Descartes's Early Doctrine of Clear and Distinct Ideas

Author(s): Stephen Gaukroger

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1992), pp. 585-602
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709939
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 Descartes's Early Doctrineof
Clear and DistinctIdeas
StephenGaukroger

PhilosopherssinceArnauldhaveoftenfoundthedoctrineofclearand
distinctideas, as it figuresin workssuch as the Meditations,distinctly
odd and implausible.My aim in thispaper is to show thatthe original
versionofthedoctrine,whichDescartesheldup to 1628,is verydifferent
fromthe doctrinethatis defendedin Meditations.I shall arguethatthe
earlierdoctrineis bothmoreplausibleand morerestricted thanthelater
metaphysical doctrine.It is nota doctrinethatderivesfromconsiderations
aboutourcognitiverelationto theexternalworldbutonethatis concerned
ratherwiththeevidentialqualityofimages,notone whichconcernsitself
so muchwithabsolutecertainty as withconviction, and thementalimages
it workswithare not the highlyabstractideas of the laterwritingsbut
vividpictorialrepresentations. Nevertheless, itis thisearlierdoctrinethat
developsintothe laterdoctrineof clear and distinctideas, and I believe
thata numberof the severeproblemsthatthe laterdoctrinewas subject
to derivefromthe anomalousnatureof its origins.I shall not concern
myselfwiththedevelopment and transformation ofthedoctrineafterthe
abandonmentof theRegulae in 1628. A studyof the earlyversionindi-
cates, however,that the later one is a doomed attemptto converta
good but limitedrhetorical-psychological criterionof what constitutes
compellingevidenceinto a criterionwhich purportsto guaranteeour
cognitivegraspagainsthyperbolicdoubt.Moreover,the pictorialnature
of the imagesto whichthe earlydoctrineis directedmilitatesagainst
the view,encouragedby Descarteshimselfand stillwidelyacceptedby
commentators, thatthe doctrineof clear and distinctideas derivesfrom
reflectionuponmathematics. In fact,as I shallshow,in so faras theearly
doctrinehas a specificbearinguponmathematics, it is actuallyin conflict
withit. But evenifthetwowerein agreement, thesourceofthedoctrine
certainlydoes not lie in mathematics.The source,as I shall show, is
ultimately rhetorical-psychological.
The Regulae ad directionem ingenii,whichwerenot publisheduntil
afterDescartes'sdeath,wereonce generallythoughtto have been com-
posedin 1628.Therehave,however,alwaysbeenthosewhohavebelieved

585

1992byJOURNAL
Copyright OF THE HISTORYOF IDEAS,INC.
586 StephenGaukroger

thatat leastsomeofthemwerecomposed earlier;andfollowing Weber's

pioneering work,'thereis nowgoodreasonto supposethattheRegulae
werein factcomposed between1619/20and 1626-28andthata number
ofstagesofcomposition areevident, withsomeoftheRulescomprising
material composed atdifferenttimes.I shallworkontheminimal assump-
tionthatRules 1 to 11 date from around 1620(with not
qualifications
relevant here)andthatRules12ff datefrom1626-28.2 Actually,I do not,
strictlyspeaking,evenneedto distinguish thesetwostagesforthemain
purposeof myargument; butsincedoingso providesus witha more
accurateaccountof Descartes'sintellectual development and sincethe
minimalassumption is nowrelatively uncontentious,we havemoreto
gainthanto losefromfollowing thischronology.

andtheDoctrineofClearand DistinctIdeas
Intuitus
in theEarlyRegulae

Our firstconcernwillbe withtheearlyRules,datingfromaround

1620.Havingestablished theunity ofknowledge inRule1,Descartessets
2
outin Rule thereasons we need a method ifwe areto succeedin our
andhe holdsup themathematical
inquiries; sciencesas modelsin virtue
of the certaintyof theirresults.Rules 3 and 4 thenset out the two
operationsonwhichthatmethod relies,namely, anddeduction.
intuition
Rules5, 6, and 7 providedetailsofhowwe are actuallyto proceedon
thisbasis,and Rules 8 to 11 elaborateon specificpoints.The central

' Jean-PaulWeber,La Constitution du textdes Regulae (Paris, 1964).

2 Followingthegeneralthrustof Weber'saccount,and addingrevisionssuggestedin
JohnSchuster,Descartesand theScientific Revolution,1618-1634(Ph.D. diss.,Princeton
University, 1977), the scheduleof compositionthatI am inclinedto followis one that
recognizestwocompositerules(4 and 8) and threestagesof composition.The firststage
of compositionis represented by what is now usuallyreferred to as Rule 4B, i.e., the
second partof Rule 4, wherea mathesisuniversalisis discussed.This fragment, which
mayhave initiallyformedpartof theproposedThesaurusmathematicus, probablydates
fromMarch-November 1619and inanycase beforeRule 4A. The secondstageofcomposi-
tion was 1619/20,the periodafterthe famousdreamof 10 November.What seemsto
have been composedat thistimewereRules 1 to 3, 4A, and 5 to 11, withtheexception
of partsof Rule 8. The Regulae were thenabandonedand takenup again in a rather
different veinin 1626-28,whentheremainder, beginningwiththeremaining partsofRule
8, werecomposed.The threestagescan be characterizedbriefly as follows:thefragment
fromthefirststageenvisagesa generalformofmathematics to whichparticularmathemat-
ical disciplineswouldbe subservient; thematerialfromthesecondstagesetsout rulesof
methodwhichgo beyondspecificallymathematicalconcerns,and it draws on areas as
diverseas rhetoric,psychology,and dialectic;and the materialfromthe thirdstage is
above all concernedwiththemechanistic construalofcognition,althoughthefinalRules
returnto moredirectlymethodological and to mathematical concerns.The wholeenter-
prisewas finallyabandonedin 1628. My concernin thispaperis withmaterialfromthe
secondand thirdstages.
Descartes'sIdeas 587

