American Philological Association

Antisthenes Was No Logician

Author(s): G. M. A. Grube
Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 81 (1950),
pp. 16-27
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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16 G. M. A. Grube [1950

III.-Antistheneswas no Logician
G. M. A. GRUBE
TRINITY COLLEGE, TORONTO

We firstmeet Antisthenesin Xenophon' as a devoted and con-

stant companion of Socrates, especially in the Symposium,where
somethinglike a statementof his general attitude is put into his
mouth. Each of thosepresentstates and defendsthe greatestgood
he thinkshe possesses,the thingof whichhe is most proud. Antis-
thenes says this is his wealth- even though he hasn't an obol.
True riches,he tells us, residein the soul. So many richmen,even
tyrants, are really very poor, for they are always laboring to
increasetheirpossessions,and one may well pity the grievousdis-
ease that is theirs. Antistheneshimselfalways has enough to eat
and drink,and clothes that keep him as warm as Callias with all
his money. His house is a sufficientshelter. When in need of
sexual satisfaction,any woman that is available can give it to him,
and because othersreject her she is even grateful. He would not
pray forgreaterpleasuresthan these but forless, forsome of them
are already excessive. Moreover,if all his possessionswere taken
away, any kind of job will provide their equivalent. Pleasure is
derived fromthe soul itself,not frombuying expensive thingsin
the marketplace; and the pleasure is much greaterif we wait until
the need is felt,ratherthan,as he is doing now,drinkinggood wine
when he is not thirsty. This kind of riches makes men freeand
1 Memorabilia2.5.3, in a discussionof the value of friends,and 3.11.17, wherehe
is mentionedas one who is constantlywithSocrates. In the Symposium,Antisthenes
teases Socrates about Xanthippe (2.10) and a littlelater (2.12) Socrates calls out to
him that no one will now contradict(&VTLMyav) and say that courage cannot be
taught. When Callias says that he makes men betterby givingthemmoney,Antis-
theneschallengeshim and agreesthat KaXOK&tya0La and 6LKatOoVIJ?7 are the same (3.4),
that justice is in the soul, not in the purse (4.2). He also remindsNiceratusthat
even rhapsodes,that silly tribe,knowtheir Homer by heart,and Socrates says pre-
sumablythe rhapsodesdo not knowthe allegories(3.6). Antisthenesalso challenges
Niceratus' claim that knowledgeof all thingscan be got fromHomer (4.6-7). The
most importantpassages forour purposeare 4.34-44, whereAntisthenesdeclaimson
wealth in the soul, and 4.61-4, whereSocratessays Antisthenesis a iiao-Tpo1ros in the
sense that he can bringtogetherpeople who need each otheras, forexample,he intro-
duced Callias to Prodicusand Hippias. Finally,in 8.4 Antisthenesprotestshis love
forSocrates.

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 Vol. lxxxi] A ntisthenes
was no Logician 17

