The Maasai's New Clothes: A Developmentalist Modernity and Its Exclusions

Author(s): Leander Schneider

Source: Africa Today, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Autumn, 2006), pp. 101-131
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187758
Accessed: 29/04/2010 09:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iupress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org
The Maasai's New Clothes:
A Developmentalist Modernity
and Its Exclusions
LeanderSchneider

"Operation Dress-Up, " a late 1960s campaign initiated by the

Tanzanian state to induce the Maasai to abandon their tradi-
tional mode of dress, opens a window on a specific articula-
tion in its historical context of "development." The analysis
draws on articles, letters to the editor, and politicians' state-
ments printed in the Tanzanian press to portray how sections
of Tanzanian society thought about the Maasai, development,
tradition, modernity, and the nation. The article shows how,
under the banner of "development, " cast as value-neutral and
nonpartisan, Operation Dress- Up pursued what must always
be a particular and therefore partisan vision of "modern
man. " Special attention is paid to how the discourses through
which the campaign was articulated rendered disagreement
with its goals hard to imagine, and even harder to recognize
as legitimate.

People tell me, "The Masai are completely happy." I tell them,
"It's not a question of whether they are happy. That's a philo-
sophical question. I'm not trying to make them happy!" But
... there is a difference between clean water and dirty water.
My problem is to get that woman clean water. My problem
is to get her a healthy child. Happy! I'm not involving myself
in that. . . . The Masai know that these things are possible-
milk for children, clean water, good houses: these things are
objective, desirable, necessary.
(JuliusNyerere, President of Tanzania,quoted in Smith 1981:12)
 Introduction
This article examines a peculiar development campaign, referred to as
OperationDress-Up, throughwhich the postcolonial Tanzanianstate sought
to induce Tanzanian Maasai to wear "modern" attire. The campaign was
paradoxicalinsofar as it defined a problem, and sought to impose a solution,
where many of its intended beneficiaries saw neither; they thus had to be
coerced, "fortheir own benefit." This paradoxcannot be explained (away)by
~- referenceto some ulterior interest the promotersof the campaignmight have
03 had. It must be understood as arising from how the project of developing the
pa
I Maasai was imagined, and the context, constraints, and structures within
0 which this imagining took shape. This imagination, and how it produced
troubling effects, therefore merit close attention.
Although discourse-theoreticalcritiques of development (e.g., Escobar
1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Sachs 1992) share this focus on develop-
a
ment's imagination and frames of understanding,they have been criticized
for paying insufficient attention to the always specific articulations and
0
effects of development discourse in favor of too generalizing a depiction of
"the" discourse of development and its generic, and generically negative,
z
m
effects (Cooper 1997; Ferguson 1999). This article's detailed examination
of a particulararticulation of development in its historical context and the
mechanics that producedthe problematiceffects observedstrives for a richer
H
-I portrait. Development is thus contemplated as an undertaking that, while
participating in broaderdiscourses and practices, needs to be understood in
its specificity.
The first section sets out what the casting of Operation Dress-Up as
a development campaign entailed. That development is often glossed as
a technocratic intervention concerned with the promotion of universally
shared goals-splendidly illustrated by Nyerere's ruminations above-has
been observed before (e.g., by Ferguson 1994). This developmental posture
of technocracy and harmoniousness notwithstanding, Operation Dress-
Up was highly contentious. This was because of dimensions that did not
conform with the campaign's image of technocratic neutrality, concerned
only with Nyerere's "objective, desirable, necessary" things. Indeed, the
campaign vividly illustrates that development in 1960s and 1970s Tan-
zania was a particularist-in the sense of being culturally partisan-and
conflictual project.
From these preliminary observations, I develop three main points.
First, the posture of a technocratically neutral development campaign had
important effects. For the campaign'spromulgatorsand supporters,it made
disagreement and contention with the campaign's goals unthinkable, or
at least un-thought-of, and it emboldened them, while delegitimizing and
silencing resisting "beneficiaries"and other critics of the campaign, at least
in national public discourse.
Second,I highlight a remarkableaspect of the discoursesthroughwhich
OperationDress-Upwas articulated:the casting of "traditional"Maasaias the
noncontemporaneous "other,"in what I call developmentalist temporality.'
The result of this casting was that the campaignwas imbued with what one
might indeed call an eschatologicalhorizon, which critically underpinnedthe
sense of urgency,necessity, and legitimacy among its supporters.
Third, I ask about the political stakes, connected to postcolonial
nation-building,in this struggleover dress.I examine the paradoxicalpolitics
of a campaign that, on the one hand, was portrayedas staunchly anticolonial
and anti-imperialist, but on the other hand, seemed to take some of its basic
cues from apparentlyquite "Western"conceptions of what modernity does,
-I
and does not, look like.
p;
Before launching into this discussion, it should be pointed out what
this article does not aim to accomplish. Work done by anthropologists and 0
historians has documented the heterogeneity of the ways by which Maasai
have creatively engaged-sometimes to embrace, sometimes to reject-the
w
structures, problems, and opportunities with which the century-long efforts
a
to develop or "civilize" them have confronted them (e.g., Bruner 2001;
Galaty 2002; Hodgson 2001; Swantz 1995; Waller 1993). This literature z
reveals much heterogeneity within "the" Maasai community, and it shows 0

m
that, in the game of development and modernity, Maasai have neither been 0
I
passive pawns, nor merely "rejectionists." The focus of the present article, z

however, is on the world of Tanzanian developers and modernizers, and on

how Maasai appearin it. Given this focus, "the" Maasai may appearas rei-
fied group, not by virtue of what this study makes them out to be, but by
virtue of how they were cast in Operation Dress-Up. The focus is precisely
on analyzing "ways of 'seeing Maasai',not 'beingMaasai"'(Hodgson2001:6),
and on what this reveals about development and the politics of modernity
in postcolonial Tanzania.

Developing Maasai:
Operation Dress-Up and the Imperatives of Modern Attire

A rich literature critically examines development projects directed at Tan-

zanian Maasai (e.g., Anderson and Broch-Due 1999; Hodgson 1999a, 2000,
2001; Jacobs 1980; Parkipuny 1979; Rigby 1969b; Spear and Waller 1993).
It shows that key conceptions about Maasai that have often persisted from
early colonial into postcolonial times have contributed to a general lack
of lasting results that could be judged as positive by or for Maasai. So mis-
guided and so much a mismatch with Maasai aspirations have been many
attempts at developing them that it seems to many Maasai "that 'progress'
was to be equatedwith poverty and, thus, immaturity ratherthan wealth and
respectability" (Waller1993:246;see also Talle 1999:123).
Over time, economically focused development initiatives have been
especially marredby a deep disregardfor the requirements, in terms of geo-
graphical flexibility, of pastoral livestock keeping (see Hodgson 2000; and,
with particularreference to Tanzanianvillagization, Hodgson 1999a, 1999c,
 2001; Parkipuny1979; Saibull 1974). Neglect of small livestock, agricultural
production, and the role of women has also been detrimental (Hodgson
1999a, 1999c). Although some administratorsdeveloped an appreciationfor
Maasai's "greatskill as stock-breedersat a time when it was fashionable to
disparagepastoralists like the Maasai as obsolete relics of an earlierphase in
human history" (Tidrick 1980:25), such exceptions seem to have had little
impact on the overall design of development initiatives. Neither does the
creative, varied, and in some cases enthusiastic and successful engagement
by Maasai of the structures and opportunities that it imposed and offered
-I alter the general impression that "development" has producedfew positive
material results for Maasai (Anderson and Broch-Due 1999; Arhem 1984;
0
Galaty 2002; Hodgson 2000, 2001; Ndagala 1974; Waller 1993).
How "Maasai culture" figured in these processes changed over time.
0
Maasai interactions with colonial discursive, administrative, and material
matrices organizedaround "ethnicity" have tended to affix Maasai identity
to the image of the male herder and warrior (Hodgson 2001). In the early
a
twentieth century, this image evoked a certain appreciationamong colonial
administrators,who deemed Maasaiinferiorin "civilization" to themselves,
but still "nobler"than many other Africans.At that time, neighboringpeople
-I
zm also found it useful to assimilate to Maasai "identity" (see especially Waller
0
1993). After World War II, however, the colonial focus on the "preserva-
f
tion" (fixing)of Maasai identity gave way, as the administration's approach
switched to targeting Maasai "cultural conservatism" as an obstacle to
Maasai "development."
This new position of Maasai in the hierarchyof cultures persisted after
colonialism. After 1961, when Tanzania (Tanganyika)gained independence,
cultural campaigning against Maasai "traditions" intensified, indicating
a different cultural economy than had existed perhaps thirty years before.
Especially from the mid-1960s onward, many aspects of Maasai life were
thus targeted. "Traditional"Maasai houses, for instance, were singled out as
an area in need of "development" and "progress"(Parkipuny1979; Swantz
1995:229-230; Talle 1999:106), although such campaigning often ignored
excellent reasons for "traditional" designs (Arhem 1985:65; Rigby 1969a,
1977; Saibull 1974). The "modernization" of Maasai diet was another area
in which developers exhibited particularzeal, often inversely proportionate
to the degree with which "objective" reasons might have supported some
of their measures (Swantz 1995:233; for Kenya, see Knowles and Collett
1989:454).2 Seen as a whole, such "development"initiatives representa con-
certed campaign to shape Maasai into "modern"subjects of the postcolonial
nation. Operation Dress-Up was part of this effort.

