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WAR, SOCIETY AND ENLIGHTENMENT
HISTORY
OF WARFARE
General Editor
kelly devries
Loyola College
Founding Editors
theresa vann
paul chevedden
VOLUME 32
60 chapter two
Major General Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (c. 1729-1783). Reproduction

by permission of the Syndics of the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.
WAR, SOCIETY AND
ENLIGHTENMENT
The Works of General Lloyd
EDITED BY
PATRICK J. SPEELMAN
BRILL
LEIDEN BOSTON
•
2005
On the cover: General Henry Lloyd. Detail of map 18 (page 606) “The Battle of Zornsdorf.”
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A C.I.P. record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISSN 1385–7827
ISBN 90 04 14410 2
© Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

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printed in the netherlands

To Jennifer
for her patience, support and exuberance

CONTENTS
List of Illustrations and Maps .................................................. ix

Illustrations .............................................................................. ix
Maps ........................................................................................ x
Editor’s Preface .......................................................................... xiii
Acknowledgements ...................................................................... xvii
I. The History of the Late War in Germany,

Vol. I (1766) ........................................................................ 1
II. An Essay on the English Constitution (1770) .................. 185
III. An Essay on the Theory of Money (1771) ...................... 257
IV. A Rhapsody on the Present System of French Politics;
on the Projected Invasion, and the Means to Defeat
It (1779) ................................................................................ 323
V. Continuation of the History of the Late War in
Germany, between the King of Prussia, and the
Empress of Germany and Her Allies, Part II (1781) ...... 375
VI. The History of the Late War in Germany, between
the King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany
and Her Allies: Containing the Campaigns of 1758
and 1759, Vol. II (1790) .................................................... 535
Index ............................................................................................ 739

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
Illustrations
1. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army,

October 1, 1756 .................................................................. 68
2. Order of Battle of the Austrian Army,
October 1, 1756 .................................................................. 69
3. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army Commanded
by the King, May 4, 1757 ................................................ 94
4. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army under the
Command of Marshal Schwerin, May 4, 1757 .............. 95
5. Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, under the
Command of his Royal Highness Prince Charles
of Lorraine, May 6, 1757 .................................................. 98
6. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army at Colin,
June 18, 1757 ...................................................................... 116
7. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army,
December 5, 1757 .............................................................. 171
8. Plate II ................................................................................ 358
9. Plate III ................................................................................ 365
10. The Military Roads from Plymouth to London .............. 372
11. Military Roads from Portsmouth to London;
Branches between Plymouth and Exeter .......................... 373
12. Plate I (Figs. 1–5) ................................................................ 417
13. Plate II (Figs. 1–2) .............................................................. 427
14. Plate III (Figs. 1–2) ............................................................ 432
15. Plate IV (Figs. 1–10) .......................................................... 481
16. Plate V ................................................................................ 497
17. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army Commanded
by the King in Person, in the Beginning of May 1758,
when it entered Moravia .................................................... 548
18. Various Orders of Battle of Prussian Armies, Corps,
and Detachments in 1758 .................................................. 549
19. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army commanded by
the King in the Camp of Königsgrätz, July 14, 1758 .... 592
x list of illustrations and maps
20. A List of the Austrian Forces under Marshal Daun,

2 August, 1758 .................................................................... 596
21. Order of Battle of the Russian Army at Zornsdorf,
on the 25th August, 1758 .................................................. 602
22. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army commanded by
His Majesty at Zornsdorf, August the 25th, 1758 .......... 603
23. Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, under the
Orders of his Excellency Field Marechal Leopold,
Comte de Daun, on the 7th of July, 1759 ...................... 680
24. Order of Battle of the Austrian Army, commanded
by H.E. Field Marshal Leopold Count de Daun,
on the 4th of October, 1759, at Heyda in Saxony ........ 690
25. Order of Battle of Prince Henry’s Army at Strehlin
Camp, on the 5th of October, 1759 ................................ 691
26. List of the Prussian Forces at the Battle of
Kunersdorf, 1759 ................................................................ 717
list of illustrations and maps xi
Maps
1. A Map of Part of the Seat of War in Germany

between the Prussians and the Austrians begun
in 1756 .......................................................................... 58–59
2. Plan of the battle of Lowositz fought on the
1st of October between the Prussians commanded
by the King & the Austrians commanded by
M. Brown & won by the former .............................. 73
3. Battle of Prague. Fought May 6th 1757, Between
the Prussians Commanded by the King and the
Austrians, commanded by Pr. Charles of Lorrain,
and won by the former .............................................. 104–105
4. Plan of the Battle of Chotzemitz. Fought on
the 18th of June 1757, Between the Prussians
Commanded by the King and the Austrians
Commanded by Marshal Daun, and won by
the Latter ...................................................................... 120
5. Plan of the Battle of Rosbach between the
Combined Army & the Prussians Commanded
by the King in Person the 5th Nov. 1757 .............. 144
6. Battle of Breslaw fought the 22d of Novem. 1757,
between the Austrians Commanded by P. Charles
of Lorrain and the Prussians, Commanded by the
P. of Bevern, and Won by the Former .................... 161
7. Plan of the battle of Lissa or Leuthen, fought
on the 5th Decem. 1757, between the Prussians
Commanded by the King, and the Austrians
Commanded by P. Charles of Lorrain, and
won by the Former .................................................... 172
8. Plan of the Battle of Gros Jagersdorff in Prussia,
fought on the 30th of August 1757, between the
Russians, Commanded by M. Apraxin and the
Prussians, Commanded by M. Lewhald, and
Won by the Former .................................................... 180
9. Plate I: A Military Sketch of the Line to Defend
from Plymouth to Dover ............................................ 354–355
10. Map of France ............................................................ 502–503
xii list of illustrations and maps
11. Map of Germany ...................................................... 510–511

12. Hungary and Transilvania with Slavonia and
Croatia .......................................................................... 514–515
13. Turkey in Europe ........................................................ 520–521
14. The Russian Empire in Europe ................................ 524–525
15. Map of Poland ............................................................ 528–529
16. A Map of the Theatre of the King of Prussia’s
Campaigns: fold-out following page .......................... 542
17. Plan of the Siege of Ollmutz by the Prussian Army,
Commanded by F.M. Keith, from 20th May to
1st July, 1758 .............................................................. 565
18. The Battle of Zornsdorf, on the 25th of August
1758 .............................................................................. 606–609
19. Plan of the Battle of Hochkirchen, October 14th,
1758 .............................................................................. 634–637
20. Battle of Palzig, July 23rd, 1759 ................................ 656–657
21. Plan of the Battle of Cunersdorf, August 12th,
1759 .............................................................................. 666–667
22. Plan of the Affair near Maxen, 20th and 21st
November, 1759 .......................................................... 696–698
EDITOR’S PREFACE
Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (c. 1729–83) is arguably the most

important military thinker of the Age of the Enlightenment. Under
the banners of Spain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, he plied
his trade, rising from the ranks of the engineers to become a major
general. This resumé is noteworthy (even in an era of tenuous national
loyalties and associations) for Lloyd’s commoner status precluded a
stable, uniform military career. Perhaps the social barriers against
which he struggled provided the genesis for his iconoclastic military
writings. Yet his interests extended far beyond the study of his cho-
sen profession: he wrote on politics, economics, and human psy-
chology. No contemporary can boast a broader military experience
coupled with a more extensive intellectual creativity than this enig-
matic Welshman. He alone among noteworthy contemporaries fused
experience and philosophy to form a comprehensive enlightened the-
ory of war and society. Before Clausewitz there was Lloyd.
His life is one of legend.1 Scion of a Welsh gentry family, he
received an Oxford education and seemed destined to follow his
father’s footsteps into the Church. But Lloyd wanted a military life:
a path that required property, income, and influence. His mother’s
remarriage all but squandered those assets as his inheritance trans-
ferred to his stepfather. Young, poor, and possessing a zeal for adven-
ture and a classical heroic outlook, he left Wales to seek his fortune
on the European continent. He found only obstacles to his ambi-
tion. Taken in and educated by Jesuits, who paid his debts accrued
during a Berlin sojourn, again he seemed destined for a religious
vocation. His goals however conflicted with the order’s mission: a
martial life remained his nemesis. Employment in Spain introduced
the refugee to military engineering and education under the Marques
de la Mina. Future prospects appeared dim, so Lloyd, a restless spirit,
traveled to northeastern France in the early 1740s where he taught
1
For a detailed study of his life and writings see, Patrick J. Speelman, Henry
Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe, foreword by Dennis
Showalter, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 221 (Westport, Connecticut &
London: Greenwood Press, 2002).
xiv editor’s preface
at a Jesuit school. In this capacity he may have remained unknown

to history, but the fortunes of war intervened.
Lloyd favored rebellion. A Jacobite in 1744 he joined a group of
like-minded Scots in French service. With them he found himself
swept into the maelstrom of military life. After fighting as a ‘volun-
teer’ at the battle of Fontenoy (1745) under the revered Maurice,
comte de Saxe, he joined Bonnie Prince Charlie’s tragic 1745 inva-
sion of Britain. He served as a liaison between the Young Pretender’s
army and local Welsh Jacobites. Arrested by authorities and incar-
cerated in London; he thereby escaped the fate of his comrades at
Culloden (1746). Upon rejoining the French army in 1747 he fought
at the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom (1747). After the war Lloyd floated
between the French and Prussian service. The Seven Years’ War
(1756–63) transformed the itinerant officer into a military thinker.
He joined the Austrian army’s Staff Corps under Franz Moritz, Graf
von Lacy in 1758. Rising to the rank of captain in the staff ’s light
infantry, he resigned his commission in 1761 out of frustration and
disagreements with superiors. The rest of the war found him in the
service of Brunswick, Prussia’s ally, as an aid-de-camp to the Hereditary
Prince Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand.
Lloyd emerged from the conflict an apostate. Where once he
advanced the divine right of kings, the Bourbon dynasty, and hier-
archical tradition, he now railed against French aspirations of hege-
mony, political injustice, and the tyranny of tradition. He transformed
his Jacobite romanticism into an intellectual rebellion: he became an
enlightened thinker. As such he also became a military philosophe,
who sought to explain and analyze war using the new conceptual
outlook of the Age of the Enlightenment. During this period he pub-
lished his History of the Late War in Germany (1766), Essay on the English
Constitution (1770), and Essay on the Theory of Money (1771). The first
stands as a proto-type for operational military history and prefigures
the development of the principles of war in the West. The latter two
works reflect the emergence of his political and economic theories
tied to utilitarian psychology and emerging liberal pretensions. For
his efforts he had received the honorary commission of Major General
from the Elector of Cologne. But he never received a British commis-
sion, and instead settled upon being a secret agent for George III.
In 1768 he supported Pasquale Paoli’s Corsican revolt against France
and traveled widely gathering intelligence and information for the
British government.
editor’s preface xv
In 1772 Lloyd accepted the commission of Major General from

Catherine the Great of Russia, who was bogged down in the Turkish
war. Lloyd helped plan and took part in the decisive campaign of
1774. He commanded the Russian division that besieged Silistria,
which enabled the army under General Petr Rumiantsev to deliver
a fatal blow against the Ottomans at Shumla. Peace soon followed,
but not for Lloyd. Intrigues within the Russian court compelled him
to leave Catherine’s service. He settled in the Austrian Netherlands
until the American Revolution (which he predicted in an earlier writ-
ing) drew him back into the stream of events. In 1779 it was Lloyd
who warned Lord North’s government of the impending Franco-
Spanish naval invasion. His earlier Jacobite exploits had convinced
him of the doubtful prospects of such an expedition. He attempted
to publish a pamphlet to that effect. The government suppressed it
in part due to its detailed information about the defense of south-
ern England but also because of its caustic criticism of the high com-
mand’s direction of the war in North America. His impertinence
cost him command of the Loyalist troops in America, and Lloyd
resumed retirement in the Austrian Netherlands.
In 1781 he published his magnum opus, Continuation of the Late War
in Germany. Not a continuation of the operational history published
in 1766, this book is actually the culmination of a lifetime of rumi-
nations on war, society, and philosophy. It contains his analysis of
contemporary practices as well as proposals for a new system of tac-
tics and operations. The psychological and moral forces of soldiers
and officers, especially the idea of genius, occupy a significant posi-
tion in his enlightened theory of war: as does the political context
of conflict and the effect that politics exert on warfare in general.
Although he did not live long enough to defend or elaborate his
ideas (he died in 1783), this treatise stands at the apex of enlight-
ened literature on warfare. His overall body of work represents the
first British synthesis of military theory.
The following is a compilation of General Lloyd’s published works.
Until now historians have relied on the original editions (or facsimile
reprints), often store-housed in rare book and special collection libraries
and therefore difficult to access. The most recent (and only English)
editions of his History of the Late War in Germany and his philosophy
of war were published in 1781—during his lifetime. Economists more
so than historians have occasionally paid attention to his Essay on the
Theory of Money. Edizioni Bizzarri issued a photo-reproduced edition
xvi editor’s preface
in 1968, the first since 1771. His Essay on the English Constitution,
obscure in his own day due to its anonymity, is not even catalogued
under his name in the few libraries that own a copy of this rare
political tract. Of all his works the study of the invasion and defense
of Great Britain received the most posthumous attention. During the
Napoleonic wars it went through six new editions in the government’s
public relations campaign to reassure a frightened populace that a
French invasion would fail (a French edition used Lloyd’s analysis
to argue the contrary). If Lloyd is a relatively unknown figure today
it is in large part due to the general unavailability of his writings.
Lloyd’s six published works comprise this volume, arranged in the
order of their publication. Although a logical layout, one still might
find it odd that the two volumes on the Seven Years’ War, of sim-
ilar subject matter, are bookends to the overall edition. But the reader
should be able to trace Lloyd’s overall intellectual development rather
than be presented with an artificial arrangement. This is especially
important for eighteenth-century intellectuals who dabbled in several
spheres of study and saw no real divisions between them. The essence
of the original editions has been preserved, except for obvious typo-
graphical errors overlooked or ignored by the previous publishers.
Lloyd’s frequent misspellings are left intact as is his awkward gram-
mar and style. Numbered footnotes contain all editorial corrections,
commentary, and explanation except when added between brackets
within the text. Each book’s introductory essay provides context and
information otherwise absent from the texts themselves.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following compilation is a direct outgrowth of my earlier work

on General Lloyd. It seemed natural to me to edit and publish his
writings so as to make them accessible again to a larger audience.
After fours years, several residences, and dozens of hours at the com-
puter typing the text and scanning the images, it is clear that there
are innumerable people who demand my gratitude and thanks.
The Inter-library loan staffs at Temple University and the College
of Charleston are first on the list, since they acquired the microfilmed
editions from which I worked—and on numerous occasions retrieved
them a second and third time. The Special Collections Library at
the University of South Carolina provided scanned copies of several
maps which were less than legible on microfilm. But most of all I
wish to thank those who provided moral support for this project and
much else; especially Dr. Mark H. Danley of the University of Mem-
phis, who like myself, is wedded to the eighteenth-century.
Special gratitude goes to my mentor, the late Dr. Russell F. Weigley,
whose encouragement sustained me when publishing seemed unlikely.
His loss is a great loss to the historical profession as a whole. Last,
I must give thanks to my wife, Dr. Jennifer Speelman of the Citadel,
for her support; especially the time she gave me while I endlessly
transcribed paragraphs and edited maps and figures late into the
night and early morning hours. To her this volume is dedicated. All
shortcomings here within, mistakes of omission or commission, are
mine alone. I hope they do not detract from the value of this work.
I
THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR

IN GERMANY, VOL. I (1766)
CONTENTS
Editor’s Introduction .................................................................. 5

Author’s Dedication .................................................................... 9
Preface ........................................................................................ 11
Reflections on the General Principles of War; and on
the Composition and Characters of the Different
Armies in Europe .............................................................. 13
Preliminary Discourse ................................................................ 32
Of France ................................................................................ 32
Of Austria .............................................................................. 35
Of Prussia ................................................................................ 36
Of Saxony .............................................................................. 38
Of Russia ................................................................................ 38
Of Sweden .............................................................................. 40
A Military Description of the Seat of War ............................ 42
Of Bohemia and Moravia .................................................... 42
Of Silesia and the County of Glatz .................................... 52
Of Saxony and Lusace .......................................................... 60
Campaign of 1756 ...................................................................... 64
Campaign of 1757 ...................................................................... 88
Reflections .............................................................................. 92
Reflections on the Battle of Kollin ...................................... 127
Reflections .............................................................................. 149
Reflections on the Battle of Breslaw, and the Preceding
Operations .......................................................................... 162
Reflections on the Battle of Lissa [Leuthen], and the
Preceding Operations ........................................................ 175
Operations of the War in Prussia, between the Prussians
and the Russians ................................................................ 178
Reflections .............................................................................. 182
Operations of the War in Pomerania, between the
Prussians and the Swedes .................................................. 184
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
Lloyd’s first historical treatise, The History of the Late War in Germany,
Vol. 1 (1766), reflects both his experiences in the Austrian Army
during the Seven Years’ War and his burgeoning enlightened out-
look, which attempted to distill the natural laws of warfare into basic
principles of organization and action. The first significant contem-
porary analysis of the Seven Years’ War, John Houlding considers
it ‘unquestionably one of the best pieces of analytical military his-
tory to be written in the English language.’1
The European war began in 1756, but Lloyd did not see action
until 1758. Recommendations from Joseph Wenzel Laurenz, Fürst
von Liechtenstein and the Archbishop of Vienna, Christoph
Bartholomäus Anton, Graf von Migazzi zu Wall und Sonnenthurn,
secured a lieutenant’s commission in Franz Moritz, Graf von Lacy’s
Generalquartiermeister corps. Under Lacy’s leadership Lloyd excelled as
staff officer, scout, and operational planner. He saw action at Hochkirch
and Maxen in particular, but was also privy to the official reports
of battles which he used to supplement his own analysis of the cam-
paigns. Accordingy to his comrade and fellow staff officer, the Italian
nobleman Pietro Verri, Lloyd was a paragon of the military profes-
sional. He intended his history to inform the officers with whom he
served and against whom he fought. In 1760, Lacy promoted Lloyd
to captain in the staff ’s Feld-Jäger-Corps (light infantry). He resigned
the following year after altercations with superiors, thereafter join-
ing the Brunswickian army under Prince Ferdinand.
Lloyd’s methodology was two-fold. He detailed in a narrative fash-
ion the political causes of the war and its chief campaigns in order
to analyze and criticize their conduct. His controversial critique of
Frederick the Great (whom he considered a military genius) as a
flawed statesman whose many mistakes led to the near destruction
of Prussia explains the author’s anonymity. It also triggered a gen-
eral Prussian reaction spearheaded by Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof.2
1
John A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 224.
2
See Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof, Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland
6 i. the late war in germany, vol. 1 (1766)
The narrative itself is an analysis of the operations that culminated

in the great battles of the war, their consequences, and the author’s
reflections on those actions. Lloyd used official accounts by both bel-
ligerents to either provide documentary support for his conclusions
or to demonstrate the often flawed nature of battlefield reports. But
this empirical study paved the way for theoretical speculation in the
form of the principles of war, which he believed permeated war-
making and provided general guidelines for the military comman-
der. Both human agency and geography regulated these principles;
and much of Lloyd’s description reflects an acute understanding of
geography’s relationshop with military campaigns, which he later
expressed in terms of the ‘lines of operation’ upon which an army
acted. As a result, his history stands as the first modern study of
war at the operational level.
The book begins with an introductory essay on the general prin-
ciples of war, also published separately in the Annual Register (1766).
These general principles of war should not be mistaken for the prin-
ciples of warmaking embedded throughout the text. An overview of
Lloyd’s conception of the military profession and the proper princi-
ples relative to preparing for war, they form the nucleus for his later
philosophy of war. Volume one covers only the campaigns of 1756
and 1757. It was reissued (without the introductory essay) in 1781
together with the Continuation of the Late War in Germany, which is not
a continuation of the historical narrative at all. He intimated that
he planned to finish the history and write volumes on the war in
Westphalia and the British campaign in Portugal. But Lloyd had not
completed volume two when he died in 1783. Seven years later the
British officer Colin Lindsay published the manuscript covering the
campaigns of 1758 and 1759. Contemporaries responded favorably
to the first volume. The Monthly Review praised it as being written
by someone ‘highly skilful[sic] in his profession.’3 Pietro Verri and
his fellow Italian philosophes sought copies of the work in part because
they thought highly of Lloyd, who lived in Italy during the late
1760s. Volume one and the posthumous volume two became the
zwischen de, Königen mit ihren Alliirten, vom General Lloyd, 6 vols. (Berlin: J. F. Unger,
1783–1801), and Otto Hermann, Über die Quellen Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges von
Tempelhoff (Berlin: Buchdruckerei von Gustav Schade (Otto Francke, 1885).
3
John Berkenhout, ‘Review of The History of the Late War in Germany,’ The Monthly
Review; or, Literary Journal 35 (August 1766): 87.
editor’s introduction 7
foundation for Henri Jomini’s influential Traité des Grandes Operations

Militaires in the nineteenth century; the operational analyis is directly
derived from Lloyd’s work. Several French and German translations
surfaced in the twenty years following his death and are generally
more numerous than the original English editions, suggesting that
Lloyd’s influence was more widespread outside of Britain than within
his native land.
Publishing History
The History of the Late War in Germany, Between the King of Prussia, and
the Empress of Germany and her Allies. London: Printed for the Author,
and Sold by R. Horsfield, L. Hawes and Co., J. Dodsley, J. Walter,
T. Davies, W. Shropshire, and E. Easton, 1766.
Geschichte des letzten Kriegs in Teutschland; zwischen den Könige von Preussen
und der Kayserin Königin und ihren Alliirten in den Feldzögen in den Jahren
1756 und 1757. Frankfurt und Leipzig: [s.n.], 1777.
The History of the Late War in Germany, between the King of Prussia, and
the Empress of Germany and her Allies. London: Printed for S. Hooper,
1781.
Histoire de la Guerre d’Allemagne en 1756; entre le Roi de Prusse et l’im-
pératrice d’Allemagne et ses Allies. Traduite par le C. Roux Fazillac.
Lausanne: [s.n.], 1784.
Introduction à l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne, en MDCCLVI entre le
Roi de Prusse, et l’Impératrice reine avec ses Alliés, Ou, Mémoires Militaires
et Politiques du Général Lloyd. Traduit et augmenté de notes et d’un
précis la vie & la caractere de ce general. Londres, 1784.
Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem Könige von
Preussen und der Kaiserin Königin mit ihren Alliirten, vom General Lloyd.
2 vols. Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1785–94.
Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du Général Lloyd, ou, Extrait de l’Introduction
a l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1756 entre le Roi de Prusse et
l’Impératrice-reine et ses Alliés. Basle: J. Decker, 1798.
Mémoires Militaires et Politiques du Général Lloyd: servant d’Introduction à
l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1756, entre le Roi de Prusse et
l’Impératrice reine avec ses Alliés. 2 vols. Traduits et augmentes de

notes et d’un precis sur la vie et le caractere de ce general, par
un officier francais. Paris: Magimel, 1801.
Histoire de la Guerre d’Allemagne, pendant les Annees 1756 et suivantes, entre
le Roi de Prusse et l’Imperatrice d’Allemagne et ses Allies. 3 vols. Traduite
en partie de l’anglais de Lloyd, et en partie redigee sur la corre-
spondance originale de plusieurs officers francais et principalement
sur celle de M. de Montazet, par le C. Roux Fazillac. Paris:
Magimel, an XI [1803].
The History of the Seven Years’ War in Germany, by Generals Lloyd and
Tempelhoff; with observations and maxims extracted from the Treatise of great
Military Operations of General Jomini, trans. from the German and
French by Captain Hamilton Smith of the Quarter-Master-General’s
office and published under the authority of His Royal Highness
the Commander in Chief. London: Printed by R. G. Clarke, 1808.
Mémoires Militaires et Politiques du Général Lloyd. Bibliothèque historique
et militaire, tome V. Paris, 1851.
The History of the Late War in Germany, Between the King of Prussia, and
the Empress of Germany and her Allies. (Cambridge: Ken Trotman,
2002). This is a facsimile reprint of the original volume.
To His Most Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Brunswic;
This Volume of the History of the Late War in Germany, is humbly Inscribed,
By His Serene Highness’s Most devoted, and most obedient Servant,
The Author.
PREFACE
The various, and numberless authors, who have wrote on the art of
war, may be divided into two classes, Didactical, and Historical: the
first are of great use, no doubt, but by no means comparable to the
others; particularly such as Xenophon, Polybius, Cæsar, and Arian,
who had not only seen, but executed great things. This enabled them
to write on those transactions with judgment and propriety; and their
works will ever be regarded, by military men in particular, as a pure
spring from whence the general principles of war may be deduced,
much better than from any systematical author.
The moderns, who have undertaken to write the history of different
wars, or of some renowned Commanders, being chiefly men of learn-
ing only, and utterly unacquainted with the nature of military oper-
ations, have given us indeed agreeable but useless productions.
Both species of compositions, are useful and necessary to those
who make war their profession. They are, however, in my opinion,
in many respects imperfect. The didactical kind communicates its
precepts purely and simply, without any application: so that they
make but a weak transitory impression on the mind, which time
soon effaces. From whence it is become a proverb, that the road to
science, by means of rules and precepts, is long and tedious; that, by
example, short and agreeable. A reader, no doubt, is much more
attentive to real, than to imaginary transactions. He believes that it
is possible, at least, to imitate what others have executed. There is
besides in every elevated mind, an emulation which encourages and
animates us to tread the footsteps of those great men, whose actions
and characters, are justly the object of our love and veneration. For
which reason, history has been ever recommended as the best, eas-
iest, and most effectual method to instruct mankind.
Those historians, both ancient and modern, who have given us
an account of different wars, though in many respects extremely
valuable, are not as accurate as they might, and ought to be.
They do not describe, with sufficient precision, and exactness, the
countries, wherein the wars were carried on, nor the particular spots,
upon which some great transaction happened: the number, species,
and quality, of the troops, which composed the respective armies,
are generally omitted, as well as the plan of operations; and the

operations themselves, excepting those which appeared extraordinary.
They do not explain minutely, as they ought, why, how, and where
every operation was transacted. They only, in general terms, give
the history of a campaign, without explaining sufficiently, the motives
by which the generals were actuated, how the various operations of
it were conducted; and lastly, what was the nature of the ground
where they happened.
The knowledge, however, of these points is so necessary; that it
is impossible to form an exact opinion of the propriety or impro-
priety of any military transaction without it.
The author of the following history has composed it, upon a new
plan, which he hopes will meet with the approbation of the learned.
He proposes to give a clear, and exact account of the most essen-
tial transactions which have occurred, during the course of this impor-
tant war. These will serve as a basis and foundation, upon which
he will write a commentary: wherein the various principles of war
will be occasionally explained.
That the reader may be enabled to form a proper judgment of
the conduct of the generals, who commanded the respective armies,
the author will 1. give some general thoughts on the principles of
war: 2. he will explain the plan of operations of each campaign: 3.
he will give, a military description of the seat of war; and 4. a par-
ticular one of the ground where any extraordinary action happened,
with a plan of it: together with an account of the conduct of the
action itself; and endeavour to point out the manœuvres that con-
tributed essentially to the gain or loss of it.
By this means the reader will be able to form a proper and exact
judgment not only of such transactions, but likewise of the reflections
and opinions of the author. It is with reluctance he finds himself
obliged to speak of himself; it is however necessary, lest he may be
thought, to advance things without a proper foundation.
He has had the good fortune to serve several campaigns under
the orders of general Count Lacy,1 now inspector general of the
1
Franz Moritz, Graf von Lacy (1725–1801). Of Irish Jacobite descent, Lacy’s
father Peter rose to the rank of field marshal in the Russian army under Peter the
Great and led the successful campaign against Sweden in 1742. See Edith Kotasek,
Feldmarschall Graf Lacy: ein Leben für österreichs Heer (Horn, Austria, Ferdinand Berger,
1956).
preface 13
Austrian army, while quarter master general of it, by which means

he has been enabled to acquire an exact knowledge of the country,
of which he has given a description; and to be acquainted with the
motives, and motions, of the respective armies. In the campaign of
1760, he was intrusted with the command of a very considerable
detachment, of infantry and cavalry, with orders never to lose sight
of the Prussian army; which he punctually complied with, and was
never unfortunate.
The two last campaigns he had the happiness to serve near the
person of a prince,2 whose social and military qualities, have gained
him the love and veneration of the present age, and will, no doubt,
transmit a glorious and immortal name to posterity.
The author is persuaded, that his stile is full of foreign idioms,
and expressions; and therefore hopes the criticks will not give them-
selves the trouble to convince him of it, particularly, if they under-
stand his meaning.
As to his opinions, he believes them reasonable, but does not pre-
sume to think himself infallible; and, consequently, does not pretend
to impose them upon others. He will think himself happy, if his
labours are attended with any advantage to his country.
Reflections on the General Principles of War; and on the Composition

and Characters of the Different Armies in Europe
It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult,

than that of war; yet, by an unaccountable contradiction of the
human mind, those who embrace this profession take little or no
pains to study it. They seem to think, that the knowledge of a few
insignificant and useless trifles, constitute a great officer. This opin-
ion is so general, that little or nothing else is taught at present in
any army whatever. The continual changes and variety of motions,
evolutions, &c. which the soldiers are taught, prove evidently, they
are founded on mere caprice. This art, like all others, is founded
2
Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand von Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (1735–1806). The Hereditary
Prince and nephew of Prince Ferdinand von Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and King
Frederick II of Prussia by marriage, Karl reigned as Duke of Brunswick from 1780
until mortally wounded at Auerstadt on 14 October 1806. See Edmond George
Petty-Fitzmaurice, Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick: A Historical Study,
1735–1806 (London, New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1901).
on certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable;

the application of them only can be varied: but they are in them-
selves constant. This most difficult science may, I think, be divided
into two parts; one mechanical, and may be taught, by precepts.
The other has no name, nor can it be defined, or taught. It con-
sists in a just application of the principles and precepts of war, in
all the numberless circumstances, and situations, which occur, no
rule, no study, or application, however assiduous, no experience,
however long, can teach this part: it is the effect of genius alone.
As to the first, it may be reduced to mathematical principles; its
object is to prepare the materials, which form an army, for all the
different operations which may occur: genius must apply them accord-
ing to the ground, number, species, and quality of the troops, which
admit of infinite combinations. In this art, as in poetry and elo-
quence, there are many who can trace, the rules, by which, a poem
or an oration, should be composed, and even compose, according
to the exactest rules. But for want of that enthusiastick and divine
fire, their productions are languid and insipid: so in our profession,
many are to be found who know every precept of it by heart; but
alas! when called upon to apply them, are immediately at a stand.
They then recall their rules, and want to make every thing: the
rivers, woods, ravines, mountains, &c. &c. subservient to them; whereas
their precepts should, on the contrary, be subject to these, who are
the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow, whatever manœuvre
is not formed on these, is absurd and ridiculous. These form the
great book of war, and who cannot read it, must for ever be con-
tent with the title of a brave soldier, and never aspire to that of a
great general.
The first object of the mechanical part, is to form the soldier, rel-
ative to the use to be made of him, and to provide him, with those
instruments of his profession, which are of most general use, because
he cannot be loaded with many different kinds; and that he be
instructed relative to the actions he is to perform, and nothing more.
This is so evident, and conformable to reason, that I will presume
to establish, as the first laws, or principles of the art of war, what
is already admitted in every other: 1. That a soldier be cloathed and
armed relative to the action he is to perform: 2. That he be taught nothing, but
what is of use to him, in the different situations which can occur, before the
enemy: 3. That he be taught every thing that is absolutely necessary for him to
know, in every case that may happen. Many will exclaim against these
preface 15
propositions, particularly those whose whole study has been applied

to learn the numberless, and insignificant trifles, with which all the
armies in Europe abound, and whose only science is reduced to
adjust a hat, a button, &c. and such other important matters, in
which the merit of an officer intirely consists, according to their opin-
ion, of military deserts. They attribute the glorious victories of the
king of Prussia, to these, and the like puerilities; and have therefore,
with great care and diligence, even with a degree of madness, intro-
duced the Prussian exercise into all the troops of Europe; nothing
but Prussian will go down. Short cloaths, little hats, tight breeches,
high-heeled shoes, and an infinite number of useless motions in the
exercise and evolutions, have been introduced, without any other
reason, than their being Prussian; as if really these things could pos-
sibly contribute to gain one battle, make a fine march or manœuvre,
carry on the operations of a siege, choose a fine camp or position, &c.
It is impossible, one would think, that men can be so blind, as not
to perceive, that what makes the object of their study and venera-
tion, has, in fact, no kind of connection with, or influence on the
events of war; yet are they so infatuated with them, that they judge
every man as he appears to be expert in them, and esteem the rest
of mankind ignorant, and worthy their contempt: but as in my turn,
I have no great regard for men, who are attached to such trifles; I
shall be very indifferent, as to the opinion they may be pleased to
form of me, and of my productions.
If the form of dress, now in use, among the soldiers, be exam-
ined, by our canon, it will be found, I think, very unfit for the pur-
pose it is made for; can any thing be more troublesome and useless,
than the hat? It answers no one end. The face is exposed to the
sun, the neck and shoulders, to the cold and rain, which in a very
little time sends numbers of the poor men to the hospitals.
The coat and waistcoat are equally useless, because they leave the
body totally exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and being
tight, hinder the men from moving with ease and facility. To these
inconveniences, which send every campaign, particularly if carried
on in the winter, at least one fourth of the army into their grave,
may be added, that if it rains, for any considerable time, the sol-
dier can with difficulty make use of his arms, and sometimes in
preparing them, he loses the happy and decisive moment. I would
therefore recommend it those, who have it in their power, to invent
some better form of dress, as well out of humanity, as for the service
of their country, which is connected with these things much more

than is generally imagined.
As to the arms made use of, the gun is, no doubt, the best that
has been invented for the infantry, being of more general use, than
any other. It were to be wished, that it was lengthened two feet,
including the bayonet, which, it is thought, may be done without
any sensible inconvenience to the soldier. If it was constructed so as
to be loaded at the breech, and the center of gravity thrown fur-
ther back, near the lock, it would not be so top-heavy as at pre-
sent, and would be much more advantageous in action. M. Saxe3
invented one of this kind, which he gave to his regiment of Uhlans;
but it had many inconveniences, which may be easily remedied. This
species of guns will be particularly useful to the cavalry. The Infantry
should have casks and cuirasses, made of strong leather, which would
last for ever, and defend them effectually against the sabre and bay-
onet, and even against balls, at a certain distance. The French have
offered a great premium to any one, who will prepare leather so as
to resist the effect of fire arms. Notwithstanding the use of lances
be exploded, I confess, I think it a very useful weapon on many
occasions; and particularly in the attack and defence of retrench-
ments, and against cavalry; wherefore I would not have it entirely
neglected. If what is commonly called Tactick, or the formation of
battalions, was founded on other principles, which possibly may be
done with advantage, the lance might be employed with great success.
According to our second canon or principle, the whole exercise
of the firelock must be reduced to six or eight articles at most;
because it can be demonstrated, that in all different cases which
occur before the enemy, the soldier can want no more.
The third principle is very extensive, and comprehends, all that
can be taught in the art of war. I shall indicate those objects which
3
Hermann Maurice, Comte de Saxe and Maréchal de France (1696–1750).
Illegitimate son of Frederick Augustus I of Saxony (Augustus II of Poland). He
served in several armies including those of Savoy, Saxony, and France. He made
his military reputation in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), during
which he defeated the Allied army at Fontenoy (1745) and brought the war to an
end by reducing the Austrian Netherlands. He was well-known for his military the-
ory written in 1732 but not published as My Reveries until 1757. See Jean Colin,
Les campagnes du maréchal de Saxe 3 vols. (Paris: R. Chapelot, 1901–04), and Jon
Manchip White, Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, comte de Saxe,
1696–1750 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962).
preface 17
should most immediately engage the attention of those who pro-

fess it.
Of all the mechanical parts of war, none is more essential than
that of Marching. It may justly be called the Key which leads to all
the sublime motions of an army; for they depend intirely on this
point. A man can be attacked in four different ways: in the front,
on both flanks, and in the rear: but he can defend himself and annoy
the enemy, only when placed with his face towards him. It follows,
that the general object of marching, is reduced to three points only,
to march forwards, and on both sides, because it is impossible to do
it for any time backwards, and by that means face the enemy wher-
ever he presents himself. The different steps to be made use of are
three; slow, fast, and oblique, which may be called traversing. The
first is proper in advancing, when at a considerable distance from
the enemy, and when the ground is unequal, that the line may not
be broke, and a regular fire kept up without intermission. The sec-
ond is chiefly necessary, when you want to anticipate the enemy in
occupying some post, in passing a defile; and above all, in attack-
ing a retrenchment, to avoid being a long while exposed to the fire
of the artillery, and small arms; and lastly, when you come near the
enemy. Then you must advance with hasty steps and bayonets fixed,
and throw yourselves on them with vigour and vivacity.
The third step is of infinite consequence, both in the infantry and
cavalry, columns may be opened, and formed into lines, and vice
versa, lines into columns, by this kind of step, in a lesser space, and
consequently, in less time, than by any other method whatever. In
coming out of a defile, you may instantly form the line without pre-
senting the flank to the enemy, which must happen, if you do it as
the Prussians, by a conversion on either flank, in order to give room
to those who follow to form upon. The line may be formed, though
ever so near the enemy, with safety, because you face him, and can
with case and safety, protect and cover the motions of the troops,
while they are coming out of the defiles and forming. The same
thing may be equally executed, when a column is to be formed, in
order to advance or retire: which is a point of infinite consequence,
and should be established, as an axiom. That no manœuvre, what-
ever be executed, especially when near the enemy, unless it be pro-
tected by some division of the troops. It is in the human heart, to
fear the dangers we do not see, and for which we are not prepared,
more than those we do see, which is the case of all conversions; the
soldier does not see the enemy, and by presenting his flank, is deprived
of all means of defence. No movement therefore ought to be made near the
enemy by conversion, excepting only to form the line on either flank,
should they be attacked. As to the different evolutions now prac-
tised, I shall not here examine them; but will establish as a rule,
that must be generally observed, and by which alone it is possible
to compare one evolution with another, and judge of their propriety.
That evolution is best, which with a given number of men, may be executed
in the least space, and consequently in the least time possible. There is scarce
any figure, geometrical, or ungeometrical, which our modern tacti-
cians have not introduced into the armies, without ever considering
how far such forms were useful in practice. It is very possible to
point out all the cases, that may occur in war, as to the manner of
fighting, which must finally be reduced to that in columns, or in
lines; consequently that form or figure is best, which is best calcu-
lated for offence and defence, marching in all kind of ground, and
may be soonest changed into a line, or column, as the case may
require. It is a general opinion, founded on the practice of all the
troops in Europe, that a column cannot march, without taking up
twice the ground it occupied, while standing, because the last man
cannot move ‘till the first has advanced the length of the whole col-
umn. This is, no doubt, true in practice, and Marshal Saxe thought
it irremediable without the Tact: nothing, however, is so easy to be
remedied, nor deserves it more; because, as we have already said,
marching is the most important point in all the military art.
A man posted in a line occupies nearly two feet, from one elbow
to another, and not quite one foot, from front to rear; that is, a
man is not quite one foot thick, consequently, when the lines make
a motion to the right, or left, the distance between each man is
above a foot, which is augmented by near two more, if they all
begin the march with the same foot: so that all the difficulty con-
sists, in making the men march with the same foot, and keep time
constantly, which is easily done, if the species of step, you would
have them march, is marked by the drum, or any other instrument.
This is often necessary after passing defiles, and when they march
in irregular and unequal ground, which is apt to throw them in con-
fusion. The article of marching is so essential, that it requires, and
deserves the greatest care and attention: it may be asserted, that the
army which marches best must, if the rest is equal, in the end pre-
vail. If what I here propose, and what is actually executed by the
preface 19
Portuguese army, with great precision, be once taught, so that sev-

eral regiments formed in one column can practice it, an army of 40
battalions, for example, will make a given march in less than half
the time, which they now require, as may be demonstrated.
As to the different kind of firings made use of, they are for the
most part dangerous or impracticable.
The platoon firing is such, as must necessarily produce a general
confusion, as well by the noise of those who command them, as by
the breaking of the line and kneeling, which are three of the great-
est inconveniences that can possibly happen, and cannot be executed
without imminent danger, when near the enemy; and therefore must
be totally excluded. Even the king of Prussia himself is of the same
opinion: for he says, the platoon fire would, no doubt, be the best,
if it could be executed. This is so dangerous, and impracticable, that
I will presume to establish the following rules on quite contrary
principles.4
1. The utmost silence must be observed; and therefore the com-
manding officer of the battalion shall alone command the different
firings.
2. That a battalion, or regiment, in advancing to the enemy, must
never be broke, unless forced thereto by the nature of the ground.
3. That the first rank must never kneel, under pretense of giving
the third an opportunity to fire, with safety, because it is very dan-
gerous, if near the enemy; and moreover, fatigues the soldier in such
a manner, that he is soon useless. To these, many other things may
be added, which are necessary for the soldier to know, as to retrench
himself, make fascines, gabions, conduct a sappe, &c.
What has been hitherto said, regards the soldier as well as the
officer: what follows regards the last only. As all kind of evolutions
is founded on calculation, being a combination of space, and time,
it is morally impossible for a man to compute these two objects,
without some knowledge of geometry and arithmetick.
4
Indeed, the system of platoon firing (where several sections of the battle line
fired in unison in order to preserve defensive firepower across the entire line) had
given way to alternate fire that had segments of the line fire in sequence, thus
exhibiting a ‘rolling’ type of fire. Although against regulations, James Wolfe’s 20th
Foot adopted alternate fire at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War and it soon
became regulation practice for the entire British army by 1763. See Houlding, Fit
for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795, 319.
The first thing to be considered, in order to reduce all evolutions

to a geometrical precision, is, That a man occupies from elbow to
elbow, when he has a gun on his shoulder, near two feet; and that,
when he marches a regular pace, he will make a step in every sec-
ond of time, and that he measures, each step about 20 inches; con-
sequently, as the space which a certain number of men occupy in
order of battle is known, and the common velocity with which they
move; it is easy to calculate the ground, and time required, to per-
form any evolution, with a given number of men. A little experi-
ence, and a certain coup d’œil,5 aided by this theory, will enable a
man to judge with great precision, of the time and space necessary
to execute any evolution whatever: a thing of the utmost conse-
quence, in a day of action; because you will be able to make a thou-
sand motions, in the presence of the enemy, which are generally
decisive, if done with precision and exactness, which you dare not
even attempt, unless you are certain of being able to execute them.
The ignorance of generals in this sublime and delicate part of war,
is the reason why you see them quite suspended in time of action,
incapable of changing their plan, according as new circumstances
rise, (which always do rise) because as the enemy approach, they
very justly fear to make any motion in his presence, as they do not
know, whether they have ground, or time enough to execute this or
that manœuvre, though convinced of their usefulness. Hence it sel-
dom happens that an action is won in consequence of the general’s
dispositions; and that chance has generally much more influence, on
the events of battles, than human prudence. Generals form their dis-
positions in the cabinet, and suppose many circumstances, which
never happen, at least just as they suppose them; and during the
action, few men have that sublime talent, to see the new circum-
stances that occur, and take advantage of them. The knowledge of
geometry is equally useful and necessary, in order to determine the
impulse that bodies, animate or inanimate, make on each other, as
this is in proportion, to the mass, and velocity: if your cavalry is of
a lesser size than that of the enemy: you may render it superior, by
giving it a greater degree of velocity. Upon this principle the Spanish
cavalry, though very light, has generally beat the German, in their
5
A common eighteenth-century concept that denotes a person’s intuitive ability
to visualize the battleground and readily comprehend the most advantageous posi-
tioning of troops.
preface 21
different wars with the house of Austria, and upon this principle our
great and heavy horse, is certainly inferior to the hunter, particu-
larly, if you make these work more on their haunches, than at pre-
sent. Nothing contributes more to facilitate the evolutions of cavalry
than this: they will be enabled in one instance to set out on a gal-
lop, without being obliged to pass, successively, from standing to
trotting, and then to gallop. While this is performing, the light-horse
is on your flanks, or shocks yours with a superior degree of veloc-
ity; and therefore gains what he loses in the mass, and beats you.
The march of armies cannot be calculated with any degree of
precision, without the help of mathematicks: because whatever is not
reduced to space and time, will in practice, turn out very uncertain.
The choice of camps depends on two principles: the one geo-
metrical, and the other, is the effect of genius: the first consists in
calculating the distances relative, to the number and species of troops
which compose the army.
The other, in seeing all the different combinations, that may be
formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the
choice of that precise combination, which is most advantageous. This
inacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and
independent of it. Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge,
they see at once the causes, and its effect, with the different com-
binations, which unite them: they do not proceed by common rules,
successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps,
no: the Whole, with all its circumstances and various combinations,
is like a picture, all together present to their mind; these want no
geometry: but an age produces few of this kind of men: and in the
common run of generals, geometry, and experience, will help them
avoid gross errors.
Fortification, another very extensive branch of war, is purely geo-
metrical, in the execution. The construction of every species of works
ought to be reduced to geometrical precision; and may therefore be
learnt by any one; but the choosing the ground advantageously, is
here, as in the choice of camps, the gift of genius alone, and sub-
ject to no rule. As the practice of fortification depends on one prin-
ciple alone, we see a remarkable uniformity in the works of all
engineers, which proves they knew only what they learnt, and indeed
what alone could be taught them; but that they had not one grain
of genius, which varies infinitely, and forms new combinations rel-
ative to the new circumstances, which must, and do occur. It is with
the ground, as with the features of men: there are not, perhaps, in
the whole world, two features perfectly alike, nor two pieces of
ground, of a given extent, perfectly similar; and consequently where
the same species of works, or the same order of battle, would be
equally proper for both. Genius alone can distinguish the most minute
and imperceptible difference to the vulgar eyes, there is between
different grounds, and occupy them accordingly. From hence appears,
how inconsiderate those great engineers and Tacticians are, who
attempt to subject every kind of ground, though infinitely different,
to one general rule. The perfection of our art would be, no doubt,
to find a construction, or an order of battle, equally proper for all
kind of ground: but this being impossible, the only thing remaining
for them to do, is to find such a construction, and such a forma-
tion of the troops, as may with the greatest simplicity, and conse-
quently velocity, be adapted to those numberless circumstances which
occur. This ought to be the constant object of their studies; but can
never be attained without geometry.
The artillery, now become the soul of military operation, is noth-
ing without geometry. The dimensions of pieces, as M. Muller6 very
justly observes, ought to be regulated by the use you propose to
make of them: and I will add, by the nature of the country where
they are to be used. For want of attending to this natural reason,
imitation and caprice have been the only rules followed, in deter-
mining the dimensions of pieces.
As the French, during the reign of Lewis the 14th,7 gave birth to
most of the customs and fashions in Europe, so in this important
article, were they imitated by every body; 24 pounders, of immense
length, and weight, were made by princes, who had neither places
to attack, or defend; whose countries, for want of roads, did not per-
6
John Muller (1699–1784). He wrote The attack and defence of fortify’d places: in three
parts (London: Printed for J. Millan, 1747), A treatise containing the practical part of
fortification: in four parts (London: Printed for A. Millar, 1755); and A treatise of artillery
(London: Printed for J. Millan, 1757).
7
Louis XIV (1638–1715), King of France (1643–1715). The ‘Sun King.’ Louis’s
reign was the longest in modern European history. He was noted for his firm belief
in the divine right of kings and his quest to secure France’s natural frontiers. The
former led to religious persecution of the Huguenots and the latter spawned con-
stant warfare that did not cease until his death. See Peter R. Campbell, Louis XIV,
1661–1715 (London, New York: Longman, 1993), and John A. Lynn, The Wars of
Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (London, New York: Longman, 1999).
preface 23
mit the use of such heavy machines: even they were introduced into
armies, though no siege was expected.
It ought to have been considered, that the French made war in
a fine open country, where the roads are good, and where there is
a great deal of water carriage. That Lewis the 14th and 15th were,
from the proximity of their own fortresses, enabled to form their
magazines near the scene of action: and lastly, that in Flanders, they
could not make one step, without besieging some important place.
The French artillery was formed relative to these circumstances. But
why we, and other princes, that are not situated in similar circum-
stances should imitate the French I do not know. I am very glad to
see Mr. Muller’s opinion prevail; and hope that artillery, and every
other machine, relative to military operations, will hereafter be made
in the most advantageous manner possible, for the use we can in
our circumstances make of them. This gentleman has proposed many
excellent things in his works; which makes it needless for me to say
any thing on the subject. I wish, for the sake of the publick, he may
give us the doctrine of sieges in all its parts, including the theory
and practice of mines, in order to complete his most useful works.(a)
The next, and indeed most important object of any, to those who
aspire to the command of armies, is geography; not only that which
consists in a general knowledge of a country, but a local one: a man
must be thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country, and its
productions; and particularly with those objects which are immedi-
ately connected with military operations, as the spring, course, breadth,
depth, velocity, windings, banks, fords, bridges of rivers, whether they
are navigable or not; whether they run into your country from that
of the enemy, or on the contrary: in the first place, you must have
a fortress, as high up as possible, in order to hinder the enemy from
taking advantage of the navigation; which is a very great one, and
facilitates much the operations of an army; insomuch, that all great
generals make it a point never to quit them if possible: and it is
remarkable that the Austrians have generally been worsted by the
Turks, whenever they have quitted the Danube. If the river runs
out of your country, you must have likewise a fortress, as low as
may be, in which you must form your magazines, that you may, at
once, enter your enemy’s country. If the river runs along your fron-
tier, as the Rhine does with regard to France, you must endeavour
(a)
The Author did not know that Mr. Muller had already executed this.
to occupy two or three capital points upon it, with good and exten-
sive fortresses; so that you may not only cover your own country,
but also make it impossible for an enemy to penetrate, without giv-
ing you an opportunity to enter his, and cut off his subsistences:
though the river be not navigable, it may however be of great use
in military operations; particularly, if it runs parallel to the enemy’s
frontiers, and crosses the principal roads that lead into his country,
because then they furnish good positions on their banks. If you make
war on any river, you must be masters of both sides, if possible,
otherwise they are of little use, excepting only to take positions behind
them. When you have a strong place on a navigable river, you may
with a handful of men embarrass a great army.
The passing of rivers, is justly considered, as one of the most del-
icate and dangerous operations of war; and yet it generally succeeds
for want of being perfectly acquainted with them; and for want of
diligence and activity in those who oppose it, otherwise it cannot
succeed: for though an enemy cannot prevent your throwing a bridge
under the protection of your artillery, if properly placed: he can,
however, hinder you from occupying such an extent of ground as
is necessary to develop your army, and may, without exposing him-
self to your artillery, attack any part of it that has passed. This
method ought to be embraced rather than attempt to prevent a pas-
sage. A remarkable instance of this happened in Italy, in the war
for the succession of Spain.8 Prince Eugene9 wanted to pass a certain
river, which the vigilance of his antagonist, the Duke of Vendome,10
8
The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). Considered one of the first
European ‘world wars,’ it was ostensibly a struggle over the throne of Spain between
the Bourbon family led by King Louis XIV of France and the Habsburgs under
Emperor Leopold I. England, the Holy Roman Empire, and the United Provinces
opposed France and Spain led by the Bourbon Philip V. Much of the fighting
occurred in the Netherlands, but Italy and Portugal witnessed important campaigns.
The war ended with the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, which confirmed Philip’s
monarchy albeit with concessions. For the military campaigns see David G. Chandler,
Marlborough as Military Commander (New York: Scribner: 1973), and Henry Kamen,
The War of the Spanish Succession, 1700–1715 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969).
9
François-Eugène, Prince de Savoie-Carignan (1663–1736). Austrian General.
A son of the royal house of Savoy, Eugene was brought up in France. He was
rejected by the French army, whereupon he joined the Austrian military. He became
a brilliant commander and served in the Turkish and French wars of the 1680s
and 1690s. Appointed field marshal at the age of 32, he served alongside the Duke
of Marlborough with distinction in the War of the Spanish Succession. See Derek
McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (London, 1977).
10
Louis-Joseph, Duc de Vendôme (1654–1712).
preface 25
had for a long time prevented; at length, however, the prince hav-
ing stole a march, threw over a bridge, and even a great part of
his army had passed and intrenched themselves, under the protec-
tion of the artillery on the other side; so that Vendome could not
attack them without much loss and danger. He therefore posted his
army as near as possible, ready to attack them, if they offered to
quit their retrenchments, in order to form and extend their front;
but it was found quite impracticable: for the Duke had placed his
troops in such a manner, that they formed a portion of a circle,
concave towards the enemy, so that the whole fire both of artillery
and small arms, could be directed and concentred upon the retrench-
ments. Prince Eugene having observed the Duke’s dispositions, was
too wise to risk an action in these circumstances, with a river behind
him; he therefore ordered his troops to repass the river, and broke
the bridge after them. This example is the best lesson that can be
given on the defence of rivers: if the course of the river is convex
to you, it will be extremely difficult to hinder an enemy from pass-
ing; because marching on the chord of the circle, he has much less
space to go than you: he labours, however, under one difficulty,
which is, that generally speaking, the banks of every river are higher,
on the side where its course is convex: if the banks are in the least
elevated, no bridge can be thrown over the river; and they are always
high alternately, if the river has a winding course, high on the con-
vex side, and low on the concave of the curve it forms. In defend-
ing the banks of rivers, the army must be separated into two or
more great corps, as the nature of the river admits; and disposed in
such a manner, as to be able to discover where the enemy passes,
and strong enough to hinder him from occupying any posts far from
the banks; because he will then have ground to form his whole army
upon, and there is no advantage in fighting him. A due attention
to what we have said, and a perfect knowledge of the river, will
make it impossible for an enemy to pass it.
I am surprised that no use is made of small rivers and rivulets to
make inundations to cover camps, which may be executed on almost
every spot, with very little expence, and would render them no less
strong than fortresses. All capital positions should, if possible, be cov-
ered by inundations, which are much more efficacious, than all the
retrenchments in the world. The sluices must be made as low as
possible, and moreover, covered with some good work or other.
If the country is mountainous, the roads must necessarily pass
through many defiles, formed by the ravins, torrents, rivers, &c. con-
sequently, advantageous camps and positions are to be found on
every spot. The knowledge of all this, when improved by superior
talents, will enable a small army to make a successful war against
one infinitely superior; as appears evident, from the example Duke
Ferdinand11 has given us in his glorious campaigns in Hessia. Most
particular care must be taken to occupy all the mountains without
exception, before you approach them with the army; for though
there are few great roads in such a country proper for cavalry and
artillery; you may however be certain, that if the country is well
peopled, there is no mountain, however it may appear steep and
craggy, nor any wood, though in appearance impracticable, but what,
on diligent enquiry, will be found to have roads at least for infantry;
and therefore you must never encamp in such a country without
occupying all the Mountains; which will not only secure your army,
but will enable you to observe the enemy’s motions, and prevent
him from observing yours, a thing of so much consequence, that I
will establish it as a rule, never to let an enemy send a patrol near
your army: on the contrary, you must always send yours on his
flanks. When the ground has been well reconnoitred, and the moun-
tains occupied, you must always camp behind them: so that the
enemy cannot see you; and that you may keep him in a state of
incertitude, which is a great advantage, in military operations: upon
this same principle you must never camp near a wood, unless you
occupy it entirely, otherwise the enemy covered by it, may make
some decisive motions against you, which you cannot perceive till it
is too late to prevent it. Had this maxim been observed at Malplaquet,
Hastenbeck, and Torgau, things would have turned out otherwise in
all probability. Never approach a wood or a mountain, unless you
occupy it intirely, is a rule that must be for ever observed, and can-
not be transgressed without imminent danger. Not only an exact
knowledge must be had of all fortified towns, but even of all the vil-
lages; particularly those through which the high roads pass, because
they form defiles; which being occupied, put an effectual stop to an
11
Ferdinand, Prince of Brunswick-Lüneburg (1721–92). Prussian Field Marshal.
Brother-in-law of Frederick the great, he commaded the army of British and German
auxiliaries in western Germany during the war. See Reginald A. Savory, His Britannic
Majesty’s Army in Germany during the Seven Years’ War (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1966).
preface 27
enemy, and give you time to make any disposition that may be
judged necessary. The science of position, camps, marches, and even
the project of campaign or plan of operations, must be regulated by
these points: it is on this knowledge only, you can determine the
numbers and species of troops that must compose the army; and
consequently the quantity and quality of your magazines, and where
they must be made; and every plan that is not founded on these
principles, must fail in the execution, if your antagonist has com-
mon sense: so that the great and important parts of war, as well in
the formation, as in the execution, depend on the knowledge of the
country; and wise generals, will always chuse to make them the foun-
dation of their conduct, rather than trust to the uncertain issue of
battles. If you possess these points, you may reduce military opera-
tions to geometrical precision, and may for ever make war without
ever being obliged to fight. Marshal Saxe calls battles the resource
of ignorant generals; when they do not know what to do, they give
battle.12
Next to this local geographer of a country, the natural history,
and political constitution of it, is an object that deserves the utmost
attention: the quantity and quality of its productions, soil, climate,
food, and form of government; because of these the physical and
moral qualities of the inhabitants intirely depend. Those who inhabit
the plains, and rich countries, are generally effeminate and bad sol-
diers, impatient under the least fatigue, are soon sick, require too
much food, and are less active than those of the mountains, and in
every respect inferior to them. What did not the poor Highlanders
do? What did they not suffer? they will live where an Englishman,
though animated with equal courage, and love of glory, will perish;
merely from the difference of their situations before they become
soldiers. The Croats in the Empress’s13 service, seldom or ever camp,
12
This passage is often cited as proof that Lloyd reflected and codified the
eighteenth-century’s disdain for battle and fighting in general. Though he qualifies
this blanket assertion in his later works, he never wavered from his belief that battle
for its own sake without a proper goal (or it being forced on you by circumstances)
was folly and ruinous of the army and to the state. In fact Lloyd became one of
the most offensive-minded theorists of the century.
13
Maria Theresa, the Empress-Queen (1717–80). Daughter of Holy Roman
Emperor Charles VI, she reigned as Archduchess of Austria and Queen of Hungary
and Bohemia (1740–80). She is most known for her heroic defiance and opposi-
tion to Frederick the Great and the restoration of Habsburg power in the second
half of the eighteenth century. She married Francis, Duke of Lorraine in 1736, who
and are exposed to all the inclemency of the weather; yet, in pro-
portion, much fewer of them die, than among the rest of the troops;
which can be attributed only to the difference of the countries from
whence they come. The inhabitants of great towns are still worse,
than those of the plains, being long enervated with vice, and its con-
sequences, they are unable to support any fatigue; and moreover,
too talkative ever to form a good and obedient soldier. The form
of government produces no less variety in the characters of men
than the physical qualities of the country.
The subjects of a despotick prince being from their birth taught
obedience, and subordination, two essential qualities to form a good
soldier, if not intirely alienated and weakened by oppression, and
poverty, are preferable to those of republicks, unless these are ani-
mated by the enthusiastick fire of liberty; of which they are very sus-
ceptible, if conducted by an able hand, and become invincible: but
if destitute of this principle, they make but indifferent soldiers; because
their pretensions to liberty, clashes continually with that blind sub-
ordination, which constitutes the very foundation of a good army.
As the subjects of a despote cannot possibly be animated with a
passion for liberty, that can raise any degree of enthusiasm, their
leaders must endeavour to substitute that of religion, which is supe-
rior to the other. When these two principles are united, as in some
of the Grecian and Roman republicks, the soldier is invincible. If
we consider the force they have on the human heart, and how eas-
ily raised, we most be surprised to see the Generals of our age neglect
them intirely: this proves they want the most infallible and must sub-
lime art of conducting mankind. There is another species of enthu-
siasm, much weaker than the former, and may be rather called a
strong passion, whose object is the love of glory and riches; both
these principles are ingrafted in the human heart, and if cultivated
with care, will produce wonderful effects, especially among the officers,
who by their situation, have the means of enjoying the fruits of them.
These principles are to be found chiefly among the subjects of a
mixt and monarchical government, where glory and riches are attended
with a real superiority and distinction.14
reigned as Holy Roman Emperor Francis I (1745–65). See C. A. Macartney, Maria

