Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Beefing up Asset
STEFAN RecoveryBASEL
MBIYAVANGA, for theINSTITUTE
21st-Century:
ON GOVERNANCE
Legal Challenges to new confiscation typologies in Latin America
STEFAN MBIYAVANGA, BASEL INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE
The new Latin American confiscation The research contrasts the Extinción
typology: Extinción de Dominio de Dominio with the following
guarantees of the European
The Extinción de Dominio primarily Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
foresees confiscation in the following which need to be complied with in
scenarios: order to ensure access to MLA in
Europe.
a) Goods constituting the object,
instrument, proceeds or profits of - Right to a fair trial (Art. 6.1 ECHR)
the commission of illicit activities - Presumption of Innocence (6.2
b) Goods that constitute an ECHR)
unjustified increase in the assets - Legality principle (Art. 7 ECHR)
of a natural or legal person, for - Right to property (Art. 1 Prot. 1
which there are no elements that ECHR)
reasonably allow them to be
considered to hail from licit
activities
c) Goods of lawful origin that have Research findings
been used or are intended to be
used to conceal, cover up, or - While the Extinción de Dominio is formally independent
intermingle with unlawful assets from any criminal procedure, it contains a number of
d) […] provisions which are arguably criminal charges [especially
confiscation pursuant to c) in the box on the left].
See for example Art. 7.1. Decreto - However, the asset holder is not awarded the full panoply
legislativo sobre extinción de dominio of rights and protections for defendants in criminal
no. 1373 of 31. January 2019 (Peru) proceedings guaranteed by international law.
- Therefore frictions are likely to appear where the
Extinción de Dominio action targets assets located
abroad and depends on MLA.
HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TRANSFORM PUBLIC TOLERANCE OF
CORRUPTION: AN AUTOPSY OF THE SPANISH INDIGNADOS MOVEMENT
HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TRANSFORM PUBLIC TOLERANCE OF
CORRUPTION: AN AUTOPSY OF THE SPANISH INDIGNADOS MOVEMENT
ELISA ELLIOTT ALONSO
DATA: Spike in concern about political corruption, even after the economic situation improved
70
15M
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Se 1
Se 4
Ju 0 2
Fe 0 5
Se 8
M 97
D 99
Ju 5
Ju 3
Ju 0 6
Fe 0 9
Se 2
O 5
Ju 7
Ju 10
Fe 1 3
Se 6
O 9
Ju 1
Ju 1 4
Fe 1 7
Ja 88
N 95
N 02
O 3
Ju 5
Ju 18
Fe 01
M 05
M 95
Ap 00
M 02
Ja 04
N 06
O 17
Ap 3
M 09
M 06
Ja 08
N 10
Ap 7
M 13
D -03
M 10
Ja 12
N 14
Ap 1
M 17
D -07
M 14
Ja 16
N 18
Ap 15
D 1
8
D 5
-0
-0
-1
l -1
-1
l -1
r-0
r-0
r-0
-8
-0
r-1
-0
-0
r-1
-0
-1
-1
-1
n-
n-
n-
p-
n-
-
n-
-
p-
n-
n-
-
p-
n-
n-
-
p-
n-
n-
-
p-
-
b-
-
-
-
b-
-
b-
-
b-
-
b-
-
ct
ov
ec
ov
ec
ct
ov
ec
ct
ov
ec
ct
ov
ec
ov
ar
ar
ay
ar
ay
ar
l
ay
ar
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ay
ar
ay
M
Corruption and fraud Politicians in general, political parties and politics The Economy
CONCLUSIONS:
I. Collective moral development can occur without III. Underlying change in perceptions and tolerance towards
resulting in increased disaffection. corruption may take time to surface and consolidate itself.
Change in political culture IV. Crisis opportunities are not enough: honest political agents
conscious of the importance of integrity also need to be
II. Social movements as a positive way of bringing present to promote real change. Factor still to be confirmed.
about an active and enlightened citizenry, essential
for integrity reform. V. Technology has the potential of placing ordinary citizens at the
centre of public affairs.
Is there a role for blockchain to enhance
IS THERE A ROLE FOR BLOCKCHAIN TO ENHANCE PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT INTEGRITY?
