper remedy.
Wong elevated the case to the SC.
In the meantime, since there was no TRO issued by the CA or SC, the RTC
continued hearing the civil case for specific performance to which Wong
actively participated. The RTC eventually issued an order rescinding the
contract of sale of a condo unit between the parties and Wong was ordered to
pay Koyama P 2,204,000.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Wong since he was not served
the summons.
RULING:
RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong.
It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be
served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it,
by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures
that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is
accomplished. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a
copy of the summons to the defendant himself.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the
regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks
to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even
though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another to whom
the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
A careful study of Sheriff Baloloy’s Return, it can be said that he improperly
resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons.
Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wong’s residence on three
different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing
else in the Sheriff’s Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted
extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. During his visits to Wong’s residence, he
was informed by the housemaids that Wong was at his office. There is no
showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know Wong’s office
address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the summons
upon him at his office. Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy
attempted to serve the summons at the former’s residence on 8 August 2007,
there was no indication that Wong’s absence was other than temporary or that
he would not soon return.
Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff
Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of
summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloy’s three visits to
Wong’s residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and
Wong’s absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloy’s visits, since Wong
Page 25 of 56
was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of personal
service of summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before resorting to
substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish
personal service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to
avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. 43
Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears
before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court recognizes that:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance
The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance
before it in Civil Case No. C-21860. The Court is not referring to Wong’s filing of
his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-21860, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over his person, because that clearly does not
constitute voluntary appearance. The Court, instead, calls attention to the RTC
Order dated 20 November 2008 allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama.
Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity opened to him by
the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the 23 January 2009
hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the 25 September
2007 Order declaring him in default. By actively participating in the 23 January
2009 hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over Civil
Case No. C-21860 and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus,
deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial
court.
245.) SANSIO PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES MOGOL
G.R. No. 177007; July 14, 2009
FACTS:
Sansio Philippines filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against
spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. At the request of Sansio, the process
server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint
on spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were in
the said premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the
criminal cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia for violations of BP
22. Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint, spouses Mogol
referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The
counsel pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the
complaint should be served only at the address that was stated in both
documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The counsel of
respondent apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint
to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for
the same. As the process server could not convince the respondent to sign for
the aforementioned documents, he proceeded to leave the premises of the
courtroom. The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service
of Summons, declaring that respondents refused to accept it with no valid
reason at all.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondents in Default. Petitioner averred
that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly served
upon the respondents at the courtroom of the MeTC. From the date of said
service up to the time of the filing of the above-stated motion, respondent had
yet to file any responsive pleading.
Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent filed an Opposition
to the Motion to Declare Respondents] in Default. Respondents averred the
service should have been effected at the respondent spouses’ residential
address, as stated in the summons and the copy of the complaint.
The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not specify
where service is to be effected.. Respondents were, thus, validly served with
summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading
before the lapse of the reglementary period therefore, the Motion to Declare
[Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious.
Respondent spouses Mogol filed an MR on the above Order, but the same was
denied by the MeTC of Manila.
Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or
Injunction before the RTC of Manila against Judge de Castro, Jr. of the MeTC of
Manila, and herein petitioner. Respondent spouses insisted there was no valid
service of summons per return of the process server, which was binding on the
MeTC judge, who did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondent
spouses. They contended that the MeTC of Manila acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring them in
default.
The RTC of Manila issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that Section 6,
Rule 14 of the ROC does not mandate that summons be served strictly at the
Page 26 of 56
address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily, said provision
states that the service of summons may be made wherever such is possible and
practicable. Therefore, it did not matter much that the summons and the copy of
the complaint in this case were served inside the courtroom of the MeTC of
Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at Lucena City.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal on the above-mentioned Order of the RTC
of Manila, which was given due course. The CA held that there was no valid
service of summons.
. person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol
Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid service of summons to the respondent spouses
RULING:
YES; A summon is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary
appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment
of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null
and void. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the
judgment of a court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner
provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the ROC, which read:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be
served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it,
by tendering it to him. The essence of personal service is the handing or
tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may
be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of
summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. The act of the counsel of
respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the
complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was
done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished was the
operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in
was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila. That being said, the subsequent
act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the
copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on
the defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated
in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear that, whenever
practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Nothing more is required.
Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the fact
that respondent spouses Mogol based their case on a wrong appreciation of the
above-stated provisions of the ROC. Respondent spouses principally argue that
Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without construing the same with
Section 7. Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the ROC cannot be
construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for
alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the
mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our procedural rules, service of
summons in the persons of the defendants is generally preferred over
substituted service.
As to the reliance of the CA on the second paragraph of the Return on Service of
Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the Summons were
returned “UNSERVED,” the Court finds the same utterly misplaced. A simple
reading of the first paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, which
contains the circumstances surrounding the service of the summons on the
persons of the respondent spouses Mogol, manifestly reveals that the summons
and the copy of the complaint were already validly served on the said
respondents. They merely refused to receive or obtain a copy of the same.
Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the
process server in the aforesaid second paragraph – an error that undoubtedly
Page 27 of 56
added to the confusion of the parties to this case – the same was, nonetheless, a
mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment of the
courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that because of such a statement, respondent
spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said return informing them that the
summons had been unserved, thus justifying their non-filing of any responsive
pleading.
The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as
may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service
provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of
justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied and due
process is served.
246.) Spouses Manuel vs Ong
G.R. No. 205249; October 15, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet a complaint for accion reivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses
Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned.
Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel
in default.
Sheriff Joselito Sales attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses
Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.
Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time
considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill.
Sheriff Sales made another attempt at personal service to petitioner Sandra
Manuel but she refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint.
Sheriff Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons.
As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within the required 15-day
period, Ong asked that they be declared in default.
RTC issued an order granting Ong's motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in
default. RTC also granted motion for ex parte presentation of evidence.
Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default.
They claimed that it is the siblings of petitioner Sandra Manuel who resided in
Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet so summons could not have been properly
served on them in the former address.
RTC denied motion to lift order of default.
Sps. Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but the CA denied it for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel has been acquired.
RULING:
Jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants was validly acquired because
personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made
by Sheriff Joselito Sales.
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in
Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is
distinguished from its alternative :— substituted service — as provided by Rule
14, Section 7:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales
endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the
Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on
the first occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra
Manuel's mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the
summons and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to
accept them.
Page 28 of 56
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the
sheriffs return but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They
claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet,
where the service of summons, was made. From this, they surmised that the
"Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return was
someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address.
Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where
summons is served. A defendant's address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally
handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should the
defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of
personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of
service.
In any case, the Court of Appeals is correct in pointing out that the Spouses
Manuel's self-serving assertion must crumble in the face of the clear
declarations in the sheriffs return. Pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the acts of Sheriff Joselito Sales and the events
relating to the attempt to personally hand the summons and a copy of the
complaint to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriffs return, enjoy the
presumption of regularity.23 Moreover, Sheriff Joselito Sales must be presumed
to have taken ordinary care and diligence in carrying out his duty to make
service upon the proper person(s) and not upon an impostor. 24
A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of
regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the
circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the
Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining
residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular
about the sheriffs return or that it was otherwise incomplete.
Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon
the Spouses Manuel to adduce proof of their claims. All they mustered was their
self-serving allegation of an alternative address. If at all, this claim of
maintaining residence elsewhere should not even be lent an iota of credibility
considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong pointed out, the barangay
clearances, which the Spouses Manuel themselves attached to one of their
pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually indicated that they were
residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet.25cralawred Their lie is, thus,
revealed by their own pleading.
As the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their
allegation but even succeeded in contradicting themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales'
recollection of events must be taken to be true. Thus, valid personal service of
summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made. From this, it
follows that jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners Benedict and Sandra
Manuel was acquired by the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet.
247.) B. D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC. v. R. S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY
DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 169919, September 11, 2009
FACTS:
BD Long Span Builders, Inc (BD) and Ampeloquio Realty Inc (ARI) entered into
an agreement wherein petitioner agreed to render rip rapping construction
services at ARI’s resort in Ternate, Cavite for P80 Million.
