 Dr Mores’s act of removing life support system does not reasonably foreseeable that it

would cause Zeena’s death. Although at first Zeena can is predicted to can still survive
for a few hours without depending on the system, only that her chance is small, but it
does not means there is no chance at all. In addition, due to his experienced and
professional medical judgement, he later on decided that Zeena was stable and not
vulnerable to change.
 Dr Mores reasonably believe that Zeena can still survive for a few hours without
depending on the system, even longer than that since she was observed to be stable.
Reasonable care had been provided to Zeena after removing the system to ensure
that she still can survive. However, in contrast, Yasmine has a small chance of survival
if system not immediately given to her.
 Therefore, it was the premature conditions of Zeena that cause her death. This is also
proven by the evidence of post mortem report that her death is due to premature
condition and no others.
 Foreseeability test:

1. Torts Law Journal/(1997) 5 TLJ No 1/Articles/Making sense of liability

for intervening acts(1997) 5 TLJ 45Making sense of liability
for intervening acts Stanley Yeo *

This was the case of Jemielita v R (1995) 81 A Crim R 409,89in which the
appellant had been convicted of murder. The prosecution contended that
the appellant had injected his wife with drug T pursuant to a suicide pact.
On one view of the evidence, the wife had proceeded after the injection to
voluntarily consume drug O which, in combination with drug T, proved
lethal. Drug T on its own was not lethal. The appellant argued that the
wife's deliberate and voluntary ingestion of drug O amounted to a novus
actus interveniens. The Court of Criminal Appeal ordered a new trial with
the following instructions, derived from the court's reading of Royall, to be
given to the jury on the issue of causation and intervening acts:
[T]he act of the appellant [in administering drug T] would nonetheless remain a substantial contributing
cause of [his wife's] death, even though the jury might think that her conduct was irrational and
unreasonable if, in the circumstances of this case ... the proper conclusion was that when he did the act
in question, the appellant intended her death, foresaw it, or the jury concluded that her death was in all
the circumstances and having regard to the state of his knowledge of them, reasonably to be foreseen
by him.90
2. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c100/4851f020f935c009b95622948faa804
0bcc6.pdf
R v Knutsen5 [1963] Qd R 157 (CCA, however, a more direct link was made
to general issues about causation. In that case a man had assaulted a
woman and left her lying unconscious on a highway. She was then run over
by a passing motorist. The original assailant was convicted of doing grievous
bodily harm, not with reference to the injures suffered in the assault but
instead with reference to the injuries suffered from having been run over.
 All three judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal took the view that the
assailant would have caused the victim’s injuries if they were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of his actions.
3. TEXTBOOK