Angara vs Electoral Commision
contests relating to the election, returns and
FACTS
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7,
1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the
NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took
his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On
Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election
of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution,
par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding
the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed
a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua
argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs
and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of
prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over
such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC
emphasized that in cases of conflict between the
several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial
review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes
of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Francisco vs HR
>FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment
proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this
case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is
constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question — h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representativesare
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution.
REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising
from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality. There exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and “one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another.” Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that delegation of legislative power. However, the Solicitor
no branch of government act beyond the powers General on the other hand points out that none of the
assigned to it bythe Constitution. petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all
of them have permits to operate and are actually
The framers of the Constitution also understood
operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered
initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
no wrong under the terms of law and had no need for
reached the floor proposing that “A vote of at least one-
relief.
third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings,” this
was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to
that the vote of the House does not initiate
be settled by the Court
impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does. Decision: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general
rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
concerned. The power of courts to declare a law
members of the House of Representatives with the
unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
protection against actual interference, a hypothetical
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the
complaint may not be filed against the same official
decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere
within a one year period.
apprehension that the Secretary of Education might
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Mariano vs COMELEC
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable FACTS:
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
dominance over the other two great branches of the Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz,
government. Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY RufinoCaldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati.
PACU vs Secretary of Education The others are residents of IbayoUsusan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51,
Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and
and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
Universities (PACU) request that Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No.
180 be declared unconstitutional due to (1) They
deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as ISSUE:
teachers and parents of liberty and property without Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of their challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic sections of R.A. No. 7854.
efficiency; and (3) Their provisions conferring on the
Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion
to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are:
1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper
partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Caturan vs DENR
CUTARAN v. DENR There is no justiciable controversy
because the applications are still pending. Hence, there
is not government act to speak of and rule upon.
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals on March 25, 1998
and the order dated August 5, 1998 in CA-G.R SP No.
43930, a petition for prohibition originally filed with the
appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from
implementing DENR Special Order Nos. 31, as amended
by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special Order No. 25,
series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances
relative thereto, for having been issued without prior
legislative authority.
In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of
the DENR issued Special Order no. 31[1] entitled
Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance,
identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral
land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region. The
special task force created thereunder was authorized to
accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land claims
within the said area, and after due evaluation of the
claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of
Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing
laws.[2] On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR
issued Special Order no. 25[3] entitled Creation of
Special Task Forces provincial and community
environment and natural resources offices for the
identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral
land claims nationwide and Department Administrative
Order no. 02,[4] containing the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines of Special Order no. 25.
In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued,
the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate
applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC)
over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp
John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were
denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on
Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and
Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the
recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the
assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of
ApengCarantes filed an application [5] for certification
of ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within
Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the
land occupied by the petitioners. Petitioners claim that
even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet
been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of
Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain
documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire
possession of the land they applied for, including the
portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also
allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the
improvements they introduced within the area they
actually occupy and if not for the petitioners timely
resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would
have been totally evicted therefrom.
Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with
the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent DENR
from implementing the assailed administrative
issuances and from processing the application for
certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the
heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said
administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis.
The Court of Appeals[6] held that the assailed DENR
Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior
to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National
Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of
1992, are of no force and effect for pre-empting
legislative prerogative but sustained the validity of
DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules
(DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate court on
the ground that they were issued pursuant to the
powers delegated to the DENR under section 13 of RA
7586, which reads:
Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights over Them.-
Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest
arising therefrom shall be accorded due recognition.
The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to
govern ancestral lands within protected areas:
Provided, that the DENR shall have no power to evict
indigenous communities from their present occupancy
nor resettle them to another area without their
consent: Provided, however, that all rules and
regulations, whether adversely affecting said
communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and
hearing to be participated in by members of concerned
indigenous community.[7]
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for
review of the appellate courts decision on the ground
that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity
of Special Order No. 25 and its implementing rules. The
petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from
processing the application for certificate of ancestral
land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes. Petitioners
contend that in addition to the failure of the DENR to
publish the assailed administrative issuances in a
newspaper of general circulation prior to its
implementation, RA 7586, which provides for the
creation of a National Integrated Protected Areas
System, does not contain the slightest implication of a
grant of authority to the DENR to adjudicate or confer
title over lands occupied by indigenous communities. It
is contended that the said law only grants DENR
administrative and managerial powers over designated
national and natural parks called protected areas
wherein rare and endangered species of plants and
animals inhabit.[8] The petitioners further allege that
the subsequent passage of in 1997 of Republic Act
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act, wherein the power to evaluate and issue
certificates of ancestral land titles is vested in the
National Commission on Indigenous Cultural
Communities/ Indigenous People (NCIP) is unmistakable
indication of the legislatures withholding of authority
from the DENR to confer title over lands occupied by
indigenous communities.[9] Finally, the petitioners
claim that the validity of the questioned DENR special
orders cannot be based on the constitutional provisions
regarding the protection of cultural communities as the
said provisions are policy statements to guide the
legislature in the exercise of their law-making powers
and by themselves are not self-executory.
The Solicitor-General filed memorandum in behalf of
the respondent DENR praying for the affirmance of the
appellate courts decision. The respondent argues that
the subject DENR special orders were issued pursuant
to the powers granted by RA 7586 to the DENR to
protect the socio-economic interests of indigenous
peoples. The land occupied by the petitioners is within a
protected area as defined by the said law and is well
within the jurisdiction of the DENR. The respondent
likewise claims that the petitioners are estopped from
contesting the validity of the DENR administrative
issuances considering that their relatives applied for
certificates of ancestral land claim (CALC) under the said
special orders which applications were, however,
denied. The petitioners should not be allowed to
challenge the same administrative orders which they
themselves previously invoked.
The respondents do not contest the ruling of the
appellate court as regards the nullity of Special Order
no. 31, as amended. The sole issue before us concerns
the validity of DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993
and its implementing rules DAO no. 02. The petitioners
main contention is that the assailed administrative
orders were issued beyond the jurisdiction or power of
the DENR secretary under the NIPAS Act of 1992. They
seek to enjoin the respondents from processing the
application for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of
Carantes because if approved, the petitioners may be
evicted from the portion of the land they occupy which
overlaps the land applied for by the Carantes heirs.
From a reading of the records it appears to us that the
petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed
facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the
court to resolve and the petition should have been
dismissed by the appellate court on this ground.