ARI failed to fulfill its obligation resulting in the cancellation of the project.
Petitioner demanded the return of the P800,000 cash bond, but respondent
refused to do so. Petitioners legal counsel sent two demand letters but the latter
still refused to return the cash bond.
BD filed with RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on respondent, through its
staff member, Romel Dolahoy. Respondent failed to file an Answer or any
responsive pleading to the complaint. Upon motion of petitioner, the RTC issued
an Order declaring respondent in default, and allowing petitioner to present
evidence ex parte.
RTC ruled in favor of BD. ARI filed the case to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s
decision stating that there was an invalid service of summons. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but likewise dismissed. ARI further appealed to the
SC.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an improper service of summons upon ARI.
RULING:
Page 29 of 56

Yes, there was an improper service of summons upon ARI.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. The service
of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a
domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an
officer who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel),
otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the
legal papers served on him. However, if the summons cannot be served on the
defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then substituted
service may be resorted to.
Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by
stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that
such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must
be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than
that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent)
through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather,
summons was served by substituted service on the defendants staff member,
Romel Dolahoy.Substituted service was resorted to on the servers first attempt
at service of summons, and there was no indication that prior efforts were made
to render prompt personal service on the defendant.
Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who
received the summons in respondents behalf, shared such relation of confidence
ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following
our ruling in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioners contention that service
on Romel Dolahoy constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service.
Petitioners contention that respondents filing of Notice of Appeal effectively
cured any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled
that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies,
to wit: (1) he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (2) if judgment has
already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section
1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and (4) he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has been presented by him. Thus respondent, which had been declared in default,
may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courts judgment
without being considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority.
248.) Planters Development Bank Vs. Chandumal
GR No. 195619, September 5, 2012
FACTS:
BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land.
BF Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and interests over the contract. On June
18, 1999, an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery
of possession was filed by PDP against Chandumal.
Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff
Galing attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three
dates but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates.
Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by serving the same
through Chandumal's mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.
For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion
to declare Chandumal in default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23,
2001, Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default
maintaining that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of
the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion which was reversed by the Court of
Appeals due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of summons.
Page 30 of 56
 whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached
ISSUES: or whether he even tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff
clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his failure to comply with
the requisites renders such service ineffective.26
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court 2.) Respondent voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Despite that there was no valid substituted
service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that Chandumal voluntarily
RULING: submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

1.) In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:
his failure to serve it personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 22 the Court
detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, summed up Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in
as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
in the return – the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of
When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to
suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in
Admit Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction
the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the
of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief
recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
receipt of summons, which matters must be clearly and specifically described in
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is
the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person in charge, who must have
considered voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.27 The Court
sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
notes that aside from the allegation that she did not receive any summons,
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on
Chandumal’s motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer
the summons.23 These were reiterated and applied in Pascual v. Pascual,24 where
failed to positively assert the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was
the substituted service of summon made was invalidated due to the sheriff’s
set forth therein was the substantial claim that PDB failed to comply with the
failure to specify in the return the necessary details of the failed attempts to
requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, 28 which
effect personal service which would justify resort to substituted service of
already delves into the merits of PDB’s cause of action. In addition, Chandumal
summons.
even appealed the RTC decision to the CA, an act which demonstrates her
recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render said judgment.
In applying the foregoing requisites in the instant case, the CA correctly ruled
that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of
Given Chandumal’s voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically
the RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 255, had all authority to render its Decision
show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step
dated May 31, 2004. The CA, therefore, erred in nullifying said RTC decision and
taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons
dispensing with the resolution of the substantial issue raised herein, i.e., validity
personally to the defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts
of the notarial rescission. Instead, however, of remanding this case to the CA,
of the defendant without indicating that such information was verified from a
the Court will resolve the same considering that the records of the case are
person who had knowledge thereof.25Indeed, the sheriff’s return shows a mere
already before us and in order to avoid any further delay.
perfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal.
There was no indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific
Page 31 of 56
249.) ALLEN A. MACASAET Vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of
general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director
Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay,
Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes
(petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article
petitioners published.
The suit was raffled to the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be
served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at
Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building,
Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.
In the morning, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to
effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to
personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the
defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the
afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he
was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s return.
petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsel’s special
appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons
because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They
contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons
personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant
by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be
impleaded as a party in a civil action.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their
answers. Undaunted, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari. The CA
promulgated its questioned decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioners
HELD:
YES. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the
summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in
the morning of September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same
date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and
not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and
gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address
on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to
the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that
further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be
futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or
required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all
times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted
service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable
time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on
the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances
already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules,
not their letter, that governs.
Petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was
demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served
through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the
RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-
trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of
discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary
appearance in the action.
250.) HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED
G.R. No. 159590. October 18, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Catalan filed before the RTC, a complaint for a sum of money with
damages against petitioner HSBC due to HSBANKs alleged wanton refusal to pay
her the value of five HSBANK checks issued by Frederick Arthur Thomson
(Thomson) amounting to HK$3,200,000.00.
Summons was served on HSBANK at the Enterprise Center, Tower I, Ayala
Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas St., Makati City. HSBANK filed a Motion to
Dismiss.
Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as
co-defendant. HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.
Summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK
(Makati Branch) at the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo
de Roxas, Makati. Without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC
TRUSTEE filed a Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint,
dated questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. HSBC TRUSTEE alleges
Page 32 of 56
that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not confer upon the RTC
jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation separate and distinct from
HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the HSBANK Makati or in any other place
in the Philippines; (c) it has not authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons
for it; and, (d) it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be served
because it does not transact business in the Philippines.
The RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss and held that it
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendants because the question of
whether a foreign corporation is doing business or not in the Philippines cannot
be a subject of a Motion to Dismiss but should be ventilated in the trial on the
merits; and defendants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC
setting up in their Motions to Dismiss other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction.
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate petitions for certiorari and/or
prohibition with the CA. The CA dismissed the two petitions for certiorari.
Hence, the present petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction over HSBSC Trustee due to improper
service of summons
HELD:
NO. The filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be considered a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a conditional
appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the service of
summons. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of
summons, cannot be considered to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. HSBC TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings in assailing the
service of summons and the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and existing
under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of summons on
foreign corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in
the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or
agents within the Philippines.
In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to rule
that it is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign
corporation is doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of
doing business must first be "established by appropriate allegations in the
complaint" and the court in determining such fact need not go beyond the
allegations therein.
The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did not
sufficiently show the fact of HSBC TRUSTEEs doing business in
the Philippines. It does not appear at all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any
act which would give the general public the impression that it had been
engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual business undertakings
in the country. Absent from the amended complaint is an allegation that HSBC
TRUSTEE had performed any act in the country that would place it within the
sphere of the court’s jurisdiction.
We have held that a general allegation, standing alone, that a party is doing
business in the Philippines does not make it so.
Also, there is no allegation in the amended complaint that HSBANK is the
domestic agent of HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons upon it. Thus,
the summons tendered to the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for
HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper. There being no proper service of
summons, the RTC cannot take cognizance of the case against HSBC TRUSTEE
for lack of jurisdiction over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the RTC is
therefore null and void. Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC TRUSTEE
should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
251.) GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO SAYSON, JR. VS. NISSIN-
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181517, July 06, 2015
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.'s (Green
Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the van's driver.
Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin-Universal Robina
Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to
P567,070.68. NURC denied any liability therefor.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before
the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's employees, was the
one who received the summons.
Page 33 of 56
NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper
service. NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the
summons was received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule on
service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a
domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its
officers.
The RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion to dismiss. It ruled that
there was substantial compliance because there was actual receipt of the
summons by NURC. NURC elevated the case to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari. The CA reversed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the summons was properly served on NURC
HELD:
Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the
corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states "general
manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely
"secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." It has now become restricted,
limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned
provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention
of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in
the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the summons on
January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it was received upon instruction of
Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation. Such fact, however,
does not appear in the Sheriffs Return. The Return did not even state whether
Avedillo was present at the time the summons was received by Tinio, the
supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers that the sheriff tendered
the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and receive the same. She
then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her behalf. However, Green
Star never presented said sheriff as witness during the hearing of NURC's
motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the sheriff executed an
affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the same was likewise not
presented as evidence. It was only when the case was already before the CA that
said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of summons was made on a cost
accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule
14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, although the
corporation may have actually received the summons. To rule otherwise will be
an outright circumvention of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the
administration of justice.
252.) INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC. AND EDMER Y. LIM VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, STATIONERY EXPRESSIONS SHOP, INC. AND
JOSEPHINE LIM BON HUAN
G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink), represented by its president,
petitioner Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of
money and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop,
Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, and Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan). Interlink
sought from Expressions the recovery of the latter's unpaid rentals and
damages resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.
In the Sheriff's Return, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel (Sheriff Muriel) certified that
he served the summons issued in the subject case, together with the copy of the
complaint, on the respondents at the office of the defendant company's
president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff Muriel stated
that Liwanan undertook to forward the said documents to her superior.
Respondents entered a special appearance through Atty. Generosa Jacinto (Atty.
Jacinto) alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
The trial court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance with
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such service defective. Thus,
it ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the respondents.
In the Sheriff's Return, Sheriff Muriel certified that he served the summons on
Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a certain Amee
Ochotorina (Ochotorina), a person of suitable age and discretion, who
introduced herself as one of the secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added
that Ochotorina assured him that the summons would be brought to the
attention of Bon Huan. He added that he had insisted that the summons be
received personally by Bon Huan, but Ochotorina refused and told him that Bon
Huan was then attending to some business matters.
The respondents alleged that the second service of the summons was still
defective because Ochotorina did not work for nor was connected with the
office of the president of Expressions, and that she was neither its president,
Page 34 of 56
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, nor its in-
house counsel.
The trial court was convinced that there was sufficient compliance with the
rules on service of summons to a juridical entity considering that the summons
was received by the assistant/secretary of the president.
The RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to prove its
claims against Expressions and Bon Huan.
Aggrieved, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. The CA annulled the RTC decision. The appellate
court ruled that the second service of summons was still defective, and the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents, thus
rendering the RTC decision void.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents
HELD:
NO. No valid service of summons.
There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic corporation duly
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and that respondent
Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service
of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon Huan, or to its managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It
is further undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made
upon Ochotorina, who was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and
clearly, not among those officers enumerated under Section 11 of Rule 14. The
service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not vest
upon the trial court jurisdiction over Expressions.
Even assuming arguendo that the second service of summons may be treated as
a substituted service upon Bon Huan as the president of Expressions, the same
did not have the effect of giving the trial court jurisdiction over the respondents.
It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable
causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time.
In this case, the impossibility of prompt personal service was not shown. The
sheriffs return reveals that Sheriff Muriel attempted to serve the second
summons personally only once. Clearly, the efforts exerted by Sheriff Muriel
were insufficient to establish that it was impossible to personally serve the
summons promptly. Further, Sheriff Muriel failed to cite reasons why personal
service proved ineffectual. He merely stated that Ochotorina told him that Bon
Huan was then attending to business matters, and that he was assured that the
summons would be brought to the attention of Bon Huan.
RULE 14: SUMMONS (SECS. 15 – 20)
253.) NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, petitioner, vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondent.
G.R. No. 175799 November 28, 2011
FACTS:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City a Complaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited
praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the
parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and for damages.
Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to
personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate
General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on
petitioner. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying
for the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and
improper service of summons; the Complaint failed to state a cause of action;
respondent does not have any against petitioner; and other grounds.
The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss providing that
there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign
Affairs on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license
to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom
summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that
the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the
Motion to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be
ventilated during the trial.
Petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its
Motion to Dismiss.
Page 35 of 56

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari.Hence, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WON there is proper service of summons based on Rule 14, Section 15
HELD:
NO. Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1)
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which
the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the
relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the
Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also
with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd.
v. Dakila Trading Corporation, 530 SCRA 170 (2007), that: Undoubtedly,
extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in
rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. When the case
instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging
Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in
which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under
a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for
entering into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and
until the plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to
the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to one quasi in
rem.
254.) Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513, G.R. No. 165016 June 17,
2008
FACTS
Petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and
support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga
City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she
prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence
Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. Petitioner
Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez
has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur. Vasquezs grandfather received them as Vasquez was
in Manila. Vasquezs mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who
informed the court of the non-service of summons.
Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it
for lack of proper service of summons.
In 2000, the court issued an alias summons in Taguig, Metro Manila upon
petitioners motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted
service on Vasquezs caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriffs return incorrectly
stated Lazaro as Vasquezs surname. Another alias summons was issued, also
received by Bejer.
On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to
file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was
furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known
address, but these were returned as he had allegedly moved to another place
and left no new address. Trial court ruled in favour of Dolores.
In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal. The appellate
court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was defective as there was
no explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect
personal service.
Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as
overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons in Taguig. Noting that
Vasquezs seamans book indicated that he left the country on January 24,
2000 and came back on October 12, 2000, they criticize the appellate court for
anchoring its rulings on mere technicality.
Page 36 of 56
Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have
been personal or by publication as substituted service is proper only if a
defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that the sheriffs return did not
state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons
ISSUE:
WON there was valid substituted service of summons.
HELD:
YES. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons
must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by
substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire,
and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning
agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a
Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro
Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his
home address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent
Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a
residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the
summons is living at the time when the service was made, even though he was
temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino
resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is
governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 16. Residents
temporarily out of the Philippines.—When any action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily
out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as
under the preceding section
Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968) offers a rational and logical
solution of the issue. We held in said case that the normal method of service of
summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal
service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of
summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily
absent resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are
always amenable to suits in personam therein
The letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff’s
return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not
conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly
prejudice petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior
attempts at personal service may have been submitted by the plaintiff during
the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service had
Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It
was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he
questioned the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such
failure to appear, and then later to question the court’s jurisdiction over his
person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.
255.) Cariaga, Jr. vs. Malaya, 143 SCRA 441, No. L-48375 August 13, 1986
FACTS:
Plaintiffs (private respondents herein) Ana Almonte Cariaga Soon filed in her
behalf and in behalf of her minor daughter Carolina, an action for (1) Annulment
of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Property, (2) Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), (3) Recovery of Real Property with damages,
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, Branch IV.
All defendants in said action filed their answer with counterclaim with the
exception of defendants (petitioners herein) Jose C. Cariaga Jr. and Marieta
Cariaga-Celis who were both residing abroad and were not served with
summons. The lower court upon motion of plaintiffs granted them leave to
effect extra-territorial service of summons upon said defendants pursuant to
Secs. 7, 17 and 18 of Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court. (Annex "A", P. 9,
Record). Accordingly, summons with copies of the complaint were served to the
defendants by registered mail abroad (Guam and U.S.A.) by the Clerk of Court at
the instance of plaintiffs (Annex "B" and "C").
Defendants, who are residents of the Philippines filed a motion to set aside the
said summons and to declare the service of summons abroad by registered mail
as null and void, it being allegedly irregular and unauthorized under the
provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court (Annex D ") to which motion
plaintiffs filed their opposition. The court however ruled that there was
substantial compliance with Rule 14.
Page 37 of 56
Defendants (petitioner herein), residing abroad, by special appearance and thru
counsel filed their motion to consider the service of summons upon, them by
registered mail as null and void. However such motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the service of summons by registered mail upon defendants in the case
at bar is one which is contemplated within the principles laid down in the
provisions of Secs. 17, 7 and 22, Rule 14 of the New Rules of Court .
HELD:
YES .Under Section 17, extraterritorial service of summons is proper: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates
to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the
relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any Interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when defendant nonresident’s property has been attached within the
Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).
In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines in three ways: (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known-address of the
defendant; and (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
The third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially
complied with in this case.