Theresa and the House of Austria (London: English University Press, 1969).
14
This proto-military sociology, derived in large part from Montesquieu, is more
fully developed in Continuation of the Late War in Germany (1781).
preface 29
From these moral and physical principles are formed national char-
acters, whose influence is seen, more or less, in every army, as it is
more or less subject to military discipline. If this is strong, and
founded only on the principle of Fear, it destroys national charac-
ters, and does not substitute any thing that is equivalent to it.
Discipline should be founded on national characters, and both are
improved by it: but as those who have the formation and conduct
of armies, seem wholly unacquainted with human nature in general,
and with its various modifications, according to the difference of
countries and government, they find themselves incapable to form a
code of military laws, founded on national characters; and are there-
fore forced to destroy these, and establish it, on weak, uncertain,
and slavish principle of Fear; which has rendered our armies much
inferior to those of the antients, as appears evident from the history
of mankind.
The French, are gay, light, and lively, governed rather by an
immediate and transitory impulse, than by any principle of reason,
or sentiment: their sensations, from the nature of their climate, are
very delicate; and therefore objects make a very strong impression
but momentary; because a new object, producing a new impression,
effaces the former. From whence follows, that they are impetuous,
and dangerous in their attacks; all the animal spirits seem united,
and produce a sort of furious convulsion, and gives them a more
than ordinary degree of vigour for that instant; but it exhausts the
whole frame: the instant following they appear languid and weak,
and changed into other men. To this national character may be
added, that their armies are recruited from the class of men that
inhabit the towns, who of all others, are the least proper for Soldiers,
being vain, impatient, talkative, and effeminate; they advance as
assured of victory, having a great opinion of themselves, and con-
tempt of others: but if repulsed, their spirits are exhausted, shame
succeeds, and humbles them to such a degree, that they are not eas-
ily prevailed upon to renew the attack; and as their vanity will never
let them confess they are in the wrong, they throw the fault on their
leaders, become mutinous, and desert. Wherefore it should be a
maxim, in making war against the French, to keep them constantly
in motion, especially in bad weather, always attack them, never per-
mit them to follow their own dispositions, force them to observe
yours; their impatience will soon reduce them to commit some cap-
ital error: if their leader is wise and prudent, and refuses to comply
with their unreasonable requests, they will treat him with contempt,
grow turbulent, and desert.
The present ministry, endeavours to introduce the German disci-
pline among them, without considering the difference there is between
their national characters; and I doubt whether it will produce the
effects they expect from it: nature must be improved, not anihilated.
The Austrian army is composed chiefly out of the class of labour-
ers, vassals of the great lords; they are obedient and patient, and
bear without a murmur the greatest hardships; and though their reli-
gion does not rise to any degree of enthusiasm, probably for want
of being excited by an able leader, yet it keeps them sober, and free
from vice: objects must strike hard to make any sensible impression,
which once received lasts long, because not easily effaced. By edu-
cation and temper, little disposed to reason about causes and events;
and therefore very proper to form a good soldier, and superior to
any other, who are not raised by some species of enthusiasm.
The Russians have all these qualifications, in common with the
Austrians; and besides, such a fund of religion, and respect, or rather
veneration for their prince, which inspires them with a degree of
enthusiasm, that must necessarily render them superior to every other
army that is not animated with similar principles. Their courage
alone has rendered them victorious, in spite of all those difficulties
in which the general ignorance of their officers involved them.
The Prussian army, being composed chiefly of strangers of different
countries, manners, and religion, are united only by the strong chain
of military discipline: this, and a most rigid attention to keep up all
the forms and discipline established, constitutes a vast and regular
machine; which being animated by the vigorous and powerful genius
of their leader,15 may be justly accounted one of the most respectable
armies in Europe: but should this spring, however, languish but for
an instant only, the machine itself, being composed of such hetero-
15
Frederick II, the Great (1718–1786), King of Prussia (1740–86). The greatest
of all the Hohenzollern rulers, Frederick made his name in war and philosophy.
He added to and increased the domains of Prussia at the expense of Austria in the
War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. Considered the great-
est military commander of his day he also is viewed as an enlightened despot who
sought to instill the principles of the Enlightenment in his government and legal
system. See Gerhard Ritter, Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1968); and Dennis Showalter, The Wars of Frederick
the Great (London: Longman, 1996).
preface 31
geneous matter, would probably fall to pieces, and leave nothing but
the traces of its antient glory behind.
They have a facility in manœuvring, beyond any other troops
whatever; and their victories must be ascribed to this chiefly; for all
the genius of the leader can do nothing without it, and almost every
thing with it.
The Spaniards are brave and patient; and have besides a point
of honour, which being improved, would make them good soldiers:
their army at present, would make but an indifferent figure, for two
or three campaigns, as their generals have neither that knowledge,
founded on study and application, or that produced by experience.
The English are neither so lively, as the French, nor so phleg-
matick as the Germans: they resemble more, however, to the for-
mer; and are therefore somewhat lively and impatient. If the nature
of the English constitution, permitted some degree more of disci-
pline, a more equal distribution of favours, and a total abolishment
of buying and selling commissions, I think they would surpass, at
least equal, any troops in the world.
The Turks, and every government founded on military force, must
necessarily decay, unless the same fanaticism which gave it birth, be
kept up, by continual wars. Mahomet understood this principle so
well, that he has made a religious precept of it, commanding his
followers never to make peace with their enemies. As the force of
this army, depends entirely on numbers, and enthusiasm; if this last
is ever extinguished, which now seems to be so much the case, the
other will avail them nothing; and that immense fabric being no
longer animated with the only spirit which could support it, must
sink under its own weight.
PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE
In order to convey a more clear idea of the history of this war, and
of its various operations; we think it may be useful previously to
shew the motives which induced the several powers of Europe to
undertake it. And also to give an exact description of the country
where it was carried on; because, the knowledge of these two points
will, it is imagined, enable the reader to form a proper judgment of
the generals who conducted the different armies, and of the pro-
priety of their manœuvres, to obtain the end each had in view.
As the reasons which determined England to declare war against
France are generally known: a detail of them would be needless. We
shall therefore relate those of other nations only.
Of France
The French convinced from experience, nothing could more effectually

contribute to realize that superiority, which they arrogated to them-
selves in Europe, than the cultivation and improvement of their
American colonies, resolved, on concluding the peace of Aix la
Chapelle [1748], to promote with care and vigilance every scheme
that seemed calculated to distress our, and advance their own set-
tlements. The first step towards accomplishing this end, was to find
a means to cut off our communication with the Indians, on whose
friendship the greatness of our colonies much depends. This, in the
end, would naturally unite them to the French, who could furnish
them with what they wanted in exchange for the different com-
modities of that country, and by degrees be made an instrument to
drive us out of it. They begun to execute their plan by establishing
a chain of forts behind our settlements, and by occupying many
countries, until then, thought, at least neutral. Though they had not
yet compleated it, what was already done had such an influence on
our inland trade, as made use tremble at the fatal consequences
which would necessarily follow, if we did not, in time, exert our-
selves and repel the injuries they intended us. Some measures, though
preliminary discourse: of france 33
ineffectual, were taken for that purpose, and hostilities were ordered
to be committed against the French both in Europe and America.
As they were not prepared sufficiently to avow their pretensions, they
only opposed remonstrances and a seeming moderation to our repeated
attacks. By this means they proposed to gain time, make us relax
our preparations, and render us odious to the other courts of Europe.
In all which they succeeded, more or less, as the history of those
times, fully evinces.
Finding at length that the contest must be decided by arms, and
that however formidable their land army was, the dispute in America
was unequal, and would probably be determined in our favour, as
it depended intirely on the means of transporting and sustaining an
army there, and consequently was intimately connected with a supe-
riority at sea; they wisely formed a scheme for attacking Hanover;
the conquest of which they supposed easy, and from the king’s nat-
ural affection for that country, they hoped a restitution of it would
make them regain whatever they lost in America, or procure them
some other advantages. In the mean time their army would be main-
tained from the contributions to be raised in the conquered coun-
try, and by its position on the Elbe, overawe Germany, and effectually
give laws to the contending parties.
The plan was in the beginning attended with all the success imag-
inable, and in the end was rendered ineffectual, only by the rapa-
ciousness and ignorance of the French general who then commanded.
The French system, we think, well concerted and even great. They
had then, including the militia, near 220,000 men, maintained at a
great expence; these would remain intirely useless, if the war was
limited to America, or even to England, for want of a marine, which
could not be formed in time of war; and the less so, as we had
already acquired too great a superiority.
A German War, was for all these reasons both eligible and nec-
essary, the expence of it to them, was comparatively nothing at all,
being reduced to the simple difference, between maintaining an army
in the field, and keeping it at home. They had troops sufficient to
form an army in Germany, to guard their country, and to conquer
America; supposing their marine had been capable to protect their
transports into that country. To supply this extraordinary expence,
they proposed making every country between the Rhine and the
Elbe contribute. This they believed would produce more than sufficient
for that purpose; so that they would have an immense army main-
tained and enriched at the expence of others. Add to this, that being
limitrophes, this alone gave them infinite advantages over us.
Whereas if England proposed sending an army into Germany, she
must form it out of nothing, that is, she had not one man as yet
inlisted for that purpose, and whatever English would be sent there
must be replaced by new levies, in order to carry on the necessary
war in America. As to the Germans, they knew we must pay for
tem at an extraordinary price, all which expence must be paid by
England alone, as it was not possible she could make any conquest
to bear any considerable part of it. These circumstances, the French
naturally supposed, would exhaust the nation’s treasure, call the king’s
attention, consequently that of his ministers to the affairs of Germany,
relax our preparations for America, produce murmurs in the peo-
ple, disunion in our counsels, and at last reduce us to the necessity
of submitting to whatever terms they should think fit to impose. To
them much more justly may be applied that remarkable saying,
America was conquered in Germany. The only or at least the most
probable means they had of saving or conquering America, was to
carry on the war with success in Germany.
It was indifferent to the French, whether they entered Germany
as allies to Prussia, or Austria, as either would answer the object
they had in view. It is probable, however, they would have chose
the first connexion, as they could with more ease hurt the Austrians
than the Prussians. Being informed of our alliance with Russia, they
instantly sent a minister to Prussia to conclude a treaty on the same
footing as that in the war of 1741; but finding we had been forced
to renounce the alliance of the former, and embrace that of the lat-
ter, they naturally accepted the friendship of the two imperial courts,
and under pretence of fulfilling their engagements contracted by this
new alliance, they immediately prepared an army of above 100,000
men, about 20,000 of which were destined to march to the Mayn,
and from thence where the empress should choose; the remainder,
which was to form the main army, was ordered to the lower Rhine,
and from thence proceed against Hannover and its allies. The com-
mand of this army was given to Marshal D’Etreés,1 as a recompense
1
Louis-Charles-César Le Tellier de Louvois, comte, duc and Maréchal d’Estrées
(1695–1771).
preliminary discourse: of austria 35
for having negotiated the treaty of Versailles; and had not he favour
of an intriguing mistress prevailed in the choice of those employed
afterwards to execute the French plan, all the efforts of England and
its allies though supported by some of the ablest generals, that this
or any age has produced, could not in all probability have prevented
its future success.
Of Austria
The empress had ever reflected on the loss of Silesia with infinite
regret, being attended with a very great diminution of her revenues
and power. These thoughts were aggravated by observing the ascen-
dancy which this additional power gave the king of Prussia, whom
it is said she personally disliked: she saw him treated every where
with respect, feared and courted by most of the courts in Europe.
No wonder therefore, that animated with these sentiments, she should
form a plan for recovering Silesia. This seems to have been the chief
object of her counsels, ever since she had ceded it to Prussia, as
appears evident, from the papers published by the king on this sub-
ject. She applied to the empress of Russia,2 and irritated that princess
against the king of Prussia to such a degree, that she was easily pre-
vailed upon to concur in any measures concerted for his ruin. The
two imperial Courts were therefore united, by new and strong alliances:
the object of which was very extensive, and tended not only to the
recovery of Silesia; but to annihilate the king of Prussia, whose domin-
ions they proposed dividing among them. The better to accomplish
this end, they invited the king of Poland3 to accede to this alliance.
He however declined it, till he saw the two empresses act with such
vigour, as would make it safe for him to declare against Prussia.
Experience had taught him that the Prussians could oppress him
with more ease and facility, than the Austrians protect him.
2
Empress Elizabeth of Russia (r. 1741–62). Daughter of Peter I, the Great, she
came to power by overthrowing the infant Ivan IV with the aid of the Guards reg-
iment. Under Elizabeth the arts and education were promoted. In 1755 she founded
the first university in Moscow. In foreign affairs her regime was known for its anti-
Prussian bias, which helped lead to the Diplomatic Revolution and trigger the Seven
Years War. She died childless in December 1761. See James F. Brennan, Enlightened
Absolutism in Russia: The Reign of Elizabeth, 1741–1762 (New York: P. Lang, 1987);
and Tamara Rice, Elizabeth, Empress of Russia (New York: Praeger, 1970).
3
King Augustus III of Poland/Elector Frederick Augustus II of Saxony (r. 1733–63).
The Austrian minister at Petersburg4 had contributed all he could

to the success of the treaty of subsidy between the court and England,
with a view to make us, as usual, pay the expence of those Troops,
which the two imperial courts intended to employ only for their own
particular service in attacking Prussia, and thereby facilitate the recov-
ery of Silesia. Probably things would have gone to their wishes, if
the king of Prussia had not declared he would consider as enemies
those who brought any foreign troops into the empire; which indi-
cated plainly he would not only hinder the Russians from coming
to the succour of Hannover in case of need, but would perhaps treat
that electorate as an enemy country. The king of England5 very justly
considered, that the Russians would be of no use to him, to protect
his German dominions, if they were at war with Prussia. For what-
ever success they might have on the Baltick against that prince, they
could never hinder him, being so very near, from occupying the
electorate, a country without any natural or artificial strength.
For which reason his majesty very prudently, as we think, pre-
ferred the friendship of Prussia, and renounced to that of the two
empresses. That of Germany, for whose advantage alone the alliance
with Russia had been made, being thus disappointed, easily per-
suaded the other to break her treaty with us; and the more so, as
these courts never had any other object in forming it, than to receive
a subsidy that would enable them to carry their schemes against
Prussia into execution, and by no means to act in concert with us,
but on condition we concurred likewise in the plan they had formed
for his ruin. Our connexions therefore with him, brought the treaty
with Russia to nothing, and very naturally produced another alliance
between the two imperial courts and that of France, whose views
we have already explained.
Of Prussia
The late king of Prussia6 had cultivated the arts of peace, I mean
those which fall more particularly under the cognizance of a prince,
4
Nicolaus Joseph Prince Esterházy (1714–90).
5
King George II of England/Elector of Hanover (r. 1727–60).
6
King Frederick William I of Prussia (r. 1713–40). Called the ‘Soldier King,’ he
laid the military and political foundations of the Prussian state. His fondness for
preliminary discourse: of prussia 37
justice and interior policy, from principle. The military art rather
for shew, than with any particular view, or love of glory. He had
left at his death 67,000 men well disciplined, and his magazines
abundantly furnished with artillery, stores, &c.
The death of the then emperor Charles VI7 left the affairs of the
house of Austria, in the utmost confusion, and distress. This the king
of Prussia thought a favourable opportunity to assert the claims he
had to some part of Silesia, and by such a bold enterprize, at the
beginning of his reign, satisfy the ambition he had, to appear a for-
midable and enterprising power, capable to hold the ballance of the
empire, and protect those princes who should hereafter recur to him
for succour. He was the first who began the war against the empress,
which having succeeded to his wish, he concluded by a treaty that
gave him all Silesia.
The recovery of this most fruitful province had been the princi-
pal object of the Austrian counsels ever since, which furnished, as
we have already related in an alliance with Russia calculated for
that end. Though they had for many years been occupied by this
one object, yet in 1756, they were not prepared to put it in execu-
tion, and had fixed the following year for that purpose.
The king of Prussia perfectly informed of what they had projected
against him, thought it prudent to anticipate their operations, and
attack the principal power of the confederacy, whom, being as yet
unprepared, he hoped to crush, and thereby dissolve the league
before they could united and bring their plan to bear. With this
view he entered Saxony: This brought on the general war in Germany,
of which we propose giving an exact account in the following Work.
the military life, his violent temper and ruling style, and the build-up of the Prussian
army did much to link Prussia with militarism and authoritarianism in the modern
world. Very cautious in foreign affairs, he waged no offensive wars. See R.A.
Dorwart, The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1953), and Robert R. Ergang, The Potsdam Führer, Frederick
William I: Father of Prussian Militarism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941).
7
Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1711–40). Most noted for failing to pro-
duce a male heir and working throughout his reign to secure acceptance of the
Pragmatic Sanction, which ensured the undivided inheritance of Habsburg lands to
his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa. His death in 1740 and Frederick the Great’s
rejection of the Pragmatic Sanction triggered the War of the Austrian Succession.
See Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993); and Matthew S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740 –1748
(London: Longman, 1995).
Of Saxony
Avarice, an impotent ambition, a spirit of intrigue combined with

indolence, a total neglect of every thing that tended to the welfare
and interest of the country, an immoderate love for shews, pleasures,
and pageantry, had been long the characteristics of this court. No
wonder! The man who governed in the name of a too indulgent
master, had brought with him into the ministry those habits he had
contracted while a page.8 Attendance cost him nothing, his life had
been dissipated in the idle and trifling occupations of a courtier; his
great and indeed only talent was the profusion of an eastern monarch,
which his vile partisans called magnificence. He was assiduous only
in besieging his royal master, to prevent truth and virtue from
approaching him; so that this humane and good prince, who had
the greatest desire to promote the good of his people, was never
permitted to know they were unhappy and wanted his protection.
Though this minister knew that the abject state, to which his bad
conduct had reduced Saxony, made it impossible for him to under-
take any thing of consequence. He was, however, always intriguing
with the courts of Vienna, and Petersburg, and forming projects for
aggrandising Saxony, at the expence of Prussia without having pre-
pared any one means of realising this vain chimera, or even pro-
vided for the common defence of the country. The money raised
with difficulty on the poor subject, to provide an army for his defence,
was dissipated in building magnificent palaces for the favourite, in
expensive journeys, &c. to satisfy his abject and low vanity: so that
the country, which might easily raise and maintain an army of 50,000
men, had scarce 15,000 without artillery or magazines; and there-
fore fell an easy prey to an ambitious and powerful invader.
Of Russia
Though the plan, formed and pursued with unwearied activity and
vigilance by Peter the Great,9 had not since his death, been culti-
vated with equal care and success; however, what he had already
8
Heinrich Brühl (1700–1763). Chief minister to Elector Frederick Augustus II
of Saxony (1733–63)/King Augustus III of Poland (1733–63).
9
Peter I, ‘the Great,’ Czar and first Emperor of Russia (r. 1682–1725). Dedicated
to enhancing the power and territory of the Russian state in the Baltic region, Peter
preliminary discourse: of saxony⁄of russia 39
done, made this empire powerful; and therefore respected and caressed.
The vast extent of this empire, the variety of its productions, and
the number of its inhabitants, form so many and such great sources
of power, that a small neglect, which in lesser states would be imme-
diately and severely felt, pass in this country unnoticed, and pro-
duce no sensible or direct bad effect. Its resources are so many, that
in some measure they may be said to supply those mistakes which
happen in the administration, and have kept up the lustre of the
empire, though the plan of the first Peter has not been steadily
adhered to.
While the Ottoman empire was formidable, this court and that
of Vienna were naturally connected. The fear of a common, and
powerful enemy, united them by the strong tye of mutual safety.
Since the decline of the Turkish empire, she finds it no less neces-
sary to cultivate the friendship of the other princes, particularly that
of the maritime powers, who take off a vast quantity of useless com-
modities. This brings a proportionable sum of money into the empire,
which, there circulating, puts that vast machine in motion, and ren-
ders it therefore formidable. Hence the facility, or rather avidity with
which the northern powers in general embrace every opportunity of
taking subsidies. The luxury and magnificence of their courts are
thereby kept up, and their princes abundantly supplied with all the
superfluities, which vanity has made necessary, and their armies main-
tained at the expence of others. To these general motives may be
added others, the late empress of Russia had, as we have already
said, conceived a most violent aversion to the king of Prussia, and
therefore readily concurred in any measure concerted for his humil-
iation, and the more so, as they flattered her with the hopes of
extending her dominions on the Baltick, a thing long aimed at, by
the Russians; she therefore with pleasure contracted an alliance with
us, which would enable her to execute the designs of her hatred and
politicks at our expence. But finding we would not break with Prussia,
she instantly renounced our friendship, and embraced that of France,
who promised her such subsidies, as would enable her to put troops
in motion, and act according to her own principle.
was inevitably drawn into war with Charles XII’s Sweden. Known as the Great
Northern War (1700–21), after initial setbacks Peter’s Russia emerged triumphant
and secured its place as the rising great power in the east. See Robert I. Frost,
The Northern Wars: War, State, and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721 (New York:
Longman, 2000).
Of Sweden
No country has in so short a time changed the principles of its con-

stitution so much as this, except Denmark. Sweden in a very few
years, from a most despotick government, as it was in Charles the
XIIth’s time, is now the most limited monarchy in Europe. Denmark,
on the contrary, in near the same period, from a free government,
is become intirely despotick. Neither seems to have got much by the
revolution, as the power and credit of either does not appear to
have been thereby augmented at home or abroad, particularly Sweden,
whose interests in foreign courts is much sunk. The power of the
crown is too limited,10 and that of the different states which form
the constitution, too complicated, to admit of any plan that requires
wisdom in deliberation, and vigour in the execution. An attempt was
made some years ago to change the constitution, by augmenting the
power of the crown, which could not have been executed without
endangering the lives and fortunes of many: it was discovered in
time, and some of the authors punished, as those who endeavour to
subvert the constitution in favour of tyranny justly deserve. Though
the plot was rendered vain, it left, however, an universal spirit of
discontent, not to say hatred and animosity against the court, whom
they naturally supposed had favoured at least, if not promoted a
plot, calculated merely to augment the influence of the crown. They
seemed particularly exasperated against the queen,11 a woman of
superior talents, and sister to the king of Prussia, to whose instiga-
tion they attributed the attempt made against their liberty. The
French, who by subsidies, and that spirit of intrigue which distin-
guish their ministers in every court, laid hold of this occasion, to
make the Swedes declare against his Prussian majesty. The war, how-
ever, being undertaken against the will of the king,12 was prosecuted
10
The limited constituional monarchy that followed the disastrous Great Northern
War, the ‘Age of Liberty,’ saw the political system dominated by the Hats and
Caps in the aristocratic senate. See Michael Roberts, The Age of Liberty: Sweden,
1719–72 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
11
Queen Louisa Ulrika of Sweden (1720–82).
12
King Adolf Fredrik of Sweden (r. 1751–71). A member of the Holstein-Gottorp
ducal house, Bishop of Lübeck (1727–50) and nephew by marriage of Charles XII,
he became King of Sweden due to Elizabeth of Russia’s influence. Married to
Lousia Ulrika, sister of Frederick the Great, he is most known for his failed coup
to recover some lost monarchical power in 1756. Sweden joined the anti-Prussian
coalition in the Seven Years’ War hoping to regain influence and territory on the
Pomeranian coast.
preliminary discourse: of sweden 41
without vigour, and they therefore embraced the first opportunity of

concluding a peace, which they never ought to have broke. The
Swedes must keep a watchful eye on the Russians, who aim at fur-
ther conquests on the Baltick: this cannot be executed, without endan-
gering the safety of Sweden. Prussia and Denmark have a common
interest in opposing the progress of the Russians. How impolitick
therefore were the Swedes to have acted on quite contrary princi-
ples. Had the confederacy succeeded against Prussia, Sweden and
Denmark, particularly the former, would have been the victims of
their bad policy, and fell an easy prey to the ambition of Russia.
A MILITARY DESCRIPTION OF THE SEAT OF WAR
Of Bohemia and Moravia
These two great provinces belong to the empress of Germany. They

are separated from Silesia, Lusatia, Saxony, and part of Bavaria, and
Austria, by a continued chain of very high mountains, which nec-
essarily renders the communication between those countries very
difficult, there being few military roads.a The first of these goes from
Olmutz, in Moravia, to a town called Sternberg, and there divides
itself into two; the one goes by Hoff to Troppau, and Jägerndorff,
in the Austrian Silesia; the other passes by Friedland, Wurbenthal,
and Zuckmantel, and from thence goes to Neiss. These two roads,
particularly the last, may be considered as one continual defile,
formed by the mountains, ravins, rivers, &c. and therefore may, no
doubt, be defended by a few troops, if properly placed, against a
numerous army. The Prussians have indeed one very great advan-
tage: they can, by sending two corps, the one by Jägerndorff, and
the other, out of the county of Glatz, from Habelschwert towards
Altstat, and Schonberg, force the Austrians to quit any position they
may take, between Freudenthal and Neiss, by cutting off their com-
munication with Olmutz, from whence they must necessarily draw
their subsistence. Whereas these can take no central position, that
will effectually hinder the Prussians from entering Moravia, by the
way of Zuckmantel, from the county of Glatz, and by Troppau, and
unite these three columns with safety; Olmutz being too far back,
can be of no use to guard the passages between Moravia and Silesia.
As the king of Prussia cannot from any place, more conveniently,
carry on the war against the empress’s dominions, than from Neiss,
into Moravia, nor where his successes would be attended with more
fatal consequences; it is surprising her majesty has not thought proper
to oppose, on that side, a stronger barrier than Olmutz, which is
certainly a very indifferent place. The fine defence general Marshal1
a
A road where infantry, cavalry, heavy artillery, and all kind of carriages can
pass.
1
Field Marshal Ernst Dietrich, Graf Marschall von Biberstein (1692–1771).
a military description of the seat of war 43
made, during the last war, was owing as much to the weakness of
the Prussian army, as to his own talents and vigilance, as will evi-
dently appear by the history of that famous siege. This fortress is so
far back, that it leaves all the avenues leading from Silesia and Glatz,
into Moravia, quite open, and a considerable body of men cannot
be sent into the mountains, without evident risk: nothing would be
more efficacious to check the Prussians, than the building a fortress,
either in the neighbourhood of Altstadt, or between, Freudenthal
and Zuckmantel; or lastly, between Jägerndorff, and Johannisthal.
The first, would be a check on Glatz and Neiss, at the same time,
and enable the Austrians to make continual incursions into those
two provinces, without any risk: nor does it appear possible for the
Prussians to penetrate into Moravia, either from Glatz or Neiss, with-
out previously taking this fortress; because a corps of troops posted
here, and sustained by a strong garrison, would cut off all commu-
nication with those two places, and soon force an army that would
advance towards Olmutz, to fall back or perish.
The second and third, would, indeed, effectually hinder the Prussians
from advancing into Moravia, ’till they had taken them: but the
siege of them would be more easy, because such a body of troops
might be sent from upper Silesia, and from Glatz, to seize the defiles
between them, and Moravia, as would make it impossible to relieve
them.
Most men think that a camp, or fortress, is well placed, if they
cannot be approached without great difficulty, which is true only,
in case they have in themselves all the resources necessary for their
defence; but as that seldom or ever happens, the perfection of the
one and the other would be, to find a situation that presents to the
enemy all the difficulties possible; and which, at the same time, may
be easily succoured, if necessary. The difficulty to find such a situation,
or the want of that sure, coup d’œil, has determined many engi-
neers, to choose the plains for their fortresses, which frees them from
censure of having ill chose their ground, and flatters their vanity, by
giving them an opportunity, to produce all the different works they
have seen in the schools, and make such a fine appearance on paper.
Another road goes from Olmutz, by Litau and Altstadt, into the
county of Glatz. The next principal road, is that, which goes from
the circle of Königsgratz, by Neustadt and Nachod, into the county
of Glatz, and from thence into the other provinces of Silesia: it is
not less difficult than the others above-mentioned, being like them,
one continual defile, particularly, when it enters the Prussian domin-

ions, where it is almost impossible for a considerable body of troops
to march, if they meet with any resistance; especially, in going from
Bohemia towards Glatz, as the mountains rise gradually; from whence
it appears, that the Prussians can with more ease penetrate into
Bohemia, than the Austrians can, into the county of Glatz. The first
have another considerable advantage; they can be provided with
every thing from the fortress of Glatz, which gives them a safe retreat,
when pushed back by superior forces: they are masters of the avenues
which lead into Bohemia; which, being intirely open and fruitful,
they can enter with ease, and subsist for a considerable time; whereas
the Austrians cannot enter the country of Glatz at all, if the passes
are properly guarded, and even should they force back the posts
placed in them, they can find no subsistence in the country, and
must begin their operations by the siege of Glatz, which, from its
very advantageous situation, can scarce be taken, though lest to the
defence of its own garrison, and certainly not at all, if there is a
considerable body of troops in the country to sustain it.
The history of the last and preceding wars, confirms what is here
advanced. In the first, it was reduced by famine, and, in the last,
chance, cowardice, and ignorance, of all which, general Laudhon2
took proper advantages, were the immediate causes of its being taken.
The next road goes likewise from the circle of Konigsgratz, by
Trautenau and Landshut, to Schweidnitz, and Jauer, in Silesia. This,
like the others, is a continual defile, and so difficult, that when the
passes are properly guarded, no army can penetrate into Silesia, on
this side. The Prussians have a fine position near Landshut, from
whence they may, by an easy march on the left, cover the road that
goes from Friedland to Schweidnitz, and sustain effectually any corps,
they may send to Schmidberg and Hirschberg. It was from this camp
that Fouquet,3 with an inconsiderable army, so often baffled the
attempts made by the Austrians, though much superior, to penetrate
2
Gideon Ernst, Freiherr von Loudon (1716–90). Field Marshal & Irish ‘Wild
Goose.’ He began the Seven Years’ War as a Major, but rose to full General due
primarily to the Russo-Austrian victory over Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf (12
August 1759). See Franz Pesendorfer, Feldmarschall Loudon: der Sieg und sein Preis (Wien:
ÖBV, 1989).
3
Henri-Auguste, Baron de la Motte Fouqué (1698–1774). Of Huguenot ances-
try and a close friend of Frederick the Great, he was wounded and captured at
the battle of Landeshut (23 June 1760).
that way into Silesia, and was at last overpowered, and intirely
defeated in it, by his own fault.
The Prussians have here the same advantages as on the side of
Glatz. The fortress of Schweidnitz, being another place of arms, sup-
plys them with every thing they want; and being so near, enables
them to begin their operations, much sooner than the Austrians. The
mountains are filled with villages, where an army may be put in
cantonments with safety, if care is taken to occupy the defiles, between
them and Bohemia, which they can do with ease, being within the
Prussian dominions: nothing therefore, can hinder them from invad-
ing that province on this side, even if the Austrians had an army
there; because that army cannot take any position nearer the avenues
that lead into it; than behind the Elbe, some where between Konigshoff
and Königsgraatz, which can, effectually, hinder the Prussians from
advancing any farther; but cannot prevent their entring it.
When one considers that the Prussians must, from the situation
of their country, make their chief efforts on this side, as well, because
they can penetrate with safety in various columns, can be supplied,
abundantly, from Glatz and Schweidnitz, with provisions, stores, &c.
and can retire without danger in case of misfortune, one is amazed,
to see her majesty leave this province, entirely, defenceless, and
exposed to the continual ravages of the enemy. As there is no kind
of fortress, nothing less than an army, can defend it against the
incursions, that may be made from the county of Glatz, and from
the mountains of Landshut.
If the enemy once passes the Elbe, above Konigsgratz, all the
provinces on the right of that river, must be abandoned; the troops
posted on the frontiers of Lusatia, must instantly, fall back to Prague,
for fear of being cut off. Even the army itself must fall back into
the circle of Chrudim, in order to cover Moravia, and keep open
the communication with Austria and the Danube. Whereas, if a
fortress capable of containing 10,000 foot and 4,000 horse, was placed
behind the Elbe, between Königshoff, and Konigsgratz, with caserns
and magazines vaulted, bomb-proof, the Prussians, could not take
it, without infinite trouble; and it would certainly hold out some
months, if we judge by their skill, on other occasions, and give time,
to come to its relief. This situation is so advantageous, that it not
only covers the country on that side, but likewise facilitates the means
of entring Silesia. As it may be made a general place of arms, to
supply the armies destined on that side, nor can the enemy leave it
behind him and penetrate into the country, because the garrison
alone, with some croats and hussars, would cut off his communication
with Silesia and Glatz, in such a manner, as would soon force him
to retire, or make him, and his army perish, though he should leave
a corps of 20,000 men, to observe the place, to secure his convoys.
Besides, a fortress of that kind, and a numerous garrison, must
force the enemy to keep a considerable corps, both in the country
of Glatz, and in the mountains of Landshut. The advantages of
such a fortress, are infinite, and in my opinion, renders it absolutely
necessary.
The next road goes from the circle of Buntzlau, by Bakhofen,
Swigan, Libenau, Riechenberg, where it divides into two; the one
goes to Friedland, and thence towards Grieffenberg, in Silesia,
Seidenberg, in Lusatia. This road passes likewise through many very
high mountains; and therefore not easily to be passed, if there are
troops to defend the defiles.
Though the king of Prussia, will never make his chief effort on
this side, having no place of arms, at a proper distance, yet as in
every war with the Austrians, he will think it necessary to occupy
Saxony, some division of his army will always enter Bohemia, on
the side of Lusatia, while it remains quite open as at present: where-
fore it would, no doubt, be very proper, to have as near the fron-
tiers as possible, some considerable fortress, which a division of twenty
thousand men, can neither suddenly take, nor safely leave behind
them, nor could any troops take their winter quarters, any where in
the mountains, from Friedland to Schandau, or even at Grieffenberg,
Marklissa, Lauban, and Gorlitz, if a considerable fortress is placed
in the neighbourhood of Friedland: neither can the communication
be kept up between Silesia and Saxony, unless an army be posted
to secure it. To these great and obvious reasons may be added, that
as Silesia, is quite an open country, without any fortress to cover it,
from Marklissa to Crossen, near Frankfort, it might be attacked, on
that side rather, than on that of Moravia, and Bohemia, which now
can’t be done, without leaving an army to cover these two provinces.
But if they are secured, by the fortresses proposed to be made in
Moravia, and near Konigsgratz; the Austrians might, we think, enter
Silesia, by the way of Lusatia, provided they have a place of arms,
near Friedland, which would enable them, as we think, to act with
safety and vigour on that side. The want of it, rendered ineffectual,
the victories gained by the Russians at Zullichau, and Cunnersdorff,
and every attempt, the Austrians made, on the Queiss, and Bober.
Should the different fortresses, above proposed, be executed, 30,000
men, besides their garrisons, will, it’s thought, be more than sufficient
to cover Bohemia, all the remainder of her majesty’s forces, may
then, act with success on the Queiss, and Bober, otherwise not.
The next road goes likewise from the circle of Buntzlau, by Leypa,
and Gabel, to Zittau, in Lusatia: this is the least difficult of any as
yet described. In the mountain, however, about Gabel, there are
some defiles, which may easily be guarded, with few troops.
The next road goes from the same province, by Rumburg, and
from thence towards Löbau, in Lusatia. This is extreamly difficult,
and, during the course of the war, I do not remember it was taken
by any considerable corps, excepting by that of the prince of Prussia,
after the battle of Kollin. Little use can be made of these two last
roads, by the Prussians, being so far from their depots, excepting for
some division of their army, when they propose invading Bohemia
on different sides at the same time, and therefore it seems useless,
to fortify them.
The next, and one of the most important roads, in all this coun-
try, is that which goes from Prague, by Budyn, Lowositz, Aussig,
Peterswald, and Ghishubel, where it enters Saxony. This road is one
continual defile, from Lowositz to the last mentioned place, runs
close to the Elbe, from Lowositz to Aussig, where the river Bila cuts
it, another deep ravin beyond Peterswald, and a third at Ghishubel.
In each of these three places, are such advantageous positions, that
twelve or fourteen battalions, would be able to defend them against
an army, though there be no kind of fortress, and if there was a
good one, it would be scarce possible to invade Bohemia, on the
side of Saxony, with success. Whenever an army proposes passing
from the one country into the other, it is absolutely necessary to be
masters of the Elbe, because it is by that river alone, such armies
must subsist, the mountains being so high, and the roads so bad,
that for many months in the year, no carriage can pass; a fortress
therefore here, would be an invincible obstacle for an army coming
from either country.
The next road goes likewise from the plains of Lowositz, over the
mountains by Töplitz, and from thence by Zinwalde, into Saxony.
This road is very bad, and so full of defiles, that it is scarce fit for
any but infantry: there are many positions to be taken on it, the
principal one is near Toplitz.
The next goes out of the circle of Saatz, by Laun, and Commotau,
and from thence over the Basberg into Saxony. This and the next
which goes likewise from the circle of Saatz, by Caaden, over the
Kupferberg, into Saxony, are extreamly difficult, and when the defiles
have been properly guarded the Prussians have always been repulsed.
During the war, excepting in 1757, when prince Maurice passed
there in two columns. Scarce any thing but light troops ever attempted
passing these defiles.
From the circle of Ellenbogen, there go two roads, the one over
the mountains to Plauen, and the other through Egra. Both these,
are in some measure impassable, for an army coming into Bohemia,
because it would not be safe to pass through such great defiles, so
near a fortress. These are the principal roads and passes, which
occur, in the counties where the war was carried on in that part of
Germany.
Bohemia and Moravia are watered by many rivers, the principal
of which are the Teiss, which rises in the mountains of Silesia, called
Schneeberg, and runs by Altstadt, Muglitz, Littau, Olmutz, Hradisch,
&c. and falls into the Danube, at Presburg; in the latter part of its
course, it is called the Morava: it is not navigable, nor can any posi-
tion be taken on its banks, to stop an enemy coming from Silesia.
The best, however, is on the heights about Littau with the right
extending towards Olmutz, and a corps further on towards Muglitz,
otherwise a column coming down the Teiss would render that posi-
tion very hazardous. This is, no doubt, the most proper position of
any to cover Olmutz, which cannot be attacked while an army is
here, nor can it well be forced, by any indirect manœuvre to quit
it, being supplied with provisions from Olmutz, nor can an enemy
advance towards Austria, leaving that fortress, and army behind him.
There are many more, small, rivers between Olmutz and Brinn,
which, passing through the mountains, furnish every where excellent
camps. Moravia, in general, is a very strong country, and may be
defended by a small army against a very numerous one, as appeared
in the war which happened after the death of Charles the VIth. For
then prince Charles,4 aided by the great Kevenhuller,5 at the head
of a very inconsiderable body of troops, compared with those of the
4
Prince Karl Alexander of Lorraine. Austrian Field Marshal and brother of
Emperor Francis I.
5
Field Marshal Ludwig Andreas Khevenhüller, Graf zu Frankenburg (1683–1744).
enemies, drove them intirely out of that country, and Bohemia,

merely by the superiority of manœuvres, which the face of the coun-
try permitted him to execute.
The Elbe rises in the mountains of Silesia, called the Riesenge-
bürg, and runs by Arnau, Kònigshoff, Jaromitz, Kònigsgratz, Pardubitz,
Neuhoff, Kollin, Nimburg, Brandeiss, where the Iser falls into it,
Melnick, where the Moldau comes into it, Leütmeritz, above which,
the Egra falls into it, Aussig, and from thence to Kònigstein in
Saxony, it is navigable only as far as Lowositz, where it grows con-
siderable. In all this extensive course few good positions can be taken
on its banks. The first and most important of any upon it, and
indeed in the whole country, is between Konigshoff, and Kònigsgratz,
from whence an army can effectually hinder an enemy coming from
Schweidnitz and Glatz, from penetrating into the interior parts of
Bohemia.
There are other positions to be taken, between Nimburg, and
Brandeiss, which cover Prague against an army coming from Lusatia.
Between these places and Saxony, no position can be taken on its
banks, because it runs paralel, to the road that pass from the one
country into the other; so that only the right or left wing of an army
camped between Lowositz and Ausig, can be posted on it, accord-
ing as the front is placed.
On the Zaffava, one position only of consequence can be taken,
and that at Beneschau, from whence you may cover the two great
roads that lead from Prague to Vienna.
The Moldau, on which some positions may be taken, which cover
Bohemia, Upper and Lower Austria, in case any attempt be made
from Voigtland in Saxony. It was from these positions that the
French, under marshal Maillebois,6 were effectually prevented from
penetrating into Bohemia, and relieving marshal Belleisle,7 then
besieged Prague.
This is the strongest place on the river; and indeed in the whole
country, and is well fortified; but being commanded by the neigh-
bouring hills, very extensive, and divided by the Moldau, it requires
such an immense quantity of stores and artillery, and such a numerous
6
Jean-Baptiste-François Desmarets, marquis de Maillebois (1682–1762). Maréchal
de France.
7
Charles-Louis-Auguste Fouquet, comte de Belle-Isle (1684–1761), Maréchal de
France. See André Dussage, Le Ministère Belle-Isle (Paris: L. Fournier, 1914).
garrison, that it seems doubtful whether any attempt should be made

to defend it or not, excepting by a couple battalions, meerly to pro-
tect it, from plunder, by capitulating. The fate of the city, in the
war of 1741, shews the truth of this opinion. The first time, it was
taken by assault, with a garrison of near 4,000 men in it; the sec-
ond time, it resisted a very few days only; and the third, it was
abandoned precipitately by the Prussians, on their quitting Bohemia.
In this last war, its fate would have been decided in a few days
more, and it would have been taken with an army in it.
The Egra rises in the circle of that name, and runs by the town
of Egra, thence by Ellenbogen, Saatz, Laun, and Budyn; and a lit-
tle way from this last town it falls into the Elbe. The only town of
strength on this river is Egra, which is well fortified; but being com-
manded by a hill, on the left of the river, it cannot make any long
defence; and therefire in the last war, it was debated, whether it
should be dismantled, or not.
It is remarkable, that, in general, the banks on the right of this
river are highest; and consequently furnish easy means for its defence.
There are many good positions to be taken on it; the first and
principal however is, that, on the right of the river behind Budyn,
by which an enemy, coming from Saxony, by the way of Aussig,
(which, as we have said, is the principal debouché into Bohemia)
may be effectually stopped, if another strong corps is placed higher
up, towards Laun, which at the same time stops any column com-
ing by the way of Commotau. This body of troops must be strong
enough to dispute the passage, ’till the army posted at Budyn has
time to come up, which may be done by an easy march on the left;
and if in 1756 the duke of Aremberg’s8 corps had taken this posi-
tion, instead of falling back to Mickovitz, the king of Prussia would
have found it difficult to pass the Egra, and probably would have
failed in the attempt, as Gen. Brown9 could have opposed him with
a numerous army.
8
Charles-Marie-Raymond, Duc d’Arenberg (1721–78).
9
Field Marshal Maximilian Ulysses, Reichsgraf von Browne (1705–57). An Irish
‘Wild Goose,’ contemporaries considered him one of the most fiery and charismatic
of the Austrian generals. His protégé was fellow Irishman Franz Moritz Lacy. See
Christopher Duffy, The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne, 1705–1757
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1964).
This country, like most others in Europe, was formerly governed

by the feudal system; it is still so, in some measure, and notwith-
standing the vast power of the house of Austria, the nobility have
some privileges: for these reasons there is an infinite number of owns
fortified, or rather surrounded with an old wall, after the Gothic
manner, whose use is very great and extensive, as they furnish effectual
means to carry on the petite guerre with success, and consequently har-
rass an enemy extremely, by rendering his convoys and subsistence
precarious, which at last must force him to abandon the interior
part of the country, and approach the frontiers. They likewise enable
you, with a small army, to dispute every inch of ground with your
enemy, who will not presume to separate his troops ’till he has forced
you back on the Danube. For this reason, the Prussians, French,
and Saxons, in the war of 1741, though they were soon masters of
it, on the appearance of any small army against them, they were
obliged to abandon it; and indeed we don’t think it can be pre-
served, if conquered, unless you include Moravia and Austria, as far
as the Danube; then indeed, having this great river for a barrier, it
may be kept, otherwise not.
Though the country, from what we have said, will appear strong,
and is really so; it has, however, many inconveniences, which make
it impossible to hinder an invasion, particularly on the side of Silesia.
The mountains, which separate these two countries, make a part of
Silesia, and therefore belong to the king of Prussia, who is thereby
master of the defiles, near which, he has the fortresses of Neiss,
Glatz, and Schweidnitz, where he can, with ease and secrecy, make
the necessary preparations; and in one march, he may enter Bohemia
in three different columns, which nothing in the world can prevent,
as no position can be taken near enough to the Debouchés, to pre-
vent his subsisting, and encamping so advantageously, between your
army and the mountains, that you cannot force him to repass them.
The nearest and best positions that can be taken to cover the coun-
try from an invasion, on the side of Schweidnitz and Glatz, are those
already mentioned, behind the Elbe, at Königshoff and Königsgratz,
which, however, you must abandon, unless you are strong enough
to hinder him from entering Moravia on your right, by the way of
Zuckmantel, as it happened in the campaign of 1758, and out of
Bohemia on your left by Friedland and Gabel. If you fail in this,
you must instantly fall back into Moravia, to cover Vienna; or to
the Moldau, to cover Prague. In the interior part of the country,

the best position, without doubt, is that in the neighbourhood of
Collin and Czaslau, as you may from thence, in a few marches, be
either behind the Elbe at Königsgratz, approach the Moldau, or fall
back into Moravia, as the case may require.
The positions to be taken in that part of the country, are those
of Lëutomischel, Müglitz, Littau, with strong corps towards Zuck-
mantel and Troppau, to cover the debouchés on that side, where
they are securely posted, and can be attacked only in front: in which
case they fall back on your army, or on Olmutz. By taking either
of these positions you cover Moravia and Austria, and have your
communication open with Bohemia, where no enemy dare separate,
while you are in force in Moravia. Another great inconveniency in
the defence of this country, is, that no considerable magazines can
with safety be placed, any where, but at Prague and Olmutz, which
are too far back from the frontiers, and your army must be sup-
plied from thence by land carriage, a thing very difficult at the end
of a campaign, particularly if the war continues long in the coun-
try, and makes horses and oxen scarce.
Of Silesia and the County of Glatz
This country lies from the south to south-east of Bohemia. It extends

in length from Liebenau, on the frontiers of Brandenburg, to Upper
Silesia, on the frontiers of Poland and Hungary, near 240 miles. Its
breadth, including the county of Glatz, to Millitsch, on the frontiers
of Poland, is near 120 miles. It is peopled, by near a million and a
half of inhabitants, and produces an yearly avenue of about four
millions of dollars, and is one of the most fruitful and richest provinces
in Europe.
It has been already said, that it s separated from Bohemia, by a
chain of mountains, running from Zukmantel, on the frontiers of
Moravia, to Greiffenberg on the river Queiss. From Lusace, it is
separated by this river, which runs by Greiffenberg, Marklissa, and
Lauban, and falls at Halbau into the Bober. This last river serves
as a barrier, on the side of Upper Lusace, ’till it falls into the Oder
at Crossen.
The advantageous situation of this country, enables the king of
Prussia to invade Bohemia with facility and success: whereas any

attempt from Bohemia against Silesia would be attended with much
more danger and difficulty. A small army posted, any where, in the
neighbourhood of Glatz, with two corps; the one between Freywald
and Johansthal, and the other about Trautenau, would, I am per-
suaded, render any attempts against it, vain and fruitless. An army
so posted cannot be forced by any direct manœuvre, because the
country is extremely strong, and it might retire under the cannon
of Glatz: and though either of the two corps posted, as we suppose,
on the right and left, were pushed back; you could not presume to
advance into Silesia with an army, leaving the enemy in the county
of Glatz; because from thence, he could cut off your communica-
tion both with Bohemia and Moravia; and consequently, in a few
days, would force you to fall back into these countries, or perish in
the mountains, as the country between these mountains and the
fortress of Neiss and Schweidnitz, could not supply an army for two
days only. Much less could you attempt any thing against these
places, if there be any troops in the county of Glatz; or any corps,
however inconsiderable, in the neighbourhood of them, your army
must subsist from your magazines in Bohemia, which you cannot
possibly bring into Silesia, while the enemy is in force in the county
of Glatz. And though there be no enemy there, your transports,
however numerous, are soon wore out, particularly if any rain falls,
which makes the roads absolutely impassable. Then you must not
think of bringing up your heavy artillery, ammunitions, &c. till the
place is entirely invested, and you have formed a considerable mag-
azine near your camp. Such preparations require much more time
than is necessary, to enable the king to come to its relief. Hence it
appears, how difficult, the conquest of Silesia must be, while there
is any small army to cover it. The progress of the Austrians in the
campaigns of 1757, 1760, and 1761, was, we think, intirely owing
to he bad conduct of the Prussian generals; which we shall demon-
strate when we give an account of those campaigns.
This country is watered by small rivers, and, like Bohemia, is cov-
ered with woods, and intersected with hills and valleys: and conse-
quently furnishes, every where, excellent camps. The chief positions
on this side, are those in the neighbourhood of Glatz, at Frankenstein,
Wartha, &c. of which we have given an account. On the left is one
near Otmoschau, which covers Neiss: on the right is that of Landshut,
which covers Schweidnitz. There is another on the heights of Wûrben,

