3/8/2019 5:02 PM

Velva L. Price
District Clerk
Travis County
Cause No. D-1-GN-18-005721 D-1-GN-18-005721
Sandra Henriquez
HALCY MARTIN DEAN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
STETSON ROANE §
Defendant. § 98TH JUDICIAL DISRICT

DEFENDANT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE COURT:

Defendant Stetson Roane (“Roane”) files this Brief in Support of his Amended Plea to

the Jurisdiction and would respectfully show the court as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition (“Petition”) on December 12, 2018, alleging a

single cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and asserting

liability because Roane allegedly is not entitled to immunity under Texas Education Code

§ 22.0511.

On January 8, 2019, Roane filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer to Plaintiff’s First

Amended Petition. On February 12, 2019, Roane filed an Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction

(“PTJ”) and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition; the PTJ re-urged the previous PTJ.

This brief is in support of the PTJ.

Also on February 12, 2019, Roane filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 10.106 of

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;

those motions were briefed within the motions themselves. Roane is not filing separate briefing

as to those motions though many of the arguments and authorities overlap and will be cited in

support of those motions.

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 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the Petition, Plaintiff makes numerous salacious allegations, which Roane vehemently

denies and successfully submitted to a polygraph examination to rebut. However, even if all such

allegations are assumed to be true, they do not permit Plaintiff to recover under Texas law.

Therefore, a rebuttal statement of facts is not strictly necessary in the context of this plea.

Nevertheless, because of the salaciousness of the allegations that have so far gone publicly

unchallenged, Roane is providing his own statement of the facts supported by affidavits by him

and his wife. 1

Roane was the superintendent for Seguin Independent School District (the District) from

July 16, 2015 until February 28, 2017. (Exh. A, ¶ 2). Roane’s wife, Nancy Denise Graves

(Roane’s Wife), was the Executive Director of Federal Programs and School Improvement for

the District from September 2015 until June 30, 2017, though she was on administrative leave

with pay from March 1, 2017 until June 30, 2017. (Exh. B, ¶¶ 2, 2).

The Texas Council of the Administrators of Special Education (TCASE) Conference (the

Conference) was held in Austin, Texas the week of January 15, 2017. (Exh. A, ¶ 3; Exh. B, ¶ 4).

Plaintiff was the District’s Special Education Director at the time of the Conference, having been

hired in April 2016 to perform that role for the 2016-2017 school year. (Exh. A, ¶ 4; Exh. B, ¶

5). Roane’s Wife was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (Exh. B, ¶ 5).

Plaintiff requested that Roane attend the Conference to meet vendors and prospective

vendors because she was a new special education director and wanted to go in a new direction

with the program and to have his buy-in because he would be the one to sign the contracts. (Exh.

1
Roane acknowledges that where his and Plaintiff’s accounts of incidents vary, it would create fact issues; however,
the fact issues are not material to the determination of the legal issues presented. This plea to the jurisdiction is
based on the facts pleaded by Plaintiff, supplemented with undisputed evidence of other facts. Thus, the existence of
conflicting accounts between Roane and Plaintiff does not defeat the plea.

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A, ¶ 5). As a former special education director at Aransas Pass ISD, Roane agreed to do so. (Id.).

Roane also thought it was a good opportunity to network with others. (Id.). In addition, it was in

keeping with Roane’s practice to accompany new administrators to their respective conferences.

(Id.). For example, Roane attended the THSCA with the new athletic director and TASA Mid-

Winter conference with campus principals. (Id.).

Roane’s role at the Conference did not require him to register for the conference itself,

but he did need a hotel room, so he asked Plaintiff to book a room for him. (Exh. A, ¶ 6).

Plaintiff had a hotel room in the conference hotel, the JW Marriott, for four nights (Sunday-

Wednesday). (Exh. A, ¶ 7). Additional rooms in that hotel were not available. (Id.). Because

Roane was not arriving until Tuesday, Plaintiff stayed in the room the first two nights and then

vacated it on Tuesday morning, January 17, 2017, to allow him to stay there, with her planning

to stay at the Hyatt Place. (Id.).

On the way to Austin, Roane exchanged text messages with Plaintiff about various

meetings and events. (Exh. A, ¶ 8). On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff, Roane, and others attended a

dinner with a law firm vendor, followed by drinks at the JW Marriott. (Exh. A, ¶ 9). They met at

7:00 in the lobby to take a taxi to attend the dinner at 7:30. (Id.). Present in the lobby were Mike

Garcia, a male attorney from the law firm hosting the dinner, Plaintiff, two female employees

from her department, and Roane. (Id.). During the evening, Roane asked Plaintiff several times

for the key to the room at the JW Marriott, but she did not provide it to him until approximately

10:30 p.m. (Exh. A, ¶ 10). The group left the dinner and returned by taxi to the JW Marriott

around 10:40 p.m. (Exh. A, ¶ 11). Mr. Garcia and Nick Maddox, another attorney of the firm,

invited everyone to have a drink in the bar. (Id.). Plaintiff’s employees declined, but Plaintiff

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chose to stay with the men. (Id.). During this time, Roane checked on his belongings and tipped

the bell hop to take his belongings to his room and stock it with Coke and ice. (Exh. A, ¶ 12).

When Plaintiff was ready to head to Hyatt Place, she asked Roane for taxi money, which

was curious because she had a district credit card that she could have used. (Exh. A, ¶ 13). Roane

went with Plaintiff to get her luggage from the bell hop where it had been stored all day and pay

for the taxi. (Exh. A, ¶ 14). The luggage was very large and had a broken wheel. (Id.). Plaintiff

was struggling to carry it. (Id.). Roane got the luggage in the taxi and realized how heavy it was,

so he decided to escort Plaintiff to the Hyatt to make sure she was able to get herself and her

heavy broken luggage to her room safely. (Id.).

In the taxi from the JW Marriott to the Hyatt Place, Roane rode in the front seat, while

Plaintiff rode in the back. (Exh. A, ¶ 15). When they arrived at the Hyatt, at the front desk Roane

offered his credit card to pay for the room because he had caused Plaintiff to move. (Exh. A,

¶ 16). Because of the broken suitcase, Roane again helped Plaintiff to her room with the heavy

broken suitcase in tow. (Id.). Plaintiff never told Roane she did not want help. (Id.).