good, for they do not then covet the possessionsof others. It is

fromSocrates that he has receivedall of it that he could carry,and
he himselfcan share it freelywith all. The greatestluxurythat
it providesis leisure,the leisureto attendto the thingsthatare really
worthwhile,and above all the leisureto listento Socrates.
This passage is rightlyregardedas the firstexpressionin litera-
ture of the general attitude which later became characteristicof
both Cynics and Stoics. It puts all the emphasis upon one aspect
of the Socratic doctrinesand personality:indifference to wealth,
self-control,completedevotion to the right. But thereis a differ-
ence: Socrates was indifferentto poverty, Antisthenesmakes a
virtue of it; Socrates was vitally concernedto discover the nature
of the good, Antistheneswas apt to take the natureof the good for
granted.2 Later tradition,with its mania for philosophic"succes-
sions," made Antisthenesthe founderof Cynicism. We may well
doubt the tradition, for,any direct contact between him and
Diogenes is improbable,3but therecan be no doubt of the general
likeness in point of view. And if Antistheneswas free fromthe
more extreme forms of shamelessnessor anaideia displayed by
Diogenes, he already had morethan a trace of it.4
That Antisthenesin Xenophon shows interestonly in the more
directly moral aspect of the Socratic doctrine is not conclusive
evidence that he had no other interests,since it was this aspect
which appealed to Xenophon's unphilosophicmind.5 Such frag-
ments and accounts of him as we possess, however,give the same
impression. We are told that he taught that the aim or teloswas
2 Diogenes Laertius 6.11: abd&pK?) & T7iV
-p &peT2rp 7rps 6aquoOJaV uwv rpoa6eo-
'V7V 6Tr IAyeZWKPCTtK7S 0X0V- T7JVTe &peTriV T(fl' gp-yco etva IA're X6&yv rXerTroV
5eopjzeh?Ppi-Te JAaB/A4-rTWV.
3 On thispointsee D. R. Dudley, A HistoryofCynicism(London 1937) 1-8.
4The referenceto sexual satisfactionreferredto above (Xen. Symp. 4.38) is a
case in point,and we findsimilarvigorousand ratherbrutalstatementsin Diogenes
Laertius,who tellsus thatAntistheneshad thereputationof treatinghis pupilsharshly
(6.4 and 21). The fragments give otherexamples,see particularly5, 9, 15, 20, 41, 45
in Mullach's Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, vol. 2 (Paris 1865) and passim.
Referencesto Mullach's fragmentsreferalso to the supportingmaterialunderthose
numbers.
6 It has been suggestedthat Xenophon's pictureof Socrates was influencedby
Antisthenes. If that wereso, our thesiswould therebybe strengthened, as Xenophon
is not given to logical discussions,but the conjectureis unnecessary. It is natural
that bothshould be mostimpressedby the moralcharacterratherthan the philosophy
ofSocrates. For an elaboratestudyofthe allegedrelationshipbetweenXenophonand
Antisthenes see K. Joel's Der Echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates (Berlin 1893).

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18 G. M. A. Grube [1950

to live according to virtue, that virtue can be taught, and he

showed a considerablehostilityto pleasure;6 but we findno trace
anywhereof any serious discussion of the nature of virtue or of
pleasure. In view of the later position of Heracles as a Stoic
saint,it is interestingto findthat Antistheneswrotea workentitled
Heracles, in which he apparently emphasized the moral value of
ponos or labor (fr. 12). His Homericwritingsseem to have been
concernedwith ethics and the ethical meaningof words: we have
a long fragmenton the ethical implicationsof the epithetiroTporos
as applied to Odysseus.7 There are, throughoutthe fragments,a
numberof sternmoralepigrams,such as that it is kinglyto do good
and be ill spoken of. Antisthenesalso wrote a violent attack on
Plato, of which the main point that has been preservedis his com-
plete disbeliefin the existenceof the Forms.8
All this points to a man of no very deep philosophicunder-
standing, who was tremendouslyattracted by the stoic side of
Socrates' character,9but who was blind to the deeper implications
of his master'sdoctrine.
It is quite consistentthat such a man should be somewhatcon-
temptuousof philosophicdiscussionin the Platonic sense, and that
he should have.used, in his opposition,the regularlogic-chopping
stock-in-tradeof the Sophists. That he did so we know fromthe
incontrovertibleevidence of Aristotle who tells us clearly that
Antisthenesmaintainedit was impossibleto contradict,to make a
false statement,or a predicativestatement,or to defineanything.
The inevitableresultis to make all knowledge,indeedall discussion,
impossible. All thisfitsthe man who said that virtuewas the most
importantthingin lifebut did not investigatewhat virtueis.
Aristotle'sevidence is definiteand clear, and as far as it goes
no one really denies it; but many attempts have been made to
make it go a great deal further,by construingthe passages so as
6 Fr. 1 and 2 in Mullach, and Diog. Laert. 6.3 p,aveh7v,iuXXovv iareiv.
7Mullach 26. With this we should link Socrates' sarcastic remark (above, note 1)
that the rhapsodes evidently don't know the allegories. This is contemporary evidence
that Antisthenes indulged in what was to be a Stoic pastime for centuries.
8 Fr. 44 (Mullach): Zirirovju&vOpa, irir6Orra 6' obx pa. To which Plato's alleged
reply is also preserved: XEXes /Aiv 4 r77ros6parat ro6eeTO' O6jtta,4 ei Lr7r6OTs
OewpeZTat

ovi,5rwKkKrcaat.
9 As Diogenes Laertius puts it (6.2): 7rap o-vKaL TO' KapTrepptKOVXa#6 Kal Td &7rcL
77X6o-aSKLT?7pie 7rpCrTOsTOV KV1LOUOO. It has already been suggested that the direct
connection with Cynicism is exaggerated, but there is no doubt as to the general
attitude.