between Schweidnitz and Breslau, which covers both: another, behind
the Reichenbachisch Wasser, with the right at Púltzen, and the left
at Faulebrucken, which answers the same purpose: another between
Liebenthal and Löwenberg, which is excellent, and covers the country
effectually against an army advancing by the way of Görlîtz, Marklissa,
and Lauban.
Further down the Queiss, is a good camp between Naumberg and
Buntzlau, but it should not be occupied, except in some very par-
ticular case; as the enemy could pass the Queiss, ad enter Silesia on
your left, by Lauban; near which is a very good camp for a small
corps to serve as a vanguard to the army posted at Löwenberg. Still
further down, on the Bober, is a good camp at Sagan, and at
Christianstadt, which covers that side effectually.
The only navigable river in this country is the Oder, which rises
in the mountains of Hungary, not far from Jablunka. It runs by
Rattibor, Kosel, Oppelen, Teshcen, Brieg, Breslau, Gross Glogau,
Frankfort, Custrin, and Stettin, a little below which it falls into the
Baltic.
The first place of any strength, you meet with, on this river, is
Kosel, which, though very small, is strong by its situation, and could
it contain a numerous garrison, would be a respectable bulwark
against the Austrians and Hungarians. The other places we have
named, as far as Breslau, are of no other use, than to cover the
country against the incursions of light troops, and to form maga-
zines, and secure the fruits of the earth in case of war.
Breslau, the capital of Silesia, is a large and well-peopled town;
but though pretty well fortified, is not capable of making any con-
siderable defence; because it is commanded by a neighbouring height:
it has no out-works of consequence. Besides, great part of the town
or suburbs are without the wall; under the cover of which, you may
begin your approaches very near; and the ditch not being protected
by a good glacis, and a well-pallisaded covered-way, you may get
into the town in a very short time. ’Tis however, in other respects,
of great use; as you may with safety lodge there a good body of
troops to recover themselves during the winter quarters. It may like-
wise cover a camp, if the ground is well chosen. Its garrison, when
left to itself, ought to be numerous, in order to protect the country.
From Breslau, still following the course of the river, you come to
Gross Glogau, which may justly be esteemed the key and bulwark
of Lower Silesia. It is a strong fortress, when compared with those
of this country, though nothing at all compared with those of Flanders.
There are generally immense magazines, and a numerous garri-
son in this town. It covers the country so effectually, that no enter-
prise of consequence can be undertaken on that side of Silesia, until
you are master of it. The taking of it will be no easy matter, as the
king will always have an army in this neighbourhood, to observe an
enemy coming from Poland, and if it be too weak to keep the field,
it will find a secure retreat under the cannon of this fortress, from
whence it cannot be forced by any direct manœuvre. Should the
enemy attempt to leave you behind, and march to Breslau, you can
be there before him; or by sending a body of hussars into Poland,
cut off his subsistences so effectually, as to force him immediately to
abandon his designs and return to the frontiers of that country: and
as the king takes care to have all the corn of the country deposited
at Breslau and Glogau, the enemy finds nothing but the growing
crop, on which no army can subsist a day; particularly in that part
of the country bordering on the Oder, which is generally sandy, and
therefore by no means fruitful. From hence it appears, that an army
coming from Poland cannot, however numerous, undertake any thin
solid. No magazine can be formed nearer the frontiers of Silesia,
than at Posen, sixty miles from Glogau. Such a magazine, however
abundant, can scarcely supply the daily consumption of a numerous
army, while it remains in that neighbourhood, much less can it be
transported to Glogau, and supply the army there for at least two
months. How can the heavy artillery, an immense quantity of stores
necessary for such a siege, be brought there? How, therefore, under-
take it? Even supposing, what probably will never happen, that it
be left to the defence of a common garrison, and that there be no
army to cover it. This shews why the Russians could not, for want
of a sufficient magazine at Posen, approach the frontiers of Silesia
till the month of July: and then their operations were chiefly regu-
lated by the necessity of making the army subsist, rather than with
a view to any military enterprise. As they could not subsist in any
one place, long enough, to think of undertaking any thing of con-
sequence; they were, notwithstanding their repeated victories, obliged
in the month of October, to abandon a country, which their own
ravages, and the nature of the circumstances, had rendered incapable
of supporting them during the winter. They must necessarily fall

back on the Lower Vistula, where they have their magazines. For
these reasons, all the operations of this army were reduced to march-
ing from the Vistula into Silesia, and after fighting and ravaging the
country, to the returning again on the Vistula.
We shall conclude this description of Silesia with observing, that
the greatest advantage arising from the favourable situation, and
nature of this country, in our opinion, consists in this: that the king,
covered with the places of Silesia, is enabled to make all his motions
with safety and celerity; that is armies are abundantly supplied, on
the spot where they encamp; that a small corps, protected by these
places, supply the place of a great army, and that so effectually, that
nothing of consequence can be undertaken in that country while
they exist. Whoever considers attentively what we have said on this
subject, will probably feel his admiration for the king of Prussia, and
his contempt for the Austrian and Russian generals, considerably
diminished.
Further down the Oder, in the marquisate of Brandeburg, lies the
city of Francfort, a rich and populous place. It is of no other use,
however, when considered in a military view, than to cover maga-
zines, which you must form here, and at Crossen, for an army
you may send on the Warta towards Posen, and those parts of
Poland.
Further down, at the confluent of the Warta into the Oder, is
Custrin. This place is small, and not at all strong, yet the Russians,
who attacked in 1758, failed in their attempt. It held out till the
king came and relieved it, by gaining the battle of Zorndorff. This
confirms what we have said of the difficulties, attending such an
enterprise, as the siege of Glogau, or indeed any place of consider-
able strength, unless you can form your magazines near such places,
or that the country itself should be able to supply your army. But
this can never happen as to ammunitions and stores, nor even as
to subsistences; if care is taken to make the farmers deposit their
grain in those places, where a siege is expected.
The situation of Custrin is very advantageous, and may be con-
sidered as one of the chief keys of Silesia and Brandeburg, particu-
larly the last, whenever an invasion is expected from the Lower
Vistula, that is, from Warsaw to Dantzig.
Some one column must pass here, and it would be no ways safe
to penetrate into Brandeburg, without having previously taken Custrin

and Stettin. It were to be wished, that some means could be found
to augment the fortifications of the former, so as to make it capa-
ble of holding a numerous garrison of horse and foot. This would
add infinitely to its importance, and it would then effectually cover
the country on that side. Stettin, from its situation chiefly, is capa-
ble of a long defence, as appeared when it was taken from the
Swedes, in the beginning of this century. It is of infinite consequence
to the king of Prussia, as it covers Brandeburg and Pomerania, in
such a manner, that though these provinces may be overrun and
ravaged, they can never be conquered: and we doubt whether any
of those powers, who may hereafter have views on this town, will
be in a condition to take it, without having made a couple of suc-
cessful campaigns, there being so many things to be done previous
to the siege of such a place.
Colberg is on the sea coast, and though many miles distant from
Stettin, it may be considered as an outwork to that place, it being
the only post in that neighbourhood, where magazines may be formed
to besiege that fortress. No considerable supply of provisions can be
got, from the products of the country: it must be brought from
Livonia, Finland, Sweden, &c. by sea. So must the artillery, ammu-
nitions, and stores, which cannot be transported from the Vistula by
land. Hence it appears of what consequence Colberg is; and we are
therefore much surprised, that the king of Prussia should have
neglected this place. Its fortifications are small and insignificant be-
yond conception, and could not, if properly attacked, have held out
two days. The defence it made redounds as much to the honour of
the governor, as it does the imputation of ignorance in the besiegers.
If this place was made fit to hold a garrison of 4,000 foot, and
2,000 horse, we think it would be impregnable to a Russian army;
as they could scarce ever be provided with the necessary means to
reduce it. Besides, it would effectually stop the progress of an army
coming that way; especially if Custrin was likewise put in the situ-
ation we have mentioned. Glogau, Custrin, Colber, and Stettin, may
be rendered insuperable barriers, on this side the Prussian domin-
ions; as Neiss, Glatz, and Schweidnitz, are on the other. The putting
of these places in a respectable condition, is the more necessary, as
Pomerania and Brandeburg are open on that side, and have absolutely
no interior defence.
Map 1. A Map of Part of the Seat of War in Germany between the Prussians and the Austrians
begun in 1756.
The frontiers of Pomerania, towards the Swedes and Mecklenburgers,

are strong by nature, and do not require the help of art; as the
Prussians are too powerful to fear any thing from that quarter.
Of Prussia I shall only say, it cannot be effectually defended while
it depends on the house of Brandeburg; because those who attack
it are borderers, and have therefore at hand all the means that can
insure success, and all the resources necessary to recover themselves
after a defeat: whereas those who are to defend it, are deprived of
every advantage, and were they subject to no other loss, than what
naturally attends war, in one campaign, they would be reduced to
the necessity of abandoning it, as they could not possibly be recruited
in time, receive horses for remounting their cavalry, or be supplied
with stores, &c. we are therefore surprised his majesty should attempt
to defend it. He, probably, held the Russians in such contempt, that
he did not doubt of their being easily beaten, and forced back into
their own country. But he saw his error, and therefore, after his
first campaign, abandoned the country. Could his majesty change
this country with the Poles for that on the Lower Vistula, it would
be much for his advantage. I shall dwell longer on the subject of
defending a distant country, when I examine the war in Westpha-
lia and Portugal, independent of politics, and merely in a military
view.
To the left of Pomerania, the king has the strong fortress of
Magdeburg on the Elbe, a place of great strength, and of equal
importance; as he may form there in twenty-four hours, such a body
of troops, as will keep in awe the Saxons on the one side, and
Holstein, Mecklenburg, and Hanover on the other. As to the king’s
dominions on the Rhine, we rather think there should be no fortress:
because it would be almost impossible to defend them against an
enemy who is on that frontier: and it would be too difficult to wrest
them from him, should he become master of them: whereas, if left
open, he will be obliged to abandon them.
The fate of Wesel in this last war confirms our opinion.
Of Saxony and Lusace
In speaking of Bohemia and Silesia, we have already said, that the

first is separated from Saxony by a chain of mountains running from
Egra to Pirna, and from Lusace by the same chain of mountains
running from Pirna to Freidland. From this place, Lusace is sepa-

rated from Silesia, by the Queiss and Bober. In all this, so exten-
sive, frontier, nor indeed on that towards Brandeburg and Thuringue,
can any position be taken, by any army the elector of Saxony can
raise, so as to cover his country effectually, because it is not strong,
either by art, or nature. However, to preserve the capital from an
enemy, coming by the way of Aussig from Bohemia, a camp may
be taken behind the ravin of Ghishubel, or further back at Gross
Zedlitz: this indeed is a resource for a few days only, because the
enemy, by marching a column on the right of the Elbe by Schandau,
may come and encamp on the heights of Weissenhirsch, from whence
he will soon destroy Dresden, or force you to a composition: still
more useless would any camp in Lusace be, because you can from
no one place there, cover that country, or any part of Saxony, either
towards Bohemia, or on the side of Brandeburg and lower Saxony.
The situation of the Prussian dominions enables his majesty to
form different points of attack from Magdeburg, Brandeburg, and
Silesia, and his being so much superior to the elector of Saxony,
would render all the efforts of that prince in the defence of his coun-
try vain. It is an unhappy situation; but such it is. Saxony alone
cannot withstand either Prussia or Austria; and therefore, by force,
or persuasion, must be made a party in every war between these
contending rivals. And as the country is intirely open on the side of
Prussia, he can over-run it and be at the capital, before it is possi-
ble for the Austrians to bring an army to cover it. We think, there-
fore, that Saxony should unite herself to the house of Brandeburg.
In the beginning of the war, which happened at the death of Charles
the sixth, Saxony was connected with Prussia, and certainly suffered
nothing from this connection; and had she not altered her system,
it is my opinion she might have reaped some advantages from this
union. In the last part of that war, she was united with Austria, and
was the victim of it. In a few days, Saxony was lost, and could not
be recovered, but by the mediation of England, and on such terms
as the victor thought proper to impose.
The transactions of this last war confirm our opinion, and shews
the absolute necessity of changing her political system. She must for-
get that she has been equal to the house of Brandeburg: her jeal-
ousy must give way to sentiments of self-preservation, which we think
can be insured only by entering into strong and close connections
with Prussia.
The interior of this country is intersected by many small rivers,

and by an infinite number of ravins, generally so deep, that they
are almost impassable. Parallel to the Elbe runs the Mulda; it rises
in the mountains called the Ertzgeburg, and it falls into the Elbe,
near Dessau. Its farthest distance from the Elbe, is about twelve
miles: though it is no where very high and craggy, it is impossible
to pass it, if you meet with the least opposition.
Between this river and the Elbe, are many good camps, but no
one position that can effectually cover the capital.
The first camp is on the right of the Weistritz, with the right wing
at Plauen, and the left, on the mountain by Potchapel. To make
this camp secure, you must have a strong corps on the other side
of the ravin by Posendorff, between Rabenau and Dippoldiswalda,
to cover your flank and watch Friberg. The enemy coming up the
Elbe may encamp with safety, on the heights of Kesselsdorff.
The second camp is further down the Elbe, with the right at
Monzig, and the left at Rothschönberg, with a deep ravin in front,
through which runs a marshy rivulet.
On the other side of this ravin, is another excellent camp, called
the Kattsenhauser, which the Prussians have often occupied during
the war. They likewise occupied one near Meissen; which was as
bad as possible, as will be evident, when we come to give an account
of some actions which have passed there, during the war.
The third is at Lomatch. The fourth is at Ochatz, which may be
made very strong, by throwing up some few redoubts before the
center, and beyond the right.
The fifth is at Strehlen, which is good, whichever way it is taken;
but you must have a corps at Hubertzburg.
The last of any consequence is at Torgau; which is a good one
whatever way you place your front. However strong these camps
may be in front, no army can remain long in them, if they are not
secured by strong corps, on the left side of the Mulda, and on the
right of the Elbe; but if this precaution is neglected, an army, for
example, destined to cover Dresden and Bohemia, must instantly fall
back on that town, to secure its communication with Bohemia, if
the enemy sends a corps, beyond the Mulda or the Elbe. The same
thing will happen to an army coming up that river; a corps posted
beyond those rivers will soon force him back to secure his commu-
nication with the Lower Elbe, and with Brandeburg. This will be
confirmed by the operations of the war in that country.
Having explained the views of the different powers at war, and

given a proper description of the country, wherein it was prosecuted.
We shall now proceed to give an account of its various operations,
hoping to make it an useful, and agreeable work to all military men;
for whose use it was chiefly undertaken.
CAMPAIGN OF 1756
The king of Prussia attempted to enter into a negotiation with the

court of Vienna, and by that means gain time, by which he hoped
to find some methods of dissolving the confederacy; or at least to
prevent its immediate effect. But, finding all his proposals rejected
with disdain, he resolved to anticipate his enemy’s designs, and carry
the war into their dominions, rather than wait their attacking him
in his own.1 The possession of Saxony is not only convenient, but
almost necessary, in order to invade Bohemia with success. His
majesty therefore determined to occupy it; he was the more confirmed
in this resolution, as he knew the elector had tacitly concurred in
all the schemes concerted for his ruin, and waited only for a sure
opportunity to concur also in the execution.
With this view, an army, consisting of near seventy battalions and
eighty squadrons, divided into three different corps, entered the elec-
torate on the 29th of August: the right wing composed one, and
marched, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunswic, from
the duchy of Magdeburg, by Hall, Leipsig, Borna, Chemnitz, Friberg,
and Dippoldiswalda, and thence towards Dresden, the place designed
for the rendezvous of the army. The center, commanded by the king
in person, composed the second corps, and marched on the left of
the Elbe, by Wittenberg, Torgau, Meissen, and thence by Kesselsdorff
to Dresden. The left wing formed the third corps, and was com-
manded by the duke of Bevern,2 who marched from the neighbour-
hood of Frankfort on the Oder, by Elsterwerda, Bautzen, Stolpen,
and Lohmen, and there encamped on the right of the Elbe opposite
to Pirna. The whole Prussian army assembled in the neighbourhood
1
For a detailed examination of Frederick’s decision to unleash a preemptive
strike see Herbert Butterfield, The Reconstruction of an Historical Episode: The History of
the Enquiry into the Origins of the Seven Years’ War (Glasgow: Glasgow University
Publications, 1951).
2
August Wilhelm, Duke of Brunswick-Bevern (1715–81). Prussian Lt. Gen. and
a noted man of learning. He educated his soldiers by hiring both professors to give
lectures on mathematics and geometry and his foreign soldiers to teach them their
language. Defeated and captured at the battle of Breslau (22 November 1757), he
was later named governor of Stettin and pursued Swedish flotillas on the Oder
throughout 1758–59.
campaign of 1756 65
of Dresden, on the 6th of September. His majesty’s intention seems

to have been to persuade the king of Poland to join him in attack-
ing Bohemia, or, which is more probable, in case of a refusal, to
have a pretence for seizing Saxony, as it really happened soon after.
The disposition of the king’s march into Saxony, we think very
fine, as there was not above 15,000 men in that country; which were
not assembled, as yet, in a body; and, even had they been so, they
were still inferior to either of the king’s columns, nor could they
advance against any one of them without being cut off from Dresden
by the other two, as appears evident from the inspection of the map
of that country.
Encouraged by these considerations, he resolved to reject the pro-
posals made him by the king of Prussia; how honestly we will not
pretend to determine, but not wisely, as will evidently appear when
we come to give our observations on this transaction.
The king of Prussia, who proposed invading Bohemia, and reduc-
ing it to his obedience before the empress could assemble her troops,
or any of the other confederates be in a condition to attack him,
had, on his entering Saxony, ordered marshal Schwerin,3 at the head
of the army, consisting of thirty three battalions and fifty-five squadrons,
to enter that province by the way of Nachod and Neustadt. But,
finding the Saxons would not come into his terms, and were so
advantageously encamped that he could not force them, he found
it necessary to change his plan of operations.
He did not think it safe to penetrate into Bohemia and leave the
Saxons masters of the Elbe behind him, as he had no magazines in
that country; nor could he convey, what little was to be found, over
those immense defiles into Bohemia, not having transports sufficient
for that purpose. For these reasons he resolved to reduce the Saxons
before he advanced any further: to prevent them from receiving any
succours; secure a passage for himself, when found necessary; and
observe the motions of the Austrians, a considerable corps, first under
the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and afterwards
under that of marshal Keith,4 was sent to take post at Johnsdorff in
3
Kurd Christoph, Graf von Schwerin (1684–1757).
4
Field Marshal James Francis Edward Keith (1696–1758). Son of 9th Earl
Marischal and brother of George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal. He spoke German
badly and was mistrusted by native Prussian officers. This was offset by Frederick’s
favor and esteem for the soft-spoken Keith, who was professional and knowledgable
Bohemia. Marshal Schwerin was ordered to keep his position at

Aujest, opposite to Königsgratz. This, the king justly imagined, would
oblige the Austrians to send an army on that side to oppose his fur-
ther progress; and, if they thus divided their forces, their efforts to
disengage the Saxons, should they attempt it, as most probably they
would, must be much less formidable.
The empress, either with an intention to conceal her designs against
the king of Prussia ’till she and her allies were sufficiently prepared
to execute them, or from the uncertain, slow, and dilatory counsels
of her ministry, had not as yet assembled any considerable forces in
Bohemia: however, on the motions of the Prussians, she ordered all
those that were then in the country to form two camps: the small-
est, commanded by prince Piccolomini,5 at Königsgratz, to oppose
Schwerin: the greatest, commanded by marshal Brown, at Kollin,
which was destined to march as soon as possible to the relief of the
Saxons.
The king encamped at Gross Zedlitz, in the neighbourhood of
Pirna: his whole care was to block up the Saxons, and reduce them
by famine, as he could not attack them with any probability of suc-
cess. In this he succeeded to his wish; for, before the end of September,
they were reduced to the most deplorable condition, and in want of
every thing.
The empress, informed of their situation, and knowing that it
depended on that army, whether Bohemia or Saxony should be
made the seat of war, ordered M. Brown to march, and attempt to
relieve them at any rate. Upon this the marshal quitted his camp
at Kollin, and arrived the 23d of September at Budyn on the Egra,
in order to be at hand to concert measures with the Saxons for suc-
couring them. Here he was forced to remain ’till the 30th, to wait
for the artillery and pontoons, then preparing at Vienna.
In this situation things continued ’till the 28th, when his majesty,
accompanied by some general officers, went to marshal Keith’s camp,
in order to examine that position, and change it, if any motions of
the enemy should make it necessary, and then return to the camp
about the world. He was killed at the battle of Hochkirch (14 October 1758). See
Sam Coull, Nothing but My Sword: The Life of Field Marshall James Francis Edward Keith
(Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2000).
5
Field Marshal Ottavio Eneo Giuseppe Piccolomini, Duca di Amalfi (1698–
1757). Commander-in-Chief of Austrian troops in Moravia (1753–57).
campaign of 1756 67
of Pirna. But, while he was here; advice was brought him, that
M. Brown, having at length got his artillery and pontoons, was
preparing to pass the Egra; which shewed plainly his intention of
relieving the Saxons.
The king thought he could not frustrate this design more effectually,
than by advancing further into Bohemia, and force M. Brown back,
by a battle, if necessary. His majesty, therefore, ordered his van-
guard, consisting of eleven squadrons, 400 hussars, and six battal-
ions, to march on the 29th of September from the camp of Johnsdorff,
and occupy that at Tirmitz, beyond the ravin and river at Aussig.
Being here further informed, that the enemy was to pass the Egra
that very day, and encamp at Lowositz, he thought it necessary to
pass the mountains at Bascopol and Kletchen, put the defiles behind
him, and occupy the avenues leading into the plain before M. Brown’s
camp; that he might, without difficulty, advance and attack him, if
he found it convenient; and therefore, as soon as the head of the
army, which had been ordered to follow to Tirmitz, appeared, he,
on the 30th in the morning, with the vanguard, set out for Welmina;
where the whole army arrived, without any other difficulty but the
badness of the roads, at eight o’clock at night.
The king fearing the enemy would march in the night, and occupy
the mountains of Radostitz and Lobosch, and, by taking such a posi-
tion, not only make it impossible to attack them, but force his majesty
to fall back to Aussig, which could not be done without the utmost
difficulty, he resumed his march, passed the ravin, and occupied the
mountains on the other side; the vanguard in C.C. and the rest of
the army in G.G. where they remained the whole night, in the order
they had marched; it being too late to camp, and the more so as
the ground had not been sufficiently reconnoitred.
The first of October, in the morning, the Prussian army, consist-
ing of sixty-five squadrons, twenty-six battalions, and 102 pieces of
cannon, was formed in I.I. the infantry in two lines, and the cavalry
in three, behind; as well for want of ground, as from its nature,
which rendered it improper for cavalry to act in.
The right wing of the infantry was posted in the village of Radostitz,
at he foot of a hill of the same name. Before this is another hill,
called the Homolkaberg, which, though much lower than the former,
is however so high that it commands all the plain underneath, as
far as the village of Sulowitz. The king afterwards advanced his right
wing to this hill, and placed a battery of heavy cannon upon it.
Illustration 1
campaign of 1756 69
Illustration 2
The center occupied the valley formed by that mountain and the
Loboschberg, on which the left wing was posted: this last mountain
is prodigiously high and steep, and runs into the plain, almost to
Lowositz. The side of it is covered with vineyards, which are sepa-
rated by stone walls; in these M. Brown had posted some thousand
Croats, who were sustained by several battalions of Hungarian infantry;
K.K. parallel to these mountains, and at some few hundred yards
distant from the foot of them, runs a marshy rivulet, which in many
places spreads itself in the plain, and forms several large lakes; between
this rivulet and the hills, on which the Prussian army formed, runs
also a very deep ravin, from Sulowitz to Lowositz. The only passes
over this rivulet and ravin are at these two villages, and over a nar-
row stone bridge between them. The ground behind this rivulet rises
a little, particularly towards Sulowitz; on this the Austrian army con-
sisting of seventy-two squadrons, fifty-two battalions, and ninety-eight
pieces of cannon, was posted. It was formed in two lines, and a
corps de reserve: the infantry was in the center, and the cavalry on
the wings, as usual; that on the right, however, a little before the
action began, marched forwards, and occupied the plain N.N. on the
left of the village of Lowositz, L.L. M. Brown had ordered this vil-
lage to be fortified, and had placed some of his best infantry in it,
with a prodigious quantity of artillery. He had likewise raised a large
battery, and some redoubts, on the plain before it. By this means
he thought he had rendered his right inattackable; his center, and
left, covered by the marshy rivulet, and the ravin above-mentioned,
were in reality so; and therefore he resolved to wait the event in
that position.
As to the king’s disposition we have nothing to say; excepting that
from the beginning he ought to have placed his cavalry in the cen-
ter, from Loboschberg to Kinitz; this would have enabled him to
leave more infantry upon the Homolka mountain; and to have rein-
forced still more his left, where he proposed making his chief effort.
From this position he might have sustained those squadrons he sent
to attack the enemy’s horse, whereas they could be of no use behind
the infantry, as they could not, in that situation, protect it, in case
they were repulsed at Lowositz.
The king’s activity in marching from Johnsdorff to Welmina shews
he knew how important it was to put the defile behind him; a gen-
eral maxim, when you advance towards an enemy, which we pre-
campaign of 1756 71
sume to recommend, for reasons too obvious, in our opinion, to

require an explanation.
The Austrians should, we think, have sent some heavy artillery
on the right of the Elbe, and have placed a battery, as we have rep-
resented in the plan; this would have taken the Prussian infantry in
the flank, while they advanced through the plain, from the Lobosch-
berg, to attack Lowositz. Why the Austrian horse passed the ravin
to attack the Prussians in Q.Q. we cannot conceive; as it could not
serve any purpose whatever.
The action begun, about seven in the morning, between the
Prussian’s left wing, and the troops which M. Brown had posted in
the Loboschberg; and was sustained by an irregular fire, without any
considerable advantage on either side ’till near 12 o’clock: then the
day, which had been so foggy that nothing could be distinguished
at the distance of a hundred yards, began to clear up. A large body
of Austrian horse N.N. was discovered in the plain by Lowositz, as
well as some infantry in and about that village, and at the redoubts
and battery. As no regular line appeared then, the king thought it
was only the rear-guard; and he was the more persuaded of this,
because, from some motions heard the night before, in the enemy’s
camp, he imagined the army had either passed the Elbe at Leutmeritz,
or was retired back to the old camp at Budyn. To be certain, how-
ever, he ordered a regiment of dragoons and some horse O.O. to
pass through the intervals of the infantry and attack that cavalry.
They did so in Q.Q. and drove them back beyond the ravin: in pur-
suing them, they advanced so far, that they were exposed to a heavy
cannonade from Lowositz and Sulowitz, and it was with great difficulty
and loss that they could retire under the protection of their infantry
in R. from whence they were commanded to resume their first posi-
tion behind the line.
By this time the fog was intirely dissipated, and the Austrian army
appeared very clearly, in the position we have shewn in the annexed
plan.
The king, having examined it for some time, judged the right to
be weakest for many reasons, and chiefly, by its being commanded
from the Loboschberg. He therefore ordered his second line to enter
into the first, with the cavalry in the center, that he might extend
his front and occupy the Homolka and Loboschberg in force: this
being soon executed, the whole army marched, inclining always to
the left; from whence he proposed making his attack. This left being
reinforced, and protected by the fire of a very numerous and well-
served artillery, advanced down the Loboschberg towards Lowositz,
and with great ease drove the Croats K.K. though supported by the
best of the Austrian infantry, out of the vineyards into the plain:
this will appear very natural from the description we have given of
this mountain, which overlooked the vineyards in such a manner,
that the troops placed in them could not raise their heads high
enough to direct their shot at the Prussians while they came down,
and consequently made but a feeble resistance.
M. Brown sent several battalions of his best infantry from his right
to sustain them in the mountains; and general Lacy, who commanded
them, made several vigorous, but fruitless, attacks at the foot of the
mountain, in one of which he was wounded. At last he was con-
vinced it was needless to renew the attempt, and therefore fell back
towards Lowositz.
The Prussians, being now quite masters of Loboschberg, were
ordered to halt at the foot of it, in order to reform the line, which
had been a little disordered, as well by the action itself, as by the
irregularity and difficulty of the ground, and to bring up the artillery:
a precaution so necessary, that the neglect of it has very often been
the cause of the loss of many battles which might have been won.
As soon as they were formed, they advanced in several lines towards
Lowositz, keeping their left close to the Elbe to avoid the fire of the
battery L.L. the right still continued on the Homolka mountain: by
this disposition the enemy’s left and center were prevented from
attempting any thing on that side, and the king was enabled to with-
draw his left without danger, if it was repulsed at Lowositz: which
indeed was not very probable; because, from the situation of the
ground, he could reinforce it with greater facility, and in much less
time, than the enemy could his right: consequently could bring a
greater number of men into action, at the same time, which gener-
ally must decide the fate of it.
Marshal Brown, believing that the victory depended on his being
able to keep Lowositz, threw almost his whole right wing into it,
and about it; the action therefore was here, long and obstinate; at
length however it was determined in favour of the Prussians, and
chiefly by the help of their artillery, which had set the village on
fire. This circumstance, and the want of ground to form upon, put
the Austrians in confusion; and, as they could not be sustained by
campaign of 1756 73
Map 2. Plan of the battle of Lowositz fought on the 1st of October between the Prussians
commanded by the King & the Austrians commanded by M. Brown & won by the former.
a proper line for want of room, the communications not having been
made broad enough to permit three or four battalions to march up
in front to support them, they were forced to abandon it, and fall
back with precipitation on their cavalry.*
Marshal Brown, seeing his right wing forced, ordered his left to
advance through the village of Sulowitz W.W. and attack the enemy’s
right: this they attempted to execute, but in vain; a small number
only of the infantry could pass the village; and those were unable
to form on the other side under the fire of a numerous heavy artillery,
which played on them from the battery on the Homolka mountain,
within a few hundred yards of the damm over which they were to
pass the marshy rivulet at Sulowitz: the few who had passed were
therefore obliged to fall back instantly into the village, which they
repassed in confusion, as many houses were already on fire.
This attempt of the marshal’s was too unreasonable to have been
undertaken with any other view, as we think, than merely to draw
the enemy’s attention that way, and gain time to put his right in
some order, and facilitate a retreat.
This he executed in a masterly manner, V.V. He ordered his cen-
ter and left to make a movement to the right, by which they occu-
pied the ground, in the instant the right quitted it, behind Lowositz.
This infantry, sustained by the right wing of the cavalry, covered
the retreat so effectually, that no attempt was made to trouble it.
The marshal took a new position a little further back: the left and
center continued at some distance behind the marshy rivulets, and
the right formed an angle with the line, having the front towards
the plain, behind Lowositz and the Elbe. So that the enemy could
not pass through Lowositz and form on the plain, with his rear
immediately on the Elbe, under the fire of a numerous artillery; and
the less so, as, to form such a line, his battalions and squadrons
must have presented their flank in marching to take up their ground.
These reasons induced, or rather forced, the king to remain satisfied
with the advantage he had gained, and keep his line behind Lowositz,
X.X. While marshal Brown continued in this position, the king had
* When a village is intended to be supported, the retrenchment must be sepa-

rated from the houses by an interval, sufficient for the troops to form in, between
the houses and retrenchments; and the village must be cleared behind, that you
may march two or more battalions in front, otherwise you cannot defend it; the
instant ’tis put on fire you must abandon it in such confusion as sometimes com-
municates to the whole line.
campaign of 1756 75
by no means effected his design. The action was not any ways deci-
sive, and therefore had not made it impossible for M. Brown to
attempt the relief of the Saxons. He was now just as much in a con-
dition to undertake it as before the action, his loss having been infe-
rior to that of the Prussians; neither could the king attack him with
any probability of success, as he must, in passing the marshy rivulet,
expose his army to those difficulties which M. Brown had, by expe-
rience, found unsurmountable.
From this very embarrassing situation his majesty’s superior tal-
ents extricated him. He sent the duke of Bevern with a large body
of horse and foot to Tschiskovitz, as if he proposed turning the
enemy’s left flank, and hemm them in between the Elbe and the
Egra. This manœuvre had its desired effect. Marshal Brown, fear-
ing the event, hastened to repass this last river, and occupy his old
camp at Budyn, which he did without any loss.
Thus ended the battle of Lowositz, which begun at 7 o’clock, and
ended at three. Both parties claim the victory. It must however be
confessed that the Prussians have the best right to it, if we judge
from the consequences of the action, which is the only certain rule
to go by in similar cases.
The Austrians did certainly intend to disengage the Saxons, and
with that view advanced to Lowositz. The king could have no other
object in view than to prevent their executing this plan. This end
was obtained by the battle of Lowositz, and the subsequent manœu-
vres, which forced the Austrians back behind the Egra, and so hin-
dered them from undertaking any thing of consequence for he relief
of their friends the Saxons. Had the Prussians gained a more com-
pleat victory, they would have been enabled to take their winter
quarters in Bohemia.
The loss of the Austrians on this occasion amounted to 19 officers,
420 private men, killed: 105 officers, 1,729 men, wounded: 711 miss-
ing, or taken prisoners: and 475 horses killed and wounded: in all,
2,984. Among the dead was count Radicati,* lieutenant general of
horse, who commanded the right wing. Among the wounded and
* Count Radicati was born in Piemont. In 1739 he was lieutenant colonel in

Vernes’s horse; wounded at the battle of Grotzka; in 1740 was made a colonel; in
1745 a major general; in 1751 he obtained a regiment; and in 1754 a lieutenant
general. He had the reputation of a good officer, and particularly for his talents in
exercising the troops.
missing was major general prince Lobowitz, and many field officers.
Among the many who distinguished themselves; Marshal Brown, in
his letter to the empress, takes particular notice of general Odonell,†
who, after the death of Radicati, commanded the right wing of the
cavalry, prince Lowenstein,6 Lacy, &c. &c. The loss of the Prussians,
in the cavalry, amounted to 11 officers, 281 private men, killed: 28
officers, 424 men, wounded: 8 officers, 238 private men, prisoners.
In the infantry, 5 officers, 423 men, killed: 53 officers, 1374 men,
wounded: 5 officers, 458 men, taken prisoners. In all, 3,308. Among
the dead were major generals Oertzen,* Lúderitz,† and Quadt.‡ And
among the wounded was lieutenant general Kleist,_ who died soon
after his wounds.
†
Count Odonell [Karl Claudius O’Donell (1715–71)] is born of a very good
family in Ireland: he was for some time lieutenant colonel in Ollone’s dragoons; in
1742 a colonel of Baleyra’s; in 1746 a major general, as a recompence for his brav-
ery and conduct at the battle of Parma. In the expedition against Provence he com-
manded a detached corps with reputation. In this battle he commanded the right
wing during the greatest part of the action, and distinguished himself very much,
for which he had a regiment given him, and was made a lieutenant general. We
shall have occasion to mention this gentleman often, in the course of this work,
with great applause.
6
Field Marshal Christian Philipp, Prinz von Lowenstein-Wertheim (1719–69).
* This gentleman was a major general of horse: he had in his youth studied at
Halle, in Saxony: he was a long time a standard bearer and subalter in the gens
d’armes; in 1725 a captain of horse; in 1739 a major; in 1741 a lieutenant colonel:
and having distinguished himself at the battle of Soor he had the ordre pour le
merite; in 1745 was a colonel; in 1750 a major general; in 1752 had a regiment
given him: at this battle he received three wounds in the head, of which he died
the next day.
†
Major general Lúderitz was born in 1699. In 1715 was an under officer in the
Potsdam guard; in 1719 a cornet; in 1725 a captain of horse; in 1740 a major; in
1743 a lieutenant colonel, and distinguished himself very much at the battles of
Hohenfriedberg and Kesselsdorff; in 1745 a colonel; in 1752 a major general. His
body was tore to pieces by a cannon ball.
‡
Baron Quadt was in 1728 a major; in 1736 a lieutenant colonel; in 1743 a
colonel; in 1747 a major general; and then obtained a regiment.
_
Lieutenant general [Friedrich Wilhelm] Kleist was born in 1688. In 1702 he
was a cadet; in 1708 wounded in the foot, which left the bone crooked for ever
after; soon after he went into the Palatin service, and served the war in Flanders
’till the peace in 1712; in 1716 he returned into the Prussian service; in 1724 was
made a major; in 1729 he went as volunteer to Corsica; in 1738 was lieutenant
colonel; in 1742 a colonel, and was in almost all the actions of that war in Silesia;
in 1745 a major general; in 1747 had a regiment; in 1756 a lieutenant general. In
the battle of Lowositz he was wounded; he continued however on horseback, with-
out binding his wounds, ’till 4 o’clock. Soon after the king gave him the order of
the black eagle. He died of his wounds in January following at Dresden.
campaign of 1756 77
Marshal Brown, having failed in his attempt to relieve the Saxons

on the left of the Elbe, resolved to try his fortune on the right. It
was agreed that the Saxons should pass the Elbe, the 11th of October
in the night, near Königstein; and that the marshal should attack
the Prussians at Ratmansdorff and Borsdorff the 12th in the morn-
ing, while the Saxons did the same on their side. Accordingly he,
at the head of about 8,000 men, passed the Elbe near Raudnitz,
and marched by Neustadtel, Romburg, and Hanspach, and arrived
at Lichtenhayn, where he encamped, waiting to hear the Prussians
and Saxons engaged, (which he knew must happen the instant these
last passed the Elbe) that he might likewise enter into action, and
execute his part of the concerted plan.
The weather had been so remarkably rainy and stormy, that the
Saxons could not effect their passage over the Elbe ’till the 13th at
four o’clock in the morning, and then with much difficulty and loss
of time. This gave the Prussians an opportunity of reinforcing all
their posts on the right of the Elbe, so that the Saxons found them-
selves opposed by forces much superior to what they expected. The
ground on the right side of the Elbe, about Pirna and Königstein,
is intersected by high mountains, covered with thick woods; they are
separated by deep ravins, formed by the rain in autumn, and by
the melting snow in the beginning of summer; there are consequently
very few practicable roads. These the Prussians had occupied, and
fortified, with the utmost care, by retrenchments, abattis, &c.
Among these great mountains is the Lilienstein, extremely high,
and so near the Elbe, that there is no room to form upon between
the foot of it and the banks of the river; and only one very narrow
road.
The Saxons passed the Elbe opposite to this mountain, and endeav-
oured to form; but the want of room did not permit it; and there-
fore they lay together in confusion, on and about a small eminence,
near the village of Ebenheit. From this situation, surrounded by every
difficulty which art and nature could oppose, it was justly, as we
think, judged impossible for them to extricate themselves.
The Prussians, in the mean time, had entered the camp of Pirna
early in the morning of the 13th, where they found the rear-guard
of the Saxons, and most of the baggage; both fell into their hands,
the bridge having been broke before any considerable part of them
could pass: destitute of every resource, extenuated with hunger and
cold, having been under arms from the 12th at night ’till the 14th
in the morning, deprived of all hopes of being succoured by M. Brown,

who now informed them of his being only at Lichtenhayn, and that
he could not advance any nearer, it was resolved to capitulate; he,
on his part, having waited above two days without receiving any
intelligence from the Saxons, thought it necessary to provide for his
own safety, and therefore retired. He lost no more than 200 men
in his retreat, which was trifling, if we consider that he might have
been cut off entirely, had the Prussians, encamped at Lowositz, been
a little more vigilant; because they might have passed the Elbe,
behind him, near Lowositz, or Leutmeritz.
During this transaction the king arrived, the 14th in the morn-
ing, at his army in Saxony, and, after much negotiating, a treaty
was concluded with the king of Poland on the 18th, by which it was
stipulated, that the Saxon army should disperse, and engage not to
serve against the king of Prussia, who was to remain master of
Saxony; and that the king of Poland should have leave to retire into
that kingdom.
The king of Prussia having thus accomplished his designs, for this
campaign, ordered his armies to quit Bohemia. This was accordingly
done before the end of the month. That commanded by marshal
Schwerin fell back into Silesia, and cantoned on the frontiers of
Bohemia from Zuckmantel to Greiffenberg. That under the king can-
toned in Saxony, and formed a chain from Egra to Pirna, and from
thence through Lusace, as far as the Queiss.
Thus ended the campaign of 1756, which lasted only two months;
the transactions of it however justly demand our attention, as well
for the reputation of the generals, as for the importance of its event;
we shall therefore give our observations on the one, and the other.
The king of Prussia seems to have committed some faults, both
as a politician, and as a general. He had known, a long time before
he entered Saxony, that a formidable confederacy was forming against
him: and yet it does not appear that he ever attempted to make any
alliance to counterballance it, and render its effect vain; which, con-
sidering the great ascendancy he had acquired in Europe, he might
probably have done.
He confided too much in himself, and had too despicable an opin-
ion of his enemies, which might, and indeed ought, naturally to have
proved fatal to him.
The next fault that occurs is, that he did not begin the war in
1755, or at least in April 1756; he was then as well prepared, as in
campaign of 1756 79
the month of August, when he entered Saxony; whereas his enemies

were infinitely less so.*
His negotiating with the king of Poland, before and after he entered
Saxony, we believe, was intended only to amuse that prince, and
prevent him from taking any measures that might obstruct or retard
his operations against the Austrians, who no doubt were the only
object of his projects at this time. Our reasons for this opinion are,
that, by the tenor and manner of this negotiation, there does not
appear the least tendency to a composition, but on condition of his
remaining master of Saxony, and of that army being dispersed, which
no doubt he was resolved to accomplish, that he might proceed to
invade Bohemia with greater hopes of success.
Whether we consider this transaction in a political, or a military
light, it will appear to have been a prudent and wise measure. He
knew too much of the sentiments of the Saxon court, with regard
to himself, and of the part they took in the confederacy formed
against him, to confide in any offers they made him. He could not
prudently leave an army of 14,000 men behind him. For, though
the king of Poland promised to disperse them, he could with ease
assemble them, and augment them at pleasure; and soon be in a
condition to make the Prussian monarch repent of his imprudence.
The possession of Saxony, considered in a military light, is of so
much consequence, that it is not possible to attack the empress, on
that side of her dominions, with the least probability of success, with-
out it. Being extremely rich and populous, an army of 40,000 men
can be raised and maintained by this electorate. Magazines may be
formed on the Elbe, from whence an army in Bohemia may be
abundantly supplied; and, by its position, if you are master of Silesia,
you surround Bohemia in such a manner, that you force the empress
to separate her armies into so many divisions, that she cannot oppose
your entering that country, any where, with success, as appears from
the wars carried on there at different times: whereas, if you are not
* We think it a general rule that you ought to begin the campaign as soon as
possible; because, if you are on the offensive, you will have time to execute what-
ever you have proposed to do: if on the defensive, ’tis no less necessary to enter
into the field as soon as possible; because, if you are beforehand with the enemy,
you consume the forage, and destroy the country from whence he is to live. Add,
that you gain time, and make him lose the campaign in driving you out of his
country; and, when he has effected it, ’tis too late to undertake any thing against
your’s.
master of Saxony, you can enter Bohemia on the side of Silesia only.
This enables the empress to united, in some measure, her forces,
which are effectually covered by Olmutz and Prague, when forced
to fall back, from whence they cover Austria; and in this case the
king of Prussia must always leave an army on the Lower Elbe, to
cover his own dominions on that side, left the elector of Saxony, by
force or persuasion, should be induced to join the Austrians.
For these reasons we think the invasion of Saxony was a wise
measure; how far it may be consistent with justice, those, who are
better acquainted with the laws of nations than we are, must determine.
From what has been said, it seems that the king of Prussia com-
mitted a capital fault, in not having marched into Bohemia, the
moment he saw the Saxons determined to defend their camp at
Pirna, and reject the terms which he proposed; because he must cer-
tainly know that the Austrian army was not assembled in any con-
siderable numbers; and that it wanted artillery and stores; that it
was posted at such a distance as made it impossible for M. Brown
to oppose his entering into Bohemia, or stop his progress when he
should be there; and therefore would fall back on the Danube, if
pushed, as well to cover the capital, as to secure his communication
with the troops he expected from Flanders, Italy, and Hungary. His
majesty therefore would have found Bohemia abandoned; and, dur-
ing the winter, he might with ease have reduced Prague and Olmutz;
both which places being then quite unprovided, and incapable of
opposing any considerable resistance.
The conquest of these two places would have enabled his majesty
to begin the next campaign in Moravia, at least; and perhaps on
the Danube; with the siege or blockade of Vienna: from whence he
might, without any risk, have sent a considerable corps on the fron-
tiers of Hungary; and the army, destined to guard Saxony, into the
empire, between the sources of the Main and the Upper Danube.
The first would have hindered the empress from receiving any suc-
cours from those countries: and the last would effectually prevent
those princes, who were his enemies, from uniting against him;
encourage those who favoured him; overawe the French in Alsace,
and on the Main; and raise such contributions as would have recruited
and maintained his armies. Had his majesty taken these steps, he
would have cut off all communication with Flanders and Hungary;
and even with the Tyrol, if the army, which I suppose in the empire,
sent a strong corps to occupy Passau and its castle, at the confluent
campaign of 1756 81
of the Inn and the Danube; one of the most important posts on that
river; which cuts off all communication between Vienna and the
empire, overawes Upper Austria, as well as the Tyrol. The few
resources left her imperial majesty would have been soon exhausted.
Marshal Belleisle, on the death of Charles VI formed a plan for
dividing his dominions.7
The French and Bavarians were to march down the Danube,
through Upper Austria, to Vienna. The Prussians and Saxons were to
enter Bohemia, and, having reduced it, proceed to Vienna likewise.
In the first campaign the French and Bavarians entered Upper
Austria, which they laid under contribution to the gates of Vienna.
The Prussians and Saxons conquered Bohemia; and nothing could
have prevented the entire and compleat execution of M. Belleisle’s
plan, but the ignorance of some of the chiefs, the weakness of car-
dinal Fleury,8 and the divisions among allies.
The king of Prussia being master of all the places on the Elbe,
by leaving a small corps to watch the camp of Pirna, he made it
impossible for the Saxons to undertake any thing against him.
Supposing they quitted their camp, they could not subsist in Saxony,
having neither places nor magazines of any kind; being at the same
time continually harassed by the corps, which we suppose, left there
to observe them: much less could they advance into Bohemia, in
order to join the Austrians; because they would find themselves
inclosed between the king’s army, and the corps left in Saxony. In
the end, therefore, they must have dispersed of themselves.
His forces at this time were numerous, and he might with ease
have brought 110,000 men into the field; 20,000 of which were more
than sufficient to block up effectually the Saxons in their camp at
Pirna, as appeared from the fact itself; for there was no more under
prince Maurice9 when they were forced to capitulate. The remaining
7
During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48).
8
André-Hercule, Cardinal de Fleury (1653–1743). Made Cardinal and chief min-
ister to Louis XV in 1726, Fleury concentrated on restoring economic stability to
France and therefore promoted peace in the international arena. The acquisition
of Lorraine from the Empire stands as his greatest diplomatic achievement. After
his death France entered the War of the Austrian Succession. See Arthur M. Wilson,
French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726–1743: A Study in
Diplomacy and Commercial Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London:
H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1936), and Peter R. Campbell, Power and Politics
in Old Regime France, 1720–1745 (London, New York: Routledge, 1996).
9
Prinz Moritz von Anhalt-Dessau. Prussian General.
90,000 were certainly more than sufficient to drive the Austrians to

the Danube.
As the army under M. Schwerin was far superior to that under
prince Piccolomini, and better provided with artillery, we think he
ought to have attacked him; and, if he thought the camp of Königsgratz
too strong, he might leave him there, and march, on the right of the
Elbe, towards Brandeiss, or even approach Prague. This manœuvre
would infallibly force M. Brown to quit his position on the Egra,
and fall back to cover that place. M. Schwerin risk’d nothing by this
motion, because Piccolomini was too weak to execute any solid enter-
prize in Silesia: and, as to subsistance, the marshal could never be
in want; the country, being very fruitful, would have furnished him
abundantly. Had what we here propose been executed, the Austrians
must have abandoned the circles of Saatz, Leútmeritz, Buntslau, and
Königsgratz, in order to assemble their forces about Prague, and
keep open their communication with the Danube; and, if we con-
sider the very bad state of the army, it is probable they would have
been forced back as far as Moravia: so that the king, even without
coming to an action, would have been master of the greatest part
of Bohemia, and have taken his winter quarters in that kingdom.
Besides, the Saxons, on seeing their friends forced back, would not
have presumed to make any stand in the camp of Pirna.
As to the Austrians, they seem to have committed many faults,
and these such capital ones, as might have decided the fate of their
empire, had the king of Prussia taken the measures already indicated.
It was well known, even in the month of June, that the king
intended attacking the Austrian dominions. From the motions then
made in the duchy of Magdeburg and the adjoining country, it was
more than probable that part of his troops would march through
Saxony. This should have determined the Austrians to send an army
there, in order to sustain the Saxons in that country, or at least
facilitate their retreat into Bohemia. This being neglected, they should
have occupied the defiles as far as the ravin of Ghishubel, and those
by Altenberg, by which a communication with the Saxons was kept
open. Half the troops then in Bohemia, posted properly in those
mountains, would have made it impossible for the Prussians either
to reduce the Saxons, or to penetrate into Bohemia.
The rest of the army, destined to act on this side, should have
encamped any where between the Egra and the abovementioned
defiles, and have thrown bridges over the Elbe, in order to send
campaign of 1756 83
their light troops, on the right of that river, as far as Schandau and
Hohenstein.
This would have forced the king to fall back to Dresden. The
next campaign the same difficulty would have occurred; and therefore,
at last, he must have renounced to the hopes of entering Bohemia
on that side, left an army to guard Saxony, and limit his operations
to the side of Silesia only. By thus securing the mountains with
20,000 Austrians, and the 14,000 Saxons, they could always enter
Saxony, and probably re-occupy it, considering that the army of the
empire could assemble on the Saala, and with ease penetrate into
that country by Voightland, on the Prussians right flank; who, not
being covered by any fortress on that side, must fall back towards
Wittemberg, and perhaps farther down. This furnished an opportu-
nity of retaking all the places on the Elbe; and of sending a corps,
through Lusace, into the marquisate of Brandeburg. The position of
Grossenhayn cuts off all communication between Silesia and Saxony,
and rendered that between Silesia and Brandeburg precarious; because
light troops, sustained by the army at Grossenhayn, could have made
incursions as far as the Oder. Piccolomini’s corps, if properly posted,
was strong enough to oppose Schwerin, and prevent his undertak-
ing any thing of consequence; which probably he had no intention
to do, while the king was hindered from entering Bohemia.
Having neglected to occupy the defiles leading to Pirna, it became
impossible to relieve the Saxons, at least on the left of the Elbe;
because twelve or fifteen battalions, which the king posted any where
between Lowositz and Pirna, could not be forced by an attack on
their front; and, if you attempted to turn their right wing, by sending
a corps over the mountains at Altenberg, it is so far off that the enemy
might, either from his troops in Bohemia, or from those in Saxony,
anticipate you. We cannot, therefore, conceive why marshal Brown
did not occupy some of these defiles, as, in our opinion, the success
of this campaign, and perhaps of the war, depended on this step.
Since these precautions were not taken, it was certainly in vain
to attempt any thing on that side of the Elbe. The only thing remain-
ing to be done, in our opinion, was to have left 20,000 men in camp
at Budyn; with a corps, composed chiefly of light troops, to push
into the mountains beyond Lowositz, and into those of Altenberg,
to draw the Prussians attention that way; and with the remainder
pass on the right, (leaving something to mask the bridge at Leutmeritz,
and observe the enemy in the mountains, between Lowositz and
Aussig) and march on that side to Schandau and Hohenstein, and