Call for bid
•Tender docs
•Evaluation
criteria public procurement integrity?
CHAN YANG
Chan Yang
1
Strengthen record integrity However, there is no free lunch Conclusions & recommendations
Prevent document tampering
better than regular e-procurement Given blockchain’s current technical
Record integrity is not absolute &
systems trade-offs, its role for integrity may be
depends on the choice of consensus
Provide aggregate model + system architecture desirable if decision-makers are willing
2 to end procurement corruption at the
traceability
“Security-scalability-decentralisation cost of relinquishing some efficiency &
De-silo fragmented e-procurement trilemma”: the most secure & “honest” decision-making power
systems, combine with big data blockchain may be the slowest, and
analytics for more accurate pricing probably quite costly Blockchain is, however, powerless if
estimate and tender specification users do not first comply with proper
development Digital trust does not replace physical procurement practices
trust (dishonest data)
Reduce the need for a Combatting corruption needs a holistic
3 Institutional barriers to adoption may
trusted central entity approach; human agency is always
be high if the new system dilutes the needed to proactively inspect, audit &
Open up bid evaluation to reduce
state’s decision-making power enforce accountability
risk of biased decision-making
INTERNATIONAL SLAPPS AGAINST POLICE POWERS: HOW INVESTMENT
International SLAPPs Against Police Powers: How Investment Arbitration
ARBITRATION IMPOSES A RISK ON FOREIGN BRIBERY INVESTIGATIONS
Imposes a Risk on Foreign Bribery Investigations
David Chriki DAVID CHRIKI
Investment arbitration: Possible Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Introducing “STRAPPs”: Strategic
Implications on the Regulatory Participation (SLAPPs) Arbitrations against Police Powers
Space of Countries
International investment agreements (IIAs) are treaties between two SLAPPs are unfounded tort claims filed in order to prevent public Though investment arbitration targets governments, and not
or more countries, designed to protect foreign investors. Almost all criticism against the claimants, and not in order to provide any individuals, several investment arbitration claims strikingly resemble
IIAs include obligations to refrain from discriminating foreign remedy to compensate for the direct damage caused to them. These “conventional” SLAPPs.
investors; prohibition on the expropriation of property of foreign claims are usually filed against social activists who led social protests
investors for an improper purpose without proper compensation; and against the activities that hinder public interests, usually carried by Arbitration claims targeting policies that are in the core of the doctrine
granting foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. Finally, wealthy corporations. of "police powers" are rarely successful. Still, IIAs often contain
almost all IIAs include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) standards of treatment that create uncertainties about how an
mechanisms. These mechanisms allow foreign investors of one party Lengthy and expensive legal proceedings often exhaust arbitration panel would interpret and apply them. Moreover,
to the agreement to submit arbitration claims against the other party, inexperienced social activists who enjoy limited resources and cannot arbitration proceedings are timely and costly. Thus, inexperienced
due to potential violations of the IIA. afford adequate legal representation. Eventually parties tend to reach and poor governments may wish to avoid arbitration by terminating
a settlement and agree to cancel the claim in exchange for a the initiatives that triggered the arbitration claim in the first place.
One of the most pressing issues regarding the international cessation of public activity directed against the Plaintiffs' actions.
investment legal regime is the concern for a regulatory chill: Arbitration claims of this kind targeting bribery investigations could
governments might refrain from adopting regulations that serve public The main concern that arises from SLAPPs is of a chilling effect on impose a significant setback on the combat against foreign bribery.
interests out of fear that such regulations would trigger costly and public participation as a result of a claim filed against them, or out of Developing countries with limited resources, who are arguably in
unpredictable investment arbitration disputes fear that a claim would be submitted against them in the future if they greater danger of becoming a victim of foreign bribery, might rather
act in the public sphere drop bribery investigations once the investor threatens with
arbitration.
