G.R. No.

80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

FACTS: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years
of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany.

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". The
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.

A motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied by the
respondent judge.

Petitioner filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground
that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can file a case of adultery against petitioner even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

RULING: NO.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to
dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

In the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery
is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to
refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the
rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against
the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to
be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make
the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced.

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. ...

Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth
be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents.

FACTS: FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines. No children were
born out of their marriage. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition.
The oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Only petitioner and Ruperto Padlan, brother of Arturo, were
declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.

On appeal, respondent appellate court declared null and void the order of the trial court, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the CA was wrong in remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

RULING: NO.

The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. However, there
was no hearing conducted with respect to the issue on citizenship of petitioner.

The finding of the lower court on the citizenship of petitioner and Arturo pertained solely to the time
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn ruling (that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.) would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a
reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case
returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

However, the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from
Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting
in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she
is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.

DOCTRINE: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.

FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued
by the Australian government. Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Philippines. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and
Filipino.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground
of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994.

Respondent contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

In 1998- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had
irretrievably broken down.

The RTC declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Petitioner argues
that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements. Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the
divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.

ISSUES: Whether the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry

RULING: NO.

Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of
a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.

Compliance with articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it
falls squarely upon him.

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy.

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity
to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A
review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court:
(1) for petitioner: (a) Complaint; (b) Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace
J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; (c) Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; (d) Office of the City
Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Samson was in its records; and (e) Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; (2) for respondent: (a)
Amended Answer; (b) Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; (c)
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; (d) Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court
of Australia Certificate; and Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987
and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.