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Vol. lxxxi] A ntisthenes
was no Logician 19

to credit to Antisthenesthe commentsof Aristotlehimself. The

nextstep is thento followthiswill of the wisp throughthe Platonic
dialogues and to see referencesto Antisthenesin every passage
where anything resemblingthese comments is found. On the
evidence of these supposed allusions a philosophyof Antisthenesis
built, and furtherreferencesto this are found.'0
This process has been going on for more than a century,and
some of its conclusionsare in danger of being taken forgrantedon
impressiveauthorityalone. Our object here is to look afreshat
the actual evidence, which is found in threepassages of Aristotle.
The firstis Topica 104B.21, thoughhere thereis no possibility
of controversyas Aristotlesimply gives as an example of a para-
doxical thesis the opinion of Antisthenesthat contradictionis
impossible:otvOTlO OOVKEaLv Kaccrep 4'oq'AvTo-%vns.
avrtXLyeLV, . ..
No otherwords can be made relevant,and we thus have a simple
statement,which,however,should be noted.
The second passage should be equally non-controversial. It
occursin the fourthbook of the Metaphysics,in the courseof a short
statementon the natureoffalsehood- Vtev-bos.Falsehood is divided
into falsehoodof fact and of logoi. Aristotlethen says:"
10 The boldest and least convincing recent attempt to build up Antisthenes into
a great logician is C. M. Gillespie's "The Logic of Antisthenes" in Archivfiir Geschichte
der Philosophie 26 (1913) 479-500, and 27 (1914) 17-38. A much more sober attempt
is K. von Fritz' "Zur Antisthenischen Erkenntnistheorie und Logik" in Hermes 62
(1927) 453-484. Natorp's article on Antisthenes in Pauly-Wissowa gives a very full
account of all the scholars who built up Antisthenes in the last century, and what
Platonic passages each believed to refer to him. See also Zeller, Socrates and the
Socratic Schools (London 1877) 284 ff. Zeller admits that the doctrines of Antisthenes
were subversive of all knowledge (pp. 291 and 301), yet is led to credit him with con-
structive logical theories (p. 296). G. C. Field, in Plato and His Contemporaries
(London 1930) 160-4, also accepts the usual interpretation of Met. 1043B, as dops
D. R. Dudley (above, note 3) 1-15. See also Wilamowitz, Platon (Berlin 1929)
i.261-4 and ii.160-1; P. Friedlander, Platon (Leipzig 1930) II.453-4; and C. Ritter,
Platon (Mffnchen 1923) 1.1l5. On the other hand P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago
1933) 37-40, is very sceptical of this "vast fabric of hypotheses about the relations
of Plato and Antisthenes." L. Campbell, in the preface to his edition of the Theaetetus,
xxix, speaks of a "misunderstanding" of Met. 1043B. A. Levi, "Le Teorie Metafisiche,
Logiche e Gnoseologiche di Antistene," in Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie 4 (1930)
227-249 comes nearest to my interpretation of that passage. A. E. Taylor, Plato,
The Man and His Work (London 1926) pp. 86, 89, 96, 331, 386, refuses to see any
references to Antisthenes' theories in Plato, and Burnet, Thales to Plato (London 1920)
251-2, is equally definite about the Theaetetus. F. M. Cornford.is more doubtful in
Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London 1949) 144 and 254.
11Metaphysics 1024B.26-1025A.1: X6yos 6b 4 ev6is o T$V pi OPTrw n i,e8vs- 5tO
7ais Xo6yosf/Vtv3's TfpOV 7 O0) rTlV &AXIOI*s,
o0'ov TOVOKVKXOV Uev6ibSTpL'y6VOV. iKaCTOV

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20 G. M. A. Grube [1950

A falselogos,in so faras it is false,is about thingsthat are not.

