HM-224I Interim Final Rule - Lithium Batteries

8006 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No.
44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
303(r), 332, and §§ 1.1 and 1.425 of the batteries at a state of charge exceeding A. FAA Technical Center Testing
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.1, 1.425, 30 percent when packed with or B. ICAO Activities
the windows for challengers and contained in equipment or devices. C. Risk Potential
D. Alternative Transport Conditions
respondents to collect information in DATES: IV. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
connection with the MF–II challenge Effective date: This interim final rule V. Summary of Changes
process are extended, to the extent is effective on March 6, 2019. A. Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
described herein. Comment date: Comments must be B. State of Charge Requirement
15. It is further ordered that, pursuant received by May 6, 2019. C. Consignment and Overpack Restriction
to § 1.427(b) of the Commission’s rules, D. Limited Exceptions to Restrictions on
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
47 CFR 1.427(b), this Order shall be Air Transportation of Medical Device
identified by Docket Number [PHMSA– Cells or Batteries
effective upon its publication in the 2016–0014 (HM–224I)] by any of the VI. Regulatory Analysis and Notices
Federal Register. following methods: A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This
16. It is further ordered that the • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to Rulemaking
Commission’s Consumer and http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference online instructions for submitting Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Information Center, shall send a copy of comments. C. Executive Order 13771
D. Executive Order 13132
this Order, including the Final • Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
E. Executive Order 13175
Regulatory Flexibility Certification, to • Mail: Docket Operations, U.S. F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Department of Transportation, West Order 13272, and DOT Regulatory
SBA. Building, Ground Floor, Room W12– Policies and Procedures
Federal Communications Commission. 140, Routing Symbol M–30, 1200 New G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Marlene Dortch,
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
20590. I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Secretary.
• Hand Delivery: To Docket J. Environmental Assessment
[FR Doc. 2019–03635 Filed 3–5–19; 8:45 am] Operations, Room W12–140 on the K. Privacy Act
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P L. Executive Order 13609 and International
ground floor of the West Building, 1200 Trade Analysis
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC List of Subjects
20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Monday through Friday, except Federal I. Executive Summary
Holidays. The safe transport of lithium batteries
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Instructions: All submissions must by air has been an ongoing concern due
Safety Administration include the agency name and docket to the unique challenges they pose to
number for this rulemaking at the safety in the air transportation
49 CFR Parts 172 and 173 beginning of the comment. Note that all environment. Unlike other hazardous
[Docket No. PHMSA–2016–0014 (HM–224I)] comments received will be posted materials, lithium batteries contain both
without change to the docket a chemical and an electrical hazard.
RIN 2137–AF20 management system, including any This combination of hazards, when
personal information provided. involved in a fire encompassing
Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Safety Docket: For access to the dockets to
Provisions for Lithium Batteries significant quantities of lithium
read background documents or batteries, may exceed the fire
Transported by Aircraft (FAA comments received, go to http://
Reauthorization Act of 2018) suppression capability of the aircraft
www.regulations.gov or DOT’s Docket and lead to a catastrophic loss of the
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Operations Office (see ADDRESSES). aircraft.
Materials Safety Administration Privacy Act: In accordance with 5 The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
(PHMSA), DOT. U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments Safety Administration (PHMSA) issues
ACTION: Interim final rule (IFR).
from the public to better inform its this interim final rule (IFR) to amend
rulemaking process. DOT posts these the Hazardous Materials Regulations
SUMMARY: PHMSA issues this interim comments, without edit, including any (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171–180) to (1)
final rule (IFR) to revise the Hazardous personal information the commenter prohibit the transport of lithium ion
Materials Regulations for lithium cells provides, to www.regulations.gov, as cells and batteries as cargo on passenger
and batteries transported by aircraft. described in the system of records aircraft; (2) require all lithium ion cells
This IFR prohibits the transport of notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can and batteries to be shipped at not more
lithium ion cells and batteries as cargo be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy. than a 30 percent state of charge on
on passenger aircraft; requires lithium FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: cargo-only aircraft; and (3) limit the use
ion cells and batteries to be shipped at Shelby Geller, (202) 366–8553, of alternative provisions for small
not more than a 30 percent state of Standards and Rulemaking Division, lithium cell or battery to one package
charge aboard cargo-only aircraft when Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety per consignment. These amendments
not packed with or contained in Administration, U.S. Department of will predominately affect air carriers
equipment; and limits the use of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey (both passenger and cargo-only) and
alternative provisions for small lithium Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590– shippers offering lithium ion cells and
cell or battery shipments to one package 0001. batteries for transport as cargo by
per consignment. This IFR does not SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
aircraft. The amendments will not
restrict passengers or crew members restrict passengers or crew members
from bringing personal items or Table of Contents from bringing personal items or
electronic devices containing lithium I. Executive Summary electronic devices containing lithium
cells or batteries aboard aircraft, or II. Current Lithium Battery Transportation cells or batteries aboard aircraft, or
restrict cargo-only aircraft from Requirements restrict the air transport of lithium ion
transporting lithium ion cells or III. Need for the Rule cells or batteries when packed with or
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Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations 8007
contained in equipment. To accordance with sections 553(b)(3)(B) could result in adverse events, such as
accommodate persons in areas and 553(d)(3) of the Administrative smoke and fire, that could impair the
potentially not serviced daily by cargo Procedure Act (APA). While PHMSA safe operation of the aircraft.
aircraft, PHMSA, through the values public participation in the Specifically, they found that in a
requirement in the FAA Reauthorization rulemaking process, the current risk of lithium battery fire, flammable gases
Act of 2018, is providing a limited a lithium battery incident and statutory could collect, ignite, and ultimately
exception, with the approval of the deadline imposed by Congress makes it exceed the capabilities of an aircraft’s
Associate Administrator, for not more impractical and contrary to public fire suppression system. The ICAO also
than two replacement lithium cells or interest to delay the effect of this recognized these dangers and enacted
batteries specifically used for medical rulemaking until after a notice and international regulations, which went
devices to be transported by passenger comment period. However, with the
into effect on April 1, 2016. The
aircraft. Furthermore, these batteries publication of this IFR, PHMSA
potential for a catastrophic loss of an
may be excepted from the state of charge encourages persons to participate in this
requirements, when meeting certain rulemaking by submitting comments aircraft, the need for harmonization of
provisions. See ‘‘Section V.D. Limited containing relevant information, data, or the HMR with emergency amendments
Exceptions to Restrictions on Air views. PHMSA will consider all to the ICAO Technical Instructions, and
Transportation of Medical Device Cells comments received on or before the IFR the statutory deadline in the FAA
or Batteries’’ for further discussion. closing comment date, consider late- Reauthorization Act of 2018 provide
This IFR is necessary to address an filed comments to the extent compelling justification to immediately
immediate safety hazard, meet a practicable, and make any necessary adopt these changes into the HMR
statutory deadline, and harmonize the amendments as appropriate. without prior notice and comment.
HMR with emergency amendments to In developing this IFR, PHMSA A Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is
the 2015–2016 edition of the considered the findings of lithium included in the docket for this
International Civil Aviation battery research conducted by the rulemaking and supports the
Organization’s Technical Instructions Federal Aviation Administration’s
amendments made in this IFR. PHMSA
for the Safe Transport of Dangerous William J. Hughes Technical Center
examined the benefits and costs of these
Goods by Air (ICAO Technical (FAA Technical Center), the National
Instructions). The serious public safety Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), rulemaking provisions using the post-
hazards associated with lithium battery and several other well-respected ICAO baseline 1 as shown in the
transportation and the statutory academic sources on lithium batteries analysis below. Table 1 shows the costs
deadline in the FAA Reauthorization and their hazards. The FAA Technical by affected section and rulemaking
Act of 2018 necessitate the immediate Center’s research found that lithium provision over a 10-year period,
adoption of these standards in batteries subject to certain conditions discounted at a 7 percent rate:
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO
10-Year quantified
Provision Benefits Unquantified costs cost
(7%)
State of Charge ........... • Limits the volume of flammable gases emit- • Potential changes in manufacturing proce- $2,304,551
ted by lithium ion cells propagated in a dures to ensure compliance with state of These estimates in-
thermal runaway. charge provision. clude only the cost
• Results in a less energetic thermal run- • Reevaluation of management practices and for entities to apply
away event if one should occur. potentially instituting changes to avoid or for permission to
• Reduces the likelihood of thermal propaga- lessen supply chain impacts such as re- ship batteries at
tion from cell to cell. duced shelf life of batteries and battery higher charge lev-
• Harmonization facilitates international trade quality issues. els.
by minimizing the burden of complying with • Additional time for end users needed to
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements charge the batteries from 30 percent state
(although currently domestic shippers and of charge or less instead of the typical lev-
carriers have the option to voluntarily com- els of 40 percent or 50 percent at which
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency manufacturers currently set the state of
between regulations reduces compliance charge.
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations
of international shipments.
1 The post-ICAO baseline is the international shipments, (2) restrict the number of Section II passenger flights. This environment also includes a
operating environment present after April 1, 2016; packages to one per consignment on international level of voluntary domestic compliance with the
this would (1) restrict lithium ion batteries to a 30 air shipments, and (3) prohibit the shipping of above provisions in the United States.
percent state of charge for international air lithium ion batteries as cargo on international
8008 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO—Continued
10-Year quantified
Provision Benefits Unquantified costs cost
(7%)
Consignment Limit ....... • Reduces the risk of fire from shipping large • Costs due to modal shift that might occur $44,328,936
quantities of excepted batteries that were from air transport to ground or marine Costs include addi-
previously being consolidated in overpacks, transport due to higher shipping costs by tional hazard com-
pallets, in single-unit load devices and sin- air. The end receivers may be inconven- munication and em-
gle aircraft cargo compartments.. ienced by longer shipping times that imply ployee training.
• Reduces the propensity for large numbers less prompt access to goods purchased..
of batteries or packages shipped in accord-
ance with regulatory exceptions..
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily com-
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
between regulations reduces compliance
of international shipments..
Lithium Battery Prohibi- • Safety benefits expected to be low or none • Potential additional costs to air carriers Impact expected low
tion as Cargo on given evidence of pre-IFR compliance.. transporting cargo shipments of lithium ion given evidence of
Passenger Aircraft. • Eliminates the risk of an incident induced batteries on cargo planes instead of pas- pre-IFR compliance.
by lithium ion batteries shipped as cargo in senger aircraft. They vary for each air car-
a passenger aircraft.. rier based on the size of the airline and the
• Eliminates the risk of a fire exacerbated by areas they service, the availability of cargo-
the presence of lithium ion batteries involv- only aircraft fleet, the capacity usage and
ing the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft.. cargo volume availability of cargo aircraft
• Harmonization facilitates international trade fleet, and the volume of lithium ion bat-
by minimizing the burden of complying with teries they were transporting by passenger
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements airplanes..
(although currently domestic shippers and • Cost due to modal shift that might occur as
carriers have the option to voluntarily com- higher costs to ship by air may induce
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency shippers to send by ground and marine
between regulations reduces compliance transportation. The end receivers may be
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations inconvenienced by longer shipping times
of international shipments. that imply less prompt access to goods
purchased. This can have potential impacts
on rural and remote communities not serv-
iced daily by cargo aircraft or only serviced
by passenger aircraft. For customers need-
ing lithium batteries used in devices, other
than medical devices, the delays in the de-
livery of the required batteries could result
in a range of consequences depending on
their intended need..
Total ..................... ......................................................................... ......................................................................... 10-Year: $46,633,487