attack the Prussians posted at Ratmansdorff, and on the Lilienstein.
These posts were very weak on that side, and fortified only towards
the Elbe, to oppose the Saxons, and therefore could not have resisted
one instant; especially if, at the same time, the Saxons made any
considerable effort. By this manœuvre the communication would
have been easily opened; and the Prussians on that side, if pursued
with vigour, could not have retired without loss, having no more
than one bridge, at Pirna, by which they could be succoured; on
which a false attack might have been made through the forest of
Löhmen, as well to prevent succours, as to alarm the Prussians; this
probably would have made them abandon their other posts, for fear
of losing their communication with the army encamped on the other
side of the Elbe.
The junction with the Saxons being once effected, and all the
right of the Elbe, as far as Pirna, occupied by the Austrians, his
majesty must have fallen back instantly into Saxony, or have per-
ished in the mountains with cold and hunger.
Marshal Brown risqued nothing by this manœuvre, as the king,
with the small army he had then in Bohemia, would not have pre-
sumed to pass the Egra and attack the 20,000 men left there; because,
by such an attempt, he would give the Austrian general an oppor-
tunity of repassing the Elbe, and occupy the defiles behind him,
relieve the Saxons, and probably reduce his majesty to the melan-
choly necessity of seeing his own army and that of prince Maurice,
thus separated, beat in detail.
He attempted, as we have said, to relieve the Saxons with 8,000
men only, and could not succeed.
We now come to examine the battle itself, wherein the conduct
of M. Brown does not seem, by any means, equal to the reputation
he had acquired.
From the description we have given of the ground, it appears evi-
dent, that the marshal could not possibly obtain any other advan-
tage, than perhaps to repulse the enemy; which, from the bad choice
of his camp, was very improbable. But, even supposing he had beat
him back as far as the vineyards on the Loboschberg, he certainly
could never have forced him from thence, and from the Homolka
mountain; because, to form these two attacks, he must have filed
through the villages of Lowositz and Sulowitz, and have formed
between those villages and the mountains upon which the Prussian
campaign of 1756 85
army, with above 100 pieces of cannon, was posted, and in many
places within musket-shot of the ground where the Austrians must
have formed. I appeal therefore to all military gentlemen, whether
in these circumstances such a manœuvre was possible.
Add to this, that the king, though repulsed, could without any
danger have sent a strong corps on M. Brown’s left, which would
have rendered his communication with the Egra so precarious, that
he must have fallen back behind that river, as it really happened
the night after the action; for it was the sending the duke of Bevern
with a corps to Tschiskovitz, rather than any advantage gained in
the battle, which forced M. Brown to repass the Egra. From whence
it appears, that, though the Austrians repulsed the king, it contributed
nothing at all to the relief of the Saxons; because they could not
detach, from that or any other camp between the mountains and
the Egra, 20,000 men, and less would not do without exposing the
remainder to certain ruin.
Having neglected to occupy the mountains of Lobosch and Homolka,
which he might have done, many hours, before the enemy appeared,
the only thing remaining to be done, was to have passed the Elbe,
the night before the battle, with the whole army, leaving some light
troops to amuse the king; these, on being pushed, retired to Budyn.
In this case M. Brown might have detached such a corps to
Schandau, as would certainly have opened a communication with
the Saxons, and probably have destroyed all the Prussians on that
side of the Elbe: with the remainder he covered the whole country
effectually, excepting those few villages between the mountains and
the Egra, which the king would not have dared to pass, because,
having no magazines in the country, and subsisting only, at least
chiefly, from what came from Saxony, he could not advance, with
an army of about 25,000 men, into an enemy’s country, leaving one
superior master of the defiles, between him and his other army, sub-
sistance, stores, &c. without exposing himself to certain ruin.
The position, therefore, taken at Lowositz, was, in our opinion,
as bad as possible; nothing could be more inconsistent, with the gen-
eral theory of war, than to occupy a camp commanded by any
neighbouring hills, and where it was impossible to bring as many
men into action, at the same time, and in the same point, as the
enemy; who, on the contrary, had ground enough to form two thirds
of his army to attack Lowositz; whereas the Austrians could bring
a very few battalions, only, to sustain it.
The left and center were inattackable; the only point to be sus-
tained was Lowositz. This the marshal saw; but did not see that it
could not be defended, because it was commanded by the Loboschberg.
If the enemy was repulsed, you could not pursue him, either with
cavalry or infantry. If we consider this position, relative to the relief
of the Saxons, the only object then in view, none could be less
proper; because, by no one manœuvre possible, could M. Brown
relieve them, though he had repulsed the enemy, who might have
taken fifty camps between that place and the Saxons, from whence
they would have hindered all communication between them and the
Austrians.
We shall therefore conclude, that, in the choice of this camp,
M. Brown acted inconsistent with the general rules of war; and with
the particular ones, which the nature of the country, and the object
he had in view, prescribed.
We hope all readers will not accuse us of presumption, for hav-
ing, thus freely, given our opinion of the actions of those men, whose
reputation is so well established. What we have said is certainly
founded upon facts, and consistent with the nature of the country;
and, as we think, with the principles of war: we therefore submit
our reflections to those who are acquainted with the one or the
other. For this purpose, we have furnished them with an exact plan
and description of the ground where the battle was fought.
This, with their own knowledge of the military art, will enable
them to decide how far our history of this campaign, and our remarks
upon its various operations, are reasonable, or otherwise.
Great preparations were made, on both sides, for the ensuing cam-
paign: the empress ordered the troops that lay in Hungary, Italy,
and Flanders, to march into Bohemia: all the regiments of hussars
were augmented to 1,500 men; and those of the cavalry to 1,000:
two of the former, and one of Hungarian infantry, were new raised:
to these were joined, two regiments of infantry, sent by the elector
of Magence10 and the Bishop of Wurtzburg,11 several pulks* of Uhlans,†
10
Johann Friedrich Karl von Ostein (1743–63). Elector and Archbishop of Mainz.
11
Adam Friedrich von Seinsheim (1708–1779). Bishop of Wurzburg (1755–79)
and Bishop of Bamberg (1757–59).
* A pulk amounts to about 800 men.
†
Uhlans are inhabitants of the Uckraine, and chiefly Mahometans. In person,
dress, and manner of fighting, they resemble the tartars, Calmucks [Kalmyks], &c.
They are armed with pistols, sabres, a lance 15 foot long, and sometimes with a
bow and arrow, instead of a carabine.
campaign of 1756 87
and three regiments of Saxon light horse: all which, with what was
already in Bohemia, formed an immense army, which, according to
many gazettes, amounted to above 180,000 men, and was to be
commanded by prince Charles of Lorrain.
The Prussians, on their side, were no less diligent and active. The
king found it absolutely necessary to get some light troops, to oppose
those of his enemies, which were extremely numerous, and had given
him much trouble, both in this and the preceding war; and there-
fore orders were given to raise four battalions of light infantry, which
were augmented very much during the course of the war.
There happened in the winter some considerable actions between
the light troops; which, though conducted with much valour and
prudence on both sides, do not deserve any particular detail; because,
in general, they have little or no influence on the success of a war,
however necessary in an army: and, though they do not contribute
essentially to the good or bad issue of a campaign, there is no doing
without them. We shall therefore proceed to give an account of the
operations of the campaign of 1757.
CAMPAIGN OF 1757
The confederacy, formed against the king of Prussia, was now aug-
mented, by the accession of Sweden and the Germanic body; whose
united forces amounted to 700,000 men; whereas those of his majesty,
and his allies, did not exceed 260,000.
As many of his enemies could not begin their operations until the
season was far advanced, his majesty resolved to take the field as
soon as possible; that he might, with his united forces, attack the
nearest, and indeed the most considerable of them, the empress of
Germany. If he had the good fortune to strike some blow of con-
sequence in the beginning of the campaign, it was very probable
this would retard, at least, and perhaps put an intire stop to, the
operations of the other confederates.
These motives, which made it necessary for his Prussian majesty
to bring matters immediately to a conclusion, made it equally so for
the empress to embrace a contrary system.
She therefore determined to remain on the defensive, until her
allies took the field, which she knew would oblige the king to divide
his forces into so many parts, as would make it impossible for him
to oppose, any where, a considerable resistance. This favourable cir-
cumstance she proposed waiting for, in order to begin her opera-
tions. In the mean time, nothing more was intended, than to provide
for the defence of her dominions.
With this view M. Brown distributed the army into four different
corps: the first, commanded by the duke of Aremberg, was posted
at Egra; the second, under the marshal himself, at Budyn; the third,
under count Kónigseg,1 at Reichenberg; and the fourth, under count
Serbelloni,2 in Moravia.
By this disposition the marshal thought he could effectually cover
Bohemia; as each of these corps was very considerable, and might
1
Maximiliam Friedrich, Graf Königsegg-Rothenfels (1708–84). Archbishop and
Elector of Cologne (1761), Bishop of Münster (1762), bestowed upon Lloyd an hon-
orary commission of Major-General in 1765.
2
Giambattista Serbelloni. Austrian General and Milanese noble. Promoted Field
Marshal in 1759, he commanded the Austrian forces in Saxony until 1761 when
he took charge of the Reichsarmee.
campaign of 1757 89
with ease be assembled in some central position, to stop the progress

of the enemy, should he attempt to advance; which it seems the
marshal did not expect he would or could do; otherwise, we think,
he never would have permitted his magazines to be formed almost
on the frontiers, against the most common rules of military prudence.
His majesty, having resolved to penetrate into Bohemia, ordered
his army to assemble in four different corps likewise: the one, under
prince Maurice, at Chemnitz; the other, under himself, at Lockwitz;
the third, under the prince of Bevern, at Zittau; and the fourth,
under marshal Schwerin, in Silesia.
As these corps were very strong, his majesty thought he might
with safety order them to enter Bohemia separately; but, for fear of
exposing them to be beat in detail, the two first were to unite, the
moment they passed the defiles, between the mountains about Lowo-
sitz and the Egra; and the two last were to do the same on the Iser,
about Turnau: then it was thought, that the four corps, thus united
into two, might proceed, without any risk, towards Prague; where
the whole was to join.
The king, fearing that the enemy should send a body of infantry
to occupy the defiles in the mountains, between Lockwitz and Lowositz,
which might make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for him to
pass them, ordered prince Maurice to penetrate into the circle of
Saatz, and instantly occupy them on the side of Bohemia, which
would necessarily force the enemy to abandon them, for fear of being
hemmed in between the two corps.
Things being thus concerted, prince Maurice quitted his station
at Chemnitz, in the beginning of April, and marched by Zwickau
and Plauen towards Egra; as if he intended attacking that place, or
at least penetrate that way into Bohemia. To confirm the duke of
Aremberg in this opinion, he ordered his light troops to engage some
considerable action at Wildstein, the duke’s quarters. Upon which
this general threw himself into Egra, and ordered his corps to assem-
ble in that neighbourhood. In the mean time prince Maurice returned
in haste back to Auerbach; where, for greater celerity, he divided
his corps into two columns; the one of which marched by Eibenstock
Schwarzenberg to Gottesgabe, and from thence over the Kupferberg
to Commottau; the other went over the Schneeberg by Schlettau,
Annaberg, and Basberg, likewise to Commottau; from whence he
marched by Brix and Bilin to Linay, where he joined the king, on
the 23d of April, who had likewise passed the mountains without
meeting any considerable obstacle: the few Austrians who were posted
at Aussig, under general Draskovitz,3 having been forced to quit that
place on the approach of the king’s army.
As the camp of Budyn is very strong, being covered by the Egra,
his majesty did not think it adviseable to attempt any thing against
it in front; he therefore marched higher up the river, towards Koschtitz,
where bridges were thrown over it, and on the 26th in the morn-
ing the whole army passed.
Here the light troops, and vanguard, met those of the duke of
Aremberg, who was then coming from Egra, and proposed either
encamping there, or go and join M. Brown at Budyn; but, on meet-
ing the king here, he fell back towards Welwarn.
M. Brown, finding the king had passed the Egra, and was encamped
on his left flank, thought it necessary to quit his position at Budyn
and retire to Prague, which was executed without any loss.
Upon which the king ordered the bridge at Budyn to be repaired,
that he might with greater ease receive his convoys; and then directed
his steps likewise to Prague, where he arrived the 2d of May, and
took his camp on the Weissenberg, on the left of the Moldau, which
the Austrians, now commanded by prince Charles, had quitted, and
passed on the other side of the river.
While these things were passing on the side of Saxony, the prince
of Bevern put his corps in motion on the 20th of April, and marched
the same day from Zittau to Reichenberg, where he found count
Kónigseg, with a body of near 20,000 men, encamped in a valley
formed by two very high mountains; the breadth of it, in this place,
does not exceed three English miles; through the middle of it runs
the river Neiss; into which many rivulets, or rather torrents, com-
ing from the mountains, fall. These mountains are covered with thick
woods, which make it very difficult for any kind of troops to pass
them; for which reasons the Austrian general occupied the valley
from one side to the other, having each wing extended only to the
foot of the mountains: the right was on a rising ground, which was
fortified with some redoubts, and covered by a deep ravin on the
right of the Neiss: the center was on the left of the river, and also
covered by a deep ravin, and some redoubts: between the left of
3
Joseph Draskovich. He supervised the recruitment of Hungrian soldiers through
1757.
campaign of 1757 91
this ravin and the foot of the mountain, on that side, is a small
plain; here the cavalry was posted in three lines, there not being
room to extend them. On the left of this cavalry was a wood, in
which they placed some few battalions, and had begun to make an
abattis, which was not compleated. From this description it appears,
that the right and center were very strong, and scarce to be attacked
at all in front. The prince of Bevern, who, by taking that route,
had put himself under the necessity of fighting, in order to join
M. Schwerin, had now no choice left but as to the manner of doing
it: his corps was posted behind a marshy rivulet, which, towards his
left, ran so close to the enemy’s line, that he could not pretend to
pass it, and form under their fire; he therefore resolved to attack
the enemy’s left; and sent general Lestewitz over the Neiss, to attack,
or rather amuse, their right. Things being thus concerted, he ordered
his cavalry to advance and attack that of the enemy; this was exe-
cuted with great bravery, but without success; they were repulsed
every time; no wonder! because, in advancing towards the enemy,
their left flank was exposed to the fire of the artillery of the redoubts,
and that of the infantry behind them; and their right to that of the
infantry posted, as we have said, in the wood, to the left of the
enemy’s horse. The prince, perceiving, at last, it would be in vain
to renew the attack, while the enemy’s horse was thus protected by
the infantry and artillery on both flanks, ordered it back, and at the
same time sent several battalions from his right, as high as was pos-
sible into the mountain, in order to come on the flank and rear of
those which the enemy had posted in the wood, at the foot of it:
this was punctually executed; the enemy abandoned the wood, and
gave the prince’s cavalry an opportunity to renew their attack, which
must naturally succeed; that of the enemy, being unable to bear its
shock, and the fire of the Prussian infantry, which had now got pos-
session of the wood on their flank. On the retreat of the Austrian
cavalry, the prince ordered his whole right to advance, and occupy
the ground they had quitted; so that he was on and behind the
enemy’s left wing, and had, besides, the advantage of the rising
ground, from whence he could with ease rake them from the left to
the right. In this situation nothing remained for the Austrians to do,
but to retire as soon as possible, for fear the enemy should push on
towards Liebenau, and cut them off intirely; which he might do, as,
in pursuing the left wing, some of his troops were already behind
them. The retreat was made in good order: count Lacy, who com-
manded the right, covered it; at Liebenau they took a new position,
where they were reinforced by some troops, who, on the march of
prince Bevern, had quitted the frontiers, and fallen back to join the
main body under count Kónigseg.
Thus ended the combat of Reichenberg, in which the Austrians
lost one general, and about 1000 men killed, wounded, and taken;
besides some cannon left at Reichenberg. The loss of the Prussians
was not much inferior.
Reflections
As the only object the prince of Bevern could have in view, was to
join M. Schwerin, we cannot conceive why he should march to
Kratzau and Reichenberg, where the road is much more difficult
than by Gabel and Bóhmisch Aycha, which was equally proper to
effectuate his junction with Schwerin; and, moreover, was guarded
only by some light troops, at Gabel, which he might force, or leave
behind, as he pleased, without any difficulty or risk. In taking this
last road, he was certainly at liberty to avoid an action; and, if he
enemy remained at Reichenberg, he might find twenty positions
behind them, and hinder them from retiring to Prague. It is always
a great fault to fight, when nothing can be got by it; as in this case.
The prince wanted to join Schwerin; he might have done it with-
out fighting, and he could obtain no more by a successful action,
as appears from the fact itself. He forced the enemy to quit their
camp at Reichenberg; they took another at Liebenau, which he could
not have forced, in all probability: he must therefore have remained
in the mountains, without any possibility of joining Schwerin, if the
march of this general had not determined count Kónigseg to quit
Liebenau and retire. All which seems to prove, that the prince
engaged in an action without any kind of reason, and from which
he could not reap any advantage, whatever was the event. An immod-
erate desire of acquiring glory, makes men sometimes undertake
things without sufficiently weighing the consequences. In the action
he seems likewise to have been guilty of some faults: he formed par-
allel to the enemy, whose line could not be attacked, with any prob-
ability of success, excepting on the left; which, being once beat, the
rest could not keep their ground; yet the prince did not reinforce
campaign of 1757 93
his right, but left his troops nearly equally distributed throughout
the whole line: his left, towards Neiss, where it could be of no use
at all, was a s strong as where he formed his attack.
His attack with the cavalry was certainly ill-advised; for, though
it succeeded, he could not prosecute his advantages; for, while the
enemy had infantry in the wood, and their center kept its position,
his cavalry could not occupy the ground on which that of the enemy
stood. From the beginning he should have formed his right as high
up the mountains as possible; brought the greatest part of his infantry
there; and have done then what he was forced to do at last. The
taking such a position would have forced the enemy to retire with-
out fighting. His sending general Lestewitz to attack the enemy’s
right was needless. By occupying the wood, and part of the hill, on
his right, the action was won; and all the manœuvres the enemy
could make, on their right and center, would have been fruitless.
The Austrians camp seems, from our description of it, very strong;
yet, on examination, it will be found otherwise; because the whole
was not equally so; and therefore, properly speaking, no part of it.
The right and center were strong by nature and art; being, as was
said, fortified with redoubts, &c. but, as the left was weak, they could
reap no benefit from them; unless they supposed the enemy so igno-
rant as to attack them there. From the general position of the ground,
it was evident, that, if the left was forced to retire, the enemy, by
occupying it, would be in the rear of the center and right, and force
them to quit their advantageous position, and fall back instantly
towards Johannisthal, for fear of being cut off from Liebenau: on
this point, to their left, depended, no doubt, the success of the action.
They should, consequently, have sent some of their best infantry into
the wood on their left, and have placed some heavy artillery at the
skirts of it; which, with that they had already, in the redoubts before
their center, would have made it impossible for the enemy to pass
the village of Bartzdorff, and the marshy rivulet they had before
their front; much less form on this side of the rivulet. The Austrians
could bring, against that point of attack, their artillery, their infantry,
and their cavalry, to sustain them. In such circumstances prince
Bevern could not certainly have formed his attack at all.
When the Austrians saw the enemy prepare to attack their left,
Why not make a general motion on that side, and carry their line
up into the mountains? This manœuvre would have decided the
action in their favour; and, by neglecting it, they were beat.
Illustration 3
campaign of 1757 95
Illustration 4
Their cavalry was too far advanced; which deprived them, in some
measure, of the advantage of their artillery on the right, and of the
infantry on the left, in the wood.
They should not have posted their whole army in the valley; for,
though the mountains which formed it, seemed impassable, yet it
happened otherwise: for the Prussian infantry did march through
that on the left; gained the higher ground; and forced, consequently,
the Austrians to abandon the wood at the foot of it. No corps what-
ever must be placed in a valley, unless you are masters of the moun-
tains which form it; and, if you cannot occupy both sides, you must,
at least, one: for, though at first sight, mountains, rocks, and woods,
may appear impassable; yet, upon a diligent inquiry, the contrary
will be always found: for, in every country that is well peopled, there
are, and must be, communications between villages; at least, for
infantry: you must, therefore, occupy the mountains and woods with
you infantry; the valley underneath with your cavalry; which will
hinder any enemy from passing through it. From all which, it appears,
that it was a bad camp, and a bad position; because, having neglected
to occupy the mountains, it could not be defended; and the troops,
posted in the valley, were not only exposed to be defeated, but like-
wise to be cut off from Prague, and their magazine at Buntzlaw,
either by the prince of Bevern’s corps, or by that of marshal Schwerin.
The prince of Bevern marched, on the 23d, towards Liebenau;
where, as we have said, he found the enemy so advantageously
posted, that he did not think it prudent to attack them: and the less
so, as he knew the march of Schwerin’s corps would necessarily force
them to retire.
This last general assembled his army, on the 18th of April, at
Trautenau; from whence he marched, on the 19th, to Kónigshoff,
where he passed the Elbe. His intentions were to proceed towards
Turnau and Liebenau, in order to facilitate the march of prince
Bevern’s corps; and, being joined with it, go to Prague. This plan
was founded on the same principles as that of the king’s. Whatever
troops the Austrians might send on the frontiers of Lusace, they
could not remain there, even though they had beat the duke of
Bevern; because the march of Schwerin, behind them, must force
them to retire, for fear of being taken between two fires; as it really
happened: for, on the 24th, they quitted their camp at Liebenau,
and marched with precipitation towards Brandeiss; and from thence
to Prague, where they arrived the 3d of May. M. Schwerin, in the
campaign of 1757 97
mean time, marched from Kónigshoff to Gitchin, where he was

informed of the action of Reichenberg, and of the enemy’s retreat.
Upon which he wisely changed his route, and marched on the Iser;
hoping still to cut them off from Prague: and, though he did not
succeed in this, he arrived at Jungbuntzlau, in time to seize an
immense magazine which they had formed there.
Having been joined by the prince of Bevern’s corps, he proceeded
to Brandeiss: where he continued ’till the 4th of May: then he passed
the Elbe, and encamped on the other side, not thinking it prudent
to advance ’till he had concerted measures with the king.
His majesty, having thrown a bridge over the Moldau, near
Podbaba, passed that river, with part of his army, on the 5th; leav-
ing the remainder, under marshal Keith, on the Weissenberg. The
6th, at 5 in the morning, marshal Schwerin’s army arrived; and,
having reconnoitred the enemy, the whole marched on the left, and
soon after the battle begun. We will give here the different relations,
that were published by authority, of this memorable action.
That published at Vienna is as follows:
His royal highness prince Charles of Lorrain was informed, on the 4th
of May, that the king of Prussia had thrown bridges over the Moldau,
near Rostock and Podbaba, in order to join M. Schwerin’s army, by
Winorz, and then attack our right, or cut off the communication with
our magazines at Kollin and Kuttenberg. His royal highness changed
his position so, that the left came to the town of Prague, and the right
towards Maleschitz and Biechowitz. The 5th the Prussians vanguard
passed the Moldau: we ordered several batteries to be raised before
the front of our army: at 11 o’clock, in the night, the king ordered
his whole army to pass that river, leaving only a small corps, and a
great quantity of artillery, on the Weissenberg. The junction of his,
and Schwerin’s army, was made on the 6th, at break of day. Immediately
afterwards the whole Prussian army, amounting to above 100,000 men,
advanced against us. M. Schwerin ordered the left wing, which he
commanded, to attack our right, and endeavour to break it; while the
king alarmed our left. His royal highness prince Charles of Lorrain,
whose army consisted of 55,000 only, saw himself obliged, by the
motions of M. Schwerin, to order his second line to enter into the
first, and place it so as to cover the right wing; the left being already
covered by the cannon of Prague. His royal highness left only two
regiments of horse there, and placed the other thirteen, in three lines,
on our right, the better to sustain it. All these motions were made
according as the Prussians extended themselves, in order to take us in
flank; which M. Schwerin had principally in view. We occupied sev-
eral heights; and M. Schwerin had likewise some before him, which
Illustration 5
campaign of 1757 99
he must occupy before he could approach us. Our artillery began to

fire about 7 o’clock; which, as well as that of the infantry, produced
so great an effect, that the whole line of M. Schwerin, which, accord-
ing to the report of the deserters, had orders to attack us, with their
bayonets fixed, was totally overthrown: while our cavalry attacked
Schwerin’s; beat it back three times; and dispersed it. As the Prussians
first line was thrown back in confusion on the second, this fired upon
them, and marched over their dead and wounded companions towards
us. They were, however, received as the first time, and again beat
back. Our right wing, profiting of their victory, followed the flying
enemy, in good order, above 600 paces; took several pairs of colours;
16 pieces of cannon; and a great number of prisoners. Our right, hav-
ing thus advanced, left a great opening between it and the left. The
king of Prussia marched, in the greatest haste, with several columns,
and occupied this vacant space; and, at the same time, ordered a fresh
body of horse to advance, full gallop, and occupy the ground where
his left had stood, and thereby come behind our right, which was pur-
suing the enemy; so that this right wing, which had been victorious
for three hours was of a sudden surrounded by the enemy: and, to
augment our misfortunes, there raised such a cloud of dust, as hin-
dered us from knowing each other; and such a confusion ensued, that
it was impossible for us to assemble the men, and put them again in
order. Part of our infantry did, however, all that was possible to join
our left wing; in which they succeeded; and retired, step by step, under
a continual fire, to Prague; where they entered together. Two thou-
sand of our right wing stopped near the field of battle, and thereby
sustained the rest of the troops that were in confusion. All our artillery
of reserve, the heavy baggage, pontoons, military chest, and 16,000
men from our right wing, assembled, the 8th, at Beneschau. In two
days 3,000 Prussian deserters are come to the army, who all declare,
that the Prussians have lost, killed, wounded, and missing, above 20,000
men. In dead, and wounded, we have lost, at most, 4,000 men; and
2,500 taken prisoners; and no more than 20 field pieces are lost. During
the battle, major general Beck, with a corps of Croats, attacked the
town of Brandeiss, sword in hand; beat a Prussian battalion, that was
there in garrison, of which he killed 100 men; and, after he had broke
the bridge over the Elbe, retired with 5 pair of colours, 2 cannon,
500 horses, a rich booty, and 678 prisoners, among whom was the
lieutenant colonel Mardefeld, and all the officers of the battalion who
were alive; all which he brought to M. Daun’s camp. On our side
M. Brown was wounded. On that of the Prussians M. Schwerin, and
five or six other generals, are killed; and general Winterfield mortally
wounded.
The Prussians account of this battle is as follows:
The king joined M. Schwerin’s army the 6th of May, in the morning;
and it was resolved to attack the enemy immediately. The imperial
army was encamped, with the left, on the Ziskaberg; and the right,
on a hill, near Sterboholi. It was determined to attack the enemy’s
right; the Prussian army, therefore, marched, on the left, through the
village of Potschernitz. M. Brown, having observed this motion, ordered
his army to march on the right, that he might not be taken in flank.
The Prussians were obliged to pass through some hollow ways, and
over some marshy ground, on the other side of the village of Bischowitz,
which threw the infantry into some disorder; and, the attack having
been made in too much haste, they were repulsed. Marshal Schwerin,
the greatest general of his time, was killed, with the colours in his
hands, at the head of his own regiment. As soon as our infantry was
formed again, they renewed the attack against the enemy’s right wing.
Prince Henry,4 the king’s brother, alighted from his horse, and put
himself at the head of his brigade; with which he mounted, or rather
climbed up the mountains; and, having beat off the enemy, took sev-
eral batteries. The cavalry of our left wing, after three attacks, forced
that of the Austrians to retire. Our center, in the same manner, beat
the enemy’s infantry, and pursued them through their camp, which
was still standing. Our left wing, to which some cavalry was joined,
marched on Michele; and we separated the Austrian army; the right
wing of which fled to the Zassava. Upon which our right attacked the
enemy’s left, and took successively three batteries, placed on the hills.
Our right wing of horse had no opportunity to come to action. Prince
Ferdinand of Brunswic attacked the enemy’s left in flank; and, as the
king, with his left, and a body of horse, had already reached the
Moldau, all the Austrian infantry was forced to throw themselves into
Prague. They attempted to march out, on the side of Kónigsaal, but
were drove back by M. Keith’s corps. We have taken above 4,000
prisoners; among whom are 30 officers: besides 60 cannon, and 10
standards. On our side we have lost, 3,099 men, 54 officers, 242 horses,
killed: 8,208 men, 397 officers, and 246 horses, wounded: and 1,557
men, 6 officers, missing.
Among the dead were M. Schwerin,* and major general Amstel.
Among the wounded were lieutenant generals Fouquet, Hautcharmois,
4
Friedrich Heinrich Ludwig, ‘Prince Henry’ of Prussia (1726–1802). See Chester
Easum, Prince Henry of Prussia, Brother of Frederick the Great (Madison: The University
of Wisconsin Press, 1942); and Eva Ziebura, Prinz Heinrich von Preussen (Berlin: Stapp
Verlag, 1999).
* M. Schwerin was born the 26th of October, 1684. He studied at Leiden,
Rostock, and Greisswalde. In 1699 he served in a Dutch regiment belonging to his
uncle; in 1705 he had a company. His uncle having quitted the Dutch service, he
did the same; and in 1706 was made a lieutenant colonel in the duke of Mecklen-
burg’s service; in 1707 a colonel. The duke Charles Leopold sent him in 1712 to
the king of Sweden, Charles the 12th, at Bender, with whom he continued a year.
On his return he was made a brigadier; and in 1718 a major general; in 1719 he
commanded the Mecklenburg troops, at the battle of Walmsmoelen, against the
campaign of 1757 101
and Winterfield; and major generals Plettenberg, Schóning, and

Blankensee. These two accounts of the battle are far from being
clear and explicit, and give but a very confused idea of the action.
We shall therefore add another, wrote by count Schwerin, general
adjutant to the marshal of that name, which seems to be, by far,
the best that appeared on that occasion.
In consequence of the measures concerted with M. Schwerin, his
majesty passed the Moldau, at Seltz, the 5th of May, 1757, at 8 o’clock
in the morning, with the corps he proposed joining to the marshal’s
army; of which he gave us notice, as had been agreed, by a twelve
pound shot, to which the marshal answered with the same signal. At
2 o’clock in the evening his majesty sent Stutterheim, one of his adju-
tants, to the marshal, with orders, that we, and the column com-
manded by general Winterfield, should break up at 12 o’clock that
night, and compass our march, so that the head of our columns should
arrive, exactly at 4 in the morning, upon the heights of Brosiz, where
his majesty promised to be, on the right, by Tschimniz. These orders
were executed with such precision, that our three columns arrived, at
the place of rendezvous, at 4 o’clock; and, at such a distance from
each other, as to leave only the space necessary to form the line. We
did not meet with any obstacle, on our march, ’till we came to the
heights before Brosiz; where Modena’s regiment of horse, two of dra-
goons, and Festetitz’s hussars, were posted that night. These fired upon
our vanguard, and retired immediately, through Brosiz, to the left wing
of their army.
As soon as the king had wished the marshal and general Winterfield
a good morning, he rode, with these two generals, without any other
escort than two of his adjutants, captain Platen, lieutenant colonel
Commission’s army, and beat them: and, the duke having reformed the greatest
part of his troops, the marshal entered into the Prussian service as major general;
in 1723 he had a regiment given him; in 1724 was sent as minister to the court
of Poland; in 1730 was made governor of Peitz; in 1731 a lieutenant general; in
1732 a knight of the black eagle; in 1739 general of infantry; in 1740 a field mar-
shal. He distinguished himself much at the battle of Molwitz, the 16th of April,
1741; where he received two considerable wounds: in 1744 he marched with a
great army into Bohemia; where he joined the king, at Prague, and commanded
the siege of that place; where he distinguished himself very much; in 1756 he com-
manded, as we have said, the army in Silesia; and, during that campaign, gave
great proofs of his superior abilities in the art of war; and was killed with the
colours of his regiment in his hand. He was rather a little sized man; he had, how-
ever, a martial look; loved the soldiers; and was very careful of them; and was
therefore much loved by them: and, though he on some occasions was very hot,
in all his expeditions he knew how to combine the greatest bravery with the great-
est prudence. After the battle of Lowositz the king wrote to him to act cautiously
(d’aller bride en main). He was twice married, and has left children of both sexes.
Oelnitz, and myself, to one of the highest hills on the other side of
Brosiz. From hence we could discover all the enemy’s camp very plain;
the first and second line from one end to the other. His majesty recon-
noitred it with his spying glass. When the enemy perceived seven or
eight persons on the hill, he sent us some four pounders, but without
effect. His majesty continued above an hour here, to examine their
position, and how they were to be attacked. The enemy was posted,
with the left wing towards Prague, on the Ziskaberg, behind the
Invalides: the right extended about 2,000 paces beyond the village of
Conradiz, near Sterboholi. Two hundred paces before their front, the
mountains were so steep and craggy, that no cavalry or artillery could
possibly ascend them. At the foot of these mountains is a deep valley,
which was intirely occupied by some hussars and Hungarian infantry.
The mountains on our side of the valley were no less steep and craggy
than the others: notwithstanding these difficulties, his majesty was
inclined to attack the enemy in front. The marshal, on the contrary,
represented to him the difficulty of the ground; the great march the
troops had made; and the strength of the enemy’s position; who had
covered the heights before their front with a prodigious quantity of
heavy artillery. His majesty, convinced by these reasons, permitted the
marshal to go and seek out some more convenient place to form the
attack. Upon which his excellency rode, full gallop, before the enemy’s
right, where the ground on both sides falls gradually, and where the
village of Miesiz, where the infantry could pass over the meadows,
and the cavalry and heavy artillery over the damms. As soon as the
marshal had reconnoitred the ground, and given an account of it to
the king, orders were immediately given to the three corps to move
on the left. This was executed with such celerity, that the army, which
had received the orders about nine o’clock, marched above four miles
through very bad roads, and at half an hour past ten was formed;
and at eleven the battle begun on the left wing. All our cavalry was
passing the damm, when that of the Austrians first turned out, and
formed itself in order of battle, without taking down one tent. They
did not probably perceive that our intention was to attack their right
flank, ’till they saw two regiments of our cavalry pass the damm, and
form directly on it. This manœuvre drew their attention that way: they
then ordered all their cavalry from the left; which, with great celer-
ity, came and formed itself, on a fine plain, on the right, in 104
squadrons, in three lines, with intervals equal to the front of a squadron.
This manœuvre was executed with such promptitude, that our lieu-
tenant general, the hereditary prince of Schónaich, who had only 65
squadrons, fearing to be outflanked, resolved instantly to attack the
enemy, without waiting for the right wing which the king had ordered
to come and reinforce him. Accordingly the attack was made in the
best order. The enemy stood still ’till we came within 50 paces of
them, then they fired their carabines; and at 30 they advanced with
a strong pace against us. We were outwinged by 8 squadrons, and
therefore ’tis no wonder our cavalry had such a hard task, and was
twice repulsed. In the third attack, Stechow’s regiment of dragoons,
commanded by colonel Winterfield, and general Ziethen,5 with 20
squadrons of Ziethen’s and Putkammer’s hussars, advanced with so
much bravery, that not only the enemy’s cavalry was intirely defeated,
but part of it was pushed on their own grenadiers, on the right wing,
which threw them back in the utmost confusion. During this attack of
the cavalry, the grenadiers of our left wing, and the regiments of
Fouquet, Kreutzen, and Schwerin’s infantry, having passed over some
meadows, were forced to advance through a very narrow road, in
order to join the rest of the line, which was already formed. As soon
as the grenadiers appeared on the other side of the defile, they were
received with twelve pounders, charged with cartridges, in such a man-
ner, that they were instantly forced to retire, and quit the defile in
the greatest confusion. In the mean time the enemy’s fire grew still
more violent, and at last obliged the grenadiers to retire back over
the damm. They were followed by Fouquet’s and Kreutzen’s regiments;
and, as the second battalion of Schwerin’s begun to do the same, the
marshal, who had been continually on the other side of the defile,
took the colours out of the officer’s hands, and rode before the regi-
ment; doing all that was possible to make them advance. He drew the
troops, as well as he could, out of the defile; and, having put them
again in order, advanced with a strong pace towards the enemy. Scarce
had he marched 12 steps, when he received several shot; one in the
ear, another in the heart, and three in the body: he fell instantly from
his horse, without the least signs of life. General Manteufel took the
colours out of his hand, and gave them to the ensign; who had scarce
received them, when a cannon shot came and killed him on the spot.
Immediately after this the whole line advanced. Our artillery did great
execution. The lines were at above 60 paces distant from each other;
when the enemy’s infantry, on the right, was observed to be in the
greatest confusion. Their center kept their ground much longer; being
protected by a great quantity of artillery. His majesty, observing that
the enemy’s right wing pursued our left with great vivacity, insomuch
that it was separated from the rest of the army, laid hold of this
favourable opportunity; and, with the greatest celerity, marched, with
his right, to occupy the space which the enemy, by advancing, had
left open: and, by this means, separated the two wings from each other.
Now the confusion was general in the enemy’s army. Our left wing,
5
Hans Joachim von Zieten (1699–1786). ‘The Hussar King.’ Born into poverty
in Brandenburg, the diminuitive Zieten entered the Prussian infantry in 1716 as a
free corporal. In 1727 he became lt. of dragoons, but was dismissed from the army
after fighting with his captain. Recalled in 1731, he was appointed commander of
the new Prussian hussar corps. He became a Major General in 1745 and fought
with distinction in the Seven Years’ War. See Georg Winter, Hans Joachim von Zieten:
Eine Biohraphie 2 vols. (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1886).
Map 3. Battle of Prague. Fought May 6th 1757, Between the Prussians Commanded by the King and
the Austrians, commanded by Pr. Charles of Lorrain, and won by the former.
being again formed, attacked the pursuing enemy, and drove them
back: and, when they endeavoured to retire to the army, they found
the ground occupied by the king. His majesty ordered an attack to be
made, with fixed bayonnets, on the enemy’s left wing, that was like-
wise flying. Here a great carnage ensued; particularly in taking the
redoubt; where the second battalion of prince Henry’s did wonders.
The enemy’s left fled into Prague; and the right, in confusion, towards
Maleschitz and Bischowitz.
Before we give an account of what followed this memorable battle,
it is necessary to examine the various operations which preceded it,
as well as the conduct of the action itself, that the reader may be
able to form a proper judgment of them, as they are in themselves,
and independent of the events. For these do not always proceed
from fine dispositions; nor are prudent and wise measures constantly
attended with happy successes. In general, however, it must be con-
fessed, that few or no enterprizes fail, but by some error, which
might have been foreseen, and consequently avoided.
The plan, formed by the Austrians, to remain on the defensive
’till their allies took the field, and thereby give them a favourable
opportunity to act with vigour, was certainly wise and prudent: but
they seem to have failed in the execution. Two thirds of the enemy’s
troops were cantoned in Saxony and Lusatia, and the remainder in
the neighbourhood of this last province; which indicated, very plainly,
that, in case he proposed to invade Bohemia, it would be on that
side; particularly as the king was there in person. Besides, by enter-
ing Bohemia from the side of Saxony, this last would be covered by
that very manœuvre: whereas, if it was done from Silesia, another
army must be left to guard Saxony. They ought to have known the
king better, than to suppose he would act with part of his forces
only, when he had it in his power to do it with the whole. Moreover,
if, contrary to all appearances, as well as to the nature of things, he
attempted to invade Moravia, he could not, in less than a month,
bring his armies on that side; and the Austrians did not require half
that time to bring all their forces there. If his majesty sent a corps
there only, the garrison of Olmutz, sustained by some Croats, a reg-
iment of dragoons, and another of hussars, would have been sufficient
to cover the country.
From all which, it appears, that the Austrians acted very impru-
dently, in posting a corps of above 20,000 men in Moravia, where
they were quite useless. What augments this first fault, was the leaving
it there even after the Prussian army was in motion, as well in

Saxony and Lusatia, as about Schweidnitz; which demonstrated their
intention was to penetrate that way into Bohemia.
This corps should, no doubt, have been placed, during the win-
ter, so as to form a chain from Moravia to Kónigshoff; and, in the
month of March, their quarters should have been drawn nearer each
other; and the center placed about Pardubitz. This would have
enabled them to assemble, on the least notice, either on the right,
towards Leutomischel; or on the left, behind the Elbe, about Schurtz.
When the Prussians were in motion, this corps should have assem-
bled at Schurtz; because, from thence, it was at hand to join count
Kónigseg; and, being united, were much superior to the duke of
Bevern’s, or marshal Schwerin’s; and therefore might attack either
of these generals, if they presumed, which was not probable, to pen-
etrate into Bohemia, and hinder them from joining their forces. But
this was neglected, and the corps in Moravia quite forgot; as one
may imagine: for, though the enemy had entered Bohemia at the
other extremity, about the 20th of April, yet this corps, on the 6th
of May, was only arrived at Bóhmisch Brodt, within twenty miles
of Prague. As to count Kónigseg’s corps, it has been already observed,
that it was posted too far in the mountains, and exposed to be taken
in between the prince of Bevern’s corps, and that of M. Schwerin.
The Austrians committed the same fault exactly, in the distribu-
tion of their troops on the frontiers of Saxony.
It was by no means probable, that the king would order a con-
siderable corps to enter Bohemia, near Egra; because, being as so
great a distance from his other columns, it would be exposed to be
cut off by the superior forces of the Austrians; who must necessar-
ily take a central position between that corps and the king’s, as they
had the greatest part of their forces in the circles of Saatz and
Leutmeritz.
It was still less probable the enemy would undertake any thing
against Egra; which, if provided with a common garrison, cannot be
taken without a siege; which most certainly he would not undertake,
as it cannot, from its situation, facilitate the operations against
Bohemia: and, if against all rules of war, he did lay siege to it, they
might in four days have brought their army to its relief. From whence
it appears evident, that the placing a corps in the neighbourhood of
Egra was of no use, and subject to be cut off from the main army
of Budyn, whenever the enemy entered Bohemia by the defiles of
Kupferberg and Basberg; as it really happened: because M. Brown

was forced to quit the position at Budyn, in order to join the duke
of Aremberg: whereas, if this general had taken a position at
Commottai, with all his light troops, sustained by some battalions of
good infantry, in the two last mentioned defiles, it is plain prince
Maurice could not penetrate that way, as he did; and, though he
had, he could not join the king until he beat the duke, who might
have been sustained by the whole army under the marshal at Budyn.
This last was likewise ill posted, being too far back to sustain any
body of troops he might send to occupy the defiles between Pirna
and Lowositz; which we think is the only method that can effectually
hinder an enemy that attempts to penetrate that way into Bohemia.
The marshal ought, therefore, to have assembled his quarters beyond
the Egra, in such a manner as to be able, in one march, to be
behind the Bila at Aussig: from whence he might either sustain the
light troops placed behind the ravin of Ghishubel, or, as he thought
most convenient, let them fall back on his army, and defend the
position at Aussig, which, if occupied by an army, cannot be forced.
Even, perhaps, it would have been more advantageous to advance
with the whole army, behind the ravin of Ghishubel, and have sent
the duke of Aremberg, with his whole corps, into the mountains of
Basberg; because these positions not only covered Bohemia, but also
enabled the Austrians to penetrate into Saxony, if it was thought
proper: whereas the different positions, taken by the Austrian army,
in order to cover Bohemia, did not answer that end, and moreover
exposed the different corps to be beat in detail, and hindered from
joining each other; as it happened to that in Lusatia, under count
Kónigseg; and that in Moravia, under marshal Daun; the first hav-
ing been beat, and the other hindered from joining the rest of the
troops at Prague. There is scarce any operation of war more deli-
cate and difficult than the distribution of the troops into winter quar-
ters: it requires a perfect knowledge of the country, and must be
regulated by a prodigious variety of circumstances: 1. regard must
be had to the enemy’s disposition; 2. to his general plan of war, and
to the particular object he has in view the ensuing campaign; 3. to
the object you have yourself in view for the following campaign. If
you propose to be on the defensive, the distribution of the troops
must be made in such a manner as to be able to unite in different
points, without leaving even a possibility of their being intercepted
in their march to the place of rendezvous: that these points be chosen
as near the frontiers as possible, in order to cover the country; and

that they be so well chosen, that the enemy can neither force you
in them, nor leave you behind. If you propose being on the offensive,
the troops must be so distributed, that, in one march, or two, they
form several great corps on the enemy’s frontiers, and pass them so
as to separate his quarters, and run no risk of being intercepted
before they join, and form one body in the enemy’s country. Above
all things, care must be taken that they are not exposed to be inqui-
eted, during the winter, which the troops must enjoy in peace and
safety, as well to refresh themselves, as to form the recruits, &.
It must be acknowledged that the king of Prussia excells in this,
as in many other parts of war: no general has ever opened the
different campaigns with more greatness or precision. His quarters
were so disposed, that it was scarce possible, from thence, to guess
at his intentions; as he could, seemingly, with equal facility, form
very different enterprizes: from whence it always happened that he
begun his operations with great views, celerity, and exactness: and,
when his troops were attacked in their quarters, they always assem-
bled in the places appointed, without ever having suffered any con-
siderable loss; which is the more extraordinary, as he had very few
light troops, especially in the beginning. His disciple, prince Ferdinand,
has likewise shewn himself infinitely superior to all the French gen-
erals, in this point, as appeared evidently on every occasion.
The Austrians neglected all the rules abovementioned, and were
therefore forced to abandon the country, in order to unite the different
corps, and moreover exposed to be beat in detail; as we have seen.
Having at last assembled their army at Prague, they were at lib-
erty to attack either the king or marshal Schwerin, who were sepa-
rated by a great river, and a most difficult country for military
operations. They were much superior to either, and therefore ought
to have risked an action in those circumstances; otherwise it is in
vain to make war. If they thought themselves unequal to the king,
or Schwerin, separately, they should not, certainly, have fought them
both when united. They should not have permitted the king to pass
such a river as the Moldau, in a most difficult place, and within
sight of their camp, and remain with a very inconsiderable body of
troops, compared to theirs, a whole day and a night on the same
side of the river. They ought, no doubt, to have attacked him, either
before he passed, or after, before he joined M. Schwerin; or, if they
chose rather to attack this last, they should have left 20 battalions
on the heights of Brositz, opposite Potbaba, to hinder the king from

passing, and march to Brandeiss, against Schwerin, without delay.
The enemy having joined all his forces the 6th in the morning,
in their presence, and his leaving M. Keith on the other side of the
Moldau, in the sight of Prague, indicated very plainly, he proposed
bringing things to an issue there. The Austrians should not there-
fore have been so confident in their numbers, and position, as to
send their cavalry to forage, while the enemy was actually making
some motions in their presence.
When they saw the enemy march on his left, they certainly did
right to change their position; but this was only part of what they
should have done. They ought to have bought all the artillery pos-
sible to bear against the village of Podschernitz, and have attacked
him as he was advancing in columns through that village, and over
the meadows, without giving him time, or ground to form upon.
They should have put their horse in two close lines, which would
have enabled them to extend their right quite up to the fishponds,
which covered their flank effectually, and deprived the enemy of the
ground, on which only he could form his cavalry; and, if they kept
back their center a little, so as to form a curve, concave towards
the enemy, which they certainly might have done, their right being
covered by the ponds, and their left by the artillery and infantry of
the right wing, in this case, the enemy could not advance at all,
without presenting his left flank; which must always be decisive in
every action, and particularly in cavalry. But the Austrians neglected
all these precautions, and moreover suffered the enemy’s horse, though
less numerous, to take them in flank; and were consequently defeated.
When M. Brown repulsed and pursued the enemy, he ought not to
have broke the line, and rushed forward, like a young soldier, who
sees and observes only what passes directly before him, without
attending to the whole, and thereby regulate this or that particular
manœuvre. When he advanced, he should have ordered the whole
line to make the same motion; and, if he did not choose to quit the
heights, where his center and left stood, he should have advanced
his right, so as to form an oblique line with the right forwards. By
this manœuvre, he was at liberty to bring all his reserve, and the
right of the second line, to sustain the point of attack on which the
victory depended; and, by keeping the line close, gave the enemy
no advantage, how much so ever he advanced with his right to pur-
sue them to Podschernitz. Even this oblique formation necessarily
enabled him to take the enemy’s whole line in flank, and rake it
from one end to the other. The marshal, by advancing with the
right only, broke the line, and thereby left an opening, which the
enemy occupied, cut the army in two, and defeated it.
There is in every camp a certain point, which may very properly
be called, the key of it, and on which depends the success of an
action; while you keep this, the enemy has nothing; and when you
lose it, all is lost. The talent of finding out this point, is perhaps the
most sublime, and the most rare, of any in the whole art of war.
On this talent depends the science of camps, and the methods of
attacking and defending them. In the present case, this point was,
no doubt, that space of ground between the point of the right wing
of infantry, and the pond near Sterboholi, where the cavalry should
have been posted, as it is marked in the plan, with the light troops
and some regular infantry in Sterboholi, and a battery on the height,
before the right wing of horse. While the Austrians occupied this
ground, they could not be defeated; but they had studied so little
the science of camps, that they did not perceive this point, and
formed their cavalry a great way behind it; and were beat.
From all the preceding remarks, it appears, that M. Brown either
did not know the country, or did not know how to occupy it prop-
erly, in the distribution of his army into winter quarters; and that
he committed numberless faults, as well before, as during the action;
which necessarily were followed with the loss of it. As we know that
he was a good soldier, and by no means a contemptible general, it
is far from being impossible, that some private motives might make
him less careful and clear-sighted than is consistent with a person
of his genius. He was, no doubt, little pleased to see prince Charles
at the head of the army; and, being under the command of another,
was, probably, less anxious about the event. Had he been alone,
perhaps he would have acted otherwise. This shews, how imprudent
it is to employ, together, men whose private views of ambition can
scarce ever coincide.
As to the king’s dispositions, they will, no doubt, appear very fine
to those who are not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of mil-
itary operations, or who have not attended to the description we
have given of the country wherein these transactions happened.
Events, like an impetuous torrent, hurry people away, without giving
them time to reflect on their causes, or examine the various cir-
cumstances, which contributed to produce them; and therefore their
opinion of things is seldom established on clear and exact ideas.

Being separated from the enemy by a chain of mountains, and
moreover protected by many strong places, he could distribute his
troops into winter quarters as he pleased, without any risk; because
the nature of the country enabled him to assemble them, before any
considerable body of the enemy could penetrate. The disposition of
his march into Bohemia, was subject to a prodigious number of
obstacles; many of which were, at least might have been, insur-
mountable.
Prince Maurice’s column was separated from that under the king
by an interval of 50 miles; and, moreover, by a most difficult coun-
try, full of mountains, woods, ravins, defiles, &c. The enemy had,
in this very space of ground, an army much superior to either prince
Maurice’s, or the king’s; they might consequently have taken forty
positions that would have effectually hindered their junction; and, if
they presumed to advance one step into the country, attack either
of them separately; and, being much superior, probably defeat them.
Even after their junction, M. Brown, with the duke of Aremberg,
was still equal to them, and might have taken several positions
between the Egra and Prague, which would have hindered them
from approaching the Moldau, and joining Schwerin. Being at last
assembled at Prague, they might have attacked either the king or
Schwerin, with forces much superior to either. As these were sepa-
rated by the Moldau, they might have been hindered from joining
at all. When the king passed that river, leaving M. Keith* on the
other side, the enemy were at liberty to destroy either of them,
having more time than was necessary for that purpose. The same
reasoning holds good with regard to the other two columns under
* Marshal Keith, knight of the black eagle, of St. Andreas, and Alexander Newski’s
orders in Russia, was born of the illustrious family of Marshall, in Scotland. In
1730 he was a major general in Russia; in 1734 a lieutenant general, and went
with the Russian troops into Germany; in 1737 he served against the Turks, and
distinguished himself greatly at the taking of Oczakow, where he was wounded; in
1741 and 1742 he commanded against the Swedes, and got the battle of Williamstrand;
in 1747 he quitted the Russian service, and entered that of Prussia; in 1749 was
made knight of the black eagle, and governor of Berlin, with a pension of 12,000
dollars, besides his pay. He was killed in 1758, at the battle of Hochkirchen, at the
head of the Prussian infantry, who had repulsed the Austrians, and were pursuing
them. He was middle sized; had a very martial countenance; and was an humane
and benevolent man.
prince Bevern and marshal Schwerin. They were so far separated,

that the enemy might have taken such positions as would have hin-
dered them from joining; and might, with superior forces, have
attacked either. From whence it appears, that the king, by thus sep-
arating his columns at such an immense distance, exposed them to
be beat in detail, and his whole army to destruction. His passing
such a river as the Moldau, in sight of an immense army, his stay-
ing eighteen hours, at least, with a handful of men, in their pres-
ence, ought to have been fatal to him; and, if it happened otherwise,
he must thank his good fortune.
His attacking the enemy in such a strong camp, and in the neigh-
bourhood of a fortress, was certainly very rash, because it was very
improbable that he beat them: and, though he did, he could not
reap any great advantage from it; as they could always retire into
Prague, and from thence march instantly out, and destroy marshal
Keith in his presence, even after he had separated the two wings.
’Tis, in general, very imprudent to attack an army near a fortress;
because, in case of success, ’tis impossible to proceed with cavalry,
which alone can destroy a defeated army; whatever advantages the
infantry may gain, they cannot prosecute them with such vigour and
celerity, as to hinder an enemy from making a retreat, and get soon
together again. Had the king got such a battle, 20 miles from any
fortress, the whole Austrian army would have been destroyed. He
was the less obliged to attack the enemy in this position, as, by
directing his march towards Kollin and Kuttenberg, where the enemy
had their magazines, they would have followed him, and given him
a more favourable opportunity to attack them; and, in all probabil-
ity, he would have met M. Daun, then coming from Moravia, whom
he might have crushed. This manœuvre would have enabled him to
destroy the enemy’s magazines, and force them to fight on his own
terms, or submit to be cut off from Vienna. As to the action itself,
he had no choice in his attack; it could be done only on the left;
but his seeing, and seizing the critical and decisive moment that
M. Brown gave him, by breaking his line, is such a stroke of supe-
rior genius, that few, very few, are capable of. His prudence, in re-
establishing the line, continually, as he advanced, and his whole
conduct during the action, most justly deserve the greatest approba-
tion. What appears rash in the manœuvres which immediately pre-
ceded it, must, probably, be attributed to the necessity of his affairs,
and to the knowledge he had of those generals who opposed him.