We gather from the allegations of the petition and that
of the petitioners memorandum that the alleged
application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC)
filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR
special orders has not been granted nor the CALC
applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the
application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of
ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not
grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the
involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the
petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. The
a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed petitioners allegation that certain documents from the
facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to
the petitioners and the respondents as there is no justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the
actual or imminent violation of the petitioners asserted petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR
right to possess the land by reason of the or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice
implementation of the questioned administrative it to say that by the petitioners own admission that the
issuances. respondents are still processing and have not approved
the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners
A justiciable controversy has been defined as, a definite
alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in
and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of
imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR may or
parties having adverse legal interests[10] which may be
may not approve Carantes application. Until such time,
resolved by a court of law through the application of a
the petitioners are simply speculating that they might
law.[11] Courts have no judicial power to review cases
be evicted from the premises at some future time.
involving political questions and as a rule, will desist
Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in
from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical
the PACU case, They (the petitioners) have suffered no
cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become
wrong under the terms of the lawand, naturally need no
moot.[12] Subject to certain well-defined
relief in the form they now seek to obtain.[17] If indeed
exceptions[13] courts will not touch an issue involving
the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and
the validity of a law unless there has been a
disturbing the petitioners possession thereof even
governmental act accomplished or performed that has a
without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the
direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person
heirs of Carantes, the case is simply one for forcible
contesting its validity.[14] In the case of PACU vs.
entry.WHEREFORE, for lack of justiciable controversy,
Secretary of Education[15] the petition contesting the
the decision of the appellate court is hereby set aside.
validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of
Education requiring private schools to secure a permit Montesclaros vs COMELEC
to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the
Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the
petitioners have permits and are actually operating
Kabataang Barangay to SangguniangKabataan and
under the same. The petitioners questioned the
limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no
regulation because of the possibility that the permit
more than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002,
might be denied them in the future. This Court held that
Antoniette VCMontesclaros demanded from COMELEC
there was no justiciable controversy because the
that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of
COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the
the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not
House of Representatives and the Senate on 20
entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the
February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills
Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does
on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to
not amount to a justiciable controversy. The questioned
postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11
regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a
March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated
private school whose permit to operate has been
Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK
revoked or one whose application therefor has been
election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership
denied.[16]
age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This
This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners was approved by the Senate and House of
speculation that the DENR will approve the application Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002
of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual respectively and signed by the President on 19 March
governmental act which directly causes or will 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus
imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention
petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of
of postponement of the SK election and reduction of Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881
age requirement on 11 March 2002.
approved by Congress on 20 February 1995
expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view
unconstitutional. of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has
become moot and academic with the passage of
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This
R.A. No. 7881.
petition presents no actual justiciable controversy.
GONZALES VS NARVASA
Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a
prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the
does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is creation of the Preparatory Commission on
not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO
it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time
43 in order to study and recommend proposed
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet
amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and
enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to
the manner of implementing them.
assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be
unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing
to file the case
MOOTNESS
Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43,
Atlas Fertilizer vs Sec. DAR
petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
(d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the
addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
implementing guidelines and procedures shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining
contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 any personal injury attributable to the creation of the
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being
as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties
by including the raising of fish and aquaculture or burdens as a result of the issues raised.
operations including fishponds and prawn ponds,
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to
treating them as in the same class or have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it
classification as agriculture or farming violates is established that public funds have disbursed in
the equal protection clause of the Constitution alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.
Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when
and therefore void.
there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is
power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there
unconstitutional. is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue
of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for
the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by
Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from
funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds
pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As
to the creation of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has
not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court
to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this
particular issue.
Lacson vs Perez
Facts: On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by
an angry and violent mob armed with deadly
weapons assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring
that there was a state of rebellion in the National
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the rebellion were
thereafter effected. On 06 May 2001 she ordered
the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion
in Metro Manila. Petitioners, PanfiloLacson, Cezar
Mancao and Michael Rey Aquino filed with an
urgent application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and Miriam Santiago
mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order. The petitions assail
declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis
both in fact an in law.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No 38
and General Order No 1 are constitutional.
Decision: Petitions are dismissed. The instant
petitions have been rendered moot and academic
as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a state of rebellion on 06 May
2001.
Defunis vs Odegaard
Brief Fact Summary. Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied
for admission as a first-year student at the
University of Washington Law School, a state-
operated institution. When he was denied
admission, he brought suit in a Washington trial
court claiming that the admissions committee
procedures were racially discriminatory.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In federal cases before
the Supreme Court, there must be an actual case
and controversy which exists at the stages of
appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the
date the action is initiated.
Facts. Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of
the Washington Law School, a state operated
university. DeFunis argued that the University’s
admissions policies and criteria were racially
discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to
attend the law school during the case and was in
his third year when the case was heard by the
Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him
graduate upon completion of his last year.
Issue. Does an actual controversy exist between
the parties, capable of redress by the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court)?
Held. The Court ordered the parties to address the
issue of mootness before they proceeded to any
filed other claims in the petition. The Court reasoned
that “federal courts are without power to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in
the cases before them.” This requirement stems
from Article III of the Constitution, under which the
the exercise of judicial power depends upon the
existence of a case or controversy. No amount of
public interest would be sufficient to create an
actual case or controversy, and the case was
rendered moot because DeFunis was going to
graduate from the law school regardless of the
Court’s ruling. Thus, the case was rendered moot.
“[T]he controversy between the parties has thus
clearly ceased to be definite and concrete.”
Acop vs Guingona
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Chief Supt. Romeo
M. Acop and Sr. Supt. Francisco G. Zubia seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision dated July 30, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which dismissed this petition for injunction.
The factual antecedents leading to the present petition
are as follows:
On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of
the criminal group known as the KuratongBaleleng gang
were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery
Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was
one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation
of the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public disclosure
of his findings that there was no shootout and the
eleven suspected members of the KuratongBaleleng
gang were instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon
dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC, made the same
statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes.
The Senate conducted hearings to determine the
circumstances surrounding the subject incident. SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the
Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul
Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended
that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted
to the government's Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Program. Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and
SPO2 dela Cruz were admitted into the said Program.
On March 12, 1996, herein petitioners, in their capacity
as taxpayers, but who are among the PNP officers
implicated in the alleged rubout, filed before the court a
quo a petition for injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order questioning the legality of the
admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into
the Program. Petitioners contend that under Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified
from being admitted into the witness protection
program even though they may be testifying against
other law enforcement officers.
On July 30, 1998, the trial court rendered the herein
assailed decision.
Hence, the petition anchored on a sole assignment of
error, to wit:
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENTS SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES AND SPO2
CORAZON DELA CRUZ ARE QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED
INTO THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM DESPITE
THEIR CLEAR DISQUALIFICATION FROM THE PROGRAM
UNDER SECTION 3(D) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6981,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'WITNESS PROTECTION,
SECURITY AND BENEFIT ACT'."
Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be
reversed and set aside and instead -
"a) An Injunction be issued enjoining the Department of
Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing
under the Witness Protection Program to respondents
SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz;
"b) Order the immediate discharge of respondents SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and for the
latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting
the benefits of the WPP; and
"c) Order respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz to return whatever monetary benefits they have
received from the government as a consequence of
their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP."[1]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
claims that the petition lacks merit and that the same
has been rendered moot and academic because the
coverage of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz under
the Program was already terminated on December 3,
1997 and August 23, 1998, respectively, as evidenced by
the letter of the Director of the Program addressed to
the OSG, dated February 10, 1999.[2] In their comment,
private respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela
Cruz agree with the OSG.