While Roane was carrying the heavy broken luggage to Plaintiff’s room, he began to

sweat and stopped to remove his tie. (Exh. A, ¶ 17). During the walk to the room, Ms. Martin-

Dean and Roane discussed work. Plaintiff asked Roane several times if he would transfer her

husband, who was a middle school choir director, to a special education teaching position even

though he did not have the proper certification. (Id.). Roane told Plaintiff that he could not do

that. (Id.). The conversation continued as Roane put her luggage in her room whereby she

informed me that her husband was totally incapable of managing his class and would be unable

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to make it through the year. (Id.). Again, Plaintiff was asking for her husband to be transferred;

Roane said he would consider it at the end of the school year, but he could not do it now. (Id.). 2

While in the hotel room, Roane did not remove any articles of clothing, sit down, make

any inappropriate sexual comments, or seek a romantic relationship with Plaintiff. (Exh. A, ¶

19).

The next day, January 18, 2017, Roane exchanged text messages with Plaintiff. (Exh. A,

¶ 20). In the first text, Roane told Plaintiff that he would be at the Texas Association of School

Boards offices that day and to text him if she needed him. Roane thanked her for the room and

for letting him hang out with her staff the night before. (Id.). Plaintiff responded, “Omg. Thank

you we had a wonderful time! It was very nice.” (Id.). Roane told her that they were lucky to

have such great leadership and to keep it up. (Id.). Plaintiff texted, “Ty! I appreciate your

support.” (Id.).

The next text message Roane received was Plaintiff inviting him to lunch with a

Medicare vendor at Coopers Barbecue, explaining that the vendor was one she was interested in

doing business with. (Exh. A, ¶ 21). Roane was not able to make it so he said, “Sorry catch up

with y’all later.” (Id.). Roane asked if Plaintiff had plans for that evening and mentioned that he

was going to see if his wife wanted to come. (Id.).

In response to Roane’s text asking if Plaintiff had an invitation to any events that

evening, Plaintiff replied that the Medicare vendor had an event at Pete’s Piano Bar. (Exh. A, ¶

22). Plaintiff reiterated that she was interested in that vendor and told Roane she would like him

to meet them. (Id.). They ended up making plans for Roane to meet the vendor at the Conference

at about 2:30-2:45. (Id.). Before they had the meeting, Plaintiff sent Roane a series of texts

2
Roane learned that after his departure from the District, Mr. Dean was transferred to the requested position. (Exh.
A, ¶ 18).

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stating, “I want you to know I think you are awesome. I love working with you. Ty for all you do

to support. I appreciate all you do!” (Id.).

At the end of the day on January 18, 2017, Plaintiff, her two staff members, Roane’s

Wife, and Roane met in the hotel lobby and walked to a reception at a Mexican restaurant. (Exh.

A, ¶ 23; Exh. B, ¶ 6). During the time at the restaurant, Plaintiff was dancing and having fun.

(Id.). Plaintiff even was aggressively teasing Roane’s Wife, making a joke that she did not know

where her co-worker’s finger had been. (Id.).

The next morning, January 19, 2017, as Roane was checking out, he called Plaintiff to

ask whether the room charge was on the district credit card or hers personally. (Exh. A, ¶ 24).

Plaintiff told me she paid with her card, so when Roane returned to the District, Roane made sure

his secretary delivered payment from him to her. (Id.).

On January 26, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a sexual harassment complaint to the District

that tracks the allegations that are made in the First Amended Petition. 3 (Exh. C). Specifically,

the complaint alleged sexual harassment by Roane during the business trip to attend the TCASE

Conference on January 17, 2017. (Id.). The District initiated an investigation, and while the

investigation was ongoing, Roane voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination on February

20, 2017 (Exh. A, ¶ 25). During this examination, Roane was asked whether he had made certain

inappropriate comments to Plaintiff, as she was alleging in her complaint. (Id.). Roane responded

that he had not, and the polygraph examiner found no deception in Roane’s answers. (Id.).

Roane and his wife amicably resigned their employment with the District with no finding

of guilt made against Roane. (Exh. A, ¶ 26). Roane’s resignation was effective February 28,

2017; Roane’s Wife’s resignation was effective June 30, 2017. (Exh. A, ¶ 26; Exh. B, ¶3).

3
This complaint is the subject of a lawsuit under the Texas Public Information Act, and for that reason, Roane and
Plaintiff have agreed to treat this as a confidential document pursuant to an Agreed Protective Order.

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 On March 6, 2017, the District notified Plaintiff that her complaint was closed; the letter

advised Plaintiff that, under Policy DIA (LOCAL) (Exh. D), if she was dissatisfied with the

outcome, she could appeal pursuant to DGBA (LOCAL) (Exh. E). 4 (Exhibit F, Letter to

Plaintiff).

On August 11, 2017, the District received a Notice of Charge of Discrimination from the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in the name of Plaintiff, alleging sexual

harassment by the Superintendent on January 17, 2017. (Exh. G). The EEOC issued a Notice of

Dismissal and Right to Sue on September 14, 2017. (Exh. H).

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Standard for Plea to the Jurisdiction

“A party may contest a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction by filing a plea to the

jurisdiction.” Houston Mun. Employees Pension System v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Tex.

2007)(quoting Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999)). The trial court

must determine at its earliest opportunity whether it has the constitutional or statutory authority

to decide the case before allowing the litigation to proceed. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction

is a question of law. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855

(Tex. 2002).

The goal of a plea to the jurisdiction is to have the trial court dismiss the cause of action.

See Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985). Further, such a dismissal is with prejudice.

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 844 (citing Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 636 (Tex. 2004)).

4
The Court may take judicial notice of these policies published on the district’s website. See In re Doe, 501 S.W.3d
313, 321 n. 11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). This particular policy page can be accessed on the
District website by clicking “Board Policy Online” at http://www.seguin.k12.tx.us/page/board.home. The policies
also can be quickly accessed at https://pol.tasb.org/Policy/Section/550?filter=D.

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 When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, the court must determine

whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to

hear the cause. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The court construes the pleadings liberally in favor

of the plaintiff and looks to the pleader’s intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient

facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively

demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the

plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. If the pleadings

affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted

without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id.

Also, the plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction by

alleging a valid waiver of immunity. See Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d

583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.

1993).

It is well established that, if the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the

court considers not only the pleadings, but relevant evidence when necessary to resolve the

jurisdictional issues raised. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007); Tex. Dep’t of

Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). The burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively

demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137,

150 (Tex. 2012).

In most cases of a jurisdictional challenge, the trial court should limit its consideration of

evidence to only that which is relevant to the jurisdictional issue and avoid considering evidence

that goes to the merits. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555. However, in some cases

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jurisdiction involves the merits. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. In such circumstances, the trial

court must review the evidence to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at

227-28. If the evidence raises a fact issue regarding jurisdiction, the trial court cannot grant the

plea and the trier of fact must resolve the issue. Id. If the relevant evidence is undisputed or if

there is no fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court should grant the plea as a

matter of law. Id. at 228. This standard generally mirrors that of a summary judgment. Id.

