G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993
Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency.
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.
Eulogio B. Alzaga for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner comes to us on a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of 23 July
1985 of respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying his claim for payment of
back wages, after he was reinstated to the service pursuant to an executive clemency.
He prays for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus against public respondents to
enforce his claim.
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily
dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the
decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in
Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at the
Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not
appeal from the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for
qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its
decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position
in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980,
1
petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
On 26 August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy
Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the President,
per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency to petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries
effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by
the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the
executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries
and that he has not been reinstated in the service.
It appears that petitioner was recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records
do not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising
Lineman.1
Petitioner again filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April
1975, the date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he was reinstated. In Decision
No. 362 embodied in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985, respondent COA denied
the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back wages
and that he had not rendered service during the period of his claim.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the COA decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the
President. On 21 April 1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
by authority of the President, denied the appeal "due to legal and constitutional
constraint,"2 holding that this Court is the proper forum to take cognizance of the
appeal on certiorari from the decision of the COA, citing Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2,
of the 1973 Constitution (now Art. IX-[A], Sec. 7, of the 1987 Constitution).
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition on the issue of whether he is entitled to the
payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive
clemency.
In his comment to the petition, the Solicitor General recommends that the petition be
given due course and the petitioner be awarded back wages to be determined in the
light of existing laws and jurisprudence. The Solicitor General submits that the award
is implicit in the grant of executive clemency, the ultimate objective of which is to
accord full justice to petitioner.
On the other hand, the COA asks this Court to deny the petition for the following
reasons: (a) petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case did not necessarily free him from
administrative liability; (b) petitioners unexplained failure to appeal the decision in the
administrative case was tantamount to a waiver or renunciation of his right to back
wages; (c) the executive clemency was granted to petitioner for the purpose of
reinstatement only since it was silent on the matter of back wages; (d) the award of
back wages is allowed only if the respondent is exonerated from the administrative
charge that his suspension or dismissal is declared illegal or unjustified by the court;
and, (e) petitioner did not render any service during the period before his
reinstatement, hence, he is not entitled to back wages based on the "no service, no pay"
rule.
The petition is meritorious.
Every civilized country recognizes, and has therefore provided for, the pardoning
power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity, in proper cases. Without such a
power of clemency, to be exercised by some department or functionary of a
government, a country would be most imperfect and deficient in its political morality
and in that attribute of Deity whose judgments are always tempered with money.3
Our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to
extend executive clemency under the following circumstances:
Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.4
From among the different acts of executive clemency spelled out above, the clemency
granted to petitioner in the instant case partakes of the nature of an executive pardon.
A reading of Resolution No. 1800 partly quoted hereunder is enlightening:
In a 3rd Indorsement dated September 5, 1980, the Director of
Telecommunications interposed no objection to the petition, while the
Minister of Transportation and Communications, in his 4th
Indorsement dated November 17, 1980, favorably recommended the
grant of executive clemency to petitioner for the reason that "while it
2
is a rule that an administrative case is separate and distinct from a
criminal case and an acquittal in the latter case dos not ipso
facto result in the exoneration in the former case, yet an exception
could arise if the basis for the acquittal was the innocence of the
accused as in the case of petitioner Garcia.
Asked for comment pursuant to Section 43 of Presidential Decree No.
807, the Civil service Commission recommends the grant of
executive clemency to petitioner in view of the findings of the court
that —
instead of coming forward to the defense of the
accused who actually was authorized to uproot or
recover the poles in question and of commending the
latter for his high sense of responsibility in
preventing losses to the government, said high
officials had even the temerity to disown and deny
the authority they gave to the accused resulting in
his separation from the service and having him all
alone in defending himself against the accusation of
the very government he tried to protect.
After a careful study, this Office is inclined to grant executive
clemency to petitioner in the light of this decision of the court
acquitting him of the crime of qualified theft which was based on the
same acts obtaining in Administrative Case No. 975 against him,
coupled with the favorable recommendation of the Minister of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner Vicente Garcia is hereby granted
executive clemency.5
Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to
whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran,6 we have firmly established the general
rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost
reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his
eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to
back wages.
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not
been found guilty of the offense charged.7 When a person is given pardon because he
did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial
court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to
him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty
and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby
directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back
wages.8 This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to
make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is
afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated
3
or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.9 There is no doubt that
petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back
wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of any
criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but
is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive
Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of control. The
President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter." 10 In pardoning petitioner and
ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his power of control and set
aside the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The
clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved him from administrative
liability. The separation of the petitioner from the service being null and void, he is
thus entitled to back wages.