topicshereare thedoctrinesof intuition(intuitus)and deduction,and it

is in thesethatthe noveltyof Descartes'saccountresides.
"Deduction" is a notoriouslyslipperytermin Descartes.Desmond
Clarkehas drawnattention to contextsinwhichitis usedto meanexplana-
tion,proof,induction, and on occasionit seemsto do little
orjustification;
morethandescribethe narrationof an argument.3 In Rule 2 Descartes
makesa claimaboutdeductionwhichat firstmakesone wonderjust how
he is usingthe term.He writes:
Therearetwowaysofarriving at a knowledgeofthings,
through experienceand
through deduction.Moreover,wemustnotethatwhileourexperiences ofthings
areoftendeceptive,thededuction or pureinference
ofonethingfromanother
can neverbe performed wrongly by an intellect
whichis in theleastdegree
rationalthoughwe mayfailto maketheinference ifwe do notsee it. Those
chainsbywhichdialecticians hopeto regulate humanreasonseemto metobe
oflittleusehere,thoughI do notdenythattheyareusefulforotherpurposes.
In fact,noneoftheerrors to whichmen-men,I say,notbrutes-areliableis
everdue to faulty Theyare due onlyto thefactthatmentakefor
inference.
granted certain
poorlyunderstood or laydownrashor groundless
experiences,
judgements.4
It is not too difficultto see whyDescartesshouldwantto maintainthat
we can neverbe mistakenabout deduction,forhe wantsintuitionand
deductionto be thetwotrustworthy processesthatwe can use to lead us
to genuineknowledge, and as we shallsee,he makesthesameclaimabout
intuition. But to maintainthatwe can nevermakea mistakein deductive
inference is nonethelessa remarkable claim.In orderto findout precisely
whathe means,it is worthaskingwhatpreciselyhe is rejecting. Whatare
the "chains" by which the "dialecticians"hope to regulateinference?
These are presumablythe rules governingsyllogistic,those rules that
specifywhichinference patternsare (formally)valid. The problemis to
determine whatit is thatDescartesfindsobjectionablein suchrules.The
claimis certainlynot thattheserulesare wrongand thatothersmustbe
substituted forthem,thatnew"chains"mustreplacetheold ones.Rather,
the questionhingeson therole thatone sees theserulesas having,since
Descartesadmitsthattheymay"be usefulforotherpurposes."Whathe
is rejectingis theiruse as rulesof reasoning,as somethingone needsto
be familiarwithin orderto reasonproperly.If one looks at the logical
textswithwhichwe knowhimto have been familiar,above all thoseof
Toletusand Fonseca, thenwe can identify the culpritwithsome degree
ofcertainty: theJesuitaccountof"directionsforthinking"(directioinge-
nii). The Jesuitaccountof logic whichDescarteslearnedat La Fleche
I Desmond Clarke,Descartes'Philosophyof Science (Manchester,1982), 63-74 and
207-10.
4 Oeuvresde Descartes,ed. Adam and Tannery(2nd ed.; 11 vols.; Paris, 1974-86),x,

"AT").
365 (hereafter
588 StephenGaukroger

was oneinwhichlogicordialecticwas construedaboveall as a psychologi-

cal processwhichrequiredregulationifit was to functionproperly.5In
the lightof this,one thingthatwe can take Descartesto be denyingis
thatmentalprocessesrequireexternalregulation,thatrulesto guideour
thoughtare needed.This is made veryclear in Rule 4:
[My]method cannotgoso faras toteachushowtoperform theactualoperations
ofintuition
anddeduction,forthesearethesimplestofall andquitebasic.Ifour
intellect
werenotalready abletoperform them,itwouldnotcomprehend anyof
the rulesof the method,howevereasytheymightbe. As forothermental
operations claimsto directwiththehelpofthosealreadymen-
whichdialectic
theyareofnousehere,orrather
tioned, shouldbereckoned a positive
hindrance,
fornothingcanbe addedtotheclearlightofreasonwhichdoesnotinsomeway
dimit.6
This is an importantpoint,forit is oftenimplicitly assumedthatthe
provisionof such rulesis just whatDescartesis tryingto achievein the
Regulae. But thiscannotbe theiraim. Descartes'sviewis thatinference
is something whichwe, as rationalcreatures,perform naturallyand cor-
rectly.Whatthendo the"rulesforthedirectionofournativeintelligence"
do thatis different fromwhat the old rulesof dialecticdid? Well, the
difference seemsto lie not so muchin whatthe rulesdo as in whatthey
relyuponto do it. In Descartes'sviewsyllogistics relieson rulesimposed
fromoutside,whereas his rulesare to
designed capturean internalprocess
whichoperateswitha criterion oftruthand falsity
thatis beyondquestion.
This is thatwe acceptas trueall and onlythatofwhichwe have a "clear
and distinct"perception.But the elaborationof thisprincipleis largely
confinedto thediscussionof"intuition," and withgood reason,foritsoon
becomesclear thatdeductionreduces,in the limitingcase, to intuition.
Towardsthe end of Rule 3 Descartestellsus that"the self-evidence
and certaintyof intuitionis requirednot only forapprehendingsingle
propositionsbut also fordeduction,since in the inference2 + 2 = 3
+ 1,we mustnotonly"intuitively perceivethat2 plus 2 make4 and that
3 plus 1 make 4 but also thatthe originalpropositionfollowsfromthe
othertwo." Here thefirsttwo perceptionsare intuitions, whereasseeing
theconnectionbetweenthemis a deduction.But thedeductionseemsin
all important respectsto be simplyan intuition,albeitan intuitionwhose
contentis a relationbetweenotherintuitions.This clearlyraises the
questionof the difference betweenan intuitionand a deduction,and so
Descartessetsout whyhe believesit necessaryto distinguish deduction
fromintuitionat all:
mentalintuition
Hencewe are distinguishing on the
fromcertaindeductions
thatweareawareofa movement
grounds in
ora sortofsequence thelatter
but
I See StephenGaukroger,CartesianLogic (Oxford,1989),46-47.
6 AT, x, 372-73.
Descartes'sIdeas 589

notin theformer, andalso becauseimmediate is notrequired

self-evidence for
deduction,as it is forintuition;
deduction from
in a sensegetsits certainty
memory. It follows thatareimmediately
thatthosepropositions from
inferred
first canbe saidtobe knowninonerespect
principles through andin
intuition,
anotherrespectthrough Butthefirst
deduction. principlesthemselvesareknown
onlythrough intuition,andtheremote conclusions onlythrough deduction.7