Annualized:
$6,639,559
Based on the analysis described in the and benefit figures. That said, given the II. Current Lithium Battery
RIA, at the mean, PHMSA estimates the significant data uncertainties regarding Transportation Requirements
present value costs about $46.6 million pre-ICAO baseline and operational Lithium cells and batteries fall into
over 10 years and about $6.6 million practices, PHMSA was unable to one of two basic categories: lithium
annualized (at a 7 percent discount completely quantify the pre-ICAO metal, including lithium alloy (also
rate). baseline. PHMSA has provided a known as primary lithium batteries),
While PHMSA examined the benefits discussion of these qualitative benefits and lithium ion, including lithium ion
and the costs of the provisions of this and costs. For more detail on cost and polymer (also known as secondary
rulemaking using the post-ICAO benefits of the pre-ICAO baseline, see lithium batteries). As the name
baseline as the basis for the analysis, we ‘‘Section 11 Alternative Baseline indicates, lithium metal cells and
acknowledge that using the pre-ICAO Analysis’’ of the RIA included in the batteries contain a small amount of
docket for this rulemaking. PHMSA metallic lithium or a lithium alloy.
baseline 2 would produce different cost
requests public comment on the RIA as Lithium metal batteries are mostly non-
2 The pre-ICAO baseline is the international
it applies to the benefits and costs under rechargeable and are often used in
operating environment present before April 1, 2016 both baselines. medical devices, computer memory, and
with: (1) No limitations of state of charge, (2) No as replaceable batteries (AA and AAA
limitation on the number of Section II packages prohibition of shipping Lithium ion batteries as size) suitable for electronic devices. The
offered in a single consignment, and (3) No cargo on passenger carrying aircraft. lithium content in these cells and
batteries ranges from a fraction of a gram compartment.7 Based on FAA Technical result in severe mechanical damage or
to a few grams and typical geometries Center data, the volume of flammable short circuits.11 This hazard drives the
include coin cells, cylindrical, and cell gas ignited to produce a 1.2 psi need for protection against damage and
rectangular. Conversely, lithium ion pressure rise corresponded to only 6.4 short circuits, as well as the use of
cells and batteries contain a lithium cells at 100 percent state of charge or 20 strong outer packaging. Hazard
compound (e.g., lithium cobalt dioxide, cells at 50 percent state of charge. Cargo communication (i.e., package marks,
lithium iron phosphate). Lithium ion compartments are only designed to labels, and shipping documents) serves
batteries are generally rechargeable and withstand an approximate 1-psi to alert transport workers throughout
are most often found in portable pressure differential. the supply chain of the presence of
computers, mobile phones, and power Triggering events to a thermal event lithium cells or batteries, the need to
tools. Common configurations are include external short circuits, handle them properly, and the measures
cylindrical and rectangular. For the mechanical damage, exposure to heat, to take in the event of an emergency.
purposes of the HMR, the size of lithium and manufacturing defects that result in Hazmat employees must be trained in
ion cells and batteries is measured in an internal short circuit. While the accordance with the HMR, ensuring that
Watt-hours (Wh). likelihood of a thermal event occurring personnel responsible for preparing for
on an aircraft is low, the consequences transport and transporting do so in
Lithium cells and batteries are of an event are high. The inability of the compliance with the HMR and maintain
capable of efficiently storing large aircraft fire suppression systems to safety throughout the supply chain.
amounts of energy and have a higher address lithium cell or battery fires In § 173.185, PHMSA sets forth
specific energy (capacity) and energy poses an unacceptable safety risk, even general requirements for lithium cells
density relative to other battery if the likelihood of an event is low. and batteries, such as United Nations
chemistries, such as alkaline, nickel The HMR include separate entries for (UN) design testing requirements,
metal hydride (NiMH), and nickel lithium metal batteries (UN3090), packaging requirements, and provisions
cadmium (NiCd). However, when lithium metal batteries packed with for small cells and batteries.12 Unless
subjected to mechanical abuse, internal equipment (UN3091), lithium metal otherwise specified in § 173.185, the
or external short circuit, overcharge, or batteries contained in equipment hazard communication and training
excessive heat, a lithium cell or battery (UN3091), lithium ion batteries requirements are located in part 172 of
is susceptible to thermal runaway, (UN3480), lithium ion batteries packed the HMR.
which is a chain reaction leading to self- with equipment (UN3481), and lithium Section 173.185(c) of the HMR
heating and release of stored energy.3 4 ion batteries contained in equipment describes provisions for the carriage of
A lithium ion cell sufficiently heated (UN3481). Both the HMR and the 2015– up to 8 small lithium cells or 2 small
can induce a thermal runaway event. 2016 ICAO Technical Instructions lithium batteries per package with
Cells in thermal runaway can release already prohibit the transport of lithium alternative hazard communication that
excessive heat (up to 1400 °F (760 °C)), metal batteries (UN3090) as cargo on replaces the Class 9 label with a lithium
as well as flammable and toxic gases, passenger aircraft.8 9 battery mark that communicates the
and the heat from a single cell in The requirements for the transport of presence of lithium batteries and
thermal runaway can spread to adjacent lithium batteries are based on risk and indicates (1) that the package is to be
cells in a battery or package.5 6 This are designed to work together to create handled with care, (2) that a flammable
cascading effect, or spreading, (hereafter layers of safety, accounting for battery hazard exists if the package is damaged,
referred to as propagation) increases the chemistry (lithium metal and lithium and (3) that special procedures must be
potential ignition of adjacent ion), battery size, and package quantity. followed in such event that the package
combustible materials. In addition, the Lithium batteries are subject to design is damaged (i.e., inspection and
pressure inside a cell can increase, type testing, various hazard repacking (if necessary), as well as a
causing the cell to rupture and resulting communication, and packaging telephone number for additional
in a projectile hazard and the release of requirements. Design testing serves to information). Further, when used, an air
flammable gases. Vented gases from ensure that batteries are able to waybill must indicate compliance with
only a small number of cells, if ignited, withstand certain transport and abuse the provisions of § 173.185(c) or the
conditions without hazardous applicable ICAO packing instruction.13
can result in a pressure pulse that can
consequences.10 However, the tests are Consignments of lithium batteries that
compromise the fire suppression
not meant to ensure that lithium comply with these provisions are
capability of an aircraft cargo
batteries are safe in all conditions, such provided alternatives from the standard
3 Bandhauer, Todd M., Garimella, Srinivas, and
as extreme heat or damage. Lithium hazard communication and relief from
Fuller, Thomas F., A Critical Review of Thermal
cells and batteries may still be subject the acceptance checks that air carriers
Issues in Lithium-ion Batteries, The Journal of the to mishandling in transport that can use to recognize and accept or reject
Electrochemical Society, Vol. 158 R–21–R25, hazardous materials as appropriate.
January 2011. 7 Webster, Harry, Summer, Steven M., Maloney,
4 Mikolajczak, Celina, P.E., Kahn, Michael, Ph.D., Thomas, Dadia, Dhaval, Rehn, Steven J., Karp, 11 A lithium battery incident at LAX in 1999 was
White, Kevin, Ph.D., and Long, Richard T., P.E., Fire Matthew, ‘‘Summary of FAA Studies Related to the the result of severe mishandling of lithium metal
Protection Research Foundation Report: Lithium- Hazards Produced by Lithium Cells in Thermal batteries. Hazardous Materials Factual Report,
Ion Batteries Hazard and Use Assessment, Runaway in Aircraft Cargo Compartments, FAA DCA–99–MZ–005. Retrieved from http://
Exponents Failure Analysis Associates, Inc., July Report DOT/FAA/TC–16/37, June 2016, available at dms.ntsb.gov/public/13000-13499/13470/
2011. https://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/TC-16-37.pdf. 559466.pdf.
5 Webster, H., Fire Protection for the Shipment of 8 Hazardous Materials: Prohibition on the 12 Small cells and batteries for the purposes of
Lithium Batteries in Aircraft Cargo Compartments, Transportation of Primary Lithium Batteries and this rulemaking are a lithium metal cell containing
FAA Technical Center, DOT/FAA/AR–10/31, Cells Aboard Passenger Aircraft; Interim Final Rule; not more than 1 gram of lithium metal, a lithium
November 2010. http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/10- [69 FR 75208] December 15, 2004. metal battery containing not more than 2 grams of
31.pdf 9 Dangerous Goods Panel Working Group on
lithium metal, a lithium ion cell not more than 20
6 Panagiotou, Joseph, Materials Laboratory Study Lithium Batteries; April 7–11, 2014; DGP–WG/LB/ Wh, and a lithium ion battery not more than 100
Report, National Transportation Safety Board, 2–WP/8. Wh (See § 173.185(c) and Section II of Packing
Office of Research and Engineering, Materials 10 The tests and procedures are described in the Instructions 965 and 968 in the ICAO Technical
Laboratory Division, Report No. 12–019, March United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria, Part Instructions).
2012. III, Subsection 38.3. 13 See 49 CFR 173.185(c)(4).
Currently, § 173.185(c) does not place a can create projectile hazards; thermal mixture of flammable gases could
limit on the number of packages runaway from a single cell that can produce an over pressure, which would
containing such lithium batteries spread to adjacent cells and packages; dislodge pressure relief panels, allow
permitted in overpacks,14 pallets, single and the venting of flammable gases that leakage of Halon from the associated
unit load devices, or single aircraft cargo can occur even when the fire is cargo compartment, and compromise
compartments. This condition allows suppressed. Cell failure resulting in a the ability of fire suppression systems to
large numbers of packages of small cells mechanical energy release was observed function as intended. As a result, the
and batteries to be placed near each during testing and was more energetic at smoke and fire can spread to adjacent
other without standard declaration to 100 percent state of charge relative to compartments and potentially
the air carrier or pilot in command. cells tested a lower state of charge. compromise the entire aircraft.
However, a state of charge at less than Moreover, the FAA testing concluded
III. Need for the Rule
100 percent still has the potential to neither oxygen starvation through
Lithium batteries are increasingly result in a mechanical energy release. depressurization in the case of cargo
prevalent in today’s consumer market For example, the FAA testing conducted aircraft nor common shipping
due to their ability to store substantially in 2010 using lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 containers (e.g., unit load devices) is
more energy than other batteries of the cells at a 50 percent state of charge effective in containing or suppressing a
same size and weight. This trend toward resulted in all 100 cells experiencing lithium cell or battery fire.
lithium ion battery technology has thermal runaway.15 Testing conducted
continued over the last decade as When controlling lithium battery
by the NTSB confirmed the potential for
illustrated by an increase in lithium ion fires, aircraft fire extinguishing agents
fire and projectile hazards and further
cell production from approximately 3 must both extinguish the electrolyte fire
concluded that aircraft unit load device
billion cells in 2007 to over 7 billion and cool remaining cells to stop the
design can impact the time it takes to
lithium ion cells produced in 2017. propagation of thermal runaway.
detect a fire originating from inside a
PHMSA identified a total of 39 Gaseous agents (such as Halon) are
cargo container.16 Additionally, the
incidents in air cargo transportation somewhat effective against lithium ion
FAA testing determined that Halon
between 2010 and 2016 with 13 of these battery fires; however, while Halon is
1301, the fire-suppressant agent used in
incidents involving lithium batteries Class C cargo compartments, could effective in extinguishing the electrolyte
and smoke, fire, extreme heat, or suppress the electrolyte and burning fire and nearby combustible materials
explosion that would have been affected packaging fires, but it had no effect on such as packaging, it has no effect in
by this rulemaking. Many of these stopping the propagation of thermal stopping the propagation of thermal
incidents were identified at an air cargo runaway from cell to cell. See 14 CFR runaway from cell to cell. Conventional
sort facility either before or after a flight. 25.857 for aircraft cargo compartment fiberboard packagings initially protect
In at least one instance, packages of classification, including Class C. Halon cells and batteries but eventually ignite
lithium ion cells were found smoldering 1301 was also shown to be ineffective in and add to the fire load. Special
in an aircraft unit load device during suppressing an explosion of the packagings originally designed for
unloading. This indicates that the initial flammable gases vented from lithium chemical oxygen generators are effective
thermal runaway likely occurred while ion cells during thermal runaway. in containing a fire from burning
the shipment was on the aircraft. lithium ion cells but allow smoke and
PHMSA also notes three aircraft A. FAA Technical Center Testing fumes to escape the package. Currently
accidents in 2007, 2010, and 2011 The FAA Technical Center issued a available fire containment covers (FCC)
where lithium ion batteries transported series of test reports in 2004, 2006, and fire resistant containers (FRC) that
as cargo were suspected as either the 2010, and 2014 that characterized the suppress fires by means of oxygen
cause or a factor that increased the hazards posed by lithium cells and starvation are not effective in
severity of the fire. Collectively these batteries transported as cargo on aircraft controlling lithium ion cell or battery
accidents resulted in the complete loss and the effectiveness of aircraft fire fires. The fire load for each test
of all three aircraft and four lives. These suppression agents, packagings, and consisted of 5,000 lithium ion 18650
accidents highlight the potential for packaging configurations. Specifically, LiCoO2 cells, with the balance of the
lithium batteries to contribute to an the FAA Technical Center tested the interior volume containing the standard
incident resulting in loss of life and/or ability of various fire extinguishing fire test load of cardboard boxes filled
loss of aircraft. agents and fire resistant packagings to with shredded paper. The state of
Testing conducted by the FAA control fires involving lithium batteries. charge was measured to be around 40
Technical Center to assess the This testing revealed that: (1) The percent. The FCCs tested were unable to
flammability characteristics of lithium ignition of the unburned flammable contain a fire involving lithium ion
ion rechargeable cells and the potential gases associated with a lithium cell or batteries and flames escaped from under
hazard associated with shipping them battery fire could lead to a catastrophic the cover, while tests on the FRCs
on transport aircraft confirmed that fires loss of the aircraft; (2) the current design resulted in explosions that were caused
involving lithium batteries sometimes of the Halon 1301 fire suppression by the ignition of accumulated
include a mechanical energy release that system 17 in a Class C cargo flammable gases vented from burning
compartment in passenger aircraft is cells and/or batteries.18
14 See 49 CFR 171.8. An overpack means an
incapable of preventing such an The 2004 tests concluded that the
enclosure that is used by a single consignor to
provide protection or convenience in handling of a explosion; and (3) the ignition of a presence of a consignment of lithium
package or to consolidate two or more packages. metal batteries can significantly increase
Overpack does not include a transport vehicle, 15 Webster, H. See footnote 5. the severity of an in-flight cargo
freight container, or aircraft unit load device. 16 Panagiotou, Joseph. See footnote 6.
Examples of overpacks are one or more packages: 17 Halon systems work by flooding the cargo
compartment fire and that Halon 1301 is
(1) Placed or stacked onto a load board such as compartment with Halon gas. The concentration of
ineffective in such occurrences.19
a pallet and secured by strapping, shrink wrapping, Halon in the local atmosphere interferes with the
stretch wrapping, or other suitable means; or burning reaction and suppresses the flame. Halon 18 Websteret al. See footnote 7.
(2) Placed in a protective outer packaging such as is stored in pressurized containers and distributed 19 Webster,Harry, Flammability Assessment of
a box or crate. via a series of pipes and fire suppression nozzles. Bulk-Packed, Nonrechargeable Lithium Batteries in
Furthermore, the report stated that the fiberboard box began to smoke 8 runaway propagation.22 The FAA
ignition of a lithium metal battery minutes into the test and then caught Technical Center further tested the
releases burning electrolytes and a fire at the 11-minute mark. As cells effectiveness of passive protection of
molten lithium spray capable of went into thermal runaway, strong torch lithium battery shipments and
perforating the aircraft cargo flames erupted from the box as published a report in February 2016. For
compartment liners, while also electrolytes were vented and ignited by these tests, a packet of water placed
generating a pressure pulse that can the burning fiberboard. The fire above the cells in a package containing
dislodge the cargo compartment continued to burn vigorously for 45 16 lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells (at 50
pressure relief panels. The dislodged minutes until all of the cells were percent state of charge) was the most
pressure relief panels allow the Halon consumed. Data was collected until all effective method of stopping thermal
1301 fire suppressant to leak out, thermocouples returned to near ambient runaway propagation, aside from a
reducing its effectiveness and temperature. In a subsequent test, the lowered state of charge.23 Early tests
permitting the fire to spread beyond the fiberboard separators were replaced
with small numbers of cells predicted
cargo compartment. These test results with a fiberglass material used as a
that the Halon 1301 extinguishing agent
identified that the Halon fire flame barrier in aircraft thermal acoustic
suppression system required on insulation that was cut to the same would suppress the open flames but not
passenger aircraft could not effectively dimensions as the fiberboard separators. prevent the propagation of thermal
suppress a fire involving lithium metal The fiberglass separators were not runaway from cell to cell. Further tests
batteries, but they were inconclusive successful in controlling the confirmed that, in some instances, the
with respect to lithium ion batteries. propagation of thermal runaway. In Halon fire suppression system was
Based on the 2004 FAA Technical additional tests, the fiberboard dividers unable to mitigate a fire involving
Center test results, PHMSA published were replaced with those coated with lithium ion batteries effectively. These
an IFR in December 2004 [69 FR 75208] intumescent paint or aluminum foil. tests were conducted with fiberboard
prohibiting the transport of lithium This modification only delayed adjacent boxes containing 100 lithium ion 18650
metal batteries as cargo on passenger batteries from being driven into thermal LiCoO2 cells. A single cell was removed
aircraft and indicated plans for the runaway and did not prevent its and replaced with a cartridge heater to
continued assessment of the hazards propagation. Finally, the FAA Technical simulate a cell in thermal runaway. The
associated with lithium ion batteries in Center evaluated the ability of an test chamber was flooded with a 6
transportation. ICAO later aligned with overpack originally designed for the percent Halon 1301 concentration at the
the HMR. transport of chemical oxygen generators first indication of open flames. The
The 2006 tests concluded that the to protect against a lithium ion battery agent extinguished the open flame and
Halon fire suppression system is fire initiated from a single cell. This prevented open flames for the duration
effective in suppressing a fire arising package consists of a fiberboard of the test. Thermal runaway continued
from lithium ion batteries. Cells container with a foil and/or ceramic to propagate throughout the box until all
continued to vent due to the air insulator that meets the requirements of cells were consumed. Tests on FCCs and
temperature but did not ignite in the HMR provisions found in appendix D to FRCs that suppress fires by means of
presence of Halon.20 part 178—Thermal Resistance Test and oxygen starvation showed that these fire
The 2010 tests investigated the ability appendix E to part 178—Flame suppression methods are not effective in
of various packages and shipping Penetration Resistance Test. A controlling lithium ion cell or battery
configurations to contain the effects of fiberboard package with 100 cells and fires. The fire load for these tests
lithium battery fires and prevent the fiberboard separators was placed into
consisted of 5,000 lithium ion 18650
propagation of thermal runaway.21 The the overpack. Thermal runaway was
LiCoO2 cells, with the balance of the
baseline for these tests was a common initiated and allowed to propagate until
interior volume containing the standard
shipping configuration for lithium ion all cells were consumed. The overpack
cells consisting of a fiberboard box fire test load of cardboard boxes filled
successfully contained the fire but
