Theories of History

Author(s): E. W. Strong
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Mar., 1961), pp. 50-52
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1876475
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 REVIEW
THEORIES OF HISTORY
E. W.
Theories of history (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press,
1959. Pp. ix+ 549), an anthology edited by
Patrick Gardiner, is divided evenly between
speculative philosophy of history, Part I,
"Philosophies of history: Vico to Colling-
wood," and critical philosophy of history,
Part II, "Recent views concerning historical
knowledge and explanation." Seventeen au-
thors in chronological order are presented in
Part I "by reasonably large extracts from
their works." Besides seeking to exhibit the
principal ideas of these systematists, Gardi-
ner aims to show that speculative interpre-
tations have not conformed to a single type.
In keeping with this aim, bibliography is
supplied not only for the seventeen repre-
sented by extracts but also for ten additional
philosophers, Bossuet being the earliest, in
a chronological list under the heading, "Clas-
sical philosophers of history and commen-
taries on their work."
Why, though, is there no mention of ibn-
Khaldun's Muqaddama, of Machiavelli's Dis-
corsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, and
of Bodin's Methodus ad facilem historiarum
cognitionem? Given the aim of showing di-
versity of type, there seems to be no good
reason for ignoring these contributions con-
cerned with instituting a method of study-
ing past situations designed to yield rules or
precepts applicable to like situations in the
present. Moreover, why place interpreters of
the historical process, Vico to Toynbee, in a
single chronological series in preference to
grouping them by type of speculative the-
ory or systematic interpretation, with se-
quence from earlier to later in each group?
Several main types of interpretation are dif-
ferentiable on the basis of their respective
presuppositions or principal organizing ideas.
There is, for example, the interpretation
premised on traits of a rationalistic individ-
ual psychology conceived to be writ large in
the progress of the human mind or the evo-
lution of institutions-an interpretation
which comes to the fore in Condorcet and
50
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ARTICLES
STRONG
can be tracked through Comte, Taine, and
Cournot into Langlois and Seignobos (ex-
cised, in the last two, of prescriptions for
the writing of universal history). Curiously,
Taine and Cournot are not listed in the bib-
liography. Taine's philosophy of history,
however, comes under discussion in the selec-
tion from Croce's History-its theory and
practice, chapter iv.
Although considerations of continuity are
remarked, by Gardiner, as having imposed
limits in the selection of writings for both
parts of the anthology, the Introduction to
Part I does not discuss courses of theorizing
in such wise as to explicate why, for exam-
ple, Vico is included but Bodin is not, Kant
is included but Schopenhauer ("On history")
is not, Tolstoy is included but Taine is not.
Each author selected by Gardiner for repre-
sentation in Part I is of an interest, taken
individually, to merit inclusion. With space
for "classical" works limited, however, by
design to exhibit both speculative and critical
philosophy of history in a single volume, one
looks for considerations of historical rele-
vance in the choice of passages from Tol-
stoy rather than from Droysen (Grundiss der
Historik) or from Windelband (Geschichte
und Naturwissenschaft). Gardiner informs
the reader in his Foreword that he has had
"to exclude various important and influen-
tial figures: Montesquieu, Turgot, Voltaire,
Saint-Simon (to name only a few), are not
represented here" (p. v). Reasons for choice,
though, are not made clear and forceful.
In selecting passages from nineteenth-
century European philosophers of history
(Comte, John Stuart Mill, Buckle, Marx,
and Plekhanov), Gardiner has seized on the
preoccupation with a science of society set-
ting forth laws of development. Tolstoy's re-
flections in War and peace on free will and
necessity fit in with this strand of interest.
Such focus, at the cost of omitting an ex-
tract from Nietzsche, prompts this question:
has not the concept of explanation upon
 THEORIES OF HISTORY 51
-which, as Gardiner notes, "the attention of has not been done elsewhere by writers using a
recent philosophers has chiefly been focussed" different idiom and tackling problems from a
(p. 269), so occupied him as to narrow un- different direction. This is particularly evident
duly the range of representation? in the case of books written by men who are
themselves professional historians and who are
The middle and largest section of Part II, intimately aware of crucial questions of term-
the section "Explanation and laws," takes inology and method; MarcBloch'sApologie pour
up nearly one-quarter of the total number of l'histoire is one such book; De la connaissance
pages in the volume. Additionally, about one- historique, by H. I. Marrou, is another [p. 274].