OperationDress-Up:AHistoricalSketch

My account of Operation Dress-Up, a campaign concerned with reforming

Maasai clothing and bodycare,focuses on how its supportersconceived of it,
and how they justified it in public discourse. Forthis purpose,I drawheavily
on newspaper reporting on the campaign.3My main source for politicians'
statements, editorial comments, and letters to the editor is the Tanzanian
English-languagedaily The Nationalist, but I also occasionally draw on the
Swahili-languageUhuru, The Sunday-News, The Daily News, and The Stan-
dard.4The Nationalist and Uhuru were party-owned and party-controlled
and, next to the independent Standard and Ngurumo, the major dailies. In
early 1970, the government took over The Standard and the weekly Sunday
News. In April 1972, The Daily News emerged out of a merger of The Stan-
dard and The Nationalist. The government-controlled papers, with their
pl;
tight integration into the party apparatus,provide a revealing window into -I
"official"views, although, the space they, like the other papers,reservedfor
0
letters to the editor also became a forum for often lively public discussions.
A,
Press coverage,in both government-controlledand independentpapers,thus
gives an authentic picture of various sides of contemporarydebates, insofar, 0
at least, as these grabbedthe attention of those parts of the public, literate
and typically urban, who articulated their views in print.
Operation Dress-Up, in its early days also called the "Masai Progress z

Plan," saw its birth in November 1967 (Nationalist, 17 Feb. 1970), when 0

governmentstatements. .. describedcertainaspectsof Masai m

z
0
cultureas "ancient,unhealthycustoms",andthe Masaiwere
orderedto put on clothes, abandontribal rituals, and start
doing their share towards reaching Tanzania'sgoals. The
Masaiwere warnedto "dressin somethingbetterthan a dirty
sheet or meagreyardof cloth which exhibits your buttocks",
and a campaignwas begun to arrestMasaiwho ignoredsuch
injunctions.(Rigby1969b:49)

Little is known about the origins of the campaignwhose pitch would periodi-
cally sharpenand soften duringa lifetime that extended into the mid-1970s.5
It apparently originated in a ban on "the Masai mode of dress and the use
of red ochre" (Nationalist, 16 Feb. 1970), instituted by the Arusha Regional
Commissioner in concert with other politicians from the region, notably
including EdwardSokoine, Member of Parliament and prominent Maasai
politician.6 The campaign aimed at making the Maasai abandon "their
habit" of smearing their bodies with red ochre and getting them to put on
"properdress,"which above all meant for men to wear trousersinstead of the
"traditional"lubega, a kind of toga.
The campaign employed a range of methods to get Maasai to adopt
the desired fashion. These varied from "persuasion"(in effect, exhortations
by politicians) to a diverse set of more or less coercive sanctions. Top-
level politicians seem to have been content with issuing repeated public
statements and appeals. The Nationalist and other newspapers repeat-
edly reported on public enunciations of the campaign's goals by Arusha
Regional Commissioner Mwakang'ata(e.g., Nationalist 10 Dec. 1968, when
Mwakang'ata claimed to be acting on a direct mandate from Nyerere;
 17 Dec. 1968; 7 May 1969; 12 Nov. 1969; 7 March 1972) and Second Vice-
President Kawawa (Nationalist and Uhuru, 16 July 1969; Uhuru, 17 July
1969). In early 1968, Mwakang'atahad ochre pits sealed. The Nationalist of
14 March 1968 reported that, because the Regional Commissioner did not
like to arrest offenders outright, he had police officers take them to town
for an explanation of the policy and a reprimand.On 14 August 1971, The
Nationalist reportedthat red ochre tradershad been given a "last warning"
by the Masailand Area Commissioner before offenders would have "their
-Al
-l businesses confiscated and their licenses withdrawn." Already in late 1968,
pupils wearing the lubega were banned from schools (Nationalist, 17 Dec.
0-1 1968). In 1970, Maasaiwho had appliedred ochre to their bodies were barred
from participating in "national festivals" in Arusha (Ndagala 1992:51).The
government also threatened to deny "improperly"dressed Maasai medical
0m care, and it sanctioned their being denied access to bars, restaurants, and
public transport (Talle 1999:114, 116).
a Many details of the methods of enforcement were left to political
LI
authority on the ground. According to a chief justice of Tanzania, who
0
labeled this and similar campaigns "vestigial exercises of chiefly power,"
m
OperationDress-Up had "absolutely no legal standing" (quotedin Finucane
-I
n 1974:129).That there was therefore not always a clear line regardingdesir-
:>
able methods of implementation is well illustrated by an exchange from
Handeni District. A 1968 letter from the Handeni Area Commissioner urges
-r
all divisional officials to take action in respect to "Maasai Going Naked":
m
"It is imperative [lazima], I repeat again, imperative that all Maasai in your
divisions be ordered that they are not to be seen wandering about naked
but that they should instead wear normal clothes like other citizens."7 The
Area Commissioner's tone earnedhim a reprimandfrom the TangaRegional
Executive Secretary,who pointed out that, counter to an explicit directive
from Tangaregional headquarters,the Area Commissioner's letter had "left
the door open to the use of force or coercion [nguvu au ulazimisha i] that
had been ruled out."8
Some of these government-ordainedsanctions appearmerely to have
officially condoned already established practices:

My personal memories from Tanzania-then Tanganyika-

reach to the colonial time. There was a backbenchin the
public buses, separatedwith a wall from the rest of the bus,
for the Maasaito travelin. Since they dresseddifferently-or
ratherdidnot dresssufficientlyto covertheirnakedness-and
carriedtheir spearsandmacheteswith them[,]they were con-
sidereda different"race"and thus another class. Their red
ochre bodies were thought to smell[,]and their total appear-
ance arousedaversionin the rest of the passengers.(Swantz
1995:227;for similarobservationsfromthe postindependence
period,see Talle 1999:114)
Although some of its messages and methods were thus not new, Operation
Dress-Up did signify the transformation of unofficial discriminatory prac-
tices into an official, programmatic,and national "development" campaign,
which brought a broad set of pressures to bear on Maasai "offenders."

Development'sNeutrality

Nyerere's protestations that head this article of his and the state's value-
neutrality and technocratism vis-a-vis the Maasai are a useful backdropfor a
-I
discussion of the insertion of OperationDress-Up into broaderdiscourses of
p;
development that cast it as a technocratic and universally desirableexercise. 0I
According to Nyerere's portrayal, developing the Maasai was a matter of
objective issues, universally desirable goals, and technocratically necessary
interventions: the state engaged the Maasai through "development," and 0
thus not to ensure their "happiness"(recognizedas a subjective matter), but
to bring them "clean water."
Much in the same vein, The Nationalist's 6 April 1968 article "Cattle z
Ranching-Answer for Masailand" reported about the activities of the 0
r-
z
MasailandRangeDevelopment Commission, remarkingthat "[d]evelopment m
I
0
for the Masai is much more than a change in dress or the absence of
ochre," enumerating clean water, fat cattle, and education as other objec-
tives of development. About a year later, Arusha Regional Commissioner
Mwakang'ata toured Mbulu District and found that "[w]ith the establish-
ment of the Masailand Management Commission [a big economic develop-
ment project]the Masai were fast discardingtraditional habits and moving
to modern civilization.... The campaign to inform the Masai and fit them
into modern society was coming ahead" (Nationalist, 18 Feb. 1969).
Within this broader casting, the argument that Operation Dress-Up
was rooted in concerns about health, hygiene, and the eradication of pov-
erty, is noteworthy. Numerous contributions to The Nationalist highlighted
the hygienic-and thus presumably objective-rationale behind the cam-
paign. Maasai women, for instance, were denied access to medical facilities
because their bead-jewelrywas deemed to be unhygienic (Nationalist, 14 Feb.
1968). Around the same time, articles and letters to the editor called for the
"reconstruction"of Maasai dress "in accordancewith hygiene and progress"
(Nationalist, 17 Feb. 1968), complained that Maasai smelled because they
did not wash (Nationalist, 19 Feb. 1968),and-hailing OperationDress-Up-
demandedthat "the Masai must comply" because "[h]emust take partin the
eradicationof ignorance, disease and poverty" (Nationalist, 26 Feb. 1968).
A lack of hygiene of course immediately cried out for rectification.
This perceived imperative is perhaps most strikingly illustrated by the fol-
lowing letter to the editor, even though the writer suggests that the total
eradication of Maasai practices may not be necessary after all: "[T]heycan
certainly continue to do their hair style with red ochre but scientifically and
hygienically" (Standard, 16 Feb. 1968, quoted in Ivaska 1999:28).In seeking
 to eradicate,ratherthan merely sanitize,9"unhygienic and unscientific prac-
tices," the propagatorsof OperationDress-Up were less considerate than the
letter-writer, but they too legitimated their intervention by casting Maasai
practices in opposition to hygiene, science, and reason.
Numerous contributions in newspapers and public statements by
politicians emphasized that this development campaign-aimed at such uni-
versally shared goals as hygiene and the eradication of poverty-was for the
Maasai'sown good, and indeed welcomed by them. ReportedThe Nationalist
of 12 February1968: "PresidentNyerere has strongly condemned advocation
for leaving the Masai in their present stage of development and has declared
-A that the Government of Tanzania is committed 'to assist the Masai attain a
0
level of development equal to that of the rest of the people in the country."'
Edward Sokoine, prominent Maasai Member of Parliament, underscored
0
the President'sstatements a few days later, declaringthat "we decided to do
0
H
what was beneficial to our people and our coming generations. The changes
;z

proposed are to the advantage of the Masai" (Nationalist, 16 Feb. 1968). A

letter to the editor elaborated on the government's benevolently paternal
position, and the Maasai'spresumed appreciation:

IH I am convincedthat when the authoritysteppedon the Masai

customs, it neverreproachedthe Masaiforhavingbeen main-
z
00
taining them, neither was there any vindicationin doing so,
but what the authoritydid was that it obliged the Masai to
discardthe old customs for the benefit of themselves and for
the whole nation[,]realising that the Masai are our broth-
ers in the nation and are an integralpart of the nation who
enjoy equally the fruits of the nation and are treatedwith no
partiality.(Nationalist,22 Feb. 1968)

Given that the "Masai Progress Plan" was thus impartial, in the interest
of the Maasai, and based on good hygienic, scientific, objective reasons,
it is not surprising to find reports in the paper that the Maasai's "District
Council Backs Changes" and passed a supportive resolution (Nationalist,
14 March 1968). Similarly, in May 1969, Maasai elders were reported to
have "welcomed the old and the new moves by the Government to develop
and educate them" (Nationalist, 7 May 1969). The press coverage gives an
impression that agrees with The Nationalist's commentary of 9 February
1968: the "question of complaints about shaving or wearing trousers has
never at any time been raisedby the Masai as a problem towards which they
have any bitterness."
A picture of developmentalist harmony thus defined Tanzanianpublic
discourse surrounding the campaign. Even a lone voice, Ole Parkipuny's
comment on the campaign, run under the heading "The Masai: One Tribes-
man's View on a Complex Problem" in The Sunday News of 25 February
1968,10which was to some extent critical of the campaign,never questioned
its goals ("Itoo would only be too glad to see the Masai change their dress"),
and merely wondered whether force and ridicule were the best available
means. Yet, public discourse and the policy debateas reflectedin the national
press belie the fact that the campaign was all but uncontentious.