This is ratherpuzzling,givenDescartes'sexample.Memoryin anygenu-

ine sensewouldseemto playno real rolein thedeductionfrom2 + 2 =
4 and 3 + 1 = 4 that2 + 2 = 3 + 1. Whydoes he specifythatremote
consequencesare knownonly throughdeduction?Could it be thatthe
consequencein the example,whichis farfrombeingremote,is known
not by deductionbut by intuition?No: it is the examplethatDescartes
himselfgives of a deduction,and the only exampleat that.He seems
concernedabove all to restrictintuitionto an absolutelyinstantaneous
act, so thatifthereis any temporalintervalof any kind,no matterhow
brief,we are dealingwithdeductionratherthanintuition.But thisis the
onlydifference; and eventhisdifferenceis undermined in Rule 7, where
Descarteselaborateson thequestionofhow to makesurethatdeductions
are reliable:
Thusif,forexample, I havefirst
foundout,bydistinct what
mentaloperations,
existsbetween
relation themagnitudesA andB, thenwhatbetween B and C,
between C andD, andfinallybetween D andE, thatdoesnotentailthatI will
seewhattherelation is betweenA andE, norcan thetruthspreviouslylearned
givemea preciseideaofitunlessI recallthemall. To remedythisI wouldrun
overthemmanytimes, bya continuousmovement oftheimagination,insucha
ofeachtermat thesamemoment
waythatit has an intuition thatitpasseson
to theothers,andthisI woulddo untilI learnedto passfromthefirstrelation
tothelastso quicklythattherewasalmostnoroleleftformemory andI seemed
to havethewholebefore meat thesametime.8

In short,themoreit approachesintuition, themorereliabledeductionis.

It is hard to avoid the conclusionthatdeductionis ultimately modelled
on intuitionand thatin the limitingcase becomesintuition.
Given this,the key notionis obviouslythat of intuition(intuitus).
Intuitionhas two distinctive act, and it
features:it is an instantaneous
consistsina clearand distinctgraspofan idea. As regardsthefirstfeature,
it is strikinghow Descartesis committedto instantaneousness fromhis
veryearliestwritings:in the hydrostatics manuscriptsdatingfromthe
beginning of 1619,9forexample,he construesmotionin termsofinstanta-
neous tendenciesto motion;and theimportanceofinstantaneous acts or
processesis something thathe willmakemuchofin hislaterwritings. At

' AT, x, 370.

8 AT, x, 387-88.
' See in particular "Aquae comprimentis.. ." AT, x, 67-74.
590 StephenGaukroger

thisstage(1620), however,we have so littleto go on thatwe can do no

more than note the fact that he seems committedto the idea of the
instant,withoutprovidingtheslightest hintas to whattheimportanceof
instantaneous processesconsistsin. The notionofclearand distinctideas,
on theotherhand,is somethingwhoseimportanceforDescarteswe can
understand, and the originsof the doctrinecan be reconstructed.
Descartesis certainlynot the firstto employthe notionof clear and
distinctideas as a criterionforknowledge;the Stoics operatedwitha
similarcriterion in theirepistemology and heldthatourclearand distinct
cognitiveimpressionsprovideus witha guaranteeof the truthof these
impressions. Descartesmayhave been familiarwiththisdoctrine,and if
he was, it would have been fromBook 7 of Diogenes Laertius'sLivesof
EminentPhilosophers, fromCicero'sAcademica,or fromtheverycritical
treatment in SextusEmpiricus.But I thinkit unlikelythathe was simply
takingover the Stoic doctrineor even that he was influencedby the
doctrinein itsspecifically Stoicform.For one thing,theStoicdoctrineis
restrictedin its applicationin the firstinstanceto perceptualcognitive
impressions(othercognitiveimpressionsderivingtheirguaranteefrom
these), whereasDescartes's paradigmcase is that of a nonperceptual
cognitiveimpression par excellence,namely,mathematics. It is crucialto
theStoicdoctrineto takeintoaccounttheexternalsourceofour impres-
sions,whereasin Descartes'sversionof the doctrinethe questionof the
source does not arise. Moreover,the Stoic doctrine,wherebywe can
inspectour cognitiveimpressionsto determinewhethertheyhave the
essentialpropertiesof clarityand distinctness, was subjectedto severe
criticismby Sextus;and Michael Frede has pointedout that it was so
vulnerablethat it is difficult to understandhow the Stoics could have
continuedto defendit.10It is therefore unlikelythat Descartes would
simplyhave takenover the doctrinewithoutat least tryingto remedy
defectsthatwerepointedout in theexpositionsof Stoicteaching.This is
especiallythe case since his own account,focusingon propertiesof the
image or idea, seems to relyon those veryelementswhichwere most
problematic fortheStoicsand whichtheymade thegreatestefforts to go
beyondby focusingon the externalsourceof our impressions.It is ex-
tremely unlikelythatDescartes'saccountderivesfromtheexplicitly epis-
temologicalversionofthedoctrineoffered bytheStoics.Rather,itderives
froma moregeneraland traditionalversion,one whichexplicitlydeals
withqualitiesofideas,impressions, or imagesin such a waythatit is not
theirsourcethatis at issuebutthequalityoftheimageitself, just as it is
forDescartes.
In fact,Descartes'saccountofclearand distinctideashas somerather
strikingparallelswitha psychologicaltheoryof cognitivegraspthathe
would have had some knowledgeof fromhis studiesat La Fleche. This

10Michael Frede,Essaysin AncientPhilosophy

(Oxford,1987), 152.
Descartes'sIdeas 591

theory, thoughAristotelian inorigin, is tobe foundnotonlyintheStoic

version butalsointhewritings ofQuintilian. It mayatfirst seempeculiar
thatDescartesshouldderive his criterion from a work which is, with
Cicero'swritings, theclassicaccountof rhetorical invention. But this
accountwas drawnuponextensively in thesixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, anditis notat all surprising thatDescartesshouldhavetaken
it as hisstarting point.
Rhetoric tookoverthetraditional concerns oflogicin a number of
areas,especially in"invention," thatis,thediscovery ofthosearguments
necessary toconvince anopponent, starting from sharedpremises, ofsome
case thatone wantsto establish. Aristotle discussedthisquestionin a
broadlyscientific contextin theTopics,butbythesixteenth century the
modelsforsuchconviction weredrawnfromrhetoric, especially from
Quintilian. Quintilian devoteda greatdeal of attention to discovering
arguments likelyto leadto conviction in areassuchas law andpolitical
oratory; and indeedifconviction wereone'saim,thensuchtechniques
are morelikelyto be ofuse thanan understanding ofwhichsyllogistic
forms ofargument areformally valid.Thisdoesnotmeanthattheespousal
ofrhetoric carriedwithit a disregard forvalidarguments, butvalidity
was regarded merely as one in
ingredient gooda argument. Now, thisis
a fairpoint.Although Aristotle's syllogistic dealswithprobabilistic forms
ofargument and holdsthatarguments maybe validwithout beingfor-
mallyvalid,it is aboveall a theory offormally validinferences; and an
understanding offormally validinferences is notsomething thatone is
likely tofindespecially useful intrying toconvince a recalcitrantopponent
ofsomecontentious conclusion.1I1Itisfarfrom clearthatlogic,understood
as a theory ofthenatureofformally validinferences, is ofanyuse by
itselfin changing someone's mindabouta conclusion or thatitis ofany
use in enabling us to understand whysomeonechangedtheirmindas a
resultofbeingconvinced byan argument.
Thefirst question seemsrather topertain totechniques ofpersuasion;
and theaim ofrhetorical theories is precisely to captureand elaborate
uponthosetechniques of persuasion whichare bestfittedto different
kindsof situations. This does notprevent logicalconsiderations being
brought to bear,butthesewillbe paramount onlyin thosecaseswhere
deductive certainty can be achieved, and suchcasesarenotlikelyto be
common.12 The second question-that ofhowargument can changeour
beliefs-ismuchmoredifficult to deal with.The rhetorical tradition,