Indeed, prayers a) and b) above had been rendered
moot and academic by reason of the release of SPO2
delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from the coverage of
the Program. However, we find it necessary to resolve
the merits of the principal issue raised for a proper
disposition of prayer c) and for future guidance of both
bench and bar as to the application of Sections 3(d) and
4 of R.A. No. 6981. As we have ruled in Alunan III vs.
Mirasol,[3] and Viola vs. Alunan III,[4] "courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"
Petitioners' main contention is that Section 3 of R.A. No.
6981 lays down the basic qualifications a person must
possess in order to be admitted into the Program and
that Section 4 of the same statute is not an exception to
Section 3 but, it simply adds requirements for witnesses
before they may become eligible for admission into the
Program in case of legislative investigations.
We do not agree.
Section 3(d) provides:
Sec. 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who
has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying
or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial
body, or before any investigating authority, may be
admitted into the Program: Provided, That:
x xx
(d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would
be testifying against the other law enforcement officers.
In such a case, only the immediate members of his
family may avail themselves of the protection provided
for under this Act.
Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of
legislative investigations in aid of legislation, a witness,
with his express consent, may be admitted into the
Program upon the recommendation of the legislative
committee where his testimony is needed when in its
judgment there is pressing necessity therefor: Provided,
That such recommendation is approved by the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be.
A careful reading of Sections 3 and 4 readily shows that
these are distinct and independent provisions. It is true
that the proviso in Section 3(d) disqualifies law
enforcement officers from being admitted into the
Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-
judicial body, or before any investigating authority."
This is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for
a specific and separate situation where a witness
testifies before a legislative investigation. An
investigation by a legislative committee does not fall
under the category of "any investigating authority"
referred to in Section 3. Section 4 contains only a
proviso that the witness' admission to the Program
must be recommended by the legislative committee
when in its judgment there is a pressing necessity
therefor and said recommendation is approved by the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not
contain any proviso similar to Sec. 3(d) as quoted
above, nor does Section 4 refer to the application of the
proviso under Section 3. In other words, Section 4 did
not make any qualification or distinction.
It is basic under the law on statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish.[5] The operation of a proviso is usually and
properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the
enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it
pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other
sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative
intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed.[6]
In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent
that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981
does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err in
concluding that if the framers of the law intended
otherwise, they could have easily placed the same
proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it under Section 4.
Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to
Section 3(d), a witness in a legislative investigation
whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be
admitted into the Program subject only to the
requirements provided for under Section 4. It is not
disputed that the Senate Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had
recommended the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and
dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by
then Senate President Edgardo J. Angara.
WHEREFORE, we DENY DUE COURSE to the petition and
AFFIRM the assailed decision.
SANLAKAS vs Executive Secretary
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some
three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of
known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of
support for the government, demanding the resignation
of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP
Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations
took place and the officers went back to their barracks
in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both
the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the
State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were
filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA
VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that
Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that
the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v.
Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in
addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred
by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed
that the President has full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have,
by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the
circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was
no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil
courts or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,
vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on
warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person
may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not
as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is
present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing,
petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members
have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Pimentel vs Executive Secretary
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies
in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as
secretaries of their respective departments. They The office of a department secretary may
were appointed in an acting capacity only. become vacant while Congress is in session.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other Since a department secretary is the alter ego of
senators filed a complaint against the the President, the acting appointee to the office
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that must necessarily have the President’s
GMA cannot make such appointment without the confidence. That person may or may not be the
consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book make it expedient that the acting appointee will
IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the also be the permanent appointee.
undersecretary of the respective departments
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”,
should be designated in an acting capacity and
such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the
not anyone else.
president “may temporarily designate an officer
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary already in the government service or any other
Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is competent person to perform the functions of an
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 office in the executive branch.” Thus, the
Constitution to issue appointments in an acting President may even appoint in an acting capacity
capacity to department secretaries without the a person not yet in the government service, as
consent of the Commission on Appointments long as the President deems that person
even while Congress is in session. Further, EO competent.
292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs
designation to an officer in the civil service
Appointments in an Acting Capacity
provided that the temporary designation shall not
exceed one year.
Appointments in an
Ad Interim Appointments
During the pendency of said case, Congress Acting Capacity
adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those
It is a permanent
previously appointed in acting capacity. appointment because it Acting appointments
takes effect immediately and are a way of temporarily
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made can no longer be withdrawn filling important offices
by the President once the but, if abused, they can
by ex PGMA is valid. Description appointee has qualified into also be a way of
office. The fact that it is circumventing the need
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is subject to confirmation by for confirmation by the
the COA does not alter its Commission on
correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the permanent character Appointments.
safeguard so that such power will not be abused (Matibag vs Benipayo)

hence the provision that the temporary

designation shall not exceed one year. In this When Upon Acceptance by Upon Acceptance by
case, in less than a year after the initial Effective Appointee Appointee

appointments made by GMA, and when the

Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
When Any time when there is
interim appointments – this also proves that the Made
When Congress is in recess
vacancy
president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are Submitted
Yes No
the alter egos of the president. The choice is the to the COA

president’s to make and the president normally

appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the
undersecretary. She has the option to
choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.
Joya vs PCGG
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG
entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christie’s
of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and
antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of
the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his
relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA
questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was
already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it
proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to
enter into an agreement with Christie’s of New York for
the sale of the artworks
RULING:
On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review
The rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: that the question must be raised by the proper
party; that there must be an actual case or controversy;
that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional
or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. But the most important
are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court
which provides that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
and that all persons having interest in the subject of the
action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be
joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of
judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party
plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and related party.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer’s Suit:
There are certain instances however when this Court
has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure
the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a
public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have
the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public
duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to
18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
governing the preservation and disposition of national
and important cultural properties. Petitioners also
anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by
them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art. They allege that with the
unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public
property without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack
basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit
and non-stock corporations established to promote
non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was
former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president
was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership
of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the
public has been given the opportunity to view and
appreciate these paintings when they were placed on
exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of
antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as
gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries
on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion
personal to them. When the Marcos administration was
toppled by the revolutionary government, these
paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and
transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino
administration however should not be understood to
mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If
these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in
their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must
be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners
thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from
their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they
are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not
possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question
their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Requisites for a Mandamus Suit
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus
filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria
for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of
mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the
public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of
the state are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after
the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is
the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim
for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the
public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is
unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for
mandamus.
When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.
Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to
challenge the legality of official acts done by the
government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure
involving public funds but the disposition of what they
allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that
petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverware were acquired from private sources and not
with public money.
Actual Controversy
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case of controversy — one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot
and academic when its purpose has become stale, such
as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition
for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a
particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past,
the issues raised in the petition have become moot and
academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this
Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual
case or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. We find however that there is no such
justification in the petition at bar to warrant the
relaxation of the rule.