Everylogosis falsewhenapplied to something otherthan that of
whichit is true. So thelogosof a circleis falsewhenappliedto a
triangle. In one sensethereis a logosofeach thingas one thing
thelogosofits essence- but in anothersensethereare many,since
a thingis bothitselfand itselfqualified,forexampleSocratesand
Socratesmusical. A falselogosis notthelogosofa thingunqualified.
Aristotleis here drawing a distinctionbetween logos as defini-
tion,of whichthereis only one foreach thing,and logos as predica-
tive statement,of whichmany can be applied to the same thing
from
as manyas it has qualities. A falsedefinitionis quite different
a falsepredication. He thengoes on to say thatAntisthenesignored
betweendefinitionand predication,with dire conse-
this difference
quences:
to thinkthata thingcould
That is whyit was sillyof Antisthenes
only be mentionedby its own logos,one logosforeach thing. It
followedfromthis that it is impossibleto contradict,and hardly
possibleto makea falsestatement. But it is possibleto mention
a thingnotonlyby its ownlogos. ...
Clearly,thereis no referenceto Antisthenesbeforehe is mentioned,
and the distinctionbetweenthe two kindsof logoi,predicationand
is Aristotle'sown. Indeed,Antisthenesis termedsimple-
definition,
minded because he ignoredit. The only theoryattributedto him
is the crudelysophisticone that a thingcan only be mentionedby
its own logos (definitionor name?) with the result that he denied
the possibilityof contradictionand false statement. Most com-
mentatorssince Alexander of Aphrodisiashave so interpretedthe
passage, though effortshave been made to attribute the earlier
statement,the very differencebetween definitionand predication
which he is blamed forignoring,to Antisthenes.12
6& XYos pf c
Eo-r v etUS roD tiv eftcat, o-rt be cUSroXXot, fre'
6 rTO i
eSrar6 rc adre Kat abrb
7reroVO6s,OtOP ZwKpaTrS Kat ZAKp&rqs pOVOLK6s. O 6& fUev6is Myos Obej&S &TtV &trxS
X6yos. 6u? 'AVrt&oOEvs'ero ejOcos 1776f &ttoV XfEyeOOat rXi7VTrl) OlKelq X4CP g' &V
W (s. f WOVavWaaLpe pAi fetvat &prTMX&yetv, o-xe6bvbe' 1)6f &ebbeoOOat. &Tot 6' lKafrOp

Xfi'yetv oV I6Vov Tri acrovi X6oyW, &XXa KatL rcj iripov. . . . I have kept the word logos
throughout the translation because it is obvious that Aristotle uses it here in several
senses, and it may well be that none of these corresponds exactly to the way Antisthenes
used it. It means in any case definition as well as predication. In Antisthenes it
may have meant word or name as well. The Oxford translators render it by "con-
ception," but this is very misleading for in this context it certainly means a thing
said, and not only thought.
12 Gillespie (above, note 10) certainly does so, if not explicitly on p. 480, without

any doubt in the body of the article, e.g. on p. 22. Alexander of Aphrodisias' com-

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Vol. lxxxi] was no Logician
Antisthenes 21