There is no question that the requirement of due process has been met as
shown by the fact that defendants actually received the summonses and copies
of the complaint and as evidenced by, the Registry Return Cards marked as
Annex A-1 (page 56-Record) and Annex B-1. Whatever defect there may have
been in the service of summons was aptly corrected by the court a quo in its
assailed order dated January 16, 1978, which gave said defendants ninety (90)
days from receipt of order within which to file their responsive pleadings.
Defendants have no reason to complain that they were unaware of the action
filed against them or claim that they were denied due process.
256) Romualdez-Licaros vs. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762, G.R. No. 150656 April
29, 2003
FACTS
Abelardo and Margarita were lawfully married on December 15, 1968. Out of
this marital union were born Maria Concepcion and Abelardo, Jr. Ironically,
marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between
the spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and
board.
In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her
two (2) children. In the United States, on April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for
divorce before the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo where she
manifested that she does not desire counseling at that time. On August 6, 1990,
Margarita was granted the decree of divorce together with a distribution of
properties between her and Abelardo.
Abelardo and Margarita executed an Agreement of Separation of Properties.
This was followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of
the spouses and for the approval of the agreement of separation of their
properties. A decision was issued granting the petition and approving the
separation of property agreement.
Abelardo commenced for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As
Margarita was then residing in U.S.A. Abelardo initially moved that summons be
served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a
quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order,
as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given
address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at
the expense of Abelardo
Abelardo was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.The marriage between
Abelardo and Margarita was declared null and void.
Almost nine (9) years later, Margarita received a letter informing her that she
no longer has the right to use the family name Licaros inasmuch as her
marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Petitioner went to SC.
ISSUE:
Page 38 of 56
Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with Abelardo
HELD:
YES. As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential. Actions in personam and actions in rem or
quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or
quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and
seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991,
Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982
together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects
the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial
service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term
“personal status” includes family relations, particularly the relations between
husband and wife.
The Process Server’s Return of 15 July 1991 shows the summons addressed to
Margarita together with the complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the
Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt. The Process
Server’s certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as
set out in the certificate. Before proceeding to declare the marriage between
Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial court stated in its Decision dated
8 November 1991 that “compliance with the jurisdictional requirements hav(e)
(sic) been duly established.” We hold that delivery to the Department of
Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule. After all, this is
exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect
service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service
pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.
257.) Busuego vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 376, No. L-48955 June 30,
1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced an action before the Pasig Court of
First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and Vivencio
Lopez to recover possession of a parcel of land and a three (3) unit apartment
house standing thereon in Rizal.
Immediately thereafter, summons was issued in the name of the four
defendants and per sheriff's return, was personally served at the address given
in the complaint, upon the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro,
personally."
Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an extension
of fifteen (15) days to file answer which was granted.
Defendants again through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10)
days to answer, as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four (4)
defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive pleading [could be]
filed by him."
Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the defendants,
for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the lower court
declared the defendants in default . Subsequently, plaintiff's case was heard and
his evidence received, and on the basis of that evidence the trial court rendered
its decision in favor of the plaintiff.
Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the lower court an ex parte motion
for execution of the default judgment, which the lower court granted.
Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his [own]
behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in
abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30 days,
within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give them sufficient time to
look for another place where the five families composed mostly of little
children, can reside. The lower court granted Romeo's motion and accordingly,
the execution of the default judgment was held in abeyance.
The defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve the writ of
execution, solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel
were ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default. The lower court denied
Page 39 of 56
the motion, finding the above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and plain
harassment on the part of the defendants.
The respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with the
same court an omnibus motion, which included a motion to lift the order of
default, a second motion for reconsideration and a motion to quash the writ of
execution issued pursuant to the default judgment, alleging for the first time
that their failure to answer was due to lack of notice.
Petitioner opposed vigorously the above motion contending that, the
defendants could not pretend absence of proper notice after they, through
counsel, had filed the two motions for extension of time to answer. The lower
court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for extension of time to
vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the defendants to be equivalent
to waiver of service of summons.
Defendants, through their new counsel, filed what in effect was a third motion
for reconsideration of the judgment by default, alleging that: the lower court
never acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper service
of summons. The third motion for reconsideration having been denied,
defendants brought a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
asserting that the orders, judgment and writs complained of were all void for
want of jurisdiction over their persons.
ISSUE:
WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the persons.
HELD:
YES. Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or respondent: (a) by service of summons
upon the defendant; and (b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court
and his submission to its authority. With respect to service of summons, the
Revised Rules of Court prescribe that a copy of the summons be served
personally upon the defendant by “handing him a copy thereof in person or if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.” Personal service, however, may be
dispensed with and substituted service may be availed of if the defendant
cannot be served personally “within a reasonable time.”
It the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service
in seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy
thereof “through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally.” Perusal, however, of the
sheriff’s return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior
efforts, if any, had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants
personally within a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such
efforts, before proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the
sheriff’s return is essential for enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules
of Court that substituted service may be resorted to only where it is not possible
to serve the defendant or defendants promptly in person. As this Court ruled in
Keister vs. Navarro, “[T]he impossibility of prompt service in person should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact
that such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service—.
As earlier noted, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be
acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority, for voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. As
long ago as 1918, the essence of voluntary appearance was explained by this
Court through Mr. Justice Johnson in Flores vs. Zurbito, as follows: “A voluntary
appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance
in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause
pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him
to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be
made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method of
appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance
and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by
presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically
objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the
jurisdiction of the court over this person. When the appearance is by motion
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole
and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is
for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. x x x”
In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number
of times without raising any objection to the improper service of summons: (1)
the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed two
successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint; (2)
more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial
court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for
Page 40 of 56
extension of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look for
another place to live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the persons of the defendants; and (3) the defendants, through
their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for reconsideration of the judgment of the
trial court and for dissolution of the writ of execution, again without contesting
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. We hold that by anyone or more
of these acts, and certainly by the whole series of acts, the defendants,
respondents herein, effectively waived the initial lack of jurisdiction over their
persons and submitted to the authority of the trial court.
258.) ALBERTO G. PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91486. January 19, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-
in-interest. They filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC
of Quezon City, claiming that they have acquired the forest land with 502
hectares through prescription and that they have filed applications for land
titling in their respective names with the appropriate government agency.
While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain,
they named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled
owners of subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of those
so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision
(hereinafter, Vil-Ma). Since personal service of summons could not be effected
on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for
leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly,
the summons was published in the Metropolitan Newsweek, a periodical edited
and published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings,
while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in
default. Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte
against the defaulted respondents. The court rendered a Partial Decision in
favor of petitioners. Court declared petitioners as absolute owners of the
aforesaid lots by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription, with the exception of the
lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title belonging to the non-
defaulted respondents.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled owners of the
subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgment was null and
void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, for the reasons
that they were never made parties, nor were their lots described in the
complaint, published summons, and Partial Decision. Named defendant was
VIL-MA, a totally separate and independent entity which had already ceased to
exist way back in January of 1976. Moreover, the summons, as well as the
Partial Decision was not published in a newspaper or periodical of general
circulation. Thus, the defective service of summons to said defendant did not
place the individual lot owners under the trial court’s jurisdiction, nor are they
bound by the adverse judgment.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition and annulling
the Partial Decision in Civil Case based on its finding that the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has acquired jurisdiction over respondent Vil-ma Maloles
subdivision by the publication of the summons and so the partial decision was
legal, valid and proper.
RULING:
We find no merit in the instant petition.
We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision is null
and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not
duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The
summons and the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited
and published in Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of
Appeals found the publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan
Newsweek, to be invalid because the said periodical is not considered a
newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City where the subject property is
located, as required by Presidential Decree No. 1079, Section 1.
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was
legal and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the
Rules of Court. The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of
the trial court.