" Aristotleis, of course,aware of the factthat different approachesare neededin

different areas. As he tellsus in theNicomacheanEthics,"it is equallyunreasonableto
acceptmerelyprobableconclusionsfroma mathematician and to demandstrictdemon-
strationfroman orator"(1094a25ff).But whatis at issuein thepresentcontextis whether
logic,in practicalcircumstances, to induceconviction.
can everbe necessaryor sufficient
12 See the discussionin ch. 3 of A. Graftonand L. Jardine, From Humanism to
Humanities(London, 1986).
592 StephenGaukroger

drawingon Aristotelian and occasionallyStoic psychology, triedto pro-

vide some account of how our ideas mightbe comparedin terms,for
example,of theirvividness,and it is not too hard to see how a notion
such as "vividness"mightoperateas a rudimentary criterionfor the
replacementof one beliefby another.Although(so far as I can tell)
thistopic was not pursuedin any detail in antiquity,thereare explicit
seventeenth-century accountsthat show how the theoryworks.Male-
branche'stheoryofthewillis one example.He tellsus thatwhentackling
theproblemofhowwe areto resista lessergoodbywhichwe aretempted,
in favorofa greatergood,we mustrepresent thegreatergood to ourselves
as vividlyas possibleso thatit becomesmorevividin our mindthanthe
lessergood. The suggestionis thatonce thebalanceofvividnesshas been
tipped,we willautomatically assentto or wishforthegreatergood.13This
is a problemthatexercisedDescartes,and Malebranche'saccountcan be
seen as a laterdevelopment withinCartesianpsychology.Althoughit is
treatedin epistemological-psychological terms,itsultimatesourcelies in
therhetorical-psychological theoriesofQuintilian,whoseworksDescartes
had studiedin detailat La Fleche.
The Romanrhetorical writerstookup elementsfromthepsychological
and poetictheoriesof theirpredecessorsas well as fromtheirrhetorical
works.Paramountamong these earlierauthorswas Aristotle,and in
Quintilian'swritings we can findelementsnotonlyfromAristotle's Rheto-
ricand Poeticsbutalso fromtheNicomacheanEthicsand thethirdbook
of the De Anima. Quintilianis concerned-as were earlierwriterson
rhetoric,such as Cicero and the authorof the anonymousRhetoricaad
herennium-withthe qualitiesof the "image," withthe searchforand
presentation ofimagesthatweredistinctive in theirvividnessand particu-
larity.A numberofrhetoricaland psychologicalconcernsmeethere,and
featureofRoman writerson rhetoricthatpsychological
it is a distinctive
categoriesare used to providea basis forrhetoricalones.This is nowhere
moretruethanin Quintilian'sInstitutioOratoria.
The verypossibilityof this whole approach derivesinitiallyfrom
Aristotle'sdefenseoftheemotions.WhereasPlato banishedtheemotions
fromtherationalmind,Aristotleshowedin theRhetoricand thePoetics
the crucial role the emotionsplay in judgment.In responseto Plato's
doctrinethat art is mere mimesis,he elaboratedthe doctrinethat in
tragedy,forexample,we are presentednotsimplywitha set ofempirical
falsehoodsbutwithan investigation ofthecauses ofhumanbehavior.By
abstractingthese causes fromparticularcircumstancesand presenting
themin a universalway,it is possibleto capturefeaturesofcharacterand
intentions whichare normallyobscured.The dramadoes thisby moving
the audience to fearand pity.Now to defendthis view fully,what is

13 See the discussionin CharlesJ. McCracken,Malebrancheand BritishPhilosophy

(Oxford,1983), 107-8.
Descartes'sIdeas 593

neededis a psychologicaltheoryof the emotions,and moregenerallyof

judgment,and thisAristotleprovidesin thethirdbook oftheDe Anima.
An important partofthisaccounttakestheformofa theoryoftheimage-
makingcapacityofjudgment,something ofwhichPlatohad a low opinion
but whichAristotlewas concernedto defend.Aristotletellsus thatthe
imagination(phantasia)functionsratherlike sense perception.It works
withimagesthatenable the mindto think,"and forthisreason,unless
one perceivedthingsone would not learn or understandanything, and
whenone contemplates one mustat thesame timecontemplate an image
[phantasma],forimagesare like sense perceptions, exceptthattheyare
withoutmatter"(De Anima 432a7-10).
The Roman rhetoricaltraditionwas especiallyconcernedwithsuch
imagesand above all withthequestionof whatfeaturesor qualitiesthey
musthaveiftheyareto be employedeffectively in convincingan audience.
Whetherone is an oratorat courtor an actoron stage,Quintiliantells
us, our aim is to engagetheemotionsoftheaudience,and perhapsto get
it to behavein a particularway as a result.14 To achievethis,on Quintil-
ian's view,one musttransform the psychologicalimage,thefantasma,
intoitsrhetorical theeikon.KathyEden has drawnattention
counterpart,
to a veryinteresting featureof this account,namely,thatQuintilianis
concernedaboveall withtheevidential qualityofimages.The oratorneeds
to exhibitratherthandisplayhis proofs.Eden sums up the situationas
follows:
Inthisdiscussion
... theolddebtofAristotelian
psychologytothefundamentally
legalmodelofjudgement and actionreemerges relation.
as a reciprocal To
influencetheoutcome ofa legaljudgement-the goaloftheorator-Quintilian's
forensicimagerelieson thepowerofthepsychological imagewhich,as farback
De Anima,has directly
as Aristotle's thejudgingpowerofthesoul.
affected
Conversely,to perform itsoffice,
theimagerequires,evenat thepsychological
stage,thevividness
andpalpabilitycharacteristic inthelawcourt.
ofrealevidence
In otherwords,thepoweroftheimagoto movethemindto a particular judge-
mentreliesontheproperty itshareswithrealordemonstrativeevidencetobear
on theoutcomeofa legaltrial.'5

