G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 signify her consent to the adoption.

Jose,
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners,
v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA
REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
F A C T S:
Atty. Jose adopted Jen and Regina. Atty. Jose is the estranged
husband of Rosario and the father of Joanne. Rosario alleged
that she and Jose were married but left Jose after a couple of
months because of the incompatibilities between them. They
however, briefly reconciled and Rosario gave birth to Joanne.
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario
alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies.
Jose, who was then 70 years old, filed a petition for adoption
and alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Lilibeth whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile
housekeeper.
A Home Study Report was conducted and at the time of the
report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily and that the children have allegedly been in his
custody since Lilibeth's death.
The trial court approved the adoption. However, Rosario filed a
complaint for disbarment against Jose. She alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36 years and that Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry, and even
went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.
Thereafter, Jose died. Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment of the decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption. They allege that
Rosario's affidavit of consent was fraudulent and that Jed and
Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent.
His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent
in her name cannot be considered compliance of
the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given
notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
would have had a reasonable opportunity to
contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the
adopter's children if they are 10 years old or
older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552, the consent of the adopter's other children
is necessary as it ensures harmony among the
prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the
other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent's love and care, as well as their
future legitimes, with another person. It is
undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's
legitimate child and that she was over 10 years
old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her
written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid.
2) No. Jose manifested to the trial court that he and
Rosario were childless, thereby preventing
Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent
was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal
service of summons should have been effected
on the spouse and all legitimate children to
ensure that their substantive rights are protected.
It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as
in this case. Since the trial court failed to
personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.

I S S U E:
1) W/N Rosario and Joanne should have been given
notice as adoption laws require their consent as a
requisite in the proceedings.

2) W/N the adoption is valid

H E L D:
1) Yes. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8552, the husband must first obtain the consent
of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children
born out of wedlock. The provision is mandatory.
As a general rule, the husband and wife must file
a joint petition for adoption. In the absence of any
decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite
their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible
to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
H E L D:
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO
and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
F A C T S:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married
and begot three children. Anna Marie however learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family
friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband's alleged
illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation
which was granted. They agreed that the children of the parties
shall be entitled to a monthly support of 1,000 and that the
Anna Marie shall be entitled to enter into any contract or
agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical
without the written consent of Herbert Cang.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a
divorce from Anna Marie where the court issued the divorce
decree and also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places" to petitioner.
Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law
of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to
support" his children and that her husband had "long forfeited
his parental rights" over the children.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption,
petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging
that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby
leaving custody of their children to private respondents.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a decree of
adoption.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that the
petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest
him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written
consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written
consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as
witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development who made the case study report required by
law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption.
I S S U E:
1) W/N minor children can be legally adopted
without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that the latter has abandoned them
2) W/N Herbert Cang abandoned his minor children
1) No. The written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such
parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The
court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even,
without the written consent of the parents or one
of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith.
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of
the natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural
father is lacking.
2) No. In reference to abandonment of a child by his
parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that
petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United
States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail
and catered to their whims.