His majesty seems too great a general to commit a common fault.
Prince Charles, with near 50,000 men, having been forced to
throw himself into Prague, the king formed the extraordinary pro-
ject of blockading him in that place. As it is very populous, the addi-
tion of near 60,000 men, including servants, and the followers of
the army, would, he hoped, soon force them to surrender for want
of subsistence.
During the celebrated blockade, nothing happened, but what is
common; and therefore, we think, a detail of the operations would
be no less insipid, than useless. In such an operation of war, noth-
ing more is to be done, than to occupy such posts, in the neigh-
bourhood of the place, as most effectually prevent any succours,
provisions, or intelligence, to enter. Those who are shut up, on the
contrary, endeavour to open the chain as often as possible, that their
wants may be relieved. The nature of the ground, the number and
species of the troops on each side, are the only matters to be con-
sulted, as to the methods to be used on these occasions: no rule can
be given as to the manner of occupying properly a piece of ground;
genius alone can do it, and precepts are vain.
It is, no doubt, a thing worthy remark, and will appear a fable
to posterity, that near 50,000 men, with a train of artillery, arms,
&c. should submit to be shut up for six weeks, and reduced to
extremity, by an army of equal force. That of the king did not cer-
tainly, at the end of May, exceed that of the Austrians; which will
appear evident, if we consider how many men he had lost in the
battle, by sickness, desertion, and the numberless detached corps.
This army, small as it was, formed a chain of posts, which extended
many miles, and was moreover separated by the Moldau; over which
they communicated by two bridges only; the one above, and the
other below the town: so that, in fact, the Austrians, had they chose
to march out of the place, would have had no more than half the
Prussian army to contend with: why therefore they did not, no man,
that has the least idea of military affairs, can ever comprehend. A
torrent carried one of the bridges away; yet did they continue quiet,
and let slip this favourable opportunity, without making any attempt
to go out. We have been very often on the ground about Prague,
and must own, it is, and will be, a matter of wonder and astonish-
ment, that no effort was made to march out. Had they attacked the
Prussians, thus separated by a great river, and divided into so many
small detachments, they could not fail in their attempt; they must
have destroyed their army. It is no less surprizing, that so great a
general as the king of Prussia should think it possible to reduce an
army of 50,000 men, in such an extensive town as Prague, with one
of equal force. The supineness of the Austrians justified this attempt,
and saved his army from inevitable destruction.
When the king summoned prince Charles to surrender, marshal
Brown, then sick in bed, being consulted, answered, with no less
spirit than amazement, “Est ce que sa majesté croit que nous sommes
tous de C-ll-ns. Dîtes au prince que mon avis est, que son altesse
aille sur le champ attaquer le M. Keith.”
The celebrated marshal Belleisle, who knew Prague perfectly well,
had, in the preceding war, with 15,000 men, defended it for many
months against the Austrians; and, being at last reduced to the great-
est extremity, quitted it with 12,000 men, and retired to Egra, with
safety and glory. This general wrote a letter, while the king was
blockading that town; which I have seen; wherein he says, “Je con-
nois Prague, si j’y etois, avec la moitié des troupes, que le prince
Charles y a actuéllement je detruirois l’armée Prussienne.”
While the king was occupied before Prague, he sent out several
detachments, in order to raise contributions, and secure, or destroy,
the magazines which the enemy had formed in different parts of
Bohemia. General Oldenbourg6 and colonel Meyer7 were sent into
the empire with the same view, and to hinder, or at least retard,
the operations of the army of the empire. But all their operations
are of too insignificant a nature to deserve any particular detail;
none of them had, nor indeed could have, any considerable influence
on the general plan of operations. We shall therefore pass them in
silence.
Marshal Daun, who now commanded the army in Moravia, which
had been the preceding campaign under the orders of prince
Piccolomini, having received orders to join the main army at Prague,
quitted Moravia, and directed his march for that purpose. However,
on the 6th of May, he was only arrived at Bóhmisch Brodt, within
12 miles of that place, where he was informed of the battle. He con-
tinued here for some days, and then retired to Kollin, as well to
6
Maj. Gen. Jürgen Friedrich von Oldenburg.
7
Karl Friedrich von Meyer (1708–75).
Illustration 6
avoid an action, as to join the right wing, which, as we have already

said, had retired to Beneschau.
The king, fearing that this army, which amounted to above 40,000
men, might not only disturb his operations before Prague, but like-
wise, by some manœuvre or other, give prince Charles an oppor-
tunity to get out of that place, thought it necessary to drive them
back further. For which purpose, the prince of Bevern, with about
25,000 men, was ordered to execute this plan.
As this general advanced, the marshal very wisely retired, in order
to receive reinforcements which were in march to join him, and fell
back successively to Kollin, Kuttenberg, Goltzjenkau, and Haber.
Having at length received all the reinforcements, artillery, &c.
which he expected, he gave orders, the 11th of June in the evening,
to march next morning. Accordingly the army quitted the camp of
Jenikau the 12th, and marched the same day to Janovitzy. The next
day general Nadasti was attacked at Pikan; but, being sustained by
the whole army, the Prussians were repulsed with loss. This general,
having been reinforced, was ordered to march by Maleschau, and
take post at Suchdol, while general Beck, with about 6000 men, was
commanded to occupy Kuttenberg; which the Prussians had quitted
on the 12th, and retired to Kollin. On the 14th the marshal marched
to Gintitz, and on the 16th to Krichenau, where he encamped. This
whole march was conducted with much prudence and vigour; inso-
much that the enemy was more than once on the point of being
attacked, and probably defeated; being much inferior. The marshal,
by the direction of his march, seems to have intended to bring prince
Bevern to an action before he was joined by any reinforcements, or
to have cut him off from Prague; the difficulty of the roads and the
good conduct of the prince prevented it.
The king, being informed of the enemy’s approach, quitted his
army before Prague on the 13th, and marched towards Kollin; where
he proposed uniting the several corps, he had detached, to the army
under the prince of Bevern, and then attack the enemy without
delay. On the 14th he marched by Schwartz Kosteletz, and Zdanitz,
intending to encamp at Malotitz; but, on approaching that place, a
large body of troops was discovered marching behind Zasmuck. Being
no ways prepared for an action, having only a few battalions with
him, his majesty threw them into the village of Zdanitz, with the
cavalry on the plain before it, and continued in this position ’till he
was joined by the different detachments he expected.
The camp occupied by the enemy, at Krichenau, was judged too

advantageous to be attacked in front, with any probability of suc-
cess: nor could it be approached on the left, without marching, a
great way up, to the source of the ravin which covered it. This
would give the marshal time to change his position, as he thought
most convenient, and perhaps afford him an opportunity to give the
king the slip, and march to Prague. For which reason his majesty
resolved to occupy the hills of Chotzemitz, behind the enemy’s right.
Accordingly, on the 18th in the morning, the army was ordered to
march on its left, along the great road that goes from Prague towards
Kollin. During the march, advice was brought that the enemy was
retiring; which was soon found to be a mistake; for he had only
changed his position, and was observed to be putting his army in
order of battle, on the very ground which the king proposed to
occupy.
The marshal, seeing the enemy’s army move on its left, easily per-
ceived the king’s intentions were to attack him on his right flank: to
avoid which, he ordered his army to move on the right, first to B.B.
the reserve in D.D. then to G.G. with the reserve in E.E. and gen-
eral Nadasti’s corps in F.F. His army, consisting of 60,000 men, was
formed in two lines; the infantry on the wings, and the cavalry in
the center. The right of the infantry was posted on a high hill, quite
close to an open wood occupied by the light troops. At a small dis-
tance before the front was the village of Krzeczor, in which some
battalions were placed very properly, as they could with ease be sus-
tained by the line. The hill, on which this village stands, presents,
towards the right, very high and steep precipices, which cannot be
passed by any species of troops. At the bottom of this hill is another
village, which was likewise occupied by some infantry. Out of the
hill, a little behind this last village, runs a rivulet almost perpendic-
ular to the enemy’s line; the banks of it are very high and craggy.
Behind this rivulet Nadasti’s corps was at first placed, and then in
F.F. so that the enemy could not advance to attack the line, with-
out presenting his flank to this corps. On the left of Krzeczor, on
a high and steep hill, is the village of Brzist, a little before the line,
also occupied by some infantry. The left was likewise on a very high
hill, which commands all the plain about it. Near the left is the vil-
lage of Podhorz; through which runs a marshy rivulet, which effectually
covered that wing. All the ground before the front was very unequal;
this obliges a line, marching to attack it, to stop often, in order to
close and form again; which is a great disadvantage, particularly

being near the enemy, whose artillery cannot fail doing great execution.
The king ordered his army to halt in the plain near Slatislunz
and Novimiesto, while he reconnoitred the enemy’s position; whom,
notwithstanding the strength of it, he resolved to attack. The army
was again put in motion, and soon after the battle begun: of which
we shall give the different relations that were published. By which
means the reader will be enabled to form a proper judgment of this
great and decisive action. The first is that published by the court of
Vienna; the second is that of the Prussians; and the last, which is
more extensive than the others, was wrote by a French officer, who
was at the Austrian army by order of his court.
As soon as the imperial and royal army quitted the camp of Gintitz,
on the 16th of June in the evening, in order to occupy that which
had been marked out at Krichenau, his Prussian majesty quitted like-
wise that of Kaurzim, and posted his army on the heights behind
Planian. Upon which the Austrian army changed its position that same
evening, and was posted, in order of battle, between two heights, that
were to the right and left. On the 18th, in the morning, the enemy
marched towards Planian, and halted between that place and the Inn
called Statislunz. At 1 o’clock, however, his army was put again in
motion, in four columns. As soon as his excellency marshal Daun per-
ceived that the enemy’s intention was to come on his right flank, he
ordered the reserve, and all the second line, to march there, and form
a flank to cover the right wing. General Nadasti, with his hussars and
Croats, was likewise ordered there for the same purpose. The first line
continued in its first position, ’till the enemy’s left wing was seen to
advance, in several columns, against the flank and right wing of the
Austrian army; then it was ordered to march on its right; quite close
to he abovementioned flank; and, at two in the evening, it was at
length formed upon the heights. Then the heavy artillery, on both
sides, began to play. The enemy’s attack on our right wing was so
violent, that it threw the cavalry into confusion: it was, however, put
again in order, by the bravery and good conduct of the generals
Serbelloni, Daun, Odonnell, Trautmansdorff, and Aspremont; and then
they repulsed the Prussians. Notwithstanding which, the enemy advanced
on the heights of the village of Krzeczor, still nearer our flank. As
soon as they reached the village, they burnt it; which was the signal
to their right wing to attack our left. At half an hour after three they
made a most violent attack on our flank, and immediately after on
our right and left wing. Some hundred men, formed in half a square,
penetrated through the flank; they were, however, drove back by our
cavalry and the Saxon carabineers. The enemy renewed his attacks
seven different times; in each of which he was repulsed; and at last
Map 4. Plan of the Battle of Chotzemitz. Fought on the 18th of June 1757, Between the Prussians Commanded by the King and the Austrians
Commanded by Marshal Daun, and won by the Latter.
forced to abandon us to a compleat victory. Upon which the Austrian

army took its third position on the heights, where it remained all night,
in order of battle; and, on the 19th, retired to the old camp of Kriche-
nau. During the action, the king was on a hill behind his left wing,
from whence he gave his orders. The enemy, in their retreat, burnt
the villages of Brzafam and Kutliers: their left wing went towards the
village of Welin; and their right towards Nimburg. This battle, which
lasted from 2 o’clock ’till nine, may be reckoned among the most
remarkable and bloody that have happened for a long time. It was
conducted, on both sides, with no less valour than prudence; ’till the
Prussians were, at length, thrown into the greatest confusion, and forced
to take a precipitate flight, by two different ways, and in small divi-
sions; as chance brought them together. Their loss, on this occasion,
may be certainly reckoned at 20,000 men: 6500 were found dead on
the field of battle; and above 7000 prisoners: among which are lieu-
tenant general Treskow,8 major general Pannewitz, and 120 staff officers;
besides 3000 deserters. We have taken 22 pair of colours, and 45
pieces of cannon. The loss of the Austrian army amounts to above
6000 men, killed, wounded, and missing. Among the first is lieutenant
general Lutzow; and among the second were count Serbelloni, general
of horse, lieutenant general Wolwart,9 and major generals prince Lobko-
vitz,10 and Wolf. The victory, after God, must be ascribed to the wise
and valourous conduct of marshal Daun.* Count Stambach, general
of horse, who commanded the left wing, contributed very much to the
victory, by the vigorous attack he made on the enemy’s right. Lieute-
nant generals Kolowrat, Wolwart, Wied, and Sincere; major generals
Schallenberg, Le Fevre, and Niclas Esterhasi,11 distinguished themselves
8
Joachim Christian von Tresckow (1698–1762).
9
Gottfried Baron Wöllwarth (1686–1770).
10
Maj. Gen. Prince Joseph Maria Carl Lobkowitz (1725–1802).
* Leopold count Daun [Leopold Joseph Maria von Daun (1705–1766)] was born
in 1705. He was, in the beginning, a knight of Malta, and colonel of his father’s
regiment: in 1736 lord of the bed-chamber; in 1737 major general, and served
against the Turks; in 1739 a lieutenant general; in 1740 he obtained a regiment;
in 1745 he was made a general of infantry; in 1748 a privy councillor; in 1751
commandant of Vienna; in 1753 knight of the golden fleece; and in 1754 a field
marshal. He had, in the preceding war, shewn no less bravery than prudence; and
was wounded in the battles of Grotzka and Friedberg, in 1749. He formed the new
exercise, and composed the institutions for the new military academy. In 1745, hav-
ing quitted the order of Malta, he married the countess Fuchs (a favourite of the
empress) by whom he has many children. He is a middle sized man, and has the
most engaging countenance that can be seen: is uncommonly brave, and cool in
action: a degree more of that vigor animi, would make him one of the greatest
men of his age. [Franz-Lorenz von Thadden, Feldmarschall Daun: Maria Theresias
grösster Feldherr (Wien, München: Herold, 1967).]
11
Nicolaus Joseph, Prince Esterházy (1714–90).
very much: as did general Nadasti,* with the Saxon light horse, and
the other troops under his command. The regiments that formed the
reserve, and the grenadiers, suffered very much; having been contin-
ually in action. Among the infantry, the regiment of Botta, commanded
by prince Kinsky,12 distinguished itself; having fired all their cartridges,
they however continued in the line, with their bayonnets fixed, and
repulsed the enemy. Among the cavalry, the four regiments of Savoy,
Ligne Birkenfeld, and Wurtenberg, distinguished themselves in a partic-
ular manner. The artillery, commanded by colonel Feuerstein, was
remarkably well served. Among the volunteers, the duke of Wurten-
berg,13 and major general count Czernichew,† likewise distinguished
themselves.
The Prussians account of the battle is as follows:
Immediately after the battle of Prague, colonel [Georg] Putkammer,
with his hussars, was sent to pursue the enemy; who was followed, on
the 9th of May, by the prince of Bevern and general Zeithen,* with
20,000 men. The first remarkable skirmish happened at Suchdol, where
the Austrians great magazine of meal was taken. Lieutenant general
Ziethen, and major generals Krochow and Manstein, with four battalions,
* General Nadasti [Franz Leopold, Graf von Nádasdy (1707–83)] is a Hungarian

born: he served at first as lieutenant colonel in Baroniai’s regiment of hussars; and
in 1736 colonel; in 1741 major general; in 1744 lieutenant general; in 1753 a privy
councillor; in 1754 commandant of Buda, and general of horse; in 1756 bann of
Croatia; and in 1758 a field marshal. He served in Italy, Silesia, and on the Rhine;
and distinguished himself greatly in the passage of that river, in the preceding war;
and by the taking of Schweidnitz in 1757. To recompence his services, her impe-
rial majesty restored him his grandfather’s estates; and, though a Hungarian, con-
ferred upon him, the government of Buda. He was married in 1745, and has several
children. Some disgust happened between him and the other commanders, after
the battle of Lissa, and he never appeared more in the army.
12
Franz de Paule Ulrich, Fürst Kinsky von Chinitz und Tettau (1726–92). Austrian
General who made a name for himself by beating back Frederick’s attack at Kolin
and by commanding the Austrian artillery at the battle of Torgau (1760).
13
Duke Karl Eugen von Württemburg (r. 1737–93).
†
Count Czernichew [Zachar Grigor’evich Chernyshev (1705–81)] is a Russian
born: he was first an ensign in the Semonowski life guards; and in 1756 a major
general. He is a man of great parts, which have contributed to advance his for-
tune. At present he is secretary of war.
* This general is greatly favoured by the king. In 1740 he served as major of
hussars, in Silesia; in 1741 was a lieutenant colonel and decorated with the order
pour le merite; and in the same year a colonel, and had a regiment given him; in
1744 a major general; in 1756 a lieutenant general. After the battle of Prague, in
which he distinguished himself, he was made knight of the black eagle. He has
commonly commanded the vanguard. After the battle of Breslaw, he made a fine
retreat. In the battle of Torgau he gained immortal glory, by occupying the heights
of Súptitz, after the king had been forced to quit the field, which tore the victory
out of M. Daun’s hands. He is now above 60 years old.
and 1100 horse, were sent from the camp at Kollin on this expedi-
tion. They succeeded in taking this magazine, notwithstanding there
was a camp of hussars and Croats behind Suchdol, and the heights
by St. John’s chapel was occupied by the Austrians. General Nadasti
sent lieutenant colonel Ballasti, with some hundred hussars, to attack
lieutenant colonel Varnery, of Putkammer’s regiment, but they were
repulsed with loss. Colonel Werner, being sent to observe the Austrians,
was attacked, near Krattenau, by colonels Zobel and Lusinski, with
600 horse, which he repulsed, and took 43 prisoners. On the 5th June,
the prince of Bevern quitted his camp at Kollin, in order to attack
general Nadasti’s corps, who was encamped on the heights near St.
John’s chapel; but this general made no stand, either there, or on the
heights by Kank; which he quitted, as well as the town of Kuttenberg.
We took 73 prisoners: and the enemy lost, killed and wounded, above
150 men more. The prince of Bevern, on this occasion, took two mag-
azines of forage and provisions, at Kuttenberg and Neuhoff, and
encamped by Neschkarziz, a village between Neuhoff and Kuttenberg.
This position forced M. Daun to quit his strong camp at Czaslaw,
and fall back first to Goltzenkau, and afterwards to Haber. The great
number of defiles hindered us from attacking the enemy’s rear-guard,
so that this march was made without any skirmish, excepting that
which happened on the 7th of June, at the defile of Czûrckwitz, which
alarmed general Nadasti, who was encamped behind Czaslaw, with
his corps reinforced by the four regiments of Saxon horse. In the mean
while, the army under M. Daun, having been reinforced, amounted
to 60,000 men; and it appeared, his intentions were to march, with
the greatest part of his troops, against that part of the king’s camp,
before Prague, on the other side of the Moldau; and, to cover this
manœuvre, to attack the prince of Bevern with Nadasti’s corps. The
prince of Bevern had only 70 squadrons and 18 battalions, and con-
sequently was in need of a reinforcement. The king, therefore, having
drawn his posts before Prague nearer together, broke up the 13th of
June, and marched with 10 battalions and 20 squadrons, by Kosteletz,
towards Zasmuck. On the same day, count Daun ordered general
Nadasti to attack prince Bevern’s fore-posts, and at the same time
made a motion with his whole army on the Prussians flank, which
forced them to retire towards Kollin, and on the 14th to Kaurzim,
where the king’s corps joined them. The 15th and 16th were employed
in reconnoitring the roads towards the village of Wisocka, where the
Austrian army stood; which was not perfectly executed on account of
the great number of the enemy’s light troops. Four thousand pandours
and hussars attacked a transport coming from Nimburg, but the escort,
consisting of 200 men, under major Billerbeck, defended themselves
above three hours; and, having received a reinforcement, arrived safe
at the camp with the loss of seven men only. On the 17th, as we pro-
posed marching to Schwoysitz, we perceived the enemy’s army formed
on the heights, in a half square, with the right wing extending towards
Kuttenberg and Kollin, and the left towards Zasmuck; the front was
covered by a chain of fishponds and morasses. We made a motion,
so that our right came to Kaurzim, and our left towards Nimburg and
Planian, before it. On the 18th we occupied some hills before this
place. The army marched on the left, in order to attack the enemy
as soon as the necessary dispositions could be made; and our light
troops had posted themselves opposite those of the enemy, who endeav-
oured to form on our left flank; we drove them back beyond Kollin,
as far as the heights, which we must necessarily occupy to be able to
attack the enemy’s right flank. Major general Hulsen,* with seven bat-
talions, was ordered to render himself master of them. The infantry
was to form a line to sustain this attack, without engaging its right,
which was ordered to remain somewhat further back. Our grenadiers
climbed up the heights, occupied a village the enemy had abandoned,
and took two batteries, each of 12 or 13 pieces behind it; and, of a
sudden, our infantry, without giving time to stop them, advanced and
attacked all the enemy’s first line, which hindered us from sustaining
the attack of the heights: four battalions would have sufficed, and the
victory was ours. The enemy, taking advantage of this fault, ordered
some infantry to file behind the line, and attack our seven battalions;
who, though they had suffered very much in three successive attacks,
and from the fire of 40 pieces of cannon, repulsed them. Norman’s
dragoons attacked the enemy’s infantry, dispersed several battalions,
took 5 pair of colours, and then advanced against the Saxon carabi-
neers, whom they beat back and pursued as far as Kollin. While our
infantry was engaged with the enemy, it suffered greatly from the heavy
artillery: the battalions were full of large openings. The regiment of
cavalry of the prince of Prussia took post opposite the interval between
the regiments of prince Bevern and prince Henry, in order to cover
the abovementioned openings, and attacked an Austrian regiment of
foot that stood over against them, and no doubt had penetrated, if it
had not been exposed, at the same time, to a battery charged with
cartouches, which threw them back on Bevern’s regiment. The Austrian
cavalry pursued them; whereby prince Bevern’s and prince Henry’s
regiments suffered so much, that they were obliged to be ordered out
of the line. This produced an opening that cut off our communica-
tion with the attack of the heights, and we were forced to retire. The
battalion of guards, on the right, repulsed four battalions, and two reg-
iments of horse, who attempted to surround them. Our left wing
remained on the ground, where the enemy was posted before the
action, ’till about 9 o’clock, and then retired. The army marched
* This general was major in 1740; in 1743 lieutenant colonel; in 1745 colonel;
in 1754 major general, and knight of the order pour le merite; in 1756 he had a
regiment; and in 1758 was made a lieutenant general. He commanded a consid-
erable corps in Saxony, against the army of the empire, with much reputation, par-
ticularly in the action by Strehlen.
towards Nimburg without being followed at all. Several cannon have

been left behind, the carriages being broke, and for want of horses.
The loss of this battle obliges us to raise the siege of Prague. The
army on the right of the Moldau marched towards Brandeiss, and
joined that which came from Kollin; and M. Keith, with his, marched
to Budyn.
The Prussians account of their loss, is 1450 men, and 1667 horses,
killed, in the cavalry; 8755 men, killed and missing, in the infantry;
and 3568 wounded: in all, 13,773. The list, published at Vienna, of
the loss of the Austrians, is 819 men killed, 3616 wounded, in the
infantry; 163 men, 414 horses, killed, 825 men, and 748 horses,
wounded, in the cavalry. Among the wounded were 23 staff officers,
and marshal Daun himself.
Though the two preceding accounts, particularly the last, are very
clear and explicit, I will add that sent to France, because it is impos-
sible that so important an action should be too much explained and
examined.
Marshall Daun, having received orders, on the 11th of June, to march
to the relief of Prague, with full power to act as he should think most
advantageous for the empress’s service, quitted his camp the next morn-
ing, and, after a difficult march of some days, arrived on the 15th at
Gintitz. His excellency proposed marching, the day following, to
Kaurzim, which was the most commodious road to Prague. The king
of Prussia had joined the prince of Bevern, with a considerable rein-
forcement, the preceding evening; and, as he had a perfect knowledge
of the country, he no doubt believed, that, by occupying the camp of
Kaurzim, he would very much embarrass marshal Daun. Effectively,
when the marshal was informed of it, he perceived very well the great
inconveniency in which the king had put him by taking this position,
while it reduced him to the necessity of marching on his right, or on
his left. It was extreamly dangerous and difficult to march on the left,
on account of the defiles, morasses, and woods; and, if he marched
on his right, he must necessarily pass near Kaurzim, and present his
flank to the enemy: and lastly, if, to avoid this, he would march a
great way about towards the right, he would be the next day farther
from Prague than at present; and moreover would, by that means,
afford the enemy an opportunity to take twenty other positions, equally
proper to hinder him from approaching that place; which is very easy
in this country, where advantageous camps can be found on every
spot. The marshal, seeing therefore that he must necessarily come to
an action, in order to deliver Prague, resolved to encamp the next
morning in the enemy’s presence, and reduce him to the necessity
wither of attacking, or give a proper opportunity of being attacked.
Accordingly, the army marched to Krichenau. On the 17th, the mar-
shal, being informed that the enemy marched towards Planian, mounted
instantly, and went to reconnoitre their motions, in person. Perceiving

that the king directed his march towards the Austrian right, he thought
it necessary to change the position of his army. It was formed with
Planian before the front: the left wing was placed, in two lines of
infantry, with a great quantity of artillery, on a high hill, that stood
quite alone, in the plain. On the right was another hill, somewhat
lower than the former; on this the rest of the infantry was posted, like-
wise in two lines, with two lines of cavalry on their flank. At the bot-
tom of the hill, between these two heights, is a plain of about 2500
paces long; here the marshal put two lines of horse, and a third in
reserve; because, as the king was equally strong in cavalry, it was imag-
ined he would make his greatest efforts against the center, in order to
cut the army in two. His excellency used all the possible precautions
to elude the king’s intention: artillery was placed on the flanks, and
before the cavalry. Things continued in this situation the 17th. On the
18th the king ordered his army to march on the left, along the great
road that goes from Prague to Vienna, and he endeavoured, contin-
ually, to come on the right flank of the imperial army. M. Daun, per-
ceiving the king’s intentions, ordered the corps de reserve to march
on the right wing, in order to cover the flank. Between 9 and 10
o’clock in the morning, the head of the king’s army appeared near
Slatislunz, about a mile and a half off, where he continued ’till mid-
day, in order to give his columns time to assemble: then all was put
again in motion, and always directed their march towards the Austrians
right flank. The marshal, who expected this, ordered his second line
to march there, and close up with the reserve. At half an hour past
one, the head of the Prussian columns, both infantry and cavalry,
appeared opposite the imperial army; which was prepared to receive
them. The Prussian infantry formed immediately, and advanced, in
good order, to attack the marshal; who likewise marched to meet them.
About 2 o’clock, the attack, supported by a numerous artillery, began
with such incredible vivacity, that an eye witness only can form a
proper idea of it. The imperial army answered with a continual fire,
both of small arms, and heavy artillery. The king of Prussia had posted
some heavy cannon on a hill, behind his infantry, which did the impe-
rial army much damage. This first attack lasted about an hour and a
half; then the fire of the imperial army began to be superior to that
of the Prussians, and forced them to quit the field of battle, that they
might rest, and put themselves in order to renew the action. This was
executed soon after; but they were repulsed, as in the first. Seven suc-
cessive attacks were made from 2 o’clock ’till half an hour past six,
when the last and most violent was made. This attack was general,
and lasted ’till past 7 o’clock, when the Prussians were forced to give
way on all sides, and retire in confusion. The marshal sent some
infantry and cavalry to pursue them. The corps of light troops, under
general Nadasti, followed them a great way, and brought in many
prisoners. The Saxon carabineers stood over against some Prussian
infantry, from which, as well as from the artillery, they suffered very
much: they desired leave to attack them; which, having obtained, they
executed it with much bravery, cut the enemy’s infantry to pieces, and
took several cannon and colours. This is what happened on the right
wing, where the battle was hottest. About two hours after the first
attack on our right, that of the Prussian army advanced against the
left of the Austrians, in order to attack it; which, considering the
strength of its position, ought never to have been undertaken. It stood
upon a hill which was almost impossible to ascend, and which was
covered with artillery that did the Prussians great damage. The Prussians
right wing, being arrived at the bottom of the hill, stopped: upon which
the Austrians left, seeing the enemy did not advance, being desirous
to attack them, and partake of the glory of the day with the rest of
the army, quitted their position, and descended to the foot of the hill.
The Austrian infantry attacked that of the Prussians with much brav-
ery; and, after an hour’s combat, obliged them to give way. The
Austrian cavalry advanced likewise, in order to attack that of the enemy,
but these immediately retired towards their infantry. The Austrians
were prudent enough not to pursue their advantages on this side, for
fear of being separated from their right wing. In about an hour after,
the Prussians right wing attacked the Austrians left again; but, in less
than half an hour, they are beat back in confusion. They resumed
their former position, and fired from all their artillery upon the Austrians,
during the whole action. While the second attack was made, six bat-
talions, commanded by count Niclas Esterhasi, having shot all their
cartridges, advanced against the enemy with fixed bayonnets, and, with
great bravery, forced them to give way. This battle was general, and
all the corps were more than once engaged, &c.
As this remarkable action makes a considerable epoch in the history
of the war, being the first the king of Prussia ever lost, we shall here
give our reflections upon it, and upon the different manœuvres that
preceded it.
Reflections on the Battle of Kollin
It has been already observed, that the siege of Prague, with about
50,000 men in it, was an imprudent and dangerous enterprize. Sieges
are attended with so great expence, and so much loss of time, and
men, that they ought never to be undertaken without the utmost
necessity. The king of Prussia was then in circumstances that required
some decisive stroke, and that as soon as possible; and therefore he
should not, by any means, amuse himself with sieges, which he knew
would give the Austrians time and means to provide for their defence,
whatever was the event of that of Prague. Sieges must never be
formed, unless, 1. when the fortresses are placed on the passes which
lead into the enemy’s country, and in such a manner that you can-
not penetrate ’till you are masters of them; 2. when they are on
your communications, and the country does not furnish the neces-
sary subsistence; 3. when they are necessary, in order to cover the
magazines you form in the country itself, to facilitate your opera-
tions; 4. when they contain considerable magazines of the enemy,
and such as are essentially necessary to him; 5. when the conquest
of them is necessarily followed by that of some considerable district,
which enables you to separate your armies into winter quarters in
the enemy’s country. In these cases, your first operations must, no
doubt, be the siege of some such place; which in all others must be
avoided. Not one of these circumstances concurred with regard to
Prague: it covers no essential part of the country, neither contained
any considerable magazine, nor was necessary for the king in order
to form one there, because the country itself furnished abundantly
all kind of subsistence; and, though it did not, his armies could be
supplied from Silesia, without any risk; for prince Charles could not,
if he remained at or about Prague, prevent it. If, instead of besieg-
ing this town, his majesty had sent 20,000 men, the next morning,
after the enemy’s right wing, which, as we have said, had fled to
Beneschau, and, with the remainder, marched to Bóhmisch Brodt
against M. Daun, it is more than probable he would have destroyed
both: they certainly could not have retired without losing their artillery,
baggage, &c. and must have fell back, with the utmost expedition,
on the Danube. Then the king was at liberty to besiege Olmutz;
which would have given him all Bohemia; because prince Charles
must likewise have marched on the Danube, in order to join the
remainder of the army, as he could not, in the situation in which
he then was, without any magazines or artillery, undertake any thing
himself: he could not even approach the king at all, without expos-
ing his army to destruction. His majesty might have taken twenty
positions that would have covered the siege of Olmutz, masked the
Danube and the capital, and forced prince Charles to march up to
Lintz, in order to pass it, and join the rest of the troops. This would
have given him all the time necessary to reduce Olmutz, and even
Prague itself, which would have been left to a common garrison.
His majesty, allured by the uncertain and vain, but flattering, hopes
of taking 50,000 men prisoners, lost sight of Daun and the right
wing, and with it an opportunity of giving some decisive blow. When
he was informed of the enemy’s approach, it was full time to repair
the fault he had committed. He might, and ought to have raised
the siege of Prague, and, with his whole forces, attack M. Daun; if
he succeeded, it was very probable that prince Charles, in so long
a march as he must make from Prague to the Danube, would give
an opportunity to attack him also; and he could scarce approach
the Danube at all, while the king was with an army near Kollin, as
is evident from the inspection of the map.
His majesty knew the prince Bevern narrowly escaped being
oppressed by the superior forces of the enemy; How could he think
that the addition of a few battalions and squadrons would insure the
victory? His whole army was scarce sufficient to contend with Daun,
and yet he persists in his project of taking Prague, and thereby
exposed himself to certain destruction, if the enemy had done part
only of what might have been easily executed, as well by the gar-
rison of Prague, as by M. Daun after the battle. It is one of the
most essential qualities of a general, not to be infatuated with a pas-
sion for some favourite and striking project, because it exposes him
to many, and sometimes fatal, consequences. It is difficult to renounce
to an enterprize once embraced, because it in some measure exposes
one to the censure of want of foresight, or constancy, both very mor-
tifying to self-love. However, there is more glory in mending a fault,
than to persevere in it. His majesty, confiding too much in his own
superior talents, too little in those of his enemies, or pressed, per-
haps, by the necessity of his affairs, has been observed, very often,
to undertake things much above the means he had to accomplish
them; and therefore no wonder that many of his projects, though
in appearance plausible, wanted solidity, and consequently have not
been always attended with success. Being arrived at Kaurzim, and
finding the enemy too strongly posted to be attacked with any prob-
ability of success, his majesty might have fell back, and taken some
other position, which perhaps would have induced them to advance,
and given him an opportunity to fight upon more equal terms: if it
be objected that prince Charles, informed of his absence, would
attack the army left before Prague, it only proves he was sensible
he had exposed that army to destruction, as it depended on the
enemy’s knowing a thing, which he might have done by a thousand
means. When he resolved to occupy the heights on the right flank
of the enemy, he ought not surely to have marched at broad day,

because they must necessarily perceive his intention, and in time to
make their dispositions accordingly, as it happened. Possibly if the
king had sent in the evening a great corps of cavalry, which he
could spare in that mountainous country, towards the enemy’s left
flank, it would have drawn their attention that way, and given him
an opportunity to march unobserved in the night, and occupy the
height of Chotzemitz: the attempting it by day made it impossible
from the first instant. His majesty in marching formed a portion of
a circle; the enemy marched on the Chord, and therefore could with
ease bring more men into action, at any one point of attack, and
in less time, than he could do, though the armies had been equal,
which must be decisive; as his majesty was in proportion much
stronger in cavalry than in infantry, he ought no doubt to have
chosen the most convenient ground on the enemy’s front for that
species of troops; and, as he had given them an opportunity to rein-
force their right, and its flank, where they had brought two thirds
of their army, he ought to have refused both his wings, and make
an effort with his cavalry, sustained by infantry and artillery, on the
center, between Chotzemitz and Brzist, where the enemy had only
cavalry; and therefore most probably would have been forced to give
way, and their two wings, being thus separated, easily defeated;
whereas, by persisting to attack their right, he could bring only his
infantry to action, the ground being very improper for cavalry, as
well on account of the ravins and woods, as of the villages before
the enemy’s front. Having resolved to attack this wing, his majesty
should have brought here all his infantry, leaving only a line of horse
on his right, which would have been sufficient, as the enemy’s left
could never quit their advantageous position and descend into the
plain. This would have enabled him to sustain his vanguard prop-
erly, and at a convenient distance; whereas he left it exposed, and
quite in the aire, his line being too far back: the more successful his
vanguard was, the more certain to be destroyed, because the more
they advanced, the more they exposed themselves to be attacked on
all sides, as it really happened: for, having pierced the first line of
the enemy, and attacked the flank of the second, they found them-
selves engaged with the greatest part of the army in front; and the
whole reserve, composed of infantry and cavalry, on their flank; and
at the same time exposed to the fire of a very numerous and well
served artillery: and, being so far advanced that they could not be
sustained by the line, were obliged to give way. If they had been
properly supported, and a body of troops sent on their flank, oppo-
site the enemy’s reserve, to keep it in awe, the battle was won: the
enemy’s reserve, to keep it in awe, the battle was won: the enemy’s
line was already broke, and had no convenient ground behind to
take a new position upon; so that the whole army would have been
taken in flank; nor could the reserve quit its position to attack this
vanguard in flank, without presenting their own, and losing the
advantage of their situation. But, as these dispositions were not made,
the enemy’s reserve, without any risk, quitted its post, and took the
king’s vanguard in flank, which, as has been said, being unsupported
by any other troops, was forced to give way, and the battle was lost.
The general faults therefore of the king’s disposition, before, and
during the action, were. 1. to have manœuvred by day, which gave
the enemy time to change their position, according to their cir-
cumstances; 2. to have formed an attack where he could not con-
veniently combine the different species of arms; whereas the enemy
had both infantry and cavalry, with a great quantity of artillery, to
sustain the point attacked; 3. to have let general Hulsen advance so
far, that he could not be supported by the line; and, 4. to have
attacked with too little infantry, considering the nature of the ground.
As to the conduct of M. Daun, it appears uniform, and founded
upon reasonable principles: after the battle of Prague, it was very
judicious; he retired before the duke of Bevern, though stronger than
him from the beginning, as well to give his men time to recollect
themselves, as to be able to receive the reinforcements he expected.
These being arrived, his conduct changes according to the circum-
stances; he is now as vigorous and active, as he seemed before slow
and dilatory. His march was calculated to cut off the prince of
Bevern, before he could join the army at Prague, or be reinforced
by it; and, though this project did not succeed, it was certainly well
laid. His conduct, during the action, appears no less prudent. The
enemy made no fault of which he did not take advantage: one only
he himself seems to have committed, which was to have kept his
line too far back: this gave Hulsen an opportunity of taking the vil-
lages, before the front, form between them and the front, and then
penetrate through the line, which would certainly have occasioned
the loss of the battle, had he been properly supported. Whenever
your line is placed behind villages, it must be at a proper distance
to sustain them, otherwise they, being taken, will be of great preju-
dice to you, and advantage to the enemy, whose motions are cov-
ered and sustained by them; whereas, if you sustain them properly,
he cannot possibly take them, nor advance, leaving them behind;
because not only they break his line and throw it into some degree
of confusion, which favourable opportunity, if improved, will neces-
sarily be attended with a defeat, and also expose it to be taken in
flank by the troops posted in them. The possession therefore of vil-
lages, provided they are at a proper distance to be sustained, is one
of the most advantageous circumstances that can occur in a field of
battle; but all these advantages are lost, and turn against you, if you
do not sustain them. They are so very advantageous that I would
never advise any general to attack them, and put them on fire with
haubitz, and choose some other point of attack, which, though in
appearance less proper, will, generally speaking, succeed better.* If
the marshal had marched the 19th with his whole army towards
Prague, it is probable that of the king, before that place, would have
been destroyed. In war a general must think he has done nothing,
while something remains unfinished; he ought to consider all his suc-
cesses as means only that lead to greater, but never make an epoch
of them, or pause to meditate, while in the full career of victory
and glory.
On the 19th his majesty quitted the army, which had fought at
Kollin, and went to Prague, in order to raise the siege: this was exe-
cuted the day following without any loss worth mentioning; that part
of the army which was on the right of the Moldau, marched down
that side as far as Leutmeritz, while that under M. Keith took the
road of Welwarn and Budyn, where he passed the Egra, and went
to encamp between Liboschowitz and Lowositz, opposite the king’s
division; so that the whole formed only one army, separated by the
Elbe, over which they had the necessary communications, and could
easily be on either side, according as circumstances might require.
With the remainder of his forces his majesty had formed another
* We have a fine example of this given by the famous Marlborough, at the bat-
tle of Hockstedt [Hochstadt, 1703]; he had attacked several times the village of
Oberklaw, but was each time repulsed with great loss; his lordship, very judiciously
having left a body of infantry to mask the village, advanced, and broke the enemy’s
line, which got the battle. The French had garnished all the villages before their
front, particularly Oberklaw and Plentheim, with a prodigious quantity of infantry,
expecting that the generals of the allies would attack them, and by no means pre-
sume to advance and leave them behind; but they were disappointed, beat, and
lost all their infantry posted in the villages.
considerable army, amounting to above 30,000 men, under the com-

mand of the prince of Prussia, who took post about Bóhmisch Leipa.
By this means it was thought they could effectually cover Saxony
and Lusatia, and keep open the communication through this last
province with Silesia: for, if the enemy marched down the left side
of the Elbe, and attempted to penetrate into Saxony, by the way of
Aussig, the king could, with his army encamped about Leutmeritz,
pass the river, and take such positions between Lowositz and Aussig,
as would effectually put a stop to their progress; and, if they directed
their steps towards Lusatia, the prince’s army could easily take some
advantageous camp in that mountainous country, which would enable
him, though inferior, to oppose them with success, at least till the
king had time to make some manœuvre in his favour.
While his majesty was thus occupied in making dispositions to
continue in Bohemia as long as possible, the Austrians were no less
active in forming their plan to drive him out of it. This could be
accomplished in three different ways: the first was to follow M. Keith
down the left of the Elbe, and endeavour to penetrate into Saxony,
the conquest of which would open the way to carry the war into
Brandeburg, and probably furnish some opportunity to put a happy
end to it; and the more so, as the Russians and Swedes would be
at hand to act in concert, and consequently with more vigour: the
second method proposed, was to leave an army to observe the enemy,
and to send the remainder into Silesia, either to besiege Neiss or
Schweidnitz, which, it was imagined, would force the enemy to quit
Bohemia, in order to cover these important places, on which the
preservation of Silesia seems very much to depend: the third and
last method that offered, was to keep the army together, and march
towards Lusatia, which would force the enemy to retire, or come to
an action: and, as this last was most probable, from the known char-
acter of the king, it would be adviseable to have the whole army
united, rather than separate it, to undertake many things at once,
and so expose it to be beat in detail. This plan was preferred to the
others: accordingly, the whole Austrian army passed the Elbe on the
1st of July, and encamped at Lissau, which the enemy had quitted
the 26th of last month, and marched successively to Jungbuntzlaw
and Tscheditz, on the right of the Iser.
Prince Charles sent general Nadasti, with a considerable corps,
likewise on the right of that river, as well to observe the enemy’s
motions at Leutmeritz, as to cover the march of the army towards
Jungbuntzlaw. General Morocz was sent also, with a strong body,

on the left of the Iser, to observe the prince of Prussia’s motions,
and to prepare every thing for the march of the main army. The
first of these corps having taken post at Mschno, between the prince’s
army and that of the king, while the other passed the Iser at Bakehosen,
on the prince’s left flank, his royal highness thought it full time to
quit Tscheditz; and, as these two corps were continually on his flanks,
he found it necessary to fall back successively to Hirschberg, Neuschloss,
and Leipa; from whence he sent general Putkammer, with four bat-
talions and 500 hussars, to occupy Gabel, that he might secure that
important pass which leads into Lusatia.
In the mean time the Austrians grand army advanced with slow,
but cautious and sure steps, to Munchengratz, and from thence to
Hunnerwasser. The enemy’s position at Leipa, covered with the Poltz,
was thought too strong to be attacked; it was therefore resolved to
turn his left flank and attack Gabel, which would necessarily force
him to retire, and at the same time open a sure way into Lusatia.
Accordingly, general Macquire, with a considerable detachment,
sutained by the vanguard was sent on this expedition. The army
advanced to Nimes, in order to cover it. The place was taken the
15th, after a defence of thirty-six hours, and the army immediately
passed the Poltz. All these manœuvres forced the prince of Prussia
to quit Leipa; and having, with Gabel, lost the nearest communi-
cation with Zittau, where he had a strong garrison, and a very con-
siderable magazine of every kind, he was obliged to make several
forced and difficult marches by Kamentz, Georgenthal, Kreywitz,
Rumburg, and Unterhennersdorff, in order, if possible, to anticipate
the enemy; but he was disappointed; for, on the taking of Gabel,
they had directed their march to Zittau, where they arrived the 19th,
and were then bombarding the town with the most unrelenting fury.
They had however neglected to invest it entirely; the prince seized
this favourable opportunity, approached the place with his army,
and having, during the preceding night, withdrawn the greatest part
of the stores, baggage, &c. on the 23d he retired, by Lôbau, towards
Bautzen, without any other loss than that of colonel Diereck, and
about 200 men, who still endeavoured to defend themselves in that
general conflagration, which consumed one of the most populous
and rich cities in Germany.
The Austrians having thus drove a considerable part of the enemy’s
forces out of Bohemia, and secured their communications with that
country, by occupying Zittau and Gabel, they resolved to advance

farther into Lusatia, and endeavour to cut off the enemy intirely
from Silesia. Accordingly, the grand army marched the 25th from
Zittau to Eckartsberg; from whence several detachments were sent
on the left, to observe the motions of the enemy; and on the right,
down the Neiss, in order to secure the passes into Silesia. A small
corps of light troops, commanded by colonel Janus,14 had already
penetrated into that country by the way of Trautenau; but it was
too inconsiderable to undertake any thing of consequence.
His royal highness prince Charles resolved to continue in the
neighbourhood of Zittau until the enemy quitted the frontiers and
fell back into Saxony; which he knew they would soon be forced to
do, in order to oppose the combined army, that was then forming
in the empire, and preparing to march towards the Saala and Leipzig.
While these things passed between prince Charles and the prince of
Prussia, the king, with near 40,000 men, remained at Leutmeritz in
great tranquility, as if he had been no ways concerned in the event.
At length, however, the taking of Zittau roused him from lethargy,
and shewed him the unfavourable situation of his affairs, which noth-
ing but superior conduct and activity could reinstate. On entering
Bohemia, at the beginning of the campaign, Silesia had been left
without any troops, excepting some weak garrisons to cover it. The
enemy had taken such a position as made it difficult to send any
succours there: they could, therefore, enter that country, and perhaps
take some place of consequence before it could possibly be relieved.
To remedy these evils, his majesty quitted Leutmeritz the 20th;
and marched successively to Pirna, where he passed the Elbe,
Bischoffwerda, and Bautzen, where he arrived the 29th, and joined
the army commanded by the prince of Prussia, who retired, and
never appeared more in the field, and died soon after.
From hence his majesty marched to Weissenberg, and there waited
’till the arrival of marshal Keith; who, having left a small corps to
protect Saxony, followed with the remainder, and joined him in the
beginning of August. Having thus assembled a very considerable
army, he resolved to open the communication with Silesia; and, if
possible, bring the enemy to an action; which might, if successful,
retrieve his affairs.
14
Franz Maximilian, Baron Jahnus von Eberstädt (1711–72).
With these views, his majesty quitted Weissenberg on the 15th,

and marched to Ostritz. His vanguard took general [Philipp Levin]
Beck’s baggage at Bernstadtel, and some of the light troops, push-
ing on to Ostritz, they there surprized general Nadasti, at table; who,
with the utmost difficulty, found means to escape. All his equipage
was taken: some letters were found in it that indicated a design to
betray Dresden to the Austrians. This served as a pretext to treat
the queen of Poland with some hardship. On the 16th he advanced
within cannon shot of the enemy, in order to give them battle; but
he found them so advantageously posted, that he did not think it
prudent to attack them. However, he continued here ’till the 20th;
and then, finding they would not quit their positions, returned to
his former camp behind Ostritz. Though his majesty had not been
able to execute his plan intirely, he had gained an important point
by opening a communication with Silesia; which he resolved to keep
so, if possible, that his forces might act in concert, at least, if not
united. He left, therefore, in this neighbourhood, a considerable part
of his army, under the command of the prince of Bevern; and, with
the remainder, returned to Dresden, in order to march against the
combined army, which was advancing towards Saxony.
Before we proceed to give an account of the ulterior operations
of the respective armies, we think it may be useful to examine those
which happened after the siege of Prague. In the description we
have given of this country, it appears, there are three roads that go
out of it into Lusatia: the first, near the Elbe, goes by Leipa, Kamentz,
and Rumburg, towards Bautzen; the second, along the Iser, by
Munchengratz, and Gabel, towards Zittau; the third, by Reichenberg,
and Friedland, towards Lauban: all which are intercepted by many
and great defiles, especially the first and last, where a corps, com-
posed of a few battalions, would suffice to stop an army. The plan,
formed by the Austrians, to act on the right of the Elbe, preferable
to the left, was certainly well advised; because they could, with greater
facility, drive the enemy out of Bohemia, than if they attempted it
on the other side, where he could take many positions between
Lowositz and Pirna, from whence they could not force him by any
direct motion; and, if they endeavoured to get on his flanks, it would
be attended with loss of time, and perhaps would fail in the execution.
This plan was attended with another great advantage, that, in forcing
the enemy to retire out of Bohemia, by gaining his left flank, they
cut him off from Silesia, and opened a sure way into it for themselves.
As soon as the army passed the Elbe, a large corps, under Nadasti,
was sent to observe the king; and another between that and the
prince of Prussia’s army. These two corps were so strong, that when
united they formed a small army, and could with safety keep close
to the enemy, and render the communication between their two
armies very precarious. A third was sent on the prince’s left flank;
and, within a march of these different corps, the main army advanced
under prince Charles. By this admirable disposition he could sustain
them, if necessary; and they had a sure retreat by falling back on
his army: he was covered by them; and, keeping on the left of the
Iser, could not be forced to fight against his will. His measures were
so well taken, and executed with so much vigour and prudence, that
in 20 days he forced the enemy to abandon Bohemia with great
loss, and cut off his communication with Silesia.
If, after the taking of Zittau, his royal highness had marched to
Stromberg, beyond Lôbau, the enemy could never have opened a
communication with Silesia. The position of Kleinschónau was too
far back, and left the road between Bautzen and Górlitz open; so
that the king could always enter Silesia without any opposition. The
method, pursued by prince Charles, of acting with strong corps,
rather than with the whole army, is attended with infinite advan-
tages, 1. it facilitates the means of subsisting, which, in every coun-
try, is difficult, when the army is very numerous; 2. it enables you
to engage every day some important combat, without bringing affairs
to a decision; 3. they revive the spirits of the soldiers, whom former
misfortunes have rendered timid; 4. by taking post on the enemy’s
flanks you force him to quit every camp, however strong, and con-
sequently to abandon the whole country. All which truths are deduced
clearly from the conduct of prince Charles on this occasion.
That of the king does not, on the whole, appear in the same
favourable light. His activity in raising the siege of Prague is much
to be commended; the least delay would have been fatal to him: his
dividing the army into several strong corps, after the battle of Kollin,
very much facilitated the retreat. These presented so many objects
to the enemy, that he could not immediately determine which was
most worthy his attention; nor could he undertake any thing against
them ’till he had ascertained their number, species, and position: in
the mean time they retired with tranquility and safety. From the
king’s conduct, on this occasion, may be deduced a general rule for
retreating after an action lost. That an army retreating must be
divided into as many strong corps as the nature of the country will
admit of; because, in this case, the enemy can do you no very essen-
tial damage: if he separates his army likewise into many corps, nei-
ther of them will be strong enough to undertake any thing of
consequence; even, if they keep too close, they may receive some
considerable check. Another advantage, arising from this method of
retiring, is, that the enemy cannot intercept any one of your corps;
because he can neither push between them, nor go so far about as
to come before them, without exposing his own troops to be hemmed
in between your different corps. If he follows you with his whole
army, one only division can be in danger, which may be easily
avoided by forming a strong rear-guard, who will get time for the
remainder to march off in safety; and the more so, as a small corps
marches much more lightly than an army. Care must be taken not
to engage the whole corps; because, if the enemy is near, and acts
with vigour, it will be lost intirely.
When prince Charles passed the Elbe, it was evident he proposed
to advance towards Lusatia, consequently the king should have left
M. Keith, with a few battalions and squadrons, in the mountains
between Lowositz and Pirna, to cover Saxony, against the enemy’s
light troops, and with the remainder have taken a position behind
the Poltz, about Leipa or Nimes, with a strong corps on his left,
towards Liebenau, and another smaller on his right, between him
and the Elbe, on the road to Rumburg. This would have made it
impossible for the enemy to advance one step ’till they had dislodged
him: they could not think of entering those great defiles, through
which the road leading to Rumburg passes, having a corps, as I sup-
pose, in front, and the whole army on their flank and rear; nor
could they enter those of Liebenau and Reichenberg on his left, for
the same reasons: they must consequently either force him to retire,
or stop short. It was still more improbable that they would separate
their army and send a considerable part of it to make an efficacious
diversion in Silesia. Such is the strength of this country, and so many
good camps to be found in it, that, if the prince of Prussia, even
with his army, had taken the road of Gabel and Zittau, instead of
that of Rumburg, it is probable he might have stopped prince Charles,
for some time at least. The enemy did not choose to venture between
his right flank and the king’s army, and they could not easily take
a position on his left, that could force him to quit Gabel and Zittau,
if he had taken his camp on the mountains between these two places,
which he ought to have done, rather than take the road of Rumburg,
by which he lost them both, and his communication with Silesia.
When the enemy arrived at Hunnerwasser, Why did not the king
march instantly from Gastorff, and come on their flank and rear,
while the prince his brother attacked them in front? Nothing in the
world could hinder them from acting in concert. This, however, and
many other favourable opportunities, which the enemy gave him,
were lost. His majesty continued, as we have said, all this while,
near Leutmeritz, in perfect tranquility.
The prince’s army was, no doubt, too weak to withstand the efforts
of the enemy, who were more than double his number; yet we think
he might have taken such camps as would have stopped them. When
a general has the misfortune to command an army that is much
inferior to that of the enemy, he must certainly retire before them,
if they send very strong corps on his flanks, as well because his sub-
sistence becomes precarious, as because they may, by a judicious use
of these corps, attack him with united forces in front and rear, and
intirely defeat him, particularly if the country has many defiles. A
general, in such circumstances, has but one way to extricate him-
self; which is, to attack, with his whole forces, whatever corps may
be sent on his flank: if he succeeds, once or twice, the enemy will
scarce attempt a third time. The prince, having neglected to do this,
was, as we have said, forced to retire from camp to camp, and at
length to abandon the whole country.
During these transactions in Bohemia, the army of the empire,
consisting of 32 squadrons, 32 battalions, 23 companies of grenadiers,
2 regiments of hussars, and 52 pieces of cannon, commanded by
the prince of Hildburgshausen,15 assembled in the circle of Franconia,
in the month of August. These were to be reinforced by 30,000
French, under the command of prince Soubise,16 who had been for
some time on the Main. Accordingly, they united at Erfurth on the
21st of August, and assumed the title of the combined army; the
object of which, was, to drive the Prussians out of Saxony. This, it
was thought, could be executed without any considerable difficulty.
The country was in some measure defenceless, there being nothing
15
Joseph Friedrich, Prince of Sachsen-Hildburghausen (1702–87). Field Marshal
and commander of the Reichsarmee.
16
Charles de Rohan, Prince de Soubise (1715–87). Maréchal de France and
Commander-in-Chief of the Franco-German army in Thuringia.
to guard it but an inconsiderable corps, incapable of keeping the

field against such superior forces; and, being thus separated, were
still less capable of making any effectual resistance. The king, being
wholly taken up in observing the Austrians, had not, as they imag-
ined, either time or means to come and oppose their operations.
For these reasons, it was resolved to march down the Saala and
begin the campaign with the siege of Leipsig, preferable to any other
enterprize, because they would be at hand to receive all kind of suc-
cours from Richlieu’s17 army, now intirely at liberty by the convention
of Closterseven, and moreover could, in case of success, take their
winter quarters in this part of Saxony, and the next campaign pro-
ceed to the intire conquest of it, and of Magdeburg and Brandeburg.
The king knew perfectly well, that, if the progress of the com-
bined army, and that of M. Richlieu, was not immediately stopped,
they would soon be on the Elbe; the consequence of which must be
fatal to him. Having, therefore, left an army of 40 battalions and
70 squadrons, under the prince of Bevern, to defend Silesia, he quit-
ted Bernstadtel the 25th of August, and marched to Dresden, where
he assembled an army, and proceeded without delay to the Saala.
On the 12th of September he arrived at Erfurth, which the enemy
abandoned on his approach, and retired to Eisenach. His majesty
followed them, intending to give them battle, but he found them so
advantageously posted, that he did not think it adviseable to attack
them; and, seeing they declined coming to an action as much as
possible, he resolved to fall back on the Saala, as well to make his
army subsist with more ease, as to be at hand to sustain a detach-
ment which he proposed sending under prince Ferdinand, to cover
Halberstadt and the neighbouring country, against the incursions of
the light troops, which infested them daily from Richlieu’s army; and
another, under prince Maurice, between the Moldau and the Elbe,
to cover that part of Saxony and Brandeburg. Accordingly, he retired
first to Buttelstadt, and from thence to Naumburg, where he arrived
the 13th of October. This retreat encouraged the combined army
to advance; they resumed their former position at Erfurth, where
general [Claude Louis, comte de] St. Germain was posted, with a
17
Louis-François-Armand Vignerot du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu (1696–88).
Maréchal de France and First Gentleman of the Bedchamber at the French Court.
See Hubert Cole, First Gentleman of the Bedchamber: The Life of Louis-François-Armand,
Maréchal duc de Richelieu (London: Heinemann, 1965).
considerable detachment, to observe the king’s motions, and cover