Thereare strikingparallelsherewithDescartes'sdoctrineofclearand
distinctideas. Justas Aristotleand Quintilianare concernedwiththe
vividnessand particularityoftheimagesemployedby theorator,drama-
or
tist, lawyer, so Descartesis concernedwiththeclarityand distinctness
of thementalimageshe refersto as "ideas." In bothcases thereis some
variationin terminology-Quintilian talksofbothvividnessand particu-
larity,and vividnessand palpabilityand Descartes of clarityand dis-

InstitutioOratoria,tr. H. E. Butler,(4 vols.; Cambridge,Mass., 1985),

14 Quintilian,

VI, ii, 27-35.

15KathyEden,Poeticand Legal Fictionin theAristotelian (Princeton,1986).
Tradition
594 StephenGaukroger

tinctness,clarityand vividness,clarityand simpleness,and so on-but

nothinghingeson this.Now DescartescertainlyknewQuintilian'stexts:
in thefifth yearof his studiesat La Fleche he would have been required
to studythe Institutioin depth and may well have been requiredto
memorizepassagesfromit.16AmongtheGreektextshe wouldhavebeen
requiredto studywas Aristotle'sRhetoric,withitsdetaileddiscussion(in
chapter3.11) of a kind of vividness(ev&apyeaa)directedtowardsthe
sensesratherthan the intellect.His familiarity withrhetoricalpractice
would have been extensive,for the Jesuitshad an intenseinterestin
rhetoric and notonlytaughtitin detailbutdevelopeda distinctive rhetori-
cal stylewhichfocusedon the use of vividimages.Centralto theJesuit
use of images in both the teachingand developmentof rhetoricwas
Philostratus'sEikones,which offeredexemplaryexercisesin the art of
rhetoricaldescription of (imaginary)paintings17thatdependedupon the
ability,as it were,to painta picturein language.Descartesretainedan
interestin theserhetoricalquestionsthroughoutthe 1620s.18There are
thena numberofpossiblerhetoricalsourcesforhis doctrineofclearand
distinctideas-Aristotle,Quintilian,Philostratus-andmyaim is not to
tryto identify a particularwriteror textas thesourceofhis doctrinebut
ratherto showthegenrefromwhichthedoctrinederivesand in particular
to indicatethatitssourcesare rhetorical/psychological ratherthanepiste-
mological.However,I am inclinedto suspect,forreasonsthatwillbecome
evidentbelow,thatdoctrinesdistinctive to Quintilianplayeda keyrole.
The contextof Descartes'saccountdiffers in one veryimportant re-
spectfromthoseofAristotleand Quintilianin that,forthelatter,convic-
tionis conceivedin discursiveterms.In thecase ofAristotlethisis as true
of logic as it is of rhetoric,drama,and legal pleading.For Aristotle,the
dialecticalsyllogismwas designedto induceconvictionin an opponent,
thedemonstrative syllogismto induceconvictionin a student,and so on.
The contextofargumentation is discursivein thesensethatone is always
arguingwithsomeoneon the basis of sharedpremises;forunlessthere
weresharedpremises,the argumentcould not begin.In the rhetorical,
dramatic,and legal cases the situationis evenmorestraightforward, for
herewhat one is doingis directedtowardsan audience.For Quintilian
"oratory"virtually takesoverthewholequestionofinducingconviction,

16 In thefifthyearofstudyat La Fleche themoralwritings ofCicero,Caesar,Sallust,

and others,and the rhetoricalwritingsof Cicero and Quintiliantook up the majorpart
of thecurriculum.See theJesuitcurriculumset out in theRatio Studiorum,givenin G.
Michael Pachtler"Ratio Studioriumet Institutiones scholasticaeS. J. per Germanum
diu vigentes,"MonumentaGermaniaePaedogogia,IX (Berlin, 1890), and the detailed
discussionin Franqoisde Dainville,La Naissancede l'humanismemoderne(Paris, 1940).
17 See Marc Fumaroli,L'Age de l'eloquence(Geneva, 1980).

18 Descartes showed a positiveand informed interestin rhetoricalissues as late as

1628,in his open letterdefendingthe rhetoricalstyleof Guez de Balzac, on whichsee
Thomas M. Carr Jr.,Descartesand theResilienceofRhetoric(Carbondale,1990),ch. 2.
Descartes'sIdeas 595

and convictionis clearlydirectedat an audience.For Descartes,by con-

trast,thecentraltaskis to convinceoneself,and onlyonce one has done
thisdoes one tryto convinceothers.
The questionthatnaturallyariseshereis whethera theorydevotedto
consideringhow one convincesan audience of something(on grounds
thatmaynot alwaysdependon the truthof whatone is arguing)could
possiblyformthe basis fora theoryabout what characteristics of ideas
enableus to recognizetheirtruth,evenifwe wouldhavedifficulty convinc-
ingothersofthattruth. 19The answeris thatitcould.Whatwe mustfocus
on is thepsychologicalcontent.Psychologicaltheoryabout questionsof
judgmentwas transmitted to themodemeralargelyintheformofrhetori-
cal theory,especiallythatofQuintilian.His treatiseon oratorymaywell
haveplayeda criticalrolein Descartes'sthinking aboutjudgingthetruth
of theoriesin termsof the clear and distinctperceptionof ideas. On
Quintilian'saccount,and herehe followsAristotle,vividillustration (evi-
dentia)ofthefacts"goes beyondmereclarity,sincethelattermerelylets
itselfbe seen,whereastheformer thrustsitselfupon our attention."20But
how do we achievesuch evidentia?The answeris givenas follows:
If we wishto giveourwordstheappearance ofsincerity,
we mustassimilate
ourselvesto theemotions ofthosewhoare genuinely so affected,
and ourelo-
quencemustspring fromthesamefeeling thatwedesiretoproduceinthemind
ofthejudge.Willhe grievewhocan findno traceofgriefin thewordswith
whichI seekto movehimto grief? . . . It is utterly Firealonecan
impossible.
kindle,and moisture alonecan wet,norcan one thingimpartanycolourto
anothersavethatwhichitpossesses itself. Accordingly,thefirst is that
essential
thosefeelingsshouldprevailwithus thatwewishtoprevailwiththejudge,and
thatwe shouldbe movedourselves before we attempt to moveothers.2'

