March 12, 2019
VII. Dissolution of Marriage
1. Annulment
Family Code, Articles 45-54
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless
after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless
the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable. (85a)
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of
the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at
the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within
the periods indicated herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not
give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the
age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge
of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane,
at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after
regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from
the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage. (87a)
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation
of facts or confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to
the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish
to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent. (n)
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44
shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of
the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.chan
robles virtual law library
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children
conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
2. Absolute Divorce
Civil Code, Articles 15 and 17
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Cases:
Roehr vs. Rodriguez, G. R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of
tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case
at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata
with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings
in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427
Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her
interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding
she's going to file in US. They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now
wants to collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object
was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them.
Court ruled for Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit
…to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging
…to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership
…in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties,
and claims to the conjugal partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC
ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY
The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal
partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
…to secure divorce
…to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce
Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce
(following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition.
(UNIVERSALITY OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute to a person of Country A the status
that is established in Country A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or qualifications that are not set in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION)
Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948,
before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However,
the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint
for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and,
on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine
Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a
decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of
adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had
begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
Arca vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579
FACTS: November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Area and defendant Alfredo Javier married. Judge
Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila solemnized it. They already had a son that time,
named Alfredo. Alfredo was born on December 2, 1931. Alfredo joined US Navy. Defendant Alfredo
Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Salud was from Cavite. She chose to
live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. She didn’t have good relations with the parents so she
went back to Maragondon Cavite. Due to long distance, their relationship strained and he filed for
divorce.
Having received a copy of the complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Area
answering the complaint alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September
23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In
that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Area averred among other things that defendant Alfredo
Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve months
preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines.
She denied, furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite,
and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about 10,000 miles
from each other.
In July, 1941 that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Area on April 9, 1941 defendant
Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and lot at 248
Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce
from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United
States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13,
1950.
After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce one against his first wife Salud
R. Area and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis issued by the Circuit Court of
Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married. Maria Odvina before
Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950.
ISSUE: won divorce of Salud and Alfredo was valid
HELD: This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar nature in a number of
cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In essence, it was held that one
of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be
domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted
It is true that Salud R. Area filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in
view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as
placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of
appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the
ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a
special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of
Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed
appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or
domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional
shore leave for shift duty.
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil 855
Ramirez vs Gmur
42 Phil 855 [GR No. L-11796 August 5, 1918]
Facts: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a
resident of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Iloilo on June 29, 1913, leaving a valuable estate
of which he disposed by will. A few days after his demise the will was offered for probate in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo and, upon publication of notice, was duly allowed and established by the
court. His widow, Doña Ana M. Ramirez, was named as executrix in the will, and to her accordingly
letters testamentary were issued. By the will everything was given to the widow, with the exception of
a piece of real property located in the City of Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to the testator’s
brothers and sisters.
As appears from the original baptismal entry of Leona Castro made in the church record of Bacolod,
she was born in that pueblo on April 11, 1875, her mother being Felisa Castro, and father “unknown.”
Upon the margin of this record there is written in Spanish an additional annotation of the following
tenor: “According to a public document (escritura) which was exhibited, she was recognized by
Samuel Bischoff on June 22, 1877.” As the years passed Leona Castro was taken into the family of
Samuel Bischoff and brought up by him and his wife a a member of the family; and it is sufficiently
shown by the evidence adduced in this case that Samuel Bischoff tacitly recognized Leona a his
daughter and treated her as such. In the year 1895 Leona Castro was married to Frederick von
Kauffman, a British subject, born in Hong Kong, who had come to live in the city of Iloilo. Three
children were born of this marriage, namely, Elena, Federico, and Ernesto, the youngest having been
born on November 10, 1898. In the month of April 1899, Leona Castro was taken by her husband
from Iloilo to the City of Thun, Switzerland, for the purpose of recuperating her health. She was there
placed in a sanitarium, and on August 20th the husband departed for the Philippine Islands, where
he arrived on October 10, 1899. Leona Castro continued to remain in Switzerland, and a few years
later informed her husband, whom she had not seen again, that she desired to remain free and would
not resume life in common with him. As a consequence, in the year 1904, Mr. Kauffman went to the
City of Paris, France, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from his wife under the French laws; and
there is submitted in evidence in this case a certified copy of an extract from the minutes of the Court
of First Instance of the Department of the Seine, from which it appears that a divorce was there
decreed on January 5, 1905, in favor of Mr. Kauffman and against his wife, Leona, in default. Though
the record recites that Leona was then in fact residing at No. 6, Rue Donizetti, Paris, there is no
evidence that she had acquired a permanent domicile in that city.