containing 100 cells with fiberboard allowed smoke and fumes to escape due with shredded paper. The state of
separators. A single cell was removed to increased pressure. The chemical charge was measured to be around 40
from the package and replaced with a oxygen generator overpack standard did percent. Since Halon has no cooling
cartridge heater to initiate thermal not account for the accumulation of effect, the temperatures found in a
runaway. The cartridge heater was vented flammable gases and was suppressed cargo fire were high enough
activated at time zero, and its therefore not effective in containing that cells continued to vent, creating an
temperature reached 1000 °F (538 °C) at lithium ion battery fires. ignition source for the accumulated gas.
the 9-minute mark and peaked at In 2013, the FAA Technical Center The buildup and subsequent ignition of
1250 °F (677 °C) at approximately 19 conducted a series of tests to examine these gases ruptured the container. The
minutes, at which point the power to the effectiveness of fire extinguishing container and its contents were
the cartridge heater was shut off. The agents for suppressing lithium metal destroyed by the ensuing fire.24
and lithium ion battery fires and
22 Maloney, T., Extinguishment of Lithium-Ion
Transport Category Aircraft, DOT/FAA/AR–04/26, preventing thermal runaway
June 2004. and Lithium-Metal Battery Fires, DOT/FAA/TC–13/
20 Webster, H., Flammability Assessment of Bulk-
propagation (DOT/FAA/TC–13/53). 53, January 2014.
Packed, Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells in
These tests used five 2600mAh lithium 23 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D., Passive Protection
Transport Category Aircraft, FAA Report DOT/ ion 18650 LiCoO2cells charged to 50 of Lithium Battery Shipments, DOT/FAA/TC–15/38,
FAA/AR–06/38, September 2006. percent capacity. Aqueous agents were February 2016.
21 Webster, H. See footnote 5. the most effective at preventing thermal 24 Webster et al. See footnote 7.
In July 2015, in response to the FAA multidisciplinary group met three times information on lithium battery
Technical Center testing, two major between 2014 and 2015 and developed shipments to develop risk mitigation
aircraft manufacturers issued notices to a series of recommendations and high- strategies as part of their safety
aircraft operators warning of these level performance standards intended to management activities. Mitigations will
hazards and supporting a prohibition on mitigate the hazard of transporting vary but could include evaluating the
the carriage of high-density packages of lithium ion batteries by air to an specific fire protection features of the
lithium ion batteries on passenger acceptable level.28 Several of these aircraft; how and where shipments are
aircraft until safer methods of transport recommendations were directed to the loaded including proximity of lithium
were implemented.25 26 27 Additionally, attention of the ICAO Dangerous Goods batteries to each other and other
the aircraft manufacturers Panel (DGP), including the development hazardous materials, such as flammable
recommended that operators who of performance standards to be met at liquids; and additional acceptance and
choose to carry lithium batteries as the cell, battery, or package level; the handling procedures. This IFR will
cargo on cargo aircraft conduct a safety implementation of interim measures, apply these important safety provisions
risk assessment that considers specific such as reducing the state of charge for to the small cell and battery
criteria listed in the July 2015 notices. lithium ion batteries; and the consignments consistent with
While the likelihood of a cargo fire recommendation to no longer use the international requirements.
involving lithium batteries is low, the current provisions for small batteries for The FLTOPSP stressed the need for
potential for catastrophic consequences large consignments. air carriers to conduct appropriate safety
including loss of life and loss of aircraft The FAA Technical Center’s research risk management activities to ensure
results in an unacceptable safety risk was presented to the DGP over the last that lithium cells and batteries can be
under the existing regulations. five years and specifically at each of the carried safely.29 The AIRP determined
B. ICAO Activities previous three meetings (ICAO DGP: that the continued transportation of
Working Group 14, Working Group lithium ion batteries on passenger
The ICAO Technical Instructions set 2015, and DGP/25). The research was aircraft presents ‘‘an unacceptable risk
minimum standards for the subsequently given to the ICAO Flight to aircraft’’ under current conditions,
international air transport of hazardous Operations Panel (FLTOPSP) and the and that ‘‘lithium batteries and cells
materials—including lithium batteries. ICAO Airworthiness Panel (AIRP), should not be transported in aircraft
PHMSA periodically amends the HMR which are staffed with global experts in engaged in commercial air transport
to adopt revisions to the ICAO each discipline as well as operations as cargo unless acceptable
Technical Instructions. The
representatives from appropriate Non- means to mitigate the risk can be
harmonization between the HMR and
Government Organizations (NGO). The established.’’ The panel further
the ICAO Technical Instructions creates
DGP determined that the emphasized the following:
consistency in hazardous materials
implementation of a 30 percent state of A growing body of test data has identified
transportation standards both
charge provision and the reduction in that existing cargo compartment fire
internationally and domestically. The
the number of small cells and batteries protection systems certified to EASA CS
amendments in this IFR will aid in
permitted in a consignment and 25.857 and U.S. CFR part 25.857 (CS/CFR
maintaining this alignment by adopting part 25) regulations are unable to suppress or
overpack were required to reduce the
requirements consistent with the 2015– extinguish a fire involving significant
risk being introduced into the aviation
2016 ICAO Technical Instructions. quantities of lithium batteries, resulting in
system. In addition, the DGP
Based largely on the FAA Technical reduced time available for safe flight and
determined that offering small cell and
Center testing, which identified hazard landing of an aircraft to a diversion
battery consignments separately to the
factors leading to the potential aerodrome.30
air carrier will allow for better
compromise of the cargo compartment ICAO recognized the safety hazard
awareness of each shipment, enabling
fire protection capabilities due to a loss associated with the offering and
operators to have a more informed
of Halon containment and significant acceptance of lithium batteries as cargo
approach to safety risk management and
damage to the aircraft, ICAO conducted and addressed it by taking action to
ultimately a more robust safety
several Multidisciplinary Lithium implement addenda to the current ICAO
management system. As a result,
Battery Transport Coordination Technical Instructions based on input
operators can apply more targeted
Meetings consisting of a group of and expertise from the AIRP, FLTOPSP,
controls to mitigate risks introduced
experts from hazardous materials, air DGP, Air Navigation Commission, and
into their system by shipments of
operations, airworthiness, battery the FAA Technical Center research.
lithium batteries. Mitigation strategies
manufacturing, and package Based on this information, the ICAO
will be based on the characteristics of
manufacturing disciplines. This Council authorized the issuance of an
the operator’s system and may include,
25 Boeing Multi Operator Message MOM–MOM– but are not limited to, limiting addendum—an ICAO tool used for a
15–0469–01B, Information—Transporting Lithium quantities and using certain protective high consequence event resulting in, or
Batteries, July 17, 2015. See http:// equipment when transporting these creating a direct risk of, loss of life or
www2.anac.gov.br/transparencia/audiencia/2015/ consignments. The major airframe serious injury to a person or damage to
aud19/anexoVI.pdf. the aircraft—to address the immediate
26 Airbus In-Service Information Transport of
manufacturers recommended that
operators perform a safety risk safety risk. The FAA subsequently
Dangerous Goods, Lithium Batteries, reference:
00.00.00182, July 24, 2015. See http:// assessment to establish whether they issued Safety Alert for Operators
www2.anac.gov.br/transparencia/audiencia/2015/ can manage the risks associated with the (SAFO) 16001: Risks of Fire or
aud19/anexoV.pdf. transport of lithium batteries. We expect Explosion when Transporting Lithium
27 A single quantifiable measurement for high
that operators would incorporate Ion Batteries or Lithium Metal Batteries
density is not possible because of the variable
effects battery chemistry, cargo compartment
as Cargo on Passenger and Cargo
characteristics, and loading configurations. As such, 28 A report of each ICAO Multidisciplinary
29 Flight Operations Panel (FLTOPSP); Second
high-density quantities of lithium batteries could be Lithium Battery Transport Coordination Meeting is
any number of batteries or cells having the potential available through the following URL: http:// Meeting; October 12–16, 2015; FLTOPSP/2–WP/31.
to overwhelm cargo compartment fire protection www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/Pages/ 30 Airworthiness Panel (AIRP); Third Meeting;
features. Multidisciplinary.aspx. December 7–11, 2015; AIRP/3–WP/21.
Aircraft on January 19, 2016, advising package offered and accepted for requirements, shipping configurations,
operators of the safety hazard associated transport, thus eliminating the ability to and cargo compartment fire protection
with lithium batteries in cargo. SAFO ship multiple packages in a single systems do not provide adequate
16001 specifically recommends consignment without standard hazard protection and may be unable to
performing a safety risk assessment and communication. ICAO agreed that these effectively mitigate a fire involving
implementing risk mitigation provisions should be incorporated in lithium ion batteries. The results further
strategies.31 the current 2015–2016 edition of the demonstrate that a relatively small fire
ICAO Technical Instructions by way of of only 450 °F (232 °C) is sufficient to
Public Meeting heat lithium ion cells to thermal
addenda as they address immediate
In consideration of the hazards to air transport safety. runaway and that the heat from a single
recommendations put forward by the Specifically, ICAO agreed to the cell in thermal runaway, which can
multidisciplinary group, and in following measures effective April 1, reach 1100 °F (593 °C), is capable of
preparation for the ICAO DGP/25 2016: 33 34 igniting adjacent packaging materials.
meeting, DOT (with representatives 1. Prohibit the transport of lithium ion Furthermore, while the Halon 1301
from PHMSA, FAA, and OST) hosted a batteries (not packed with or contained fire suppression system in Class C cargo
public meeting on September 18, 2015, in equipment) as cargo on passenger compartments has been shown to
to obtain feedback on how to better aircraft; effectively suppress the open fire
enhance the safe transport of lithium 2. Require all lithium ion batteries associated with the burning electrolyte
batteries by air.32 DOT specifically (not packed with or contained in and greatly reduce the potential ignition
requested public input on mitigation equipment) to be shipped at not more of adjacent flammable materials, it is not
strategies, information, and data. The than a 30 percent state of charge on effective in cooling any cells already
meeting included a discussion on cargo-only aircraft; engaged in thermal runaway. Thermal
pertinent safety recommendations from 3. Restrict the use of Section II 35 (both runaway will continue to propagate
the multidisciplinary group and lithium ion and lithium metal) cell and until all the cells in the consignment
possible amendments to the ICAO battery shipments to one package per have been consumed. Aircraft cargo
Technical Instructions. DOT noted both consignment or overpack. containers delay the detection of smoke
in the meeting notice and during the ICAO agreed that prohibiting the and fire originating from container
public meeting that we may consider transport of lithium ion batteries as contents, thereby decreasing the time
adopting new standards or revised ICAO cargo on passenger aircraft addresses a interval between when smoke and fire
Technical Instructions in a future pressing safety issue and further become detectable and taking
rulemaking action. Additionally, on determined that a reduced state of immediate action to suppress a fire and
October 8, 2015, FAA hosted a public charge, combined with restricting protect the aircraft.36 Flammable gases
meeting to discuss the agenda for ICAO Section II batteries to one package per produced during a thermal runaway
DGP/25, including those proposals consignment or overpack, is event may continue to develop and
related to lithium batteries. significantly safer than the current collect in a confined space, and the
ICAO agreed to a series of measures transport requirements. ICAO also ignition of these gases is sufficient to
to address the previously and newly agreed to include in the 2017–2018 rupture packages and dislodge pressure
identified hazards, such as prohibiting ICAO Technical Instructions a provision relief panels that could result in loss of
the transport of lithium ion batteries as highlighting the need for air carriers Halon containment, significant damage
cargo on passenger aircraft and to the aircraft, and danger to both the
who wish to transport hazardous
requiring all lithium ion cells and traveling public and flight crews.
materials to include a safety risk
batteries transported on cargo-only This information was presented to the
assessment process for the transport of Multidisciplinary Meeting on Lithium
aircraft to be shipped at a reduced state hazardous materials before choosing to
of charge of not more than 30 percent Batteries that recommended mitigating
do so. The provision will further state measures be taken to reduce the risk of
until such time that detailed that safety risk assessments should
performance standards could be a fire involving significant quantities of
include appropriate information to lithium cells and batteries (UN3090 and
developed and implemented. An result in the implementation of safety
approval provision would allow UN3480) that may exceed the fire
measures that ensure the safe transport suppression capability of the aircraft
competent authorities to authorize of hazardous materials, including
transport of lithium ion batteries on and could lead to a catastrophic loss of
lithium cells and batteries, as cargo. the aircraft. Various other groups
cargo-only aircraft at a higher state of
charge provided an equivalent level of C. Risk Potential including the International
safety can be established. ICAO also Coordination Council for Aerospace
The respective FAA Technical Center Industry Association (ICCAIA), major
agreed to greatly reduce the application and NTSB testing demonstrate that
of long-standing provisions for the airframe manufacturers, the
current packages, hazmat handling International Federation of Airline
transport of small batteries (commonly
referred to in the ICAO Technical 33 Addendum 3 to the 2015–2016 edition of the
Pilots Association (IFALPA), AIRP, and
ICAO Technical Instructions, issued January 15, FLTOPSP endorsed the
Instructions as Section II batteries). Per
2016. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/ recommendations from the
this amendment, the Section II AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20 Multidisciplinary Meeting on Lithium
provisions apply only to a single small Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-2015- Batteries and separately provided
2016.ADD-3.pdf.
31 The FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 34 Addendum 4 to the 2015–2016 edition of the
additional recommendations. The ICAO
16001 is available through the following URL: ICAO Technical Instructions, issued February 23, Council approved the adoption of
http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/ 2016. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/ additional requirements to mitigate risks
airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/ AddendumCorrigendum%20to%20the%20 posed by lithium batteries as cargo on
media/2016/safo16001.pdf. Technical%20Instructions/Doc%209284-2015-
32 The public meeting notice and the comments 2016.ADD-4.en.pdf.
cargo-only aircraft. This decision was
received are available on the public docket DOT– 35 The term ‘‘Section II’’ is not used in the HMR based upon the input and expertise from
OST–2015–0169 available through but identical provisions for small cells and batteries
www.regulations.gov. are included. (See 49 CFR 173.185(c)). 36 Panagiotou, J. See footnote 6.
the AIRP, FLTOPSP, DGP, Air • July 28, 2011: The Republic of Restrictions on Air Transportation of
Navigation Commission, and the FAA Korea, a 747–400 cargo aircraft crashed Medical Device Cells or Batteries’’ for
Technical Center research. The into international waters. The two pilots further discussion. This provision
prohibition of the transport of lithium aboard the flight were killed. The Korea addresses the legislation titled ‘‘FAA
ion batteries (UN3480) as cargo on Aviation and Railway Accident Reauthorization Act of 2018’’ signed on
passenger aircraft was made in response Investigation Board determined that the October 5, 2018, by the President, which
to tests that demonstrate that fire cause of this accident was a fire that instructs the Secretary to issue limited
involving lithium ion batteries may developed on or near two pallets exceptions for lithium ion and metal
exceed the capability of aircraft cargo containing hazardous materials cells or batteries used for a medical
fire protection systems. The additional packages, including hybrid-electric device to be transported on passenger
requirements to mitigate risks posed by vehicle lithium ion batteries and aircraft. See Public Law 302–89.
lithium batteries, which will continue to flammable liquids. Additionally, the provision addresses
be permitted for transport on cargo Please see the Appendix A of the RIA comments submitted to Docket No.
aircraft, include transporting all lithium for this rulemaking, a copy of which has DOT–OST–2015–0169 announcing a
ion batteries at a state of charge not been placed in the docket, for more public meeting to seek input on issues
exceeding 30 percent of their rated detail on PHMSA Incident Reports concerning lithium batteries that were
capacity and limiting the number of involving lithium batteries. to be discussed by the ICAO DGP, in
packages of small lithium ion or lithium Although the aforementioned which the Medical Device Battery
metal batteries. While the likelihood of measures provide significant Transport Council (MDBTC) noted
a fire involving a shipment of lithium improvements to safety, they do not concerns relevant to shipping medical
batteries in air transport is low, the eliminate all risks and should be devices and batteries by air (e.g.,
consequences of such an incident would coupled with other mitigation strategies delivery to remote locations and
be catastrophic. With the potential for as part of a layered approach to safety. increased supply chain constraints). The
an uncontrolled fire involving a In this IFR, PHMSA is adopting the MDBTC noted that prohibiting the
relatively small quantity of lithium changes approved by ICAO that were transport of lithium ion batteries on
batteries to lead to a catastrophic failure informed by aviation safety experts and passenger aircraft and the 30 percent
of the airframe, the inability of the are already implemented in state of charge restriction would
package or the aircraft fire suppression international air transportation. negatively impact the transport of
system to control such a fire presents an As discussed in ‘‘Section IV. Good replacement lithium ion batteries for
unacceptable safety risk. PHMSA Cause for Immediate Adoption,’’ medical devices. The provision also
acknowledges that there are PHMSA has determined that proceeding addresses comments to the docket that
advancements in packaging design and with notice and comment to adopt identified a need to ship lithium ion
packaging configurations, including fill additional safety measures for transport cells and batteries to remote areas.
materials and fire suppression agents, of lithium ion batteries is impracticable. As previously discussed in
which are promising and may D. Alternative Transport Conditions ‘‘Subsection A. FAA Technical Center
eventually provide safe and reliable Testing’’ of this section, the
ways to continue to transport lithium PHMSA considered an alternative in ineffectiveness of fire suppression
batteries on board passenger aircraft. which the IFR would prescribe specific systems (Halon or oxygen starvation) to
However, PHMSA identified a total of conditions authorizing the transport of control propagation of thermal runaway
39 incidents in air cargo transportation lithium ion batteries at a charge greater from cell to cell or to control the
between 2010 and 2016, with 13 of than 30 percent on cargo-only aircraft or production of large quantities of
these incidents involving lithium as cargo on passenger aircraft. The flammable gases drives the need for
batteries and smoke, fire, extreme heat, conditions would need to mitigate the additional safety controls. The ICAO
or explosion, that would have been safety risks posed by the batteries, Council adopted a prohibition on the
affected by this IFR. These types of which include fire, thermal runaway, transport of lithium ion batteries as
incidents are indicative of the types of and explosion from ignition of vented cargo on passenger aircraft due to the
events that are possible if lithium ion gases. The conditions considered inability of aircraft fire suppression
batteries continue to be transported on included limits on the size and number systems to mitigate a fire involving
passenger aircraft. Below are summaries of cells, a reduced state of charge, the lithium ion batteries. Determination of
of three U.S. and international events number of packages, the packaging, the aircraft fire suppression system
that highlight the potential for lithium additional fire suppression systems, and vulnerability was based on assessments
batteries to contribute to an incident manufacturing controls on the cells and positions presented by a wide range