Maasai Receptions

The presence of serious sanctions against Maasai dress offenders indi-

cates that Operation Dress-Up cannot have been a campaign whose goals
were everybody's aspiration. Although critical Maasai opinions and acts
of defiance and resistance did not register in national public discourse and
p-
were, as can be seen from the above, actively denied, they were strong and
0
widespread. According to Corby Hatfield, when the ban on clothing was 0

reiterated, in March 1970, 0

m

a largenumberof women fromall overthe Southgot together

to curse the Masai leader of the community, who was also
Chairmanof the RanchingAssociation.Then they begancol- z
0
lecting money foran en masse tripto Dares Salaamto present
their complaintsto the President.The curse was eventually I
removed by a judicious slaughteringof a number of cattle m
z
0
and the women persuadednot to make the trip to Dar.In the
North,the nationalparliamentarian [Sokoine]was also cursed.
(Quotedin Hodgson2001:149)

Such strong reactions signify that many Maasai disagreedwith the reading
of their way of life as a "predicament"imposed on them by "poverty and
ignorance"; indeed, they embraced what Operation Dress-Up glossed as
their "traditional" practices as being preferableto what was presented as
"modern" ways. Their response often reflected good functional reasoning
and/or reasons of taste. Turning the arguments about hygiene back against
the developers, a Maasai elder, questioning the allegedly hygienic rationale
behind OperationDress-Up and the ban on red ochre, complainedto officials:
"we use red ochre to prevent the growth of lice. We have no water in our area.
How are we to avoid lice without water?" (Ndagala 1992:51).
Ratherthan offering an objective rationale for intervention, the devel-
opers' conception of "hygiene" appears to have been shaped by particular
images of what hygienic practices should look like. The salience of tastes
in shaping Operation Dress-Up is perhaps revealed most clearly by the fact
that negative images of the "other"were reciprocal:

The prejudicesagainstthe Maasaiin terms of their dirtiness

appearto carry little weight for the Maasai self-images;in
fact, they seem to be morepreoccupiedwith their own dislike
of others. As early as 1905, Hollis reportedthat the Maasai
thoughtthatpeoplefromthe coast stanklike "fowls"andthey
wouldnevergo nearthem or touch them if they couldavoidit.
 Thereare also stories of Maasaiwho openly hold their noses,
even vomit, when they get close to people who wash with
soap. They find the smell of perfumedsoap,in particularthe
brandRexona,detestable.(Talle1999:117)"

A similar point can be made about the glossing of the targetingof Maasaidress
as a move towarderadicatingpoverty.Why enforcinga dress code would help
eradicate poverty is a major unanswered question: would the Maasai's new
attire not have left them substantially as naked as the infamous emperor?
4)
0 But even the readingof Maasai dress as a sign of poverty appearserroneous,
-I at least as long as by "poverty"one means the absence of material means.
0
Such means were often available, and the Maasai'senthusiastic adoption of
i new blanket designs that appearedon the market in the 1970s shows that
these would also be mobilized toward acquiring desired consumer goods.
0
That Maasai "appearance and way of life .. . conjure images and fantasies
-.
of the 'poor"' (Talle 1999:115), despite their often ample wealth, indicates
that the meaning of poverty is a more complex construct than an "objec-
tive" measure of wealth. Consumption patterns and tastes with which the
labeler could not identify were a crucial part of what would be counted as
-Hi

z
m
signifying "poverty." It appears that "traditional" Maasai dress signified
0
"poverty" to many non-Maasai because they could not imagine it to be
desirable:if one had the means to get out of the lubega, the reasoning must
I have run, one would certainly do so. That Maasai elders "voice an intense
dislike of modern clothes, such as shorts and trousers"because "[t]heyfind
them impractical,uncomfortableand unaesthetic" (Talle 1999:116-117)was
not acknowledged, nor could "traditional"dress be recognized as a prefer-
ence, being interpretedinstead as a sign of poverty and destitution. (A study
of the social and historical formation of such "traditional"tastes would be
fascinating, as would be to ask more probing questions about the processes
that made some Maasai ardent proponents, and others, such as the modern-
izing MP Sokoine, detractorsof such tastes. How such processes were forged
in the dialectical politics of "modernity" and "tradition,"also intersecting
with gender and generation, has been laid out by Ranger(1983). Hay (2004)
presents a fascinating case study on the issue of dress in Kenya,and Hodgson
(2001) traces out the politics of (self)image-makingin the interplay of the
Tanzanian state and Maasai. Here, however, the focus will remain on how
Tanzaniandevelopers failed to talk about tastes, as they subsumed the issue
of Maasai dress under the discourse of development.)

Symbolsof Backwardness
andan Imageof Development
The Maasai rejection of "modern" dress and bodycare indicates that this
development campaign, contrary to its self-image, was not founded on
"objective," value-neutral practicality: instead, it was based on a particular
way of seeing and judging-a discourse in which Maasai were a symbol of
"backwardness."Concepts such as "hygiene"and "poverty"were embedded
 within this universe of meaning; they did not "objectively"stand outside it.
Despite the idiom of "development," suggesting technocratic neutrality, in
which OperationDress-Up was couched, this was a campaign for a partisan
visual-aesthetic order.The fact that the press repeatedlyused visual propsin
its reportingon the campaign is thus by no means coincidental: the image
of the Maasai, and what it representedto modern elites in postindependence
Tanzania,occupied center stage in the campaign.
This image mattered enough for a picture of a young Maasai warrior
carrying a spear to be dropped from the 100-shilling note in early 1969,
to be replaced with a picture of two lions. The Nationalist of 13 March
1969 commented on the occasion: "Time changes and man changes with 0
it. The former Masai ... is gone[,] and the Masai is now fully partaking in
the development of Arusha." One could not invent a more telling illustra-
tion of the salience of the image: dress "him" up and the "formerMasai is za
gone"-replaced by a new, development-minded incarnation. C'
0
And dress up "he" did: on 16 July 1969, Uhuru reported on a speech z
in Parliamentby Second Vice-PresidentKawawa,in which he again promul-
gated the campaign. The next day, a front-pagepiece with two photographs
followed up this story.