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F.
TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.
F A C T S:
Tomasa claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased. Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the
legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L.
Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased
Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo, Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming
his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son
and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of
the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive
father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Pedro’s intervention.
I S S U E:
1) W/N the marriage between the Tomasa Vda. De
Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid
2) W/N defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted
son of Alfredo E. Jacob
H E L D:
1) Yes. It has been established that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not
require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.
With regards to the loss of the marriage certificate,
due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage
ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the
testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own
declaration in court. These are relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
2) No. Central to the present question is the authenticity
of Judge Moya's signature on the questioned Order of
Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter,
two expert witnesses were presented, one for
petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial
court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and
brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.
It was clear that Judge Moya could not recall having
ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly,
when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya
declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption
cases. The only decisions he made in open court
were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his
decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did
not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s
conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In
the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob
had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both
the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no
record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and
ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
F A C T S:
Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon. After their marriage, minor
Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. The spouses prayed for the declaration of the child
Michael C. Mazon as their child for all intents and purposes;
dissolution of the authority vested in the natural parents of the
child; and that the surname of the child be legally changed to
that of the petitioners and that the first name which was
mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to
"MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought
the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to
"Michael." He argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be
granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the
correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on
the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies only to
the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
I S S U E:
1) W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for adoption despite the fact that the
notice by publication did not state the true name
of the minor child.
2) W/N the prayer for the correction of the name of
the child in the civil registry should be granted
H E L D:
1) Yes. In this case the correction involves merely
the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d,"
so that what appears as "Midael" as given name
would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from "Midael C.
Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names "can
be read and pronounced with the same rhyme
(tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give
notice so that those who have any objection to
the adoption can make their objection known.
That purpose has been served by publication of
notice in this case.
2) No. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and
because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the
correction of the name of the minor, is void and
without force or effect. The trial court was clearly
in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be
made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was
not impleaded in this case much less given notice
of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction
of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable
party in a case renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.
While there was notice given by publication in this
case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that
notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor
was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
addition the correction of his name in the civil
registry was also being sought. The local civil
registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to
implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the
petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void
for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to
the subject matter.
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M.
REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M.
REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, Respondents.
F A C T S:
Eugenio was the registered owner of a parcel of land which
was first registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes,
siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the
heirs following the death of his parents.
A complaint was filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan
by respondents Librada, now deceased, and her alleged
daughter Leonida for annulment of contract denominated as
Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents alleged, among others, that they are the legal
heirs of the late Godofredo who was the lawful and registered
tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the
subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other
unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
document denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents
from the subject property; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the
subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to
maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation
of the subject property. During trial, respondents presented a
leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo
to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between
him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation
of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere
tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an
agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and
that she was fully aware of the contents of the document.
Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also
questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract,
over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio
also asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the
present suit.
The Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the
tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject
land.
On the other hand, the DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are
former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses
Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among
others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of
their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the
farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB
banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the
leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo
to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the
evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal
incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract.
The Court of Appeals issued a resolution regarding the status
of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case and
affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
I S S U E:
1) W/N there exist a tenancy relationship between
Eugenio and the respondents
2) W/N Eugenio can question the legal standing of
Leonida as a party on the ground that she was a
mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a
legal heir
H E L D:
1) Yes. A tenancy relationship cannot be
extinguished by mere expiration of term or period
in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation
or the transfer of legal possession of the
landholding according to Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.
2) No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be
collaterally attacked. The legitimacy of the child
cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The same rule is applied to adoption
such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. Against these jurisprudential
backdrops, we have to leave out the status of
Leonida from the case for annulment of the
"Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’
cause.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
F A C T S:
Petitioner Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein, among others, that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.
The trial court granted the petition. The petitioner filed a motion
for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name but was denied. The Republic,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to
use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
I S S U E:
1) W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.
H E L D:
1) Yes. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to
use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of
the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552
(law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary
rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs.
Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and
father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle
name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.
 H E L D:
1)
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P.
LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
F A C T S:
Petitioner Monina is married to Primo Lim. They were childless.
Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted
to them by a certain Ayuban. Monina and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the children’s
parents.
2)
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. However, Lim died. Thereafter, Monina married
Olario, an American citizen.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. She then filed separate petitions
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. Michelle and her
husband gave their consent to the adoption as well as Michael
and Olario.
The trial court dismissed the petitions. It ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband.
I S S U E:
1) W/N the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly
adopt
2) W/N joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated upon
reaching the age of majority
No. The rule provides that husband and
wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
No. It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of
majority or 18 years of age — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the
name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs
of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still
considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents
are entitled such as support and successional rights.
 could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt is waived.

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for

adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of
the petition. He then conceded that the annulment
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014 case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
He even kept the money given him, in violation of the
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, Code’s mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon
vs. demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent. funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
F A C T S: violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and
of the public confidence in the legal profession.
Nery filed a complaint alleging that she engaged the services
of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana.
As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter.
Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in installment. Sampana,
thereafter, sent a text message informing Nery that he already
filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the
court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer
necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional.

Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the

status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there
was no such petition filed in the court. Thus Nery met
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00
she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct
the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was
never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the
reimbursement but the demands were left unheeded.

Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the

petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have
mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana
committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.

Sampana was found guilty of malpractice for making Nery

believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.

I S S U E:

1) W/N a certification must first be obtained before filing

the petition for adoption

H E L D:

1) No. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the

certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he
suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be
married to her close relative, the intended adoption

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
F A C T S:
John was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville. As such,
he was enrolled under the government's Employees'
Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the SSS. However, SSS
denied the claim because she was no longer considered as the
parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL.
The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed
the ruling of the SSS.
I S S U E:
1) W/N the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases,
to receive the benefits under the ECP
2) W/N petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John’s work-related demise.
H E L D:
1) Yes. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears
that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987, or only less than three (3) years since the
decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to
have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the
legitimate parents is contrary to law.
2) Yes. Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then
about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority
over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside
from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive
parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four
(4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession to the estate
of their child who was the subject of adoption. While
the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should
certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance at a better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched
from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the
adopted child’s quality of life might have been better
off not being adopted at all if he would only find
himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental
authority over the adopted child.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent
given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees'
Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.