resulting is loss of life and/or loss of themselves. PHMSA was unable to of global experts in the field of aircraft
aircraft. identify a general set of conditions in design, certification, and operations.
• February 7, 2006: Incident at the which it would be safe to transport any The additional requirements to mitigate
Philadelphia International Airport in quantity or type of lithium ion cells as risks posed by lithium batteries, which
which a fire suspected to have been cargo on a passenger aircraft or at a will continue to be permitted for
caused by lithium ion batteries charge greater than 30 percent on cargo- transport on cargo aircraft, include
destroyed a cargo aircraft and much of only aircraft. transporting all lithium ion batteries at
its cargo. However, PHMSA is authorizing, with a state of charge not exceeding 30
• September 3, 2010: Dubai, United the approval of the Associate percent of their rated capacity and
Arab Emirates, a 747–400 cargo aircraft Administrator, up to two lithium limiting the number of packages of
(U.S. flag) crashed while attempting to batteries used for medical devices to be small lithium ion or lithium metal
land at the Dubai International Airport transported on passenger aircraft, and as batteries.
after a fire was discovered. Both pilots applicable, at a state of charge higher Therefore, in this IFR, PHMSA is
were killed, and the aircraft and its than 30 percent, when the intended implementing the revisions approved by
cargo, which included a significant destination of the batteries is not ICAO and informed aviation safety
quantity of lithium ion batteries, were serviced daily by cargo aircraft. See experts to address the risks created by
destroyed. ‘‘Section V.D. Limited Exceptions to the air transport of lithium batteries,
along with an exception for the limited as required. The IFR is necessary to Accordingly, this IFR is effective upon
transport of lithium cells or batteries allow PHMSA to come close to publication in the Federal Register.
specifically used for a medical device complying with the 90-day timeframe
V. Summary of Changes
where the intended destination is not required by the FAA Reauthorization
serviced daily by cargo aircraft, with the Act of 2018. The statutory mandated To ensure the safe transport of lithium
approval of the Associate Administrator. deadline does not provide PHMSA with batteries by air and protect the traveling
sufficient time to prepare and publish a public, flight crews, and for
IV. Good Cause for Immediate harmonization with international
proposed regulation in the Federal
Adoption regulations from ICAO, PHMSA amends
Register, provide an opportunity to
The Administrative Procedure Act comment, and issue a final rule. the HMR to prohibit the transport of
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., generally The purpose of Section 333 is to lithium ion cells and batteries (UN3480)
requires public notice before address the potential safety risk in as cargo on passenger aircraft; require
promulgating regulations. See 5 U.S.C. transporting lithium batteries by air. all lithium ion cells and batteries
553(b). The APA provides an exception, Indeed, the caption of the provision is (UN3480) to be shipped at not more
however, when there is good cause to ‘‘Safe Air Transportation of Lithium than a 30 percent state of charge on
conclude that notice and public Cells and Batteries.’’ Congress’s choice cargo-only aircraft; and restrict small
comment is impracticable, unnecessary, to single out Section 333 for rapid lithium cell or battery shipments to one
or contrary to the public interest. See 5 implementation suggests that it package per consignment or overpack.
U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). perceived this safety risk to warrant Also, PHMSA is providing a limited
PHMSA finds that compliance with accelerated intervention. The need to exception, with the approval of the
the notice-and-comment process for this follow Congress’s directive to address, Associate Administrator, to the
rulemaking would be impracticable. within 90 days, a status quo that restrictions on the air transport of
Accordingly, PHMSA finds that there is Congress itself regarded as demanding replacement medical device cells and
good cause for this IFR to be exempt urgent remediation would make the batteries if the intended destination for
from the notice-and-comment process. notice-and-comment process ordinarily the cells or batteries is not serviced
Interested parties will still have an applicable under the APA ‘‘contrary to daily by cargo aircraft. PHMSA would
opportunity to submit comments in the public interest’’ in this instance. authorize the transport on passenger
response to this IFR before a permanent Congress’s desire to eliminate, as aircraft of not more than two lithium
final rule is issued.37 PHMSA’s finding speedily as possible, potential air cells or batteries specifically used for a
of good cause is based on the transportation risks associated with medical device and would waive the 30
impracticability of providing the public lithium batteries among air operators percent state of charge limit for lithium
with notice-and-comment while which have not already voluntarily ion cells and batteries, with an approval
attempting to comply with the 90-day adopted ICAO’s 2015–2016 lithium of the Associate Administrator. PHMSA
statutory rulemaking mandate in the battery standards is supported by FAA further defines medical device for the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Technical Center testing showing the purposes of the HMR as an instrument,
Public Law 115–254 (October 5, 2018, potential for an uncontrolled fire apparatus, implement, machine,
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018).38 involving a relatively small quantity of contrivance, implant, or in vitro reagent,
Section 333 of the FAA lithium batteries and the potential including any component, part, or
Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires the buildup of flammable gases in a accessory thereof, which is intended for
Secretary of Transportation to conform suppressed lithium ion battery fire that use in the diagnosis of disease or other
U.S. regulations on the air could lead to a catastrophic failure of conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
transportation of lithium cells and the airframe, as well as the large body treatment, or prevention of disease, of a
batteries to the 2015–2016 edition of the of research conducted by DOT, NTSB, person. See ‘‘Subsection D. Limited
ICAO Technical Instructions, including and other respected sources that Exceptions to Restrictions on Air
the amendments that were made demonstrates the potential safety risks Transportation of Medical Device Cells
effective on April 1, 2016. The act was of lithium batteries transported by air or Batteries’’ of this section for further
signed into law on October 5, 2018, and under the current regulations and the discussion.
requires DOT to take this action within connection of the revised regulations to A. Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
90 days, which is January 3, 2019. This those hazards.
IFR adopts the 2015–2016 edition of the PHMSA finds that the use of notice PHMSA is prohibiting the transport of
ICAO Technical Instructions and and comment procedures before issuing lithium ion batteries (UN3480) as cargo
subsequent revised standards effective this rulemaking is impracticable. This on passenger aircraft because of their
April 1, 2016, into the domestic HMR, IFR is the only rulemaking option that unique challenges associated with
will allow PHMSA to come close to thermal runaway: Pressure pulses,
37 DOT has sought public input on multiple meeting the statutory deadline in the venting of flammable gas, and resistance
occasions prior to this rulemaking. DOT held a FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 while to extinguishment. The FAA Technical
public meeting on September 18, 2015, to discuss addressing the potential safety risk in Center investigated the ability of various
the ICAO Technical Instructions lithium battery fire suppression measures—fire
amendments and to obtain input on mitigation
transporting lithium batteries by air.
strategies, information, and data on how to better Additionally, while the APA generally suppression agents, depressurization,
ensure the safe transportation of lithium batteries requires that publication of a FCC, and FRC—to control lithium ion
by air. See Notice of Lithium Battery Safety Public substantive rulemaking be made at least battery fires. The results concluded that
Meeting and Request for Information, 80 FR 52368 gaseous fire suppression agents were
(August 28, 2015). Additionally, FAA hosted a
30 days before its effective date, the
public meeting on October 8, 2015, to discuss the APA provides for dispensation of the effective in extinguishing the electrolyte
agenda for ICAO’s lithium battery proposed 30-day effectiveness delay upon good fire but had no effect in stopping the
amendments. cause similar to the notice and comment propagation of thermal runaway from
38 PHMSA’s compliance with the statutory
requirements. 5 U.S.C. 553(d). For the cell to cell. Therefore, a lithium ion
deadline was negatively impacted by a lapse in
funding from December 22, 2018 through January
reasons discussed above, PHMSA finds battery fire can still compromise the
25, 2019, that affected PHMSA, FAA, and other good cause to dispense with the 30-day aircraft critical systems even in the
government agencies. delay in effectiveness upon publication. presence of Halon, which is the current
means of suppression in passenger of high-density packages of lithium ion kg may continue to be transported on
aircraft cargo compartments. A lithium batteries on passenger aircraft. Several cargo-only aircraft.43
ion battery fire was marginally large passenger air carriers responded to B. State of Charge Requirement
controlled through oxygen starvation, the notices by voluntarily instituting
which is the primary means of bans on the transport of lithium ion PHMSA is requiring all lithium ion
controlling fires in Class E cargo batteries. cells and batteries transported as
compartments.39 The FCCs were unable UN3480 (not packed with or contained
to contain flames and flammable gases Removal of Authorization for Lithium in equipment) on cargo-only aircraft be
from escaping, and tests involving FRCs Ion Aircraft Batteries shipped at a state of charge of not more
resulted in explosions. The FRCs than 30 percent of their rated capacity.
permitted flammable gases generated As a consequence of the prohibition This requirement was determined based
from cells in thermal runaway to on the transport of lithium ion batteries on FAA Technical Center test results
accumulate in a confined area within (UN3480) as cargo on passenger aircraft, demonstrating that the propagation of
the FRC before being ignited by burning PHMSA is removing the authorization thermal runaway could be greatly
packages, or a spark from a burning cell, in § 172.102(c)(2) special provision A51 reduced or eliminated at this level. The
and exploding. An analysis of the that permits the transport of lithium ion hazardous effects of thermal runaway
batteries consumed in the FRC fire test aircraft batteries on passenger aircraft. were markedly less when the cells were
indicated that only a small fraction of Special provision A51 was added to the at 30 percent state of charge or less
the 5,000 cells went into thermal HMR in the HM–215L final rule. 78 FR relative to higher states of charge. The
runaway, vented, and caused the 987 (Jan. 7, 2013). This amendment, FAA tested lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
explosion. which became effective on January 1, cells at five charge states: 100% (two
As discussed in this IFR, the FAA 2013, harmonized the HMR with an tests), 50%, 40%, 30%, and 20%.
Technical Center tested the ability of authorization added to the 2013–2014 The results can be summed up as
several common shipping containers to ICAO Technical Instructions that follows:
contain the effects of a thermal runaway allowed a package containing a single • The 100% cell exploded in both
originating from a single lithium cell. lithium ion aircraft battery with a net tests, and rapid cooling was observed.
Currently authorized packages, package mass not exceeding 35 kg on passenger Peak temperature: 1030 °F.
configurations, shipping containers, and • The 50% test consumed all cells.
aircraft. In 2013, shortly after the Peak temperature: 1044 °F.
consignment limits could neither authorization in special provision A51
contain a lithium battery fire nor • At 40%, two cells were consumed,
became effective, there were two and the peak temperature 760 °F
prevent the propagation of fire from one
incidents involving lithium ion batteries decreased after thermal runaway in Cell
package to another. FCCs and FRCs
installed in Boeing Model 787–8 2.
were unable to contain a fire involving
lithium batteries. Overpack containers aircraft. The first incident on January 7, • At 30%, venting occurred in Cell 1
designed to transport chemical oxygen 2013, involved a Japan Airlines Boeing with no thermal runaway. Peak
generators successfully contained the 787–8 that was parked at the gate at temperature: 560 °F.
fire from lithium ion batteries but Logan International Airport in Boston, • At 20%, venting occurred in Cell 1
permitted smoke and vapors to escape. MA. Maintenance personnel observed with no thermal runaway. Peak
Neither were fire suppression systems, smoke coming from the lid of the temperature: 502 °F.
including the Halon that is currently auxiliary power unit battery case, as These results apply to lithium ion
used in cargo compartments, entirely well as a fire with two distinct flames cells of this size and chemistry and
effective against lithium battery fires. Of at the electrical connector on the front thermal runaway effects may be
the package configurations that were of the case. No passengers or different for different cell sizes and
tested, the only effective methods to crewmembers were aboard the airplane chemistries. However other studies
stop propagation of thermal runaway at the time and none of the maintenance involving different lithium ion cell
were reducing the state of charge to 30 or cleaning personnel aboard the chemistries show a similar trend of
percent and adding a pack of water airplane was injured.41 A second reduced hazardous effects at a reduced
above the cells.40 The inability of the state of charge. The ICAO agreed that a
incident on January 16, 2013, on an All
package or the aircraft fire suppression 30 percent state of charge limit was
Nippon Airways flight required the
system to control a fire involving appropriate based on the testing
flight to make an emergency landing.
lithium ion batteries presents an information available.
Four passengers out of the 173 In implementing the ICAO Technical
immediate safety hazard of which the occupants on board the aircraft suffered
actions in this IFR will address, while Instructions, PHMSA has fully
minor injuries during the evacuation. It transmitted the provisions into the
also harmonizing to the ICAO Technical appears that in both cases the heat from
Instructions. HMR. Consistent with the ICAO
a single overheated cell propagated to Technical Instructions, PHMSA
This IFR is consistent with the July
adjacent cells resulting in a thermal authorizes the transport of lithium ion
2015 aircraft manufacturer notices to air
carriers warning of these hazards and runaway.42 In response to these cells or batteries on cargo-only aircraft
supporting a prohibition on the carriage incidents, ICAO issued an addendum in at a higher state of charge subject to the
February 2013 to disallow lithium ion approval of the Associate Administrator
39 Class E cargo compartments are common on the batteries from being transported under for Hazardous Materials Safety. Also,
upper deck cargo compartments of freighter aircraft. special provision A51. Lithium ion consistent with ICAO, PHMSA did not
Class E compartments have fire detection systems, batteries with a net weight of up to 35 provide an authorization for
the means to shut off ventilation flow, and the
means to exclude hazardous quantities of smoke, transporting lithium ion batteries as
41 Aircraft Incident Report; Auxiliary Power Unit
flames, and noxious gases from the flight crew
compartment. Class C cargo compartments also Battery Fire; National Transportation Safety Board 43 Addendum 1 to the 2013–2014 edition of the
include an approved built-in fire extinguishing or NTSB/AIR–14/01; Adopted November 21, 2014. ICAO Technical Instructions, issued February 12,
suppression system controllable from the cockpit. 42 Aircraft Serious Incident Investigation Report, 2013. http://www.icao.int/safety/DangerousGoods/
See 14 CFR 25.857. Japan Transport Safety Board; AI25014–4; Documents/Doc%209284-2013-2014Edition_
40 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D. See footnote 23. September 25, 2014. Addendum-1.en.pdf.
cargo on passenger aircraft. cell faults associated with cell • Reduces the magnitude of the
Accordingly, if there is a need to manufacturing defects. Existing heating rate if thermal runaway
transport lithium ion batteries on a transport requirements reduce the occurs.52 53 54 55 56
passenger aircraft, an applicant must likelihood of thermal runaway from Comprehensive laboratory testing
apply for a special permit in accordance damage and external short circuits. from various sources, including the
with the provisions of part 107, subpart Internal short circuits can form during FAA, has shown that lithium ion
B. charge and discharge cycles, physical batteries are thermally more stable and
An approval is written consent, damage to the cell or battery or the hazardous effects of thermal
including a competent authority manufacturing defects. Thermal runaway are less when the battery is at
approval, from the Associate runaway events originating from a reduced state of charge. Both Roth et
Administrator or other designated internal cell faults appear to be rare, but al.57 and Doughty and Roth 58 found that
Department official, to perform a do nevertheless occur. Regardless of the a higher state of charge in commercially-
function that requires prior consent cause, the hazardous effects of a thermal available lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2
under the HMR. Approvals are an runaway event are the same. Cell cells resulted in lower onset
extension of the regulations and chemistry, state of charge, and heat temperature of self-generated heating
facilitate the continued safe transport of transfer environment are some of the and that the magnitude of a cell’s
hazardous materials by providing significant factors that influence the response to internal short circuit is
specific regulatory relief on a case-by- effects of failure.44 Multiple influenced by state of charge. Other
case basis. Approvals are valid for both independent studies have shown that, studies, such as that done by
domestic and international independent of the initiating factor, Somandepalli et al.59 have observed that
transportation and are recognized as reducing the state of charge measurably the volume of gas vented from cells in
approval by a competent authority for reduces both the likelihood and thermal runway is less at lower states of
the purposes of the ICAO Technical consequence of an incident involving charge. More importantly, a sufficiently
Instructions and other international lithium ion batteries. Most significantly, reduced state of charge for the most
hazardous materials regulations. When lowering the state of charge reduces or
shipping internationally, approval is commonly carried cells eliminates
eliminates the ability of a cell to propagation of thermal runaway and the
required from the country of origin and experience thermal runaway and the
the country of the air carrier. Only a potential for a chain reaction in the
potential for propagation. Reducing the event of a single cell failure.
single approval is required for state of charge for lithium ion cells and
shipments originating in the United batteries offered for transport translates In an aviation environment, the safety
States transported by a domestic air to a safer transport environment. benefits associated with a reduced state
carrier. PHMSA’s approval application of charge are more pronounced than for
Specifically, reducing the state of
procedures are set forth in 49 CFR part other modes due to the potential
charge of a lithium ion cell or battery:
107, subpart H. PHMSA specifies an consequences of an in-flight event. As
• Decreases the likelihood of thermal
expiration date in each approval, which evidenced by testing conducted by the
runaway; 45
is typically 2 years from the date of FAA Technical Center and supported by
• Decreases or eliminates the
issuance. It is important to note that analyses performed by a major aircraft
potential for thermal runaway to spread
PHMSA only grants approvals for manufacturer, an incident involving
to adjacent cells or batteries; 46
activities allowed (if approved) under even a relatively small number of
specific conditions identified in the • Increases the cell’s ability to lithium ion cells is sufficient to
HMR. Applications for approvals and tolerate a short circuit and significantly overwhelm existing aircraft safety
supporting documentation may be reduces the maximum temperature systems and compromise the integrity of
submitted by mail, by facsimile, achieved at the point of shorting; 47 the aircraft. Taking this into account,
electronically via email, or through • Reduces the quantities of gases manufacturers often preemptively ship
PHMSA’s online system. Unless released if thermal runaway lithium ion batteries at a reduced state
emergency processing is requested and occurs; 48 49 50 51 of charge as a business practice.
granted, applications are usually 44 Mikolajczak et al. See footnote 4.
processed in the order in which they are 45 Doughty, commercial 18650 Li-ion batteries with LFP and
Dan, and Roth, E. Peter, A General
filed. Discussion of Li Ion Battery Safety, The
NCA cathodes—impact of state of charge and
Lithium ion batteries contain both a overcharge, Royal Society of Chemistry Advances,
Electrochemical Society Interface, Vol. 21, No.2,
Issue 70, June 2015.
chemical and an electrical hazard. It is Summer 2012.
51 Roth, E. P., Crafts, CC, Doughty, D. H., and
the combination of these two hazards 46 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
McBreen J., Advanced Technology Development
that creates a unique challenge to safety 45.
47 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