Page 41 of 56
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the
approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan
Newsweek is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules
strictly require that publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such time as the court may order. The court orders
relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that
the summons was to be published. In the absence of such specification,
publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements of the
rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled with the defective
publication of the summons rendered the service by publication ineffective. The
modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a
fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the
statutory requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by
substituted service, or by publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and
fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is
considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the
rules, the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private
respondents are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was
filed on November 2, 1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a
juridical entity. Vilma Maloles Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more
than six (6) years earlier, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical
personality.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 17596 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
259.) REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION VS. DIAMOND DRAGON
REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015
FACTS:
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected at
the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Reicon and
respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) entered
into a Contract of Lease, whereby Reicon leased the subject property to
Diamond for a period of 20 years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011. In
turn, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee Foods
Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises (Maybunga), represented by its
proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao (Andrew).
Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had issued by
way of payments were all dishonored upon presentment. This prompted Reicon
to demand the payment of the accrued rentals and terminate the contract.
Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over
the portions of the subject property they respectively occupy.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon,
Jollibee, Maybunga, Andrew, alleging that the contract did not provide for its
unilateral termination by either of the parties. As such, Diamond prayed that the
unilateral termination of contract effected by Reicon, as well as the separate
contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and Maybunga, be declared
invalid and illegal. Further, it sought the award of unpaid rentals from Jollibee
and Maybunga, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
By way of special appearance, Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons
was not served upon its president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by the Rules of
Court, but upon a certain Fernando Noyvo, a houseboy/gardener, at a residence
located at Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, which is not the principal office of
Reicon.
Opposing Reicon’s motion to dismiss, Diamond argued that, even assuming that
summons was not properly served upon Reicon, improper service is not a
ground to dismiss its complaint.
RTC denied Reicon’s motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of
summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules allowing for the dismissal of a complaint. Reicon moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied.
Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon Presiding Judge of the RTC in not
dismissing Diamond’s complaint. In a Resolution, the CA required Reicon to
show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for its
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond. It appears that the
CA’s earlier Resolution addressed to Diamond was returned to it, with the
notation “RTS-Moved Out.”
In its Compliance, Reicon stated that Diamond has not submitted any paper or
Page 42 of 56
pleading notifying the RTC of any change in its address. As such, Reicon
maintained that the service of its petition to Diamond’s address as above-
indicated should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it proffered that
Diamond may be served through its counsel of record at the latter’s office
address.
Diamond filed a manifestation, under a special appearance, averring that
Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its failure to serve
a copy thereof on its counsel of record. It cited the rule that when a party is
represented by counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon said counsel
to constitute valid service.
The CA dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition based on the following grounds:
(a) non-compliance with the requirements of proof of service of the petition on
Diamond and (b) non-compliance with the rule on service upon a party through
counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served
upon the person of Diamond.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases originally filed before
the CA, provide as follows:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement
of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the
grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired.
– The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of the certiorari petition filed
by Reicon before the CA, shows that it contains the registry numbers
corresponding to the registry receipts as well as the affidavit of service and/or
filing of the person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on
behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of Reicon’s certiorari petition had been
served to the RTC as well as to Diamond through its address at “Suite 305 AIC
Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules on proof of
service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46 above-quoted.
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as
its business address in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of
evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved out. Hence,
Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of
its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3
and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as above-cited, which merely entails service of the
petition upon the respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by
nature, an original and independent action, and, therefore not considered as
part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the certiorari petition,
as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for
respondent has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition outright
for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules as well as the rule on
service upon a party through counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The
service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon
his counsel, is what the rule properly requires, as in this case.
On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction over the
person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its
voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed
by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had
Page 43 of 56
consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo
and even before this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. —
The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his
voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e.,
the Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was
returned with the notation “RTS-Moved Out,” the alternative mode of
Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction
over its person.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 21, 2012
and November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 under the parameters discussed
in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 15: MOTIONS
260.) JOSE DELOS REYES VS. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI
G.R. No. 169135, June 18, 2010
Petition: This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
The trial court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 24858 in favor of respondent
Josephine Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court.
Then, Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 480537 (subject
property) during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate
of sale was executed in her favor on even date. A writ of possession was issued by the
trial court. Subsequently, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No.
480537.
Respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the
sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin
grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and that
the trial courts’ decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by prescription.
The trial court granted respondent’s the motion on the ground that the prescription for
the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner
thereafter sought review via certiorari before the CA.
The CA denied the petition. The CA noted that the subject motion is a non-litigious
motion, hence, the three-day notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed with the trial
court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by prescription, laches
or estoppel.
Issue:
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Petitioner contends that the motion filed by respondent to compel the sheriff to execute
the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does not contain a notice of
hearing.
Respondent’s Arguments:
Respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and that
petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be heard
by the trial court.
Ruling:
Page 44 of 56
The petition lacks merit. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of
sale as a matter of right.
The CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a
general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions
which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate
of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the
subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court
gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a
Comment/ Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, validly claim that he was denied his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 13, 2005 Decision and August 3, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87972 are AFFIRMED.
261.) FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR. VS. MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171872, June 28, 2010
Petition: petition for review
FACTS:
Petitioner Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed with the MTC of Batangas a complaint for
forcible entry against respondent Manila Southcoast Development Corporation.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the
disputed land. Respondent appealed to the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas. The RTC,
in its Decision dated 22 January 2004, reversed the MTC decision and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was set for
hearing on 26 February 2004. Petitioner sent a copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration to respondents counsel by registered mail on 23 February
2004. During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC
judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004. Meanwhile, it was only on 3 March
2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that
respondent’s counsel received a copy of petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 and
was further reset to 6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent filed its
Motion to Dismiss, claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule
did not toll the running of the period of appeal, which rendered the decision
final.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failure to appeal
within the 15 days reglementary period and declaring the 22 January 2004
Decision as final and executory. The RTC ruled that petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice
rule. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration which was
dismissed by the RTC. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The CA held that the three-day
notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro
forma. As found by the RTC, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 12
February 2004 was received by respondent only on 3 March 2004, or six days
after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals held that all violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 which render
the purpose of the notice of hearing of the motion nugatory are deemed fatal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner had violated the three-day notice rule
RULING:
We find the petition meritorious.
In upholding the RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals relied mainly on petitioners alleged violation of the notice
requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which
read:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner
Page 45 of 56
 as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing
shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. No written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of
procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court
of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice.
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
three-day notice rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that
although respondent received petitioners Motion for Reconsideration six days
after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset
three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only on 6 August
2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly,
respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed
its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the circumstances of this
case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due
process. Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have
resolved the motion based on the merits.
Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion
for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC
found that the notice of hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion which was set to
be heard on 12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November
2004. The RTC held that the service of the notice of hearing was one day short
of the prescribed minimum three days notice.
We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that [e]very written motion required
to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice. Thus, the date of the hearing should be at least three
days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the
petitioners Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to
comply with the notice requirement, respondent should have received the
notice of the hearing at least three days before 12 November 2004, which is 9
November 2004. Clearly, respondents receipt on 9 November 2004 (Tuesday)
of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on 12
November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days notice.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22
November 2005 and the Resolution dated 3 March 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89621. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas to resolve petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and Omnibus Motion on the merits.
262.) PURITA DE LA PEÑA, JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RTC-Br. 2, Balanga,
Bataan vs. PEDRO R. DE LA PEÑA, BENJAMIN P. BRIONES
G.R. No. 116693 July 5, 1996
FACTS:
A Complaint was filed against petitioner in the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, seeking
(a) the annulment of the deed of sale and deed of extrajudicial partition
executed between Fortunata de la Peña and Purita de la Peña, (b) the partition
of the estates of Fortunata de la Peña and Gavina de la Peña, and (c) the award
in their favor of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs of the suit.
Petitioner Purita de la Peña filed her Answer with Counterclaim. Subsequently,
the parties entered into partial compromise agreements where they agreed to
Page 46 of 56
settle their respective claims. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig dismissed the complaints
for annulment of the deeds of sale and extrajudicial partition, partition of the
estates of Gavina and Fortunata de la Peña, and the counterclaim of Purita de la
Peña for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement.2
Respondents herein as plaintiffs before the trial court received copy of the
aforesaid decision on 2 July 1993. On 15 July 1993, plaintiffs filed their Motion for
Reconsideration which is now being assailed as pro forma since it did not
contain a notice of hearing.