“Conventional” SLAPPs
Social activists address government Settlement: Termination of
(Pring & Canan, 1996) decision-makers about some public Lawsuit against the social activists proceedings in in return for halting
concern and call for change of policy public criticism
STRAPPs using
investment arbitration Government introduces a measure Arbitration threats against the host
Settlement: : Termination of
proceedings in return for cancelation
exercising legitimate “police powers” State of measures – causing a
REGULATORY CHILL
The victims of foreign bribery are in Current SFO Practice Feasibility of U.S. adopting SFO practice
most cases left without remedy • These principles are too broad and lack the • This paper considers issues that arise
• In 2014, the Left Out of the Bargain specificity necessary to provide effective in attempting to argue that the United
Report by the Stolen Asset Recovery guidance or to function as a normative States should follow the United
Initiative indicated that only 3% monies framework. Kingdom in adopting a policy of
extracted through foreign bribery • Nonetheless, the United Kingdom has, both compensation.
settlements were returned to the victim before and after the adoption of the • Policy issues:
state in which the initial act of bribery compensation principles, ordered that corrupt
occurred. actors remediate foreign governments directly. • To what extent does current U.S
For example, the foreign bribery case against anti-corruption policy align with a
• Demand-side enforcement has proved Standard Bank in 2015 resulted in a deferred policy of remediation?
largely ineffective at remedying the prosecution agreement mandating that • Does an unwritten policy of rent-
harm caused by foreign bribery. Standard Bank pay $US7 million to the seeking drive FCPA enforcement?
Tanzanian Government (see here). Similarly, in
• The supply-side of bribery is policed to • Practical issues:
2018 a court order was issued against Alstom
a far greater extent and provides a Power Ltd which provided that £10,963,000 in • How to identify the victims of foreign
more promising platform for remediating compensation be paid to the Lithuanian bribery?
the victims of foreign bribery. government (see here). • How to ascertain the loss caused by
• Remediation has also been achieved for the foreign bribery?
• There is a growing sentiment in the
benefit of the citizens of developing nations. For • How to ensure that money given
literature which urges countries such as
example, the SFO reached a settlement back to foreign governments and
the United States to pursue remediation
agreement with BAE Systems in 2010 for an citizens is not used in future corrupt
for the benefit of those harmed by acts
accounting offence which required it to pay £30 schemes?
of foreign bribery.
million for the purpose of buying educational
materials in Tanzania (see here). In 2014, the • Should the United States practice of
• However, there are numerous practical insisting upon a nexus between
proceeds of a confiscation order made over the
issues that need to be addressed harm and remediation that is
course of the Smith and Ouzman foreign
before national enforcement agencies employed in environmental
bribery case were used to purchase a fleet of
like the DOJ will be able to confidently regulation carry over into anti-
ambulances in Kenya (see here regarding the
adopt a policy of remediation and put bribery enforcement?
foreign bribery case and here regarding the
that policy into practise on a consistent
purchase of ambulances), and most recently, a
basis.
£4 million civil forfeiture order against Griffiths
Energy for foreign bribery was put toward
• In June 2018, the United Kingdom
development projects in Chad in 2018 (see
government formally adopted its
here).
‘compensation principles’, which are
geared toward providing a guiding
framework that can be used to indicate LOGS
?
VIRTUAL was stolen from exchanges investigate various blockchains
DIGITAL (3,6 more than in 2017)2 • Cryptoassets –
CURRENCY
CURRENCY new asset class
(IMF, ESMA,
(BIS, WB) needed?
ECB,EBA)
15% USD ~25% of all BTC users and 1. Analyse the patterns
1,34 B ~44% of BTC TRX are 2. Act against the initial problem
associated with illegal activity 3. Reframe
USD ~USD 72 billion of illegal
78% 4. Have a holistic approach
8,27 B activity p.a. involves BTC 4
5. Disrupt the disrupter
6. Not over-regulate
7. Set international boards
2017: 78% projects (USD 1,34 billion) 8. Use blockchain to your advantage
ended up being scams1
Corruption trap:
The Case of the Colombian states
Since the 1990s, corruption has been increasingly studied from various disciplines and diverse theoretical approaches
and perspectives all around the world. Nevertheless, until now, few are the studies that take regional or local views into
consideration for understanding the behaviour of this phenomenon within countries. This study addresses corruption in
the regions of Colombia in relation to their levels of development.
Literature points out that there are different ways in which corruption and development are related. Some authors
conclude that corruption increases income inequality and poverty by distorting the level and effectiveness of social
spending. However, in these vicious cycles the causes and consequences are not yet clear. Considering the above, this
paper analyses the relationship between corruption and development in Colombia from a subnational perspective.