The third passage is the most importantfor our purpose and

consistentlymisinterpreted. It occurs in the eighthbook of Meta-
physics,and the question immediatelyprecedingis whetherovrtza,
substance,can exist apart. It cannot do so, we are told, at least
in the case of some artefactalike houses and instruments,and
(1043B.21):
Perhapsneitherthesethingsthemselves, norany otherthingsnot
put togetherby nature,are substances,for one mightsay that
natureis theonlysubstancein destructible
things.
The point is the difficultyof establishingthe substance of a thing,
particularlyof artificialcompounds,which may not be substance
in the propersense at all. Aristotlethen continues:"3
So the difficulty
of the Antistheneansand othersuch uncultured
peoplehas somerelevancehere:that it is not possibleto definethe
essenceofa thing,for,theysay,a definitionis a longrigmarole."4
Again a clear statement:Antisthenesdenied the possibilityof defi-
nition."6 Aristotlecontinues:
But it is possibleto explainof whatkinda thingis, as withsilver:
we cannotsay whatit is, but thatit is liketin. So thereis a sub-
stanceof whichtherecan be a statementand a formula, as forex-
mentson this passage are enlightening in this connection,particularly(In Aristotelis
MetaphysicaCommentaria, ed. Hayduck, Berlin 1891, 434.25): etI7r68i Tavra acrtrLTat
'AVTOeiv7)V enjOcs Xkeyo,Ta. . . 7rapaKpovo-OvTa v7ro TOVTOiV pev8iVX6-yo, JAI8ei'hi
&7rX)os elvaLX6-yov oh 'ydp et ,ui 7&7rXAWS iOTL 14r KVPIS, J&q Kact'0K i0-rTi'.
131043B.23-32: 6o-Te i &wopia i, ot 'AIr'ToObpeLOLKaL oi o6rws &araLbevrot ?r6pov,
gXeL TUV&Kacp6,, 6rt 0IK &0TTLr7 TI &Tt bp&oao-aL, -r6 yap opov X6yol,elJaL /AaKpo6'. &XXa
rOLoV 14LvTiL b'8tAV&XeT7a KaL 8L8&Ctat (lo-rep Apyvpo', Ti LL'f LT0J'P OV, TL 68 oIov KaTT&-
TepOS. eOaT ohvoiLas goTL JALv Sis ev'8iXe7at eTl'a 8po' KaL X&'yo', otLOv T7is oVVOiTOV, e'Tlre
aLEorTIj MiTe V 77T7ji it (10V 6' arT 7rpc'iTWco OKftn, eftrep TL KaTa 7T15s /aLpa et 6 X6yos
6 hpLo-TLK6S KaL 8el T7 p' 6To-rep VXqp elpaL 76 b8 cs sopovs. My interpretation requires
b'8iXeT7a, as read by both Ross and Schwegler,and the best Mss; thereis an inferior
variant WePXeaOat. I have removedthe parenthesisusuallyprintedroundthe words
76, -y&p . . . JAaKp6, and put a stop after 1saKp6i. Note the construction: 6T1 . . .
bpaaloawOa,then the accusative and infinitive. If the quotationcontinuedafter&XX&
I feelsure we should have had eithera continuationof the accusative and infinitive,
or a s,ukin the firstpart of the quotation,or a repetitionof 87 after&XXc.
14 Ross (note ad loc.) interpretsthe expressionas meaning"a diffuseand evasive
answer,"and refersto xiv, 1091A.8,whereAristotlehimselfdefinesthe phrase:-yLtyPTeLr
6 JaKp6s X6'yos o-Trep 6 T7(Zi 8oXcop &aP gqb8p VeLis XiyovoL (see Ross' note). Any
otherinterpretation, forexample Gillespie's "a compoundname" (482), simplydoes
not make sense in this passage.
15So Ross in note on B.23-5. See also Alexander (554 Hayduck): &Tol 6' a'TrCop
&ropLa 5t7 OhK goTL-uv6p0aa-LOat, o'' go-rTLpbptow6 TU'os.

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22 G. M. A. Grube [1950

ample thatof a compound,be it perceptible though

or intelligible;
the primaryelementsof whichit is composedcannotbe defined,if
the defining logosassertssomethingof something,and one part of
it is as the matterand theotheras theform.
I suggestthat the only thingattributedto Antistheneshere is that
definitionis impossible. That is the "difficulty"or aporia, and
it is relevant in so far as we are not sure what the substance of
thingsis. What followsare the commentsof Aristotle:a .XXa .

EVCEXeTrac,"but it is possible . ." (even where the substance is

uncertain). This seems much the best constructionand quite in
Aristotle'smanner. It also gives the most natural sense.'6 What
Aristotlesays in effectis that it is difficultto establish the nature
of the substance, especially in the case of artificialcompounds
whichindeed may not have it - to this extentAntisthenes'theory
that it is impossibleto defineanything(which Aristotleexpresses
in his own words) has a certainrelevance,since it is the essence or
substance that we attempt to define. In spite of all these diffi-
culties, however,you can say what a thing is like, and you can
analyze a compoundinto its componentelements(as Plato showed
in the Theaetetus). Both of these Antistheneswould deny.
Those who followthe usual interpretation,'7 whichattributesall
this to Antisthenes,that you can both say what a thingis like and
definea compoundinto its components,do not explainthe following
difficultiesraised by theirfar less natural construction:
a) Not only is the language of the sentenceAristotelian(Aris-
totle oftenputs otherpeople's ideas in his own technicallanguage)
but so are the ideas. Certainly Antistheneswould never have
admitted the existence,let alone the definitionor analysis, of in-
telligible compounds, or indeed of any intelligiblesat all. Nor
could he have spoken of a definitionbeing partly matter and
partlyform.
b) The statement that one can say that silver is like tin is
obviouslymeant to be a significantstatementabout silver;it points
16 Levi (above, note 10) 241-4, sees that the definition of compounds by analysis