B. This Court lacks jurisdiction over a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under the facts pleaded because the claim is preempted by Chapter 21 of the
Texas Labor Code.

The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act is codified in Chapter 21 of the Texas

Labor Code (“Chapter 21” or “TCHRA”). The TCHRA provides a statutory cause of action for

sexual harassment in employment. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438,

445 (Tex. 2004). The Texas Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have determined that

the preemption of a claim by Chapter 21 is a jurisdictional bar to suit. See Waffle House, Inc. v.

Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010); City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2008);

Woods v. Communities in Sch. Se. Texas, 09-14-00021-CV, 2015 WL 2414260, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont May 21, 2015, no pet.)(mem. op.); Pruitt v. Int’ l Ass’n. of Fire Fighters, 366

S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2012, no pet.). If the complained-of acts constitute a statutory

violation of Chapter 21, those acts cannot also serve as the basis of an independent common-law

claim. See Pruitt, 366 S.W.3d at 748 (citing Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 813).

In addition to the general rule that Chapter 21 preempts common law tort claims, the

Texas Supreme Court has made clear that the specific common law cause of action for IIED

cannot be used to address claims related to sexual harassment in employment situations. The

Texas Supreme Court has stated that IIED is a “gap-filler” tort never intended to supplant or

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duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies. Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d

814, 816 (Tex. 2005)(citing Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d at 441). The Court added that, “[e]ven if

other remedies do not explicitly preempt the tort, their availability leaves no gap to fill.” Id.

The fact that Plaintiff is attempting to sue Roane directly rather than the employer, the

District, does not alter this result. In Creditwatch, the Court prohibited recovery on an IIED

claim against a plaintiff’s supervisor because the supervisor’s conduct could form the basis of a

claim under the TCHRA. See id.; Tex. Labor Code § 21.000, et. seq. Thus, under Creditwatch

and numerous other court decisions, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress against a defendant supervisor where the plaintiff could bring a state statutory

claim or other tort claim against plaintiff’s employer based on the same conduct alleged. See

Rawlings v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 3:07-CV-1608-O, 2008 WL 2115606, at *4 (N.D.

Tex. May 20, 2008)(citing Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 815-817)(other citations omitted); see

also Fisher v. Dallas County, 299 F.R.D. 527, 537–38 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Mercer v. Arbor E & T,

2012 WL 1425133, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2012) (citing cases); see also Muniz v. El Paso

Marriott, 2009 WL 4878619, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2009) (“Under Texas law, a claim for

IIED is not available against an employee’s supervisor if the same alleged conduct supports a

claim for relief against the employer under other legal theories, such as the anti-discrimination

statutes.”); Rawlings v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 2115606, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May

20, 2008) (“[A] plaintiff cannot bring a claim for [IIED] against a defendant supervisor where

the plaintiff could bring a state statutory claim or other tort claim against plaintif[f]’s employer

based on the same conduct alleged. Accordingly, for Plaintiff to have stated a claim on which she

has a reasonable basis of recovery against ... her former supervisor, Plaintiff’s IIED claim cannot

be based on facts that could form the basis of any workplace harassment or discrimination claim

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at all, even an action solely against her employer.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted));

Louis v. Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied).

In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations form the basis of a claim for sexual harassment under

Chapter 21, and Plaintiff knew it. Plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint with her

employer and filed a charge of discrimination alleging sexual harassment and retaliation against

her employer. (Exh. C; Exh. G). Both complaint documents complain about the conduct on

January 17, 2017, of the statutory “chief executive officer of the school district.” See Tex. Educ.

Code Ann. § 11.201(a).

But we don’t have to rely on Plaintiff’s understanding of the nature of her claims to see

that she is alleging conduct that could form the basis of a claim under the TCHRA; the law itself

makes that abundantly clear.

First, because of Roane’s status as the CEO of the District, the District potentially faced

liability under an “alter ego” or proxy theory, which deprives the employer of the affirmative

defense usually available in a hostile environment/sexual harassment cases. See Ackel v. Nat’l

Commc’ ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2003). 5 An individual is a proxy for the

employer when he holds a “sufficiently high position in the management hierarchy” so as to

speak for the entity. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998)).

Plaintiff certainly understood Roane to be in this capacity as she stated in her pleadings that

“Defendant Roane had been granted sole hiring and firing authority by the [SISD] board, so

Halcy reasonably believed he might use it to retaliate against her, and she believed and feared he

had the ability to do whatever he wanted with regard to her position with the district.” (Petition, ¶

4.12).

5
Texas courts “consistently look to federal law to inform our construction and application of the TCHRA because
one of its purposes is to ‘provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII.’” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 764 n. 5 (Tex. 2018).

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 Second, the alleged conduct at issue certainly falls within the protections of Chapter 21.

Plaintiff argues that the conduct that she originally characterized as sexual harassment when she

filed her complaints actually is not sexual harassment covered by Chapter 21. Plaintiff makes

this argument by attempting to parse the activities of the evening of January 17, 2017, to claim

that certain of the activities were outside the scope of the superintendent’s duties; however, it is

all activity that is covered by the TCHRA and Title VII by virtue of their relationship as

supervisor and employee on a business trip. Plaintiff’s pleadings indicate that the alleged conduct

on January 17, 2017, occurred during a business trip (Petition, ¶¶ 4.3-4.9). 6

Such alleged activity occurring during a business trip is unquestionably covered by

Chapter 21. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748 (plaintiff’s allegations of harassment included an

allegation that while she and a supervisor were on a business trip, the supervisor had invited her

to the hotel lounge, made remarks about her breasts, and, when she gave no encouragement to

him, told her to “loosen up” and warned her, “I could make your life very hard or very easy at

Burlington.”); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (plaintiff’s allegations of

harassment included allegations that her supervisor had invited her out to dinner and, at the

dinner, suggested that they go to a motel and have sexual relations and that her supervisor had

made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, both during and after business hours);

Moring v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 243 F.3d 452 (8th Cir. 2001)(employee prevailed

6
The following quotes reflect that all of the allegations came during a single encounter following a business
dinner from which Roane was escorting Plaintiff that occurred in Austin while they were there for the Conference
and that much of the conversation related to work. “Roane arrived at the conference . . . He arranged a business
dinner for Halcy and several of her colleagues.” (¶ 4.4). “After [the business dinner] Roane insisted on ‘ensuring’
Halcy got back to her own hotel ‘safely.’” (¶ 4.5). In the hotel room, he mentioned “he needed someone like her to
‘work with him.’ He talked about how they could do great things together and ‘be powerful.’” (¶ 4.6). “Plaintiff
reminded Defendant Roane that Denise was also Halcy’s direct supervisor at work.” (¶ 4.7). “Defendant began to
boast . . .” (¶ 4.8). “Halcy informed Defendant Roane . . that [he] and she could only be ‘work friends.’” (¶ 4.9).
While Roane denies the allegations related to the dialogue, he recalls different work-related discussion,
specifically about Plaintiff’s husband and whether he could be moved to a teaching position. (Exh. A, ¶ 17).