Agan vs PIATCO
Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored
the possibility of investing in the new NAIA airport
terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp.
They submitted proposals to the government for the
development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.
Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples
Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested
alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still
the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, otherappropriate documents to implement the
it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. resolutionOctober 19, 1998 CHR issued
(PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a
concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate Resolution No. A98-055
the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was
providing for the upgrading and raising of salary grades
amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition
of certain positions in thecommission. According to the
of the obligations given to the concessionaire,
same resolution, savings under Personnel Services
development of facilities and proceeds, fees and
would be used to support the implementation of
charges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is
charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA thescheme.November 17, 1998 CHR issued
terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service
Resolution No. A98-062
providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition
claiming that they would lose their job, and the service collapsing vacant positions in the body to provide
providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention.
additional source of funding forsaid staffing
Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition
modification.The CHR forwarded said staffing
assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of
modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a
congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo
request for its approval, but the then DBM
declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO
SecretaryBenjamin Diokno denied the request with the
contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office
justifications that-
concluded null and void.
The upgrading scheme involved elevating the level of
Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement
divisions to a bureau or regional office, and elevating
is void, together with its amendments for being
services to offices-
contrary to the constitution.
Section 78 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1998
Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being
says that no organizational unit or changes in key
contrary to public policy. The amendments have the
positions shall beauthorized unless provided by law or
effect of changing it into and entirely different
directed by the president, and there is no existing law
agreement from the contract bidded upon. The
which the CHR can use as a legal basis for their
amendments present new terms and conditions which
proposed scheme.-
provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the
altered the technical and financial parameters of other Section 2 of R.A. No. 6758 known as the Compensation
bidders had they know that such terms were available.
Standardization Law
The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and
supplements thereto are set aside for being null and , provides that the DBM is directed to establish
void. andadminister a unified compensation and position
classification system in the government. And the
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced
Supreme Court ruled in VictorinaCruz vs Court of
by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be
Appeals G.R. No. 119155 that the DBM has the sole
taken away from them.
power and discretion to administer the compensation
CHREA vs CHR andposition classification system of the National
Government.-
FACTS:
Though the CHR may be a member of the CFAG
September 4, 1998 CHR promulgated
(Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group), it is not vested
Resolution No. A98-047 with the authority toreclassify, upgrade and create
positions without the approval of the DBM. The
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme members of the CFAG may formulate and
among selected positionsin the commission and implementorganizational structures but these must be
ordering its Human Resources Department Division to within the parameters of the Unified Position
prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and
Classification and Compensation Systemestablished
under R.A. 6758.In light of the DMBs disapproval, the
CSC-NCR Office recommended to the CSC-Central Office
that the subject appointments be rejected.
Thepetitioner CHREA also requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation.However, the CSC-
Central Office denied the petitioners request in a
resolution dated December 19, 1999 and reversed the
recommendationof the CSC- NCR. CHREA filed a motion
for reconsideration with the CSC-Central Office but this
was denied. CHREA, therefore, elevated thecase to the
Court of Appeals. When the court of Appeals affirmed
the resolution of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the
validity of theupgrading scheme, CHREA filed a petition
in the Supreme Court.In this petition, CHREA contends
that the Court of Appeals and CSC-Central Office erred
in approving of the CHRs alleged authority toupgrade,
classify and create positions when the DBMs approval is
indispensable for such scheme. CHREA also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that,
according to the constitution, the CHR enjoys Fiscal
Autonomy.In their answer, the respondent questioned
the locus standi of the CHREA considering that it is not a
recognized bona fide organization of itsemployees and
that its president, Marcial Sanchez has no authority to
sue the CHR. Respondent also contends that it has the
authority toimplement the scheme it proposed even
without the approval of the DBM because it enjoys
fiscal autonomy.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner has a locus standi on the
case.
Held:
Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no
locus standi considering that there exists no official
written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner
as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there
anything in the records to show that its president has
the authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in
a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of. Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of
respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the
upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that
portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for
Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the
employees, including those in the rank and file, are
derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case
was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of
the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of
the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s
personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA
when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus,
neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue
that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court
below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as
to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind
the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in
pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a
determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the
reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the
CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general
provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998,
which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its
reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no
organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the
President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no
law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent
CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney
VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of
Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central
Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change
the context from support to substantive without actual
change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an
administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In
Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.
David vs Arroyo
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” But the President must be careful
in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes
beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution,the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20thAnniversary of the EDSA PeoplePower I, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged
plans to overthrow thegovernment, issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of
nationalemergency. She cited as factual bases for the
said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group andtheir
audacious threat of the
MagdaloD-Day; the defections in the military,
particularly in thePhilippine Marines; and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. On the same
day, sheissued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting
the standards which the Armed Forces of thePhilippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should
follow in the suppression andprevention of acts of
lawless violence. The following were considered as
additional factual bases forthe issuance of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers
and cell sites inBulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army
outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
soldiers;and the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join5,000
Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.Immediately, the Office of
the President announced the cancellation of all
programs andactivities related to the 20th
People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked
permits to hold rallies.Members of the Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who
marched from various parts of Metro Manila to
converge at theEDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed
by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan
party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of
the Criminal Investigation andDetection Group (CIDG)
raided theDaily Tribune offices in Manila and
confiscated news stories,documents, pictures, and
mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were
stationed inside theeditorial and business offices, as
well as outside the building. A few minutes after the
search andseizure at theDaily Tribune offices, the police
surrounded the premises of another pro-
oppositionpaper, Malaya
, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP
warned that it would take overany media organization
that would not follow “standards set by the government
during the state of national emergency.”On March 3,
2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state
of national emergency and after all the present
petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued
Presidential ProclamationNo. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring
that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist
and lifting PP1017. These consolidated petitions
forcertiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP
1017 andG.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion. It is contended that
respondentofficials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve
democraticinstitutions, are actually trampling upon the
very freedom guaranteed and protected by
theConstitution. Hence, such issuances are void for
being unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered
the present petitions moot andacademic;
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing;
3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the
issuance of PP 1017;
4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial
Law;
HELD:
The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic because all the exceptions
to the “moot and academic” principle are present.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuadethe courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic, if: (1)thereis a grave violation of
the Constitution; (2)the exceptional character of the
situation and theparamount public interest is involved;
(3)the constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and (4)the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. All these exceptions are present here. It
is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raisedaffect the public interest, involving as
they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms of
expression,of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating the bench andthe bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police,
on the extent of the protection givenby constitutional
guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, thepresent petitions are subject to
judicial review.
All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the
transcendental importance of the issue involved.
It has been held that theperson who impugns the
validity of a statute must have apersonal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain directinjury as a result.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met: (a)the cases involve
constitutionalissues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
thetax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there
must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens,
there must be a showing that he issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and (e)forlegislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon
theirprerogatives as legislators.
Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the
requirement of locus standi may be waivedby the Court
in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus
standi is but corollary to the biggerquestion of proper
exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of
PP No. 1017 and G.O.No. 5 is a judicial question which is
of paramount importance to the Filipino people. In view
of thetranscendental importance of this issue, all the
petitioners are declared to have locus standi.
There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s
exercise of her calling-out power,which petitioners did
not refute.
InIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (338 SCRA
81 [2000]), the Court considered thePresident’s “calling-
out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. It is incumbentupon the petitioner to show
that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis.Nonetheless, the Court stressed that “this does
not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a mannerconstituting grave
abuse of discretion.” Under the expanded power of
judicial review, the courts areauthorized not only “to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable andenforceable,” but also “to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.” As to how the Court may inquire into the
President’s exercise of the power,Lansang v. Garcia (42
SCRA 448 [1971]) adopted he test that “judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court notthat the
President’sdecision is correct,” but that “the President
did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down
isnot correctness, but arbitrariness.Petitioners failed to
show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual
basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
ConsolidatedComment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance
of PP1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Petitioners did not refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling formilitary aid.
Judging the seriousness of the incidents, President
Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasionor rebellion. In times of
emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that
we repose a certainamount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same
time, itobliges him to operate within carefully
prescribed procedural limitations.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely
an invocation of the President’scalling-out power.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a“sequence” of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling-out power,the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus , and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,”the President may call the armed
forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion orrebellion.” Considering the circumstances
then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary
toissue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position todetermine the
actual condition of the country. But the President must
be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that
goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom
of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater
are the limitations.In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art.
XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to
takeover privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest.It is plain in the wordings
of PP 1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her
calling-out power. PP 1017 is not a declaration of
Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts
thatcan be done only under a valid declaration of
Martial Law. Specifically, arrests and seizures without
CITIZEN STANDING
Tanada vs Tuvera
Held:
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would
have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in
the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite
legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding,
they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since
the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early
as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3
this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ
of mandamus would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular
right to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public
officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79
M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people
are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest
in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator
Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to
the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice
Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to
error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen
that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that
the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Chavez vs PEA and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered
into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the
Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President
Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and
leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred
to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila
Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP
and PEA entered into an agreement that all future
projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned
by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the
transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM
ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture
agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This
caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the
agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public
domain (famously known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer
praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction
and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these
events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended)
JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue
of whether the amended joint venture agreement is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the
constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising
the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain,
which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Kiluisang Mayo Uno vs Garcia
Facts:
The Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates
within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for
a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate
increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer
Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were
exorbitant and unreasonable.
Private respondent PBOAP asserts that the petitioner
has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in
the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed
for.
They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's
authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a
presumption of public need in applications for
certificates of public convenience.
Issue: W/N Petitioner has the legal standing?
HELD:
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must
be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the
definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
In Lamb v. Phipps, 7 we ruled that judicial power is the
power to hear and decide causes pending between
parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law
and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of
locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly
affected by and whose interest is immediate and
substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue.
The rule therefore requires that a party must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury
to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision
so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers in his behalf. 8
In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had
suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable
injury and damage from the implementation of the
questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has
shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated
and continues to be violated with the enforcement of
the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders.
KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and
jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger
fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who
comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must
be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of
the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside
this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal
standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality
is not without judicial precedent. As early as the
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its
discretion and waived the requirement of proper party.
In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., et al., 9 we ruled in the same lines and
enumerated some of the cases where the same policy
was adopted, viz:
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
[G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756
(Araneta
v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de
Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of
Customs); and G.R. No. L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission
on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)], this Court brushed
aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits
are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680
[1972]) or that it "enjoys an open discretion to entertain
the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
(1976)].
John Hay Peoples Coalition vs Lim
Facts: The controversy stemmed from the issuance of
Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos
declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special
Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax
exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone.
In the present petition, petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also
held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a
provision of the Constitution, that has the full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of property
from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its
power to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption
would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a
law granting any tax exemption must have the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress. Moreover, the claimed statutory exemption
of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest
and unmistakable from the language of the law on
which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that the
grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and
other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being
violative of the Constitution. However, the entire
assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being
repugnant to the law or the Constitution. The
delineation and declaration of a portion of the area
covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the
powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as
contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the
case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue: WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring
the petition
HELD: YES. R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the
concurrence of the affected local government units to
the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the
country. The grant by the law on local government units
of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is
equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is
in effect a recognition of the real interests that
communities nearby or surrounding a particular base
area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and
substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the government act being
challenged. Theirs is a material interest, an interest in
issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an
interest in the question involved or an incidental
interest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of
Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social
existence of the people of Baguio City. ... Moreover,
petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon
were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time,
engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and
whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of
their constituents the question of whether to concur
with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners
Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against
the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of
1994)supporting the issuance of the now challenged
Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the
present petition.
IBP vs ZAMORA
Facts:
Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, as commander in chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or
lawless violence in Metro Manila in the light of the
escalating cases of crime and lawlessness in the city.
The President declared that the services of the Marines
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. Subsequently,
the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines
(the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police
(the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
Issues: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
HELD: On the first issue The Supreme Court ruled that
the petition has no merit. First, petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites
of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second,
the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he
commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of
the Constitution.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest
of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the
lis mota of the case. The IBP has not sufficiently
complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as
a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.[13] The term interest means a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its
standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Executive vs CA
FACTS: The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995 took effect on 15 July 1995 and its Omnibus
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Act was
published on April 1996. However, even before the law
took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine
Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a
petition for declaratory relief to declare some parts as
unconstitutional and prayed for a preliminary injunction
enjoining herein petitioners from implementing it.
On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days
there from. After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed
their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an
amended petition, the amendments consisting in the
inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other corporations
which it alleged were its members and which it
represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary
restraining order.
Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042 violate
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution (i.e.
discrimination against unskilled workers, discrimination
against licensed and registered recruiters, among
others). The RTC eventually granted the writ so the ES
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
asserting that “…Acro-Phil is not the real party-in-
interest as petitioner in the trial court, as it was
inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit
corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the law. They argued that if, at all, any
damage would result in the implementation of the law,
it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies
and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers
discriminated against who would sustain the said injury
or damage, not Acro- Phil.”
The CA dismissed this, hence the present petition.
ISSUE: WON ACRO-Phil has locus standi HELD: Only
insofar as the 11 licensed and registered recruitment
agencies impleaded in the amended petitions but not
for the unskilled workers it was claiming for. The
modern view is that an association has standing to
complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the
legal identity of an association with that of its members.
An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action.
The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation,
ACRO-Phil was organized for the purposes inter alia of
promoting and supporting the growth and development
of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local
and international levels; providing, creating and
exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive
benefit of its general membership; enhancing and
promoting the general welfare and protection of
Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any
individual, company, entity or association on matters
related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to
perform other acts and activities necessary to
accomplish the purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil
is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its
members, because it and its members are in every
practical sense identical.