half of the preceding section, "Critiques of
classical theories of history," dwells on con- The question is not raised whether the
ditions, empirical and logical, for warranted new approaches and methods fruitful in
assertion of causal determination: cf. the es- other areas of philosophical inquiry are be-
savs of Karl Popper ("Prediction and proph- ing brought to bear on historical thinking in
ecy in the social sciences"), Bertrand Russell ways of most use and help to professional
("Dialectical materialism"), and Isaiah Ber- historians and their students. Professional
lin ("Determinism, relativism, and historical historians have shunned philosophy of his-
judgments"). In the final section, Ernest tory and have admonished their students to
Gellner's "Holism versus individualism in do likewise, often without being careful to
the social sciences," J. W. N. Watkins' "His- distinguish between speculative and critical
torical explanation in the social sciences," philosophizing. In now being supplied by
and Gellner's reply to Watkins are also con- critical philosophers with analyses in support
cerned mainly with causal accounting. of skepticism of "these large and high-sound-
Granting that the amount of space devoted ing claims, these generalities and metaphors
in Part II to historical explanation is not of which such liberal use has been made"
disproportionate to the amount of attention (p. 267) by Hegel, Spengler, and other inter-
which has recently been given to the subject preters of the historical process, historians
by philosophers in Great Britain and the may gain reasons not acquired earlier for
United States, the concerns of philosophers distrust and aversion. There is need, how-
past and present in interpreting history and ever, to look further and elsewhere than to
assessing historical knowledge have ranged castigations administered by critical philoso-
more widely and diversely than Gardiner's phers to their speculative brethren if one
selections succeed in showing. At the same aims to fetch examinations of historical in-
time, it should be recognized that it is the quiry from which historians might be most
strength of his anthology as compared with apt to profit. More attention could well be
Hans Meyerhoff's collection of readings, The paid to considerations decisive in determin-
philosophy of history in our time (New York, ing relevance, to employment of characteriz-
1959), that the former groups its selections ing and categorizing concepts, to procedures
topically whereas the latter does not. in the use and testing of hypotheses, to con-
Except for Geyl and Toynbee in their ditions requisite for reconstructing continui-
B.B.C. debate on the question, "Can we ties and correspondences, and to warrants for
know the pattern of the past?" no other his- making or withholding value-judgments.
torians are heard from in Part II. Gardiner Gardiner himself treats "considerations of
remarks that the recent articles chosen are continuity" rather casually in the task of pre-
nearly all by philosophers working in the senting authors historically in Part I. He
United States or the British Commonwealth: comments on some features characteristic of
theories of history in the eighteenth and
I have been largely concerned to show how the nineteenth centuries, on the rise from these
development of approachesand methods, which theories of problems of a conceptual nature,
have proved fruitful in other areasof philosophi- and on the attack on such problems made by
cal inquiry, have affected the treatment of prob- Dilthey, Croce, and, later, Collingwood in
lems raised by the theoretical examination of
history; and it so happens that the systematic their desire to vindicate the "autonomy of
employment of these ways of doing philosophy history." These men "saw how history may
is still chiefly confined to the English-speaking be a subject for philosophical examination
world. But it would be misleading to give the in a sense quite different from that envisaged
impression that interesting and valuable work by the speculative philosopher-historians.

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52 E. W. STRONG
They did not set themselves the task of
trying to uncover a 'meaning' or pattern in
the historical process as a whole, but concen-
trated instead upon discussing the ways in
which practicing historians in fact interpret
their subject matter, attempting to reveal the
presuppositions that underlie any piece of
genuinely historical thinking" (p. 8). By the
beginning of the twentieth century, then, "a
quite separate form of inquiry had grown up,
directed, amongst other things, towards the
analysis of historical procedures, categories,
and terms." Gardiner does not descend from
such characterizations to following out con-
tinuities through the authors chronologically
arrayed in Part I by searching out particular
strands of influence, derivation, and carry-
ing forward. In the absence of these strands,
the chronological sequence is deprived of
consequential relations.
The kind of continuity with which Gardi-
ner is concerned quite appropriately in Part
II, where chronological arrayal is set aside,
is logical rather than historical. Engaged in
showing not how critical philosophy of his-
tory has come to be what it is but rather in
showing the kind of work done by philo-
sophical analysts in recent years, he quite
justly collects several writings in the first
section which bear critically on classical the-
ories of history. The attention subsequently
paid to C. G. Hempel's essay, "The functions
of general laws in history," published in
1942 in the Journal of philosophy, affords
both historical and logical reasons for plac-
ing it at the head of the middle section,
"Explanation and laws." Discussions of
Hempelian theory appear in the articles of
Morton White, William Dray, Charles
Frankel, Alan Donagan, and Michael Scriven.
Considerable attention is also paid to Gardi-
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ner's book, The nature of historical explana-
tion (Oxford, 1952), from which passages
could well have been selected for inclusion
in the anthology. The articles by Gellner
and Watkins in the final section, "History
and the social sciences," take up matters
earlier discussed, but in the main less co-
gently, by contributors to The social sciences
in historical study (Social Science Research
Council, Bulletin 64, 1954).
The bibliography, compiled under the
headings "Source books, general commen-
taries, and works on methodology" and "Ar-
ticles," supplies an excellent guide to a large
body of literature that has accumulated, par-
ticularly in the last twenty-five years, on the-
ory of history. Some books deserving inclu-
sion are not noticed (e.g., J. B. Black's The
art of history [London, 1926] and K. E.
Bock's Acceptance of histories [Berkeley,
1956]), but the compilation has been done
conscientiously. There are reasons already
remarked for being less satisfied with the
representation accorded classical philoso-
phers of history. Gardiner's interest is not
here engaged as fully as with recent critical
theorizing, his knowledge is not as wide and
thorough, and his performance as a historian
is not on a par with, nor guided effectively
by, his expertness in critical philosophy of
history. It appears pertinent, then, to suggest
to critical philosophers of history that the
question that they have directed against spec-
ulative philosophies of history might be
pressed more assiduously as concerns their
own analyses, to wit, "What connection do
they have with the actual procedures of his-
torians?"
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY