ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT VS. ATTY.

MARASIGAN
Facts:

A sworn affidavit-complaint was filed by Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle recovered by
members of the PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, was lodged at RTC. The chief of police of Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to
respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof. After the trial to determine the true owner of the motorcycle,
the RTC ordered for its release to Pentecostes who immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle
to him but was told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed grave misconduct.

Ruling:
No. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an
unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

Sect. 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep
all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court,
and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

Respondent as clerk of court was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and
to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere,
and upon the prior authority of the RTC.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP
of Mlang, North Cotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the
reason was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duties
include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

15 Day Suspension
FATHER AQUINO et al vs. ATTY PASCUA
A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

FACTS:
Father Aquino et. al. filed a letter-complaint against Atty. Pascua, a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial
Practice Law. It was alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified 2 notarized documents in which he filed with the Civil
Service Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the documents but they were not entered in his
Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Atty.
Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his
part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial
Register the affidavit-complaints.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial
Register the affidavit-complaints of Acorda and Domingo. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua’s failure to
enter into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part
as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter
in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make
the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a
ground for revocation of his commission. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s 1st offense,
court believed that the imposition of a 3-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order.
Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
upon him.
IN RE: JUDGE QUITAIN
JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

FACTS:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent
thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and
criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was dismissed from the service. The Deputy of
Court Administrator (DCA) required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he
committed before the JBC.

Respondent explained that he did not disclose the case in his Personal Data Sheet because he was of the
honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his
resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case. The court contends that Judge
Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government service. At the time
he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of
the subject administrative case, as well as AO 183 dismissing him from the government service.

ISSUES:
1. WON the resignation of the judge renders the administrative proceedings against him moot and academic.
2. WON the judge be excused of his omission in the PDS.

HELD:
1. No. Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his
resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred, much
less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of
his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If
such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by
the simple expedient of resigning from the service.

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render
moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing
of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him.

2. No. Respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the
part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. They have often stressed that the conduct required of
court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint
the Judiciary. The court condemns, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would
have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, he is
hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned
leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
Bernardo vs. Atty. MEJIA
Adm. Case No. 2984. August 31, 2007
FACTS:

Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Mejia of several administrative offenses such as misappropriating
and converting to his personal use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s
property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed of
Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan
obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En Banc found the Atty. Mejia guilty of all the
charges against him and imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition praying that
he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law but was denied. The respondent filed again this present
petition with a plea for reinstatement. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law
profession. At 71, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.

HELD:
Yes. 15 years has passed since he was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court
does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him,
and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it
also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all,
penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is
reminded that practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
GSIS v. Pacquing
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831, Feb. 2, 2007
Corona, J.

Facts: Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from GSIS and secured by real &
chattel mortgages. Bengson defaulted in paying the amortizations so GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the same.
Bengson then filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure in the RTC San Fernando, La Union in 1977
to which it was given a favorable decision. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision on appeal and the same became
final and executory. GSIS failed to return the foreclosed properties so Judge Pacquing, then new presiding
judge, ordered the former to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties along with the
costs of suit amounting to P31 million. An alias writ of execution was later issued by Judge Pacquing, resulting
in the levy of GSIS’ shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation worth P6.2 million. GSIS moved to quash the writ
of execution on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution
under Sec. 39, RA 8291. GSIS then filed several cases, including the present administrative complaint against
Judge Pacquing and Atty. Bañez for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and for violation of RA 8291.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Pacquing was liable for ignorance of the law

Held: No. For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be
gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. Petitioners assertion that
respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the contrary, the
records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the finality of the order directing
petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. Judge
Pacquing’s acts were neither tainted with bad faith or malice, nor was he biased or partial. In the exercise of
his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a
matter of right following the finality of said order. Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment;
it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.
VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
FACTS:

This case involves 3 consolidated cases revolving IBP Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. de
Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP
National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by
the IBP Board.

Complainant moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds: 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule
with the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the State Bar of California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or
surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended 3 year suspension.

Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most
noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National
President. Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in Complaint were the very issues raised
in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said
issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that
the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

On the other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He
asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. During
the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as
member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President for having committed acts which
were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court
by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and
categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an
unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without
just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. On their response, the
IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and
was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely
no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law.
He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP
Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance
with the minimum standards of due process of law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which amounted to moral
turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course of his practice of law.

2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person of Attorney Leonard S. Devera
wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral turpitude, as basis for disbarment, of
respondent in an administrative proceeding.

4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.

HELD:
1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite
a recommendation of suspension of 3 years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could
be taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts
action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case,
considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty.
de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the
hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical
under Philippine law.

2. Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the
highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of
Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice.

3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of
the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm
ground to stand on. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the
ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-
election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of
law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each
member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses
the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack
of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.

4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant’s contention that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while
the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence.
It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension
and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely
sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. Although the parties in the
present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata. In order that the
principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera
cannot argue res judicata in his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the
first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being
principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or disbarment.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697
from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the
letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the
disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion; 3. AFFIRM the
election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in
accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose
Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
Advincula v. Atty. Macabata
A.C. No. 7204

Facts:
Advincula filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macabata, charging the latter with grossly immoral
conduct. Advincula sought legal advice from the latter about the possibility of filing a complaint against
Queensway Travel and Tours for not settling their accounts as demanded. Atty. Macabata offered Advincula a
ride on 2 occasions, one where he sent Advincula home and gave her a kiss on the cheek and embraced her
very tightly and one where Atty. Macabata allegedly kissed Advincula forcefully while his other hand was
holding her breast. Later, the two texted each other and messages were used by Advincula as the evidence of
guilt. Atty. Macabata admitted that he kissed Advincula on 2 ocassions because Advincula offered her lips to
him. He also argued that the corner where he dropped her off was a busy street, makes it impossible to
commit the acts imputed to him.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Macabata committed grossly immoral acts warranting his disbarment or suspension.

Ruling:
No, the acts of Atty. Macabata would not suffice to warrant a disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law. The term “grossly immoral” is referred to acts, (1) so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or (2) so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or (3) committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Although Atty. Macabata had admittedly
kissed Advincula, it is not sufficient as to warrant a grossly immoral act. Also, Advincula failed to present
substantial evidence against Atty.Macabata, proving the latter showed grossly immoral conduct.

However, the Court found Atty. Macabata guilty of an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. Rule 7.03
of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Therefore, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macabata is hereby dismissed. However, he
is hereby reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a stern warning
that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING
ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner lawyers filed a petition seeking the disqualification of Atty. De Vera from being elected Governor of
Eastern Mindanao in the 16th IBP Regional Governor's Elections. Petitioners contended that respondent's
transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen
abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of
Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.

Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude for the position.
According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for
irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations of the plunder law. They
further alleged that De Vera could have been disbarred in the US for misappropriating his client's funds had
he not surrendered his California license to practice law.

Respondent averred that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his
chapter membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also
stressed that the right to transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court
which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any
of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative
complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in the IBP.

Held:

The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is entitled to select, change
or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change his chapter
membership, subject only to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than 3 months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De
Vera's transfer to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done more than 3 months ahead of the
chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.

The Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. The Court emphasized that the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by
the Court or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty.
Leonard De Vera, Respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine
in the amount of P20K for his remarks contained in 2 newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. The Court
held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law. The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera
immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals."

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. Bare allegations and unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof.

The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit under Section 40 of the IBP By-
Laws which provides that only nominees can file a written protest setting forth the ground therefor. Petitioner
Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis
Oriental IBP and are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern Mindanao pursuant to the rotation
rule enunciated in Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court also held that the instant petition was
premature as no nomination of candidates has been made by the members of the House of Delegates from
Eastern Mindanao, and assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the
nomination.
IRRI vs NLRC
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993

NOCON, J.:

Facts:

Micosa stabbed to death Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna. Micosa was accused of the crime of
homicide. The RTC rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide. IRRI's Director General personally
wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose
appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as
defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. IRRI's Human Resource Development Head,
J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for
homicide. J. K. Pascual insisted that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and
informing him that he is thereby charged of violating the Institute's Personnel Manual.