ZDT MUM77
SIKU I~ ~ .Iw w : .
~~~~~~~~~~~. - ; 7 7.

51K~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*
h up NM*

RPT gm Pmbe bW1

_U~~~~~~~~~~N li Ed sa

YA _ DAR 15 SALkA

TUM--ENJE. A_ 1.WWVA
ft"".-
_

vyeiWXtoue
Ieluwwiw
37. .7..7. 7h 777777

J t _3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
7.., 7777 .77777 _7 L7 - ...

.77W77777
77. Ri7wi
77. 7si 7..3. ix.1 . . ye7s
7d* i

W7 Y. I7I.-7.7.7M ks -7.- 777777.777777

7 777 s .77_

4110".q.ft kW77777
7. Wik 1.7777
&,-*h
777 EU77737777777777 p^5 7& rc 7 s 7.77#-..7
77.t '77..I ^
_
_
.
,At Y.$b Ijh-l bk. K.i lUL
77.7 Ilhl 77K.7 7.777.77.7 747777s .t 7777777-7_-
,s
114>SS"

77771wiw
N1.77.7 - 7.r 777, |
77777 k*77 ..
77 a.777 . ...7. . i.- . - .;I.,,

W.W3. Wan Y* MAetuer\*Jr

%.
Wa ^ u Y!h.
ttdi 7.777.i757T77777
A. S77 477 777 :777.77 7117-
77 -77
7 .7777,7.

Nd7.W
77777.7 7 .77.
7777.7.
y77.77 fa a say. _u 7:.,A.7 7777777777777
ie. _. 777~: _-4. 7, _ _
t? kll R7t7
734 77777 777 4 7

_ EwkXtisiZi v- mtup t:W* I #is t-. i t;wlf

-~~~~ ;_UWd S*wl- k1

_. t_777.7 7777 77 777.

l e S*&qIF
H9E.

- *
Z .-
TW.
mEeyy:
7577 77777.77R.7
"Mf,.,
77777777777-77t;
777,
*$aXg^!'*
7 .. 777, 7777774
Sio
! Y dm F. iT
U0
|_o>|i
iirY$uee, 40.. ............ZAAAav.- N......

wsto'Lns
1 sb>fs at ls*g 1s s ti.S, a L*l t _ * YOU
i - _ g
F.-w tsou 16is Wun1Z
/^9
Sbs NfAttIes
a i -wkylr1*_-w_

Mr.Kilasia: b~~~~~~~~Wj
A Before and Afte~~~~~~~'R.W"
Shot Vk Y4WSe lli Iwadhi ltA. * r -.0k.
. , -obw#
oo*+L

Mr. Kilasia: A Before and After Shot

 From when he was little until he came here yesterday on
Monday,Mr.Kilasiawouldalwayswearthe traditionalMaasai
robes[mavazi ya kiasli ya Wamasai] that make them wander
aroundhalf-naked.After coming to Dar es Salaamyesterday
andhearingthe invitationgiven by the SecondVice-President
Mr. Kawawabeseechingthe Maasaito wear modernclothes,
he went to buy forhimself a shirt, trousers,a belt anda tie. In
the pictureMr.Kilasia(left)canbe seen in lubega robesandon
the rightdressedin his new clothes. (Uhuru 17 July 1969)
-I

By shedding his old clothes, Mr. Kilasia had shed the past, and he had begun
0
to "embody" the developed modernity that Tanzanian elites imagined for
him (Allman 2004a; Burgess 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, 1997;
P
m Martin 1994).

Modern Times: Being in Developmentalist Temporality

The Maasai's Pastness

z
m
0
us
The meaning of the Maasai's image to the promoters and supportersof the
campaign was a function of what one might call an "aesthetic economy,"
I a specific historical phenomenon, manifest in this form neither in early
colonial nor in "indigenous" reactions to Maasai visual appearances(Hodg-
son 2001; Waller 1993: the fact that what had become, in the period under
discussion, the liability of "traditional" Maasai looks can today again be
an asset, further underlined this economy's historical contingency).12 Here,
however, the concern is not with a diachronic analysis of this economy's
genesis, but with some central components of its architecture, its workings,
and its political effects.
As discussed above, discursively transposingaesthetic judgmentsonto
the terrain of value-neutral and technocratic development was a key aspect
of how this economy operated;its deployment of a developmentalist tem-
porality was another. It is useful here to pick up Nyerere's train of thought
where we left it in the quote that heads this article:

It's 1964for everybodyin the world,including the Masai,and

the pressurefor all to live in 1964, including the Masai, is
fantastic.... In the twelfth century ... this problemperhaps
would not have been formidable.But today the standardof
living in the United States of Americais partof Tanganyika.
SometimesI wish I could put Tanganyikaon anotherplanet.
Then we could give it a hundredyears to catch up. But we
can't do that, we can't isolate ourselves. (Quotedin Smith
1981:12)
The question, forced by this passage, of the connection between the Tan-
zanian leadership's vision of modernity and "Western"modernity will be
investigated below. The present section examines how the campaign to
"develop" the Maasai was inscribed into the binary modernity versus tra-
dition, which underlies the pressure Nyerere here feels to ensure that the
Maasai live in the present.
Maasai have for long been an icon of development's and modernity's
other. Hinting at a long history of this othering, Rigby notes: "The very lan-
guage of development is imposed upon a people, who are assumed to occupy
a place, a time, a form separate from, and even antagonistic to, those of the
planners of 'progress"'(1969a:229).Hodgson emphasizes the persistence of 0
such thinking in postindependence Tanzania:"The African elite who took
power embraced the modernist narrative with its agenda of progress. For
them, the Maasai represented all they had tried to leave behind, and per- z
sisted as icons of the primitive, the savage, the past" (1999a:225).Maasai n
I
pastoralism was a particularly central building block in the foundation of
such contentions. To Tanzania's developers, it suggested that the Maasai's
was an obsolete way of life that stood against the current of history. Swantz
aptly summarizes the most pervasive referents of this conception of Maasai z
as modernity's other:

Pastoralistswerebackwardandprimitivepeoplewho resisted
change and evaded education.They pridedthemselves irra-
tionally on largeherdsof cattle[,]thus endangeringtheir own
livelihood in times of droughtor by having erodedtheir pas-
tures.Theirnomadicmode of life, unhealthyhouse building-
style, one-sided diet, semi-nakednessand unwillingness to
settle and cultivate bore evidenceto their resistancetowards
all mannerof modernizationand to the necessity of bringing
developmentto the pastoralists.(1995:228)

Such conceptions also structured public discourse surrounding Opera-

tion Dress-Up. We have already encountered The Nationalist gloss on the
"formerMasai's" disappearancefrom the 100-shilling bill: it is an excellent
example of the essentialization of Maasai as defined by their "pastness."
Similarly, numerous statements by politicians, letters to the editor, and
regular contributions to The Nationalist cast the issue of Maasai modes of
dress in terms of modernity versus tradition, and present versus past. Such
a temporalized notion of differenceappearsto dominate, subsume, and erase
all other forms of difference:all "traditions,"including those of the Maasai,
were essentially alike, bound together by their common "pastness"(this, we
know, is not an uncommon move in modernizing discourses).'3Comments
a letter to the editor: "every tribe has or had its customs more or less like
those of the Masai. But since other tribes were quick to see the modernizing
torch before them, they discarded them" (Nationalist, 22 Feb. 1968), and
 a letter to the editor of The Standard of 22 October 1968 makes the same
claim: "At one time the Europeanswere also dressed as the Masais now"
(quoted in Ivaska 1999:29).
This temporalotheringof the Maasaiis clearly reflectedin the ubiquity
of the tropes of the "museum" and "preservation"in the public discourse
surrounding Operation Dress-Up. On 11 September 1968, The Nationalist
reported that Nyerere had told a mass rally at Monduli that human beings
could not be preservedlike animals in a zoo. Member of ParliamentSokoine
could similarly "see no reason why 'I should accept my people as museum
pieces of an extinct people"' (Nationalist, 16 Feb. 1968). B. B. Mbakileki, of
-I the University of Dar es Salaam, concurred in a letter to the editor, which
0
a warned against "turning any one section of our society into a museum of
traditional culture. Museums are not made up of men" (Nationalist, 17 Feb.
1968). And a reportfrom Kenya carriedby The Nationalist on 10 November
1970 conjures up a telling image: there is a profound-and surely intended-
-I
symbolism to the reporton a "numberof young Masai" who "decidedto cut
off their red ochre daubedhair and send it to the museum." Maasaipractices
thus had no place in the contemporaryworld-except, of course, literally in
m
a museum, the place where things rest outside the current of time and life.
z It is not at all coincidental that there was, during this time of intense
construction on the edifice of the modern nation, a general move to banish
n and segregate from lived experience "traditions" that did not fit into an
m

I image of modernity. The "village museum" Makumbusho, at the periphery

of Dar es Salaam, conceived in the early 1970s, is a good example (Mbug-
huni 1974; for examples from Kenya, see Bruner2001). Here can be found,
physically taken out of everyday life, "traditional"housing designs, which
the Tanzanianstate was actively combating as outdated and to be overcome,
not least through its grand project of villagization (Schneider 2003, 2004).
The same logic underlies Second Vice-PresidentKawawaadvising "villagers
who moved into modern permanent houses not to demolish all the 'misonge
houses.' He said: 'Some of these houses must be preserved and kept as a
sort of museum for the benefit of future generations"' (Nationalist, 21 Mar.
1969). The "museumization" of traditions, physically and rhetorically, was
an exercise in boundarycreation-and a statement that such traditions had
no other place in modern life.
The temporalization of difference we see at work in Operation Dress-
Up ensued in a categorical denial that Maasai practices had coeval contem-
poraneity and legitimacy in today's world (see Fabian 1983). An editorial
provides an apt illustration of what can appropriatelybe called the eschato-
logical expectation, directed at the Maasai, arising within developmentalist
temporality:

As we develop[,]we must partwith old ways and evolve new

ideas, thereby creatingnew values, and new men-men of
today and tomorrowand not men of yesterdayand the day
before.... Herein Tanzania,the Masaiis a consciousrevolu-
 tionaryman of tomorrow.He has nothing to lose but exploi-
tation and degradation.His inevitable victory is progress.
(Nationalist, 10 Feb. 1968)

Similarly, an administratorof the Masailand Ranching Association saw his

task in these terms: "Weare trying to take the Masai from the Stone Age to
the Atomic Age" (Nationalist, 6 Apr. 1968). Even Parkipuny'ssympathetic
take on the question of Maasai dress had to admit that Maasai ways were
ways of the past, and would therefore have to yield:

[TiheMasaiup to this moment, considertheirtribalcultureto

be comparableto any one of the civilised societies. They are
not simply resistantto "civilisingforces"as they areso often
condemnedby those who utterly fail to understandthem.
They are a strong-willedpeople who regardthemselves as a
nation, and who are fully dedicatedto the perpetuationof a
culture they considermeaningful.It is only too sad that this z
-.

will-powerhas built up at the wrongpoint andplace[,]i.e.[,]at

the triballevel and in a cultureonly seekingto survivein the m

I
wrongcentury.(Sunday News, 25 Feb. 1968) z

Their essential pastness, then, already determined the future of Maasai

practices: they would have to give way, as Maasai left behind their state of
noncontemporaneous contemporaneity. Koselleck's notion of "asymmetric
counterconcepts" is apropos here. The opposition of traditional Maasai
versus developed modern was constructed in a way that closely mirrors
Koselleck's portrayal of the counterconceptual construction of Heathen
versus Christian: "All the existing peoples-Hellenes, ethnai, gentes, and so
forth-who became definedin a Christianperspectiveas 'Heathens,'gentiles,
or pagani,belong .. . to the past" (1985:176).As with the dynamics in 1960s
Tanzania, this temporalization of difference carried critical implications:
"Expressedtemporally, the Heathen was 'not yet' a Christian.... Thus the
eschatological horizon contained a processual moment in the arrangement
of the counterconcepts which was capable of unleashing a greaterdynamic
than that inhering in the ancient counterconcepts" (Koselleck 1985:182),
"a dynamic which negates the existing Other" (Koselleck 1985:165).Draw-
ing on Fabian's (1983:2) classic examination of how anthropology makes
its object through the deployment of temporary concepts, we see here an
"oppressiveuse of time" through the "denial of coevalness."

PoliticalEffects

The casting of "traditional"Maasaipractices and dress as signs of seemingly

"objective" problems (poverty,hygiene) and relics of "the past" had impor-
tant political effects. At base, "developing"the Maasai involved an attempt
to transform their "deviant" tastes (a thankless task, as an administrator
 of the MasailandRanchDevelopment Commission lamented in The Nation-
alist of 6 April 1968: "It is relatively easy to show the Masai how to make
money, but it is not so easy to teach them to want money"). But to the
promoters and supporters of the campaign, the "modern," urban Tanzani-