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where, on an overnight business trip, the plaintiff’s supervisor showed up to her hotel room in his

boxers, sat on her bed, touched her thigh, attempted to kiss her, and would not leave); Ferris v.

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 824 (2002)(jury

could properly find on these facts that hotel room was a part of the plaintiff-flight attendant’s

work environment, bringing rape by co-worker within the realm of Title VII).

No matter how Plaintiff tries to characterize the alleged conduct on January 17 about

which she complains, it is conduct that is subject to the statutory construct of Chapter 21. In

addition, the other conduct about which Plaintiff complains actually occurred in the workplace

itself (Petition, ¶¶ 4.12, 4.14-4.16). Thus, all of the alleged conduct is covered, and when

Plaintiff received her notice of right to sue from the EEOC in September 2017, she could have

sued under Title VII or Chapter 21. For some reason she chose not to do so, but by so choosing

Plaintiff lost her ability to recover for the conduct that occurred that is the basis of her lawsuit.

Further supporting the characterization of the alleged conduct as covered under Chapter

21, it is clear from the pleadings that the only reason for Plaintiff to even argue that it was

extreme and outrageous conduct that caused her emotional distress was because of the

employment relationship, specifically, Roane’s role as the CEO of her employer and the husband

of her direct supervisor. A random man propositioning a random woman, even using illicit

language, will not be considered unlawful conduct, i.e., conduct that is “so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Hoffmann-La Roche

Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004). What makes Plaintiff claim it is unlawful

is the fact that it occurred in the context of the employment relationship and took advantage of

the imbalance of power in that relationship. Plaintiff cannot use that relationship to argue the

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conduct was extreme and outrageous and then ignore the fact that it was in the context of the

working relationship to argue that the statutory remedy for such conduct does not apply.

Plaintiff’s IIED claim is preempted by the TCHRA.

2. This Court further lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies against a professional employee of a school district, as
required by section 22.0514 of the Texas Education Code.

A person may not file suit against a professional employee of a school district unless the

person has exhausted the remedies provided by the school district for resolving the complaint.

Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 22.0514. The exhaustion of remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

suit, so the court addresses this issue in a plea to the jurisdiction. See O’Neal v. Ector Cnty.

Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 S.W.3d 50, 51 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).

Plaintiff claims she was not required to exhaust because Roane was acting outside the

scope of his employment, and she is suing him in his individual capacity. Courts “reject the

suggestion that merely pleading form words, such as a conclusory allegation that [an employee]

was acting ‘outside the scope of her employment,’ allows the statutory exhaustion requirement to

be circumvented. In assessing subject matter jurisdiction, this court must consider the factual

allegations upon which relief is sought, not just the manner in which the cause of action is

pleaded.” Melendez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 418 S.W.3d 701, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). As established above, Roane was acting within the scope of his

employment, and her complaints are related to the impact his conduct had in the workplace.

Therefore, Plaintiff was not excused from exhaustion.

Seguin ISD Board policy requires employees to submit complaints of harassment through

Board Policy DIA (LOCAL) (Exh. D). The policy also calls for an investigation to be conducted.

(Id. at p. 3). The policy provides for a complainant who is dissatisfied with the outcome to file an

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appeal through DGBA(LOCAL) policy. (Id. at p. 4). In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint on

January 26, 2017 (Exh. C). On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff was advised through her counsel that her

complaint had been resolved by the resignation of Roane. (Exh. F). The letter specifically stated

that if Plaintiff was not satisfied with the result, she could appeal through the District’s DGBA

policy. (Id.). If Plaintiff wanted to continue to press claims against Roane, she should have

sought a finding of wrongdoing by Roane. Plaintiff could have complained under DGBA about

the District closing the complaint without providing her with that. She chose not to do so,

thereby failing to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Because Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies this Court does not have

jurisdiction over the claims against Roane.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Stetson Roane respectfully prays this Court grant its plea to

the jurisdiction and dismiss this matter in its entirety, that Roane be granted taxable costs and

attorney’s fees pursuant to Tex. Educ. Code §§ 22.0517 and 22.055, and that the Court grant all

other relief deemed appropriate, both in equity and in law.

Respectfully submitted,

by: _____________________________
Jennifer A. Powell
Texas Bar No. 00783554
Eric E. Muñoz
Texas Bar No. 24056021
4201 W. Parmer Lane, Suite A100
Austin, Texas 78727
(512) 476-9944
(512) 472-2599 fax
jpowell@edlaw.com
emunoz@edlaw.com
Counsel for Defendant Stetson Roane

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
has been sent via court-generated electronic mail on March 8, 2019, to the following:

Walter L. Taylor
The Hart Law Firm
6630 Colleyville Blvd, Suite 100
Colleyville, Texas 76034
Wtaylor@thehartlawfirm.com

________________________________
Jennifer A. Powell

- 16 -
A
B
 EXHIBIT C

CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT

NOT FILED BUT SERVED ON COUNSEL

FOR PLAINTIFF PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPHS 12 AND 13 OF THE
PARTIES’ AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND SUBJECT TO GRANTING OF A
TEMPORARY SEALING ORDER
PURSUANT TO RULE 76A
Seguin ISD
094901 D
EMPLOYEE WELFARE DIA
FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND RETALIATION (LOCAL)

Note: This policy addresses discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation involving District employees. For discrimina-
tion, harassment, and retaliation involving students, see
FFH. For reporting requirements related to child abuse
and neglect, see FFG.