Program for Lithium-Ion Batteries: Thermal Abuse
in the air transportation environment. Performance of 18650 Li-Ion Cells, Sandia Report:
45.
As referenced in this section, numerous 48 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
SAND2004–0584, March 2004.
52 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
private and public sector studies have 45.
clearly demonstrated and validated 45.
49 Somandepalli, V., Marr, Kevin C., and Horn,
53 Somandepalli et al. See footnote 49.
through physical testing that reducing a Quinn C., Quantification of Combustion Hazards of 54 Bandhauer et al. See footnote 3.
cell or battery’s state of charge Thermal Runaway Failures in Lithium-Ion Batteries,
55 Roth et al. See footnote 51.
measurably reduces this risk. A number SAE International. J. Alt. Power, Vol. 3, No. 1, May
56 Golubkov et al. See footnote 52.
2014.
of factors can lead to an incident in 50 Golubkov, Andrey W., Scheikl, Sebastian, 57 Roth et al. See footnote 51.
transport, including but not limited to Planteu, René, Voitic, Gernot, Wiltsche, Helmar, 58 Doughty, Dan, and Roth, E. Peter. See footnote
thermal, mechanical, or electrical abuse; Stangl, Christoph, Fauler, Gisela, Thaler, 45.
substandard cell design; and internal Alexander, and Hacker, Viktor, Thermal runaway of 59 Somandepalli et al. See footnote 49.
Existing aircraft protection systems these must be identified to the air takes into account, among other factors,
simply cannot mitigate the operator as hazardous materials. The the types and quantities of lithium
accumulation and potential for ignition identification of these consignments as batteries carried, the quantity per flight,
of flammable gases, which can hazardous materials will allow their location within the cargo
completely overwhelm current aircraft operators to consider safety risk compartment, and their proximity to
safety systems and lead to loss of the assessments and implement mitigation other dangerous goods;
aircraft’s flight capabilities. Requiring strategies appropriate to the operator’s • An in-service information article
cells and batteries to be transported at specific capabilities, thus reducing the issued by Airbus Industries in 2015 (ISI
a sufficiently reduced state of charge hazards posed by such consignments. 00.00.00182) advising operators who
would immediately and measurably The hazardous materials regulatory transport lithium batteries to conduct a
reduce both the likelihood and system has for decades proven its safety assessment that considers, among
consequences of an incident involving effectiveness in mitigating risks other factors, information on the types
lithium ion cells or batteries in an associated with hazardous materials of lithium batteries being shipped, as
aviation environment. As demonstrated transportation. Shippers and operators well as the quantity and density of the
by multiple studies and physical testing, understand this system and have consignment. Airbus further
the exothermic reaction experienced by included steps in their processes to recommended that all consignments of
a cell is highly dependent on the state ensure compliance. Current provisions lithium batteries be identified and
of charge.60 61 For the most commonly for small batteries were developed based notified, and that policy to notify the
carried cell, the lithium ion 18650 on the reduced risk posed by a limited flight crew of all lithium battery
LiCoO2 cell, research and testing is number of small batteries in a single consignments is established; and
particularly significant. The FAA package. These provisions were • Interim recommendations from the
Technical Center testing has specifically developed before current research and Third International Multidisciplinary
demonstrated that for these cells, a state testing that demonstrate the significant Lithium Battery Transport Coordination
of charge of 30 percent not only reduces fire hazard posed by consolidations of Meeting (see paragraph 5.1.3 and
the intensity of thermal runaway but such packages in an aviation appendix A to the report available at
also completely eliminates propagation environment. ICAO considered reducing http://www.icao.int/safety/
of thermal runaway.62 While no one or eliminating the provisions for Section DangerousGoods/Pages/
safety measure known today is II of the ICAO Technical Instructions Multidisciplinary.aspx), including
singularly effective in eliminating all because such consignments do not safety risk assessments by operators
hazards inherent in the transport of require shipping papers or notification who wished to transport lithium
lithium ion batteries, this particular to the pilot in command. Shipping batteries that would require
measure dramatically reduces the papers provide air carriers with consideration of information on the
possibility of an unmanageable event information (i.e., quantity, type of types and quantities of lithium batteries
that could lead to loss of the aircraft and package, package weight) that is and cells being transported.
the lives of those aboard. Further essential to accurately identify packages Alignment of the HMR with the
research and additional work is of lithium batteries and to conduct revised Section II provisions in the
necessary to more comprehensively effective safety assessments. ICAO ICAO Technical Instructions for small
assess the most effective mechanisms to ultimately agreed to limit provisions for batteries directly addresses NTSB
mitigate those hazards. While this work Section II batteries by restricting to one Recommendation A–07–109 that the
continues, it is in the best interest of the the number of packages that can be Department ‘‘eliminate regulatory
public that carriage of lithium ion cells offered as a single shipment or placed exemptions for the packaging, marking,
or batteries as cargo on passenger into a single overpack and noted that and labeling of cargo consignments of
aircraft be prohibited and that state of this action would ensure such small secondary lithium batteries (no
charge be reduced on lithium ion cells consignments were subject to standard more than 8 grams equivalent lithium
and batteries being carried as cargo on hazard communication, thereby content) until the analysis of the failures
cargo-only aircraft. improving awareness to the operator. and the implementation of risk-based
ICAO considered recent actions by requirements asked for in Safety
C. Consignment and Overpack Recommendation A–07–108 are
Restriction government regulators and the industry,
and various recommendations from the completed.’’ This recommendation was
PHMSA is restricting the use of Third International Multidisciplinary closed by NTSB when the DOT took an
alternative provisions for small lithium Lithium Battery Transport Coordination ‘‘Acceptable Alternative Action’’ by
cells and batteries to one package per Meeting: harmonizing the HMR with the 2013–
overpack or consignment to prevent the • A safety alert for operators issued 2014 ICAO Technical Instructions,
consolidation of large numbers of by the FAA in 2010 (SAFO 10017) which included amended provisions for
lithium cell and battery shipments in a recommending that operators load bulk Section II batteries. The relevant
single overpack or consignment under consignments of Section II batteries in amendments to the 2013–2014 ICAO
provisions designed for small quantities Class C cargo compartments or locations Technical Instructions were adopted by
of batteries. Shippers can still offer where alternate fire suppression was ICAO on the basis that those
lithium cells or batteries in an overpack available; 63 amendments were considered to ensure
or a consolidated consignment, but • A multi-operator message issued by that:
the Boeing Company in 2015 (MOM– [T]raining would now be required for many
60 Mikolajczak, C.J., and A. Wagner-Jaureff, US MOM–15–0469–01B) advising operators more shippers preparing lithium battery
FAA-Style Flammability Assessment of Lithium Ion
Cells and Battery Packs in Aircraft Cargo Holds, who transport lithium batteries to shipments; operators would now be required
Exponent Failure Analysis Report, April 15, 2005 conduct a safety risk assessment that to perform acceptance checks on all large
Retrieved from: http://www.prba.org/wp-content/ shipments of lithium batteries prior to
uploads/Exponent_PRBA_burn_box_report_ 63 The FAA Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) loading and stowage aboard an aircraft; pilots
final1.pdf. 10017 is available through the following URL: would be notified of the presence, location
61 Webster, H. See footnote 20.
http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/media/ and quantity of lithium batteries aboard the
62 Maloney, T., and Dadia, D. See footnote 23. safo10017.pdf. aircraft . . . and regulators would be
provided a framework in which better potential impacts these criteria may requirements, and the FAA on-site
training, oversight and enforcement could be have on stakeholders. inspection.
applied.
• The limitation to ‘‘not more than This limited exception also addresses
However, implementation of the two replacement lithium cells or comments submitted to Docket No.
revised ICAO provisions in practice batteries’’ applies to the number of cells DOT–OST–2015–0169, which identified
revealed a deficiency in that large or batteries per package, as approved by a need to transport lithium ion batteries
numbers of Section II packages the Associate Administrator. to remote areas that are accessible by
continued to enter the air transport • A destination is no longer passenger aircraft only.
stream in bulk (overpacked and/or considered to be ‘‘serviced daily by a
palletized) configurations. Adopting the VI. Regulatory Analysis and Notices
cargo aircraft’’ when it is
amendments in this IFR will bring the impracticable 65 to reach the intended A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This
HMR into alignment with the ICAO destination by cargo aircraft and Rulemaking
Technical Instructions and address this subsequent motor vehicle This IFR is published under the
deficiency. transportation. The person applying for authority of the Federal Hazardous
D. Limited Exceptions to Restrictions on the approval of the Associate Materials Transportation Law, 49 U.S.C.
Air Transportation of Medical Device Administrator must demonstrate that 5101 et seq. Section 5103(b) authorizes
Cells or Batteries this provision applies. PHMSA has not the Secretary of Transportation to
To execute the mandate in Section provided a specific distance of when a prescribe regulations for the safe
333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of location is no longer considered transportation, including security, of
2018, PHMSA is authorizing, with the serviced daily by a cargo aircraft to hazardous material in intrastate,
approval of the Associate Administrator, allow for flexibility in evaluating each interstate, and foreign commerce. This
the transport of not more than two scenario on a case-by-case basis; IFR revises regulations for the safe
lithium cells or batteries used for a however, PHMSA seeks comment on transport of lithium cells and batteries
medical device to be transported on whether a distance should be by air and the protection of aircraft
passenger aircraft and an exception from considered. operators and the flying public.
the 30 percent state of charge limit • Batteries ‘‘required for medically
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
under specified conditions. This necessary care’’ are batteries that are
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
provision applies when the intended needed for a medical device that is used
destination of the batteries is not by the recipient for medical care. Executive Order 12866 (‘‘Regulatory
serviced daily by cargo aircraft and the PHMSA’s standard operating Planning and Review’’) requires
batteries are required for medically procedures [for approvals and special agencies to regulate in the ‘‘most cost-
necessary care. The medical device cells permits] will be updated when effective manner,’’ to make a ‘‘reasoned
or batteries must be (1) individually reviewing applications for consignments determination that the benefits of the
packed in an inner packaging that of lithium cells or batteries for medical intended regulation justify its costs,’’
completely encloses the cell or battery, devices, as prescribed in Section 333 and to develop regulations that ‘‘impose
(2) placed in a rigid outer packaging, paragraph (b)(1) of the FAA the least burden on society.’’
and (3) protected to prevent short Reauthorization Act of 2018. This IFR is considered a significant
circuiting.64 PHMSA is also adopting Specifically, PHMSA will either grant or regulatory action under E.O. 12866 and
the definition of medical device as used deny an application for air the Regulatory Policies and Procedures
in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 transportation of lithium ion cells or of the Department of Transportation. 44
as follows: ‘‘A medical device means an batteries specifically used for medical FR 11034. However, this IFR is not an
instrument, apparatus, implement, devices, no later than 45 days after economically significant regulatory
machine, contrivance, implant, or in receipt of the application. A draft will action as defined by section 3(f)(1)
vitro reagent, including any component, be submitted to the FAA no later than under E.O. 12866, because it does not
part, or accessory thereof, which is 30 days after the date of application, have an annual effect on the economy
intended for use in the diagnosis of and the FAA will conduct an on-site of $100 million or more or adversely
disease or other conditions, or in the inspection no later than 20 days after affect in a material way the economy, a
cure, mitigation, treatment, or receiving the draft from PHMSA. sector of the economy, productivity,
prevention of disease, of a person.’’ Section 333 paragraph (b)(1) applies to competition, jobs, the environment,
Several aspects necessary to only lithium ion cells and batteries, but public health or safety, or State, local,
implement the FAA Reauthorization Act since paragraph (b)(2) applies to both or tribal governments or communities. A
of 2018 requirements, are not defined in lithium ion and metal batteries for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) is
the congressional mandate. In this IFR, medical devices, PHMSA understands available for review in the public docket
PHMSA defines requirements based on the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 for this rulemaking and summarized
previous interpretations, current language in section 333 paragraph (b)(1) below. Please see the RIA for more
regulatory requirements, and ease of to also apply to lithium metal batteries details on the benefits and costs of the
implementation. PHMSA requests for medical devices. PHMSA seeks IFR.
comments on these criteria, including comments on the application As previously discussed, the safe
requirements or evaluation process, transport of lithium batteries by air has
64 PHMSA notes methods to prevent short
including any potential impacts on been an ongoing concern for PHMSA,
circuiting include, but are not limited to: Packaging FAA, and DOT. Lithium batteries pose
each battery in fully enclosed inner packages made applicants or airlines, such as package
of non-conductive material, packaging batteries in design, distance between the intended unique challenges to safety in a
a manner to prevent contact with other batteries, destination and an airport not serviced transportation environment because,
devices or conductive materials, and ensuring daily by a cargo aircraft, communication unlike other hazardous materials, they
exposed terminals or connectors are protected with contain both a chemical and an
non-conductive caps, non-conductive tape, or by
other appropriate means. See PHMSA Letter of 65 PHMSA has previously used the term electrical hazard. This combination of
Interpretation, Reference Number 16–0174; May 18, ‘‘impracticable’’ in the HMR. See §§ 173.150(f) and hazards, when involved in a fire
2018. 175.310(a). encompassing significant quantities of
lithium batteries, may exceed the fire (1) Prohibit the transport of lithium impacts approximately 99 domestic
suppression capability of the aircraft ion cells and batteries (not packed with passenger airlines, 468 shipping firms,
and lead to a catastrophic loss of the or contained in equipment) as cargo on and over 27,000 employees on average.
aircraft. passenger aircraft; PHMSA examined the benefits and the
In response to both the hazards posed (2) Require all lithium ion cells and costs of the provisions of this
by the transport of lithium ion batteries batteries (not packed with or contained rulemaking using the post-ICAO
by air, as evidenced by the FAA in equipment) to be shipped at not more baseline 66 as the basis for the analysis
Technical Center testing results (see than a 30 percent state of charge on as shown below. Table 2 summarizes
‘‘Section III.A. FAA Technical Center cargo-only aircraft; and the benefits and costs by rulemaking
Testing’’), and the recent developments (3) Restrict small lithium cell and
provision over a 10-year period and
in the international community, battery shipments to one package per
annualized, discounted at a 7 percent
PHMSA is amending the HMR consignment or overpack.
applicable to lithium cells and batteries Some costs and benefits are related to rate.
not contained in or packed with the total number of companies or
equipment to: employees affected. The IFR potentially
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO
10-Year
Provision Benefits Unquantified costs quantified cost
(7%)
State of Charge ........... • Limits the volume of flammable gases emit- • Potential changes in manufacturing proce- $2,304,551. These es-
ted by lithium ion cells propagated in a dures to ensure compliance with state of timates include only
thermal runaway. charge provision. the cost for entities
• Results in a less energetic thermal run- • Reevaluation of management practices and to apply for permis-
away event if one should occur. potentially instituting changes to avoid or sion to ship bat-
• Reduces the likelihood of thermal propaga- lessen supply chain impacts such as re- teries at higher
tion from cell to cell. duced shelf life of batteries and battery charge levels.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade quality issues.
by minimizing the burden of complying with • Additional time for end users needed to
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements charge the batteries from 30 percent state
(although currently domestic shippers and of charge or less instead of the typical lev-
carriers have the option to voluntarily com- els of 40 or 50 percent at which manufac-
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency turers currently set the state of charge.
Consignment Limit ....... • Reduces the risk of fire from shipping large • Costs due to modal shift that might occur $44,328,936. Costs in-
quantities of excepted batteries that were from air transport to ground or marine clude additional haz-
previously being consolidated in overpacks, transport due to higher shipping costs by ard communication
pallets, in single-unit load devices and sin- air. The end receivers may be inconven- and employee train-
gle aircraft cargo compartments. ienced by longer shipping times that imply ing.
• Reduces the propensity for large numbers less prompt access to goods purchased.
of batteries or packages shipped in accord-
ance with regulatory exceptions.
• Harmonization facilitates international trade
by minimizing the burden of complying with
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements
(although currently domestic shippers and
carriers have the option to voluntarily com-
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency
66 The post-ICAO baseline is the international shipments, (2) restrict the number of Section II passenger flights. This environment also includes a
operating environment present after April 1, 2016; packages to one per consignment on international level of voluntary domestic compliance with the
this would (1) restrict lithium ion batteries to a 30 air shipments, and (3) prohibit the shipping of above provisions in the United States.
percent state of charge for international air lithium ion batteries as cargo on international
TABLE 2—SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS FOR LITHIUM BATTERY PROVISIONS—POST ICAO—Continued
10-Year
Provision Benefits Unquantified costs quantified cost
(7%)
Lithium Battery Prohibi- • Safety benefits expected to be low or none • Potential additional costs to air carriers Impact expected low
tion as Cargo on given evidence of pre-IFR compliance. transporting cargo shipments of the lithium given evidence of
Passenger Aircraft. • Eliminates the risk of an incident induced ion batteries on cargo planes instead of pre-IFR compliance.
by lithium ion batteries shipped as cargo in passenger airplanes. They vary for each air
a passenger aircraft. carrier function of the size of the airline and
• Eliminates the risk of a fire exacerbated by the areas they service, the availability of
the presence of lithium ion batteries involv- cargo-only aircraft fleet, the capacity usage
ing the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft. and cargo volume availability of their cargo
• Harmonization facilitates international trade aircraft fleet, the volume of lithium ion bat-
by minimizing the burden of complying with teries they were transporting by passenger
multiple or inconsistent safety requirements airplanes.
(although currently domestic shippers and • Cost due to modal shift that might occur as
carriers have the option to voluntarily com- higher costs to ship by air may induce
ply with ICAO requirements). Consistency shippers to send by ground and marine
between regulations reduces compliance transportation. The end receivers may be
costs and helps to avoid costly frustrations inconvenienced by longer shipping times
of international shipments. that imply less prompt access to goods
purchased. This can have potential impacts
on rural and remote communities not serv-
iced daily by cargo aircraft or only serviced
by passenger aircraft. For customers need-
ing lithium batteries used in devices other
than medical devices, the delays in the de-
livery of the required batteries could result
in a range of consequences depending on
their intended need.
Total ..................... ......................................................................... ......................................................................... 10-Year: $46,633,487.