Micosa explained his act was of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve
moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of
probation, which the trial court granted to him. Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee
who recommended to the Director General, his continued employment. J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa
that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990. Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his
reinstatement with full backwages. On appeal, the NLRCommission affirmed the LA.

Issue:

Whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment

Whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

Ruling:

Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's Director General that as regular core
employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the
Philippine Labor Code."8 Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as
defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an
employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes.
Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach
by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article
282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him
absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the
breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. On the other hand, the
commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes
must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly
lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex,
having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the
conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as
laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

2. Under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his conviction
for homicide cannot be sustained. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals;
an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or
to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Thus, the precipitate
conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted
considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful
aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is
conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa
stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa
was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket
of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had
stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to
defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by classifying a crime as malum in seor as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and
are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term,
the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Soriano vs. Atty. Dizon
AC 6792
January 25, 2006

FACTS:
Atty. Dizon was driving his car under the influence of liquor when a taxi driver overtook him. Dizon tailed the
taxi, pulled it over, and berated Soriano, the taxi driver, and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression,
Soriano forced open his door, causing Dizon to fall to the ground. Soriano tried to help Dizon get up, but the
latter was about to punch him so Soriano punched Dizon first to fend off an impending attack. Soriano
prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver with the
handle wrapped in a handkerchief. As Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up from
the pavement, Dizon fired and shot him. Soriano fell on the thigh of the accused, and the latter merely pushed
him out and sped off. The bullet hit Soriano’s neck and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors
who treated him, he would have died if not for the timely medical assistance. Soriano sustained spinal cord
injury causing the left side of his body to be paralyzed, disabling him for his job as a taxi driver.

Dizon was eventually convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation, conditioned on payment of
civil liabilities. However, four years after judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation.

Soriano filed complaint before the CBD of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. The Commissioner of the CBD
recommended that respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
and for violating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR. The IBP adopted the recommendation 0

ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude.
Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:
Yes. The crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is
“everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver
for no justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was the aggressor
because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending himself when he counterpunched
Dizon. Moreover, Dizon’s act was aggravated with treachery when he shot Soriano when the latter was not in
a position to defend himself. Soriano was handing Dizon’s eyeglasses, which he just picked up, when he was
shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in handkerchief in
order not to leave fingerprints on the gun used. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic incident indicated
his skewed morals.

The court ruled that the appalling treachery and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly showed his unfitness
to continue as a member of the bar. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree
of good moral character, which is not only a condition precedent to admission, but also a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. While the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired, the court
held that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with the lofty aspiration that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice. Atty. Dizon was disbarred.
Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. The 1987 constitution provides in Sec. 1, Article 9-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and 6 Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

Issue: Whether the respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

Ruling:

Yes. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of
law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator
of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of
COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the
view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
CRUZ VS CABRERA
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a 4th year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who
acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the RTC,
Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Cuerdo. Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s
act of compelling the court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him
before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in
his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a
lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear
anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear
ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate,
malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

Issue:

Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases

Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A
party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC.
34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

2. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation
usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal
advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute (referring to
the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General from engaging in private practice) has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to the
public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in
the practice of law. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

FACTS:
Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Sagucio for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The complainant is the daughter of one of the
stockholder and former President of Taggat Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel
Manager and Retained Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They alleged that complainant, who
took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received retainer's fee.
On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is no longer part of
Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. He
points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint
but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.
Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or
the complainant and he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The IBP
found respondent guilty of violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

HELD:
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does
not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed
acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit
of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s
fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s
admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is
an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
AGUIRRE VS RANA
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. Before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. The Court allowed respondent to
take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election. On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any
kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in
the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
IN RE: EDILLON
AC 1928
12/19/1980
FACTS:

Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. Edillon
contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply
with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in
order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is a ready a member.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo
Facts:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues from 1977-2005
in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the CSC then migrated
to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him
to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays
his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the
profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of
due process of the law.