DEFINITIONS Solely for purposes of this policy, the term "employees" includes
former employees, applicants for employment, and unpaid interns.
STATEMENT OF The District prohibits discrimination, including harassment, against
NONDISCRIMINATION any employee on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, disability, or any other basis prohibited by law. Retalia-
tion against anyone involved in the complaint process is a violation
of District policy.
DISCRIMINATION Discrimination against an employee is defined as conduct directed
at an employee on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, nation-
al origin, age, disability, or any other basis prohibited by law, that
adversely affects the employee's employment.
HARASSMENT Prohibited harassment of an employee is defined as physical,.ver-
,

bal, or nonverbal conduct based on an employee's race, color, reli-

gion, gender, national origin, age, disability, or any other basis pro-
hibited by law, when the conduct is so severe, persistent, or
pervasive that the conduct:
1. Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
employee's work performance;
2. Creates an intimidating, threatening, hostile, or offensive work
environment; or
3. Otherwise adversely affects the employee's pefformance, en-
vironment, or employment opportunities.

EXAMPLES Examples of prohibited harassment may include offensive or de-

rogatory language directed at another person's religious beliefs or
practices, accent, skin color, gender identity, or need for workplace
accommodation; threatening or intimidating conduct; offensive
jokes, name calling, slurs, or rumors; physical aggression or as-
sault; display of graffiti or printed material promoting racial, ethnic,
or other stereotypes; or other types of aggressive conduct such as
theft or damage to property.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination defined as un-

welcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors; sexually
motivated physical, verbal, or nonverbal conduct; or other conduct
or communication of a sexual nature when:

DATE ISSUED: 9/2512015 1 of 4

UPDATE 103
DIA(LOCAL)-B

310
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094901

EMPLOYEE WELFARE DIA

FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND RETALIATION (LOCAL)

1. Submission to the conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a

condition of an employee’s employment, or when submission
to or rejection of the conduct is the basis for an employment
action affecting the employee; or
2. The conduct is so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the em-
ployee’s work performance or creates an intimidating, threat-
ening, hostile, or offensive work environment.
Examples Examples of sexual harassment may include sexual advances;
touching intimate body parts; coercing or forcing a sexual act on
another; jokes or conversations of a sexual nature; and other sex-
ually motivated conduct, communication, or contact.
Retaliation The District prohibits retaliation against an employee who makes a
claim alleging to have experienced discrimination or harassment,
or another employee who, in good faith, makes a report, serves as
a witness, or otherwise participates in an investigation.
An employee who intentionally makes a false claim, offers false
statements, or refuses to cooperate with a District investigation
regarding harassment or discrimination is subject to appropriate
discipline.
Examples Examples of retaliation may include termination, refusal to hire, de-
motion, and denial of promotion. Retaliation may also include
threats, unjustified negative evaluations, unjustified negative refer-
ences, or increased surveillance.
Prohibited Conduct In this policy, the term “prohibited conduct” includes discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation as defined by this policy, even if the be-
havior does not rise to the level of unlawful conduct.
Reporting An employee who believes that he or she has experienced prohib-
Procedures ited conduct or believes that another employee has experienced
prohibited conduct should immediately report the alleged acts. The
employee may report the alleged acts to his or her supervisor or
campus principal.
Alternatively, the employee may report the alleged acts to one of
the District officials below.
Definition of District For the purposes of this policy, District officials are the Title IX
Officials coordinator, the ADA/Section 504 coordinator, and the
Superintendent.
Title IX Coordinator Reports of discrimination based on sex, including sexual harass-
ment, may be directed to the designated Title IX coordinator. [See
DIA(EXHIBIT)]

DATE ISSUED: 9/25/2015 2 of 4

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EMPLOYEE WELFARE DIA

FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND RETALIATION (LOCAL)

ADA / Section 504 Reports of discrimination based on disability may be directed to the
Coordinator designated ADA/Section 504 coordinator. [See DIA(EXHIBIT)]
Superintendent The Superintendent shall serve as coordinator for purposes of Dis-
trict compliance with all other antidiscrimination laws.
Alternative An employee shall not be required to report prohibited conduct to
Reporting the person alleged to have committed it. Reports concerning pro-
Procedures hibited conduct, including reports against the Title IX coordinator or
ADA/Section 504 coordinator, may be directed to the Superinten-
dent.
A report against the Superintendent may be made directly to the
Board. If a report is made directly to the Board, the Board shall ap-
point an appropriate person to conduct an investigation.
Timely Reporting Reports of prohibited conduct shall be made as soon as possible
after the alleged act or knowledge of the alleged act. A failure to
promptly report may impair the District’s ability to investigate and
address the prohibited conduct.
Notice of Report Any District supervisor who receives a report of prohibited conduct
shall immediately notify the appropriate District official listed above
and take any other steps required by this policy.
Investigation of the The District may request, but shall not insist upon, a written report.
Report If a report is made orally, the District official shall reduce the report
to written form.
Upon receipt or notice of a report, the District official shall deter-
mine whether the allegations, if proven, would constitute prohibited
conduct as defined by this policy. If so, the District official shall im-
mediately authorize or undertake an investigation, regardless of
whether a criminal or regulatory investigation regarding the same
or similar allegations is pending.
If appropriate, the District shall promptly take interim action calcu-
lated to prevent prohibited conduct during the course of an investi-
gation.
The investigation may be conducted by the District official or a de-
signee, such as the campus principal, or by a third party desig-
nated by the District, such as an attorney. When appropriate, the
campus principal or supervisor shall be involved in or informed of
the investigation.
The investigation may consist of personal interviews with the per-
son making the report, the person against whom the report is filed,
and others with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the

DATE ISSUED: 9/25/2015 3 of 4

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EMPLOYEE WELFARE DIA

FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT, AND RETALIATION (LOCAL)

allegations. The investigation may also include analysis of other in-

formation or documents related to the allegations.
Concluding the Absent extenuating circumstances, the investigation should be
Investigation completed within ten District business days from the date of the re-
port; however, the investigator shall take additional time if neces-
sary to complete a thorough investigation.
The investigator shall prepare a written report of the investigation.
The report shall be filed with the District official overseeing the in-
vestigation.
District Action If the results of an investigation indicate that prohibited conduct oc-
curred, the District shall promptly respond by taking appropriate
disciplinary or corrective action reasonably calculated to address
the conduct.
The District may take action based on the results of an investiga-
tion, even if the conduct did not rise to the level of prohibited or un-
lawful conduct.
Confidentiality To the greatest extent possible, the District shall respect the
privacy of the complainant, persons against whom a report is filed,
and witnesses. Limited disclosures may be necessary in order to
conduct a thorough investigation and comply with applicable law.
Appeal A complainant who is dissatisfied with the outcome of the investi-
gation may appeal through DGBA(LOCAL), beginning at the appro-
priate level.
The complainant may have a right to file a complaint with appropri-
ate state or federal agencies.
Records Retention Copies of reports alleging prohibited conduct, investigation reports,
and related records shall be maintained by the District for a period
of at least three years. [See CPC]
Access to Policy This policy shall be distributed annually to District employees. Cop-
ies of the policy shall be readily available at each campus and the
District administrative offices.

DATE ISSUED: 9/25/2015 ADOPTED: 4 of 4

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094901 E
PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA
EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Complaints In this policy, the terms “complaint” and “grievance” shall have the
same meaning.
Other Complaint Employee complaints shall be filed in accordance with this policy,
Processes except as required by the policies listed below. Some of these poli-
cies require appeals to be submitted in accordance with DGBA af-
ter the relevant complaint process:
1. Complaints alleging discrimination, including violations of Title
IX (gender), Title VII (sex, race, color, religion, national origin),
ADEA (age), or Section 504 (disability), shall be submitted in
accordance with DIA.
2. Complaints alleging certain forms of harassment, including
harassment by a supervisor and violation of Title VII, shall be
submitted in accordance with DIA.
3. Complaints concerning retaliation relating to discrimination
and harassment shall be submitted in accordance with DIA.
4. Complaints concerning instructional resources shall be sub-
mitted in accordance with EF.
5. Complaints concerning a commissioned peace officer who is
an employee of the District shall be submitted in accordance
with CKE.
6. Complaints concerning the proposed nonrenewal of a term
contract issued under Chapter 21 of the Education Code shall
be submitted in accordance with DFBB.
7. Complaints concerning the proposed termination or suspen-
sion without pay of an employee on a probationary, term, or
continuing contract issued under Chapter 21 of the Education
Code during the contract term shall be submitted in accord-
ance with DFAA, DFBA, or DFCA.
Notice to Employees The District shall inform employees of this policy through appropri-
ate District publications.
Guiding Principles The Board encourages employees to discuss their concerns with
Informal Process their supervisor, principal, or other appropriate administrator who
has the authority to address the concerns. Concerns should be ex-
pressed as soon as possible to allow early resolution at the lowest
possible administrative level.
Informal resolution shall be encouraged but shall not extend any
deadlines in this policy, except by mutual written consent.

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 1 of 7

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PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA

EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Direct Employees shall not be prohibited from communicating with a

Communication with member of the Board regarding District operations except when
Board Members communication between an employee and a Board member would
be inappropriate because of a pending hearing or appeal related to
the employee.
Formal Process An employee may initiate the formal process described below by
timely filing a written complaint form.
Even after initiating the formal complaint process, employees are
encouraged to seek informal resolution of their concerns. An em-
ployee whose concerns are resolved may withdraw a formal com-
plaint at any time.
The process described in this policy shall not be construed to cre-
ate new or additional rights beyond those granted by law or Board
policy, nor to require a full evidentiary hearing or “mini-trial” at any
level.
Freedom from Neither the Board nor any District employee shall unlawfully retali-
Retaliation ate against an employee for bringing a concern or complaint.
Whistleblower Whistleblower complaints shall be filed within the time specified by
Complaints law and may be made to the Superintendent or designee beginning
at Level Two. Time lines for the employee and the District set out in
this policy may be shortened to allow the Board to make a final de-
cision within 60 calendar days of the initiation of the complaint.
[See DG]
Complaints Against Complaints alleging a violation of law by a supervisor may be
Supervisors made to the Superintendent or designee. Complaint forms alleging
a violation of law by the Superintendent may be submitted directly
to the Board or designee.
General Provisions Complaint forms and appeal notices may be filed by hand-delivery,
Filing by electronic communication, including e-mail and fax, or by U.S.
Mail. Hand-delivered filings shall be timely filed if received by the
appropriate administrator or designee by the close of business on
the deadline. Filings submitted by electronic communication shall
be timely filed if they are received by the close of business on the
deadline, as indicated by the date/time shown on the electronic
communication. Mail filings shall be timely filed if they are post-
marked by U.S. Mail on or before the deadline and received by the
appropriate administrator or designated representative no more
than three days after the deadline.
Scheduling The District shall make reasonable attempts to schedule confer-
Conferences ences at a mutually agreeable time. If the employee fails to appear
at a scheduled conference, the District may hold the conference
and issue a decision in the employee’s absence.
DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 2 of 7
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PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA

EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Response At Levels One and Two, “response” shall mean a written communi-
cation to the employee from the appropriate administrator. Re-
sponses may be hand-delivered, sent by electronic communication
to the employee’s e-mail address of record, or sent by U.S. Mail to
the employee’s mailing address of record. Mailed responses shall
be timely if they are postmarked by U.S. Mail on or before the
deadline.
Days “Days” shall mean District business days, unless otherwise noted.
In calculating time lines under this policy, the day a document is
filed is “day zero.” The following business day is “day one.”
Representative “Representative” shall mean any person who or an organization
that does not claim the right to strike and is designated by the em-
ployee to represent him or her in the complaint process.
The employee may designate a representative through written no-
tice to the District at any level of this process. The representative
may participate in person or by telephone conference call. If the
employee designates a representative with fewer than three days’
notice to the District before a scheduled conference or hearing, the
District may reschedule the conference or hearing to a later date, if
desired, in order to include the District’s counsel. The District may
be represented by counsel at any level of the process.
Consolidating Complaints arising out of an event or a series of related events
Complaints shall be addressed in one complaint. Employees shall not file sep-
arate or serial complaints arising from any event or series of events
that have been or could have been addressed in a previous com-
plaint.
When two or more complaints are sufficiently similar in nature and
remedy sought to permit their resolution through one proceeding,
the District may consolidate the complaints.
Untimely Filings All time limits shall be strictly followed unless modified by mutual
written consent.
If a complaint form or appeal notice is not timely filed, the com-
plaint may be dismissed, on written notice to the employee, at any
point during the complaint process. The employee may appeal the
dismissal by seeking review in writing within ten days from the date
of the written dismissal notice, starting at the level at which the
complaint was dismissed. Such appeal shall be limited to the issue
of timeliness.
Costs Incurred Each party shall pay its own costs incurred in the course of the
complaint.