Quintilianthengoes on to ask how we generatetheseemotionsin our-

selves,and therefollowshis accountof the evidentialqualityof images.
The crucialpointhere is thatunlessone is alreadyconvincedby one's
own images,one willnotbe in a positionto use themto convinceothers.
So self-conviction forthe convictionof others;and self-
is a prerequisite
conviction,liketheconvictionofone's audience,dependson thequalities
of the image,amongstwhichmustfigureclarity(perspicuitas) and viv-
idness(evidentia).
AlthoughI can findno directborrowingsfromQuintilianon Des-
cartes'spart,I findit hardto believethatsomeonewho knewthistextso
well and who himselfofferedsuch a similardoctrinewas not influenced

19 Note,forexample,theremark to Mersennein a letterof25 November1630:"I will

test,in thetreatiseon Dioptrics,whetherI am able to explainmythoughtsand persuade
othersof a truthafterI have persuadedmyselfof it-somethingI am notsureof" (AT,
i, 172).
20 Quintilian, op. cit.,VIII, iii, 61.
21 Ibid, VI, ii, 27-29.
596 StephenGaukroger

byit,or at leastbyhis memoryofit. It is a modelofself-conviction along

I
the lines developedby Quintilian, suggest, that is the
effectively same
one takenup by Descartesin Rule 3, wherewe are told thatwhat we
mustseekis something we can clearlyand evidently intuit(clareeteviden-
terpossimusintueri)and thatthe mindthat is "clear and attentive"will
be able to achievethis. Althoughthe earlyRules draw theirmodel of
knowledgealmost exclusivelyfrommathematics, the pointis that the
doctrineof clear and distinctideas is exhibitedparadigmatically in the
case ofmathematics, notthatit is necessarilyderivedfrommathematics.
It shouldnot be surprising thata conceptionbased on such a strongly
pictorialmodelofrepresentation shouldfinditsparadigmaticmanifesta-
tionin something as abstractas mathematics. In theearliestwritingthat
we havefromDescartes,theCompendium Musicae,clarityofrepresenta-
tionis a focalpointofthetreatise.This amountsto favoring thatpictorial
formof representation in whichdifferences can be detectedat a glance;
therepresentation of musicalintervalsnot as a ratioof integersbut as a
pairingof lines' lengthsby arithmeticproportion.22 Moreover,in the
CogitationesPrivatae,which is roughlycontemporary with the early
Rules,theimage-forming poweroftheimaginationis made thebasis for
the operationsof reason,and indeedits poweris extolledabove thatof
reason:
makesuseoffigures
As imagination toconceiveofbodies,so intellectmakesuse
bodiesto figure
ofcertainsensible things,
spiritual suchas windand light;by
moreprofoundly,
which,philosophizing we candrawourmindbycognition to
It mayseemremarkable
theheights. thattherearemoreweighty judgements in
thewritingsofpoetsthanofphilosophers.The reasonis thatpoetswritewith
moreenthusiasmandtheforce there
ofimagination; arewithin us,as inflintstone,
sparksof thescienceswhichare educedthrough reasonby philosophers but
whicharestruck forth
bypoets throughimagination.23

The idea of thisimage-forming powerbeingat thecenterof cognitionis

dominantin Descartes'sthoughtat this period.Moreover,as a recent
commentator has pointedout, at thistimeDescartesgenerallydoes not
use thetermimaginatio and itscorrelatesto indicatesimpleoperationsbut
ratherto denoteactive,exploratory, investigativeprocesses:visualizing
geometrical visualizingthe end of apparentlyinfinite
constructions, pro-
cessesofdivision,applyingmathematical constructs to physicalproblems,
synthesizing,throughthe act of listening,the discretepartsof a song.24

22 Cf. AT, x, 91-92.

23 AT, x, 217.
24 Denis L.Sepper,"Descartesand theEclipseoftheImagination,1618-1630,"Journal
of theHistoryofPhilosophy,28 (1989), 383-84.
Descartes'sIdeas 597

The LaterRegulae and the Applicationof

Clear and DistinctIdeas to Mathematics
In the course of the 1620s Descartes developeda highlyabstract
conceptionof mathematics.The rhetorical-psychological conceptionof
clear and distinctideas that we have just looked at worksin termsof
pictorialor quasi-pictorialimages,and as suchit wouldseeminappropri-
ate to the kindof mathematicsthatDescarteswas pursuingat the time
of the laterRegulae. But in Rules 16ff,Descartes providesan account
of mathematicsthat employsthisconception.His aim is to show how
mathematics is applicableto reality,and thisrequireshimto show how
mathematical operationscan be represented in theimagination, a corpo-
realbodywitha two-dimensional surfacewhichis thesiteoftherepresen-
tation.In Rules 12-14 Descartes had attemptedto establishthat the
externalworldis represented therebymeansoflinesand two-dimensional
figures,and in Rules 15ffhe triesto show how mathematical operations
can also be represented in thesetermsin the imagination,so thatthey
"map onto" the representation of the world,so to speak. But he also
attemptsto legitimate thisrepresentation of mathematics in theimagina-
tion; and in doing this,he invokesthe clear and distinctnatureof the
mathematical entitiesand operationsperformed in theimagination, enti-
ties,and operationswhichare pictoriallyrepresented in two dimensions.
The crucialpointis thatthelegitimation ofmathematics derivesfromthe
pictorialformthat its operationstake in the imagination,because this
legitimation worksin termsof the doctrineof clear and distinctideas,
whichcan only functionin termsof notionswhichhave a pictorialor
quasi-pictorialcontent.
The mostsignificant aspectofDescartes'sthinking aboutmathematics
at thistimeis the veryabstractway in whichhe conceivesof numbers.
To appreciatetheimportance ofthisproperly, itwillbe helpfulto contrast
his conceptionof numberbrieflywiththat of Greek and Alexandrian
arithmetic.25Take the case of multiplication. On the construalof this
25 What we mustfocusupon here is the relationbetweenarithmetic and geometry.
There was an especiallyclose relationshipbetweenthe two in antiquity,and thereare
essentiallytwo waysin whichthisrelationcan be interpreted. On thefirstinterpretation,
geometry was employedin orderto expandtheresourcesof arithmetic, and it was intro-
ducedinordertoresolvetheproblemofincommensurability byallowingincommensurable
magnitudes tobe represented The resultwas whatis sometimes
unproblematically. referred
to as a "geometricalalgebra,"a way of dealingwitharithmetical problemswhichallows
one to go beyondthe resourcesof arithmetic. Althoughthisview of the matteris that
traditionallyaccepted(despitethepioneeringworkof JacobKlein in the 1930s),at least
until the last twentyyears or so, it has been subjectedto seriouscriticismand now
looks quite implausible.On the second interpretation, the geometricalarticulationof
arithmetical operations,farfromincreasingthegenerality and abstractnessofarithmetic,
infactdiminishes Indeed,thereis a case to be madethatancientarithmetic
itconsiderably.
is infacta formofmetricalgeometry. For moredetailssee JacobKlein,GreekMathemati-
cal Thoughtand theOriginofAlgebra(Cambridge,Mass., 1968);MichaelMahoney,"The
598 StephenGaukroger