However, with respect to the unskilled workers, the
Court finds that ACRO-Phil cannot file the petition on
their behalf and that it even failed to implead such
unskilled workers in their petition.
Kilosbayan vs Guingona
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it
the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO
decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying
its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993,
after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating
an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a
multinational company and one of the ten largest public
companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer
itsservices and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step,
Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a
Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was
intended to be the medium through which the technical
and management services required for the project
would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an
on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993,
PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October
1993, the Office of the President announced that it had
given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate
the country’s on-line lottery system and that the
corresponding implementing contract would be
submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final
clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.”
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter
to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering
the denial by the Office of the President of its protest
and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary
Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can stop
Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of the
Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with
its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic
corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors,
priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the
petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and
Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo,
are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of
Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and
Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as
members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents,
meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing
to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution
in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have the Locus standi?
Held: We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition
and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court
hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of.
TAXPAYER’S STANDING
US vs Richardson
Facts:
Respondent, as a federal taxpayer, brought this suit for
the purpose of obtaining a declaration of
unconstitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act, which permits the CIA to account for its
expenditures "solely on the certificate of the Director. ."
The complaint alleged that the Act violated Art. I, Sec 9,
clause 7, of the Constitution insofar as that clause
requires a regular statement and account of public
funds. The District Courts dismissal of the complaint for,
inter alia, respondents lack of standing under Flast v.
Cohen, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. That
court held that respondent had standing as a taxpayer
on the ground that he satisfied Flast's requirements
that the allegations (1) challenge an enactment under
the taxing and spending Clause of Art I, Sec 8, and show
(2) a "nexus" between the plaintiff’s status and a
specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and
spending power.
Issue: W/N the respondent has a locus standi?
Held: Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit.
(a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the
requirements of Art. III, did not "undermine the salutary
principle . . . established by Frothingham vs Mellon, that
a taxpayer may not employ a federal court as a forum in
which to air his generalized grievances about the
conduct of government or the allocation of power in the
Federal System.
(b) Respondent’s challenge, not being addressed to the
taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating
the CIA’s accounting and reporting procedures, provides
no "logical nexus" between his status as "taxpayer" and
the asserted failure of Congress to require more
detailed reports of expenditures of the CIA
(3) Respondent’s claim that, without detailed
information on the CIA’s expenditures, he cannot
properly follow legislative or executive action, and
thereby fulfill his obligations asa voter, is a generali8ed
grievance insufficient under Frothingham or Flast to
show that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining direct injury as the result" of such action.
ITF vs COMELEC argue that the award of any contract for automation
involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan
Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act
amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the
8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a
laws governing the transaction must be followed
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
strictly.
system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal
disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its
being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when
Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting
2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
three (3) phases of its Automated Election System;
unconstitutional law."
namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation
System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing Jumamil vs Café
System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.
FACTS
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-
Some stalls of the public market of Panabo, Davao del
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated
Norte were destroyed in a fire. Mayor Café entered into
the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10,
contracts with individuals willing to deposit Php
2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she
40,000.00 each to aid in the construction of new market
authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
stalls. Some of these individuals have been friends and
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an relatives of the Mayor and members of the Sangguniang
"Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid". Bayan of Panabo. Later, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Panabo issued Municipal Resolutions No. 7 and 49, and
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities
Appropriation Ordinances 111 and 10; which
(including the herein Petitioners Information
appropriated a total amount of Php 2.2 million for the
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented
construction project of the stalls. After the completion
by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon
of the project, the stalls were leased through a public
Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin
raffle limited to the individuals that Mayor Café
Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to
contracted with.
Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been Citing his capacity as a taxpayer, Jumamil filed a petition
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with for declaratory relief against the public respondents,
eligibility as well as technical and procedural questioning the constitutionality of the ordinances. The
requirements (many of which have been discussed at RTC and CA declared Jumamil to lack legal standing
length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding. because he was not a party to the contract entered into
by the Mayor and the individuals and thus have
Issue: Whether the petitioner has standing?
dismissed the petition.
Held: On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their
ISSUE Whether one who has filed a taxpayer’s suit
capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and
but who is not a party of the subject contract lacks legal
concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to
standing to question the constitutionality of tax laws
this case are "of transcendental importance and of
national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding HELD
and questionable award of the Contract to an
No. The petitioner filed the suit citing his capacity as a
unqualified entity would impact directly on the success
taxpayer and not in his personal capacity. Therefore, he
or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on
does not need to be a party to the subject contract in
the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of
order to question the constitutionality of tax laws.
the people would inevitably affect their faith in the
However, although he has cited his capacity as a
democratic system of government. Petitioners further
taxpayer, in order for the Court to rule on the issue of
constitutionality, he still needs to specifically prove Decision: In questioning the validity of special
substantial interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
election, petitioners assert harm classified as
of money collected by taxation. Having failed to have
submitted such proof, the petitioner has no legal “generalized grievance.” They failed to establish
standing in the case. direct injury they suffered from the said
governmental act. However, the Court relaxed
Although the petitioner has no legal standing, the Court
may rule on the issue of constitutionality in matters of the requirement on standing and exercised its
transcendal or of paramount importance to the public. discretion to give due course to voter’s suit
The Court has considered the question of the involving the right of suffrage.
constitutionality of tax laws to be of paramount
importance to the public allowing such waiver of
procedural rules by using the following determinants: LEGISLATIVE STANDING

The character of the assets or funds involved; Ople vs Torres

The presence of a clear case of disregard of a Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
respondent agency or instrumentality of the Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos
government; and on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition
to invalidate the said order for violating the right to
The lack of any other party with a more direct and privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated
specific interest in raising the questions being raised. on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation
of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the
VOTER’S STANDING
citizen’s right to privacy.
Tolentino vs COMELEC
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to
Facts: After becoming president on January maintain suit?

2001, Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished
Guingona as vice-president. After confirmation as member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the Senate
the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308
calling the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a
is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that
special election tobe held simultaneously with the the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking
2001 May regular election. It also provided that domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring
the candidate garnering the 13th highest vote will demarcation line between the power of legislature to
make laws and the power of executive to execute laws
serve for the unexpired term of Guingona.
will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be
Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica allowed.
sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming the
GOVERNMENTAL STANDING
winner. They contend that it is without
jurisdiction because it failed to notify the People vs Vera
electorate of the position to be filled in (special FACTS: Petitioners, People of the Philippines and
election) due to this the people voted without Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)
distinction in one election for 13 seats are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party,
and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the
irrespective of term.
criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim
of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s have standing Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for
to maintain suit? probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private
prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First
Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing
Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of
prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of
civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal,
the court, on 26 March 1935,modified the sentence to
an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months
of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days
of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other
respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration
and four successive motions for new trial which were
denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but
the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November
1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu
Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for
reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded
the case to the court of origin for execution of the
judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the People of thePhilippines is a
proper party in this case.