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 3 of 7

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094901

PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA

EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Complaint and Complaints and appeals under this policy shall be submitted in
Appeal Forms writing on a form provided by the District.
Copies of any documents that support the complaint should be at-
tached to the complaint form. If the employee does not have copies
of these documents, they may be presented at the Level One con-
ference. After the Level One conference, no new documents may
be submitted by the employee unless the employee did not know
the documents existed before the Level One conference.
A complaint or appeal form that is incomplete in any material as-
pect may be dismissed but may be refiled with all the required in-
formation if the refiling is within the designated time for filing.
Audio Recording As provided by law, an employee shall be permitted to make an au-
dio recording of a conference or hearing under this policy at which
the substance of the employee’s complaint is discussed. The em-
ployee shall notify all attendees present that an audio recording is
taking place.
Level One Complaint forms must be filed:
1. Within 15 days of the date the employee first knew, or with
reasonable diligence should have known, of the decision or
action giving rise to the complaint or grievance; and
2. With the lowest level administrator who has the authority to
remedy the alleged problem.
In most circumstances, employees on a school campus shall
file Level One complaints with the campus principal; other
District employees shall file Level One complaints with their
immediate supervisor.
If the only administrator who has authority to remedy the al-
leged problem is the Superintendent or designee, the com-
plaint may begin at Level Two following the procedure, includ-
ing deadlines, for filing the complaint form at Level One.
If the complaint is not filed with the appropriate administrator, the
receiving administrator must note the date and time the complaint
form was received and immediately forward the complaint form to
the appropriate administrator.
The appropriate administrator shall investigate as necessary and
schedule a conference with the employee within ten days after re-
ceipt of the written complaint. The administrator may set reasona-
ble time limits for the conference.

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 4 of 7

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PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA

EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Absent extenuating circumstances, the administrator shall provide

the employee a written response within ten days following the con-
ference. The written response shall set forth the basis of the deci-
sion. In reaching a decision, the administrator may consider infor-
mation provided at the Level One conference and any other
relevant documents or information the administrator believes will
help resolve the complaint.
Level Two If the employee did not receive the relief requested at Level One or
if the time for a response has expired, the employee may request a
conference with the Superintendent or designee to appeal the
Level One decision.
The appeal notice must be filed in writing, on a form provided by
the District, within ten days of the date of the written Level One
response or, if no response was received, within ten days of the
Level One response deadline.
After receiving notice of the appeal, the Level One administrator
shall prepare and forward a record of the Level One complaint to
the Level Two administrator. The employee may request a copy of
the Level One record.
The Level One record shall include:
1. The original complaint form and any attachments.
2. All other documents submitted by the employee at Level One.
3. The written response issued at Level One and any attach-
ments.
4. All other documents relied upon by the Level One administra-
tor in reaching the Level One decision.
The Superintendent or designee shall schedule a conference
within ten days after the appeal notice is filed. The conference shall
be limited to the issues and documents considered at Level One.
At the conference, the employee may provide information concern-
ing any documents or information relied upon by the administration
for the Level One decision. The Superintendent or designee may
set reasonable time limits for the conference.
The Superintendent or designee shall provide the employee a writ-
ten response within ten days following the conference. The written
response shall set forth the basis of the decision. In reaching a de-
cision, the Superintendent or designee may consider the Level
One record, information provided at the Level Two conference, and
any other relevant documents or information the Superintendent or
designee believes will help resolve the complaint.

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 5 of 7

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PERSONNEL-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS DGBA

EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

Recordings of the Level One and Level Two conferences, if any,

shall be maintained with the Level One and Level Two records.
Level Three If the employee did not receive the relief requested at Level Two or
if the time for a response has expired, the employee may appeal
the decision to the Board.
The appeal notice must be filed in writing, on a form provided by
the District, within ten days of the date of the written Level Two re-
sponse or, if no response was received, within ten days of the
Level Two response deadline.
The Superintendent or designee shall inform the employee of the
date, time, and place of the Board meeting at which the complaint
will be on the agenda for presentation to the Board.
The Superintendent or designee shall provide the Board the record
of the Level Two appeal. The employee may request a copy of the
Level Two record.
The Level Two record shall include:
1. The Level One record.
2. The notice of appeal from Level One to Level Two.
3. The written response issued at Level Two and any attach-
ments.
4. All other documents relied upon by the administration in
reaching the Level Two decision.
The appeal shall be limited to the issues and documents consid-
ered at Level Two, except that if at the Level Three hearing the ad-
ministration intends to rely on evidence not included in the Level
Two record, the administration shall provide the employee notice of
the nature of the evidence at least three days before the hearing.
The District shall determine whether the complaint will be pre-
sented in open or closed meeting in accordance with the Texas
Open Meetings Act and other applicable law. [See BE]
The presiding officer may set reasonable time limits and guidelines
for the presentation, including an opportunity for the employee and
administration to each make a presentation and provide rebuttal
and an opportunity for questioning by the Board. The Board shall
hear the complaint and may request that the administration provide
an explanation for the decisions at the preceding levels.
In addition to any other record of the Board meeting required by
law, the Board shall prepare a separate record of the Level Three

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 6 of 7

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EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS/GRIEVANCES (LOCAL)

presentation. The Level Three presentation, including the presenta-

tion by the employee or the employee’s representative, any
presentation from the administration, and questions from the Board
with responses, shall be recorded by audio recording, video/audio
recording, or court reporter.
The Board shall then consider the complaint. It may give notice of
its decision orally or in writing at any time up to and including the
next regularly scheduled Board meeting. If the Board does not
make a decision regarding the complaint by the end of the next
regularly scheduled meeting, the lack of a response by the Board
upholds the administrative decision at Level Two.

DATE ISSUED: 12/1/2014 ADOPTED: 7 of 7

UPDATE 101
DGBA(LOCAL)-A
 F

700 LAVACA, S TE . 1443 C HRISTOPHER H. S CHULZ

AUSTIN , TEXAS 78755 CSCHULZ @SLH -LAW . COM
TELEPHONE : (512) 962-7384 F ACSIMILE : (210) 538-5384
WWW.SLH-LAW.COM & WWW.K12LAW.COM

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS FOR TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

March 6, 2017

By Email: tigerhanner@gmail.com

Mr. Karl Tiger Hanner

Law Offices of Tiger Hanner
807 McPhaul Street
Austin, Texas 78758

Dear Mr. Hanner,

On January 26, 2017, your client filed a complaint against Superintendent Stetson Roane pursuant to
DIA (Local). The only remedy sought is that Stetson Roane be removed from his position. On
February 27, 2017, Stetson Roane resigned from Seguin Independent School District. Because of his
resignation, Stetson Roane no longer holds a position with Seguin Independent School District and there
is no other relief that can be granted. Therefore, we consider your client’s complaint closed at this time.

Pursuant to DIA (Local), a complainant who is dissatisfied with the outcome of an investigation may
appeal through DGBA (Local), beginning at the appropriate level, or file a complaint with appropriate
state or federal agencies. Additionally, Seguin Independent School District prohibits retaliation against an
employee who makes a claim alleging to have experienced discrimination or harassment, or another
employee who, in good faith, makes a report, serves as a witness, or otherwise participates in an
investigation.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

S CHULMAN , L OPEZ ,
H OFFER & ADELSTEIN , LLP

Christopher H. Schulz

CHS:cap
cc: Ms. Dorothy Whitman
Assistant Superintendent, Human Resources
Seguin Independent School District

Schulman, Lopez, Hoffer & Adelstein, LLP—Trusted advisers and advocates for Texas independent school districts,
charter schools and local governments offering accessible, responsive legal representation to our clients.