the remainder of the army, who, not being able to support the cold,
were put into quarters of cantonment.
Prince Charles, seeing the enemy’s forces thus separated at an
immense distance, and the road into Brandeburg quite open, resolved
to send a considerable detachment to Berlin; and, to cover this expe-
dition, another great corps, under general Marshal, was sent upon
the Elster. His royal highness proposed, by the enterprize, to raise
the credit of his arms, which the taking of the enemy’s capital could
not fail to do; to make a diversion in favour of the combined army,
because it was not doubted but the king would quit Saxony for some
time, and hasten to he succour of his residence; and lastly, to oblige
the prince of Bevern to make some considerable detachment, which
would facilitate the means to drive him out of his present advanta-
geous position.
Accordingly, general Haddick,18 with about 4000 men, was sent
to Berlin; which he took, and ransomed, and then retired behind
the Spree with safety and honour.
Prince Maurice, who, as hath been said, had been detached towards
the Elbe, was on his march there when he was informed of the
enemy’s enterprize against Berlin; he immediately passed that river,
and directed his march towards Berlin, in hopes still to anticipate
the enemy, or at least intercept him in his retreat; but, on his arrival
at Schwelinz, advice was brought that Haddick had been at Berlin,
and, having ransomed it, was retired in Lusatia.
The king, having been informed of this enterprize against his cap-
ital, and believing at first that the enemy had concerted some solid
plan with the Swedes, who were likewise advancing that way, thought
it necessary to go and defeat their designs in person. For which pur-
pose, having left about 6000 to 7000 men, under M. Keith, to guard
the Saala, and observe the combined army, he quitted Leipzig on
the 16th of October, and on the 20th arrived at Annaberg, on the
right of the Elbe, where he was informed of Haddick’s retreat. Upon
which he ordered prince Maurice to resume his position between
18
Lt. Gen. Andreas, Graf von Hadik von Futak (1710–90). Noted for his raid
on Berlin with 3,400 light troops in October 1757, where he acquired 215,000
talers and a dozen pairs of gloves stamped with the municipal coat of arms in
contributions.
the Elbe and the Moldau, and with part of the troops returned to
Leipzig.
The generals of the combined army, now reinforced by a very
strong corps, commanded by the duke of Broglio,19 resolved to seize
this favourable opportunity which the king’s absence afforded them,
and once more penetrate into Saxony: accordingly, they put their
troops in motion, passed the Saala on the 25th, and on the 27th
had their head quarters at Weissenfels. From hence count de Mailly20
was sent to summon Leipzig, which M. Keith refused to surrender.
Things were in this situation, when the king arrived with about
10,000 men; and, being joined by the corps under M. Keith, and
prince Ferdinand, an army of 22,000 men was assembled, with which
he resolved to march against the enemy.
Though the combined army was much superior to that of the
king, it was thought prudent to decline coming to an action, with
the Saala behind them; and probably they meant to concert some
new plan with M. Richelieu, now intirely disengaged. Accordingly,
the whole army repassed that river on the 29th; 4 battalions, and
18 companies of grenadiers, were left to defend Weissenfels; and 14
battalions, with some cavalry, under the command of the duke of
Broglio, were sent to occupy Merseburg; which shews they then pro-
posed defending the banks of the Saala.
The king quitted Leipsig on the 30th, and arrived the day fol-
lowing at Weissenfels, which he ordered to be attacked instantly;
and, after some resistance, took it sword in hand. The enemy, hav-
ing for the most part passed the river, put fire to the bridge, which
intercepted some of them, who were made prisoners. Their army
was divided into two parts: the one, commanded by the prince of
Hildburgshausen, remained opposite to Weissenfels; and the other,
under prince Soubise, approached Merseburg, to sustain M. Broglio,
or cover his retreat, in case it should be thought convenient to aban-
don that place.
19
Victor-François, duc de Broglie (1718–1804), Maréchal de France and
Commander-in-Chief of the French army. For the French army’s performance over-
all performance see, Lee Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years’ War: A Study
in Military Organization and Administration (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967).
20
Augustin-Joseph, comte de Mailly (1708–94). Maréchal de France. Guillotined
in the French Revolution.
His majesty knew, that, while the enemy had such considerable
forces on the frontiers of Magdeburg and Saxony, he could not think
of separating his army, to put the troops in winter quarters when
the season required it, even supposing he could keep the whole in
that country: it was therefore resolved to give the combined army
battle, and, if they declined it, drive them so far back that they could
not resume their operations, at least for this campaign. Accordingly,
bridges were thrown over the Saala, at Weissenfels, Merseburg, and
Halle, where the army passed in three columns, and assembled, the
2d of November, near the village of Rosbach, as in A.A. The enemy,
having abandoned the design of defending the banks of the Saala,
quitted Merseburg, and united their whole forces in B.B. The king
examined their position the 3d, and resolved to attack them the next
morning. Accordingly, he advanced at he head of his cavalry, in
order to occupy those posts which should be found most proper to
cover the infantry, and at the same time form his dispositions for
the attack. Being arrived in D.D. he perceived they had, in the pre-
ceding night, changed their position, and taken another in C.C. which
appeared too strong to be attacked: upon which the army was ordered
to march on the left, and encamp in E.E. with the left at Rosbach,
the center at Schartau, and the right towards Bedra, with the cav-
alry in the third line.
The commanders of the combined army attributed this retrograde
motion of the king to fear. This, and the great force of their army,
elated their courage in such a manner, that they resolved to attack
him next morning, and so finish the campaign; the fatigues of which
their troops seemed no longer able or willing to endure. The king’s
right and center were deemed too well posted to be attacked with
success, consequently they proposed attacking the left on the flank
and rear; and at the same time general St. Germain was ordered
to take post, with a considerable corps, in N.N. as well to amuse the
enemy, as to cover the march of the army: at 11 o’clock it was put
in motion, in three columns; the vanguard was composed of Austrian
and imperial cavalry, followed by the French and imperial infantry;
the whole was closed by the French horse. Being arrived on the hill,
opposite the enemy’s left flank, they halted, and ordered the French
horse to advance, and join the rest of the cavalry at the head.
About 1 o’clock the king was informed that they were in march
on his left flank; but, not being able as yet to discover their in-
tentions, he remained quiet for the present, and observed them. At
144
i. the late war in germany, vol. 1 (1766)
Map 5. Plan of the Battle of Rosbach between the Combined Army & the Prussians Commanded by the King in Person the 5th Nov. 1757.
2 o’clock he perceived they had passed his flank, and continued

marching towards Merseburg; upon which he ordered his cavalry
and artillery to march on the left, behind the hills, and occupy that
near Lunstadt and Reichertswerben, while the infantry followed in
all haste.
The generals of the combined army, seeing the enemy quit their
camp with an appearance of precipitation, thought they were retir-
ing; which seemed the more probable, as they could not discover
any thing of the march, being covered by the hills. Anxious lest the
enemy escaped, and they lose the fruits of their fine dispositions,
they advanced in great haste with their cavalry, followed, at a con-
siderable distance, by their infantry, hoping to overtake the rear-
guard, and, by attacking it with vigour, either destroy it, or force
the enemy to a general action. Being arrived near Reichertswerben,
some of the enemy’s horse appeared on the heights behind the vil-
lage; they continued, however, to advance, thinking they were only
posted there to gain time, and cover the retreat. This illusion soon
vanished; all the Prussian horse was then forming, under the pro-
tection of some heavy artillery, posted on the hill, which did great
execution, and contributed essentially to the success of the battle. As
soon as they were formed, his majesty ordered them to attack that
of the enemy; this they executed with promptitude and vigour, broke
them, and drove them back in confusion to the village of Busendorff,
where they attempted to rally; but the Prussians renewed their attack,
without giving them time to execute it, broke them again, and so
effectually, that they quitted the field. In the mean time the gener-
als of the combined army endeavoured to form their infantry; but
the king, who had as yet six or eight battalions only come up, ordered
them instantly to advance, and attack the enemy, while they were
occupied in forming the line. This was immediately executed; and,
being supported by the cavalry and artillery, they easily broke those
few troops which had formed at the head of the columns, and drove
them back in confusion.
Prince Soubise, however, did not give up the affair as lost; the
reserve, consisting of five regiments of cavalry, was ordered to advance
and sustain the infantry, in order to form the line, if possible. These
were instantly attacked, broke, and drove off the field; upon which
the infantry, unsupported by its own cavalry, taken in flank by that
of the enemy, and moreover exposed to a heavy fire of the artillery
and small arms, were unable to keep their ground, much less form
a line forwards: they attempted once more to form it behind, between
the village of Busendorff and the Luftschiff, under the protection of

some French cavalry; but these being over-powered, and forced to
retire, after a vigorous combat, the infantry was likewise obliged to
quit the field with precipitation. Count St. Germain covered the
retreat.
Thus ended the battle of Rosbach; where 22,000 men, conducted
with prudence and vigour, defeated above 50,000, with the incon-
siderable loss of about 300 men, killed and wounded; whereas that
of the combined army mounted to about 800 killed, and 6000 pris-
oners, including 11 generals and 300 officers, together with 72 pieces
of cannon, and other military trophies. Many relations of this bat-
tle were published by authority: that of Vienna is too general, and
gives a very imperfect idea of it; we shall, therefore, omit it, and
give that of Berlin, and another wrote by an officer in the combined
army; which, with what we have said on the subject, will enable the
reader to form a proper judgment of this extraordinary affair.
The Prussians account of the battle is as follows:
In the beginning of September, the army of the empire, and the corps
commanded by prince Soubise, assembled at Erfurth, intending to pen-
etrate into Saxony, and render themselves masters of the Elbe: upon
which part of the Prussian army marched towards Naumburg. Our
light troops had a skirmish with those of the enemy, over which they
gained a considerable advantage. The army passed the Saala, and
advanced as far as Buttelstedt. About this time the convention of
Bremersforde, between the French and Hanoverians, was made, and
a strong corps from the duke of Richlieu’s army entered the princi-
pality of Halberstadt: prince Ferdinand of Brunswic was sent there; he
soon delivered the country from the French, of whom he took 20
officers and 400 men; but, as the duke of Richlieu advanced with his
whole army, prince Ferdinand retired to Wansleben, from whence he
could intercept their convoys. His majesty’s army marched to Erfurth,
which the enemy quitted and retired into the mountains behind Eisenach.
We had a post at Gotha; prince Hildburghausen attacked it, but was
repulsed with loss. Both armies continued in this situation ’till the end
of October, when a corps of Hungarian troops marched through Lusatia
into Brandeburg: it was thought that general Marshal’s corps would
follow them, which obliged his majesty to send prince Maurice to
oppose them, and he himself followed, and advanced as far as Annaberg,
to intercept them; but the enemy’s expedition had no other object
than to raise contribution, and, on the approach of prince Maurice,
they retired without having collected it all. While part of our army
marched to succour the electorate, M. Keith, with the rest, retired
into Leipsig. The generals of the combined army believed this a
favourable moment to put their projects in execution: accordingly they

marched cantonwise, part by Naumburg and Seitz, and part by
Weissenfels, in order to take Leipsig, and our great magazine at Torgau.
Our army was ordered to assemble at Leipsig, where the different
corps arrived the 26th of October. On the 31st we marched, intend-
ing to attack the enemy’s quarters; we made some prisoners, but went
no farther than Lutzen. His majesty, being informed that the enemy
retired on all sides, marched with the vanguard to Weissenfels. This
city was defended by some of the Bavarian and Circle troops: we
attacked it, and took it, with about 300 prisoners: the enemy burnt
the bridge over the Saala to facilitate their flight. The troops of the
empire encamped on the other side of the river, over against Weissenfels,
posted behind the enclosures and the houses, in order to hinder us
from repairing the bridge: they formed a chain on the left side of the
river; and marshal Keith, who, with the greatest part of the army, was
marched to Merseburg, found the bridge burnt, and the town occu-
pied by 14 French battalions, a detachment of which broke down the
bridge at Halle. The field marshal went with a detachment to this last
place, and ordered the bridge to be repaired, which obliged the enemy
to abandon their posts on the Saala, and retire towards Micheln. We
repaired immediately the other bridges, and passed the river by
Merseburg, Halle, and Wiessenfels: the three columns assembled on
the same day near the village of Rosbach. His majesty, having recon-
noitred the enemy, found that they could be attacked on the right
flank with advantage, which was resolved to be executed the follow-
ing day: accordingly we marched, the cavalry having the vanguard.
When we arrived on the heights, from whence the day before we had
examined the enemy’s position, we found they had changed it: their
front was not only parallel to ours, but was covered by a deep ravin;
their right was in a wood, on a high hill, covered also with three
redoubts and an abbattis.* It was not thought prudent to attack them
in this advantageous position, and so we returned to our old camp.
The enemy, perceiving we did not attack them, ordered some detach-
ments to follow us; they fired a few cannon shot at our cavalry, but
without effect. The 5th, in the morning, we were informed the enemy
were in motion on their right; and, soon after, that their whole army
was in march: about noon we perceived the heads of their columns
opposite to the flank of our left wing: we would take no resolution ’till
we knew perfectly their intentions. About 3 o’clock we perceived they
had passed our left wing, and directed their march towards Merseburg:
upon which our army was formed in order of battle, and, having made
a motion on the left, we coasted them: we reached the heights, which
our cavalry occupied in such a manner, that they came on the flank
* Trees cut down, and placed so as to form a parapet; behind which the troops,
particularly infantry, are placed.
of that of the enemy, and after several attacks broke and dispersed
them. Our infantry reached the village of Reichertswerben, where our
left was posted; and, as we perceived the French infantry form in
columns, in order to attack us, we anticipated them. The battle lasted
about an hour and a half: six battalions only of our left wing came
to action. We followed the enemy to Burgwerben: the night hindered
us from reaping still greater advantages from our victory. The day fol-
lowing our army marched towards Freidburg: the 7th a strong detach-
ment passed the Saala, and advanced to Eckartsberg, &c. &c.
The next was wrote by a French officer in the combined army.
It was resolved to attack the left flank of the Prussian army: accord-
ingly, at nine in the morning, our’s marched in two columns. General
St. Germain was ordered to take post before our camp, with 9 bat-
talions and 14 or 15 squadrons, in order to attack the enemy in front,
when he perceived that we did the same on his flank. The king, hav-
ing been informed of these motions, which he so much desired, left
his camp standing, with part of his army in it, to oppose St. Germain,
and to make us believe he was in perfect security. The left wing of
his army was hid behind a hill, and covered by some marshy ground,
and a village: part of his army was formed behind the above-men-
tioned hill, on which was a great quantity of artillery. Not far from
this hill is another, which joins it, and extends far into the plain.
Behind this bill the enemy had his infantry in columns, a great quan-
tity of artillery, and almost his whole cavalry. Our army, having marched
about two hours, was now opposite the enemy’s flank; we had a fine
plain before us, and, perceiving no enemy, we hastened our march.
It looked as if we feared the enemy should escape us, and only recon-
noitred his front, without taking any notice of his left wing; so were
we heartily chastised for it. About half an hour after three our cav-
alry struck in with that of the enemy, which stood at the bottom of
the second hill, and advanced in good order against ours, whom they
could easily break; because the cavalry of the empire was so close to
them, that they could not fire freely, nor could they form in good
order. When the enemy first appeared, the cavalry of the left wing
was ordered to advance, which they executed full gallop; but they
found that of the right wing in confusion. Notwithstanding this, the
Austrian cavalry, and the regiments of Bourbons, Lameth, and Fitzjames
in particular, fought with success. Scarce was the combat between the
cavalry engaged, when the enemy directed his artillery to play on the
front and flank of our cavalry and infantry. Our infantry was imme-
diately formed, but in some places they were too close, and in others
had large openings; they moved to the left, where some brigades were
soon repulsed by the fire of the Prussians: that of Mailly followed them;
that of Wittmer, of which was the regiment of Diesbach, kept its ground
the longest; and prince Soubise was obliged to go himself and order
it to retire.
All the other accounts concur in the principal circumstances, and

therefore it seems needless to add any more.
Reflections
The generals of the combined army do not seem to have formed

any fixed plan of operations, as if they proposed acting according
to circumstances, as they occasionally arose: at first they seem will-
ing to occupy Saxony, provided it might be done without any risk;
they avoid coming to an action during the whole campaign, and at
last, when it was least proper, they engage it. When the king quit-
ted the Saala, having there only 12,000 men in two different corps,
then was the time to advance and attack Leipsig; they might have
taken many positions, which would have made it difficult, and per-
haps impossible, for the king to relieve it; as he had no more than
10,000 men with him, and about 6000 men under prince Maurice;
so that they would have had only these 16,000 men to contend with.
As to the corps under prince Ferdinand, he might easily have been
forced under the cannon of Magdeburg; any small detachment from
the right of Richlieu’s army would have been sufficient for that pur-
pose. Having suffered the king to unite his different corps at Leipsig,
it was prudent, no doubt, to repass the Saala, because it is of too
dangerous a consequence to engage an action with a great river
behind the army; but they should have defended the banks of that
river. As they were much stronger than the king, he could not pass
it without their knowledge: if they left a strong detachment over
against Weissenfels, and another at Merseberg, and with the army
had taken a central position between these two places, they could,
by an easy march, sustain either of them; and therefore, in all prob-
ability, have hindered the enemy from passing at all. If they pro-
posed fighting, they could not have a better opportunity than while
the enemy was passing the river; and, if they did not, they should
have gone behind the Unstrut, and covered themselves with that
river. It is agreed upon, by every one, that the king’s army passed
the Saala in three columns; one at Weissenfels, another at Merseberg,
and the third at Halle; by which means they were separated from
each other about seven miles; and that they united at Rosbach. We
cannot conceive why the generals of the combined army permitted
the enemy to commit so great a fault, without punishing him for it:
they could have taken many positions to prevent the junction of

these columns; and could, with their united forces, attack either of
them separately; as appears evident, from the inspection of the map.
Having, during the campaign, declined coming to an action, they
should have persisted in that resolution a few days longer; because,
from the situation of affairs in Silesia and in Westphalia, it was prob-
able the king would be forced to go against the Austrians in per-
son; and, though he did not, it was impossible for him to oppose
effectually the combined army, and that of Richlieu, now disengaged,
because he must necessarily have one or the other upon his flank;
and, having about a fifth part of their forces only, he must have
abandoned the country, or fell a victim to superiority, if he persisted
to wait for them; so that in this very campaign he would have lost
either Saxony or Silesia, and perhaps both, had M. Richlieu and
the generals of the combined army acted with more judgment.
The plan they formed to attack the enemy’s left flank was incon-
sistent with all the rules of military prudence; because, in case of a
defeat, there was no retreat at all for them: they had a river behind
them, and the enemy between them and the country to which they
must necessarily retire. The conduct of the action was no less impru-
dent; they could not think the enemy would permit them to inve-
lope his left wing, and cut him off from the Saala; and, as they
marched at mid-day, he could not be deceived as to their intentions.
No general will suffer an enemy to attack him in flank and rear:
How could they imagine such a general as the king of Prussia would
commit this fault? When they resolved to attack his left flank, they
should have made some demonstrations on his right, to draw his
attention that way: and, by marching in the night, approach his left
flank, and attack it, without giving him time to change his position.
This was the only probable means to bring their plan to bear. The
method they took made it impracticable from the first instant they
put the army in motion.
When the king quitted his camp with an air of precipitation, St.
Germain should have followed him; and a strong detachment of cav-
alry have been sent on the road to Merseburg, in order to recon-
noitre his motions; and, if they found he was retiring, these two
corps would have sufficed to beat his rear-guard; and, if it was found
he only changed position, they would have kept him at bay, and
give time to form the army, or retire into their old camp. Surely
it was unpardonable to march with the whole army without any
vanguard, which must never be done, particularly if near the enemy.
When at length they were undeceived, and found that the enemy
was forming on the heights of Reichertswerben, Why persist in
advancing? They should instantly have formed their line as far back-
wards as possible, and by no means attempt it under the enemy’s
fire, and so near him; because such manœuvres can never succeed,
if the enemy has either conduct or vigour.
The king appears in a very different light: though he sees the
enemy in motion all the morning, he is easy and quiet; no ways agi-
tated, as too often is the case; waits ’till he perceives their inten-
tions, and then instantly makes his dispositions. His marching behind
the hill was attended with many great advantages: that appearance
of a flight elated the spirits of the enemy so as to make them neglect
the necessary precautions; they hastened so much that their army
was thrown into some disorder while in march; and they were so
perfectly deceived, that they found themselves, all at once, with the
head of their columns, under the fire of the enemy’s line; and so
near, that they could not form their troops. The king saw this
favourable moment, and ordered his cavalry to attack directly; and,
though scarce any of the infantry was come up, he ordered those
few battalions to advance before the enemy could make any dispo-
sition. One inch of ground, or one instant of time lost, would have
given the enemy time and room to form their line; but the king’s
dispositions were so exact, and so well calculated, that neither hap-
pened; and he was most deservedly crowned with victory; which put
an end to the campaign in Saxony.
We have already said, that his majesty the king of Prussia, on
leaving Lusatia, had left there the duke of Bevern,* with a considerable
* Augustus William duke of Bevern was born in 1715; in 1733 he served against
the French; in 1735 he entered the Prussian service, as lieutenant colonel; in 1739
he was made a colonel, and wounded at the battle of Molwitz; in 1741 he had a
regiment given him; in 1743 was made a major general; in 1747 governor of Stettin;
in 1750 knight of the black eagle, and lieutenant general. He distinguished himself
in the battles of Hohenfriedberg, Lowositz, Prague, Chotzemitz, and Breslaw: after
which he was made a prisoner, while he went with a servant only to reconnoitre
the enemy. He was in 1758 released, without any ransom, for his affinity to the
empress. The king seeming offended at his conduct, he retired to his government
in Stettin; where he remained ’till 1762; when he was called to the army in Silesia,
and had a corps confided to him, while the king was besieging Schweidnitz. The
Austrians, intending to relieve that place, attacked him with an army under the
command of generals Lacy, Laudhon, and Odonell, whom he repulsed several times,
though they were three times stronger than he was, and gave the king time to come
to his aid. He may, no doubt, be numbered among the first generals of this age.
body of troops, to observe prince Charles; and, above all things, hin-
der him from making any solid enterprize against Silesia. Accordingly,
the duke, having received a convoy from Bautzen, quitted Bernstadtel,
and encamped on the mountain, called the Landscron, near Górlitz.
Prince Charles advanced with the main army as far as Bernstadtel,
and sent general Nadasti with a considerable corps to Seidenberg,
also between the Neiss and Queiss, as well to observe Winterfield,
as to secure a passage over the Neiss, and be ready to follow, or
anticipate the duke of Bevern, whenever he went towards Silesia.
His royal highness was desirous to force the enemy to quit their
present position, and carry the war into Silesia; because not only
the army would be maintained at their expence, but, being much
superior, could undertake something solid: whereas, if he continued
there, the campaign would soon be at an end, and the fruits of their
preceding good manœuvres lost. For these same reasons, it was
incumbent on the duke of Bevern to keep things in the present sit-
uation, and draw on the war, without permitting the enemy to gain
any considerable advantage. His position seemed to enable him to
obtain this end. The Austrians could not, he thought, enter Silesia,
and leave him behind, because he could return into Bohemia, and,
by cutting off their subsistence, make it impossible for them to do
any thing of consequence in Silesia; and, having a garrison in Bautzen,
he was at hand likewise to favour, or be favoured, by the king’s
operations in Saxony; and, no doubt, could he have kept his posi-
tion ’till the king had delivered that country from the combined
army, the enemy must have been forced back into Bohemia, with-
out even attempting any thing against Silesia.
Prince Charles, perfectly acquainted with all these reasons, resolved
to force the enemy to quit their position, and march to Silesia; but,
it having been judged too strong to be attacked, it was necessary to
obtain by dint of proper manœuvres what could not be done by
force. Wherefore, he sent a corps to drive the garrison out of Bautzen,
and so cut off the enemy’s communication with Saxony, and deter-
mined to attack general Winterfield, which would likewise cut them
off from Silesia. These resolutions being taken, Nadasti’s corps was
considerably reinforced, and on the 7th of September the attack was
made on that of Winterfield’s. This general had posted, on a hill
called Holtzberg, at a small distance from his camp, two battalions;
against which the Austrians directed their attack, and came upon
them before they could either be sustained or called back. They
defended themselves with uncommon bravery; insomuch that

Winterfield had time to come with some troops to their relief, and
facilitate their retreat: upon which the combat became more violent
than ever, in hopes of being able to keep their ground; but, having
lost a great number of men, and their general mortally wounded,
they were forced to quit their post, and retire to their camp. The
Austrians took possession of the Holtzberg; which, however, they
abandoned the next morning; having lost, in this bloody action, killed
and wounded, about 2000 men.
The duke of Bevern, having lost Bautzen, and with it his com-
munication with the king in Saxony, and moreover fearing the
Austrians would now, after the defeat of Winterfield, pass the Neiss
with their main army, and so hinder him from entering Silesia,
resolved, while it was in his power, to march thither; and the more
so, as he could not possibly subsist in his present position, because
he could draw nothing from his magazines in Saxony, and what
could be had from Silesia was subject to be intercepted by the
enemy’s light troops, who were extremely numerous, and had a very
favourable country, full of woods, ravins, hills, &c. to act in.
Accordingly, not daring to pass the Neiss at Górlitz, so near the
enemy, he fell down that river to Naumburg, and there passed it;
and from thence marched successively, by Buntzlaw and Hainau,
toLignitz, where he arrived the 19th.
Prince Charles, having received information of the enemy’s march,
put his army instantly in motion, and took his route by Lauban,
Lówenberg, Goldberg, Hundorff, Jauer, Nicolstad, and Greibnig,
where he arrived on the 25th. By taking this position he had cut
off the enemy from Breslaw, Schweidnitz, and all Upper Silesia. On
the following day, he ordered the village of Barshdorff, where the
enemy had posted some infantry, to be cannonaded; which, having
put the houses on fire, forced them to retire, and take a new posi-
tion behind it, where they could be sustained by the whole army.
Prince Charles intended to attack them, but the duke of Bevern,
proposing, if possible, to regain his communication with Breslaw and
Upper Silesia, quitted his camp in the night of the 27th, and directed
his march towards Glogau, that he might pass the Oder in safety,
if he was followed by the whole Austrian army; but, finding that
only the vanguard pursued him, and that only on the right of the
Katzbach, towards Parchwitz, he resolved to pass it near Lampersdorff;
which was executed on the 29th; and, having marched up the right
of the Oder, he repassed it at Breslaw, and on the 1st of October

took his camp on the banks of the Lohe, with the city behind him.
By this fine march he once more opened the communication with
Upper Silesia, and covered the capital with his army, which was rec-
iprocally covered by it.
Prince Charles found it would be useless to pursue the enemy on
his quitting Lignitz, because he could only drive them under the
cannon of Glogau, where they could remain in safety, and be provided
with all the necessary stores and subsistence: whereas he, on the con-
trary, had no magazines in the country; nor could he form any, hav-
ing the enemy in front, and their strong places behind him; so that
he must necessarily fall back, and approach the frontiers of Bohemia;
from whence only his numerous army could be nourished. For these
reasons, instead of fatiguing his troops in a vain pursuit of the enemy,
he directed his march towards Breslaw; hoping, no doubt, to take
that place before the enemy could come near it, being in itself very
weak, and moreover had then an inconsiderable garrison.
Being arrived on the Schweidnitzwasser, a small river within three
miles of Breslaw, he found the enemy had anticipated him, and was
encamped, about two miles off, between him and that town. These
circumstances made it necessary to concert new measures. His royal
highness could not possibly continue long in that situation, as well
for want of subsistence, as because the winter was growing sharp,
and would soon make it impossible for him to keep the field; nor
could he presume to separate his army in the middle of an enemy’s
country, where they had an army, and all the strong places, in their
power. It seemed likewise rather dishonourable to retire into Bohemia
without having attempted any thing, and so lose the fruits of their
past labours; and the more so, as his army was much superior to
that of the enemy already, and, besides, his royal highness expected
a considerable body of Bavarians and Wurtemburgers, who were on
their march, to join him. These motives made him determine to
undertake the siege of some fortress, that he might have a place of
arms in the enemy’s country, and put part, at least, of his army in
it, with safety, during the winter, and so be enabled to enter it the
ensuing campaign without difficulty, and, having the necessary stores
and provisions in this place, prosecute the war with more ease and
safety than hitherto had been done.
This resolution being taken, the next object was, to fix upon the
place that would best answer the end they had in view: Neiss, being
near the frontiers of Moravia, could be attacked with more facility

than any other; because they could be supplied with every thing nec-
essary for such an undertaking from Olmutz, and the taking of it
would secure a passage into Upper Silesia; and, besides, they would,
the ensuing campaign, from thence attack the country of Glatz with
more ease than from any other place whatever. To this it was
objected, that Neiss was at such a distance, that the army could not
arrive there ’till the season would be too far advanced to carry on
the siege without infinite pains, and probably without success; and
the more so, as the duke of Bevern could be there with his army
long before them, and take such a position as would effectually cover
the place; and lastly, that, though they should take it, the advantage
that would accrue from it was trifling; because they would get scarce
any part of the country with it; while the enemy had Kosel, Brieg,
and Glatz, all about it; and that it only covered Moravia, leaving
Bohemia quite open to the enemy.
It was next proposed to attack the enemy before Breslaw: if they
beat him, not only that fortress would fall, but they would be at lib-
erty to attack any place in Upper Silesia; which, being left to their
own weak garrisons, would soon be reduced: by this means the whole
Austrian army, covered by these places, could with safety be sepa-
rated, and put into winter quarters. This proposition was very plau-
sible, but thought dangerous; because, in case they did not succeed
in this attempt, it would be extreamly difficult to retire into Bohemia,
from whence they were separated by many high mountains, and
had very bad roads to pass through; and, moreover, the town of
Schweidnitz, with a strong garrison in it, behind them. These rea-
sons being well weighed, it was resolved to attack Schweidnitz, prefer-
able to the two others abovementioned; because they would be
masters of the principal defiles which lead to Bohemia on that side,
and of all the towns and villages behind Schweidnitz; which would
enable them to keep the greatest part of the army in Silesia during
the winter; and, moreover; if they took it without great loss of time,
they could then, with safety, attack the duke of Bevern, having a
place to retire to in case of misfortune, or undertake some other
enterprize.
Accordingly, general Nadasti, with a very considerable corps, was
sent to besiege Schweidnitz; where he was joined by the Bavarians
and Wurtemburgers. This town lies in a fine plain, about three miles
distant from the mountains which separate Silesia from Bohemia, is
rich and populous: originally, when it first came into the power of
the Prussians, during the preceding war, it was surrounded only by
an old wall, with round towers, in the Gothic manner; but his majesty,
considering the advantageous situation of it, as well to facilitate any
projects he might hereafter form against Bohemia, as to cover Silesia,
resolved to fortify it: accordingly, on the conclusion of that war, he
ordered several redoubts, called star redoubts, because they resem-
ble a star, to be built about it: these were joined by a curtain; and
in the intervals, between the redoubts, were placed some small lunettes,
or half moons: the whole covered by a ditch, with a covered way
pallisaded.
Of all the species of works used in fortification, the starry redoubt
is the worst; because, by the nature of its construction, it can have
no flank; and the re-entering angles take up so much of the ground
within, that they cannot contain the number of men and artillery
sufficient to defend them; and are, moreover, exposed to be enfiladed
from one end to the other; so that it is impossible they should make
any considerable defence, when properly attacked.
General Nadasti ordered two true attacks, and one false one, to
be made; and the trenches were opened in the night of the 27th of
October; and, a breach having been made in three of these redoubts,
the 11th at night, they were carried by assault; which forced the
governor to capitulate the next morning. The garrison, consisting of
4 generals, and about 6000 men, were made prisoners of war: a
vast quantity of provisions, artillery, and stores, were found in the
place, and 300,000 florins.
During all this time, prince Charles, and the duke of Bevern,
remained quiet in their camps by Breslaw; the first to cover the siege
of Schweidnitz, and the other to fortify his camp; because he did
not dare quit it, and march to relieve Schweidnitz, for fear of los-
ing Breslaw, and be hemmed in between the prince’s army, and that
before Schweidnitz.
Prince Charles, having succeeded to his wish, in his undertaking
against that place, was encouraged to attack the enemy, though now
very strongly fortified; and, therefore, general Nadasti was ordered
to come and join the main army with that under his command.
Accordingly, that general arrived on the 19th, and encamped on the
right, as marked in the plan. The two following days were taken up
in making the necessary preparations for the attack. Every thing
being ready, on the 22d in the morning, the battle begun; of which
we give here the different relations, as published by authority; which,

with our reflections on the ground and the action, will be sufficient
to give a clear idea of it.
That published at Vienna is as follows:
The imperial and royal army was encamped, with the right at Strachwitz,
and the left at Grossmasselwitz, in two lines, and a reserve. The
grenadiers were posted at Grossmochber, to cover the right wing; and
some regiments of infantry at Kleinmasselwitz, to cover the left. The
army under general Nadasti stood on our right, beyond Operau, on
the left of the Lohe, with some lights troops at Hartlieb, on the other
side of it. The Prussian army was likewise posted in two lines; the
infantry in the first, and the cavalry in the second; both extending
from Cosel to Kleinmochber, and from thence, in a strait line, towards
Breslaw; so that it formed a half square, with the angle at Kleinmochber:
but, when they perceived our dispositions, they changed their position,
and that part of the army which extended from Kleinmochber towards
Breslaw, was ordered to advance towards the Lohe, and occupy some
hills, as well as the villages of Kleinburg and Kreitern, in order to
make a front against general Nadasti. They were covered by the Lohe,
which is not broad, but the banks of it are very marshy; and had
thrown up a great many redoubts and rentrenchments. Their right
wing was covered by an abatis, or parapet of trees cut down; behind
which they had posted their hunters or marksmen, and six battalions
of grenadiers, to cover their right flank. The village of Pilsnitz, through
which the Lohe passes, was well fortified with redoubts, before and
behind it, which presented continually some new defence. The same
was done at the villages of Schmiedfeld, Hoflichen, Kleinmochber, and
Grabischen, with breastworks, ditches, and three rows of wolf-holes;*
so that it was almost impossible to pass them. Besides these works,
there was likewise, between and behind the villages, other redoubts
and batteries, with parapets, as far as the suburbs of the town. On
the other side the Oder they had put some infantry in the villages of
Protsch, Weida, Hunnera, Schiisdorff, and Rosenthal; and some cav-
alry between the villages. Upon the left wing they had moreover two
regiments of Hussars.
Such was the situation of both armies: the Austrian amounted to
60,000 men, and the Prussian to about 40,000.
In consequence of the measures concerted between his royal high-
ness and his excellency marshal Daun, batteries were raised the 21st
at night, the pontoons brought near the places where the bridges were
to be laid, and all the other necessary preparations for passing the
river and attacking the enemy’s works being compleated, the army
* Round holes, generally about two feet in diameter at the top, one at the bot-
tom, and near two deep.
marched the 22d, before day, and was formed, in two lines, on the
banks of the Lohe; the first was composed of infantry, and the other
of cavalry. The baggage was sent back behind to Schweidnitz, and the
surgeons ordered to follow the army, and to stay at certain places,
where the wounded were to be brought.
The 22d, the day appointed for the attack, there was a great fog,
which prevented us from seeing the enemy’s dispositions. At nine in
the morning we raised four batteries, in which 40 pieces of cannon
were placed, which played on the villages of Pilsnitz, Schmiedfeld,
Hoflichen, Kleinmochber and Grabischen, and the redoubts, ’till 12
o’clock. In the mean while, the fog began to dissipate; upon which we
advanced to lay the bridges over the river; and, in less than three
quarters of an hour, seven were made in the enemy’s presence, and
under their fire.
His royal highness and M. Daun were at Grossmochber, and the
signal agreed upon being given by their orders, general Sprecher, who
had under his orders major general Richlin, advanced with 35 com-
panies of grenadiers, sustained by 12 companies of horse grenadiers,
commanded by prince Lowenstein, and passed the bridge by Gross-
mochber. These troops were supported by the right wing of the first
line of infantry, under the command of lieutenant general Andlau, and
major generals duke of Ursel, and baron Unrhue; and, moreover, by
the corps de reserve, commanded by lieutenant generals count Wied,
and Nicholas Esterhasi, and major generals Blonquet, Wolf, and
Otterwolf; and, lastly by the right wing of the second line, commanded
by lieutenant generals Minulph, count Stahremberg, and major gen-
erals Wulfen, and Buttler.21
At the same time and place, count Luchesi, general of horse, and
lieutenant generals Spada, and Wolwart, and major generals Deville,
Kolbel, and Aspremont, with the right wing of the first line of horse,
likewise passed. All these troops formed, in two lines, on the other
side the Lohe, under the fire of the enemy’s artillery, and attacked
their cavalry and infantry that were advancing. At 1 o’clock the fire
of the small arms began, and lasted very hot, and in good order, about
half an hour, without being able to force wither side to cede an inch.
At last, the enemy’s horse and foot were obliged to give way; upon
which our infantry took the village of Grabischen, and the great bat-
tery behind it. Our troops advanced still forwards to the retrenchment
by Kleinmochber; and, though the enemy had sent there both infantry
and artillery, they were, however, drove further back.
The next attack was commanded by lieutenant general count Arberg,
and under him major general Lacy, and was sustained by the infantry,
commanded by lieutenant general Macquire, and by the left wing of
21
Freiherr Louis Butler (ca. 1700–75). An Irishman and General Field Marshal
Lieutenant.
the second line of horse, commanded by count Stambach, general of

horse. This column was to attack the villages of Schmiedfeld and
Hoflichen; and, at 3 o’clock passed the Lohe. Counts Arberg and
Macquire attacked the redoubts by Schmiedfeld, and, after a most
bloody combat, drove the enemy out of them. At the same time, count
Wied, who commanded the reserve, advanced against Hoflichen; and,
notwithstanding it was covered by breastworks, ditches, and wolf-holes,
he took it, as well as the redoubt that was near it.
The third attack against Pilsnitz was more violent, and lasted longer
than any of the others. This village is cut in two by the Lohe, whose
banks are very high here, and the ground all about is very close and
difficult to be passed; and, besides, the entry and the issue out of it
were covered by redoubts. General Keuhl, with the left wing of infantry,
sustained by the left wing of the second line of horse, commanded by
count Serbelloni, was ordered to attack this village, and the neigh-
bouring works; but, by the difficulty of the ground, the strength of the
works, and the bravery of the enemy, he was repulsed; with great loss,
three several times. At last, however, though it was now near six
o’clock, and quite dark, he renewed the attack with so much courage
and bravery, that the enemy was forced to give way, and abandon
successively the village and the redoubts.
We though that, with the day, the battle was likewise at an end.
The enemy, however, appeared again, and a column advanced against
Kleinmochber, endeavouring to come on the flank of the archduke
Joseph’s22 and Leopold’s23 regiments of horse. These being sustained
by six companies of grenadiers, posted in the redoubts, commanded
by general Sprecher, made such good manœuvres, as kept the enemy
at a distance, till prince Charles’s regiment of foot, and Luchesi’s reg-
iment of horse, had time to come up, which obliged them to retire
for good and all.
Not far from Pilsnitz, on the right of the Lohe, the enemy had a
great abatis, which reached quite to the Oder. Colonel Brentano,24
22
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1765–90). The most radical of the enlight-
ened despots, Joseph enacted a series of social reforms and created a secret police
to root out opponents to those reforms. His main objective was to rebuild the
Habsburg military and win back Silesia from Prussia. See Derek Beales, Joseph II:
In the Shadows of Maria Theresa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and
T.C.W. Blanning, Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
23
Leopold II (Peter Leopold), Grand Duke of Tuscany (r. 1765–90) and Holy
Roman Emperor (r. 1790–92). Perhaps the most successful enlightened despot, his
reforms in Tuscany won him great acclaim: he restored the economy, rooted out
corruption in the judicial system, created a citizens’ militia, and introduced local
self-government. His major accomplishment as Emperor was to restore order after
his brother Joseph’s chaotic regime by simply reversing many of his ill-conceived
reforms. See A. Wandruszka, Leopold II, 2 vols. (Vienna: Herold, 1965).
24
Josef Anton von Brentano-Cimaroli (1719–64). See Friedrich von Brentano,
Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Josef Anton von Brentano: Eine militärische Lebensskizze (Hildesheim:
August Lax, 1886).
with his Croats, sustained by 1000 men of regular infantry, was ordered
to attack it. He had the good fortune to succeed, and pass it; but, as
we had not then got possession of Pilsnitz, he was forced to retire with
some loss. Soon after, however, he renewed the attack; and, as our
left wing was then advanced to Pilsnitz, he passed the abatis, and
threw the enemy into no small confusion.
Major general Beck, with a considerable corps, was sent over the
Oder; and, having drove the enemy out of several villages they occu-
pied, he cannonaded the enemy’s right wing, over the Oder, at Cosel,
in flank and rear.
What we have hitherto related was performed by the army which
had always remained in this neighbourhood during the siege of
Schweidnitz. Besides these several attacks, general Nadasti, with the
army he had commanded at the above siege, (excepting a few battal-
ions) and reinforced by four regiments of horse, was ordered to divide
his troops in three columns, at the head of which were grenadiers,
sustained by battalions and brigades, and having passed the Lohe, to
attack the enemy’s left wing, that was posted against him. Accordingly,
he occupied the village of Hartlieb the 21st, which the enemy held
with infantry and cavalry; and, on the 22d, at break of day, he passed
the Lohe, and formed his army with the right at Oltaschin, and the
left towards Kreitern, where the artillery of reserve was likewise posted.
The enemy, whose cavalry extended on the plains of Durjahn, endeav-
oured to take our corps in the flank, which the good dispositions of
general Nadasti prevented.
In the mean time, general Wolfersdorff, with 16 companies of
grenadiers, attacked the village of Kleinburg, drove the enemy out of
it, took one cannon, and advanced to Woischwitz. The Saxon light
horse, who were on the right, were preparing to advance; but, the
evening coming on, and the enemy’s horse being advantageously posted
on a hill, behind some redoubts, general Nadasti thought it would be
needless to attempt any thing farther.
During this time, the enemy attacked Kleinburg with seven battal-
ions, and some cavalry; and, having put it on fire, retired on the hills
behind the redoubts; where they continued ’till they found that the
rest of their army was retiring; then they followed them, and passed
the Oder, through Breslaw. We have taken 36 pieces of cannon, and
about 600 men prisoners, with above 3000 deserters.
The Prussians account of this battle is very little exact; particularly
where it says, that the Austrian’s right wing had not only been
repulsed, but that it quitted the field, and retired to Neumark, many
miles off; which is both false and ridiculous. It is as follows:
When the Austrians had taken Schweidnitz, and the corps employed
in that siege had joined the main army at Lissa, they resolved to attack
the prince of Bevern’s corps before the king could come to succour
campaign of 1757
161
Map 6. Battle of Breslaw fought the 22d of Novem. 1757, between the Austrians Commanded by P. Charles of Lorrain
and the Prussians, Commanded by the P. of Bevern, and Won by the Former.
him. They knew that, in spite of Marshall’s and Haddick’s corps, he

had already passed through Lusatia. Accordingly, on the 22d of
November, the attack was made, at nine in the morning. The enemy’s
army was, at least, three times stronger than ours, as appears by the
gazettes they have often published: and general Nadasti had a partic-
ular corps opposite the flank of our left wing. The attack succeeded
so ill to the Austrians, that their right wing was totally defeated, and
forced to retire towards Neumark. Lieutenant general Ziethen, who
commanded our left wing, likewise entirely defeated Nadasti’s corps,
and the enemy thought the battle lost; having been forced, in most
places, to fly; but, as on our right some of our regiments had some-
what suffered, the prince of Bevern thought it best to quit the field of
battle, which we had kept till 5 o’clock, and retire into our camp, and
the following night pass the Oder, over the bridge that is in the town
of breslaw. The Austrians, finding that every thing was abandoned as
far as Breslaw, returned, and occupied the field of battle; which, to
their great astonishment, we had quitted. Our loss is midling: that of
the Austrians, according to accounts worthy of credit, amounts to above
20,000 men. The 23d we remained behind Breslaw. The 24th, the
duke of Bevern rode out at 4 o’clock in the morning, with one ser-
vant only, in order to reconnoitre the enemy, and fell in with some
of their advanced posts, who made him prisoner. The same day, hav-
ing waited in vain the duke’s return; lieutenant general Kyow took
upon him the command of the army. General Lestewitz, who, by the
king’s orders, was left commander of Breslaw, could not possibly defend
long so extensive a place, and so ill fortified, against such a consider-
able army as that of the enemy; and so he must be content to have
leave to retire, with his garrison, and the sick we had left in Breslaw,
to Glogau.
The Austrians lost in this action 666, among which one general,
killed: 4620, of which five generals, wounded: 437 missing: and about
400 horses killed, wounded, and lost.
No account appeared of the loss of the Prussians.
Reflections on the Battle of Breslaw, and the Preceding Operations
It has been already observed, that there is, in every camp, some one
essential point, or hinge, which may be called the key of it, and on
which the strength of it most immediately depends: the same holds
good as to positions. In a whole country there may not, perhaps,
be one found which will enable a general to obtain his ends. The
choice of this point, with regard to positions, depends entirely on,
and must be regulated by, the object he has in view; by the situa-
tion of his magazines; and by the number and species of his troops;
that he may not only have a good position, but likewise a good field
of battle, in case he is attacked.
The duke of Bevern had two objects in view: the first and prin-
cipal one was to cover Silesia; and particularly Breslaw, Schweidnitz,
and Neiss; against which alone the enemy could direct their opera-
tions: the other object was only secondary, and of much less con-
sequence; and was to keep open a communication with the Elbe, as
well to act in concert with the king in Saxony, as because he drew
his subsistence chiefly from Dresden. The camp he had taken at
Bernstadtel, though a little too far back, answered, in some mea-
sure, these ends: he could be on the Elbe, or in Silesia, sooner than
the enemy, by marching on his right, by Lôbau and Bautzen; or on
his left, by Lauban and Lówenberg, and so on to Schweidnitz or
Breslaw. The only inconveniency of this position, was, that the enemy,
being much superior, could send strong corps towards Bautzen, and
thereby render his convoys, coming from the Elbe, precarious. This,
however, might have been remedied by occupying Bautzen with a
considerable detachment of cavalry, and some light infantry, and
posting another of the same species about Lôbau; which would have
formed a chain from his right quite to the Elbe; so that he might,
and, as we think, ought to have kept this position as long as possi-
ble; which would have stopped the progress of the enemy.
Instead of which, he abandoned it, and took another, still farther
back, on the Landscron, near Górlitz: the consequence of which was,
that he instantly lost his communication with the Elbe, and rendered
that with Silesia very difficult; nor could he remain in his present
situation for want of subsistence: he might, however, still have antic-
ipated the enemy’s march into Silesia, and towards Breslaw and
Schweidnitz, if, instead of marching by Langenau, Naumberg,
Buntzlaw, Hainau, and Lignitz, he had marched by Lauban,
Lówenberg, Goldberg, and Jauer; which the king did, the year fol-
lowing, after the battle of Hochkirchen, in much more difficult cir-
cumstances: for the whole Austrian army was encamped on the
Landscron, within sight; yet he passed the Neiss and Queiss, and,
in spite of the enemy, went into Upper Silesia, and raised the siege
of Neiss. If, therefore, the prince of Bevern had taken this route,
and even gone to Liebenthal, between Greiffenberg and Lówenberg,
with a strong corps on the right of the Queiss, between Marklissa
and Greiffenberg, it would have been impossible for the enemy to

advance one step farther: they could not pass between his left and
those immense mountains, called the Riesengeburg, having no road;
much less could they march on his right, towards Lówenberg and
Lignitz, leaving him master of those immense defiles and mountains
which separated them from Bohemia, from whence only they could
draw their subsistence, without exposing their army to certain destruc-
tion. They must, therefore, either stop short, or come to an action;
which he could accept, much to his advantage, in that strong camp
of Liebenthal, or decline it, and retire successively to Lahn and Jauer,
and lastly to Striegau and Schweidnitz. In all which places there are
such camps to be taken, as cannot easily be forced. The country is
extremely close, and therefore numbers are of little use, because they
cannot be all brought to action: whereas, by taking the march he
did, he left that very road open which he ought to have taken, and
by that means gave the enemy an opportunity to anticipate him; so
that, on his arrival at Lignitz, he found they had taken a position
between that town and Jauer, and by that means cut him off from
Schweidnitz, Neiss, Breslaw, and all Upper Silesia. Indeed he got
afterwards to Breslaw, but this ought to be attributed to his extra-
ordinary good fortune, that the enemy committed a greater fault
than he had done. Being arrived at Breslaw, we think he ought to
have drawn the principal effects and stores out of it, and sent them
to Glogau, and have gone with his army to Schweidnitz, where the
enemy must have followed him; because they could not keep Breslaw,
even if they had taken it while he was master of Schweidnitz, and
of the defiles which lead into Bohemia; nor could they force him,
by any manœuvre, to abandon that town, and the neighbourhoos;
nor, supposing they were masters of Breslaw, could they put their
army into winter quarters, while he was in possession of a chain of
fortresses behind them, and had an army between them and their
own country, with which they could not have the least communi-
cation, not even with the capital; so that they must necessarily be
forced to quit Silesia, and endeavour to gain Bohemia; which was
by no means an easy undertaking; because, as we have said, they
are separated from that country by an enemy’s army, and three
strong fortresses, as Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neiss, on the very defiles
where they must pass; and, in which, in all human probability, their
army, in that advanced season, and harrassed by the enemy, would
have perished. By staying at Breslaw, and suffering Schweidnitz to
be taken, he gave prince Charles an opportunity to take first a post

in the country, and by that means enabled him to prosecute his
advantages with security; which brought on the loss of the battle of
Breslaw, and with it Breslaw itself; and might, if these advantages
had been properly improved, occasion that of all Silesia.
Whenever the Austrians attempt any thing against that country,
by the way of Lusatia, the Prussians may, we think, by taking the
above positions, even with an inconsiderable army, effectually stop
their progress.
As to the conduct of the action of Breslaw, we think that the
Prussians, to the many works, which, during seven weeks, they had
raised, should have added an inundation, if possible, by means of
the Lohe. This would have effectually covered them. The choice of
the camp does not appear to have been well made; because the left
wing and its flank were not so strong as the front; so that, if the
enemy had made the principal attack where Nadasti was, the Prussians
must have abandoned their strong camp, and lose the fruits of their
long labours, in order to make a front where Ziethen stood; and,
moreover, if the enemy ever got possession of the hills behind
Kleinburg and Grabischen, the whole Prussian army would have
been hemmed in between the Lohe and the Oder, with general Beck
in their rear on the other side, and the enemy front, without sufficient
ground to manœuvre upon; and, in such circumstances, it would
have been difficult even to get into Breslaw. It would, I think, have
been better to place the right on the town of Breslaw, and occupy
the villages that were near and under the protection of it. The left
should have been extended to the hills by Kleinburg and Grabischen,
which ought to have been fortified with care, and redoubts raised
all along the front, from right to left. The army, so posted, could
not, we think, have been forced at all; nor could the town be attacked
while it was there. When the enemy passed the Lohe at Grossmochber,
we think that general Ziethen, instead of extending his left, should,
on the contrary, have lengthened his right as far as Grabischen, with
his infantry and all the heavy artillery on the hill, it, and his cav-
alry, at the bottom of it; and the prince of Bevern’s division should
have closed its left with the right of this. By which means, the enemy,
who had passed the Lohe there, would have been taken in flank,
whether they attacked Grabischen or Kleinmochber: whereas, by the
dispositions made, there was an interval between Ziethen’s right, and
the prince of Bevern’s left, where the enemy entered, and met with
no other difficulty than that at Kleinmochber. This interval was the

key of the camp; and, the instant the enemy got possession of it,
the prince of Bevern could not continue where he was, though he
had been victorious on his right and center; because, being masters
of this interval, if they reinforced that attack, which they might have
done, they were on his flank, and would successively have pushed
him into the Oder: whereas, if he repulsed the enemy here, the bat-
tle was won; because, though they succeeded in their attacks at
Pilsnitz and Schmiedfeld, they could not continue in that ground
between the Lohe, the Oder, and his army, with Beslaw just before
them; and must, therefore, have abandoned those villages, and repass
the Lohe.
The event confirms my opinion: for the enemy had got no very
great advantage on the right and center; yet it was necessary to
retire, because they had taken Grabischen and Kleinmochber, and
were, consequently, on prince Bevern’s flank; and might, if he con-
tinued in the same position, cut him off from Breslaw, and throw
him into the Oder.
As to the conduct of prince Charles, it seems to have been no
less prudent than vigorous. By sending two corps on the enemy’s
flank, he forced them to quit their strong camp on the Landscron,
and go farther down, in order to pass the Neiss and Queiss; which
was an essential advantage to him, because he had, by that means,
a nearer road than they to Breslaw and Schweidnitz. When his royal
highness came to Lignitz, we think he should have attacked the
enemy; and, if that was thought dangerous, he should have sent
20,000 men to besiege Breslaw, then defended by a very weak gar-
rison; and, with the remainder of the army, have covered the siege;
which he could easily have done, being still very much superior to
the enemy, who could not possibly approach Breslaw, without pre-
viously coming to an action.
When the prince of Bevern quitted Lignitz, and marched towards
Steinau, on the Oder, prince Charles should have sent a strong corps
after him, and with the army have gone to Dyherrenfurth; and there
throw as many bridges as possible over the Oder, in order to be on
the other side, as circumstances might require. By this means he
could cover the siege of Breslaw, and effectually hinder the enemy
from disturbing it. Why he permitted the prince of Bevern to march
near twenty leagues, and pass the Oder twice, and come to Breslaw
before him, while he had only ten leagues to march, and no river
to pass, is what cannot easily be conceived. As to the conduct of

the action itself, it does not seem to have been intirely prudent and
blameless. The three attacks were made precisely against the strongest
part of the enemy’s camp, and were, moreover, exposed to great
difficulties in passing the Lohe under the fire of their works: whereas,
if his royal highness had only made a false attack on the enemy’s
center and right, and have posted his left by Neukirchen, with some
heavy artillery and haubitz near it, and have passed his line by
Grossmochber, between Operau and the Lohe, where the bridges
must have been laid, and Nadasti’s left quite close to the prince’s
right, so as to form a kind of curve about the enemy, as marked in
the plan, he would have avoided the villages and works, in which
the enemy placed the greatest hopes, and the difficulties that must
occur in passing the river so near them; and, moreover, would have
forced them to abandon these very works, in order to take a new
position, with their right on the Lohe, and their left towards the hills
behind Kleinburg, which would have exposed it to be enfiladed from
one end to the other, by the artillery placed at Neukirchen and
Grossmochber. When the enemy’s right and center quitted their
ground, as they must have done, nothing could hinder the light
troops from occupying it, and taking them in the rear. For all which
reasons, I think, the Austrians should have made their attack where
Nadasti was, by which they would have avoided all those great
difficulties they met with. Even, if this general, instead of extending
his right, had stretched out his left so as to close with the right of
the army which passed at Grossmochber, and have acted with his
usual vigour, it is probable the Prussian army was lost, and thrown
into the Oder.
The immediate consequence of this battle was the taking of Breslaw,
with about 300,000 florins, and a prodigious quantity of stores in it.
The Austrians, thinking the campaign finished, were preparing to
enter into winter quarters; when news came, that the king, at the
head of a considerable body of troops, was advancing towards Silesia.
Upon which all thoughts of separating the army were laid aside, and
proper measures taken to go and oppose the enemy. With this view,
colonel Bulow, with about 3000 men, was sent to occupy Lignitz,
in hopes, by that means, to stop the king for some time; as it was
thought he would pass near that place. Prince Charles, having resolved
to go an meet the enemy, passed the Schweidnitz on the 4th of
December, intending to advance further on towards Glogau; but the
arrival of the enemy, the day following, prevented it, and occasioned
a general action, near Lissa: of which we shall, as usual, give the
different accounts, as published by authority.
That of the Austrians is as follows:
The king of Prussia, having quitted Saxony, and passed through Lusatia,
he arrived, with a considerable corps, at Parchwitz, on the Oder, where
he was joined by the army which had been under the command of
the prince of Bevern; which, with what he had conducted, amounted
to 40,000 men, provided with a fine train of artillery, fascines, gabions,
&c. and, having passed the Katzbach, it was easy to foresee that his
intentions were to take Neumark and Lignitz; and then, either attack
the imperial army before Breslaw, or march to Striegau and the fron-
tiers of Bohemia, in order to cut off our communication with that
country.
For which reasons, it was resolved by his royal highness prince
Charles, and his excellency M. Daun, with the unanimous consent of
all the generals, to advance, and pass the Schweidnitz without delay,
and so secure Lignitz; and, above all things, endeavour to frustrate
the designs of the enemy. Accordingly, the garrison of Lignitz was
reinforced, and a large corps of Bannalists, hussars and picquets of
horse, sustained by the Saxon light horse, were sent to Neumark.
The army, having been provided on the 3d of December, for four
days, with every thing necessary, and prepared for all events, broke
up the 4th in the morning, and passed the Lohe and the Schweidnitz,
in order to encamp there. While it was filing over the bridges, advice
was brought, that the king of Prussia had quitted Parchwitz the 4th
in the morning, and was advanced to Neumark, from whence he had
forced our troops to retire. Upon which the baggage was sent back
behind the Schweidnitz, and the columns ordered to hasten their march,
that the army might be formed; which was accordingly done, in two
lines. General Nadasti, with the corps under his command, made a
third, which was designed to cover the flank of the left wing; and the
corps de reserve that of the right. The army was posted with the right
at Nypern, the left at Leuthen, and the center at Frobelwitz: all these
villages were occupied with infantry, and provided with artillery. In
Frobelwitz were eight companies of granadiers, with many picquets:
in Leuthen seven companies of granadiers, with several picquets: and
several picquets also in Nypern. All the companies of granadiers, and
the picquets of the reserve, were posted on the right of the cavalry,
at the point of a wood that joined it.
General Lusinski, with two regiments of hussars, and some granit-
zers, sustained by the Saxon light horse, commanded by count Nostitz,
was posted so as to cover the left wing; and general Morocz, with two
regiments of hussars, and some granitzers, on the right, for the same
purpose. Whilst we were making these dispositions, the enemy advanced
on this side Neumark, with his right at Krintsch, and the left at
Bischdorff, with his foreposts at Borna. In this situation both armies
continued under arms the whole night. The 5th in the morning, before
day, general Nadasti, whose corps had made a third line, went, as had
been concerted, and posted himself near the cavalry of the left wing,
and extended his troops to a hill, that was on the side, upon which
some artillery was placed, and an abatis made before it. The Austrians
under his command were next the left of the army, and the
Wurtemburgers and Bavarians came to be on the flank, and behind
the abatis.
At the break of day, the enemy made several motions, sometimes
to the right, and sometimes to the left, which lasted ’till 12 o’clock;
and it appeared he intended to attack the right wing of the imperial
army; insomuch that general Luchesi, who commanded there, sent sev-
eral times to demand succours. The reserve was destined for that pur-
pose; yet the sending of it was postponed ’till the enemy’s intentions
were fully known: but, as the count repeated his instances, and the
enemy’s motions behind the hills not being discovered, the reserve was
sent him, and M. Daun went there himself, in order to be at hand
in case of need. Scarce had the reserve marched, when the enemy’s
cavalry appeared on our left; which shewed they proposed attacking
that wing, and the flank adjoining: upon which his royal highness and
his excellency M. Daun ordered prince Esterhasi, general of horse,
and generals Macquire and Angern, with the cavalry and infantry
under their command, and all the second line, to march and sustain
that flank. About 1 o’clock the enemy approached it, and the fire of
the small arms began against the Wurtembergers; which being very
hot, forced them back in confusion, leaving their artillery behind them;
which brought the Bavarians, who formed the flank, likewise into con-
fusion. These auxiliary troops immediately threw the other regiments
of the Imperials in disorder, and hindered those that were coming to
sustain them from doing any thing to the purpose. Every possible
means was used to bring the troops into order, but in vain. During
this time, the enemy attacked the village of Leuthen, and the left wing
of the army, and had brought there the greatest part of his forces; but
he was repulsed three several times with great loss; so that the victory
was dubious for a long while. At length, however, the Prussians pen-
etrated in the opening between the left wing and the flank, and so
were in the rear of our army. We were forced to abandon Leuthen,
and retire towards the Schweidnitz and the Lohe. This was executed
in good order, and under a continual fire. In this manner the battle,
which lasted from 1 o’clock ’till five, finished.
The Prussian’s account is as follows:
After the battle of Rosbach, his majesty turned his thoughts towards
Silesia, in order to oppose vigorously the progress of the Austrians.
Accordingly, his majesty, at the head of 33 squadrons, and 19 battal-