We claim that there is a corruption trap that makes it difficult to establish the dependent and independent variables
between corruption and development. The question that guides our paper is: What are the dynamics between
corruption and development at the state level in Colombia?
To answer it, we collected 22 indicators for the 32 departments that make up the administrative division of Colombia.
These indicators were grouped into three dimensions: development, institutional capacity and transparency. To identify
the relations between these categories we used a development proxy and we built an institutional capacity index and a
corruption/transparency index.
From this, a scatter plot chart was built to categorize the different departments of Colombia by their levels of corruption,
institutional capacity and development. Also, the data obtained by the diagram was georeferenced to identify specific
characteristics of each region. The conclusions include a categorisation of the departments of Colombia according to the
existing links between corruption and development on each one of them with institutional capacity as an intervening
variable.
● There are 13 states in a corruption trap. In this last group, states are on the periphery of the country, on the Second
borders and far from the center (the capital, Bogotá), as can be seen in the maps. Some of these have high
levels of violence and they have been particularly affected by the presence of illegal armed groups and drug
Category
trafficking. Additional proof of their low capacity is that it is in these states there are no complete data for
development indicators such as Gini or poverty. Third
● The question that remains to be answered is how to break this trap. With the evidence we have, we can
Category
suggest that it would be possible to improve the situation of these states starting with the institutional
capacity and the presence of the State.
● Limitations to our study: Although we managed to make a consistent analysis from a statistical point of view, it
is also true that in contexts such as that of Colombia, studies at the territorial level may present limitations
such as missing data and under-report by states or local authorities. Even with open data and e-government
initiatives present in Colombia, access to complete and high-quality datasets for understanding local
governance remains a challenge.
● There is probably a corruption trap for many countries and regions of the world. While not all of those are
necessarily underdeveloped, it is clear that lower socio-economic and human development and lower
institutional capacity reduce the probabilities of getting out of that trap, as the necessary resources are not
present to take action on corruption, improve accountability, sanction wrongdoers and put in place more
transparency and integrity tools.
Acknowledgements:
Universidad Externado de Colombia for its support
Juan Manuel Pedraza, for his invaluable technical support with the data analysis
John Moreno, for useful discussions and ideas on data analysis
SHOULD ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS
SHOULD ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS APPLY TO ASTROTURFING?
APPLY TO ASTROTURFING?
LUCAS DE LIMA CARVALHO, UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO
LUCAS DE LIMA CARVALHO, UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO
Astroturfing is the practice of hiding a We live in times of fake news and mass
vested sponsorship of an idea or a claim usage of social media by people
behind the veneer of “grassroots everywhere, a practice that has reduced
supporters”. the scope of influence of traditional news
outlets over select “audiences”. There are
The first incidents of astroturfing date back
many ways of creating astroturfing
to the early 1900s, but the advances of
movements today using Twitter bots, fake
instant communication and social
Facebook or YouTube user accounts, and
networking have arguably enhanced its
carefully crafted TV ads, which would go a
effects on the political arena and on The very nature of anti-corruption laws is long way in convincing voters of the
relevant social issues nowadays. to help protect public integrity, or the “urgency” and “relevance” of their claims.
integrity of public institutions or public
“goods” that are relevant for society. To successfully implement anti-corruption
Though astroturfing may be viewed as policies against astroturfing, jurisdictions
primarily a regulatory, antitrust or should:
consumerist issue from a legal standpoint,
it begins to affect public integrity when it
produces tangible results in public Distinguish between cases of genuine
discourse. astroturfing and cases of improper
identification of funders/supporters
• Coalition for Medicare Choices • It violates public integrity as a principle Establish a link between the
of Public Administration astroturfing campaign and the
(sponsored by healthcare companies)
• It offends international commitments appropriate penalty
• #EuSoudaLapa (residential real estate
sales campaign in Rio de Janeiro) undertaken by modern democracies
(such as the ACHR)
THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE.
ANOF
THE IMPACT ASSESSMENT
CORRUPTIONOF
ONITALIAN PUBLIC PERFORMANCE.