Annualized:
$6,639,559.
Based on the analysis described in breakdown of U.S. passenger and cargo- were packed in equipment. While these
this RIA, at the mean, PHMSA estimates only aircraft incidents involving lithium incidents indicate the potential harm
the present value costs about $46.6 batteries from 2010 to 2016 in which a from the presence of a lithium ion
million over 10 years and about $6.6 Hazardous Materials Incident Report, battery fire, the scope of this rulemaking
million annualized (at a 7 percent DOT Form 5800.1, was submitted. does not affect lithium ion batteries
discount rate). We filtered incidents for those carried in airline passenger baggage or
While PHMSA examined the benefits involving lithium batteries and fire, packed in equipment. There were no
and the costs of the provisions of this extreme heat, or explosion. In addition, fatalities or hospitalizations associated
rulemaking using the post-ICAO we filtered passenger aircraft incidents with these incidents.
baseline, we acknowledge that using the for those occurring in cargo as opposed U.S. Cargo Aircraft Lithium Battery
pre-ICAO baseline 67 would produce to passenger baggage. We also filtered Incidents: PHMSA identified a total of
different cost and benefit figures. That both passenger and cargo-only aircraft 139 incidents in air cargo
said, given the significant data incidents for those involving lithium transportation. Thirteen of these
uncertainties regarding pre-ICAO ion batteries as opposed to lithium incidents involved lithium batteries and
baseline and operational practices, metal batteries given applicability of the fire, extreme heat or explosion that
PHMSA was unable to completely three provisions and the extent that would be affected by the IFR. PHMSA
quantify the pre-ICAO baseline. For information was available in the cannot be certain of how many of the 13
more detail on cost and benefits of the incident report. We further filtered lithium battery incidents in cargo
pre-ICAO baseline see the ‘‘Section 11 incidents for undeclared shipments or transportation relate to the consignment
Alternative Baseline Analysis’’ of the those without labels and markings limit provision. However, based on
RIA included in the docket for this where possible. review of the narratives of the incidents,
rulemaking. U.S. Passenger Aircraft Lithium PHMSA believes that at least five of the
PHMSA reviewed incidents involving Battery Incidents: PHMSA identified a incidents are related to the consignment
lithium batteries shipped by air to total of 21 lithium battery incidents in limit provision.
determine how many reported incidents passenger air transportation relevant to
the scope of this rulemaking. PHMSA Summary of Benefits
would be affected by the scope of this
IFR. The following summary provides a started with a set of 36 lithium battery PHMSA expects the IFR will improve
incidents in passenger air transportation safety for flight crews, air cargo
67 The pre-ICAO baseline is the international and filtered out 15 of the incidents operators, and the public as a result of
operating environment present before April 1, 2016 involving lithium ion batteries and fire, the state of charge requirement and the
with: (1) No limitations of state of charge, (2) No extreme heat, or explosion. PHMSA consignment and overpack restriction
limitation on the number of Section II packages
offered in a single consignment, and (3) No
determined that the incidents resulting by reducing the possibility of fire on
prohibition of shipping Lithium ion batteries as in fire involved lithium ion batteries cargo-only aircraft. Additionally, the
cargo on passenger carrying aircraft. transported in passenger baggage or IFR will harmonize the prohibition of
lithium ion batteries as cargo on closely packed lithium ion batteries to non-Federal requirements are
passenger aircraft and eliminate the be transported by aircraft without ‘‘substantively the same’’ as the Federal
possibility of a package of lithium ion requiring the shipper to disclose requirements. In addition, this IFR does
batteries causing or contributing to a fire information to the air operator or the not have sufficient federalism impacts
in the cargo hold of a passenger aircraft. pilot in command. The potential for a to warrant the preparation of a
small number of lithium batteries in federalism assessment.
Passenger Aircraft Prohibition
thermal runaway to vent flammable gas
The provision prohibiting lithium ion E. Executive Order 13175
and propagate thermal runaway
batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft between cells in the same package and This IFR has been analyzed in
will provide safety benefits to air between adjacent packages and material accordance with the principles and
operators and the public by virtually caused the ICAO to review the criteria contained in Executive Order
eliminating the possibility of (1) an effectiveness of the existing safety 13175 (‘‘Consultation and Coordination
incident induced by lithium ion standards. ICAO adopted a consignment with Indian Tribal Governments’’).
batteries shipped as cargo in a passenger restriction to preclude abuse of the relief Because this rulemaking does not
aircraft and (2) a fire exacerbated by the provided for small quantities of small significantly or uniquely affect the
presence of lithium ion batteries in the lithium cells and batteries. communities of Tribal governments and
cargo compartment of a passenger Based on the estimated mean 10-year does not impose substantial direct
aircraft. In addition, this rulemaking undiscounted cost of $65.84 million and compliance costs, the funding and
will harmonize U.S. regulations with the estimated economic consequences of consultation requirements of Executive
the ICAO Technical Instructions. $34.9 million for a cargo-only flight Order 13175 do not apply.
State of Charge Requirement incident, the rulemaking would need to F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive
prevent 1.9 incidents over the next 10 Order 13272, and DOT Regulatory
The provision limiting the state of years for the benefits to exceed the
charge will provide safety benefits to air Policies and Procedures
quantified costs, or approximately one
cargo operators and the public by every 5 years. The rulemaking would Section 603 of the Regulatory
reducing the available energy and need to prevent a larger number of Flexibility Act (RFA) requires an agency
limiting the propagation of heat and fire incidents to exceed the rulemaking’s to prepare an initial regulatory
in the event of thermal runaway in cost when non-quantified costs are flexibility analysis describing impacts
lithium ion cells and batteries. The FAA considered. There have been two on small entities whenever an agency is
Technical Center report, Hazards fatalities in the U.S. safety record,69 required by 5 U.S.C. 553 to publish a
Produced by Lithium Batteries in which covers the period related to general notice of proposed rulemaking
Thermal Runaway in Aircraft Cargo accidents involving lithium ion batteries for any proposed rulemaking. Similarly,
Compartments, found that the volume shipped by air. section 604 of the RFA requires an
of gases emitted by lithium ion cells in agency to prepare a final regulatory
thermal runaway is dependent on the C. Executive Order flexibility analysis when an agency
state of charge of the cell and higher This rulemaking is considered an issues a final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553
states of charge yield greater volumes of Executive Order 13771 regulatory after being required to publish a general
flammable gases. Further, reducing the action. Details on the estimated costs of notice of proposed rulemaking. Because
state of charge of lithium ion 18650 this rulemaking can be found in the of the contributing factors and the need
LiCoO2 cells to not more than 30 rulemaking’s economic analysis. to address the identified safety risk,
percent resulted in a less energetic PHMSA has found that there is good
D. Executive Order 13132
thermal runaway event and greatly cause to forgo notice and comment
reduced the likelihood of thermal This IFR has been analyzed in pursuant to the exceptions in 5 U.S.C.
propagation from cell to cell.68 As such, accordance with the principles and 553(b)(B)(3). Accordingly, PHMSA has
the state of charge requirement in this criteria contained in Executive Order not analyzed the effects of this action
rulemaking will serve to mitigate the 13132 (‘‘Federalism’’) and the under 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604.
likelihood of thermal propagation for President’s memorandum
(‘‘Preemption’’) published in the G. Paperwork Reduction Act
lithium ion cells stored in cargo holds
of cargo-only aircraft, particularly for Federal Register on May 22, 2009 [74 PHMSA currently has approved
lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells, by FR 24693]. This IFR will preempt State, information collections under Office of
preventing the propagation of thermal local, and Indian tribe requirements but Management and Budget (OMB) Control
runaway. does not propose any regulation that has Numbers 2137–0034, ‘‘Hazardous
substantial direct effects on the States, Materials Shipping Papers and
Consignment and Overpack Restriction the relationship between the national Emergency Response Information’’ and
The provision restricting the number government and the States, or the 2137–0557, ‘‘Approvals for Hazardous
of packages per consignment or distribution of power and Materials.’’ A review of the baseline and
overpack when transported in responsibilities among the various change of paperwork and recordkeeping
accordance with limited hazard levels of government. Therefore, the burden related to this IFR would bring
communication will provide safety consultation and funding requirements small lithium batteries into fully
benefits to air cargo operators and the of Executive Order 13132 do not apply. regulated status, thus requiring shipping
public by addressing the fire hazard If adopted, this IFR will preempt any papers. PHMSA estimates that there will
associated with shipping large State, local, or tribal requirements be an additional 28,242 shipments
quantities of small lithium cells and concerning these subjects unless the annually that will require a shipping
batteries that were previously being paper. PHMSA estimates that each
consolidated in overpacks, pallets, in 69 For the purposes of this analysis, the scope of shipping paper takes one minute and
single unit load devices. The existing the U.S. safety record includes incidents reported thirty seconds to complete (28,242
to PHMSA over a 10-year period using a DOT Form
regulations permit large quantities of 5800.1. Furthermore, PHMSA is unable to conduct
shipments × 1 minute 30 seconds),
a root cause analysis on many lithium battery which results in approximately 741
68 Webster et al. See footnote 7. incidents due to the destruction of evidence in fire. burden hours. PHMSA does not
estimate any increase in out-of-pocket Southeast, Washington DC 20590, can overheat and ignite under certain
costs. These shipments will also require Telephone (202) 366–8553. conditions and, once ignited, can be
a notification to the pilot in command especially difficult to extinguish. The
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
(NOPIC) taking 1 minute per shipment presence of lithium batteries can also
(28,242 shipments × 1 minute), which A regulation identifier number (RIN) increase the severity of a fire originating
results in an increase of approximately is assigned to each regulatory action from another source. In general, lithium
471 burden hours. PHMSA does not listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal batteries have a higher energy density
estimate any increase in out-of-pocket Regulations. The Regulatory Information (i.e., high energy to size ratio) than other
costs. In total for this information Service Center publishes the Unified types of batteries and are susceptible to
collection, PHMSA estimates an Agenda in April and October of each thermal runaway, which is a chain
approximate increase of 56,484 annual year. The RIN contained in the heading reaction leading to self-heating and
number of responses (28,242 shipping of this document can be used to cross- uncontrolled release of the battery’s
paper responses + 28,242 NOPIC reference this action with the Unified stored energy. In addition, most lithium
responses) and approximate increase of Agenda. ion batteries manufactured today
1,212 burden hours (741 shipping paper I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act contain a flammable electrolyte.
burden hours + 471 NOPIC burden Laboratory testing conducted at the
hours). This IFR does not impose unfunded FAA Technical Center has demonstrated
PHMSA also estimates that an mandates under the Unfunded that lithium batteries pose a greater risk
additional 468 approval requests will Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does in air transportation than other types of
result from the new requirements in this not result in costs of $141.3 million or batteries (e.g., alkaline, nickel-metal
IFR. PHMSA estimates that it takes 40 more to either State, local, or Tribal hydride, and nickel cadmium). This
hours to complete the paperwork governments, in the aggregate, or to the testing has also demonstrated that even
portion of an approval request, resulting private sector, and it is the least a few lithium batteries can present a
in 18,720 additional burden hours (468 burdensome alternative that achieves serious hazard. The current fire
approval requests × 40 hours per the objective of the rulemaking. suppression systems installed on
request). PHMSA does not estimate any J. Environmental Assessment aircraft provide, at best, limited
increase in out-of-pocket costs. effectiveness in mitigating fires
The National Environmental Policy involving a consignment of lithium
A summary of the information Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4375
collection changes can be found below: batteries, which confirms that lithium
(NEPA) requires Federal agencies to batteries pose unique transportation
OMB Control Number 2137–0034 consider the environmental impacts of hazards of which the current
proposed actions in their decision- requirements are not effective in
Annual Increase in Number of making process. Where an agency does
Respondents: 0. mitigating.
not anticipate significant environmental Additionally, during the ICAO
Annual Increase in Annual Number of impacts, the Council on Environmental Dangerous Goods Panel Meeting (DGP–
Responses: 56,484. Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing 25; October 19–30, 2015), the DGP
Annual Increase in Annual Burden NEPA require Federal agencies to proposed two amendments to the ICAO
Hours: 1,212. conduct an environmental assessment to Technical Instructions. These proposed
Annual Increase in Annual Burden consider (1) the need for the action, (2) amendments were based on
Costs: $0. alternatives considered, (3) the human recommendations developed at the
OMB Control Number: 2137–0557 and environmental impacts of the action Second and Third International
and alternatives, and (4) a list of the Multidisciplinary Lithium Battery
Annual Increase in Number of agencies and persons consulted. See 40 Transport Coordination Meetings,
Respondents: 468. CFR 1508.9(b). This IFR would amend which took place in September 2014
Annual Increase in Annual Number of the Hazardous Materials Regulations and July 2015, respectively. By way of
Responses: 468. (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171–180), with the DGP–25, the DGP recommended that the
Annual Increase in Annual Burden following provisions to (1) prohibit the ICAO Technical Instructions be
Hours: 18,720. transport of lithium ion cells and amended to (1) require all lithium ion
Annual Increase in Annual Burden batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft; cells and batteries on cargo-only aircraft
Costs: $0. (2) require all lithium ion cells and to be shipped at not more than a 30
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act batteries to be shipped at not more than percent state of charge and (2) restrict
of 1995, Public Law 104–13, no person a 30 percent state of charge on cargo- the number of packages that may be
is required to respond to an information only aircraft; and (3) restrict small offered under current ICAO Technical
collection unless it has been approved lithium cell and battery shipments to Instructions provisions for small
by OMB and displays a valid OMB one package per consignment or batteries (‘‘Section II’’ batteries) to not
control number. Section 1320.8(d) of overpack. more than one package per
title 5 of the CFR requires that PHMSA consignment. The ICAO Council
provide interested members of the 1. Need for the Action approved and published these
public and affected agencies an Lithium batteries pose unique amendments for incorporation into the
opportunity to comment on information challenges to safety when transported 2015–2016 ICAO Technical Instructions
and recordkeeping requests. Please by air because, unlike other hazardous in January 2016, with an effective date
direct your requests for a copy of the materials, they contain both a chemical of April 1, 2016.
information collection to Steven and an electrical hazard. This On February 22, 2016, in addition to
Andrews or Shelby Geller, U.S. combination of hazards, when involved the two safety enhancements discussed
Department of Transportation, Pipeline in a fire encompassing significant above, ICAO adopted an additional
& Hazardous Materials Safety quantities of lithium batteries, may safety measure that prohibits, on an
Administration (PHMSA), East exceed the fire suppression capability of interim basis, all consignments of
Building, Office of Hazardous Materials an aircraft and lead to a catastrophic lithium ion batteries as cargo on
Standards, 1200 New Jersey Avenue lithium battery event. Lithium batteries passenger aircraft. This prohibition will
continue to be in force as separate work Reauthorization Act of 2018 mandate to widely agreed-upon; numerous
continues through ICAO on a new issue a limited exception for lithium laboratory tests support that thermal
lithium battery packaging performance cells and batteries transported via runaway is related to the battery’s state
standard. This additional safety measure aircraft for medically necessary care. of charge.
is also effective April 1, 2016. Alternative 1: No Action Alternative: • Not adopt the provision to restrict
Lastly, this rulemaking meets the The No Action Alternative is the excepted battery shipments to one
congressional requirements in Section scenario in which PHMSA does not package per consignment or overpack.
333 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of adopt any of the provisions that • As this alternative only partially
2018. The FAA Reauthorization Act of comprise the IFR. This alternative addresses the transportation of lithium
2018 mandates that within 90 days of represents a baseline scenario in that it cells and batteries adopted by ICAO
enactment, the Secretary shall issue portrays the way the world would look prior to the effective date of the FAA
regulations that adopt the requirements absent of PHMSA action. The current Reauthorization Act of 2018, this
in the 2015–2016 ICAO Technical regulatory standards would remain in alternative would not meet
Instructions related to the air effect. This alternative does not meet the congressional mandate in its entirety.
transportation of lithium cells and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
congressional mandate to harmonize 3. Environmental Impacts
batteries, as well as the revised
standards adopted by ICAO, which were with the 2015–2016 ICAO Technical Preferred Alternative:
effective on April 1, 2016, and any other Instructions for air transportation of In selecting the provisions as
provisions adopted by ICAO prior to the lithium cells and batteries, harmonize described in this IFR, PHMSA
effective date of the FAA with any further revisions including concluded that human safety and
Reauthorization Act of 2018. The FAA those effective on April 1, 2016, and to environmental risks would be reduced
Reauthorization Act of 2018 also directs add a limited exception and expedited and an increase in protections to human
the issuance of a limited exception to review of special permit and approval health and environmental resources. As
the restrictions on medical device applications for air transportation of discussed in detail in ‘‘Section III. Need
lithium cells and batteries transported lithium cells and batteries for medical for the Rule,’’ FAA research has shown
via aircraft, including an expedited device. that air transportation of lithium ion
review of applications for approvals and Alternative 2: Partial Harmonization batteries poses a human safety risk. This
special permits related to the air Alternative: IFR includes the specific measures to
transportation of lithium cells and Under the Partial Harmonization reduce environmental and human safety
Alternative, PHMSA would: risks to air cargo operators and the
batteries required for medically
• Partially adopt the planned public. Specifically, the consignment
necessary care.
regulation. In particular, this alternative and overpack restriction will lower the
2. Alternatives Considered would involve adoption of the risk of inadvertent bulk loading batteries
In this rulemaking, PHMSA prohibition provision described in this in a cargo compartment of a cargo-only
considered the following three rulemaking as well as the 30 percent aircraft without full hazard
alternatives: state of charge provision (see ‘‘Section communication, and the state of charge
Selected Alternative: V. Summary of Changes’’ for further provision will decrease both the
The Selected Alternative is the detail on these provisions). While there likelihood and consequence of an
scenario, in which PHMSA adopts into may be some combination of factors that incident involving lithium ion batteries.
the HMR the amendments presented in effectively mitigate the hazards posed Additionally, the prohibition of lithium
this rulemaking, including to: by the transportation of lithium ion ion batteries as cargo on passenger
• Prohibit the transport of lithium ion batteries on passenger aircraft, the aircraft will generate human safety
cells and batteries as cargo on passenger variable effects of battery chemistry, benefits to air operators and public by
aircraft; cargo compartment characteristics eliminating the possibility of (1) an
• Require all lithium ion cells and including fire suppression capabilities, incident induced by lithium ion
batteries to be shipped at not more than and loading configuration clearly batteries and (2) a fire exacerbated by
a 30 percent state of charge on cargo- demonstrates that there is no single the presence of lithium ion batteries
only aircraft; and factor that would preclude the involving the cargo hold of a passenger
• Restrict small lithium cell and possibility of a thermal runaway event aircraft.
battery shipments to one package per for all types of lithium ion batteries. Potential environmental impacts of
consignment or overpack. Therefore, since the information to date each amendment in the IFR are
PHMSA’s selected alternative is the does not provide for a level of surety discussed below:
‘‘full harmonization’’ approach since it that the risk can be fully mitigated, a (1) Prohibit the transport of lithium
aligns with ICAO actions and prohibition on the transport of lithium ion cells and batteries as cargo on
amendments to the ICAO Technical ion batteries as cargo on passenger passenger aircraft.
Instructions described in this aircraft is most suitable option. With Prohibiting lithium ion batteries as
rulemaking. Full harmonization under respect to the prohibition provision, cargo on passenger aircraft will generate
this rulemaking includes all three PHMSA expects that the prohibition on human safety benefits to air operators
amendments above. In addition, this transporting lithium ion batteries on and the public by virtually eliminating
alternative meets the FAA domestic passenger aircraft would result the possibility of (1) an incident
Reauthorization Act of 2018 mandate to in minimal cost impacts on shippers of induced by lithium ion batteries
harmonize with the 2015–2016 ICAO lithium ion batteries and air carriers. shipped as cargo in a passenger aircraft
Technical Instructions for air This is because most U.S. passenger air and (2) a fire exacerbated by the
transportation of lithium cells and carriers have already voluntarily presence of lithium ion batteries
batteries and adopt any further revisions stopped carrying this cargo on their involving the cargo compartment of a
adopted prior to the effective date of the passenger aircraft. passenger aircraft.
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 within • Adopt the 30 percent state of charge Incident-related contaminated debris
90 days of enactment (See Section 333). requirement. PHMSA maintains that the entering the air, water (possible when
This alternative also meets the FAA technical basis for this provision is aircraft make transoceanic flights or a
cargo’s manifest involves a segment of set of requirements for classification, By providing this exception, PHMSA
transportation aboard an ocean vessel), packaging, hazard communication, has considered the needs of individuals
and soil media would be avoided or handling, stowage, etc., thereby who require the replacement of lithium
mitigated and thus benefit the natural minimizing the possibility of ion cells or batteries for medically
environment under this provision. improperly preparing and transporting a necessary purposes as required by the
Additionally, fewer and mitigated consignment of hazardous materials FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
incidents involving lithium batteries because of differences between domestic PHMSA further concludes that the
will result in less contaminated debris and international regulations. amendment, which will increase
to be landfilled. PHMSA expects that Greenhouse gas emissions would standardization and consistency of
the prohibition on transporting lithium remain the same under this amendment. regulations, will also result in greater
ion batteries on domestic passenger (2) Require all lithium ion cells and protection of human health and the
aircraft will have an incremental benefit batteries to be shipped at not more than environment. Consistency between U.S.
to human safety and the environment a 30 percent state of charge on cargo- and international transportation
over the current state since most U.S. only aircraft. requirements enhances the safety and
passenger air carriers have already Requiring all lithium ion cells and environmental protection of
voluntarily stopped carrying this cargo batteries on cargo-only aircraft to be international hazardous materials
on their passenger aircraft. shipped at not more than a 30 percent transportation through:
PHMSA acknowledges that the state of charge will provide safety • Better understanding of the
medical device exception poses an benefits to air cargo operators and the regulations;
increase in safety risk and public by reducing the available energy • An increased level of industry
environmental risk due to the dangers and limiting the propagation of heat and awareness and hence, compliance;
posed by lithium ion cells and batteries. fire in the event of thermal runaway in • The smooth flow of hazardous
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 lithium ion cells and batteries. The FAA materials from their points of origin to
requires the implementation of a Technical Center report, Summary of their points of destination; and
medical device exception but did not FAA Studies Related to the Hazards • Consistent emergency response in
fully specify how the exception applies. Produced by Lithium Cells in Thermal the event of a hazardous materials
By providing this exception, PHMSA Runaway in Aircraft Cargo incident.
has considered the needs of individuals Compartments, FAA Report DOT/FAA/ Enhanced environmental protection
who require the replacement of lithium TC–16/37, June 2016, found that ‘‘the will also be achieved through more
ion cells or batteries for medically volume of gases emitted by lithium ion targeted and effective training. This
necessary purposes as required by the cells in thermal runaway is dependent amendment will eliminate inconsistent
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. on the state of charge of the cell. Higher hazardous materials regulations, which
PHMSA further concludes that this states of charge yield greater volumes of hamper compliance training efforts. For
amendment, which will increase flammable gases. Reducing the state of ease of compliance with appropriate
standardization and consistency of charge of lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 regulations, air carriers engaged in the
regulations, will result in greater cells to thirty percent or less resulted in transportation of hazardous materials
protection of human health and the a less energetic thermal runaway event generally elect to comply with the ICAO
environment. Consistency between U.S. and greatly reduced the likelihood of Technical Instructions, as appropriate.
and international transportation thermal propagation from cell to cell.’’ By maintaining consistency between
requirements enhances the safety and As such, the state of charge requirement these international regulations and the
environmental protection of in this rulemaking will serve to mitigate HMR, shippers and carriers are able to
international hazardous materials the likelihood of thermal propagation train their hazmat employees in a single
transportation through: for lithium ion cells stored in cargo set of requirements for classification,
• Better understanding of the holds of cargo-only aircraft, particularly packaging, hazard communication,
regulations; for lithium ion 18650 LiCoO2 cells, by handling, stowage, etc., thereby
• An increased level of industry preventing propagation of thermal minimizing the possibility of
awareness and hence, compliance; runaway. improperly preparing and transporting a
• The smooth flow of hazardous In addition to human safety benefits, consignment of hazardous materials
materials from their points of origin to incident-related contaminated debris because of differences between domestic
their points of destination; and entering the air, water (possible when and international regulations.
• Consistent emergency response in aircraft make transoceanic flights or a Greenhouse gas emissions would
the event of a hazardous materials cargo’s manifest involves a segment of remain the same under this amendment.
incident. transportation aboard an ocean vessel), (3) Restrict the number of packages
Protections for human safety and and soil media would be avoided or that may be offered under current
environmental protection will also be mitigated and thus benefit the natural provisions for small cells and batteries
enhanced through more targeted and environment under this provision. to one package per consignment or
effective training. This amendment will Additionally, fewer and mitigated overpack.
eliminate inconsistent hazardous incidents involving lithium batteries Restricting each consignment and
materials regulations, which hamper will result in less contaminated debris overpack to one package will provide
compliance training efforts. For ease of to be landfilled. human safety benefits to air cargo
compliance with appropriate PHMSA acknowledges that the operators and the public by addressing
regulations, air carriers engaged in the medical device exception poses an the fire hazards associated with
transportation of hazardous materials increase in safety risk and shipping large quantities of small
generally elect to comply with the ICAO environmental risk due to the dangers lithium cells and batteries, which were
Technical Instructions, as appropriate. posed by lithium ion cells and batteries. previously being consolidated in
By maintaining consistency between The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 overpack pallets, in single unit load
these international regulations and the requires the implementation of a devices and in single aircraft cargo
HMR, shippers and carriers are able to medical device exception but did not compartments. Under this provision, air
train their hazmat employees in a single fully specify how the exception applies. cargo operators will be able to more
accurately control the number of Greenhouse gas emissions would deaths, injuries, and environmental
batteries loaded on an aircraft and thus remain the same under this amendment. contamination through smaller, more
prevent fires that could result in injuries Alternative 1: No Action Alternative: controlled consignments, whereas the
and loss of life. The number of Under the No Action Alternative, Partial Harmonization Alternative will
consignments and paperwork for air current regulations would remain in not offer these protections.
operators and offerors will increase with place, and PHMSA would not add new
only one package allowed per provisions to the HMR. Not adopting the 4. Agencies Consulted
consignment. However, the additional environmental and safety requirements
PHMSA has coordinated with the
amount of administrative work is in the IFR under the No Action
FAA in the development of this
expected to be small and would be Alternative would result in a lost
rulemaking.
offset by the much greater savings in opportunity for reducing the number of
avoided and mitigated incidents. and mitigating the damage from 5. Finding of No Significant Impact
In addition to human safety benefits, environmental and safety-related
incident-related contaminated debris incidents. The requirements in this IFR reduce
entering the air, water (possible when Additionally, efficiencies gained the likelihood of lithium batteries
aircraft make transoceanic flights or a through harmonization in updates to causing or contributing to accidents on
cargo’s manifest involves a segment of transport standards would not be a cargo-only aircraft and virtually
transportation aboard an ocean vessel), realized. Foregone efficiencies in the No eliminate the likelihood on passenger
and soil media would be avoided or Action Alternative include freeing up aircraft. This rulemaking would reduce
mitigated and thus benefit the natural limited resources to concentrate on air the possibility of an incident on
environment under this provision. transport hazard communication issues passenger aircraft by prohibiting the
Additionally, fewer and mitigated of potentially much greater transportation of lithium ion batteries as
incidents involving lithium batteries environmental impact. Greenhouse gas cargo on passenger flights. Secondly,
will result in less contaminated debris emissions would remain the same under reducing the charge of lithium ion
to be landfilled. the No Action Alternative. batteries has been shown to reduce the
PHMSA further concludes that the Alternative 2: Partial Harmonization likelihood of thermal runaway, thereby
amendment, which will increase Alternative: reducing the likelihood of a lithium
standardization and consistency of Under the Partial Harmonization battery fire on aircraft. Finally, the
regulations, will also result in greater Alternative, PHMSA would adopt the restriction of a consignment or overpack
protection of human health and the passenger aircraft prohibition provision, to one package is intended to ensure
environment. Consistency between U.S. as well as the 30 percent state of charge that consignments that currently meet
and international transportation provision into the HMR. The Partial the letter of, but not the spirit of, the
requirements enhances the safety and Harmonization Alternative does not, alternative hazard communication
environmental protection of however, include the consignment and provisions are shipped and labeled as
international hazardous materials overpack provision. Improvements in Class 9 hazardous material.
transportation through: human safety and reduction in potential
In response to the hazard posed by the
• Better understanding of the for environmental impacts from an
transport of lithium ion batteries by air,
regulations; incident under this alternative would
and recent developments in the
• An increased level of industry therefore lie somewhere between the No
international community, these
awareness and hence, compliance; Action Alternative and those in the IFR.
amendments are intended to promote
• The smooth flow of hazardous Referring to the regulation portion of the
probable environmental impacts section environmental protection, safety,
materials from their points of origin to
above, the same increases in human international harmonization, and
their points of destination; and
• Consistent emergency response in safety and reduction in potential for clarity. These regulatory revisions will
the event of a hazardous materials environment impacts from an incident offer more efficient and effective ways
incident. would occur for human safety and the of achieving PHMSA’s goal of safe and
Enhanced environmental protection environment as those discussed under secure transportation, protecting both
will also be achieved through more provisions (1) and (2). Similarly, as people and the environment from
targeted and effective training. This discussed under provisions (1) and (2), hazardous materials in commerce.
amendment will eliminate inconsistent PHMSA acknowledges that there are The IFR provides more protection to
hazardous materials regulations, which some safety and environmental risks to human health and the environment than
hamper compliance training efforts. For allowing the transportation of lithium the ‘‘No Action’’ and ‘‘Partial
ease of compliance with appropriate cells and batteries for the purposes of Harmonization’’ Alternatives discussed
regulations, air carriers engaged in the medically necessary care, with the above. The IFR thus comprises the most
transportation of hazardous materials approval of the Associate Administrator, environmentally preferable alternative.
generally elect to comply with the ICAO on passenger aircraft and at a state of The provisions of this IFR build on
Technical Instructions, as appropriate. charge greater than 30 percent, but that current regulatory requirements to
By maintaining consistency between those risks are outweighed by the enhance the transportation safety and
these international regulations and the benefits to those individuals needing security of consignments of hazardous
HMR, shippers and carriers are able to the replacement lithium cells and materials transported by aircraft,
train their hazmat employees in a single batteries for their medical devices. thereby reducing the risks of an
set of requirements for classification, Those human safety and environmental accidental or intentional release of
packaging, hazard communication, benefits discussed under provision (3) hazardous materials and consequent
handling, stowage, etc., thereby would not be expected to occur. environmental damage. PHMSA
minimizing the possibility of The main difference between the therefore believes that the net
improperly preparing and transporting a Partial Harmonization Alternative and environmental impact will be slightly
consignment of hazardous materials the regulation’s environmental benefits positive. PHMSA finds that there are no
because of differences between domestic is that the regulation will allow for significant environmental impacts
and international regulations. better control of fires and consequent associated with this IFR.
K. Privacy Act (Pub. L. 103–465), prohibits Federal Incorporation by reference, Labeling,