HELD: YES
RATIO: The People of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila,
is a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No.
4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is
brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.
Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that
the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
FACIAL CHALLENGE
Estrada vs SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-
ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as
amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law
to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes
the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January
2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS,
BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR
BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series
of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE
WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following
grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS
VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY
LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY
FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF
PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF
THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT
STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS
REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO
MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA
7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended
by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression
of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the
Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words 8 The intention of the
lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in
such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following
commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination — the result or product of combining;
the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual
characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same
class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the
observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern'
consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of
Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the
pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public
officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall
unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him, follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative,
if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes
or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining
whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It must be
stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law
does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly
stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running
fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic
mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with
Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed "willfully,
unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the
very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effect and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government official, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance
against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA
7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late
in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the
same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history.
The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the
State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to
construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the
law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what
the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by
Congress cannot be expected to spell out with
mathematical precision how the law should be
interpreted under any and all given situations. The
application of the law will depend on the facts and
circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then
be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts.
Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function of
the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as
would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of
legislative enactments.
 A construction should be rejected if it gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are
sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly,
"plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic
depredation which affects not just private parties or
personal interests but the nation as a whole."
Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a crime
against national interest which must be stopped, and if
possible, stopped permanently."
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society
of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be
regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
Umali vs Guingona
Facts: Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. However, a
confidential memorandum against him was sent to
President Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential
Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for
investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings and
hearings set by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not
raise clarficatory questions during the hearing. PCAGC
foud prima facie evidence to support the charges and
President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He
appealed to the Office of the President but was denied.
He elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not accorded
due process and deprived of security of tenure. Petition
for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the decision and
was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the
constitutionality of PCAGC as a government agency.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Umali was
raised at the earliest opportunity?
Decision: In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was
lifted. Regarding the constitutionality of PCAGC, it was
only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late
to raise the said issue for the first time at such a late
stage of the proceedings.
NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Lis mota is a Latin term meaning the cause or
motivation of a legal action or lawsuit. The literal
translation is "litigation moved".
Arceta vs Mangrobang
Facts: On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a
check to Oscar Castro payable to cash for the amount of
Php 740k even with full knowledge that the account has
no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was
subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City
Prosecutor of Metro Manila charged Arceta of violating
BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved for
the charge to be dismissed and pleaded not guilty. She
then petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing the constitutionality of BP Blg 22
citing the Lozano doctrine.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22
is the lis mota of the case?
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit.
Every law has in its favour the presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution
and not one that is speculative, doubtful or
argumentative. Petitioner failed to show that BP Blg 22
by itself or by implementation transgressed a provision
of the Constitution
MANDATORY NOTICE
Mirasol vs CA
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a
crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to
purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB
to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted
to the government. Believing that the proceeds were
more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners
asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it
ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans
from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the
proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations.
PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No.
579, there was nothing to account since under said law,
all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to
the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to
declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof
are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or
executive order. The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section
3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or
not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of
a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor
General such notice would be tantamount to depriving
him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is
not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such
notice is required in "any action" and not just actions
involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no
room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order,
or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its
implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation. Petitioners
now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for
the exercise of this power: First, there must be before
the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial review. Second, the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
MITRA VS COMELEC
In essence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition
is not dissimilar from the prohibition proceedings just
dismissed filed respectively by former delegates Samuel
C. Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales.[1] All three suits
proceed on the assumption that the present
Constitution is not in force and effect. There is this
variation. In the last two paragraphs of this petition,
the plea is made for the holding of a plebiscite so that
the people may vote on the ratification of the
Constitution, now in force, but as to them still in the
stage of proposal. In the event it is rejected, so their
thinking goes, then the 1935 Constitution, which in the
view of petitioners was suspended by the establishment
of an authoritarian regime by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces after the proclamation of martial
law, could be once more operative with the lifting of
martial law on January 17, 1981. As in the Occena and
Gonzales petitions, there is what was therein referred
to as a "rather unorthodox aspect" in "the assertion
that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law,
the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding."[2]
This excerpt from the opinion is, therefore, fully
applicable: "To put it at its mildest, such an approach
has the arresting charm of novelty - but nothing else. It
is in fact self-defeating, for if such were indeed the case,
petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a
Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that
Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here
would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility."[3]
A similar judgment is thus indicated. The petition must
be dismissed. If there is a further expression of view on
the part of the Court, it is to clear the misapprehension
that seems to be current in certain legal quarters about
the import of the Javellana decision[4] and the role of
the President as Commander-in-Chief during the period
of martial law.
1. What is the ruling in Javellana v. Executive
Secretary?[5] Rightfully, it is ranked by eminent jurists
and academicians abroad as one of the most significant
manifestations of the exercise of the function of judicial
review. Apparently, this awesome and delicate power
has implications still not adequately grasped. By virtue
of this prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or
legitimates the acts of a coordinate department,
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The
decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of
rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is
controlling. To go bock to Javellana v. Executive
Secretary. The ruling cannot be any clearer. The
dispositive portion reads: "[Accordingly], by virtue of
the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with
the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and
Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in
force and effect."[6] As far as there being "no further
judicial obstacle" to the operative character of the 1973
Constitution, there can be no doubt that such is the
view of eight of the ten members of the Court.
Petitioners apparently did not take note of the
immediately preceding paragraph of the opinion of the
then Chief Justice Concepcion, who, while one of the
dissenters, spoke for the Court on the voting: "On the
fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973
is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance
thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely,
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their
votes on the third question that they could not state
with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2)
members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result that there are not enough votes to declare that
the new Constitution is not in force."[7] Both the
statements of "there being no further judicial obstacle"
as well as the negative form in which mention is made
of there being "not enough votes to declare that the
new Constitution" is not in force reflect the traditional
mode in which constitutional issues are passed upon in
accordance with the American concept of judicial
review. The function of judicial review, as observed by
Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission,[8] reflects the adoption of the American
type of constitutional government "where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department."[9] In the event therefore that the
decision rendered may give rise to doubts and
perplexities, there is comfort and assurance in the
thought expressed by the same eminent jurist in
another leading case of Villena v. Secretary of
Interior:[10] "Familiarity with the essential background
of the type of government established under our
Constitution, in the light of certain well-known
principles and practices that go with the system, should
offer the necessary explanation."[11] One of such
practices is the manner in which the dispositive portion
of a decision in a suit contesting the validity of a
legislative or executive act is worded. It was noted that
Justice Holmes had a penchant for the double negative.