ions, quitted Leipsig the 12th of November, and arrived the 13th at
Eulenberg, the 14th at Torgau, the 16th at Muhlberg, the 17th passed
the Roder at Grossenhayn, where general Haddick had been with 2000
men, but was retired to Konigsbruck. He had left some hussars behind
the Roder to observe us; but they were drove back by ours, who took
about 40 prisoners.
The 18th his majesty marched by Polsnitz to Konigsbruck, where
the pandours under general Haddick stopped once more; whom he
forced to retire towards the corps under general Marshal, in Lusatia,
who likewise retired towards Lôbau, and never appeared again dur-
ing our whole march. The 20th his majesty passed over the Black
Elster to Camenz; and the 21st over the Spree to Bautzen; from whence
Marshal’s corps had retired towards Bohemia: the 22d his majesty
passed the Old Spree, and went to Maltitz; the 23d to Gorlitz; from
whence Haddick’s corps likewise retired towards Bohemia: the 24th he
passed the Queiss, and went to Naumburg in Silesia; the 26th to
Deutmansdorff; the 27th to Lobethau; and the 28th to Parchwitz;
where we arrived at 6 o’clock in the evening; and there found the
Austrian colonel Gersdorff, who was just come with about 1100 horse
and foot. His majesty ordered him to be immediately attacked, and
killed about 80 men, took 150 prisoners, and dispersed the rest. The
army passed the Katzbach, and remained some days at Parchwitz, to
rest after such a strong march. The 1st of December, the hussars,
belonging to the army of prince Bevern, came to us; and the 2d that
whole army joined ours. On the 4th we marched to Neumark, where
we found some thousand Croats and hussars, who kept the gate oppo-
site to us shut, and endeavoured to get out on the side of Breslaw. In
the mean while, some of our dragoons and hussars went about the
town, and others opened the gate by force; so that, having drove the
enemy out, they fell into the hands of those who had gone on the other
side. We killed about 300, and took 600 prisoners, with the bakery of
the whole army, a small magazine, and two cannon. Here advice was
brought, that prince Charles had quitted Breslaw, and was advanced
to Lissa, with his right at Nypern, and his left at Golau, with the
Schweidnitz behind him. His majesty thought proper to go and meet
him; and therefore ordered the army to break up on the 5th, at 5
o’clock in the morning. At break of day we discovered, on a hill behind
the village of Borna, about half a mile from Neumark, a strong corps
of cavalry, which, in the twilight, was thought to be the enemy’s whole
army. Upon our approaching them, we found it was only two regi-
ments of hussars, and the Saxon light horse, commanded by general
Nostitz. Our vanguard attacked them immediately; drove them back
into their camp; and took 500 prisoners. We continued our march, in
wet and thick weather, about four miles; and, near 12 o’clock, we dis-
covered the enemy’s whole army, in order of battle, behind the vil-
lage of Leuthen. All the hills before their front were covered with
Illustration 7
172
i. the late war in germany, vol. 1 (1766)
Map 7. Plan of the battle of Lissa or Leuthen, fought on the 5th Decem. 1757, between the Prussians Commanded by the King,
and the Austrians Commanded by P. Charles of Lorrain, and won by the Former.
artillery; and the left wing had, besides a great hill with artillery upon
it, an abatis likewise. The right had also a great many batteries before
it. The king resolved to attack the enemy’s left, as soon as our army
reached the heights before it. We marched on the right; so that our
right wing came up to the Schweidnitz river. We first attacked the
wood; and very soon drove the enemy’s infantry out of it. When they
perceived that we outwinged them, and took them in flank, they were
forced to change their position; and, as we were on their flank, they
had nothing more to do, than to take the first new position they could
find, to hinder us from enfilading their army from one wing to the
other. They therefore sent some brigades of infantry on the heights
abovementioned, behind the wood: our right wing attacked it; and,
after an obstinate combat, took it. The enemy formed a new line by
Leuthen, and defended themselves with much bravery; but, at last,
were forced to give way. Here our cavalry of the right wing attacked
that of the enemy, and defeated it. They were, however, afterwards
drove back by the enemy’s artillery charged with cartridges: but, being
again re-established, they attacked their infantry, and took many pris-
oners. During these several attacks, the enemy’s right advanced. The
cavalry of our left attacked that of the enemy, and entirely defeated
it: then our regiment of dragoons Bareuth attacked a body of infantry,
that was on a hill, behind, while our infantry did the same in front;
which soon forced them to fly. His majesty pursued the enemy to
Lissa. The battle began at 1 o’clock, and finished at four. If we had
had a few hours more day light, the enemy’s loss would have been
still much greater. Prince Maurice commanded the right wing under
the king, and major general Retzow the left. Our loss consists in 500
men killed, and 2300 wounded: among these is general Rochow, who
was also taken prisoner. The enemy’s army, which amounted to 80,000
men, never fought with more bravery than this time. Ours amounted
to 36,000 men only. The enemy stood in a plain, with some small
hills on it, which they covered with artillery. There were likewise many
bushes on the plain, of which they took advantage. On their left wing
was a considerable wood, where they made an abatis, and took all the
measures possible to hinder us from coming on their flank. General
Nadasti, with his corps, was likewise posted there, with intention to
come on our flank. For which reason, his majesty placed four battal-
ions behind the cavalry of our right; which wise disposition was after-
wards of great service to us: for, when Nadasti attacked our right wing
of horse, and had thrown some regiments in confusion, the fire of
these battalions threw the enemy back in great disorder, and by that
means cleared our flank, and enabled our right to act with vigour
against the enemy’s left, which in a short time was forced to retire.
The right wing of our infantry continued to advance in the finest
order, though it was exposed to a prodigious cannonading, and the
fire of small arms. Our artillery, of which we had no small quantity,
did great service, and sustained our advancing infantry; and, by degrees
silenced that of the enemy, which was at last abandoned. Though the
enemy had fought with great bravery during the whole action, yet they
seemed to redouble their forces and courage at Leuthen, which was
fortified with redoubts and retrenchments. The combat lasted here
above an hour; and our brave battalions made several attacks, one
after another, before they got masters of the village. This decided the
battle; for the enemy, on losing this village, retired with great precip-
itation, and never attempted again to make any considerable stand.
Our cavalry, and particularly the hussars, pursued the flying enemy;
killed many; and took some thousands prisoners. His majesty pursued
the enemy to Lissa, where he ordered the army to remain that night
under arms. Our infantry did wonders. We thought, in the beginning,
that our left would have no opportunity to come to action, as our
right advanced so much before it; however, at 4 o’clock, the battle
was general: even our small reserve was ordered to advance into the
line. Our cavalry had many difficulties, in the beginning, to encounter,
from the ditches and enclosures: at last, however, by the activity of
our brave general Ziethen, it had also an opportunity of acting. The
6th we followed the enemy, and the 7th invested Breslaw. General
Ziethen, with a great corps of infantry and cavalry, was sent after
them. He has taken several cannons, and above 3000 waggons. We
have taken, in and since the battle, to the 12th of December, 291
officers, and 21,500 men, prisoners, among whom are generals Nostitz,
and Odonell, 116 cannon, 51 pair of colours, and 4000 waggons.
The loss of the Austrians, not including the Wurtembergers and
Bavarians, amounted to 6574, killed and wounded. Among the first
were generals Luchesi, Otterwolf, and prince Stolberg:25 and among
the wounded were generals Haller, Macquire,26 Lacy, Lobkowitz, and
Preysac. That of the Prussians consisted of about 5000 men, not
including the cavalry.
Prince Charles left a very considerable garrison in Breslaw, under
the command of general Sprecher, and retired to Schweidnitz; and,
having provided for the defence of that place, he made his disposi-
tions to retire into Bohemia; which was accordingly executed: and,
before the end of the month, the Austrians entirely evacuated Silesia,
excepting only the town of Schweidnitz.
In the mean time, the king opened the trenches before Breslaw;
and, a bomb having fallen into a powder magazine, the 16th in the
evening, the attacked bastion, and near half the adjoining curtain,
25
Christian Karl, Prinz von Stolberg-Gedern (1725–64).
26
Field Marshal Johann Sigismund Maguire von Iniskillen (d. 1767).
was blown up, and above 800 men of the besieged. This misfortune
obliged the commandant to capitulate the 19th at night. The garrison,
consisting of above 17,000 men, including 13 generals, and the sick
and wounded at the two last battles, were made prisoners of war.
General Driesen had been sent the 16th, with a body of troops,
to besiege Lignitz; and, on the 26th, took that place by capitulation.
Colonel Bulow, the governor, obtained leave to retire into Bohemia,
with his garrison, consisting of near 3000 men.
Thus one victory, improved by a vigorous and active genius,
enabled his majesty to recover, in one month, all, excepting
Schweidnitz, that he had lost during the whole campaign.
When the king left Saxony, in order to go to Silesia, M. Keith,
with about 8000 men, had been sent into Bohemia, with a view to
draw general Marshal, then in Lusatia, there; and, by that means,
facilitate the march of the king. This end having been happily accom-
plished, M. Keith, after he had burnt several magazines, and the
bridge at Leutmeritz, returned to Saxony; where he put his troops
into winter quarters.
Reflections on the Battle of Lissa [Leuthen], and the Preceding Operations
Prince Charles knew, even before the battle of Breslaw, that the
king, with about 10 or 12,000 men, at most, was coming into Silesia:
the only object his majesty could have in view, was to join Bevern’s
army, without which he could attempt nothing at all; nor even, with
so inconsiderable a force as that he brought with him, approach the
Austrian army, without exposing himself to certain destruction.
Wherefore, the only object prince Charles should have had in view,
was to prevent him from effectuating this junction. His royal high-
ness should therefore have marched to Parchwitz, and take a posi-
tion between that place and Lignitz, with a strong corps, on the
heights of Pfaffendorff, which would have hindered the king from
approaching the Oder; nor even could he have gone to Glogau,
without giving them an opportunity to attack him, and consequently
defeat him, considering the Austrian army was, perhaps, six times
stronger than he was.
The only measure taken by the Austrians, was to send a garrison
to Lignitz, which could answer no end whatever, and exposed so
many men to be lost. It was by no means probable that the king
would amuse himself with a siege of that miserable place, when all
Silesia was at stake.
When the Austrians had permitted the king to unite all his forces,
and provide them with the necessary artillery, &c. we cannot con-
ceive why all of a sudden they resolved to quit Breslaw, and go to
meet him. I know very well, that flattery, too prevalent in camps,
as well as courts, had raised their spirits and confidence much above
what prudence prescribes: but they could then have no motives to
desire an action; because, if victorious, they could not, in that advanced
season, pursue the enemy further than Glogau; and, if vanquished,
it might prove fatal to them.
Having passed the Schweidnitz the 4th, they were informed the
enemy was advancing towards them; Why not instantly repass that
river, and put it before them, rather than behind. Though this river
is but small, yet its banks, for the most part, are very marshy; inso-
much that an army cannot pass it without the greatest difficulty, and
scarce at all if they meet any opposition. If the Austrians had done
this, and have sent a strong corps higher up on their left flank, with
their light troops on the same side as the enemy, on the road that
leads to Striegau, we do not think his majesty would have attempted
to pass the river; and, if he did, the corps abovementioned would
have been on his flank during the passage and the action; and, as
they were much stronger than he was, having their army covered
by the Schweidnitz, they could have posted 20,000 men on their
flank; which would have made it impossible for the enemy to pass
the river. He would, therefore, in all probability, have marched to
Striegau, in order to bring the Austrians from their advantageous
situation, by endeavouring to cut off their communication with
Bohemia. In this case, the corps, posted, as we suppose, on their
left, would have been at Striegau before the enemy; and the whole
army must have marched behind Schweidnitz, with the right at
Hohen Giersdorff, and the left towards Friberg; which would have
secured the road by Landshut to Bohemia, and their communica-
tion with that country. This position is very strong, and we do not
think they could have been beat in it; nor, in that advanced season,
by any manœuvre on their left, be forced out of it; nor could the
king continue in the neighbourhood of Striegau, having no maga-
zines within a hundred miles of him. He must, therefore, have given
up the point, and retire to Glogau, in order to refresh his troops,
who were much in need of rest. These measures being neglected,
or never thought of, they should have advanced, and occupied all
the hills before them, particularly that of Lobetnitz, as well to take
this advantage from the enemy, as to have room enough behind
them to manœuvre upon; but, from the moment they heard of the
king’s approach, they seem stupified; they neither advance or retire.
It is impossible for a superior army to be outwinged, but by some
fault; yet this happened. The king made great demonstrations against
their right, by which they were deceived so long, that he, covered
by the hills they had neglected to occupy, had time to bring his
whole army on their left. The only remedy then, was to order their
right and center to march against his left; and, as they were much
superior, and this wing weakened, to reinforce the right. They would
have inveloped it, and in all probability destroyed it; nor could the
king pursue his advantages on the right, while his left was thus
attacked, for fear of being inclosed between the enemy’s right wing
and the river, where there was not ground enough to act in. They
should, at the same time, have formed a line or two behind the
flank attacked, with intervals to let the troops repulsed pass, and
then advance against the enemy, whom they would have found broke,
and in confusion, and, therefore, easily have defeated him.
Instead of which, they ordered the whole army to make a motion
on the left, to sustain that wing; so that the columns met their com-
panions retiring, and the enemy advancing in order of battle; which
hindered them from being able to form at all; and thus the whole
army was defeated, one battalion after another, as must necessarily
happen. Troops marching in small and long columns can never open,
and form themselves in a line, when near the enemy, and under his
fire; and, therefore, such a manœuvre must never be attempted.
They should have endeavoured to keep the enemy back ’till they
had formed a line, and then advance, or wait his coming. This not
being executed, the battle was lost, and nothing could prevent it.
It was likewise a capital fault to have put the auxiliary troops,
who had never seen and enemy, on the flank. If they had thrown
their light troops, and 8 or 10 battalions of Austrians, sustained by
Nadasti’s corps, and the whole left wing, into the wood, before the
village of Sagschutz, and ordered their right and center to advance,
and attack the enemy’s left, we think they would have gained the
victory.
The king’s conduct was founded on the most sublime principles
of war. Though his army was much inferior to that of the enemy,
yet, by dint of superior manœuvres, he brought more men into

action, at the point attacked, than they; which must be decisive when
the troops are nearly equal in goodness. Wherefore, generals must
make it their study, to establish, in time of peace, such evolutions
as facilitate the manœuvres of armies; and, in time of war, choose
such a field of battle, if possible, as enables them to hide part of
their motions, and so bring more men into action than the enemy;
and, if the ground, either by nature, or by the vigilance of the enemy,
does not permit them to cover their motions, then a greater facility
of manœuvring will answer the same end, and enable them to bring
more men to the principal point attacked than the enemy. The only
advantage of a superior army, in a day of action, consists in this
only, that the general can bring more men into action than the
enemy; but, if they do not move with facility and quickness, and are
not all brought to action at the same time, that superiority of num-
bers will be of no use: on the contrary, will serve only to increase
the confusion. From whence we will deduce a general rule: “That
general, who, by the facility of his motions, or by artifice, can bring
most men into action, at the same time, and at the same point, must,
if the troops are equally good, necessarily prevail; and, therefore, all
evolutions, which do not tend to this object, must be exploded.”
Operations of the War in Prussia, between the Prussians

and the Russians
The king of Prussia, being informed of the Czarina’s accession to

the treaty of Versailles, ordered general Lewhald,27 with about 30,000
men, to march on the frontiers of Prussia, and oppose the march
of the enemy. Accordingly, this general, having assembled his army
in the month of June, advanced to Insterburg, with a corps further
on towards Memel, to observe their motions.
In the mean time, the Russian army, consisting of 31 regiments
of foot, and 14 of horse, 5 of hussars, and about 16,000 Tartars,
Calmucks [Kalmyks], and Cosacks, amounting in the whole to 62,000
foot, 19,000 horse, and the abovementioned Tartars, &c. broke up
27
Field Marshal Hans von Lehwaldt. Defended East Prussia from the Russians
in 1757 and commanded the Prussians at the battle of Gross-Jägersdorf (30 August
1757). In 1758 he commanded Prussian defenses against a possible Swedish invasion.
in May, and advanced, in four columns, towards the frontiers of

Prussia.
Three of which passed through Poland, and the fourth through
Samogitia, towards Memel. This last was commanded by general
Fermor,28 and destined to besiege that town. To facilitate which
enterprize, admiral Lewis, an Englishman of reputation, in the Russian
service, sailed with a considerable fleet from Revel, with 9000 men
on board, in order to land, and attack Memel on the sea side, while
general Fermor did the same on the land side. Accordingly, they
arrived before Memel at the end of June, and, on the 5th of the
following month, they took the place by capitulation.
This conquest was of infinite consequence to the Russians, because
they could make a convenient place of arms of it, and, by means
of their fleet, provide it with provisions and stores sufficient to sup-
ply the whole army, (who could not possibly be provided otherwise)
and consequently prosecute the operations of the campaign.
This expedition being happily executed, the whole army, under
the command of M. Apraxin,29 united in the month of August, on
the river Russ; and from thence advanced towards Pregel. Upon
which general Lewhald quitted the camp at Insterburg, and retired
towards Wehlau; where he continued ’till the 30th of August, and
then advanced to attack the Russians, who had passed the Pregel,
and were encamped at Gross Jagersdorff. This occasioned a great
battle: of which the Prussians give the following account.
Lieutenant general Schorlemmer having reconnoitred the enemy’s posi-
tion, it was resolved to attack them the 30th. We first attacked their
left wing. Prince Holstein’s regiment, under his own command, Ruesch’s,
28
Villim Villimovich Fermor, Graf von Fermor (1702–71). Cavalry general of
Baltic Lutheren and Scots descent. Commanded detached corps of 16,000 in the
1757 campaign that invaded East Prussia, capturing Memel, and commanded first
division at the battle of Gross-Jägersdorf. In 1758 took command of the occupa-
tion of East Prussia that culminated in the battle of Zorndorf (25 August 1758).
Relieved of overall command in 1759, he organized the 1760 commando raidon
Berlin. Of special note is that was an early advocate of using infantry squares against
the Turks. See Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature
of Russian Military Power, 1700–1800 (London, Bostonn and Henley: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1981).
29
Field Marshal Stepan Fedorovich Apraksin (1702–58). President of the War
College and commander of the Russian field army, he led the 1757 invasion of
East Prussia that culminated in the battle of Gross-Jägersdorf. His decision to retreat
after that victory led to the relief of his command. He escaped formal punishment
by dying from an apoplectic seizure. See Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West.
Map 8. Plan of the Battle of Gros Jagersdorff in Prussia, fought on the 30th of August 1757, between the Russians, Commanded by M. Apraxin and the Prussians,
Commanded by M. Lewhald, and Won by the Former.
and the second battalion of Schorlemmer, distinguished themselves very

much. They took several batteries, and totally defeated the enemy’s
cavalry. We advanced, over a prodigious number of dead bodies, against
the center and right wing of the enemy’s army, that was protected by
various batteries and retrenchments. We took three of them in the
wood, each from 10 or 12 cannons: in one of which the marshal him-
self gave quarter to a Russian colonel; and in another we made gen-
eral Lapuchin a prisoner. We should probably have kept the field of
battle, if, unfortunately, our second line had not fired on our first; the
great smoak of the artillery, and of two villages which the enemy had
put on fire, having hindered our people from seeing their compan-
ions; so that our first line was exposed to the fire of the enemy’s
infantry, sustained by 150 pieces of cannon, and that of our own sec-
ond line. We therefore quitted the field of battle, and retired in good
order, without being followed. Our loss, in all, amounts to about 2000
men. That of the enemy much above 9000. Among whom are gen-
erals Lieven and Lapuchin.
This account, as generally happens with the losers, is very little exact,
and no ways worthy to be printed, but impartiality required it.
That of M. Apraxin, to the Czarina, is as follows:
I had the honour to inform your majesty, that numberless and invin-
cible obstacles hindered us from approaching the enemy on the right
of the Pregel. Wherefore, I resolved to pass this river, and force them
to come to an action; which was accordingly done on the 28th; and,
as the enemy perceived, by this manœuvre, and our ulterior march,
that we could cut off their communication with the countries from
whence they drew their subsistence, they found it necessary to aban-
don their strong camp, and likewise pass on our side the Pregel on
the 28th. The 30th your majesty’s army, in consequence of the order
given the preceding night, was ready to march; and the vanguard, and
part of the army, were already in motion; when, at 4 o’clock in the
morning, we perceived that the wood, before our front, was filled with
the enemy’s troops, whose motions had been covered by it. We were
not as yet formed, when the enemy came out of the wood in the finest
order, and began to fire upon us with their artillery, and soon after
with small arms; which continued without intermission the whole action.
They attacked our front with great fury; and it required uncommon
firmness to resist their efforts. The first and chief attack was against
our left wing. They advanced in columns, within gun shot, and then
formed the line. When both armies were formed, with the front against
each other, the fire of artillery and small arms continued for three
hours, and the victory was all this while doubtful. The enemy made
all the efforts possible to break our front; but were repulsed in each
attempt with great loss. While these things passed on our left, they
attacked our right and vanguard (who, from the nature of the ground,
were somewhat more advanced than our left) with two separate corps
of cavalry, sustained by infantry; but were repulsed in both places.
Our artillery, particularly those called the Schwalows, did great exe-
cution; and contributed much to throw the enemy’s cavalry in confu-
sion. Though they met every where with the same bad success, they
made one effort more. On our left wing several openings were found
in the line, because the marshy ground made it impracticable to close
it. The enemy attempted to penetrate through these intervals, in order
to cut our line in two, and so take it in flank; but they were mistaken:
for we had posted there some troops out of the second line; so that,
scarce had they entered the wood, when they were received with fixed
bayonnets, and soon forced to fly with precipitation: which put an end
to the battle, &c.
The rest of general Apraxin’s letter contains nothing more than com-
pliments, no wise necessary to give an idea of the action.
The Russians took 29 cannons, and about 600 prisoners. Their
loss consisted in 800 killed, among which were generals Lapuchin,
Sybin, and Kapnist; and 4620 wounded, among whom were the
generals Lieven, Tolstoi, Bosquet, Villeboy, Manteuffel, Weimarn, and
Plemannikow. That of the Prussians in about 3000 killed, wounded,
and missing.
The Prussians retired to Wehlau, and the Russians continued in
their camp, by Norkitten, ’till the 7th of September; when they made
some dispositions, as if they intended passing the river Aller, at
Friedland, on the enemy’s right flank; but it was not executed. They
attempted likewise to disembark some troops in the Curish bay, but
were repulsed by the militia. On the 17th the whole Russian army
broke up, and retired in haste towards the frontiers; so that, by the
end of the month, they had entirely abandoned the kingdom of
Prussia, excepting Memel; where they left 10 or 12,000 men. This
put an end to the campaign in Prussia.
Reflections
When the Prussians knew that the enemy was in march, they should,
one would think, advance to the frontiers, and have made incur-
sions into Poland, to destroy the provisions, or carry it off; which
would have retarded very much the progress of the enemy, who had
absolutely no other means of subsisting, but what they found on the
spot, as they passed; which was rendered still more difficult, by the
terror the tartars inspired, by their uncommon ravages and cruelty.
Another advantage would have accrued; that the inhabitants of Prussia
would have had time to withdraw themselves, and their cattle, and
retire to Konigsberg, or some other places of surety: whereas, by
staying on the Pregel, the best part of the country was left at the
mercy of the enemy.
As to the conduct of the action itself, nothing can be objected to
M. Lewhald. He had, no doubt, orders to fight, though much infe-
rior. He formed his army in a line, facing the enemy, which may
be considered as a fault, being so much weaker than they; because
he could not make any considerable effort, in any one point; his
troops being equally distributed throughout the line; so that the
enemy had every where a greater number of men in action than he
could have. As the Russians were then little known, ’tis no wonder
the Prussian general should think his troops superior to theirs, and
therefore did not think it necessary to oppose any thing but infantry
to infantry, and cavalry against cavalry. But experience has proved,
that the Russian infantry is by far superior to any in Europe; inso-
much that I question whether it can be defeated by any other infantry
whatever; and, as their cavalry is not so good as that of other nations,
reason dictates, that a mixed order of battle alone can conquer them.
They cannot be defeated; they must be killed; and infantry, mixed
with great corps of cavalry, only can do this.
If the Russians intended to remain in Prussia, their first care ought
to have been to form magazines at Memel, in order to supply the
army; because they must know, that it was impossible for the coun-
try, even had they observed the most exact discipline, to furnish
enough for that purpose. The want of this precaution, both this and
all the following campaigns, rendered their victories useless. They
made war, and always will, in all probability, like the Tartars. They
will over-run a country, ravage and destroy it, and so leave it; because
they can never, according to the method they now follow, make a
solid and lasting conquest. They put themselves an insurmountable
barrier to it. Their own light troops, and the want of a solid plan
of operations, will one day ruin their army.
Operations of the War in Pomerania, between the Prussians

and the Swedes
The Swedes, under pretence of guarrantying the treaty of Westphalia

[1648], sent an army of about 17,000 men, under the command of
general Ungern Sternberg, against the Prussians. This army passed
the Peen, and, having soon taken Demmin, Anclam, and the islands
of Usedom and Wollin, they advanced into the Prussian part of
Pomerania; where they raised contributions, without meeting any
obstacle: for the garrison of Stettin, consisting of about 10,000 men,
under general Manteuffel, could not quit the important place, in
order to oppose the progress of the Swedes. At length, however, the
army, which had been in Prussia, arrived under general Lewhald;
and, before the end of December, forced the Swedes to abandon all
they had taken, except for Penamunder and the Anclamer retrench-
ments, and retire under the cannon of Stralsund.
Thus ended the campaign of 1757, the most important for the
number of great actions, the variety of events, and the uncertainty
of its issue, of any recorded either in antient or modern history.
We hope our account of it, and our reflections on its various oper-
ations, will prove no less agreeable than useful to our readers.
The End of the First Volume

II
AN ESSAY ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION

(1770)
CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................ 191
Chapter I. Of Monarchi-Aristo-Democratic Governments .... 192
Chapter II. Of the King’s Prerogative .................................... 196
Chapter III. Of the Privileges of Parliament .......................... 213
Chapter IV. Of the Advantages of the English
Constitution ............................................................................ 222
Chapter V. Of the Disadvantages of the English
Constitution ............................................................................ 229
Chapter VI. Methods Proposed that may Contribute
to Perfect the Constitution .................................................... 234
Chapter VII. Of Colonies ........................................................ 237
Chapter VIII. Of Ireland .......................................................... 245
Chapter IX. Parallel between the Respective Forces
of England and France .......................................................... 246
Europe in the 1760s exhibited tireless efforts by the great powers to

rebuild their shattered economies after many years of war. Successive
crop shortages, monetary inflation, and a general political malaise
triggered sporadic but widespread popular unrest. General Lloyd
spent much of the post-war decade in northern Italy as a British
secret agent and resident philosopher.1 He aided Pasquale Paoli’s
failed Corsican revolt and mingled with Italy’s literary elite. In 1768
the ‘Wilkes and Liberty’ movement erupted in England, prompting
him to predict revolution. He returned to London in 1770 and pub-
lished his first political treatise under the pseudonym ‘Cato,’2 which
launched his career as an enlightened thinker and reformer.
John Wilkes (1727–97) had co-founded The North Briton, a pro-
Scot, anti-Hanoverian political journal that in 1763 lampooned George
III and his ministers. A general warrant for libel implicitly targeted
Wilkes, who as MP from Aylesbury was protected by Parliamentary
privilege. But his enemies passed resolutions that lifted the privilege
and expelled him. He quickly fled to France and was convicted of
blasphemy and libel in absentia. He returned to London in 1768 (gen-
eral warrants were outlawed in 1766), won election as MP for
Middlesex, but authorities arrested him for the past convictions. This
last outrage sparked popular protests and mob violence, one of which
was put down by brute force at St. George’s Fields. The courts over-
turned the second conviction in absentia, but not the original libel.
Wilkes waged a pamphlet war, but in February 1769 Parliament
expelled him for the second time. The resulting ‘Wilkes and Liberty’
movement targeted government corruption, ministerial abuse, and
advocated general political reform.
1
The Archbishop-Elector of Cologne, Maximilian Friedrich von Königsegg-
Rothenfels, conferred the honorary title of Major-General in 1765. Henry Lloyd to
Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst, Graf zu Schaumburg-Lippe, Munster, 18 September 1765,
A XXXV 18.108, Schaumburg-Lippe Family Papers, Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv,
Bückeburg, Germany.
2
The Roman politician Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger (95–46 BC), foe of
Julius Caesar, champion of republican government and devotee to the principle of
liberty.
190 ii. an essay on the english constitution (1770)
A Wilkes’s partisan, Lloyd wrote this essay to condemn the unjust

and unlawful use of Parliamentary power. Its central analysis con-
cerns the idea of a balanced constitution where King, Lords, and
Commons equally share political power and thus provide a check
on any attempt by one party to dominate the others. The influence
of Montesquieu is clearly apparent in Lloyd’s political thought, as is
the enlightened belief that the British constitutional order kept despo-
tism at bay. His reflections on the corrupt and despotic politics of
the seventeenth-century Stuart kings not only reveal a deep affection
for the constitutional order, but signify his complete transformation
from Jacobite adventurer. The failed absolutist, crypto-Catholic out-
look had given way to the radical politics of Wilkes and the antecedents
of nineteenth-century liberal thought. John Almon’s imprint, the fore-
most radical press of the late eighteenth-century, should come as no
surprise.
Lloyd did not end with the issue of John Wilkes. His treatise,
albeit the least known of his writings, is a comprehensive examina-
tion of Great Britain circa 1770. Most notable is his critique of
British colonial policy in chapter VII, which he argued would only
end with colonial aspirations for independence! In chapter VIII he
generally condemns the heavy-handed treatment of the Irish and
advocates reforms encouraging industry and political equity: no doubt
a reflection of his own Celtic heritage. But it is the final chapter
that begs close examination. Gravely concerned with Britain’s mili-
tary power and issues of defense, Lloyd created a rudimentary but
path-breaking comparative analysis of military strength based on the
relative and absolute power of nations. His conclusion: the Peace of
Paris (1763) had indeed weakened France, but British strength did
not follow from it. Social unrest and moral corruption, colonial oppo-
sition to imperial policy, and the challenge of maintaining far-flung
commercial possessions posed serious defense concerns unless the
government adopted his ‘blue water’ policy. Within ten years events
validated Lloyd’s warnings of national complacency.
Publishing History
An Essay on the English Constitution. London: Published for the Author,

and Sold by J. Almon, 1770.
PREFACE
The following Essay is part of a more extensive Work on the different

Governments established among Mankind, which the Author pro-
poses giving to the Public in a few Months.1 In the mean Time he
has thought that the Publication of this Essay might be useful in
these critical Circumstances, and hopes it may contribute to confirm
the Rights of the Subjects, so lately and so wantonly violated.
1
Lloyd never published the complete treatise entitled, ‘Essais philosophiques sur
les gouvernements.’ It survives in three manuscripts held at the Fitzwilliam Museum,
Cambridge. This essay and the subsequent An Essay on the Theory of Money (1771)
extrapolate certain themes.
CHAPTER ONE
OF MONARCHI-ARISTO-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
Such I call those governments which are composed of king, lords,

and commons: of this kind are England, and Sweden. They seem,
at first sight, very complicated, but in fact are not so, being finally
reduced to three parts only, which form the constitution.
According to the principles of equality, which we have shewn to
be the basis, and foundation of all free governments, it is evident
that if either of the powers which compose the English constitution,
preponderates, it is in danger of being overturned: if, for example,
that part which represents the Democracy prevails over either of the
other two; it will, be degrees, as in Charles the First’s1 time, over-
turn the house of peers, naturally inclined to royalty, if not sup-
ported by the crown, and soon reduce even the crown itself also to
submit.
The house of commons is the more dangerous, as it is very numer-
ous, and, when it opposes the crown, cannot fail of being supported
by the nation in general, ever justly jealous of its power and influence,
so that the people willingly concur in every measure, that may tend
to diminish the power of the one, and support that of the other.
The house of commons being moreover masters either of granting
or refusing the supplies, can at any time embarrass the government.
Their jealousy of the lords makes them embrace with pleasure, every
opportunity of mortifying them. Prudence therefore, as well as neces-
sity, requires that the king should shew a particular regard and def-
erence to the commons in general; and, above all, to those who
distinguish themselves by their talents and eloquence, ever respectable,
and always act powerfully in a free state, especially if the members
who compose it are numerous. He must therefore attach them to
his interest by lucrative and important employments, that being united
1
Charles I (r. 1625–49), King of England. This passage refers to the Puritan
House of Commons and the subsequent execution of Charles and the establishment
of the Commonwealth.
i. monarchi-aristo-democratic governments 193
in a common cause with the crown, they must support those mea-
sures, of which they are themselves the authors. However zealous
they may seem to appear for the good of their country, I fancy the
most just and able minister would find it impossible to carry any
point of consequence, however equitable and necessary, without great
opposition, and perhaps at last miscarry, if the members, of both
houses, were not animated by some other principles than those of
patriotism and glory, of which, luxury and corruption seem to have
extinguished every idea. Had the place-bill taken effect, it would
probably have been followed by fatal consequences, very different
from those it was intended to produce: and therefore, though I pro-
fess myself a lover of my country, I am really glad it did not pass.
Can it be imagined that the house of commons would have seen,
with indifference, all the employments of the kingdom in the hands
of the lords, and their dependants? but this must have been the case,
if the commons could not enjoy them. Dissention, instead of that
jealousy necessary to support the balance, on which the safety of the
constitution depends, must have ensued between the two houses,
which the king, having no longer any influence on the commons,
could not have suppressed, or hindered from being carried to such
a height, as would have overturned the whole machine of govern-
ment. Besides, the peers, by possessing all the great employments in
every department, and filling the army, navy, &c. with their depen-
dants, would in fact become an Aristocracy: for power always fol-
lows riches, and soon becomes too powerful to be checked by the
king and commons. The old method of dethroning the one, and
oppressing the other, would have been naturally renewed. For such,
in fact, was the antient system, which would have still continued, if
some of our kings had not wisely and justly raised the power and
dignity of the commons, as a check upon the lords. The event demon-
strated the wisdom of their measures. The commons, as well from
principle, as interest, must have opposed the lords upon every occa-
sion, and the king must, for his own safety, and that of the consti-
tution, have supported them. A just and moderate influence on the
commons, which would not have been preserved, had the place-bill
passed, is absolutely necessary to maintain the balance between the
powers which compose the government. If at present the crown’s
influence is supposed to be very extensive in both houses, the min-
istry cannot, without the greatest difficulty, carry on the common
business of the nation, if, upon every occasion, they find themselves
clogged and embarrassed, by the opposition. How could they proceed
when they had lost their influence in both houses? which must have
been the case if the lords had too much, and the commons too little
power.
As the commons are very numerous, there will be many whom
the ministry cannot, or will not employ, on the terms they wish.
These will always oppose his measures, right or wrong: The same
difficulties, though in a lesser degree, being fewer in number, and
naturally more attached to the crown, will also occur in the house
of lords. As things now are, the constitution has less to fear from
them, than from the commons, their number being much smaller;
and, as individuals, are not entitled to any more power than any
other members of the community, and have therefore no more
influence on the people than what naturally arises from talents and
riches: and the commons, at the same time, being numerous, and
in general rich, and supported by the people, when in opposition to
the crown and lords, the latter could never endanger the constitu-
tion, nor would they attempt it, unless the commons were totally
oppressed; because their power and dignity depend, on the present
form of government: whereas that of the commons would increase,
in proportion as that of the crown and lords declined. Nor do I
think any thing can destroy the influence of the commons; for they
are intimately connected with that of the people, and, in general,
rich, and well instructed in what regards their rights and privileges.
Even a military force would be found ineffectual; because many of
the officers are more attached to their country, than to the service,
being gentlemen of independent fortunes; contrary to what happens
in other countries, where the officers have no other resource than
their pay, and the prince’s bounty. These have no country but their
regiments, or any other source for subsistance, and are therefore
entirely dependant on the will of the sovereign. If the commons, as
formerly, were few and poor, the lords would soon be masters of
the state, and all balance between the different parts which form the
constitution destroyed. The king therefore has no other resource than
to augment the power of the commons, or that of the lords, as cir-
cumstances may require, in order to maintain a proper equilibre
between them, on which his own safety, as well as that of the state,
depends. The want of sufficient power in the crown to maintain the
i. monarchi-aristo-democratic governments 195
balance between the different classes, which form the constitution in

Sweden, is the reason why that unhappy kingdom is for ever rent
with intestine convulsions, which destroy all industry; and to this
their poverty must be chiefly attributed, being otherwise a brave and
active people.
CHAPTER TWO
OF THE KING’S PREROGATIVE
Prerogative is a word, like those of Liberty and Religion, which has

produced more civil wars, and done much mischief to mankind, than
all other causes put together. Those who are attached to the prince,
and partake of his power, endeavour continually to extend the pre-
rogative. There is scarce any object, which, according to these gen-
tlemen, is not in some measure subject to the prerogative, and the
arbitrary will of the sovereign. Sometimes they will dispense with the
laws, and supply their pretended deficiency by the king’s proclama-
tions, so that, in a short time, if the ministry was not checked by
his opponents, of which we hope there will always be many, the use
and benefit of the laws would be lost, and replaced by the prerog-
ative and arbitrary power of the crown: for such must be deemed
that power, which is derived from, and exerted by the will of one
person. In this case the constitution would be in fact dissolved, and
nothing remain but the vain and empty form of impotent laws; as
it happened at Rome after the subversion of the republic under the
tyrannic governments of Augustus, and Tiberius. Their successors
even neglected this vain ceremony, and carried their despotism to
the utmost height of cruelty and oppression.
Those, on the contrary, who do not partake of the king’s favour,
jealous of those who do, are ever exclaiming against every exertion
of power, even in those cases, where the welfare of the state requires
it. I remember, some time ago, the nation was greatly afflicted by
the dearness of provisions, encreased by the infamous and cruel race
of monopolizers, who oppressed the poor, and excited them to com-
mit several violences, so that the public tranquility was greatly dis-
turbed: the king therefore, by the advice of his council, thought it
necessary, by his own authority, to apply some remedy that would
relieve the poor, and restore the peace of the nation. With these
paternal views he prohibited the exportation of corn, for a limited
time, until the parliament could provide some more effectual rem-
edy. It is true, that such a prohibition was contrary to an express
law, which not only permits, but encourages, by great premiums,
ii. the king’s prerogative 197
the exportation of corn. Every body however agreed that the evil
was great; that it required immediate relief; and therefore the nation
in general highly approved of what the king had done. Notwithstanding
which, those who were opposed to the ministry, complained of this
measure, as a most enormous abuse that sapped the foundation of
the constitution, whose laws, they said, had been wantonly violated,
and even without necessity. The ministers were obliged to procure
an act of indemnity, for having advised the king to provide for the
safety of his people. It is doubtless essential to a free government,
that there should be an opposition, to keep a watchful eye on the
conduct of the minister, and check him in the pursuit of arbitrary
measures, to which most men are too much inclined. Such an oppo-
sition however must be regulated by equity and justice, otherwise it
will degenerate into chicanery, malice, and faction. One must never
see more in an object than what it really contains. There is noth-
ing however indifferent, from which, by forced constructions, and
interpretations, you may not draw what consequences you please.
You cannot, consistently with justice, deprive a minister of the rights
of a subject; you must hear him, and prove his conduct criminal,
before you can punish him; when this is done, you cannot be too
severe, that his example may deter others from abusing the confidence
the king has reposed in them. But if those in the opposition do
nothing more than declaim, without distinction, against every mea-
sure pursued by the minister, they give room to believe, that envy
and malice, rather than the love of truth and patriotism, are the
real motives of their conduct. It is equally impossible that a minis-
ter should always be in the wrong, as it is, he should always be in
the right. Those therefore who always exclaim against him, justly
deserve the name of factious; while those who always defend him,
deserve the appellation of vile and infamous mercenaries, and ene-
mies to their country, who deserve the hatred and execration of all
honest men.
It is a common saying, the mouths of the royalists, That the king
can do no wrong. This is undoubtedly true, but not in the sense they
use it, as if he was infallible, and had a right to do whatever he
pleased. For, on the contrary, he is himself like any other man, sub-
ject to the laws in civil matters, and if in those, which are criminal,
supposing for example he had the misfortune to treat a subject ill,
in his person or property, he seems exempted, and is not usually
called to answer for the fault. It is not however because he is not
answerable for it, as the laws direct, but because it is more eligible
to suffer the man to go unpunished, than to call the king to justice;
according to that general principle: It is better to suffer a lesser, than a
greater evil. The sense therefore of that saying, is, that the king, being
only a part of the legislative power, cannot of himself, and as king,
do any wrong; a quality equally applicable to the other two branches;
because they are authorised conjointly to form any law, and sepa-
rately they have a negative, which they can lawfully put upon any
question. So that neither the king, or either house, either by assent-
ing to, or rejecting a law, can be properly said, to do wrong; because
they are authorised by the law to do it, and whatever they do, as
king, lords, and commons, will be lawfull, though at the same time
it may be unjust. But the king is also a man. The lords and commons,
as men, and subjects, and may have the misfortune to violate the
laws; will any one say, that, in strict justice, they are not subject to
the penalties imposed by them? If in any nation whatever, any one
man, or body of men, can violate the laws of the country without
being answerable for it; I say, such a man, or body of men, are
despotic, and the government a despotism: for, if they have a right
to violate the laws in one point, they may in all; unless the partic-
ular case permitted be specified; then, it is a despotism in that par-
ticular case only; but which would very soon extend to others.
But though, whatever is done by king, lords, and commons, as
such, be lawful, it may, as we have already observed, be unjust. For
example, a law that would deprive a man of his life or property,
without giving him the means of defending himself according to the
established customs of the land, would be unjust. A law to perpet-
uate the parliament, or prolong the duration of it, would be unjust.
On the contrary, a law that would diminish it, would be both law-
ful and just; because it does not abridge the rights of the electors,
but increases them, by giving them more frequent opportunities of
exerting them: Upon this principle, which we think evident, because
no elector in chusing a member can possibly intend that such a
member should be authorised to diminish his own rights. It is there-
fore certain that the parliament which prolonged the duration of the
commons from three to seven years, committed an usurpation on
the rights of the electors. The parliament might with equal reason
have changed the constitution, and perpetuated themselves. It would
have been lawful, but unjust, and in fact the constitution would have
been dissolved, and every man re-entered into his original right,
which force may oppress, but can never destroy, or invalidate. All
laws contrary to natural equity are unjust, and of course void. All
laws that would command an unequal distribution of justice, is void;
and the force applied to put it in execution, is tyranny.
A king of England is not only an essential part of the legislative
power, but likewise the chief magistrate, head of the church, and
commander in chief, of all the armies both by sea and land. As such
therefore, he has the disposal of all employments whatever; and by
that means enjoys an effectual method of keeping the balance between
the other two parts of the legislative power, which he could not do,
without it; or if he was obliged to confer employments on any one
class of men, to the prejudice of others. It is said that the power of
the crown increases, even in such a manner as to threaten the free-
dom of the constitution. Facts however prove the contrary. For the
ministry cannot carry the most indifferent point, however just, and
necessary, without securing a majority in both houses, by motives
intirely unconnected and incompatible with the object in question.
It is only by places, pensions and occasional gratifications, that the
ministry get the common business of the nation done. It is neces-
sary in every species of government that a proper power be lodged
some where, to confer employments and execute the laws. If such
powers were lodged in either of the two houses, the constitution
would not last a month. It cannot therefore be placed with greater
advantage, and less inconveniency, than in the king, as by this power
alone he can preserve the balance between the discordant parts which
form the constitution. Though the king is chief of all the forces, the
military are here less dependent on the crown, than in any other
country: because they are subject to the civil magistrate like other
men. Their pay, and number, also depend on the parliament. The
king has no arbitrary power, either in making or executing the laws,
or on the revenues: the quantity, and use to which they are des-
tined being dependent of parliament: In this chiefly consists the force
and goodness of the English constitution, which cannot therefore be
easily destroyed.
However corrupted we may suppose the members of both houses,
there will be among them, many men of Genius and integrity; there
will be many more, whose disappointed ambition, will induce them
to concur with the former, in opposing the arbitrary views of the
ministry: even those, who, according to the common phrase, are sup-
posed to be sold to the ministry, will concur in his views only to a
certain degree: because they will reserve the power of being sold
again, whenever their circumstances may require. It is upon this
principle, that Montesquieu1 observes, that the English are more eas-
ily corrupted than his countrymen; because those, by the continual
enjoyment of liberty, do not sufficiently know the value of it; whereas
these, on the contrary, who always groaning under the yoke of
oppression, if ever they obtain the least shadow of liberty, are raised
to a degree of enthusiasm, which force and violence can alone repress.
The minister therefore, can never procure any law to be made
which directly opposes the principles of the constitution; nor can he,
by military force, ever destroy it, supposing they would concur with
him: because the people are brave and warlike; in a few weeks they
would become soldiers; and form particularly an excellent cavalry.
How could thirty or forty thousand men oppose a million, animated
by the love of liberty. The city of London, with such easy commu-
nications over the river, could not, I am persuaded, be forced, by
twenty thousand men. Indeed it is little to be feared that ever such
an attempt will be made by his present majesty: I wish he may
always enjoy power sufficient to hold a steady balance, between the
other two parts of the legislature. Had he proposed to extend his
power at the expence of liberty, nothing could have contributed to
it so much as a war; yet we find that, on his ascending the throne,
he adopted pacific measures; and which he has with constancy pur-
sued. So that his conduct proves he can have no intention, and cer-
tainly he has no interest to destroy public liberty.
Neither of the three parts which form the constitution, has any
power or influence over the laws, otherwise national liberty would
soon vanish. James the second,2 unhappily for him, assumed the right
of dispensing with the laws; which, if admitted, would have rendered
them useless; the government would have been an absolute monar-
chy, and the parliament either a mere phantom, or an instrument
of oppression. This opinion so generally prevailed, that excepting a
1
Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755). His
influence on Lloyd’s political and sociological philosophy is evident. L’Esprit des Lois
(1748) provided a general understanding of peoples, cultures, governments, and laws,
and informed nearly all the enlightened thinkers.
2
James II (r. 1685–88), King of England. This passage refers to the Catholic
James’s refusal to abide by and uniformly enforce the Test Act (1673), which required
all office-holders to take communion in the Church of England. Facing Bishop-led
opposition he was compelled to adopt James I’s position that as king he could make
and unmake laws at will.
few courtiers, the whole nation rose to a man, and forced the king
to abandon a crown, he would have held upon unjust terms. The
king as supreme magistrate, may, as well as the lords, decide causes
by appeal; and the latter also original causes by impeachment; but
both the one and the other, must be guided by the laws, and where
they may be deficient, natural equity must supply the want of pos-
itive law. But as members of the constitution, they have no influence
over them, and as men, they are bound to obey them. Nor can they,
without violating the most obvious principles of a free government,
confound their moral character with that of men.
The kings prerogative may be reduced to three objects. 1. As a
member of the constitution he must, like the others, enjoy perfect
liberty and independence to act in parliament, that he may, with-
out restraint, give, or refuse, his consent to any law proposed to
him. If he was under any constraint, the government would be dis-
solved, whereas if a member of either house be hindered from assist-
ing in parliament, the privilege of the member would, indeed be
violated, but the constitution would still remain: because one mem-
ber does not, like the king, form an essential part of it. The liberty
therefore of the royal person is essential to its preservation. In the
same manner if either of the houses was forced to a compliance, it
would equally destroy the constitution.
Charles the First having, at the beginning of his reign, extended
the prerogative beyond the limits prescribed by the laws then in
being, violated the privileges of parliament by arresting some mem-
bers, and by raising money, without the consent of the legislature;
contrary to the established laws of the land. By this he had, in fact,
dissolved the constitution. His partisans say, that many of his pre-
decessors had exerted the same powers, and therefore, it was law-
ful in him to imitate them. To which I answer, that the exertion of
any power incompatible with the known laws of the land is an abuse,
which no prescription, however long, can render lawful. The cruel
Henry the eighth,3 and queen Elizabeth4 had often exerted the pre-
rogative beyond what the laws prescribe. No one however, I think,
3
Henry VIII (1509–47), King of England. This passage refers to Henry’s treat-
ment of his wives and any and all opponents of his polices, such as the execution
of Sir Thomas More for refusing to take the oath of supremacy declaring Henry
the protector and head of the Church of England.
4
Elizabeth I (1558–1603), Queen of England. This passage probably refers to
the compulsory Anglicanism promoted by Elizabeth as well as the incarceration and
murder of Mary, Queen of Scots.
will say they acted justly. And the opposition of the subject, in either
case, would have been justified as well by the laws of equity as those
of the land; to which the king is equally subject with any other man.
The crown lawyers will no doubt exclaim against this doctrine, and
say, it implies a contradiction; that the king, in whose name the laws
are made and executed, should be subject to them: It would be
ridiculous, that the king should in his own name, accuse himself,
which according to the stile of the laws, would be the case. To which
I answer, That the king as forming a third part of the legislative
power, cannot, any more than the other two, by giving, or refusing
his consent to a bill, incur any penalty, and consequently be sub-
ject to the sentence of the law. Nor, as supreme magistrate, any
more than those, who act by his authority, as such, be subject to
any law for having duly executed them: they are authorised to act
in this manner by the constitution. It is a breach of the laws only,
that renders a man subject to penalty. The words king and magistrate
signify only Moral characters and do not exclude that of men; who, as
such, being subject to human frailties, may have the misfortune to
commit actions contrary to the laws, and be therefore subject to the
penalties imposed by them. If any person by his own authority can
give himself a dispensation from observing the laws; or obtain author-
ity from any power whatever to do it, as Augustus did be a degree
of the Senate; it is evident that such a person is, to all intents and
purposes, an absolute monarch; subject to no other rule than that
of his own arbitrary will: and if, from a principle of humanity, he
permits his subjects to enjoy life and property, they ought to acknowl-
edge the favour with submission and gratitude; he being subject to
no penalty, because there is no power superior to his own. He may
commit whatever injustice he pleases, without being answerable to
any tribunal; which is the proper characteristic of an absolute monar-
chy. If, for example, an absolute monarch, in whose person alone
the sovereign power is concentrated, should order a village to be
plundered and burnt: can it be doubted but that as a man he vio-
lates the laws of the society, as well as those of natural equity; and
therefore justly incurs the penalty imposed by the one and the other?
The most despotic sovereign upon earth is always supposed to act
for the good of his subjects, for this alone every superior power was
originally granted; and by virtue of this he is entitled to their obe-
dience. If, I say, this right, which every man has to his personal
security as well as to his property, be openly, and wantonly, vio-
lated; his duty of obedience ceases. He is no longer the father and