Judge Baclig denied the motion for reconsideration as he found no cogent and
compelling reason to warrant the reversal or modification of the decision
sought to be reconsidered. Consequently, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal
and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal. On the other hand, petitioner herein as
defendant in the court below filed a Motion for Execution contending that the
motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period as it failed to contain a notice of hearing hence pro forma.
Judge Baclig issued another Order 5 denying the motion for extension to file an
appeal and ruled that plaintiffs' period to appeal had already lapsed as it was
not tolled by the motion for reconsideration earlier filed, the latter being pro
forma for lack of a notice of hearing. As regards defendant's motion for
execution, the court a quo found no necessity to issue a writ considering its
earlier ruling dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and defendant's counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals held null and void the order of the trial court declaring
private respondents' motion for reconsideration pro forma.
Petitioner moved to reconsider. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its ruling that the motion for
reconsideration was not a mere scrap of paper so that the notice of appeal was
timely filed; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs suspend the running
of the prescriptive period
RULING:
No. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the motion for reconsideration
filed by the plaintiffs did not contain any notice of hearing. It was therefore pro
forma, hence it did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. The copy
of the decision was received on 2 July 1993. Consequently, respondents had
until 17 July 1993 within which to file their notice of appeal. Since they filed
their Notice of Appeal and/or Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal on 20
August 1993 or 49 days after receipt of the decision, the appeal was clearly filed
out of time. On that date the decision of the court a quo already attained finality
34 days earlier, hence, could no longer be reviewed much less modified on
appeal. The filing of the Notice of Appeal and/or Extension of Time to File Appeal
was a futile exercise. There was no longer any period to appeal nor a decision
that could still be appealed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 25 May 1994 and 29 July
1994 are SET ASIDE and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent as pro
forma is REINSTATED. Consequently, the judgment dismissing the complaint as
well as the counterclaim has acquired FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
263.) Manacop vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104875.November 13, 1992
PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
FACTS
Petitioner was the president of the Manacop Construction Corp. Manacop Corp
was first impleaded in the original complaint for sum of money filed by
respondent Cruz Inc. Respondent Cruz Inc amended the complaint to drop
Manacop Corp, and implead petitioner Manacop in his personal capacity
instead. The trial court ruled in favor of Cruz Inc and a writ of preliminary
attachment was issued.
To the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner interposed an Omnibus
Motion grounded on the following: 1) the issuance of the writ was irregular,
there being no affidavit therefor; 2) the feasibility of utilizing the writ prior to
his substitution as party defendant; 3) his family home is exempted from
attachment under Family Code. The motion was denied.
In the CA, the petitioner propounded additional defense. He should not have
been made liable as his personality is separate and distinct from his
corporation. The CA ruled in favor of respondent Cruz Inc.
Page 47 of 56
ISSUE
Whether the additional defense must be accepted despite the filing of an
Omnibus Motion of which it was not included.
RULING
Short Answer
No. An Omnibus Motion must include all available defenses and those not
excluded are deemed waived.
Long Answer
Petitioner harps on the supposition that the appellate court should not have
pierced the veil of corporate fiction because he is distinct from the personality
of his corporation and, therefore, the writ of attachment issued against the
corporation cannot be used to place his own family home in custodia legis. This
puerile argument must suffer rejection since the doctrine in commercial law
adverted to and employed in exculpation by petitioner, during the pendency of
his petition for certiorari in the appellate court and even at this stage, may not
be permitted to simply sprout from nowhere for such subtle experiment is
proscribed by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court, thus:
“A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the movant
to raise all available exceptions for relief during a single opportunity so that
multiple and piece-meal objections may be avoided.
264.) Azajar vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-40945. November 10, 1986
PETITION to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals appealed from, are
affirmed
FACTS
Azajar, herein petitioner, ordered 100 kegs of nails from Samco, herein private
respondent. The consideration was fully paid but Samco only delivered a
portion of the order.
In the case before the CFI, Samco filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
failure to state cause of action, and improper venue. The motion was
accompanied by a notice of hearing however, instead of directing to the parties,
the same was directed to the clerk of court. In view thereof, and upon the
instance of the petitioner, Samco was declared in default, as the motion to
dismiss failed to toll the period for filing answer, it being defective. The CFI
ruled the case in favor of respondent petitioner Azajar.
In the CA, on MR, case was ruled in favor of Samco. The CA held that the notice
of the hearing was a substantial compliance with the rules. Hence, this present
petition.
ISSUE
Whether failure to strictly comply with the notice of hearing is fatal.
RULING
Short Answer
No. First, the notice of hearing, while defective for failure to direct to the parties,
constitutes substantial compliance. Second, in consideration of the grounds for
the motion to dismiss, which are failure to state cause of action and improper
venue, it is plausible that there be no hearing at all. Third, cases should be
determined on the merits.
Long Answer
It was wrong, of course, for Samco to have failed to set its motion to dismiss for
hearing on a specified date and time. The law explicitly requires that notice of a
motion shall be served by the appellant to all parties concerned at least three
(3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of
any affidavits and other papers accompanying it; and that the notice shall be
directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing of
the motion. The uniform holding of this Court has been that a failure to comply
with the requirement is a fatal flaw. Such notice is required to avoid surprises
upon the opposite party and give the latter time to study and meet the
arguments of the motion, as well as to determine or make determinable the
time of submission of the motion for resolution.
Samco quite frankly admits its error. It pleads however that under the
circumstances the error be not regarded as irremediable or that it be deemed as
constituting excusable negligence, warranting relief. It argues that legal and
logical considerations, which it took to be tenable, caused it to theorize that a
Page 48 of 56
hearing on the motion was dispensable. It also adverts to its possession of
affirmative defenses in addition to those set out in its motion to dismiss which,
if ventilated and established at the trial, would absolve it from all liability under
the complaint.
These considerations, to be sure, did not erase movant’s duty to give notice to
the adverse party of the date and time of the hearing on its motion, the purpose
of said notice being, as already stressed, not only to give the latter time to
oppose the motion if so minded, but also to determine the time of its submission
for resolution. Without such notice, the occasion would not arise to determine
with reasonable certitude whether and within what time the adverse party
would respond to the motion, and when the motion might already be resolved
by the Court. The duty to give that notice is imposed on the movant, not on the
Court.
Withal, the reasons for Cham Samco’s erroneous notion of the dispensability of
a hearing on its motion to dismiss are not utterly without plausibility. This
circumstance, taken together with the fact, found by the Intermediate Appellate
Court and not disputed by petitioner Azajar, that Samco has meritorious
defenses which if proven would defeat Azajar’s claim against it, and the eminent
desirability more than once stressed by this Court that cases should be
determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections, all conduce to concurrence with the Court of Appeals that “the
ends of justice would be better served in this case if we brush aside technicality
and afford the petitioner its day in court”
265.) Sarmiento vs. Zaratan
G.R. No. 167471. February 5, 2007
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
FACTS:
Petitioner Sarmiento filed a complaint for ejectment against respondent
Zaratan. MTC ruled in favor of petitioner Sarmiento.
Respondent appealed the decision with the RTC. Respondent also filed a motion
for extension of time for the filing of the memorandum for a period of 5 days on
the ground that the counsel was sick, lack of staff, and flooding in the office
occasioned by a storm. The motion was not acted by the RTC which it will
subsequently justify on the ground that said motion did not contain the
requisite notice of hearing. The respondent was however able to file the
memorandum within the extended period prayed for. RTC nonetheless
dismissed the appeal.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA ruled in favor of
respondent and remanded the case to the RTC. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE:
Short Answer
Whether the inaction by the RTC upon the motion for extension was proper on
the ground that the motion did not contain a notice of hearing.
RULING:
No. The motion for extension of time is an ex parte motion which does not
prejudice the substantive right of the opposing party. As such, the failure to
comply with the requisite notice of hearing is not fatal.
Long Answer
“SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion.—Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard
and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.”
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in
a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of hearing is required where a party has a right to
resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard.
The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the
movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time
to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice
demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard.
Page 49 of 56
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time
to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question
does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend
the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to
respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and
flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim
likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears,
respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the
memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period.