Issues:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the
practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property without due process?

Held:
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction. The payment of
dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it is clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,
one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
SANTOS JR. VS. ATTY LLAMAS
AC 4749
01/20/2000
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against Atty.
Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place
of issuance) in his pleadings. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as
appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his
IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he
is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law
and for being a senior citizen.

HELD:

Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if non-payment covers a period of 1-year, default
shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter
whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No.
7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment
of membership or association dues.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty.
Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later.
 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW

EN BANC[

B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER

Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to
avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
now intends to resume his law practice.

Issue:
Whether Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:
No. Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. The practice of law is a
privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of *RA 9225+.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although
he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit
to engage in such practice.
CRUZ VS MINA
G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
Facts:
Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father is the
complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a 3rd year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Sec. 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend
of a party litigant. The petitioner avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant

Ruling:
Yes. The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the
court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend
of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
FELICIANO V ATTY. BAUTISTA – LOZADA
FACTS:
Alvin Feliciano filed an injunction and TRO against Atty. Bautista – Lozada in representing his husband
Edilberto Lozada in the latter’s case against the complainant on June 5, 2007. Feliciano alleged that Atty.
Bautista – Lozada appeared as a counsel for her husband and actively participated in the court proceedings
while still suspended from the practice of law in reference to a court judgment on December 15,2005.
Feliciano argued that the act of the respondent constitutes willful disobedience to acourt order.

Atty Bautista – Lozada claims that she was only forced by the situation that she needed to defend the right of
his husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She believes that since she is representing his husband and
not a client, it is not within the prohibition of the law. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation and
the IBP Investigating Officer recommended disbarment for Atty. Bautista – Lozada The IBP-BOG adopted the
recommendation with modification to suspension of only 3 months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Atty. Bautista – Lozada warrant disciplinary action?

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Bautista – Lozada’s act of representing his husband in court proceedings while still serving her
suspension is an act prohibited by law that should warrant disciplinary action. Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court clearly stated that a willful disobedience of any lawful order of the superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so is aground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. The practice of law is defined as any activity, in or out of
the court, which requires that application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. In
the case at bar, Atty. Bautista-Lozada in appearing, signing for and in behalf of his husband in pleadings and
court proceedings constitutes practice of law where she should desist herself from engaging during the period
of her suspension. The prior judgement of her suspension was promulgated on December 15, 2005, therefore
she cannot engage in the practice of law until December 2007.
Quiachon vs Ramos
Facts:
Quiachon filed a disbarment case in 2011 against her former lawyer, Atty. Ramos. Adelia was a plaintiff in a
labor case, and she was represented by Ramos. She won in the Labor Arbiter level, but it was reversed by the
NLRC, and the reversal was affirmed by the CA. According to Adelia, she kept asking Ramos the status of her
case, and Ramos kept saying that there was no decision yet. While Adelia was waiting for Ramos in his office,
she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon. She asked
Ramos’s secretary to open the envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment
of the CA’s decision.

During the pendency of the disbarment proceedings, Adelia filed a motion to withdraw the complaint. And, on
the basis of this withdrawal, the IBP Commissioner Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against
Ramos despite the finding that there was negligence. This was adopted by the IBP-BOG.

Issue:
Whether or not the case against Ramos should be dismissed on the basis of Adelia’s withdrawal.

Held:
No. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR. Thus, it should
have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

Rrespondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of
the proper legal remedy that would promote the client's cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case
entrusted to him. All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.
PO1 CASPE vs. ATTY. MEJICA
A.C. No. 10679 March 10, 2015
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by PO1 Caspe against Atty. Mejica for alleged violation of
CPR specifically Rules 1.03, 1.04, and 10.01.

Petitioner’s Contention:
Caspe said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica
served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who
counseled and represented him.

Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of interest and the present
complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then
threatened Caspe that “he will help file cases after cases against the complainant until he kneels before
him. He will ‘put down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed from the service.” From then
on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of suits against him.

In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Gaduena, a barangay tanod,
harassed Busa and Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on duty, together with PO1 Lopeña responded.
They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was turned over to the police station. Gaduena evaded
arrest with the help of barangay captain Agda and other barangay tanods who allegedly clobbered
Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and harmony, the Chief of Police called and requested
that Caspe desist from filing charges against the barangay captain and tanods, specifically Gaduena.
Caspe acceded.

However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint for serious slander by deed against
Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit of 2 barangay tanods. It was alleged that Caspe kicked,
collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with the Chief of
Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged Gaduena to file
the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages and disbarment against Atty. Mejica before
the IBP. The IBP CBD ordered the case submitted for decision.

Respondent’s Contention:
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a Notice of
Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not receive a copy of the
complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty.
Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he received the Notice in the
afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not given the opportunity to answer. Atty.
Mejica also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he was not present during the
preliminary conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening words.

IBP Ruling and Recommendation:

The IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that
Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in encouraging the filing of suits against Caspe making good his
threat to file case upon case against the latter until he kneels before him. Notice was taken that this
was Atty. Mejica’s second infraction for a similar offense. In Baldado v. Mejica, he was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three months. The IBP CBD thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. The IBP BOG adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP CBD.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable?

HELD: Yes, Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to observe and
give due respect to courts and judicial officers.

The Supreme Court adopts the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed. The IBP CBD
concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the cases against PO1 Caspe other
than to get back at him. The High Court agrees that the confluence of circumstances points to Atty.
Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04
and 10.01 of the CPR.

With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not able to
receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended the mandatory
conference, this contention is untenable.

Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the
Philippines provides that:

SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.

a) Non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be
deemed a waiver of right to participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then
be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the
Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings supposedly
since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records suggest however that a copy of the
complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He submitted 2
manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an
action against him. It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before
the IBP indicates a lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures.

A lawyer’s unjustified refusal to heed the directives of the IBP and to appear at the scheduled
mandatory conference constituted a blatant disrespect for the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming a
lawyer. A lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers
and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the
Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys.

Atty. Mejica is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and 10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.
Enriquez v. De Vera
A.C. No. 8330
March 16, 2015
Facts:
Enriquez filed a complaint for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. De Vera in relation to the latter’s
issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan. According to Enriquez, she is a businesswoman
involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by
subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera.

Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000 from Enriquez with interest ofP20,000 per month until fully paid.
Enriquez she was persuaded by Atty. De Vera to borrow from a common friend, Luzon, by mortgaging
her property in Lucena. Atty. De Vera issued a post-dated check for 500,000 and 2 more checks to cover
the interest agreed upon.

In June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Enriquez’s sister for 100,000, to which, Enriquez
was the guarantor. Another post-dated check was issued by Atty. De Vera to Enriquez for the said
amount. Upon maturity, Enriquez presented them for payment but the checks bounced for being drawn
against insufficient funds. When attempted to be encashed a 2nd time, the checks were dishonored
because the account was closed. Thus, Enriquez demanded payment from Atty. De Vera but the latter
failed to settle her obligations. This prompted Enriquez to file a complaint against Atty. De Vera for
violation of B.P. 22 and estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC. On the other hand, Atty. De Vera
claims that she only issued said checks to guaranty Enriquez’s loan and they were not meant to be
deposited.

ISSUE:
WON De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held liable administratively for issuance and
dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the CPR.

RULING:
Yes. In De Jesus v. Collado, the Court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing
post-dated checks that were dishonoured upon presentment for payment. Misconduct involves
“wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment”; it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.

In the case, the Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera’s allegation of
“lending” her checks to Enriquez is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, she is
presumed to know the consequences of her acts. Membership in the bar requires high degree of fidelity
to the laws whether in a private of professional capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the legal
profession as a whole. A lawyer may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties
which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer to him.

Suspended 1 year.