ans who constituted the political leadership and the public audible in the
national press, this was not a project that pitted their particular concep-
tion of a modern (and thus good) life against another, which might have
been equally valid. They alone were the bearers of modernity, an aspira-
tion for which, by virtue of its association with "objective"goods (poverty
-I
alleviation, hygiene), of course had to be universally shared.
The political effects of this discursive structuration may be illus-
0 trated by juxtaposing Operation Dress-Up with Operation Vijana (Opera-
tion Youth), a similar campaign, which aimed at making another section of
Tanzania's citizenry, urban youth, comply with standards of proper dress.
Both campaigns can be seen as part of the Tanzaniangovernment's attempt
I-A

m
to foster socialist sobriety, self-discipline, and work ethics, also in the
I
q
realm of a visual, "textilian" order (Burgess2002, 2005; Ivaska 2003). But
not all deviance from this project was constructed equal, and thus the two
campaigns took very different shapes.
Ln
m
Operation Dress-Up, subsumed under a discourse of developmental
value-neutrality and universally shared aspirations, and structured by the
0
dynamicized binary of tradition versus modernity, dealt an inferior hand
I to any argument that would have attempted to defend Maasai "traditions."
Cast as it was, legitimate disagreement with the campaign appearedalmost
unthinkable; as Bergerhas put it, "[riesistancesto development are almost
by definition, the actions of ignorant or superstitious people, who do not
properlyunderstandtheir own interests" (1974:180).This casting, combined
with their spatially and socially peripheral position in Tanzanian society,
conspired to produce an almost total silencing of actual Maasai disagree-
ment with, and contestation of, the government's project in the public
discussion as it played out in newspaperreporting,political statements, and
commentary.
This stands in sharp contrast with Operation Vijana,initiated by the
TANU Youth League (the sometimes militant branch of the single party)in
early October 1968. This campaign attempted to enforce a ban on "unbe-
coming and decadent" fashions-such as miniskirts, tight trousers, and
wigs-that were spreadingpredominantly among urbanyouth (Ivaska2002;
on a similar campaign in revolutionaryZanzibar,see Burgess2002, 2005; on
Zambia, see TranbergHansen 2004). Unlike Operation Dress-Up, however,
Operation Vijana could be, and was, forcefully contested within, and not
largely without, national public discourse. This difference was at least in
part a function of the different discursive strategies and interpretative grids
available to the differentparties to these debates. They thereforepoint us to
the political effects of the discursive positioning of Maasai "traditions"in
Tanzanian national discourses of development and modernity.
 Ivaska (2002), on whose account the following paragraphsdraw, sur-
veys the 111 letters to the editor related to OperationVijanaprintedin Octo-
ber 1968 in Tanzania's independent daily The Standard and finds that the
vast majority spoke out against the ban.'4With The Nationalist's coverage
generally more supportive,"5there unfolded in the pages of the Tanzanian
press a spiritedpublic debate on the merits and demerits of OperationVijana.
A central feature in this debate was the starkly divergentviews on the mean-
ing of modernity and its connection to dress. Many of the mostly young
urbanletter-writers expressed their view that miniskirts connected them to A)
broad,cosmopolitan currents of modern fashions and lifestyles. Members of ~-t
the Youth League and several editorials took a different stance, and argued
0
that such dress was the product of Western decadence, and thus contraryto
a Tanzanian conception of modernity as socialist and centered on the goal -4

of national development. On this count, The Nationalist of 3 October 1968,

for instance, referredto Youth Leagueactivists involved in OperationVijana
as the "shock troopersof socialist construction in Tanzania."
This lively debate demonstrates that critical letter-writers were suc- z
cessful in publicly and directly contesting the government's vision of a
visual modernity for Tanzanian youth. Critics at least partially succeeded 0
I
in recruiting the concept of modernity in support of their visions. Con- m
z

tributions grappledwith a wide variety of questions, such as the limits of

individual rights, the problem of defining a society's values, and the proper
scope of enforcement (Ivaska2002; and e.g., Nationalist, 11 Oct. 1968 and
14 Oct. 1968). There were also discussions about the meaning of Tanzanian
and African culture in postcolonial times (Ivaska2002; and e.g., Nationalist,
21 Oct. 1968, 29 Oct. 1968, and 1 Jan. 1969).As in OperationDress-Up, sup-
porters of Operation Vijanaattempted to legitimate their case by reference
to objective criteria: but the argument that the wearing of miniskirts and
tight trousers was "both uncomfortable and unhygienic" was peripheralin
a debate in which much that was contestable was indeed contested.
The fact that, by contrast, dissenting Maasai voices were ignored and
silenced in the public discourse about OperationDress-Up was partly a func-
tion of a lack of access of the geographically and in other ways peripheral
Maasai to the news media, but those who opposedOperationVijanawere not
just advantagedbecause of their education and easier access: crucially, they
could contest the campaign on its own terms, staking their own, different
claim on modernity. Perhapstheirs was a decadent, "nonsocialist" moder-
nity, one that did not accord with the official notion of the new socialist
Tanzanian man, but these kinds of differences still had to be engaged with
on a more or less level playing field. Urban youths could not be ignored as
voices from the past in a hierarchically temporalized discourse: they were
not, already and on so many levels, defined as modernity's other. They
invoked a right to choose one's dress against OperationVijana-"The ques-
tion of dress is a personal liberty. Everybodyhas the right to wear whatever
he thinks presentable" (letter to the editor of The Standard, 11 Oct. 1968,
 quoted in Ivaska 1999:33)-but the possibility that such a right could be
invoked against Operation Dress-Up was not entertained in public dis-
course. As the chairman of the University Students' African Revolutionary
Front dismissingly remarked:"[Foreigncritics of Operation Dress-Up] talk
of 'freedom of dress and individuality.' What they mean is that the Masai
has got not only the right to be naked but also the freedom not to wash-to
smell" (Nationalist, 19 Feb. 1968). It similarly appearedconsistent for B. B.
Mbakileki, of the University of Dar es Salaam, to invoke the discourse of
equality and respect for all people in support of a campaign that appeared
-I
deeply disrespectful of Maasai choices: "the issue of the Masai dress bears
pO
very much on our avowed goals of human equality (in any sense you take
0
it), human dignity and respect for all men" (Nationalist, 17 Feb. 1968).
p
i) Along the same lines, a favorable comment on the Tanzanian campaign,
attributed to the speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, cast the campaign as
being in harmony with ideals of equality and democracy: "the Masai must
be developed and not be left as museum pieces. They are human beings and
Im
are fully entitled to development like any other tribe in Kenya. He declared:
'The government must up-hold the principles of democracy at whatever
cost"' (Nationalist, 2 Mar. 19681.
z
Such claims in the name of equality, human dignity, democracy, and
m
the rights of man not only masked the exclusionary nature of the campaign,
but also cast potential and actual criticism as necessarily illegitimate: in
0
I developmentalist times, "human rights" essentially became the right to
m
V)
behave in modern ways. As relics of the "Stone Age," as "museum pieces,"
Maasai were disqualified from having a legitimate alternative vision of their
present-and their future.
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the broaderimplica-
tions of this casting of rights, democracy, and equality, but what we see in
OperationDress-Up has echoes in the texture of the developmentalist state's
authoritariantendencies, in Tanzaniaand elsewhere. These tendencies were
prompted and legitimated by a political imagination in which the state was
the bringerof the neutral and universal good of "development,"and a "back-
ward"population was disqualifiedfrom having valid opinions on what shape
such "progress"should take and through what means it ought to be attained
(Schneider2004, 2006). Although the encounter of the state and the Maasai
may thus be seen as a particularinstance of this broaderphenomenon, it has
to be counted as an extreme case. An importantreasonfor this, I suggest,were
the campaign'simmediate, and indeed visceral, underpinnings."Premodern"
Maasai dress spoke to campaign supporterswith especially self-evidentiary
urgency:this is Bourdieu's"visceral intolerance ('sick-making')of the tastes
of others" (1984:56)through which taste makes its distinction. Simply put,
no one could argue with the naturalized categories and judgments in the
developers' aesthetic economy of "premodern" looks, "bad" smell, and
"hygiene." In this context, Miller's comment on George Orwell's imagina-
tion serves as a useful gloss on some of the roots of democratic deficits,
exemplified by Operation Dress-Up, in postindependence Tanzania:
 There will always be classes, he [Orwell]feels, as long as a
groupinsists on living in a way that will objectivelyoffend
even those sympathetic to it. Classlessness, socialist equal-
ity, must dependon eliminatingthe conditionof this kind of
social disgust.Classes held in place by disgustwill be imme-
diatelyrestoredby disgustunless peoplelike the Brookersare
civilized and cleanedup. (1997:249)

Tanzanian Visions of Modernity: Revolutionary, Yet Derivative?

p-
n
00
The visceral underpinnings and discursive castings of Operation Dress-Up,
and the political claims they mobilized, arewell illustrated in the campaign's
(re)presentationin a full-pagefeature, "Focuson the Maasai,"printed in The
aID
Nationalist on 26 February 1968.16Again, a reference to "the eradication
of ignorance, disease and poverty" frames the Maasai's "modernization"
m
in a discourse of technocratic and universal goals, and again the strong z

iconographic dimension of the modernity that Tanzanian "modern" elites m

envisioned for Maasai is palpable, putting the paper in a position to let, as Ul)

the writer puts it, these pictures of "progress"(and of course its absence) z

"speak for themselves." m

The Masai must be transformedinto a revolutionaryman of

tomorrow.This processhas begunto take shapeas canbe seen
in our picturesunderwhich speakfor themselves.The Masai
must progressand progressquickly.He must look like these
[pictured]NationalServiceyoungMasaiMoran.He must take
partin the eradicationof ignorance,diseaseandpoverty.'7

A final issue for discussion forced by these representationsis that in certain

critical respects Tanzanian conceptions of what modernity had to look like
appearedto echo certain basic suppositions of a distinctly "Western"image
of modernity. Despite Nyerere's ruminations about catching up to the West
(quoted above), Tanzanian modernization, "socialist" and "self-reliant" as
it aimed to be, was not an indiscriminate embrace and wholesale imitation
of the experience of the West. Yet, a connection clearly existed, if in compli-
cated, conflicted, and oftentimes quite paradoxicalways. What was-what
could be-the shape of an "alternative"Tanzanianmodernity in postcolonial
times?
The tight intertwining of talk about development and modernity with
discourses of revolutionary socialism and postcolonial nation-building sug-
gests a radical rejection of "the West" as a guiding image. Indeed, such a
rejection seems to be reflected in how the criticisms of OperationDress-Up,
invariably portrayedas coming from abroad,that were noticeable in public
discourse were addressed.The press and politicians vigorously defended the
campaign against "some aggressive reaction from people across the border
 .-THE NATIONARAI.
ST-^ z

sNO.0e-ss!
i 34 E O- N. THEM Z
BRM. ON=
sS.d plKp of ft
"
hx
tt->
syKl . . efer . _
m-Wt{lv_ x bo
. ,s.m,
eustArdF sl d, o~ MM4i CO t.:Ffou

ftiti.h i#6 # ddeil I& IAW -f sl-ht'l O s-wWr s

%fy tit*
bP aoeewpk i C.U Ib ffit 1i*eu itf rS Al- 1' 'L

t t.. wgwiolsF x;. e "L 'sj.t,ol_

All . i_ ftt Imm C4l f&l hsfil r1elows~;c*t _:_

h'i.A doft
7dy .u -P *tisfut Sds2&
ptr.

Uv4 Wwk
ibe: .r _ a w [ c.bor,o > < -o
h 4;,rdtf <r8
rJwh itxr oFm:

p;
-I. a:- l.o.iiiiiIa* _w Uf ftwr: aAk .,s?s _ --.

_wt 1-jp t 4 * 0 # . l0s

~~~~q.A"s
2ftR#sdi>we/f

0 r_fB _ v _ dr:el?da .eC?

fA. hh,> h-Esglt j
?r .shXu.s. . s w i_*_Hw
Ehat
tAl2--iS-4,. 5My g :f flttEii11r_-

0
_ _dhfS CpfUS wWrI _ ....
.......
xterixMit A'... p- - J " 'd
.- ......-.....O. ^ d
I P-ts wwkft b _

;-.
-

i-4.. -
dog.. U_
b-.br \tI Wh .-/ d. tom mom

t% t,2 it StEf _. _tS, i l 4jl .Y_

.+
Wotb\ Wi _ mr tpb
1. -. to .A:l
iftl
ft,jF ksuOsZ7. h**d - $N
C'
z ., s. 1" IV wk
b th. sv

-4 -o -a E
tIs. iSd ". -- ti-

m
w.W 1 . aodt. Tkav_. f| 49_ -4Jv
" , _
Tgan.
.y -" , -j
n rbsaw
?si .#,W * i /

eS1 I&l!_lbt_ ."

Uh , :. 4 --
t. a b" Dant "2k

I
m
6I b_.; .d*, Ilk W . .

-vkzw M-.
'Ma - 'so
i 'ol Tog
wh
Tw

"Fcu onteM si
and as far afield as the United States and Germany" (Nationalist, 17 Feb.
1970), and it is worth paying attention to how such arguments were framed.
A good example was a protractedcross-borderexchange between two Kenyan
MPs, Oloitiptip and Keen, and voices in the Tanzanianpress. In response to
statements in which he had criticized Operation Dress-Up, Oloitiptip was
told by a "Pressman'sCommentary" in The Nationalist of 9 Februarythat
"people, particularly the Masai, must postpone taking him seriously until
such time that he abandons his western suits and takes to going to Parlia-
ment and his Ministerial [Office] in the Masai traditional undress he so
piously advocates for others." His colleague, Keen, threatenedto take up the AI

challenge:on 10 February,The Nationalist reportedthat Keenhad stated that 0

Tanzaniawas "terrorizingthe Masai,"and that he was contemplatingattend-
ing the next meeting of the East African Legislative Assembly at Arusha
daubed in red ochre. Two weeks later, the full-page "Focus on the Masai"
(reproducedabove) included mug-shots of the two Kenyan offendersin their
I
"typical bourgeoisie attire": "Whatthe two gentlemen have told the world, a

which is clearly nothing but reactionary and representative of colonialist z

interests, boils down to this: that the Masai must be left as he is seen in our m
m
picture[,] ... namely in his traditional dress, complete with ochre, a spear,
a simi [knife]and without progress."Luckily, "[t]herevolutionary people of m

Tanzaniahave dismissed the vituperationof the two gentlemen as hogwash"

(Nationalist, 26 Feb. 1968).
From the vantage point of Tanzania's postcolonial leadership and
elites, criticism from abroadwas deeply suspect, reflecting a series of con-
cerns not unique to Tanzania. Even nonpreservationist anthropological
interest in "nonmodern"ways of life was often "regardedas ephemeral to
the overwhelming need to bring about change, or as an intellectual justifica-
tion of the forces of colonialist oppressors[,]whose concern it was to keep
remote and ruralareasin a backwardand impoverished state" (Harries-Jones
1972:101). Such thinking was prominent in Tanzanian public discourse
around OperationDress-Up, where criticisms were generally representedas
an "imperialist conspiracy to turn the Masai against their own government"
(Nationalist, 15 Mar. 1968). Surmises a letter to the editor:"The cause of the
local reactionaries and the foreign capitalists is one: to exploit the African
masses" (Nationalist, 19 Feb. 1968). Often, such "reactionary"agendaswere
perceived to be a direct continuation of an earlier, colonial production of
backwardness-and the exploitation connected to it. A statement by Sokoine
illustrates this thinking well:

Those hypocriteswho pretendto love the Masai but only if

they [theMasai]arepreservedto satisfy their touristicdesires
can no longer fool us. ... They are the people who placed
Africa under slavery.They partitionedour continent under
different colonial masters. They are the same people who
burnt the Masai bomas [homesteads],[and]shot cattle and
human beings to move them from their best grazinglands
 for their own occupation.It is they who wanted to delay our
independencebecause they alleged other tribes were savage
anduneducated.(Nationalist, 16 Feb. 1968)

Nyerere, too, objected to the "preservationof traditions,"which, as Sokoine

rightly suggests, colonial regimes liked to enlist as a justification for continu-
ing oppressive rule. A churchman recollects about the President'sthinking:
"He had no sympathy for the way the British had romanticized the Masai,
and he said that the Masai would have to develop, like everybody else.
P
C-) 'They're going to have to fall in line"' (quoted in Smith 1981:58). Opera-
-4 tion Dress-Up, then, arose amid these historically specific political urgen-
0 cies. "Backwardness"had in the past justified inaction, oppression, and
exploitation-and not least for this reason it had to be overcome.
I
The upshot, however, of this emancipatory undertaking-manifest
in Operation Dress-Up as well as in other "modernizing"campaigns of the
postcolonial Tanzanianstate, villagization being the most notable of them-
m was a demandfor "backward"Maasai,or, as in the case of villagization, peas-
ants, to "fall in line" (see Schneider2004). Development, modernization,and
Ul)
progress-pursued to overcome a colonial past of exploitation, paternalism,
0
z
and domination-thus justified new forms of paternalism and coercion. As
D
m
Ferguson(19991and Cooper (1997)have persuasively argued,current enthu-
siasm for abandoning the project of development, modernity, and progress
has deeply problematicconsequences (see Nyerere'sconcern with all too real
m
material global inequalities), but the problematic politics that this project
has often given rise to must at the same time not be ignored.
A close look at Tanzanians' engagement with colonial oppressorsand
their neocolonial successors reveals paradoxes,and not just on the level of
the concrete results of "fighting past oppression."It is indeed hard to avoid
the conclusion that at the foundation of the "revolutionary"project of mod-
ernization lay ways of assessing what was to be counted as "modern" and
what as "backward"that postcolonial Tanzanianelites sharedwith the colo-
nialists and Western imperialists they so vehemently positioned themselves
against (Keesing 1994; Rowlands 1995). Nothing, of course, would seem
furtherfrom such a convergence than the position expressed,for instance, in
the letter to the editor of The Nationalist by the chairman of the University
Students' African Revolutionary Front:

[T]heneurotic,decadentimperialistswant the maintenanceof

the status quobecauseby lookingat the nakedMasai... they
are able to assuage the caustic attacks of neurosis resulting
from the general decadence of the capitalist society. .. . The
imperialistswant the Masaito go nakedbecausethey fearhim
in militaryuniform.(Nationalist, 19 Feb. 1968)

Nyerere, too, distanced himself from the imperialist-touristgaze: "Mwalimu

... pointed out that ideas of leaving the Masai remain in their present stage
of development were of foreignerswho wished to see the Masai look funny
so that they could take their pictures" (Nationalist, 12 Feb. 1968).
And yet: it seems to be precisely this gaze's way of reading the world
that provided the judgmental basis for Operation Dress-Up. Both the tour-
ist/imperialist, who was accused of wanting to preserveMaasai "traditions,"
and modernizing Tanzanians, who sought to overcome these "traditions,"
saw a "backward"people, rightfully subject to (condescending)curiosity or,
as the case may be, coercive (andcondescending)modernization campaigns.
Contrary to what their pronouncements might lead one to believe, the
-I
Tanzanian modernizers' engagement with the figures of the tourist and the
p;
Western imperialist thus appearsto be highly ambivalent. 0
The President'sexhortations directedat the Maasaiofferan illustration oc
of this double move, positioning oneself starkly against the Western gaze
while sharing, or at least catering to, its presuppositions:
w

Youmust rejectin total to be equatedwith wild animals[,Jand

m
you must discardthe habit of wearingredochre.We preserve z
wild animalsfor the touristindustry,but that cannotbe with m

humanbeings.Youmust progressand developas your fellow m

compatriotsin the rest of the country.(Nationalist, 11 Sept.
m
1968)

The critical point is that it was not, in the main, Maasai who were doing the
equating whereof the President spoke.
In their basic conceptions, were Tanzanian visions of modernity, as
revealed in Operation Dress-Up, "derivative"visions (Chatterjee 1993)? It
is uncomfortable to draw such a conclusion, especially given that Tanza-
nian visions of socialist modernity seemed so deeply imbued with the urge
to avoid, as Nyerere put it, "slavishly copying others" (Nationalist, 2 Jan.
1969). Certainly there was a strong appreciationof such Fanoniandangers,'8
an explicit exposition of which can be found in a presidential speech that
asked teachers to "Create a New Tanzanian":

Examiningthe effects of our colonization,PresidentNyerere

said that Tanzaniansand colonisedpeoplegenerallyhad been
too influencedby the traditionsandways of life of the North
Europeansandthe North Americans.The first thing the colo-
niser did was to destroythe people'sself-confidencein order
to facilitate his domination.He deridedeverythingAfrican
and extolled everythingcolonial. The African'straditionshe
condemned as uncivilised, and he held out the European
traditions as the best and the civilised norm. As a result[,]
many of our people imitated the way of life of the coloniser,
indiscriminately.They could not think for themselves. They
thought and believed in the superiority of the coloniser's
culture.(Nationalist 17 Aug. 1968)
 Despite such protestations, however, examination of the aesthetic economy
that underlay OperationDress-Up leads to the conclusion that the "alterna-
tive modernity," in whose creation Nyerere led the Tanzanian state, never
seemed too far removed from key elementary conceptions of modern life
and modern looks, based in a Western, colonial, and perhaps missionary
iconography of modernity.'9
This essential ambiguity is well illustrated by a veritable obsession
with "nakedness,"the Maasai'sand others', reflected in public discourse (on
missionary concerns with African nakedness, see Allman 2004b; Comaroff
and Comaroff 1997;Hay 2004). Here is the issue laid out in supportof Opera-
-I tion Vijana'ssanctions against "indecent" dress in a letter to the editor of
0
a The Nationalist (ll Oct. 1968):

It is quite o.k. for an Americanfatherto swim togetherhalf-

naked with his fully grown daughteror a mother with her
Ncb
son. But it is a social impossibilityfor an Africanto do so....
I
I am told in U.S.A.thereareclubs of the NUDESwhose num-
-i

bers include even Professors.What has led to this primitive

z
practice?
H
0K
m
What is of course remarkableabout this way of casting the issue is how what
m appear to be conservative (Christian?Western?)values are invoked in the
name of an essentialized "African"culture, all in a move to critique Western
cultural decadence.
A meaningful examination of the genesis of the system of values that
underlay such judgments cannot be accomplished here, but some of the
broaderpressuresand constraints that made it perhapsan inescapablesystem
in this time and place may briefly be sketched. Central here is the theme of
respectability and-to take a cue from Ferguson's(2002)provocative discus-
sion-staking claims to "membership"and an equal standingwithin a global
socio-cultural order.In this context, the campaign can be read as a project
that sought to secure membership as respectable equals, first, for Maasai
in the nation, and second, for the Tanzanian nation in its global family (on
the key role of clothing in staking out identities and political claims over
the course of the twentieth century, see Allman 2004a, 2004b; Hay 2004;
Martin 1994).
Apart from being desirable in and of itself, being part of the modern
nation and being seen that way carried important implications. Sokoine,
Tanzania's most prominent Maasai politician, for instance, was acutely
awareof the political implications of the image of backwardnessof his people
(see the long quote near the beginning of this section). Changing this image
must, if nothing else, have seemed an essential concession to make in the
ongoing struggle to secure Maasai land rights, resources, and respect-all of
which they had so often been denied (Swantz 1995:230;Waller 1993:244).To
change such dynamics, something would have to give, and it was not likely
going to be deeply rooted and global standardsthat accorded respectability
to some, and not to other, ways of self-(re)presentation."Traditional"Maasai
dress must have seemed a small sacrifice to make. Ideally, the observerwith
liberal inclinations might hope, it should be through changes in the world's
exoticizing vision of Maasai, and not through a coerced change of their outer
appearance,that the Maasai's "normalization" would be achieved (Galaty
2002:360);even if they sharedthe sentiment, the politician and other "mod-
ernizing" members of the Maasai community might not have felt that they
had the luxury of hoping for such a different world (Ferguson1999, 2002).
-I
Respectability also mattered to many participantsin the public discus-
pa
0
sion over Operation Dress-Up for different, but related, reasons. Here, the
audience was not domestic, but international. "Tanzaniais a new nation and 0

has to establish herself beside older states," Second Vice-PresidentKawawa a

declaredin his 1965 memorandum "The Promotion of Cultural Activities in NJ
Tanzania"(quotedin Mbughuni 1974:17).Establishing oneself next to other
nations meant to be respectable in the eyes of the world-whose standards
one shared, but which, even more certainly, one had to conform with and
performfor (on Ghana,see Allman 2004b).Appropriatedemonstrationswere
zm
often quite an explicit project.20With an international audience in mind, I
0
"modern"Tanzanians expressed an acute sense of embarrassmentthat the m
:D

Maasai were "roamingthe landscape"in a state of "semi-undress"-a situa-

tion that was again and again judgedto be "unbecoming to Tanzania'srapid
social and economic progress."'2'As is discernible from many of the state-
ments quoted above, this was a ubiquitous sentiment in the public debate
around Operation Dress-Up. Many interventions focused explicitly on the
damage done to Tanzania'sglobal respectability by the Maasai's image. As
one letter to the editor implored its readers:

Suppose we all comply with those who defend the Masai

custom and retreat ourselves to our former customs each
accordingto his tribe[,]and thus our Presidentputs on ragsof
butteredleatherfrom animals as his forefathersdid[,Jand let
our Ministersand the governmentofficialsand ... everybody
do the same. Whata funny, disgustingand a sarcasticnation
will appear!(Nationalist, 22 Feb. 1968)

How, then, did Tanzanian elites' visions of modernity relate to colonial

and "Western" conceptions? Although there were many proclamations of
a radical break with colonial ways, it was of course, as Iliffe has taught us
about Tanzanian history more generally, "more complicated than that"
(1979:412).Tanzanian visions of modernity participated in a larger,global,
iconographic order. Operation Dress-Up was shaped by such wider, always
bounded and discriminating, discourses-which, whether sharedor suffered,
neither Maasai, nor other Tanzanians, could entirely escape.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Fouranonymous referees for this journal provided many helpful comments and suggestions.
The article has also benefited greatly from the comments of David Edwards,Dorothy Hodg-
son, and Andrew Ivaska. None, of course, bears any responsibility for the perspectives and
conclusions here expressed.

p'-
NOTES
P
0
1. Fabian(1983)and Koselleck(1985)explorethe dynamic,teleologicaldimensionof a distinc-
tively modern temporality.See also Anderson(1991) and Mitchell(2000b);both draw on
m WalterBenjamin'snotion of "emptytime;'a preconditionfor the possibilityof speeding up
time or history(= development?);see Galaty,who drawson Ricoeur'snotionof"emplotment"
to capturethe idea that images of Maasaiare situated in largernarratives,which explain
"how they [Maasai]exist in time, and what destinies for them are foretold and justified"
H
(2002:351).
2. Thisissuewas a generalfavoritewith high-rankingpoliticians.SecondVice-President
Kawawa,
-I
z
m for instance,admonished"allpeasantsto discardcustomsthat forbadethem to eat meat and
0
eggs"(Nationalist,25 Nov.1969)The next day,the paperfollowed up the story:"itis obvious
n
for example that a people who still hold that to eat eggs is 'dangerous'for women have a
very low consciousness.Certainlythe organizationof the modernprogressivestate callsfor
a relentlessfight againstsuch beliefs no matterwho holds them and howeverdeep-rooted
they may be'
3. Ivaska(1999, 2002) has previouslyanalyzedpress coverage surroundingthis and a related
campaign.
4. Onthe press,see Chachage(1997 )andTordoffand Mazrui(1972).
5. Accordingto Talle(1999:116),the issue of Maasaidress was again on the politicalagenda
"morerecently"(the early 1990s?);Swantz(1995:230),however,notes that "contemporary"
rulesto weartrousersunderthe lubega have"inthe course of time been forgotten.'Indeed,
Hodgson(2001:150)remarksthat "authentic" Maasaihave in recentyearsbecome valued as
touristattractions;see also Bruner(2001).
6. Hodgson (2001), Mwansasu(1985), and Swebe (1984) provide biographicalsketches of
Sokoine'slife.
7. "Wamasai KutembeaUchi"(23 Aug.1968)[TanzaniaNationalArchives 513/P4/9/l1l],emphases
in the original.
8. "Wamasai KutembeaUchi"(26 Nov.1968)[TanzaniaNationalArchives 513/P4/9/l1l].
9. Experimentationwith having the Game Department make game meat availableto the
Watingidain the new villageof YaedaChini,because they had in the past"[t]imeand again
... disappearedinto the bush to look for honey and game meat"(Nationalist,17 Aug. 1971;
see also 5 July1971and 6 Sept. 1971),echoes the idea of sanitizingtraditionshereexpressed.
The search for game meat was objectionable because it was associated with a "savage"
lifestyle,but it became legitimatefood provisioningwhen performedby the Game Depart-
ment. Similarly,in 1970,there was talkof canninggame meat as partof an UtingidaWildlife
UtilizationProject:canninggame meat was glossed as commendable"utilization,7while
using
 it for local consumption was cast as objectionable"poaching"[TanzaniaNationalArchives
599/GD/21/MLU33/1
1.
10. Parkipunyalso contributeda laterpiece to the DailyNewsof 29 Nov.-2 Dec. 1972. (Jacobs
1980).See also Parkipuny(1979).
11. Onthe constructionof such visceralperceptionsor reactions,see Burke(1996).Inthe 1920s,
LuoChristianswho used soap in responseto missionaries'urgingsabout cleanliness"stank"
to their"traditionalist"
neighbors(Hay2004:73).
12. Whilepresentingone's fellow Maasaicountrymenas a photo opportunityto touristswas
apparentlymorallyrepulsiveto Tanzania'smodern elites in the 1960s and early 1970s (see
-I
also Shivji1973),this stance seems to have changed over the years (Bruner2001; Hodgson
p;L
2001:150).Theriseto globalprominenceof the politicsof indigenousnessand culturalauthen- 0
ticitytoday position"traditions"in a ratherdifferentglobal aesthetic economy."Traditional" z

Maasaidress today also marksits weareras a much-sought-aftersecurityguard in Dares

Salaam. z
13. CompareMitchell:"modernizingapproaches ... must gather all the differenthistoriesof r-
I
colonialisminto a singularnarrativeof the coming of modernity.Theycan deal with the non-
m
modernonly as the absence of modernity,only as formsthat lackthe discipline,rationality, z

and abstractionof the modernorderof things-and therefore,sincethey aredefinedby what m

they are not, as essentiallysimilarto non-modernformseverywhereelse"(2000a:xvi).

14. TheStandard'scriticalreportingon the ban and violent enforcementby the YouthLeague z
m
made it the target of harshcriticism,and the YouthLeaguestruckbackat the paperin a pro- m
test that turnedviolent (Nationalist,3 Jan.1969).The paper'scriticalreportingon Operation
Vijanawas repeatedlycited in criticismsthat lambastedit as an organ of 'imperialism"
and
ideas"(e.g.,Nationalist11 Oct. 1968 and 3 Jan.1969).
"reactionary
15. E.g.,lettersto the editorof TheNationalistof 11, 14, and 29 October1968;but criticalvoices
also found a place (e.g.,Nationalist,21 Oct. 1968).
16. Thefeaturepartlydrewon a photo opportunitypresentedby a receptionat the State House
of a groupof fortyyoung Maasaimen led by Sokoine.TheNationalistof 12 February1968 had
alreadyfeatureda pictureof this occasionon itsfrontpage, and TheSundayNewshadcovered
the same storyon 11 February1968.
17. In its exclusivefocus on Maasaimen, exemplifiedhere, development discoursein the late
1960s carriedon an also historicallyprevalentgenderedness (Hodgson1999b,1999c, 2001).
18. TheNationalistwas awash in contributionsthat criticallyreflecton Tanzania'spostcolonial
conditionin this light;on 17 January1969,for instance,it offereda lengthy reviewof Fanon's
BlackSkin,
WhiteMasks, commentingthatthe colonizedwas"elevatedabove the jungle status
in proportionto his adoption of the mother country'sculturalstandards'Similarconcerns
found echoes in many statements by politicians,as in the President'sinauguraladdress of
10 December 1962:"Ofall the crimesof colonialismthere is none worse than the attempt
to make us believe we had no indigenouscultureof our own;or that what we did have was
worthless-something of whichwe shouldbe ashamed,insteadof a sourceof pride"(Nyerere
1966:186).
19. WhetherTanzania's drawingcloserto Chinain the late 1960s effected significantchanges in
these orientationsis debatable:Nyerere'sintroductionof the "Chou-En-Lai suit"to Tanzania
(see Smith 1981 for
:13), instance, could be interpretedas signalingdifferentinfluencesin a
matterclose to the mainissuesof the presentdiscussion;Isuggest, however,thatthis was still
a comfortablycompatiblevariationon a veryfamiliartheme.
 20. See, for instance,the invitationof "Ex-Colonial to Tanzania's
Rulers" ten-yearindependence
celebrations-according to Nyerere-'because before they left they believed and actually
saidthat we could not develop withoutthem.'Wewantthem to come and see forthemselves
whethertheirprophecyhas come trueor not"'(Nationalist,21 June 1971;forthe followup,28
Feb.1972).
21. "Eventoday,' Hodgson remarks,"forcertain Tanzaniansand other Africans,'the Maasai'
representembarrassingremindersof a lifestylenow despised and denigrated"(2001:3).