After having been declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also served
as basis for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have left
his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that
accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back wages. 11
Established jurisprudence fixes recovery of back wages to a period of five (5) years to
be paid an illegally dismissed government employee who has been ordered
reinstated. 12 The cases heretofore decided by this Court show that petitioners therein
were employees of local governments who were removed from office by their local
officials. The reasons given for their removal were abolition of office or position,
reduction of work force, or lack of funds on the part of the local governments
concerned, which reasons were found by this Court to be either devoid of factual basis
or not sufficiently proven, otherwise, their dismissal would have been valid and
justified. In contrast, the case before us is different, involving as it does circumstances
that impel us to deviate from the general rule previously laid down on the recovery of
back wages for five (15) years. Petitioner's reinstatement in the instant case which was
ordered pursuant to a grant of executive clemency was effected not because of lack of
sufficient proof of his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he did not
commit the offense charged. Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be
afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice
caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help
surmising the painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his
dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man,
and worse, a thief. Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner
full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984
when he was reinstated. The payment shall be without deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Commission
on Audit dated 23 July 1985 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
ordering public respondents, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, the Minister
(now Secretary) of Land Transportation and Communications, the Regional Director
of Telecom Regional Office No. IV, or whoever may be sitting in office in their stead,
to pay the full amount of petitioner's back salaries from 1 April 1975 to 12 March 1984
based on his latest salary scale.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-13-3132 June 4, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ALABEL, SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from the letter1 dated March 15, 2011 of Executive
Judge Jaime L. Infante (Judge Infante) of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel,
Sarangani Province, "Branch 38. (RTC), addressed to complainant the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA),2 inquiring about the employment status of respondent
Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of the said RTC since August 3,
1993. In the aforementioned letter, Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite
Ampong's dismissal from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which
dismissal was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any official information
or directive from the OCA on the matter. As such, Ampong remains employed in the
RTC and has been continuously receiving all her monthly salary, benefits, allowances,
and the like.
The Facts
4
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong
for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March
21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her,
the CSC rendered a resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory
penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board
Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the
ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to
the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her.
Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals (CA).4
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal
from service on the ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the
CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on
August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review on certiorari and,
thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P.
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26,
2008 Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA,
which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued
to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter
notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated
September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to
withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.8
In her Comment9 dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its
ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted
complications in its enforcement.10 Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the
CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the case against her.11
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum12 dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended that Ampong be
found guilty of Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed
from the service on the ground that she no longer possesses the appropriate eligibility
required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except
accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution.13
The OCA found that Ampong’s act of impersonating and taking the November 1991
Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers for and on behalf of another person
indeed constitutes dishonesty, a grave offense which carries the corresponding penalty
of dismissal from service. It added that the fact that the offense was not connected with
her office or was committed prior to her appointment in the judiciary does not in any
way exonerate her from administrative liability as an employee of the court.14
Further, the OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court Interpreter III did not
divest the CSC of its inherent power to discipline employees from all branches and
agencies of the government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service.
Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the administrative penalty of dismissal
against her, which carries with it that of cancellation of civil service eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in
the government service, unless otherwise provided. In this relation, the OCA
emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her civil service
eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III.15
The Issue Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Ampong had been
dismissed from her employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.
As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held
Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir,
viz.:
The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which
includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the
giving of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating,
collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation
5
of the Civil Service examination." [Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET exam,
to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a
deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray." [Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial
employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not have been appointed as a
judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed
in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s] present status as a
judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she
deserves.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in
the same case, viz.:
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined
under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-
owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is
granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge
on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and
their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an
examinee of a civil service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the
offender involved a judicial employee under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.
A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial
employees who also impersonated civil service examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC
1âwphi1
likewise filed the necessary charges before the OCA because respondents were judicial
employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and meting the penalty of
dismissal, this Court held that "respondents’ machinations reflect their dishonesty and
lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants and
employees of the judiciary."
Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the
Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that
petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the
time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative
supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC.
Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another
person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil
service-supervised examination.
That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case
out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.17 (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law,"18 Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008
Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from
service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In
line with Section 58(a)19 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to
similarly suffer the same.
6
To clarify, however, despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she
should nevertheless been titled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to
the aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of
the same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government
employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of
their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such
remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.20
It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties
but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s
good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest
of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to
meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore,
deserve to remain with the Judiciary.21
WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong,
Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch
38, on the ground of Dishonesty. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are
forfeited except accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually disqualified from re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-
owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution, effective
immediately.
SO ORDERED.