operationin ancientmathematics, we multiplylinelengthsbylinelengths.

If a, b, and c are line lengths,forexample,a X b is a rectanglehaving
sidesoflengtha and b, and a X b X c is a solid figureofsidesa, b, and
c. Even thoughwe are dealing with abstractnumbers,we are always
multiplying numbersof something by numbersof something, and conse-
quentlythereis a dimensionalchangein multiplication. This is indicated
by the factthatwe cannotmultiplymorethan threenumberstogether,
sincetheproductis a solidwhichexhauststhenumberofavailabledimen-
sions.26
Thisextraordinarily constrictiveconceptionofnumberswas paralleled
by an equally constrictiveconceptionof arithmeticand geometry,in
whichthepointoftheexercisewas to computea determinate numberor
constructa determinate figurerespectively.For the mathematicians of
antiquityit was only if such a determinate numberor figurecould be
constructed or computedthatone could be said to have solvedtheprob-
lem. In the case of arithmetic, onlynaturalnumberswere allowableas
solutions;negativenumbers,in particular,werenot,and wereregarded
as "impossible"numbers.Towards the end of the Alexandrianperiod,
mostnotablyin Diophantus'sArithmetica, we beginto finda searchfor
problemsand solutionsconcernedwith generalmagnitudes;but these
proceduresnevermakeup anything morethanauxiliarytechniquesform-
inga stagepreliminary to thefinalone,wherea determinate numbermust
be computed.27
In Rule 16 of the Regulae Descartes explicitlysets aside both the
constrictive conceptionofarithmetic thatlimitsit to computingdetermi-
nate numbersand the constrictive conceptionof numberthat,retaining
the intuitivespatialelementsof geometry, construesmultiplication as a
in
procedure whichproducts are alwaysautomatically ofa higher dimen-
sion. The firsthe dispenseswithas follows:
It shouldbe notedthatwhilearithmeticians haveusuallydesignated
[logistae]
eachmagnitude ofunitsor bysomenumber,
bya plurality we areabstracting
herefromnumbers just as we abstracted
themselves, above [Rule 14] from
geometrical and fromeverything
figures else.We do thisnotjustto avoidthe

Beginningsof AlgebraicThoughtin the SeventeenthCentury,"in S. Gaukrogered.,

Descartes:Philosophy, Mathematicsand Physics(AtlanticHighlands,N.J.,1980), 141-55;
A. Szabo, The Beginnings of GreekMathematics(Dordrecht,1978); S. Unguru,"On the
Need to RewritetheHistoryofGreekMathematics," History
Archivefor ofExactSciences,
25 (1975/76),67-114.For some of the philosophicalrationalebehindthisconceptionof
numbersand a defenseof ancientarithmetic as a formof metricalgeometry, see Stephen
Gaukroger,"Aristotleon IntelligibleMatter,"Phronesis,25 (1980), 187-97.
26 This constraintis onlyeveroverlookedonce in thewholeofGreekand Alexandrian
mathematics, in Heron's Metrica(I, 8), wheretwo squares (i.e., areas) are multiplied
together, and thismaywellsimplyhavebeenan oversight. One scholiaston Herontreats
it as such,and thereis no way in whichHeron could havejustifiedthe procedure.
27 For detailssee the exemplaryaccountin Klein,op. cit.
Descartes'sIdeas 599

tediumofa longand superfluous butaboveall to makesurethat

calculation,
thosepartsoftheproblem whichmakeup theessential alwaysremain
difficulty
distinctandarenotobscured byuselessnumbers.If,forexample,theproblem
is to findthehypotenuseofa right-angled whosegivensidesare9 and
triangle
12,thearithmeticianwillsaythatitis 25 or 15.Butwewillwritea andb for
9 and 12,andshallfindthebasetobe a2 + b2.In thiswaythetwopartsa and
b,whichthenumber runstogether,arekeptdistinct.28
He continuesby dealing with the questionof dimensionalchange in
operationssuch as multiplication:
We shouldalsonotethatthoseproportions thatform a continuingsequenceare
to be understoodin termsofa number otherstryto express
ofrelations; these
proportionsinordinary algebraicterms bymeansofseveraldifferentdimensions
andshapes.Thefirst theycalltheroot,thesecondthesquare,thethirdthecube,
thefourth thebiquadratic, and so on. Theseexpressionshave,I confess, long
misledme.... All suchnamesshouldbe abandoned as theyareliableto cause
confusionin ourthinking. For thougha magnitude maybe termed a cubeor a
itshouldneverbe represented
biquadratic, to theimaginationotherwise thanas
a lineora surface....What,aboveall,requires tobe notedis thattheroot,the
square,thecube,etc.,are merely magnitudes in continuedproportion, which
alwaysimpliesthefreely chosenunitthatwe spokeofin thepreceding Rule.29

In otherwords,the cube of a, forexample,is not designateda3 because

a three-dimensional
itrepresents figurebutbecauseitis generatedthrough
1 a a2
serieswiththreerelations:
a proportional .- = = -. He concludes:
a 2 a3