~-t
0p;4 REFERENCES
0

Allman,Jean.2004a. FashioningAfrica:Powerand the Politicsof Dress.InFashioningAfrica:Powerand

the Politicsof Dress.Editedby JeanAllman.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.
-1
2004b. "LetYourFashionBe in Linewith OurGhanaianCostume":Nation,Gender,and the
Politics of Cloth-ing in Nkrumah's Ghana. In Fashioning Africa:Power and the Politics of Dress.
Im
Editedby JeanAllman.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.
Anderson,Benedict.1991.ImaginedCommunities.
2nd ed. London:Verso.
00
Anderson, David M.,and V.Broch-Due, eds. 1999. ThePoorAreNot Us:Poverty&Pastoralism in EastAfrica.
I
z
Athens:OhioUniversityPress.
m
Arhem, Kaj. 1984. The Maasai and the State-The Impact of Rural Development Policies in a Pastoral
Peoplein Tanzania.Copenhagen:International
WorkGroupfor IndigenousAffairs.
1985. Pastoral Man in the Garden of Eden: The Maasai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area,
m
V)
Tanzania.UppsalaResearchReportsin CulturalAnthropology.Uppsala:Universityof Uppsala.
Berger, Peter L. 1974. Pyramids of Sacrifice:Political Ethics and Social Change. New York:Basic Books.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction:A SocialCritiqueoftheJudgmentof Taste.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
UniversityPress.
Burgess,Thomas.2002. Cinema,BellBottoms,and Miniskirts:
StrugglesoverYouthand Citizenshipin
Revolutionary Zanzibar. InternationalJournalofAfrican HistoricalStudies 35(2-3):287-313.
2005. The Young Pioneersand the Ritualsof Citizenshipin RevolutionaryZanzibar.Africa
Today 51 (3):3-28.
Bruner,Edward.2001.The Maasaiand the LionKing:Authenticity,Nationalism,and Globalizationin
African Tourism. American Ethnologist 28(4):881-908.
Burke, Timothy. 1996. Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in
ModernZimbabwe.Durham:DukeUniversityPress.
Chachage,C.S. L.1997. Democracyand the FourthEstateinTanzania.InPoliticalCultureand Popular
Participationin Tanzania.Dares Salaam:Universityof Dares Salaam.
Chatterjee,Partha.1993.TheNationand ItsFragments.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Comaroff,Jean, and John L.Comaroff.1992. Home-MadeHegemony:Modernity,Domesticity,and
Colonialismin SouthAfrica.InAfricanEncounters
withDomesticity.Editedby K.T.Hansen.New
Brunswick:
RutgersUniversityPress.
,and John L. Comaroff. 1997 The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier.Vol. 2. of
Of Revelation and Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cooper,Frederick.1997.ModernizingBureaucrats,
BackwardAfricans,and the DevelopmentConcept.
In International Development and the Social Sciences. Edited by Frederick Cooper and Randall
Packard.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Escobar,Arturo.1995.Encountering TheMakingand Unmakingof the ThirdWorld.Prince-
Development:
ton: PrincetonUniversityPress.
Fabian,Johannes.1983. Timeand the Other:HowAnthropology
MakesItsObject.New York:Columbia
UniversityPress.
Fanon,Frantz.1967.BlackSkin,WhiteMasks.NewYork:GrovePress.
Ferguson,James. 1994. TheAnti-PoliticsMachine:"Development," and Bureaucratic
Depoliticization,
PowerinLesotho.Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress.
1999.Expectationsof Modernity: Mythsand Meaningsof UrbanLifeon theZambianCopperbelt.
Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
.2002. Of Mimicryand Membership:Africansand the "NewWorldSociety'CulturalAnthropol- -I
4)
ogy 17(4):551-569. 04
Finucane,JamesR.1974.RuralDevelopmentand Bureaucracy in Tanzania:
TheCaseof MwanzaRegion.
Uppsala:ScandinavianInstituteof AfricanStudies.
Galaty,John.2002. HowVisualFiguresSpeak:NarrativeInventionsof "ThePastoralist"
in EastAfrica.
0
VisualAnthropology
15:347-367.
R1972.Anthropological
Harries-Jones, MethodandRuralDevelopment:A CaseStudyinSudan.Canadian
Associationof AfricanStudies.Paperpresentedat the AnnualMeetingin Waterloo,Ontario, z
25-26 February.
zm
Hay,MargaretJean.2004. Changesin Clothingand Strugglesover Identityin ColonialWesternKenya.
0
Im
In FashioningAfrica:Powerand the Politicsof Dress.Editedby Jean Allman.Bloomington: AX

IndianaUniversityPress.
Hodgson, DorothyL. 1999a. Images & Interventions:The Problemsof PastoralistDevelopment.In
ThePoorAreNot Us:Poverty&Pastoralismin EastAfrica.Editedby DavidM. Andersonand
V.Broch-Due.Athens:Ohio UniversityPress.
1999b. Pastoralism,Patriarchyand History:ChangingGender Relationsamong Maasaiin
Tanganyika,1890-1940.JournalofAfricanHistory40:41-65.
1999c. "OnceIntrepidWarriors":
Modernityand the Productionof MaasaiMasculinities.
Ethnology38:121-150.
2000.TakingStock:State Control,EthnicIdentityand PastoralistDevelopmentinTanganyika,
1948-1958.JoumalofAfricanHistory41:55-78.
.2001. OnceIntrepidWarriors: and the Cultural
Gender,Ethnicity, Politicsof MaasaiDevelopment.
Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.
Iliffe,John. 1979.AModernHistoryof Tanganyika. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Ivaska,AndrewM. 1999. 'Anti-Mini MilitantsMeetModernMisses". A DebateoverDressin 1960sTanza-
nia. Paperpresentedat the inauguralconferenceof the JournalforImperialand Post-Colonial
Studies,MichiganState University,EastLansing,February.
2002. "Anti-MiniMilitantsMeet ModernMisses":UrbanStyle, Gender,and the Politicsof
"NationalCulture'in1960s Dares Salaam,Tanzania.
Gender&History14(3):584-607.
.2003. Cosmopolitanismand the Productionof"Culture":
Style,the City,and the Statein Dares
Salaam,1930-2000. Ph.D.diss.,Universityof Michigan.
Jacobs,A. H.1980. PastoralDevelopmentinTanzanianMaasailand.RuralAfricana
7:1-14.
Keesing,Roger.1994.Colonialand Counter-Colonial
Discoursein Melanesia.Critique
ofAnthropology
14(1):41-58.
Knowles,J. N., and D. P Collett. 1989. Natureas Myth,Symbol and Action:Notes towards a His-
toricalUnderstandingof Developmentand Conservationin KenyanMaasailand. Africa59(4):
433-461.
 Koselleck,Reinhart.1985. FuturesPast:On the Semanticsof HistoricalTime.Cambridge,Mass.:MIT
Press.
Martin,P.1994."TheStatusof Clothesin ColonialBrazzavillel'
JournalofAfricanHistory35(3):1-26.
Mbughuni,L.A. 1974.TheCulturalPolicy
of the UnitedRepublicof
Tanzania.Studiesand Documentson
CulturalPolicies.Paris:UNESCO
Press.
Miller,Williamlan.1997. TheAnatomyof Disgust.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Mitchell,Timothy. 2000a. Introduction.In Questionsof Modernity.Edited by Timothy Mitchell.
Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress.
2000b. The Stage of Modernity.In Questionsof Modernity.Edited by Timothy Mitchell.
-I
Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress.
0 Mwansasu,B.U. 1985.EdwardMoringeSokoine,1938-1984.Dares Salaam:TanzaniaNews Agency.
Ndagala,D.K.1974.Socialand EconomicChangeamong the PastoralWakwaviand ItsImpacton Rural
Development.M.A.thesis, Universityof Dares Salaam.
1992.Territory, andLivestock:
Pastoralists, ResourceControlamongtheKisongoMaasai.Uppsala
)-k

Studiesin CulturalAnthropology,18. Uppsala:Universityof Uppsala.

Nyerere,JuliusK.1966.Freedomand Unity:A SelectionfromWritingsand Speeches 1952-65. Oxford:
I
OxfordUniversityPress.
M.L.1979.Some CrucialAspectsof the MaasaiPredicament.InAfricanSocialisminPractice:
Parkipuny,
ro TheTanzanianExperience.Editedby AndrewCoulson.Nottingham:SpokesmanBooks.
H Rahnema,Majid,and VictoriaBawtree,eds. 1997. ThePost-Development
Reader.London:Zed Books.
z
0
Ranger,Terence.1983.TheInventionof Traditionin ColonialAfrica.InTheInventionof Tradition.
Edited
m by EricHobsbawmand TerenceRanger.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
I Rigby,Peter.1969a. Cattleand Kinshipamong the Gogo.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.
1969b. Pastoralismand Prejudice:Ideologyand RuralDevelopmentin EastAfrica.InSociety
and SocialChangein EastemAfrica.Editedby R.J. Apthorpe.NkangaEditions,4. Kampala:
MakerereInstituteof SocialResearch.
Rowlands,M.1995. InconsistentTemporalitiesin a Nation-Space.In WorldsApart:ModemityThrough
the Prismof the Local.Editedby DanielMiller.NewYork:Routledge.
Sachs,Wolfgang,ed. 1992. TheDevelopmentDictionary.London:Zed Books.
Saibull,S. A. 1974. SocialChangeamong the PastoralMaasaiinTanzaniain Responseto the Ujamaa
VijijiniPolicyof Tanusince the ArushaDeclarationof 1967. M.A.thesis, Universityof Dares
Salaam.
Schneider,Leander.2003. Developmentalismand ItsFailings:WhyRuralDevelopmentWentWrongin
1960s and 1970sTanzania.Ph.D.diss.,ColumbiaUniversity.
2004. Freedomand Unfreedomin RuralDevelopment:JuliusNyerere,UjamaaVijijini,and
Villagization.CanadianJournalofAfricanStudies38(2):344-392.
2006. Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianismin Tanzania:Connects and
Disconnects.AfricanStudiesReview49(1):93-118.
Shivji,Issa,ed. 1973. Tourism
andSocialistDevelopment.Dares Salaam:TanzaniaPublishingHouse.
Smith,WilliamE.1981.Nyerereof Tanzania.Harare: ZimbabwePublishingHouse.
Spear,Thomas,and RichardWaller,eds. 1993. BeingMaasai:Ethnicity&Identityin EastAfrica.Athens:
OhioUniversityPress.
Swantz,M.S.1995.Conflictsbetween the Systemsof Knowledgeof the Pastoralistsand Developmen-
talists:TheCaseof ParakuyoMaasaiin BagamoyoDistrict.InTheTanzanianPeasantry: Further
Studies.Editedby PeterForsterand Sam Maghimbi.Avebury:Aldershott.
Swebe, B.S. 1984.EdwardMoringeSokoine.Dares Salaam:TanzaniaBooksellers.
Talle, A. 1999. Pastoralists at the Border: Maasai Poverty & the Development Discourse in Tanzania.
In The Poor Are Not Us: Poverty & Pastoralism in East Africa. Edited by D. M. Anderson and
V. Broch-Due. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Tidrick,K. 1980. The Masai and Their Masters: A Psychological Study of District Administration. African
Studies Review 23(1): 15-31.
Tordoff, W., and A. Mazrui. 1972. The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania. Journal of Modem African
Studies 10(3): 427-445.
Tranberg Hansen, Karen. 2004. Dressing Dangerously: Miniskirts, Gender Relations, and Sexuality in
Zambia. In FashioningAfrica:PowerandthePoliticsofDress. Edited byJean Allman. Blooming-
I-'.
ton: Indiana University Press.
P-i
Waller, Richard. 1993. Acceptees & Aliens: KikuyuSettlement in Maasailand. In Being Maasai: Ethnicity 0
& Identity in East Africa. Edited by Thomas Spear and Richard Waller. Athens: Ohio University
Press.