PROCUREMENT WORK CONTRACTS AND SUPPLIERS
AN ASSESSMENT OFMILANI
RICCARDO ITALIAN PUBLIC WORK
(UNIVERSITÉ CONTRACTS
DE LAUSANNE, ANDDES
ECOLE SUPPLIERS
SCIENCES CRIMINELLES)
RICCARDO MILANI (UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE)
Explore firm-level
Develop a new corruption risk indicator at the contract level corruption red flags
+ INEFFICIENCY
• More profit margins
• Contracts managed by • Less debts over total assets
municipalities
• Complex contracts • Less days to receive payments
• Extreme savings in
contract awarding • More days to pay customers
• More Connection with opaque
- INEFFICIENCY jurisdictions
• Quality of Institutions
• EU contracts
• Contracts managed by
State-owned firms
FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN COMMODITY TRADING THROUGH
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
SHAN “HELEN” JIANG
Fighting Corruption in Commodity Trading Through Blockchain Technology
Shan “Helen” Jiang
A Blockchain-based platform would ask every party to upload the proof of completing their
Blockchain is most fit in scenarios where: job and share this information simultaneously with the rest of the parties. This may include
Commodities are naturally grown products; they can be either “hard” – such as oil, gold, minerals – or seller initiating the transaction by confirming the goods are transferred to a shipping
“soft” – like cotton, wheat, sugar. Commodity trading takes place in both primary and secondary company, bank confirming issuance of a Letter of Credit to the seller, and the shipping
commodity markets. In the primary markets, commodities are extracted from nature and are prepared • There are multiple players in the system
• Establishing trust in the system is rather difficult company confirming that goods have been loaded. Every single action of parties on the
for transportation at the production site, where they then would be delivered to refineries or smelters for Blockchain would be recorded and formed a block to be added upon the previous block.
processing and then sold to energy users or manufacturers in the secondary markets. Through trading, • The system is susceptible to contamination or is easily corruptible
• Eliminating information asymmetry and improving transparency is conducive to the well- Meanwhile smart contract would only release the funds when all conditions – including
commodities are transported often across continents from its production site to the destination where shipping companies’ proof of delivery and presentation of Bill of Lading, confirmation of
they are going to be consumed – this is the most obvious effect of commodity trading. It also balances function of the system
• Preventing record from being tampered with is a crucial goal delivery from the buyer – are satisfied.
supply and demand of commodities in the global market, as both supply and demand can fluctuate for a
variety of reasons including seasons, production capacity, politics, among others. II. Inter-entity Account Verification
Applying those standards to commodity trading, it seems it ticks all the box. Commodity trading
is a dispersed system with multiple stakeholders who do not know or trust one another; the
sector is extremely opaque where corruption can happen between any two ends of a relationship Blockchain will also come in handy for reconciling accounts among different entities,
and monitoring corruption in the sector would incur formidable cost, and such efforts may still targeting the special corruption schemes such as flipping and swap deals. Inter-entity
turn out to be futile account reconciliation is about making sure records in different entities – meaning all
balances owed to and from entities – are in agreement.
The Commodity Trading Companies 3 Features of Blockchain III. Space for Regulatory Agencies such as the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) to oversee regulatory reporting from the entities and
I. Traceability and Identity Proof: Cryptographic Keys ensure compliance
Commodity trading companies (CTCs) provides vital support for the business model of trading. They conduct
arbitrage across globe, acting upon price signals and mainly operate as middlemen in the global value chain.
Blockchain has a solution to the identity authentication issues among multiple players through the use of One node on the Blockchain can be connected to CFTC’s reporting system, providing CFTC
CTCs possess some unique features:
cryptographic keys. Moreover, the proved and recorded identity can help stakeholders to trace and a real-time window into market activities. Moreover, reporting can also be designed as a
First, CTCs serve to build relationships among counterparties in the trading. They act as intermediaries with
capture data along the supply chain. condition in a smart contract, and compliance will automatically trigger the events followed.
comprehensive protocols and provide logistics for trading parties across the globe, administering the delivery
In a Blockchain platform, identity can be created, verified and distinguished through a digital signature Blockchain can also be used in a more sophisticated way for CFTC to detect trade-based
chain for primary economic products from the extraction site to the ultimate buyers.