A favorite phrase of his was that the statute "was not
unconstitutional." That is of the essence of judicial
review. For one of its basic postulates is the
presumption of validity. The burden of proof is thus on
the person assailing the action taken by a coordinate
branch. There is no need therefore of an affirmative
finding as to its being constitutional. It suffices that it
has not been shown to be otherwise. It is likewise by
virtue of such presumption that Justice Malcolm
correctly asserted: "To doubt is to sustain."[12]
Scholars in the field of constitutional law have even
gone further. They maintain that when the Supreme
Court or some members thereof whose votes are crucial
deem the question raised as a political[13] and not
judicial resulting in the dismissal action, there was, even
then, a manifestation of power of judicial review at
work. The Court, by ruling that it was without
jurisdiction, allowed the political branches to have their
way. In that sense, to use a favorite phrase of Thomas
Reed Powell, the Court was silently vocal and not
silently silent. In Javellana, the Court assumed
jurisdiction, but only two of the ten members then were
of the view and so voted that the 1973 Constitution is
not in force. There is no affront to logic, it would seem,
for us to dismiss the petitions and accordingly rule that
"there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." As
was pointed out in the joint decision in the Occena and
Gonzales petitions: "That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this
Court has invariably applied the present Constitution.
The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases
may be cited."
Salonga vs Cruz-Pano
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally
protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has
been established to warrant the filing of an information
for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the
iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute
him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which
occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns
Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated
petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General
sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that
“the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled
case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12,
1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from
receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence
within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the
contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges
against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an
amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas,
dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39
other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as
amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October
1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss
the charges against Salonga for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.
On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January
1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of
an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people,
including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge
dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the
subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the
contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an
information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against
him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the
Philippines today.
Issues: Whether the above case still falls under an
actual case
Held: No. The Court had already deliberated on this
case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on
January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio
Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of
Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito
Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed
under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the
prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s
crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant
the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this
decision has been rendered moot and academic by the
action of the prosecution.
Javier vs COMELEC
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy
more popular support but the latter had the advantage
of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites
of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections,
the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are
now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. The petitioner
thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the
proclamation was void because made only by a division
and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, the private respondent
took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its
decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private
respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently
demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as
the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are
violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will
not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls
the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial
(and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the
ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after
all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on
the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Ynot vs IAC
Facts:
Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station
commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A
which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef
from one province to another. Confiscation will be a
result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained
the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could
no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its
presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the
constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright
confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard
before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative
power by the former president under Amendment 6 of
the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that
had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the
constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path
of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to
relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing an existing
law due to the grant of legislative authority over the
president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise
language to avoid controversy. In the due process
clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it
would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance
of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all
circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt
to every situation with varying degrees at protection for
the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard
definition for due process lest they be confined to its
interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption
which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or
rational connection between facts proved and fact
presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a
criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of police power which both restrains and is
restrained by due process. This power was invoked in
626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of
carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, it can’t be said that it complies with the
existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition
and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin
proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical
only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would
not have been proved in a court of justice with the
accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of
police power because the method to confiscate
carabaos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was
denied the right to be heard or his defense and
punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
against the separation of powers.
The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law
during that time was valid.
EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution.
Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19,
1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of
the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit
against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having
elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other
hand claims that the defense of prescription would not
be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948,
when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the
period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during
which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of
the loan. The lower court did not find such contention
persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and
the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the same
were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription
(Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a
law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a
statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged
void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached. Precisely because of the judicial
recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war
sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series
of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that
during the eight-year period that Executive Order No.
32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription
did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit
is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan
matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant
Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen
years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from
March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No.
32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two
months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort
was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
League of Cities vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of
the Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for
reconsideration which was denied by the Honorable
Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also
denied until on the 18th of November 2008, the
judgement became final and executory.
The Court then on the 19th of December 2009,
unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the
constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it
already rendered.
RULING:
Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the
operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law
remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity
and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the
present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the
implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of
salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean
that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.
Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter
of equity and fair play to innocent people who may
have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their
unconstitutionality.
CIR vs San Roque Power Corporation
FACTS:
On October 11, 1997, San Roque Power Corporation
(San Roque) entered into a Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA) with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by
building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project in San
Manuel, Pangasinan.
The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly
incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of
P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared
in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year.
San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for
refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54, representing
unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for
taxable year 2001.
However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended
Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since it
increased its unutilized input VAT To the amount of
P560,200,283.14. San Roque filed with the BIR on the
same date, separate amended claims for refund in the
aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14.
On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its
amended administrative claim with the CIR on March
28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA.
CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was
prematurely filed with the CTA.
ISSUE:n WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund?
HELD: No. San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund
because it failed to comply with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before
filing its judicial claim.
On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its
amended administrative claim with the CIR on March
28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the
CTA, which showed that San Roque did not wait for the
120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim.
Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is
mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA 8424 or the Tax
Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the
petitionvoid.
It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and renders the petition premature and
without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA
does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s
petition.
Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed
against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity."
Thus, San Roque’s petition with the CTA is a mere scrap
of paper .Well-settled is the rule that tax refunds or
credits, just like tax exemptions, are strictly construed
against the taxpayer.
Whether the Atlas doctrine or the Mirant doctrine is
applied to San Roque is immaterial because what is at
issue in the present case is San Roque’s non-compliance
with the 120-day mandatory and jurisdictional period,
which is counted from the date it filed its administrative
claim with the CIR. The 120-day period may extend
beyond the two-year prescriptive period, as long as the
administrative claim is filed within the two-year
prescriptive period. However,
San Roque’s fatal mistake is that it did not wait for the
CIR to decide within the 120-day period, a mandatory
period whether the Atlas or the Mirant doctrine is
applied.
Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is clear,
unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120 days
to act on an administrative claim. The taxpayer can file
the judicial claim (1) Only within 30 days after the CIR
partially or fully denies the claim within the 120- day
period, or (2) only within 30 days from the expiration of
the 120- day period if the CIR does not act within the
120-day period.
Even if, contrary to all principles of statutory
construction as well as plain common sense, we
gratuitously apply now Section 4.106-2(c) of Revenue
Regulations No. 7-95, still San Roque cannot recover
any refund or credit because San Roque did not wait for
the 60-day period to lapse, contrary to the express
requirement in Section 4.106-2(c). SC granted the
petition of CIR to deny the tax refund or credit claim of
San Roque.
Araullo vs Aquino
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding
of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken
slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to
the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed
funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada
made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for
voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out
that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects
were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each,
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of
the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain
laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs.
38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed
funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is
applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It
is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the
DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power
to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit
(which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s
involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project
in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although
some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still
non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such
projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what
was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not
refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow
moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is
no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly
by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be
used as money source for the DAP because under the
law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes
the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable.
The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it
may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can
no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP
cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However,
the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP
if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.
PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Salazar vs Achacoso
Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement
filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal
recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand
Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to
appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against
him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a
Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It
stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or
authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was
then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served
the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them
in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner
filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the
seized properties, because she was not given prior
notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process.
She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of
Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her
will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and
prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or
arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on
Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held,
“We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
of no force and effect… The power of the President to
order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) cannot be
made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure order was
in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that
the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38,

paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized
as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.