Anyone may search the electronic agencies from establishing any Markings, Packaging and containers,
form of written communications and standards or engaging in related Reporting and recordkeeping
comments received into any of our activities that create unnecessary requirements.
dockets by the name of the individual obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. For purposes of these 49 CFR Part 173
submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an requirements, Federal agencies may
Hazardous materials transportation,
association, business, labor union, etc.). participate in the establishment of
Incorporation by reference, Packaging
The DOT posts these comments, international standards, so long as the
standards have a legitimate domestic and containers, Radioactive materials,
without edit, including any personal Reporting and recordkeeping
information the commenter provides, to objective, such as providing for safety,
and do not operate to exclude imports requirements, Uranium.
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL– that meet this objective. The statute also In consideration of the foregoing,
14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at requires consideration of international PHMSA amends 49 CFR chapter I as
www.dot.gov/privacy. standards and, where appropriate, that follows:
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
L. Executive Order 13609 and PHMSA participates in the PART 172—HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
International Trade Analysis establishment of international standards TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS,
Under Executive Order 13609, in order to protect the safety of the HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
agencies must consider whether the American public, and we have assessed COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY
impacts associated with significant the effects of the IFR to ensure that it
RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
variations between domestic and does not cause unnecessary obstacles to
foreign trade. In this case, the IFR will REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY
international regulatory approaches are PLANS
unnecessary or may impair the ability of fully harmonize U.S. lithium battery
American business to export and provisions with the ICAO international
standards. Further, the DOT engaged the ■ 1. The authority citation for part 172
compete internationally. In meeting
public by highlighting the provisions of continues to read as follows:
shared challenges involving health,
safety, labor, security, environmental, this IFR in a domestic public meeting Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49
and other issues, international prior to their adoption. DOT also CFR 1.81, 1.97.
regulatory cooperation can identify requested comments from stakeholders
approaches that are at least as protective on the effect of these provisions. ■ 2. In § 172.101, the Hazardous
as those that are or would be adopted in Accordingly, this rulemaking is Materials Table is amended by revising
the absence of such cooperation. consistent with Executive Order 13609 the entry for ‘‘Lithium ion batteries
International regulatory cooperation can and PHMSA’s obligations under the including lithium ion polymer
also reduce, eliminate, or prevent Trade Agreement Act, as amended. batteries’’ to read as follows:
unnecessary differences in regulatory List of Subjects
requirements. § 172.101 Purpose and use of the
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act 49 CFR Part 172 hazardous materials table.
of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by Education, Hazardous materials * * * * *
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act transportation, Hazardous waste,
(8) (9) (10)
Hazardous Packaging Quantity limitations Vessel