cannot be attributed to Antisthenes, but he still attributes to him the previous state-
ment that you can say what a thing is like.
17 So Ross, Schwegler and the Oxford translators, as well as those mentioned
above in note 10. Alexander's comment seems a bit confused: he appears to say that
to say what a thing is like, and to analyze a physical compound into its components
was thought possible by Antisthenes and those like him, but the definitionof compounds
is denied by them and asserted by Aristotle (554 Hayduck).

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Vol. lxxxi] Antisthenes
was no Logician 23

to a commonquality betweensilverand tin and is thereforea form

of predication,a statementof quality. It could not thereforehave
been made by Antistheneswho refusedto see the differencebetween
predicationand definitionand who insistedthat you can only refer
to a thingby its own oikeioslogos.
c) The theory that compounds (even if only physical com-
pounds) could be definedor analyzed into theircomponentparts
could hardly have been held by Antisthenes,since he denied the
possibilityof predicationor definition,or that anythingcould be
mentionedexcept by its own logos. Nor does it seem to fitin with
his denial of the possibilityof error. Moreover, this interesting
theory,which Plato discusses at some length (Theaet. 201E), and
which is of some subtlety,can hardly be attributedto one whom
Aristotlecalled an unculturedsimpleton,and whose knowntheories
are always referredto with contemptby Plato.
From our examinationof these passages we may conclude that
the only logical theories,if they deserve the name, that Aristotle
mentionsas belongingto Antisthenesare the usual sophisticand
eristictrickswhich Plato exposed as contraryto all philosophicor
scientificinvestigation:that it is impossibleto contradict,to define,
to predicate,or to make a false statement.
Nor is there any 6erious evidence outside Aristotle for any
Antistheniclogic. Only one sentence in Diogenes could be inter-
preted to support it, but he gives no authorityfor it and it has
deservedlyreceived little attention. Diogenes tells us (6.3) that
Antistheneswas the firstto definelogoswhen he said: "The logos
is that.which showswhata thingis or was,"X0'YO oTTV
' '
O TO 7 t vV
kTL 6v@.18 If genuine,this fragmentshould no doubt be brought
into relation with Aristotle's statement that Antisthenessaid a
thingcould only be referredto by its OIKElOS Xo'yosand in no other
way. Logos cannot here mean definitionsince, as we have seen,
Aristotlesays that Antisthenesdenied the possibilityof definition,
whichwas to him only "a long rigmarole." Antisthenesmay have
meantsimplythat the onlylogos,the onlywordor expressionwhich
18 Thereis also a reference
to Antisthenes
in Alexander'sCommentary on the Topica
of Aristotle(ed. M. Wallies, Berlin1896,p. 42) wherehe is referred to as one of those
who mistakenlyconsidered rI ?)v as an adequate expression,as against Aristotle's
ri 7v estva&.There seemsto be some-confusion here,but as faras it goes thissupports
Diogenes in attributingthe expressionri iv to Antisthenes.