matched to a specific wallet, which contains pair of a public key and a private key. The signature – or money laundering. A reporting requirement on the Blockchain as a prerequisite for the
Second, it is common that CTCs primarily adopt a business model called “transit trade,” where they rarely have
the public-private key pair – is associated with an address that can, for example, receive funds. The execution of transaction would effectively alert CFTC about irregular trading activities
physical possession of the commodities, or register with customs authority of a country as such trade only
signature proves ownership of one’s assets and allow one to control the funds. The private key is used through a self-generated Suspicious Activities Report (SAR), and record all the information
qualifies as an export of services. This model of transit trade has major implication for corruption detection and
for encryption of transactions, while the public key is used for decryption and is shared with third parties the agency may need to find out the identity of the fraudsters.
monitoring.
in the platform. A typical scenario is that the sender of the funds encrypts the transaction with a private
Third, CTCs typically help build connections between buyers and foreign officials and politicians, interacting with
key and the recipient decrypts it with a public key. If the transaction fails to go through, it can only mean
political exposed persons (PEPs). In particular, through loans pledged on future commodity deliveries, CTCs
that this transaction is not from that particular wallet, i.e. the identity is false or is impersonated, and
also pre-finance extraction activities by indebted governments, who otherwise would not be able to get loans
some party is trying to defraud the others.
from banks or other financial institutions. Emerging economies, for example, particularly find such commodity
pre-payment via CTCs is a useful substitute for bank loans. The way for CTCs to do it is to present such pre-
payment deals as security to negotiate a syndicated lending agreement with international banks. II. Tampering-resistance: Hash Function, Proof of Work (PoW) and Consensus
Hashes are used together with digital signature to ensure the integrity of data on Blockchain. Hash is a
one-way cryptographic function, a method of transforming large quantities of data input into numbers
and codes that are hard to decipher. Bitcoin network normally uses Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). An
Corruption in the Commodity Trading Sector important feature of hashes is that a tiny change of input data would alter the output in a significant way.
The relationship between public and private keys is determined by hash function: the public key is
The reality for the commodity market is, perhaps unsurprisingly, highly opaque: particularly in the markets for mathematically derived from the private key, but to reverse the process would take supercomputers
“hard” commodities like oil, gas, or minerals, where CTCs would frequently interact with foreign governments trillions of years to crack, making it impossible in reality. This feature ensures that the digital signatures
and state-owned enterprises, the risk of corruption is alarming. PEPs would also take advantages of the opacity and Bitcoin address would be resistant to any tampering.
of commodity trading to launder illicit proceeds derived from corruption, which is termed trade-based money Proof-of-Work (PoW) is yet another function to ensure the integrity of information on the Blockchain.
laundering. A few recent cases have put the issue of corruption in commodity trading under the spotlight. PoW is used to confirm transactions and add new blocks to the chain, where miners compete to get
rewards by generating valid blocks of transactions, including collecting all relevant transactions, verifying
them through running all data via the SHA algorithm, and arranging blocks. This is the process of
mining. The hash of each block contains the hash of the previous block; changing the data in the block
means regenerating all successor blocks and redoing all the computing work done through previous
mining – this is practically infeasible to achieve.
Figure 2: Model construction and validation, using training and test set.
TABLE 2: OUT-OF-SAMPLE ACCURACY OF PREDICTIONS (%)
The final dataset includes 83,125 firms, with each record containing
financial and industry information as well as whether the firm was
politically connected in 2011.
LOGOS, MYTHOS AND ETHOS OF BLOCKCHAIN: AN INTEGRATIVE
LOGOS, MYTHOS AND ETHOS
FRAMEWORK FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION OF BLOCKCHAIN:
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
IGBAL SAFAROV, PHD, UTRECHT UNIVERSITY
IGBAL
ZIYA ALIYEV, SAFAROV,
PHD, ERASMUSPHD, UTRECHT
UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY
ROTTERDAM
ZIYA ALIYEV, PHD, ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
Smart contracts
100
STUDY EXPERT TEST OPEN FIRST SECOND
DESIGN SELECTION STAGE ROUND ROUND ROUND
Private 50
(permissioned) Non-reversibility
blockchain
ANTI-CORRUPTION VS 0
Financial Cross-border
ACCESS TO INFORMATION JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE
resources nature
CONCLUSION