Main Office: 517 Soledad Street, San Antonio, Texas 11 (210) 538-5385 11 Facsimile: (210) 538-5384

82
 G
EEOC FORM 131 (11/09) U.S. 6...1a1 Employment Opportunity C„ionmission
PERSON FILING CHARGE 1 1

Haley Martin-Dean
Dorothy Whitman THIS PERSON (check one or both)
Assistant Superintendent of Administrative Services
SEGUIN ISD X Claims To Be Aggrieved
1221 Kingsbury St.. Is Filing on Behalf of Other(s)
Seguin, TX 78155
L EEOC CHARGE NO.
451-2017-02545 (UNPERFECTED)
NOTICE OF CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
(See the enclosed for additional informat on)

This is notice that a charge of employment discrimination has been filed against your organization under:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) The Equal Pay Act (EPA) The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 7 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)

The boxes checked below apply to our handling of this charge:

No action is required by you at this time.

2.[I Please call the EEOC Representative listed below concerning the further handling of this charge.
3. Please provide by a statement of your position on the issues covered by this charge, with copies of any supporting documentation to the EEOC
Representative listed below. Your response will be placed in the file and considered as we investigate the charge. A prompt response to this
request will make it easier to conclude our investigation.

4.7 response
Please respond fully by to the enclosed request for information and send your response to the EEOC Representative listed below. Your
will be placed in the file and considered as we investigate the charge. A prompt response to this request will make it easier to
conclude our investigation.

5. n EEOC has a Mediation program that gives parties an opportunity to resolve the issues of a charge without extensive investigation or
expenditure of resources. If you would like to participate, please say so on the enclosed form and respond by
to
If you DO NOT wish to try Mediation, you must respond to any request(s) made above by the date(s) specified there.

For further inquiry on this matter, please use the charge number shown above. Your position statement, your response to our request for information,
or any inquiry you may have should be directed to:

Norma Guzman, San Antonio Field Office

Enforcement Manager 5410 Fredericksburg Rd
EEOC Representative Suite 200
San Antonio, TX 78229
Telephone (210) 281-7617
Fax: (210) 281-7690
Enclosure(s): Copy of Charge

ri
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION
• El Race ❑ Color ( Sex ❑ Religion ❑ National Origin ❑ Age ❑ Disability ❑ Retaliation ❑ Genetic Information Other

ISSUES: Sexual Harassment

DATE(S) (on or about): EARLIEST: 01-17-2017 LATEST: 01-17-2017

A perfected charge (EEOC Form 5) will be mailed to you once it has been received from the Charging Party.
•■■

Date

1
Name / Title of Authorized Official 'gnature its

Travis G. Hicks, hilsCA4d Al:

August 7, 2017 Director

311
EEOC Form 5 (11109)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION Charge Presented To: Agency(les) Charge No(s):

—
This form Is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See enclosed Privacy Act FEPA
Statement and other information before completing this form. =
X EEOC 451-2017-02545
Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division and EEOC
State or local Agency, if any
Name (Indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.) Home Phone (Incl. Area Code) Date of Birth

Haley Martin-Dean (830) 305-3222 1968

Street Address City, State and ZIP Code

269 Turtle Lane, Seguin, TX 78155

Named is the Employer, Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship Committee, or State or Local Government Agency That I Believe
Discriminated Against Me or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULARS below,)
Name No, Employees, Members Phone No. (Inakide Area Code)

SEGUIN ISD Unknown (830) 401-8651

Street Address City, State and ZIP Code

1221 Kingsbury St, Seguin, TX 78155

Name No. Employees, Members Phone No. (Include Area Code)

Street Address City, State and ZiP Code

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es).) DATE(S) DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE

Earliest Latest
--. --,
RACE COLOR X SEX RELIGION NATIONAL ORIGIN 01-17-2017 01-17-2017
X RETALIATION Li AGE DISABILITY j j GENETIC INFORMATION

OTHER (Specify) 1 XI CONTINUING ACTION

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper is needed, attach extra sheet(s)):
I have been employed with Respondent since May 1 2016. While employed I was subjected to Sexual
Harassment from the Superintendent. As soon as I was able I reported the incident to human
Resources which ultimately ended with the Superintendent resigning his position. After his
resignation I was subjected to retaliation for reporting the incident.
Rumors have been spread by members of the school district and I have been accused of making
false allegations.

These actions would not have occurred if I were male.

I believe I have been discriminated against based on my sex/female as I was sexually harassed and
then retaliated against by having my complaint made public in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended.

I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any. I NOTARY — When necessary for State and Local Agency Requirements
will advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number and I will
cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their
procedures.
I swear or affirm that 1 have read the above charge and that it is true to
I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct, the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS DATE

(month, day, year)
.
Date Charging Party Signature
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EEOC Form 161 (11(16) U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION H
DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS
To: Haley Martin-Dean From: San Antonio Field Office
269 Turtle Lane 5410 Fredericksburg Rd
Seguin, TX 78155 Suite 200
San Antonio, TX 78229

On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whose identity is

CONFIDENTIAL (29 CFR §1801.7(a))
EEOC Charge No. EEOC Representative Telephone No.

Sybil Edwards,
451-2017-02545 Investigator (210) 281-7654
THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:
The facts alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes enforced by the EEOC.

Your allegations did not involve a disability as defined by the Americans With Disabilities Act.

II The Respondent employs less than the required number of employees or is not otherwise covered by the statutes.

El Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged
discrimination to file your charge
IXI The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the
information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with
the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
The EEOC has adopted the findings of the state or local fair employment practices agency that investigated this charge.

Other (briefly state)

- NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHTS -

(See the additional information attached to this farm)

Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send you.
You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your
lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be
lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different.)

Equal Pay Act (EPA): EPA suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3 years for willful violations) of the
alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay due for any violations that occurred more than 2 years (3 years)
before you file suit may not be collectible.

On behalf of the Commission

Enclosures(s)
gni )z.0 17
'64 Travis G. Hicks, (Date Mailed)
1 Director
CC:

Dorothy Whitman
Assistant Superintendent of Administrative Services
SEGUIN ISD
1221 Kingsbury St.
Seguin, TX 78155

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