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24 G. M. A. Grube [1950

you could use to mentiona thingwas its name. You can name
things,but that is all.19
With this may be linkeda quotation fromAntisthenesin Epic-
tetus (1.17): &px, d'raoas e rT)Vbvo,pouav
7oK4t4S, which may point
to the fact that Antistheneshad some theoryof the importanceof
names, perhaps no more than has just been mentioned. Indeed
it may mean even less, forProdicus mightwell have said the same
thing. In any case, it is no evidence to attributeto Antisthenes
any elaborate theoryof language.20
The list of titles of Antisthenes' works given by Diogenes
Laertius has also been used as evidenceof seriouslogical theorizing.
Most of them,however,are obviously moral diatribes. We have
alreadyseen evidencethat his Homericwritingswere mostprobably
not much more. All were apparentlyfairlywell written,since they
pleased Cicero, but his verdict was that they were the work of a
sharp wit ratherthan a man of learning.2' He wrote on politics,
but Athenaeus (5.220D) tells us that his Politicus at any rate was
mainly "a runningdown"- Kara86pou- of Athenian politicians.
Sathon or On Contradiction sounds deep, but traditionsays it was
mainly a violent attack on Plato. There is no evidence that the
half-dozenor so workswith logical titleswere any more profound.
We may wonder,as Plato is reportedto have done (Diog. Laert.
3.35) how one can writein disagreementwith othersto prove that
contradictionis impossible,but that is not likelyto have inhibited
Antisthenes.
Cicero also tells us that Antisthenessaid that therewere many
popular, but only one natural god.22 The statementwas not very
original by his time, though it foreshadowsthe Stoic synthesis
betweenpolytheismand monotheism;at any rate, it is no evidence
of logical theories.
19Gillespieis probablyrightto see a close connectionbetween"one thing,one
logos" and "one thing,one name" (482 and passim). This, however,does not justify
him in attributingto Antisthenesany elaboratetheoriesof language,and thensaying
that Cratylusin the dialogue named afterhim is only a mask forAntisthenes. A
commentof Alexander(554 Hayduck) on the aporia of 1043B is also interestingin
this connection:i7res&ioAs 6 6ptajus oiKcffTrLP SvoAa,obK gaart bploaaaOat.For logosas
name see also Euthyd.285E, Cratyl.387c and Proclus,In Cratyl.45.
20 Von Fritz bases his reconstruction largelyon this quotationin Epictetus.
21Ad Atticum12.38: hominis acuti magis quam eruditi. Also under fr. 8 in
Mullach.
22 De Nat. Deor. 1.13; and also fr.24 (Mullach).

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Vol. lxxxii was no Logician
Antisthenes 25

If we now turn to the Platonic text,we findAntisthenesmen-

tioned in the Phaedo (59B) as present at the death of Socrates.
There is no other specificreferenceto him, though the views we
know him to have held are, naturally,broughtup in discussion.
That it is impossible to make a false statement is discussed in
Cratylus429B, and also in Euthydemus283E. In the latterdialogue
we also have the impossibilityof contradictionat 285D, and Sophist
251B-C mentionsthe theorythat predicationis impossible. Plato
is of course concernedto disprove these negations,but it is worth
notingthat all threeare mentionedas held by a good many people,
in no way new, and somewhatcontemptuouslydismissed.23 When
Isocrates refersto these same views, he does so in much the same
manner.24 In all thesecases it is hard to see any directreferenceto
any one person,be it Antisthenesor another.
If our interpretationof the two passages fromthe Metaphysics
is correct;there is no reason to see any referenceto Antisthenes
anywhereelse in Plato, thougha great deal of scholarlyingenuity
has been expendedin such attempts.25
23 Crat. 429D: appa 67t Vtvbrj Xt-y'sw rs2
Troap&lrav obK lTrtv . . . UvXvol -yAp rT'es o0
X0yoJpTe5 . . . Kal Yw The argumentis thenrefutedwithparticularrefer-
Kat T&XIaL.
ence to Cratylus' theoryof "true names." Regardingthe denial of contradiction
and falsehood,Socrates says in Euthyd.286c: KaL y,&p or &ipol fpcwra-y6pap o4,066pa
kxpCvOro abr' Kaal and in Sophist 251B (about predication): roLs TE
oF Trt 7raXacurepot,
vPOLs KCaL TrCo3yep6pirop - r
Tro#s#Asa0kTL Oolov 7rapeKva'Ka/Aev.. . r.yXa.VeT .J.y s yp .
7roXX6xJsTr&TotaVra &iarov5aKa&T, 5lore 7rpea,/3pvrpots &vOpt1rots....
24Isocr. Helen 1.
26The mostimportantof the otherpassages is Theaet.201D ff.,whereTheaetetus
puts forward,as a definition of knowledge,&Xi1Otis
&t5aMAeTrX&ov. This wholetheory
is attributedto Antisthenes,in particularby Gillespie(483). For this thereis not a
scrap of evidence,on any interpretations of the Metaphysicspassages or any others.
However, in the followingattemptto definelogos in this connection,Socrates then
bringsup the suggestionthat compoundscan be definedby analyzingtheminto their
components,thouighthe latter remain indefinable. This is, of course, the theory
mentionedin Met. 1043B,and those who thereattributeit to Antisthenesnaturally
see a reference to himhere. However,ifour interpretation of that passage is correct,
the basis for any referenceto Antisthenesin the Theaetetusdisappears. Gillespie
makes much (483) of Plato's use of the expressionolKelos X6'yosin Theaet.202A, a
phrase which Aristotle,as we have seen, attributesto Antisthenesin Met. 1024B
(quoted above). But Aristotle'suse of the words does not prove that the phrase
belongedto Antisthenes,though,even if it did, the use of it by Plato here does not
mean that the wholecontextcan be attributedto him. The factthat Socrates brings
forwardthis theoryof compounds "as a dream" has little significance, and rather
suggeststhat Plato thoughtof it himself.
We have seen thatthereis a certainsimilaritybetweenthe positionofAntisthenes,
that all you could say of a thingwas its own logos (name?) and certainthingssaid by
Cratylus. There is no evidence,however,forcreditingto Antisthenesany theories