materials Hazard Special (§ 173.* * *) (see §§ 173.27 and stowage
Identification Label
Symbols descriptions class or PG provisions 175.75)
No. codes
and proper division (§ 172.102)
shipping names Non- Passenger Cargo Loca-
Exceptions Bulk Other
bulk aircraft/ aircraft tion
rail only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8A) (8B) (8C) (9A) (9B) (10A) (10B)
* * * * * * *
......... Lithium ion bat- 9 UN3480 ...... .......... 9 422, A54, 185 ........... 185 ... 185 ... Forbidden 35 kg ........ A ......
teries includ- A100.
ing lithium ion
polymer bat-
teries.
* * * * * * *
■ 3. In § 172.102, in paragraph (c)(2), A51 For aircraft batteries, irrespective accordance with this special provision
revise special provision A51 and add of the quantity limitations specified in must be noted on the shipping paper.
special provision A100 in appropriate Column (9A) of the § 172.101 Table or * * * * *
alphanumerical order to read as follows: § 175.75(c), wet cell batteries, UN2794 A100 Lithium ion cells and batteries
§ 172.102 Special Provisions.
or UN2795, up to a limit of 100 kg net must be offered for transport at a state
mass per package may be transported of charge not exceeding 30 percent of
* * * * * aboard passenger aircraft. Transport in their rated capacity. Lithium ion cells
(c) * * * and batteries at a state of charge greater
(2) * * * than 30 percent of their rated capacity
may only be transported under ‘‘LITHIUM ION BATTERIES— consignment limit described in
conditions approved by the Associate FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section is
Administrator in accordance with the ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’ or subject to all applicable requirements of
requirements in 49 CFR part 107, labeled with a ‘‘CARGO AIRCRAFT this subchapter, except that a package
subpart H. Guidance and methodology ONLY’’ label specified in § 172.448 of containing no more than 2.5 kg lithium
for determining the rated capacity can this subchapter. metal cells or batteries or 10 kg lithium
be found in sub-section 38.3.2.3 of the * * * * * ion cells or batteries is not subject to the
UN Manual of Tests and Criteria (IBR, (4) * * * UN performance packaging
see § 171.7 of this subchapter). (ii) Not more than one package requirements in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of
* * * * * prepared in accordance with this this section when the package displays
paragraph (c)(4) may be placed into an both the lithium battery mark in
PART 173—SHIPPERS—GENERAL overpack. When a package displays the paragraph (c)(3)(i) and the Class 9 label.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS ‘‘CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY’’ label, the This paragraph does not apply to
AND PACKAGINGS paragraph (c)(1)(iii) mark, or the batteries or cells packed with or
paragraph (c)(3)(i) lithium battery mark contained in equipment.
■ 4. The authority citation for part 173 and is placed in an overpack, the
continues to read as follows: appropriate label or mark must either be * * * * *
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101–5128, 44701; 49 clearly visible through the overpack, or (g) Limited exceptions to restrictions
CFR 1.81, 1.97. the label or mark must also be affixed on air transportation of medical device
■ 5. In § 173.185: on the outside of the overpack, and the batteries. Irrespective of the quantity
■ a. Revise the introductory text and overpack must be marked with the word limitations described in column 9A of
paragraphs (c)(1)(iii) and (c)(4)(ii) ‘‘OVERPACK’’. the § 172.101 Hazardous Materials Table
through (vi); (iii) A shipper is not permitted to offer of this subchapter, up to two
■ b. Add paragraphs (c)(4)(vii) and for transport more than one package replacement lithium cells or batteries
(c)(5); prepared in accordance with the specifically used for a medical device as
■ c. Redesignate paragraph (g) as provisions of this paragraph in any defined in this section may be
paragraph (h); and single consignment. transported as cargo on a passenger
■ d. Add new paragraph (g). (iv) Each shipment with packages aircraft. Packages containing these cells
The revisions and additions read as required to display the paragraph or batteries are not subject to the
follows: (c)(3)(i) lithium battery mark must marking requirement in paragraph
include an indication on the air waybill
§ 173.185 Lithium cells and batteries. (c)(1)(iii) of this section or the ‘‘CARGO
of compliance with this paragraph (c)(4)
As used in this section, consignment AIRCRAFT ONLY’’ label required by
(or the applicable ICAO Technical
means one or more packages of Instructions Packing Instruction), when § 172.402(c) of this subchapter and may
hazardous materials accepted by an an air waybill is used. be transported as cargo on a passenger
operator from one shipper at one time (v) Packages and overpacks of lithium aircraft when approved by the Associate
and at one address, receipted for in one batteries prepared in accordance with Administrator and provided the
lot and moving to one consignee at one this paragraph (c)(4) must be offered to following conditions are met:
destination address. Equipment means the operator separately from cargo (1) The intended destination of the
the device or apparatus for which the which is not subject to the requirements cells or batteries is not serviced daily by
lithium cells or batteries will provide of this subchapter and must not be cargo aircraft if a cell or battery is
electrical power for its operation. loaded into a unit load device before required for medically necessary care;
Lithium cell(s) or battery(ies) includes being offered to the operator. and
both lithium metal and lithium ion (vi) For lithium batteries packed with,
chemistries. Medical device means an (2) Lithium ion cells or batteries for
or contained in, equipment, the number
instrument, apparatus, implement, of batteries in each package is limited to medical devices are excepted from the
machine, contrivance, implant, or in the minimum number required to power state of charge limitations in § 172.102,
vitro reagent, including any component, the piece of equipment, plus two spares, special provision A100, of this
part, or accessory thereof, which is and the total net quantity (mass) of the subchapter, provided each cell or
intended for use in the diagnosis of lithium cells or batteries in the battery is:
disease or other conditions, or in the completed package must not exceed 5 (i) Individually packed in an inner
cure, mitigation, treatment, or kg. packaging that completely encloses the
prevention of disease, of a person. (vii) Each person who prepares a cell or battery;
* * * * * package for transport containing lithium (ii) Placed in a rigid outer packaging;
(c) * * * cells or batteries, including cells or
and
(1) * * * batteries packed with, or contained in,
(iii) Except when lithium cells or equipment in accordance with the (iii) Protected to prevent short
batteries are packed with or contained conditions and limitations of this circuits.
in equipment in quantities not paragraph (c)(4), must receive * * * * *
exceeding 5 kg net weight, the outer instruction on these conditions and
Issued in Washington, DC on February 27,
package that contains lithium cells or limitations, corresponding to their
2019, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
batteries must be appropriately marked: functions. part 1.97.
‘‘PRIMARY LITHIUM BATTERIES— (5) For transportation by aircraft, a
FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT package that exceeds the number or Howard R. Elliott,
ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’, quantity (mass) limits in the table Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
‘‘LITHIUM METAL BATTERIES— shown in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this Materials Safety Administration.
FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT section, the overpack limit described in [FR Doc. 2019–03812 Filed 3–5–19; 8:45 am]
ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT’’, paragraph (c)(4)(ii) of this section, or the BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

HM-224I Interim Final Rule - Lithium Batteries

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HM-224I Interim Final Rule - Lithium Batteries

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8006 Federal Register / Vol. 84, No.

44 / Wednesday, March 6, 2019 / Rules and Regulations

Total ..................... ......................................................................... ......................................................................... 10-Year: $46,633,487

features. Multidisciplinary.aspx. December 7–11, 2015; AIRP/3–WP/21.

Total ..................... ......................................................................... ......................................................................... 10-Year: $46,633,487.

K. Privacy Act (Pub. L. 103–465), prohibits Federal Incorporation by reference, Labeling,

Hazardous Packaging Quantity limitations Vessel

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