Under the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits
of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession of the land in
question.
Further, it has been held that a “motion for extension of time is not a litigated
motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an
opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court
in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and
usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.”
It has been said that “ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural
matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an
exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the
resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion
266.) ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LANDEX
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 165952. July 28, 2008
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco
for lack of merit.
FACTS
A huge tract of land was subdivided into 39 lots, 22 of which belonged to
petitioner Aneco, and 17 to Landex. The issue arose when Landex started
building a fence on 1 of its lots.
Petitioner Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC, which ruled in its
favor. Landex moved for reconsideration, but the motion did not contain the
requisite notice of hearing. Realizing its fault, respondent Landex filed another
motion, this time to set the hearing for its motion for reconsideration. The
hearing was set but Aneco failed to attend. RTC eventually granted the
reconsideration and dismissed the case filed by Aneco.
The CA affirmed RTC. Hence this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether the subsequent motion to set hearing cures the defect in a prior
motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. The purpose of the requisite notice of hearing is to give the opposing party
the opportunity to oppose the motion. The same purpose was achieved by the
subsequent motion to set the hearing of the defective motion, therefore, it
cannot be said that there was deprivation of due process.
Long Answer
It must be stressed that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within
the court’s sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully
adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of
that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error.
To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is
part of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending
motion in court and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids
is not the mere absence of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the
unfair surprise caused by the lack of notice. It is the dire consequences which
flow from the procedural error which is proscribed. If the opposing party is
given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective motion, the procedural
lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially complied.
We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently
cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for
reconsideration. Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for
reconsideration but Aneco’s counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco
additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration. Aneco was
afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose
the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was
Page 50 of 56
afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for
reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC
and the CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.
267.) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION
and BERLITA DEANG
G.R. No. 177931. December 8, 2008
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
FACTS
Respondents filed a complaint for reformation of contract and specific
performance against petitioner PNB. In the RTC, 25 days after summons was
served upon the petitioner, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner
PNB in default. On the same date, the petitioner filed a motion for extension,
which the RTC granted. The motion to declare default was denied by the RTC.
Respondents then via certiorari went to the CA. The CA ruled in favor of
respondents and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA found that the filing of
the motion for extension was laden with procedural irregularities:
1. The Motion for Extension was served and filed via LBC, a private
courier, a mode which is not recognized by the rules.
2. The Motion was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period of 15 days
from service of summons.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether a motion for extension filed after the lapse of the period sought to be
extended may be granted.
RULING
Short Answer
No. First, once the period has already lapsed, the court becomes powerless to
extend the same. Second, rules pertaining to periods are construed strictly. No
compelling reason was given for the belated filing of the answer. Third, filing
and service via a private courier is not recognized by law. The petitioner did not
provide explanation for its conduct.
Long Answer
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
The court’s discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such
motion’s timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to
entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of
the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend.
More. Petitioner served and filed the Motion for Extension through a private
courier, LBC, a mode not recognized by the rules. Explanation for availing such
mode was not stated in the Motion. The mode was, nonetheless, clearly
unjustifiable, considering that (a) petitioner’s handling counsel was based in
nearby location; (b) postal registry service is, for lack of explanation to the
contrary, available in the city; (c) urgency is out of the equation because the
official date of filing done via private messengerial service is the date of actual
receipt of the court, and had the motion been personally filed the following day,
it would have reached the court earlier. It thus shows that the mode was utilized
to obscure any indication that the motion was filed out of time.
In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness
of the Answer and no compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The
intention to delay was rather obvious.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
business.
268.) CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA Vs. EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK,
INC. and MICHAEL POTENCIANO
FACTS:
Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and LolitaB. Areza maintained two bank deposits
with respondent Express Savings Bank’s Biñan branch: 1) Savings Account No.
004-01-000185-5 and 2) Special Savings Account No. 004-02-000092-3.
They were engaged in the business of "buy and sell" of brand new and second-
hand motor vehicles. On 2 May 2000, they received an order from a certain
Gerry Mambuay (Mambuay) for the purchase of a second-hand Mitsubishi
Pajero and a brand-new Honda CRV.
Page 51 of 56
The buyer, Mambuay, paid petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn against the
Philippine Veterans Bank (drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00) for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱1,800,000.00).
About this occasion, petitioners claimed that Michael Potenciano (Potenciano),
the branch manager of respondent Express Savings Bank (the Bank) was
present during the transaction and immediately offered the services of the Bank
for the processing and eventual crediting of the said checks to petitioners’
account.4 On the other hand,Potenciano countered that he was prevailed upon
to accept the checks by way of accommodation of petitioners who were valued
clients of the Bank.5
On 3 May 2000, petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account
with the Bank. The Bank, inturn, deposited the checks with its depositary bank,
Equitable-PCI Bank, in Biñan,Laguna. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the checks
to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks.
On 6 May 2000, Potenciano informedpetitioners that the checks they deposited
with the Bank werehonored. He allegedly warned petitioners that the clearing
of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean that
the checks were not infirmed.6 Thus, the entire amount of ₱1,800,000.00 was
credited to petitioners’ savings account. Based on this information, petitioners
released the two cars to the buyer.
Sometime in July 2000, the subjectchecks were returned by PVAO to the drawee
on the ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the
original amount of ₱4,000.00 to ₱200,000.00. The drawee returned the checks
to Equitable-PCI Bank by way of Special Clearing Receipts. In August 2000, the
Bank was informed by Equitable-PCI Bank that the drawee dishonored the
checks onthe ground of material alterations. Equitable-PCI Bank initially filed a
protest with the Philippine Clearing House. In February 2001, the latter ruled in
favor of the drawee Philippine Veterans Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank, in turn,
debited the deposit account of the Bank in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00.
The Bank insisted that they informed petitioners of said development in August
2000 by furnishing them copies of the documents given by its depositary bank.7
On the other hand, petitioners maintained that the Bank never informed them of
these developments.
On 9 March 2001, petitioners issued a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00. Said
check was dishonored by the Bank for the reason "Deposit Under Hold."
According topetitioners, the Bank unilaterally and unlawfully put their account
with the Bank on hold. On 22 March 2001, petitioners’ counsel sent a demand
letter asking the Bank to honor their check. The Bank refused to heed their
request and instead, closed the Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a
balance of ₱1,179,659.69 and transferred said amount to their savings account.
The Bank then withdrew the amount of ₱1,800,000.00representing the
returned checks from petitioners’ savings account.
Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and
the unlawful and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners
filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against the Bank and
Potenciano with the RTC of Calamba.
On 15 January 2004, the RTC, through Judge Antonio S. Pozas, ruled in favor of
petitioners.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion
for execution from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents’
motion for reconsideration did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court; hence, it was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the
period to appeal.
On 22 April 2004, the RTC, through Pairing Judge Romeo C. De Leon granted the
motion for reconsideration, set aside the Pozas Decision, and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court awarded respondents their counterclaim of moral and
exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 each. The trial court first applied the
principle of liberality when it disregarded the alleged absence of a notice of
hearing in respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted
the award of damages.
Any argument as to the notice of hearing has been resolved when the pairing
judge issued the order on February 24, 2004 setting the hearing on March 26,
2004. A perusal of the notice of hearing shows that request was addressed to
the Clerk of Court and plaintiffs’ counsel for hearing to be set on March 26,
2004.
Page 52 of 56
CA agrees with appellants that they should not pay moral and exemplary
damages to each of the appellees for lack of basis. The appellants were not
shown to have acted in bad faith.
Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari arising both
procedural and substantive issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and grave
abuse of discretion in in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion
for Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 ofthe Rules on Civil
Procedure
RULING:
NO. Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court
and not to the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from
the date of filing.
As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to
the adverse party has beensubstantially complied with when a copy of the
motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party,
coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as
prayed for, issued an order setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004.
We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing
Rule if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the
counsel of the adverse party.
269.) G.R. No. 176697 September 10, 2014
CESAR V. AREZA and LOLITA B. AREZA, Petitioners, vs.