Wewhoseektodevelopevident anddistinctknowledgeofthesethingsinsiston
Arithmeticians,
thesedistinctions. on theotherhand,are content to findthe
eveniftheyhaveno graspofhowit follows
resultsought, fromwhathasbeen
given,butinfactitis inthiskindofgraspalonethatscience[scientia]
consists.30

In theseimportantdevelopmentsDescartesshows a veryclear and

explicitawarenessof the directionin whichhis algebrawas moving.He
is now beginning to considerbothgeometry and arithmeticin termsofa
theoryof equations,therebyshowinga graspof mathematicalstructure
well beyondthatof any of his contemporaries.The powerof algebra,as
techniquewhichhe identi-
Descartesconstruesit,is as a problem-solving
fieswiththeancientartofanalysis.It worksby construing unknownsin
termsofknowns,byprovidinga symbolism forthemwhichenablesthem
to be slottedinto equationstyingknownsand unknownstogetherin a
systematic way.This procedurehas immenseadvantagesover,forexam-
ple, the traditionalgeometricalproofs,and Descartes believesthat an

28 AT, x, 455-56.
29 AT, x, 456-57.
30 AT, x, 458.
600 StephenGaukroger

algebraicdemonstration revealsthestepsinvolvedin solvingtheproblem

in a completelytransparent way. Indeed, it is the transparencyof its
operations,as muchas itsabstractness, thatDescartesfindsofthegreatest
value in his new algebra.This "transparency" of algebraicoperationsis
whatmarksthemout as beingcompletely certain,and whatthistranspar-
ency amountsto, in philosophicalterms,is "clarityand distinctness."
Moreover,it bringswith it all the connotationsof pictorialvividness
which,I have argued,are such a crucialpartofthedoctrineofclearand
distinctideas as it figuresin the earlyRegulae. Not onlyis the idea of
validationby meansof pictorialvividnessstillactiveeightyearslaterin
the laterRegulae,but it is presentin the moststrikingand unexpected
context.Havingestablishedthehighlyabstract,structural featuresofhis
newalgebra-its concernwithmagnitudes in generalratherthanparticu-
lar numbersand shapes,the basis forits notationin seriesof continued
proportions ratherthanspatialimagery-DescartesproceedsinRule 18to
validateitin termsofintuitive obviousness,termswhichare unashamedly
spatial and indeed pictorial.Having set out arithmetical operationsin
algebraicterms,he continues:3"
Fromtheseconsiderations it is easyto see howthesetwooperations areall we
needforthepurposeof discovering whatever magnitudes we are requiredto
deducefrom othersonthebasisofsomerelation. Oncewehaveunderstood these
thenextthing
operations, todo is toexplain topresent
how themtotheimagina-
tionforexamination, and howto displaythemvisually, so lateron we may
explaintheirusesor applications. If additionor subtractionis to be used,we
conceive intheform
thesubject ofa line,orintheform ofanextended magnitude
in whichlengthaloneis to be considered. For ifwe add linea to lineb

a b

we add theoneto theotherin thefollowing

way,

a b

andtheresultis c.

And so on forsubtraction, and division.The case ofmulti-

multiplication,
plicationillustratesthe quite regressivenatureof the representationof
arithmetical operationsrequiredby Descartes'svalidatingprocess.32

3' AT, x, 464.

32 AT, x, 466.
Descartes'sIdeas 601

ab byc,
Again,ifwe wishto multiply

we oughtto conceiveofab as a line,namely:

ab

figure:
in orderto obtainforabc thefollowing

ab

Thereis clearlya discrepancyherebetweenthe concernto represent

the operationsof arithmeticalgebraically,in structuralterms,and the
concernto providea vindicationof arithmeticalprocessesin termsof
operationsso clearand vividthatone cannotfailbutassentto them.The
Descartesalmost
ironyis that,havingpaid thishighpriceforvindication,
certainlyrealizedthatit would not succeed anyway;forin the uncom-
pletedRules 19-21he extendshis accountto a setofproblems-problems
thatmustbe set up in termsof severalequationsin severalunknowns-
thatcan be dealt withalgebraicallybut whichcannotbe legitimated in
the way proposed;and at thisverypointhe abandonstheRegulae.33

Conclusion

Descartesdoes not abandon the doctrineof clear and distinctideas

after1628.Rather,he transformsit froma doctrineabouttheevidential

starting
op. cit.,is an indispensable
33 The accountoftheseissuesin ch. 6 of Schuster,
point for furtherwork on these topics,althoughhe sees the questionin termsof an
ofmathematics,
ontologicallegitimation whereasI see it in termsofan appeal to a notion
of representationderivedfromthe rhetorical-psychological tradition.
602 StephenGaukroger

valueofimagesintooneabouthowwe areto guarantee theveridicality

ofourcognition oftheexternal worldagainsthyperbolic doubt.Thefirst
doctrineis derivedfromtherhetorico-legal tradition, filledout
suitably
in termsderivedfromAristotelian psychology, whereasthesecondis
metaphysical andhasnosuchclassicalprecedent. Thefirstreliesonwhat
Descartesrefers to as "thenaturallightofreason,"and indeedit is in
manyrespects constitutive ofthenatural lightofreason, something which,
likeconscience (on whichit mayhavebeenmodelled,if onlyuncon-
is an ultimate
sciously), resort.The secondrelieson a divineguarantee,
and-far fromthecriterion ofclearand distinct ideasbeingsomething
humanbeings have forged forourselves-it now becomessomething
whichGod has explicitly provided and whichhe guarantees. Giventhis
onemight
difference, askwhatis theconnection betweenthetwoversions
ofthedoctrine, andindeedwhether theycanbe saidtobe versions ofthe
samedoctrine in anymorethanname.
Thereis in facta connection, and it is a keyone:bothdoctrines are
concerned aboveallelsewiththenature ofself-conviction.Iftheargument
ofthispaperis accepted,thenwhatDescartesis doingis movingfrom
a rhetorical-psychological conception of conviction to a metaphysical
conception, a movethatoccursno earlierthan1628.How well-advised
thismovewas is nota questionI can deal withhere.But it is worth
remembering whatthismovefromrhetoric to metaphysicsresultedin:it
beganas a rhetorical-psychological doctrine inwhichthenotionofa clear
and distinct idea was easyto recognize and in whichtheproblemwas
howtoexplainhowsuchideasarose;anditendedas a doctrine inwhich
itwasso difficult to sayexactly whata clearanddistinct ideawasthatit
becamea laughing-stock in thesecondhalfoftheseventeenth century.

ofSydney.
University