Issue: Whether or not the the the divorce obtained by Mr. Kauffman is valid.
Held: No. It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which
neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a
divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. The voluntary appearance of
the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff’s residence in the State or
country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile
and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of
remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that State. This
is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own
domicile.
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. vs. Teodoro, 20 SCRA 653
Wala ko mahanap case digest online kaya I copied portions.
FACTS: The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. No. 30916. The case relates to the execution
of a joint and several judgment for money obtained by the said company against the Philippine
Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas, Jr., in a litigation started in 1952 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
with only a slight modification in respect of the award for attorney’s fees.
The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the decision sought to be reviewed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When said decision became final, respondent Manila Surety secured on September 20, 1961, from
the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 17014 a second alias writ of execution
addressed to respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for
respondent Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard Street,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances and personal properties
found therein belonging solely and exclusively to the petitioner with the exception of a sewing
machine which belonged to a maid by the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E. television set which was the
property of the minor Jose Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a Columbia, radio
phonograph which belonged to Jose Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was then abroad, her sister
Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody and safekeeping of the properties, had
made representations to the deputy sheriff and to the counsel of respondent Manila Surety regarding
the ownership of the petitioner over certain personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same
and proceeded with the levy.
Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places notices of sale, preparatory to disposing
petitioner’s properties at public auction.
To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner’s properties, she filed on November 3, 1961, with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with injunction, entitled ’Trinidad Teodoro v. Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal’. praying among other things, for
damages and a writ of preliminary injunction which was accordingly issued upon petitioner’s filing of
a bond in the sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public
auction the properties claimed by said petitioner.
However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety filed an ’Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint and to Dissolve Injunction’ to which an opposition was filed.
After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of their respective claims and after hearing
their arguments, the lower court declared that the properties in question are community properties
of Trinidad Teodoro (herein petitioner) and Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May 12, 1962, the writ
of preliminary injunction it had issued and dismissed the complaint (Civil case No. 6865, CFI-Rizal).
Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case No. 6865 of Rizal) interposed an
appeal. In the meanwhile, however, the Manila Surety filed on May 29, 1962, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of a third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of
the judgment debt in civil case No. 17014. Acting upon said motion the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued on June 2, 1962, the Third Alias Writ of Execution.’
Thus, on June 7, 1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of Rizal again repaired to the residence of
herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and levied upon the same properties, with
the exception of the baby grand piano and the ’Columbia’ phonograph which were the properties of
Jose Corominas, Jr. and which had already been sold at public auction November 6, 1961 for
P3,305.00, the Regal sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in the boy’s and girl’s
rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a stereophonic phonograph and the G.E. television set. An
on the following day, June 8, 1962, respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal advertised the sale at public
auction of the aforementioned properties claimed by herein petitioner, setting the date thereof for
June 16, 1962."cralaw virtua1aw library
Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals to stop
the scheduled sale. On October 24, 1962 the said Court rendered the decision now under review,
granting the writ prayed for and permanently enjoining respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal from
selling at public auction the properties in question for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Jose
Corominas, Jr.
The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties, claimed by
respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established between her and
Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon
on execution for the satisfaction of the latter’s judgment debt. The facts relied upon in support of this
theory of co-ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo and quoted by the Court of
Appeals, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November 29,
1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of
matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .
"Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955 . . . On March 26,
1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the
Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street, Manila, . . . On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe
County, Nevada, U.S.A."cralaw virtua1aw library
Additional pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and not controverted by the
parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage
to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon their joint
petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.
ISSUE: The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the situation
thus created. This Article provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."cralaw
virtua1aw library
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid
under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership
was terminated in 1957; and that the former’s subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad
Teodoro is bigamous and void.
1. EXECUTION; EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF ONE OF THE PARTNERS IN A VOID
MARRIAGE NOT ANSWERABLE FOR JUDGMENT DEBT OF THE OTHER PARTNER. —
The properties that can be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil Code are
those acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries. Where the funds used in acquiring the properties were fruits of one of
the partners’ paraphernal investments which accrued before the "marriage’ the said properties
remain exclusively those of that partner, and, as such are beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
the judgment debt of the other partner.