EXPRESS SAVINGS BANK, INC. and MICHAEL POTENCIANO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Cesar V. Areza and LolitaB. Areza maintained two bank deposits
with respondent Express Savings Bank’s Biñan branch: 1) Savings Account No.
004-01-000185-5 and 2) Special Savings Account No. 004-02-000092-3.
They were engaged in the business of "buy and sell" of brand new and second-
hand motor vehicles. On 2 May 2000, they received an order from a certain
Gerry Mambuay (Mambuay) for the purchase of a second-hand Mitsubishi
Pajero and a brand-new Honda CRV.
The buyer, Mambuay, paid petitioners with nine (9) Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (PVAO) checks payable to different payees and drawn against the
Philippine Veterans Bank (drawee), each valued at Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00) for a total of One Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱1,800,000.00).
About this occasion, petitioners claimed that Michael Potenciano (Potenciano),
the branch manager of respondent Express Savings Bank (the Bank) was
present during the transaction and immediately offered the services of the Bank
for the processing and eventual crediting of the said checks to petitioners’
account.4 On the other hand,Potenciano countered that he was prevailed upon
to accept the checks by way of accommodation of petitioners who were valued
clients of the Bank.5
On 3 May 2000, petitioners deposited the said checks in their savings account
with the Bank. The Bank, inturn, deposited the checks with its depositary bank,
Equitable-PCI Bank, in Biñan,Laguna. Equitable-PCI Bank presented the checks
to the drawee, the Philippine Veterans Bank, which honored the checks.
On 6 May 2000, Potenciano informedpetitioners that the checks they deposited
with the Bank werehonored. He allegedly warned petitioners that the clearing
of the checks pertained only to the availability of funds and did not mean that
the checks were not infirmed.6 Thus, the entire amount of ₱1,800,000.00 was
credited to petitioners’ savings account. Based on this information, petitioners
released the two cars to the buyer.
Sometime in July 2000, the subjectchecks were returned by PVAO to the drawee
on the ground that the amount on the face of the checks was altered from the
original amount of ₱4,000.00 to ₱200,000.00. The drawee returned the checks
to Equitable-PCI Bank by way of Special Clearing Receipts. In August 2000, the
Bank was informed by Equitable-PCI Bank that the drawee dishonored the
checks onthe ground of material alterations. Equitable-PCI Bank initially filed a
Page 53 of 56
protest with the Philippine Clearing House. In February 2001, the latter ruled in
favor of the drawee Philippine Veterans Bank. Equitable-PCI Bank, in turn,
debited the deposit account of the Bank in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00.
The Bank insisted that they informed petitioners of said development in August
2000 by furnishing them copies of the documents given by its depositary bank.7
On the other hand, petitioners maintained that the Bank never informed them of
these developments.
On 9 March 2001, petitioners issued a check in the amount of ₱500,000.00. Said
check was dishonored by the Bank for the reason "Deposit Under Hold."
According topetitioners, the Bank unilaterally and unlawfully put their account
with the Bank on hold. On 22 March 2001, petitioners’ counsel sent a demand
letter asking the Bank to honor their check. The Bank refused to heed their
request and instead, closed the Special Savings Account of the petitioners with a
balance of ₱1,179,659.69 and transferred said amount to their savings account.
The Bank then withdrew the amount of ₱1,800,000.00representing the
returned checks from petitioners’ savings account.
Acting on the alleged arbitrary and groundless dishonoring of their checks and
the unlawful and unilateral withdrawal from their savings account, petitioners
filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against the Bank and
Potenciano with the RTC of Calamba.
On 15 January 2004, the RTC, through Judge Antonio S. Pozas, ruled in favor of
petitioners.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration while petitioners filed a motion
for execution from the Decision of the RTC on the ground that respondents’
motion for reconsideration did not conform with Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court; hence, it was a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the running of the
period to appeal.
On 22 April 2004, the RTC, through Pairing Judge Romeo C. De Leon granted the
motion for reconsideration, set aside the Pozas Decision, and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court awarded respondents their counterclaim of moral and
exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 each. The trial court first applied the
principle of liberality when it disregarded the alleged absence of a notice of
hearing in respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court but deleted
the award of damages.
Any argument as to the notice of hearing has been resolved when the pairing
judge issued the order on February 24, 2004 setting the hearing on March 26,
2004. A perusal of the notice of hearing shows that request was addressed to
the Clerk of Court and plaintiffs’ counsel for hearing to be set on March 26,
2004.
CA agrees with appellants that they should not pay moral and exemplary
damages to each of the appellees for lack of basis. The appellants were not
shown to have acted in bad faith.
Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari arising both
procedural and substantive issues.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law and grave
abuse of discretion in in upholding the legality and/or propriety of the Motion
for Reconsideration filed in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 ofthe Rules on Civil
Procedure
Ruling:
NO.
Sections 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must
not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
Petitioners claim that the notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court
and not to the adverse party as the rules require. Petitioners add that the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration was scheduled beyond 10 days from
the date of filing.
As held in Maturan v. Araula, the rule requiring that the notice be addressed to
the adverse party has beensubstantially complied with when a copy of the
motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of the adverse party,
coupled with the fact that the trial court acted on said notice of hearing and, as
prayed for, issued an order setting the hearing of the motion on 26 March 2004.
Page 54 of 56
We would reiterate later that there is substantial compliance with the foregoing
Rule if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the
counsel of the adverse party.
270.) MICROSOFT CORPORATION and ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED
Vs. SAMIR FARAJALLAH, VIRGILIO D.C. HERCE, RACHEL P. FOLLOSCO,
JESUSITO G. MORALLOS, and MA. GERALDINE S. GARCIA (directors and
officers of NEW FIELDS (ASIA PACIFIC), INC.),
G.R. No. 205800; September 10, 2014
Respondents.
FACTS:
Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and
Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New
Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit
1603, East Tower, PhilippineStock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City.
Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields
was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software.
Orion Support, Inc.(OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification
of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano)
and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's
tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe
and Microsoft software.5
On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief
of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.
The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla).6
On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of
respondents. Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able to use two
computers owned by New Fields and obtained the following information
regarding the installed Microsoft and Adobe software.
Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software,7 and he
saw the screens of the computers used by the OSI staff, including the product
I.D. Nos. of the installed software.
After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued
certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to "copy, print,
reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software
products."
An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before
Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant
Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same date.
The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields
employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items
were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing
unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.
On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two
warrants served (Search Warrant No. 10-15912).11 The motion was received
by petitioners on 10 June 2010 and was set for hearing on 11 June 2010. During
the hearing on the motion, petitioners were allowed by the RTC to file their
Comment/Opposition on or before 21 June 2010.
In their Comment/Opposition dated 21 June 2010,13 petitioners alleged that:
The Motion [to Quash] failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day notice rule
under the Rules of Court. Hence it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper.
In this case, the Motion of Respondents was scheduled for hearing on 11 June
2010. However, Respondents only furnished [petitioners] a copy of the Motion
on 10 June 2010, or just1 day before the scheduled hearing, which was in clear
violation of the 3-day notice rule.
On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing
that "allthe items seized from the respondents be returned x x x." According to
the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer had the
pirated software. The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet,
despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners’ possession for
several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the
petitioners’ contention that the threeday notice rule was not complied with
because petitioners were already notified of the motion personally.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari26 under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010
before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash despite: (1) respondents’
failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence
of probable cause, and personal knowledge of the warrant applicant.
Page 55 of 56
The CA denied the petition for certiorari. It ruled that when the court a quo
ordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in
effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice
rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent
judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the
opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it grant the
motion to quash when respondent’s failed to comply with the three day notice
requirement.

RULING:

NO. SC ruled that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be
relaxed in this case. However, it sustain petitioners’ contention that there was
probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have
upheld the validity of both warrants.

In Anama v. Court of Appeals,29 we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not
absolute. The purpose of the ruleis to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due
process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study
the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule
may be dispensed with.

As correctly pointed out by the CA:

In the instant case, when the court a quoordered petitioners to submit their
comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in
court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its
purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on
the motion giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the
arguments stated in the motion.

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