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26 G. M. A. Grube [1950

And so we are left-inthe end with much the same Antisthenes

with whom we started: an earnest, blunt, vigorous and sharp-
wittedman whom tradition,on the whole faithfully enough,repre-
sented as the forerunner of Cynicismand Stoicism. He was prob-
ably middle-agedwhen he came under the influenceof Socrates
and was already well established as a friendof the Sophists, for
traditionalso representshim as a pupil of Gorgias,and Xenophon
tells us, as we saw, that it was he who introducedCallias to both
Hippias and Prodicus,whicharguesan earlyand close acquaintance
with these Sophists in his own right. It is also fromthe Sophists,
no doubt, that he acquired his general scepticism about philo-
sophical discussionin the Platonic sense, and a quiverfulof verbal
darts to use against it.
There is no reason to thinkthat when he came under the spell
of Socrates he abandoned his formerways, or feltit as the kind of
conversionwhichnecessitatesa completebreakwithone's past life.26
It was not the Socratic search fordefinitions,for real knowledge,
which attracted or impressed him; it was the Socrates whom
Alcibiades saw imperturbablein defeatat the battle of Delium, the
man who was unmoved by public clamor after the battle of
Arginusae,who resistedthe blandishmentsof Alcibiades as easily
as the power of the thirtytyrants. The differencebetween the
Sophistsand Socrates was thereforall to see, but thereis no reason
to think that it was the same sharp antagonismin the streetsof
Athensas we findin the dialogues of Plato.
AfterSocrates' death, an inevitablecleavage arose betweenthe
followerswhom his strong personalityhad held together. Some
on the originof language. Cratyluswas an extremeHeraclitean,yet Gillespiewants
to see in him a meremask forAntisthenes,and maintainsat the same time that the
theoriesofAntistheneshad nothingin commonwiththe relativismofeitherHeraclitus
or Protagoras (445-8; 35-8).
Referencesto Antistheneshave been inferredin many otherplaces in Plato; in
the Apology, the Protagoras, Euthyphro, Ion, Alcibiades, Charmides, Hippias I and II
and, more specifically, in Theaet. 152A, 161c, 169B, 174A, 175D, 176c, 187; Rep. 372D,
479A, 505B, 568A, 583 if.; Soph. 246, 252c, 259c; Phil. 14c, 15D, 17A. See Natorp
(above, note 10).
and not withoutirony,that the unforgettable
26 It is significant, pictureof this
"stoic" Socrates is drawnforus by Plato, not by Xenophon. The existenceof such
Socraticsas Antisthenes,on the otherhand, is perhapsthe best argumentagainst the
Burnet-Taylorpositionthat the PlatonicSocratesis historical. If Socrateshad really
developed the theoryof Forms to the full,Antisthenescould hardly have been a
devotedfollowerat all, and even Xenophonwould have shownsignsof discomfort.

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Vol. lxxxi] Antisthenes
was no Logician 27

of the youngermen, like Phaedo and Euclides, concentratedon the

logical or metaphysicalimplicationsof the master'sdoctrines. We
may well believe that others,like Antisthenes,thoughtsuch studies
both useless and un-Socratic. Of this second group Antisthenes
was probablythe most powerfulmouthpiece. Only Plato, with his
deeper understanding,could work out a synthesis between all
aspects of the Socratic personalityand doctrines.

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