2. ID.; THIRD-PARTY CLAIM NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. — A third-party claim is not
an exclusive remedy. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that nothing therein
contained "shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. INJUNCTION; ELEVATION OF APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WHEN AN
INDEPENDENT PETITION FOR INJUNCTION IS JUSTIFIED. — An independent petition for
injunction is not unjustified if under the circumstances it is impracticable to first wait for the
appeal to be elevated to and docketed in the Court of Appeals and then secure the ancillary remedy
of injunction therein.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
139 SCRA 139
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and
had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in
Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, (1989)
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982
and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. NO. 124371, 23 November 2000 (repeated case)
Garcia vs. Recio, G. R. No. 138322, 2 October 2002
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an
Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick
and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3,
1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was
valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the
former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country
where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive
or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus
free him on the ground of bigamy.
Zamoranos vs. People, G.R. No. 193902, 1 June 2011
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again,
this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their
marriage was confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to
De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of
Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to
strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil
ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first
marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the
two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a
bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter
retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos
including a petition for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment
from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor
Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision
in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch
2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest

HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity
FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn
of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He
marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan
returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man.
City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over the
Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.
subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the
Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to
Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that
his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken
recognized judicially by the Philippine court.
cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a
Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but
Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman
was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil
validly severed their marriage ties.
Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the
divorce decree
court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by
HELD: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino
P.D. No. 1083.
spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status
of the Filipino spouse.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive
that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is
presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's
obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to
national law.
both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage
without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.
while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6,
Iligan City, should haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown
that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De
Guzman. (3) Legal Separation

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Family Code, Title II
Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the
National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs TITLE II
and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
LEGAL SEPARATION
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to common child, or a child of the petitioner;
remarry.
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz
and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus,
affiliation;
entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy. GRANTED
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines
or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained
of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act
constituting the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the
occurrence of the cause. (102)
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly
improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of
them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The
administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian
under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall
likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.
(105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall
not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions
of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the
donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the
latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable.
The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where
the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The
revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon
written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the
time the decree of legal separation become final. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly
signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following
consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever
stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property regime.
The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article
shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After
due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such
order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed
or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's
claim. (195a, 108a)
(4) Capacity to Remarry
Family Code, Article 26, paragraph 2
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
Sec. 1. Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 naulit
Republic vs. Orbecido, G. R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005 naulit
VIII. Parents and Children (Parental Relations)
Civil Code, Articles 15
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
Family Code, Articles 163-182 (Paternity and Filiation); Articles 209-233 (Parental
Authority)
TITLE VI
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Chapter 1. Legitimate Children
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. (n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband
or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided,
that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and
signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code. (n)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence. (255a)
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence
of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born
within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the
termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
(261a)
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from
the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was
recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was
unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge
of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period
prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)
Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In
these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the
Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code. (264a)
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force. (287a)
Chapter 4. Legitimated Children

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a) chan robles virtual law
library
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit
their descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within
five years from the time their cause of action accrues. (275a)
TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and
rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being. (n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the
cases authorized by law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey
them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority
shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the
court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise
the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by
one parent against the other. (315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children
similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads
of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government
agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over
said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
 Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in
them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when
the best interests of the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution
exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides,
for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the
assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall
be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits
of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or
suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
(318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the
child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's
homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever
committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court
may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon
the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of
the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the
parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the
child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the
property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article
shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case
the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or
by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily
to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall
be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would
have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the
child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's
legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority;
or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.
(327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising
the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.
(330a)
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental
authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable
negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall
deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under
the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed
for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and
will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be
subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such
authority. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Republic Act 9858
REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS
BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the
Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be
legitimated."
"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The
annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation."
Section 2. Implementing Rules. – The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the
chairpersons of the Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of
Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of
the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the
UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act
not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations
and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
amended, modified, superseded or repealed accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
Cases:
Roehr vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE
JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine.
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50
of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata
with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings
in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been
promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the
purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of
tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case
at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards
child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of
custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the