protector, but the oppressor and enemy of his subjects, whose tyranny
they may oppose, as they might that of any other individual, who
would forcibly deprive them of their just rights; which are equally
secured by the positive laws of society, and the original laws of
nature. Nothing more evidently shews the degree of infamy and slav-
ery, to which the Roman republic was reduced, than their decree
to free Augustus from the observation of the laws. Nothing surely
could be more unjust. As individuals they might perhaps have given
away their liberty, but they could not give up that of the whole
Roman people, without violating the most obvious principles of nat-
ural justice.
The first Cæsar, and his successors, were exactly similar to those
of Cromwell,5 whose power was founded on a military democracy,
of which he was the chief; and though both permitted justice to be
in general impartially administered, yet they were both, in fact,
equally tyrants, and oppressors of their country: and as such, deserve
the execration of mankind. And though under Cromwell civil lib-
erty was in a great measure preserved, yet the principles of the con-
stitution were totally destroyed.
The second part of the king’s prerogative, is founded on the laws,
or on prescription, which reason and necessity authorise. It consists,
in his having the disposal of all employments, civil, military, and
ecclesiastic; being the supreme and indeed the only magistrate in the
kingdom, the others acting only by his authority. Even the house of
lords, who enjoy an hereditary jurisdiction, act only in the king’s
name: all authority relative to the execution of the laws, being reposed
in him alone.
In the work mentioned in the preface, we have shewn, that in
republics the magistrates ought to be appointed for a limited time
only, that they may not acquire too great an authority over their
equals; because equality forms the basis of such governments. In
monarchies, on the contrary, they ought to be for life, to secure
their liberty and independence in the administration of justice. When
5
Oliver Cromwell (r. 1653–58), Lord Protector. For Lloyd, Cromwell serves as
a warning to overwhelming Parliamentary power. Religious toleration and political
liberty in no way were augmented under the Commonwealth. All opposition was
crushed. Cromwell pacified Scotland with the sword in 1650 and the hapless Irish
Catholics were massacred and their lands seized throughout the interregnum.
the present king came to the throne, they held their commissions
only at the king’s pleasure: and many examples prove, that the king’s
pleasure, had more power over them, than the sense of their duty,
in executing the laws. His majesty, moved by a principle of good-
ness, and justice, consented, or rather promoted a law, which con-
stitutes the magistrates for life; unless convinced of having violated
the laws of their country; and consequently rendered themselves inca-
pable of being entrusted with the execution of them. He will there-
fore deserve the praise and gratitude of the latest posterity. By having
the disposition of employments, he has, indirectly, that of the rev-
enues, excepting that part alone, which is destined to pay the inter-
est of the national debt. So that his influence is very extensive, and
encreases daily with the luxury and corruption of the members, who
compose the two houses. There is no method so effectual to enslave
a rich and free nation, as that of augmenting the luxury of indi-
viduals. Because the wants, which arise from them, render all mankind
equally poor. It is vain to attempt setting any bounds to them; the
desire of satisfying them, is stronger than all laws, and will leap over
every obstacle that may be opposed to it. Whoever therefore is pro-
vided with the means of supplying such necessities, will become
absolute master of every individual; and if he meets with any resis-
tance, it is because he either will not, or cannot comply with the
demands of those who wish him to supply their wants. The ques-
tion, with an indigent person, is only upon what terms he will sub-
mit to be the slave of a minister. In a free government therefore,
where many are to be corrupted, a ministry should never accumu-
late places and pensions on any individual, because otherwise, they
diminish the means of making friends, and encrease the number of
their enemies. The whole treasury of a powerful nation, is not sufficient
to satisfy the insatiable desires of men, who are actuated only, by a
principle of self-interest. A minister must know how to dispense
favours, so as always to have it in his power to confer others. If he
aims at despotism, he must govern mankind by their hopes and fears,
which alone can secure their implicit obedience to his will. If they
become independent, that chain which ties them to his carr, upon
every occasion, break, and rather embarrass than facilitate its motion.
He must not therefore, if he can possibly avoid it, give places for
life, much less for many lives, as of late has been too frequently
done. There is in human nature, a repugnancy to slavery and obe-
dience, we are necessarily carried on to action by our own passions,
and nothing but hopes and fears can force us to abandon our own
sentiments, and embrace those of others. If therefore a minister means
to extend his power at the expence of liberty, he must make it a
rule, never to employ men of high birth, fortune and abilities, because
such will not easily be induced to sacrifice their own natural impo-
tence, for an assumed and uncertain consequence dependant on the
will of another. Upon these principles it is observable, that in despotic
governments the persons employed have no personal importance,
their very existence almost depends on the will of the vizir,6 and in
proportion as a free government degenerates into despotism, though
dependants on the crown must be selected from such as are most
vicious, abandoned, and miserable, because actuated by such prin-
ciples and motives, they must necessarily concur with, and execute
every command of their superiors, on whose favour alone their very
being depends. With a just, and prudent minister it should be a con-
stant rule, equally just and prudent, never to confer two employ-
ments upon one person, unless in the military, on which class alone
the governments which have garrisons should be conferred. If a man
enjoys two employments, which require any degree of application,
it is impossible he can acquit himself of his duty. No pensions should
be granted to any man, unless he is rendered incapable of serving
his country any longer by infirmities; when it would be cruel to take
a man’s bread from him when he has served his country, and can
do it no longer. The ministry, by squandering the public money,
like the prodigal son, will soon have nothing more to give; and there-
fore infallibly lose their influence. The late lord Orford7 was singu-
larly lavish in this kind; it was he who first reduced corruption to a
system, which, of all his politics, is the only thing his successors have
followed, and greatly improved. No man ever trampled so much
upon decency and propriety, as this all-powerful minister. He united
in his own person places which, by their very nature, are incom-
patible: as those of first lord of the treasury, and chancellor of the
exchequer; the latter being designed as a check upon the former.
6
The Grand Vizier was the de facto leader of the Ottoman Empire. He ruled in
the Sultan’s name and led his armies on campaign.
7
Robert Walpole, 1st Earl of Orford (1676–1745). Considered the first British
‘Prime Minister,’ he held the reins of power from 1721–42. He made his vast for-
tune from the perquisites of power and was noted for his adept use of bribery and
patronage to maintain his political standing.
Though these principles of distributing employments to many per-

sons, are quite republican, yet, in a mixed government, they tend
to arbitrary power. Indeed the more they are contracted, the sooner
the constitution degenerates into absolute monarchy; because the
fewer they are, the easier they are corrupted. The ministry, by this
means, obtain whatever they please, provided they do not openly
attack the constitution in such a manner as to awake those, whom
luxury and corruption had lulled to sleep. With a little phlegm and
prudence, the ministry would easily seduce a rich and corrupted peo-
ple. It is therefore a wanton imprudence in those who aim at despo-
tism to rouze the people from their lethargy, by an insolent abuse
of power, which offends even those who feel the least for the lib-
erty of their country. In general such a minister fails in his enter-
prise, and draws so many difficulties upon himself and his master,
as are not easily surmounted. It is in vain for him to get his con-
duct approved by parliament; for he only adds to the crime itself,
that of having, with the nation’s money, corrupted the members of
the legislature.
The king has likewise the power of making peace or war: but he
ought, for his own sake, to use it moderately, because the money
necessary to carry on a war depends on parliament; he must not
therefore undertake it without just and necessary motives; he should
even be solicited by the general voice of the nation.
A peace, good or bad, never fails of being the object of enquiry
and disputes in both houses. The ministry always exert their influence
to procure the approbation of both houses, in order to secure them-
selves from its consequences. This indeed may quiet them for the
present; but does not by any means preclude either house, from
making it the subject of a future enquiry, which they always have
a right to do; as they have to discuss any other matter whatever.
The ministry, sedulously constant in engrossing all power to them-
selves, affect to sow dissidence and discord between the king and his
people, whom they would have him consider, rather as enemies than
faithful subjects: nor would they ever consult the parliament, unless
their concurrence was necessary to procure money, or pass some
favourite law. They use their utmost efforts to hinder the national
council from interfering in public affairs, excepting when, from indo-
lence, ignorance, or timidity, they do not chuse to act by their own
authority: they are always crying out, “You meddle with what does
not belong to you; you encroach on the prerogative of the crown:”
as if a king could have any affairs which are not essentially con-
nected with those of the nation; or any prerogative, but for the com-
mon advantage of the subject: he alone, say the ministry, has a right
to do this, or that. Even the privy council is too numerous for these
gentlemen; because among the many, there will always be found
some, who are guided by reason and justice, and therefore are unfit
to be consulted by those, who do not want advice, but approbation.
They must therefore have a cabinet council, or junto, composed of
five or six persons, their creatures, by whom the national business
is conducted. The favourite of the day is the sole and absolute mas-
ter of this junto; so that, in fact, he is grand visir, for favourite and
visir are synonimous terms. The king, besieged by his favourite, and
his friends, can never know the true state of things; much less, the
sentiments of the nation upon the measures they are pursuing in his
name: petitions are libels, and the authors a vile faction, who deserve
his majesty’s indignation. The favourite exercises the most despotic
power over those who presume to oppose his tyranny; deprives hon-
est and able men of their employments, seduces some, and intimi-
dates others; so that no one can oppose a sufficient resistance to his
injustice and violence. The laws, corrupted by the infamy of those
who ought to protect them, and see them duly executed, become,
in their venal hands, an instrument of oppression. The king there-
fore, if not extremely prudent, and an able judge of the characters
of men, is ignorant of the evil, until he has lost the affections of his
people; and, when it is often too late to apply an adequate remedy.
Of all the misfortunes which can happen to the king of a free
people, the greatest is that of having a favourite, and of being gov-
erned by him, which is always the consequence. Lewis the XIVth,8
having been disappointed in all his favourites, used to say, “I endeav-
oured to make myself friends, truly attached to my person, and glory;
but I found only selfish and intriguing courtiers.” It is hard to deter-
mine whether a favourite, in or out of the ministry, is most hurtful
to a nation. If the favourite is out of the ministry, he, and those he
places about his master, are for ever exclaiming against the admin-
istration, who loses all influence with the king, directed by his favourite.
Disunion and confusion ensue in every department. Many are more
attached to their own interest, than to the good of the nation. These,
8
Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715), King of France.
finding their companions have no credit with the favourite, steer

their course accordingly, and are so far from concurring with those
who aim at nothing but the public good, that, on the contrary, they
make their court to the favourite, and oppose the ministry, so that
they must resign for want of sufficient credit to carry on the public
business. A succeeding administration, unless intirely devoted to the
fabourite’s views, must soon, for the same reasons, give place to
another; and so on, till one scarce knows who are the ministers. In
such a fluctuating situation, it is easy to perceive, that the govern-
ment is a real anarchy, without any system either at home or abroad.
Hence proceed that uncertainty and inconsequence which distinguish
the English above any other nation in Europe. A favourite is most
particularly jealous of those, who distinguish themselves by their tal-
ents and virtue, and never rests until, by calumny and artifice, he
forces them from their several departments; so that the king is deprived
of their counsels, and must therefore be advised by those, who are
perhaps the least qualified to assist him. In short, a favourite, out
of employment, is an invincible obstacle both to the happiness of
the king and his people, which ought to be considered as one and
the same thing. If solicited by his own ambition, and that of his
flatterers, he takes a part of the ministry, he must be sole master:
with this view he turns out every person, particularly those of abil-
ities, that he may replace them with his favourites, who concur in
all his views: so that, in a short time, for want of genius and hon-
esty, the nation is reduced to the lowest ebb of misery. Having all
the power centered in himself, he makes no other use of it, than
that of adding insult and oppression to the misfortunes he has drawn
on his fellow-subjects. The talents which constitute a favourite, are
generally so incompatible with those of a good man, and an able
statesman, that we have scarce any example in history of a favourite
who was an upright and able minister. Sully9 is perhaps the only
one. But his master, trained up in the school of adversity, had learned
to know mankind, and was great enough to honour and employ
those who were at once both virtuous and able to conduct the affairs
of government. Queen Elizabeth’s ministry were favourites, because
9
Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully (1560–1641). Finance Minister under
King Henry IV (r. 1589–1610), who did much to rehabilitate the French economy
after the wars of religion. He was noted for a plan to create a European common
market.
they were able statesmen. A favourite, out of employment, hinders

others from serving their country; and, when employed, ruins the
nation from a want of talents and integrity. If the honour and inter-
est of the kingdom requires that a war should be undertaken, or
continued, a favourite, sensible of his want of abilities, and popu-
larity, feels he cannot carry it on, and therefore a peace, no matter
of what kind, must immediately be procured. A vanquished enemy,
destitute of resource, must be courted, and every motive of national
interest, and glory, sacrificed to the weakness of an ambitious favourite,
the preservation of whose power is made the only rule of public
measures. Of this kind were Fleury, Walpole, and some others of a
later date. Another favourite of a different turn, who hopes to aug-
ment his power and fortunes, by the troubles inseparable from war,
is ever exciting his master to break with some power, such were
Louvois,10 Belleisle,11 and Buckingham.12 So that a favourite, whether
pacific or warlike, is equally fatal to his king and country. We should
be always diffident of a man who tells us, never to trust any but
himself and friends; we may justly believe, that such a man is only
animated by envy, and the love of power, because he must either
be a most imprudent imposter, or a fool, who would persuade me
that a few people alone, in a whole nation, are fit to be trusted. A
prince, in the choice of a favourite, should imitate Pharamond,13
who is said to have called a man he esteemed, and said to him, “Be
my friend, and that you may always continue to be such, I give you
wherewith to live handsomely, upon condition you never ask me any
favour for yourself, or others; tell me only, when I do wrong, or
neglect to do what is right.” Such ought to be the favourite of a
wise and able prince, and whenever the favourite deviates from these
10
François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1641–91). French War min-
ister under Louis XIV, who continued his father’s reforms that created Louis’s grand
army. Lloyd is referring to his support for Louis’s aggressive foreign policies, espe-
cially the devastation of the Palatinate (1689).
11
Charles Louis Auguste Fouquet, duc de Belle-Isle (1684–1781). French mar-
shal responsible for Louis XV’s entry into the War of the Austrian Succession
(1740–48) to secure Charles of Bavaria’s claims to the imperial throne.
12
George Villiers, 1st Duke of Buckingham (1592–1628). King James I of England’s
(r. 1603–25) favorite, who controlled royal patronage and was rumored to be James’s
lover. He led a failed expedition to relieve the Huguenots in 1627 in a vain attempt
to save his political career against Parliamentary impeachment.
13
A Knight of the Round Table in the Arthurian legends and supposed first
king of France.
principles, the prince may be assured he has been deceived, and

should therefore discard him. In a free government, where the
confidence of the people is the strongest and only bulwark of the
king’s safety and glory, if his minister be unpopular, though evidently
an able and good man, prudence requires, he should be employed
far from court, on some embassy or other employment.
Though in a free government, the laws are very numerous, yet
there often happen extraordinary cases, which could not be foreseen,
nor provided for. It is therefore necessary there should be reposed
in some person, sufficient powers to act according to the circum-
stances of any extraordinary event. This power constitutes the third
species which, we have observed, form an essential part of the pre-
rogative, which is precluded from all authority over those cases
specified by the laws. If for example, an enemy should appear upon
the coast, the king, as supreme magistrate, and commander in chief,
may, without paying any regard to the laws, take every measure, he
thinks proper, for the security of the nation. Such as destroying vil-
lages, fields, or cattle. In the same manner, in case of a sedition or
popular insurrection, which oppose the execution of the laws and
by violence and disorder disturb the publick tranquility, the king
may, and ought, to employ the military force to assist the magis-
trate: for the army is no less destined to secure the interior, than
exterior peace of the kingdom: every man who violates the laws of
his country is no less an enemy, than a stranger, who comes with
an army to invade it. If the civil power has not sufficient authority
to execute the laws, the king must, as supreme magistrate, give him
all possible assistance. In short, in all those evils which the laws can-
not remove he must do it by his prerogative: for every species of
power neither has, nor can have, any other object, than the general
advantage of the subject. So that the king in particular, as well as
all those intrusted with power, are obliged to see the laws duly exe-
cuted: and when any unforeseen accident happens, which they can-
not remedy, they must, according to the spirit of that general law,
which is the basis, and includes all others, Salus populi suprema lex esto,
provide by their own authority for the publick safety. This prerog-
ative is founded upon reason and necessity, and therefore just.
The king has likewise the power to deprive all military officers of
their employments: which seems incompatible with, and contrary to,
natural justice, unless by their crimes, or incapacities, they become
unworthy of the trust reposed in them. For it is unjust to inflict a
punishment, where there is no crime, besides the military in England

belongs to the nation, who pays them; and by no means to the king,
who is only their chief. This abuse is contrary to the spirit of the
constitution; because the king thereby acquires an unjust influence
over the votes and liberties of parliament; of which many officers
are members; and, who having no other means to provide for them-
selves and families, rather than be exposed to misery must concur
in all the measures of the ministry, however inconsistent with their
own sentiments, and the good of the publick. With regard to those
who are paid out of the king’s civil list and are employed as his
own servants, he can, like any other man, dispose of them as he
pleases; because if he makes a bad choice, he is the only sufferer.
The king has likewise the power of creating peers, but not of
depriving them of the privileges annexed to their dignity. By which
means, he acquires great influence on the commons: because many
of the members, being men of genius, and eloquence, often embar-
rass and oppose the views of the ministry: these excited by ambi-
tion, are easily prevailed upon to accept of a peerage, and to become
subservient to the crown, and useless to their country. Raised to a
superior class, they adopt the sentiments of it; naturally inclined to
royalty and jealous of the commons. This house being at present
composed of many members equally distinguished by their talents
and riches, seems to have taken the lead of, and acquired a certain
superiority over, the lords: for which reason, I suppose the king
thought it necessary to create a great number of new peers, by which
means he increased their power at the expence of the commons.
The more numerous any assembly is, the less influence the king has
over it, because, as Machiavel14 observes, few are corrupted by few.
Though the lords have been thus greatly increased, the king’s
influence over them will always be very great, because the sixteen
scotch peers and the bishops in particular, whose fortunes depend
more immediately on his favour, will generally concur with the views
of the ministry: so that for this reason, and this general propensity
to royalty, there is little probability they will ever side with the com-
mons against the crown. The great employments he confers upon
the latter, secures him an influence in that house, which increases
14
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). Lloyd refers here to his Discourses (1531),
which espouse the necessity of political morality, an uncorrupted political culture,
and adherence to republican principles.
with the luxury and wants of its members; so that his power might
augment to a degree that would endanger the liberty of the consti-
tution. The king has likewise the power of dissolving the parliament
whenever he pleases; which being exerted at a critical moment by
Charles the second,15 saved his crown, and may therefore, be some-
times equally advantageous, to the king, and the people.
15
Charles II (r. 1660–85), King of England. Lloyd is referring to Charles’s dis-
solution of Parliament in 1681 to block passage of the Exclusion Act aimed at keep-
ing the childless king’s Catholic brother James from assuming the throne.
CHAPTER THREE
OF THE PRIVILEGES OF PARLIAMENT
The privileges of parliament are founded upon the necessity of secur-

ing the liberty and independence of the members that compose it.
Otherwise, it would soon become, an instrument of oppression: and
the more cruel, as it would authorise, by the formalities of the law,
the arbitrary will of a tyrannic master. We have a thousand exam-
ples of this in the history of different nations, whose members were
vicious and corrupted. It is therefore of infinite consequence, that
no person whatever, should have an unjust influence over the votes
of those who form the constitution.
According to these principles, the tribunes of the people, in the
Roman republick, were deemed sacred: divine were added to human
motives, the better to secure their personal safety and independence.
This privilege however neither did nor could be extended beyond
the exercise of his function as tribune: in all the rest he was only a
citizen; and, as such, ought to be subject to the penalty of the laws
if he had violated them.
The love of power always, however, excited them to confound
and identify the double characters of tribune and subject, an action
incompatible with order and the publick good. The crimes of the
man were supported by the power of the tribune. This abuse went so
far as to cause the greatest violences and injustice. They continually
mixed the ideas of the man with that of the magistrate, and like tyrants,
treated those who opposed their violence as criminal, and whom
therefore they endeavoured to punish accordingly. In England also
every thing is become a breach of privilege, wherever a member of
either house is concerned. If, for example, a member owes me money,
the laws very wisely, preferring the national interest to that of an
individual, prohibits any violence from being offered to his person,
during the sitting of parliament, while he is supposed to be employed
in the business of the nation; the lords indeed enjoy this privilege
at all times; nor can they be arrested in person, except when they
are supposed to have committed some crime destructive of the public
peace. Then indeed if the lord, or member, is sitting, the magistrate
lays before the lords the motives for which he begs leave to arrest
the person accused, and which they cannot refuse, without violating
the laws, by stopping the course of justice: that is, without becom-
ing tyrants and public enemies. For such must be deemed any man,
or body of men, who hinder the magistrate from executing the laws;
and should they therefore refuse to deliver the person claimed, he
may seize him wherever he finds him. The abuse of privilege, has
been, of late, carried to such lengths that a member thinks himself
exempted from the quality of a subject, and the penalties of the
laws. You can have no dispute with them even the most trifling,
and unconnected with their characters as members, without being
called before the house, whose judgment is generally directed by the
sense of power and revenge, rather than by the rules of equity and
justice. According to reason, no member should, nor is, in fact, enti-
tled to any other than personal privilege and liberty, during the sit-
tings of parliament. For in all the cases, he is only a subject like
any other man. Notwithstanding which, we have many examples of
people being called before the house and severely punished for some
personal dispute with a member. Nothing can be more absurd or
injust, than to suffer a member to violate the laws in my person,
and not only escape the punishment he may deserve, but procure
my being called before the house, to whose arbitrary sentence I must
submit, or be imprisoned and ruined. If I offend a member, pro-
vided I do not hinder him from assisting in parliament, I offend
only a subject, and not a national agent. The law has provided a
remedy, and I am ready to submit to its decision. Nothing is more
just, and comformable to the idea of a free government, which nec-
essarily precludes all arbitrary proceedings. Yet he can prosecute me
at common law, and, at the same time, call me before the house:
so that I may be punished there, though I have a verdict in my
favour in a court of justice. Whatever injury I may receive by the
house, I can have no remedy at law, because they do not form a
body corporate; nor can I appeal from their decisions, because they
are not a court of justice. Consequently we must suppose they are
possessed of an arbitrary power; at least such is their pretention,
confirmed by their practice, contrary to all idea of civil liberty. For
if any body of men can do what they please without being respon-
sible to any other power, it is plain, they are despotic. It is the height
of absurdity, and injustice, that any body of men, should, without
form or process, punish a man, who has not violated any law; and
iii. the privileges of parliament 215
if he has, he can be subject only to the penalty imposed by it; other-

wise it is a despotism, and by no means a free government, which
supposes that no man can be punished but by the law; and that no
one can be a judge in his own cause; which maxims, founded on
reason and justice, they presume to violate, and openly assert an
absolute power over every case they chuse to think regards them-
selves; without considering that every member of the house, and
every other man, is a subject, who can by no power upon earth be
justly deprived of his rights, established equally on natural, and pos-
itive laws. As they together compose a part of the legislation, their
power can extend to nothing more than the formation of laws; and
their privilege no farther than to secure a perfect liberty and inde-
pendence in giving their votes, and transacting the business of the
nation. In every other circumstance they are like the rest of the peo-
ple; they are mere subjects; and as such answerable for their actions
before the proper tribunal. If the legislative power, or any part which
composes it, interferes with the functions reserved to the magistrate
alone, public liberty is lost, and law and justice nothing more than
empty names. Of all mankind, none have a greater interest in observ-
ing the laws, than those, who form them. It is their own work, which,
for their own dignity and importance, they should inviolably observe.
Yet, by a contradiction too natural to ambition, they always endeav-
our to abuse them in the persons of others, whom they would sub-
ject not to law, but to their own arbitrary power. As things have
gone lately, I should not be surprised to see the members plead their
privilege to avoid paying their just debts, and commit every species
of violence, with impunity.
The house of lords, enjoys many particular privileges, founded
upon laws torn from the weakness of the princes and the misery of
the people, which formerly they abused to the utmost excess. The
scandalum magnatum proves the truth of this assertion: the remains of
the feudal government and tyranny to which the people were always,
and the princes then, victims. It was a real anarchy and tyranny,
and the more cruel, as many persons had a right to exercise it. If
we consider only the spirit of a free government, no part of the leg-
islative power, much less any other man, should enjoy any other
privilege but what is necessary to secure the personal safety and lib-
erty of the members, while they are employed in transacting the
public business, all other privileges, excepting such as are meerly ad
honorem, are incompatible with civil and public liberty. Both houses,
particularly the commons, assume a sole and exclusive right over

their own members, which they extend to elections and whatever
relates thereto, and even punish arbitrarily whom they please, for
having interfered in them, which seems very strange, because the
laws have provided a proper remedy, and no man can, consistently
with the notions of a free government, be punished but for having
violated the law, and then only, by the proper magistrate, whose
sentence is determined by the same law; and when that law is silent,
no man can inflict a punishment, unless he is despotic: indeed many
of the pretentions and proceedings of the commons are intirely
despotic. They call any man before the house, they punish him
though he has offended no law. They fine and imprison him for an
unlimited time, till he submits to their arbitrary will, and there lies
no appeal to any tribunal whatever. Pray what is despotism? It is
exactly this, and has been wantonly exerted against the liberty and
property of the subject. The object of this, and every other privi-
lege, can be no other than to secure, not only the liberty and inde-
pendency of the members, but also of the electors. For if these are
not free, it is impossible the others should be so. This extensive priv-
ilege has been permitted to the commons, because they were sup-
posed to be particularly jealous of the freedom of their members,
and would therefore be more tenacious in its defence, than any other
tribunal, who might, for many reasons, be induced to deviate from
that principle of liberty, on which the freedom of parliaments essen-
tially depends. The commons themselves were therefore very justly
instrusted with the power of deciding many cases, which relates to
elections. But they have extended it beyond all bounds, in assum-
ing a right, even in those cases which are subject to the common
law. What can be more inconsistent with law and reason than to
punish a man by the arbitrary power of a majority, whose decision
is only founded on force, and is no otherwise valid than because
they are the strongest. So that, if in a similar case, another major-
ity should decide the contrary, that decision would be equally law-
ful; because it is founded on the same principle of force. But if we
consider the nature of a free government, it will appear that every
decision founded on a majority, unless particularly authorised by law,
is destructive of liberty; and therefore intirely despotic. In order to
transact business brought before a numerous assembly, the law very
wisely determines, that a majority, or any number more than a
majority, should be deemed the sense of the whole body; otherwise
nothing could be ever concluded: but this supposes the laws have
provided no remedy. For if any body of men can interfere with the
laws, it is plain that such a body of men assume the whole legisla-
tive power, which alone has a right to change the laws; but cannot
interfere in the execution of them, without becoming tyrants: for
such, in reality, is the man who acts contrary to a law made by the
legislative power, which must remain in force, until it is repealed by
the same power. And when the legislative power is composed of
many parts, neither of these separately has any more power over
the laws than any other individual.
The commons likewise assume the power of expelling any mem-
ber at pleasure, in which they acknowledge neither positive laws, nor
even those, which form the freedom of the constitution. A majority
decides arbitrarily of the liberty and property of the subject, and
even of a whole province. Of all the privileges they arrogate to them-
selves, none is more absurd and unjust, or more fatal in its conse-
quences, than this. It is contrary to every notion of natural right,
and a free government, of which it saps the very foundation. It is
essential to the independency of parliament, that every member of
it should be perfectly free; and upon this very principle every priv-
ilege is founded. And yet the commons themselves dare violate it in
the most despotic manner. Where is the freedom of parliament, if
it is admitted that any power upon earth has a lawful right to deprive
a member of his seat, upon no other foundation, than because a
majority, or rather force, has been pleased to do it? Upon the same
principle, a majority may exclude the whole minority, until two mem-
bers only remain, to represent the whole nation. For where the deci-
sion of a majority is in itself a law, they have a right to dispense
with, and act contrary to the laws, in every case where a member
is any ways concerned, and which, by the same power, they may
extend as far as they please. So that a member, as such, loses all
the rights of a subject, though at the same time he lays under the
penalty of the laws, which have a right to punish, though they have
not the power to protect him. This doctrine arises naturally from
the privilege the commons assume of expelling a member; but is
contrary to natural right, to the positive laws of the kingdom, and
in particular to that which forms the liberty of the constitution. 1.
Because a member of a particular society, where the interest of the
individuals which compose it is alone concerned, cannot, without
violating the law of natural equity, be expelled, unless he refuses to
conform to the regulations of it; or has committed some crime, which

renders him unworthy to be continued any longer a member of it,
otherwise his expulsion, must be considered, as the effect of force
and violence, and therefore is unjust. A member of the house of
commons is a publick agent, elected, according to law, to transact
the affairs of his constituents: he cannot therefore be excluded from
the national council without violating the fundamental laws of the
constitution; which require and command him to assist personally in
parliament. Unless he has committed some crime, for which the law
has, by its sentence, deprived him of his life, which is the only case,
as the law now stands, that can vacate his seat in parliament and
which authorizes his constituents to elect another in his room. For
if the sentence does not extend to death, the member having com-
plyed with it recovers all his rights, both as a member and as a sub-
ject: otherwise he would be punished, not by the law, but by arbitrary
and despotic power; which alone can extend a penalty, without any
regard to law or equity, and punish a man for a single and incon-
siderable fault with unbounded tyranny. And therefore such an expul-
sion would be contrary to equity, and to that very law which forms
the liberty of the constitution. The house of commons cannot take
cognizance of any crime which a member as a man, and a subject,
has committed, without infringing at once on the power of the law
and that of the magistrate, who alone is authorized to punish him,
in virtue of that law which he may have violated. It is essential to
justice and civil liberty, that no man should be punished until he
has been tried, and convicted, in due form of law, which the mag-
istrate alone has the right to do. The commons therefore, in expelling
a member, for any cause whatever, violate the laws of natural jus-
tice, by inflicting a punishment upon a man who has not been proved
guilty of any crime, they likewise violate the positive laws of the
land, by condemning a man contrary to the established forms, which
prescribe that he should be tried by his peers alone, and punished
according to law. Nor is there any tribunal, which can proceed in
any other manner, without substituting despotism for law. They like-
wise violate the laws, in assuming the power of judicature; for they
are neither magistrates nor court of justice: and only a part of the
legislative power; and whose authority is confined to the framing of
laws. The magistrate alone can take cognizance of, and punish crimes,
always, however, as the law directs. Whereas the house of commons
in their determinations exert an arbitrary power over the person and
property of a member, who never ceases to be a subject contrary

to the established laws of the kingdom, which prescribe both the
manner and the degree of punishment. They likewise overturn the con-
stitution by depriving a member, and consequently his constituents
of their fundamental rights; upon which all liberty depends. Nor is
this power of depriving a member or a subject of his rights excluded
from the house alone; even a law which did it would be unjust, and
contrary to equity: because no man can be justly deprived of the
benefit of the laws, unless it be legally proved, that he has violated
them. The power of the house of commons over its members is, like
that of any other society, which cannot subsist, unless order, and
method be observed in transacting the business of it. Necessity there-
fore requires, that they should have a proper power to establish rules
for the conducting of affairs, and to inforce obedience to them, oth-
erwise nothing could be done. But this power cannot be extended
farther, without interfering with the laws, to whom alone a subject
is accountable for his actions. Nothing can be more imprudent than
to permit the commons to exercise this unlimited and unwarrantable
power. The example of Cromwell shews the bad tendency of it. For
by expelling one member after another, the commons were reduced
to two hundred, who pretended to have the whole legislative power
centered in them. If the king, or lords, for example, should order
the commons to expell this or that member; it would be the most
daring breach of privilege, and as such, the commons would cer-
tainly resent it. How then can that be just in them, what would be
a real crime in another? For they can no more destroy their own
privileges than any other man, because their privileges are essen-
tially connected so close with the liberty of the constitution, and the
rights of the electors, that you cannot touch the one, without destroy-
ing the other. The privileges of the house are founded on this one
principle, viz. that of preserving the privileges and rights of the sub-
ject. So that the violation of the one, necessarily implies the violation
of the other. A law that would diminish the liberty, or independency
of the electors, or members, would be essentially unjust. How much
more so, if a particular body pretended to exert such power.
Charles the First and James the Second lost their crowns, for hav-
ing attempted to dispense with the laws, and diminish the liberty of
parliament: and yet certainly they had as good a pretence as the
commons can possibly have. The truth is, that no body of men, or
power whatever, can diminish the liberty of parliament, or dispense
with the laws, without destroying the constitution. The lords never
pretended a right to expel a member, which however would be less
criminal, than in the commons, because the injury would extend
only to the person of the lord whose right would be violated; whereas
the commons injure the rights of every elector of the kingdom in
general, and those of the province whose member they expel, in
particular. They have of late carried their despotism still farther: they
have not only expelled a member, but admitted another in his room,
who was not elected at all; and have established a precedent which,
if admitted, must destroy every idea of a free constitution. They say,
that the member admitted was duly elected, having a majority of
votes; because the person who had the real majority, could not be
elected, and the votes for him were considered as nothing. Why so,
I ask? Is he disqualified by the laws? No such thing; he has the
qualifications required, and was legally elected. But we have declared
him incapable of being elected. In that case you suppose that a res-
olution of a majority of your house, can dispense with, and is supe-
rior to the most fundamental laws of the constitution. This indeed
is insulting common sense, as well as law. You have not even the
least power over any law whatever, but as part of the legislative
power; and then only to say, yes, or no. If you can act contrary to
law, in one case, pray why not in any other? If a resolution of the
house is superior to law in this particular case, you may, by fol-
lowing these principles, expel any member lawfully elected, and admit
in his room a candidate who should have one vote alone. To what
strange absurdities, contradictions, and ill consequences, are despo-
tism and tyranny reduced, when they pretend to authorise violence
and injustice by custom and precedents? The sheriff, according to
his oath, returned Mr. Wilkes. Was he not qualified? Was it not a
lawful election? Yes, no doubt; but we will not have him. We, by
our own authority, declare, that the majority of our house is supe-
rior to any law, and that, hereafter, we will admit as members whom
we please, without paying any regard to the laws of our country, or
to the rights of the electors. Even we will choose those, whom the
electors have rejected. We will attribute to ourselves the sole right
of election; and we will replace those we expel, with others we like
better. We may perhaps perpetuate ourselves in parliament, and so
spare the electors the trouble of choosing members, whom we are
resolved not to admit among us. All this would be equally lawful
with what they have done, or rather indeed equally contrary to rea-
son, justice, and the fundamental laws of the constitution. If the king
does me an injury, the laws have provided a remedy. And shall the
commons do me and my constituents the greatest injury possible,
and I am entitled to no redress? Absurd! If I was a member, and
the speaker ordered me, by force, to be turned out, I would not
obey: and, in my own name, and that of my constituents, I would
bring an action against him, and all those who acted by his orders:
and the law must do me justice. If you think your resolutions are
superior to all law, you had better make short work of it, and imi-
tate Cromwell’s parliament: vote the house of lords useless and dan-
gerous to the constitution, and so on. It is astonishing that the king
and lords can sit tamely, and permit the exertion of such despotism.
They are more immediately interested in it, than the subject. The
partizans of the commons say, that, by prescription, they alone have
a right over their own members. To which I answer, that, in what
regards the discipline of the house, it is true; but in every thing else,
false, and incompatible with the laws’ because these alone have the
sole right of punishing any man whatever, who violates them; and
no privilege on earth can exempt him from this penalty imposed by
them. The privilege of a member, and that of the whole body, can
extend no farther than to secure their liberty and independency,
while they are transacting the national business; and even then a
member may, by a breach of the peace, or some other crimes, for-
feit it, and be carried to prison. Besides, no prescription, however
long, can render lawful a power, which, in its nature, is contrary to
equity, and the fundamental laws of the kingdom. The commons
indeed have violated the privilege of parliament, and the rights of
the subject, by expelling a member legally chosen; so that in fact
that province is no longer represented as the law directs. If ever
those in the opposition have a majority, they may plead the prece-
dent given them, and expel every member they please; and estab-
lish an arbitrary power, as the present majority has done, and with
equal justice. It is to be hoped that the king and lords will concur
in inforcing the laws, which make their safety, as well as that of the
subject; and put an effectual stop to the unjust and arbitrary pro-
ceedings of the commons, who, if permitted to make one step far-
ther, will inevitably overturn the constitution, already tottering by
the repeated strokes of tyranny.
CHAPTER FOUR
OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE

ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
Having shewn that the English government is composed of three

different powers, it follows, that it enjoys all the advantages of a
republic; because nothing depends upon the arbitrary will of either,
and where each, separately, is animated by, and formed upon different
principles: so that, unless these are corrupted, the constitution can-
not be destroyed. Luxury indeed, by increasing the wants of the
members, may finally contribute to its dissolution. Civil liberty is the
more secured, as each member remains always a subject, and, con-
sequently, is, in every case whatever, bound to obey the law. He
therefore takes care, not to consent to any which might infringe his
liberty; and to which he might himself soon fall a victim. His wants,
which force him to concur with the views of a minister, will always
be limited by the fear of becoming a sacrifice to his imprudent con-
descendency. Whenever therefore a minister forms projects, which
openly violate the constitution, the shame of contributing to execute
them, often stops those who are, otherwise, insensible to the duty of
a member; and the more so, as the people in general are sharp
sighted, and jealous, of the crown, which carries them to great
excesses against those whom they believe too favourably inclined to
its interest. The ambitious views of the ministry too often justify the
violence of the people. This government enjoys all the advantages
of a Democracy, without its inconveniences: the people are repre-
sented by a limited number of deputies chosen by themselves, and
whose power is determined by the laws, and by the other two parts,
which form the constitution. So that, while these exist, they cannot
subvert the liberty of their country. It was for this reason that
Cromwell, to accomplish his plan of despotism, began it by dimin-
ishing, and afterwards extinguishing the power of the lords, which
procured him an easy victory over his king and country. It is, how-
ever, certain, that if the civil wars had not given him so great an
authority over the military, he never could have obtained it. At pre-
sent, when the nobility and gentry have seats in the house of com-
iv. the advantages of the english constitution 223
mons, and are employed in the army and navy, it would be impos-
sible for any man whatever to execute an enterprize formed against
the liberty of his country. Luxury and corruption throw the balance
rather upon the side of the crown.
The power of the lords is balanced by that of the commons; and
therefore they cannot attempt any thing to their prejudice, or to that
of the crown. Moreover their power is limited to the whole body,
as part of the legislation: as individuals, they are little more distin-
guished than the rest of the subjects. Since the abolishment of feu-
dal anarchy, the personal power of the lords is greatly reduced: they
can no longer wage war against the king, nor hold the people in
servitude. They have, however, still power enough to hold the bal-
ance between the crown and the commons, as the latter have to
hold it between the lords and the crown, which keeps that between
the two houses. So that neither has force enough to oppress either
of the others. The violence of the commons, the ambition of the
lords, and the power of the crown, mutually restrain each other; and
neither can pass the limits, without meeting invincible obstacles from
the other, which cannot be overcome by force, but may perhaps by
corruption. It seems therefore impossible to form a constitution which
has less defects, and is naturally better calculated to secure public
liberty, against the violence of Democracy, the ambition of Aristocracy,
and the tyranny of Monarchy, which are equally excluded, and whose
different principles seem a sure barrier against the effects of their
union. The great number of employments the king has to dispose
of, gives him influence enough, in both houses, to carry on business
to a certain degree of order and tranquility, generally incompatible
with mixed governments, particularly if the assemblies are numer-
ous. The king moreover having the power of forming alliances, and
employing whom he pleases in the different departments, without
being responsible to any one, the government has, in a great mea-
sure the advantages of simple monarchy, which, in general, is incom-
patible with mixed governments. The executive power being also, as
we have said, in the king, a certain rapidity of force, enter into the
resolutions of the council, particularly when composed of able and
popular men. So that, upon the whole, the government seems rather
a monarchy than a mixed state. The energy and force of it, how-
ever, depends chiefly on the ability, integrity, and above all, on the
popularity of the ministry, otherwise no influence suffices to carry
on business; disunion, the necessary consequence of weakness and
want of abilities, will naturally divide and weaken the councils. The
king must therefore employ only such as are able, honest, and pop-
ular, otherwise he will infallibly lose his influence and importance;
and, instead of conducting the helm with a firm and steady hand,
will expose himself and the state to many difficulties, which finally
may expose the one and the other to great danger and perplexity.
When the king has not, or will not exert his lawful prerogative in
the choice of able and popular men, the government will degener-
ate into a real anarchy. A nation, in this unhappy situation, may
justly be compared to a ship which has lost the rudder, tossed about
in a stormy sea, till at last it breaks against the rocks, where the
ship and crew must inevitably perish. He must, above all things,
avoid employing men that are unpopular: for, in a free government,
the people look with jealousy and fear on the power of the crown,
and become furious, if they see a subject particularly distinguished
by the prince, and the more so, as talents, humanity, and modera-
tion, are seldom the shining qualities of a favourite.
Civil liberty, never fails to excite the subject of industry, being
secured in the employment of its fruits. By freely following his own
genius, he generally succeeds in his pursuits of riches: the concur-
rence of others, animated by the same motives, forces him to search
new methods, which may entitle him to the preference. Arts there-
fore, and manufactures, are brought to a degree of perfection, no
where else to be found. They are rather finished with solidity than
with taste: because the subject in general, being richer than in other
countries, can afford a higher price, which enables the artizan to
give his works completely finished. Whereas in France the people,
being poor and vain, their manufactures must continually change in
the modes: so that they are distinguished by their good taste, rather
than by their solidity. The marine, in England, is not only a source
of riches, but of safety; so navigation is carried to a greater degree
of perfection, than in any other country whatever.
In a free nation, the laws are extremely numerous, because you
cannot, as in simple monarchies, repose an arbitrary power in any
magistrate, which may enable him, by good regulations, to antici-
pate, and prevent the evil, you can only punish it. By securing the
life and property of the subject, the laws are increased to such a
degree, as in some measure to become useless and are rather a
source of oppression and chichanery, than of protection. It is a mis-
fortune, that one cannot provide for the safety of mankind, without
multiplying the means, so as often to render them useless, and some-

times worse than the evils which they are designed to obviate.
No country upon earth, can boast of more humanity towards crim-
inals than England, who knows neither tortures, perpetual impris-
onments, gallies, or slavery. All processes must be finished in a few
months. The witnesses are examined in public, and confronted with
the accused, to whom the laws administer every means, that may
contribute to his justification. Arbitrary power is excluded, as well
in the form of his trial, as in the sentence which is determined by
the laws. The jury, chose by lot, are alone his judges. I wish the
same indulgence was found in the penalties imposed on criminals,
which, in my opinion, are much too severe. The spirit of avarice,
too natural in a commercial people, has carried the degree of pun-
ishments beyond the limits prescribed by humanity and natural equity.
All ideas of distributive justice, are lost and confounded by the num-
ber and equality of punishments: death being almost a common
penalty for all crimes, great and small. The manner of it makes lit-
tle or no difference. The king’s humanity has, indeed, saved many,
but still the numbers which thus perish annually, is a real loss to a
nation, and their example neither does nor will diminish the num-
ber of crimes.
These are essentially connected with the morals of the nation,
which being generally corrupted, in great and opulent cities, it is in
vain to attempt diminishing the number of crimes by any penalty
whatever: for, while the causes remain, the effects become necessary
consequences of them. Punishments therefore only destroy the inhab-
itants, without diminishing the evil. What then? no punishments?
Yes, but such only as are necessary, to hinder any future evil from
a criminal, and which may render him an useful example to deter
others: while he lives, the example lives, and his life may be ren-
dered useful to the state. An inanimate and dead being is useless,
and soon forgot. The wants of man are immediate and strong. The
fear of punishment is diminished by its distance and uncertainty, and
must therefore cede to the first, unless you diminish the sources from
which the crimes proceed, the number of laws and punishments will
only prove their impotency.
Toleration is a necessary consequence of civil liberty, and I shall
always consider it as one of the greatest advantages of the English
government; freedom of opinion is inseparable from civil liberty,
insomuch that when I see a prince endeavour to establish an unity
in religion, I conclude he means to enslave his subjects, because the

one leads to the other. It is on this principle that all Roman Catholic
princes, who are more or less despotic, have proscribed all other
species of religion, as much as in them lays. In a free government,
the legislative power must never interfere with men’s opinions, philo-
sophical or religious. Their actions alone are subject to the laws. It
is useful there should be a variety of opinions, and none should be
excluded, but such as embrace tenets contrary to the principles of
a free government. Even these must be treated with lenity. A vari-
ety of opinions always produces an emulation useful to good morals.
I have therefore considered Quakers, Anabaptists, Presbyterians, &c.
as a check upon our clergy, and am not therefore sorry to see
Whitfield’s1 doctrine make such a progress, because the moral is
good. They may call them hypocrites if they please, which is impos-
sible, for the people are never such; provided their conduct is good,
it is indifferent to the state from what motive it proceeds. Severity
of morals is always conducive to civil liberty, and, I am persuaded,
the people I have mentioned would be the last to abandon it: as,
on the contrary, corruption of manners leads to tyranny and slav-
ery, and those, infected by it, would be the first to submit to them.
The king being, happily, head of the church, the clergy are no
longer independent of the state, and masters of an ignorant people,
whom, at pleasure, they could excite to rebel against their sover-
eign. The body of clergy has now no influence on the legislative
power, excepting the bishops, who have a seat in the house of peers.
They are too prudent to oppose the views of the crown, on whose
favours their fortunes depend. They might, by complying with the
duties of pastors, and fathers of their flocks, gain the love and ven-
eration of mankind. It is pity they should show so great a repug-
nance for this home-felt glory, and so much inclination for the vanities
of this world.
The military is, in England, a resource of ministerial power rather
than of safety and defence to the nation. I don’t mean this, as an
invective against that respectable body. The valour of the soldier
and the abilities of many of the officers, claim my esteem and ven-
1
George Whitefield (1714–70). Evangelical Methodist preacher who played a
central role in the Great Awakening in North America. Lloyd is referring to White-
field’s doctrine of religious toleration.
eration. I mean only that the army might be upon a better footing,
if the commander in chief was at liberty, to consult merit alone in
the choice of those he employs. Parliamentary connections often, I
am sure, force him, to deviate from his own sentiments, in the dis-
posal of offices. The number of officers, has been augmented, beyond
every proportion, with that of the soldiers, in order to have many
places to give the members of both houses and their dependants, by
which means a weak minister secures their concurrence in his views.
I dare say, the number of officers in England surpasses that of the
Prussian army, six times more numerous. If, after the late war, the
public good had been alone consulted, all the reduced officers should
have been aggregated to the standing regiments, where they would
have done duty, till, by a vacancy, they had been advanced accord-
ing to their antiquity, without admitting any new officers, till these
had been all provided for: another plan has been followed, and the
nation is now loaded with the expence of maintaining a prodigious
number of officers, intirely useless to their country. The army is filled
with young men, who can have brought nothing more than good
will into the service, while the old officers forget what they may have
learnt. The number of regiments, is by far too great, and that of
the soldiers too few. The pay and expence of the guards state major,
half pay officers, both by sea and land, would I am persuaded, be
sufficient to raise and maintain twenty thousand Germans or Swiss.
The custom of selling employments in the army is contrary to jus-
tice and the good of the service: in England however, it contributes,
to civil liberty, because it diminishes the influence of the minister,
who cannot hinder a man from buying in his turn though he should
not have any parliamentary connections; whereas if the places were
all given it is plain the army would be filled only with the minis-
ter’s dependants. One cannot help being astonished at the conduct
of the ministry just before the peace, and even when it was almost
concluded. The army was incompleat, nor could recruits be raised,
so that there was scarcely a regiment which did not want a great
number of men. Reason and the good of the nation required that
these should have been compleated; and the number of men, could
they be found, increased in each company, which would have ren-
dered the army better, and saved much money; the oeconomical
ministry, however contrary to every principle of reason, ordered a
prodigious number of new corps to be raised, whose officers were
named, but the men were never raised: nor do I suppose it was ever
intended; and of all these corps none rendered the least service to
their country, now loaded with the subsistance of their officers: I
must in justice except Elliot’s light horse,2 equal if not superior to
any of the kind in Europe.
2
15th Regiment of Light Dragoons. Raised by Colonel George Augustus Eliot
(1717–90) in 1759, it was Britain’s first light horse regiment ( John Burgoyne raised
the 16th Light Dragoons the same year). Commanded by Lt. Col. Henry Erskine
at Emsdorf ( July 16, 1760) it demonstrated great skill in pursuit.
CHAPTER FIVE
OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE

ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
Distributive justice, is the foundation of a free government in par-

ticular: insomuch, that its preservation depends upon this principle.
It is therefore necessary that every man should contribute to the
support of government in proportion to the interest he has in its
preservation, that is, in proportion to his property; upon this prin-
ciple, it is equitable and just, that each province, or town, should
elect a number of deputies or members, in proportion to what they
pay towards the expence of the state. Otherwise the first principles
of equity and distributive justice are violated, and consequently the
force and goodness of the constitution are thereby diminished. This
is too much the case in England. The small county of Cornwall,
sends more members than Middlesex, including London, Westminster
and the Borough of Southwark; tho’ the latter probably pay a hun-
dred times more than the former. A county, or town, which hath
five or six thousand electors, sends two or four members, when a
miserable village with ten or twelve houses sends as many, so that
it enjoys the same power in disposing of the public revenues, and
forming laws as the most opulent county; which is contrary to nat-
ural justice, and tends directly to destroy the constitution. Because
the electors of such a wretched village, being poor, and few in num-
ber, are easily corrupted, and the more so, as many of them are
employed, as excise-men or otherwise, under the government. So
that a candidate favoured by the court, and a little money is always
elected. Being thus chose he must concur in all the views of the
minister, from whom he expects a place or pension. Such a mem-
ber therefore, from the instant he enters the house is already resolved
to follow blindly the orders of his patron. As the number of these
mercenary boroughs is very great: the ministry, by this alone, are
sure of a third part of the members, which with those they seduce
by places, pensions, &c. enables them to carry almost any point in
the house of commons. That of the lords seldom, or never, refuses
its concurrence with the court. The bishops and most of the peers,
enjoy great employments under the crown, and therefore from prin-
ciple or interest, are generally favourable to the ministry. So that if
the members who compose the legislative power are corrupted, he
governs as despotically, as any oriental vizir, and gets any law, how-
ever inconsistent with civil liberty, passed; witness the game and mar-
riage acts, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the spirit
of a free constitution. The influence of the ministry is also greatly
increased by the publick manner in which the votes are given, because
many out of fear concur against their own sentiments with the views
of the ministry, whose revenge they might obviate by giving their
votes by secret ballotting, as at Venice, and at Rome formerly. All
enmities and personal disputes are thereby avoided, and men see,
in the affairs proposed, nothing but the interest and good of the
nation, whereas now they consider chiefly, who speaks, and not what
he says, and so seldom weigh matters as their importance and the
public good require. The attention of those in the opposition is fixed
upon the ministry, and adherents, whom they watch with a jealous
eye, in hopes of finding some opportunity to embarrass them, and
hinder them from carrying on the affairs of the nation, and so force
the crown to change them, and often replace them with their oppo-
nents. The ministry and their friends, on the contrary, affect to treat
their enemies as factious and disaffected, and so mix their own pri-
vate affairs with those of the king, which often alienates his affections
and confidence from those men, who are most deserving of them.
In the mean time national affairs are intirely neglected. Each party
is too much occupied with their mutual animosities to think of any
thing else. In such a situation, a minister though an able and hon-
est man, can, neither form, nor execute any plan that tends to the
national good; these dissensions are the cause of that instability, and
inconsistency, which are remarkable in the English government, both
in foreign, and domestic affairs. No confidence can be reposed in a
court whose measures are continually fluctuating, nor have we scarce
ever made an alliance, from which the nation has drawn durable
advantages. If the king is firm in the support of his minister, his
credit with the nation is often thereby diminished, because that
firmness which reason and prudence often justifies, is attributed to
particular favour and affection for his minion. Even the opinion of
favoritism will diminish his influence with those attached to his per-
son and interest, who never see with indifference any man particu-
larly distinguished by their sovereign; if, on the contrary, he easily
v. the disadvantages of the english constitution 231
abandons his ministers and sacrifices them to their enemies, they,

become more inveterate against the crown, as well from envy as
from disappointment and loss of their places, the new ministry, never
fail to imitate their predecessors, upon whom they revenge, with
interest, what they had suffered. So that a prince must have immense
talents to govern a mixt constitution; whereas in simple monarchies,
where the whole power is concentred in one man, and submission
is the lot of all the rest, things must go as the minister directs; so
that if he is honest and able, he can do more good than in republics,
and if the contrary more harm. In these last, there is no where
lodged a sufficient power, to direct and harmonize the discordant
parts of the machine. The springs, being weakened by corruption,
can no longer communicate that constant and regular action, which
forms the force of every well regulated government; of which, in
England, scarce any thing more than the exterior figure and form
remains; as in the Roman republick, when, the people animated by
the ambition of individuals, threw every thing into confusion, and
though the forms were preserved, yet in fact it was a real anarchy,
where force alone distinguished the rights of mankind. Such a gov-
ernment could not subsist long, and therefore gave way to despo-
tism under the Cæsars. These also preserved the ancient forms, but
liberty was extinguished. In England, and indeed in all free gov-
ernments, if the members are corrupted, their union, as well as dis-
union, contribute equally to the destruction of public liberty.
From what we have said, it follows, that foreign affairs are little
studied or understood. The great and only talent required, is that
of knowing how to manage the house of commons, and elections.
That of an able negociator, acquainted with the interest of the
different powers, and of the connections we ought to have with them,
is no ways esteemed; compared with the former, who obtains what-
ever he pleases. Nothing shews the power of money so much, as
that the first lord of the treasury should be deemed the prime min-
ister, which in fact he is, though by his office no way connected
with foreign affairs; because he has the disposal of all the public
money. In such circumstances, the nation enjoys neither tranquility
at home, nor influence abroad, which is the fate of mixed govern-
ments: because the more extensive civil liberty is, the less will be its
force. It is impossible to combine these two things, being by nature
incompatible. The force and activity of any government is in an
inverse proportion to the number of parts which compose it. A
monarchy therefore has, in particular, infinite advantage over a repub-

lic. The whole power being concentred in one person, he can direct
the national force to any one object; whereas in mixed governments,
the parts which compose it, from principle, or passion, are too het-
erogeneous a nature ever to be united in their views. The machine
therefore moves slowly and irregularly; and, by the least accident,
its activity is stopped. So that a monarchy seems particularly adapted
to action, glory, and conquest; and mixed governments to peace, lib-
erty, and domestic happiness; which therefore should ever be the
views of a good minister, in a republican and free government.
Although the number of members in both houses consists of above
seven hundred, yet the minister is abundantly supplied with the
means of securing a majority in his favour. So that, in fact, they
seem assembled only to authorize his proceedings by the formality
of the laws. The qualifications required in the electors and elected,
are too often a mere deceit, which cannot be easily discovered, or
punished; and even such as were established when money was at
least three times more scarce than at present. Reason requires, that
the qualifications should be augmented in that proportion. It often
happens, that a man, without a farthing in the world, procures a
simulated qualification from some great man, in whose views he must
concur, or starve. While the parliament is composed of many such
members, whose subsistence depends entirely on the favour of the
minister, it is evident that the shadow only of liberty remains, and
that the substance will soon be extinguished.
The house of commons at present sits for seven years; a period
too long, and almost incompatible with the spirit of a free govern-
ment: because a member, by concurring with the views of the min-
istry, hopes to reimburse whatever his election may have cost him;
and at the same time procure some lucrative employment, that may
supply the wants, to which his luxury and extravagance have reduced
him. So that, from principle or necessity, he must become a slave.
Corruption and ambition have however this one advantage, that the
ministry cannot employ all the members, so that many are always
against him, and to the utmost oppose his views.
The crown has power enough to corrupt and seduce the mem-
bers, but not enough to oppress the constitution, or restore it to its
primitive vigour and principles. The ministry, greedy of power, will
extend it on the ruins of their country. Luxury and corruption will
facilitate their victory. Perhaps some violent shock at home or abroad;
v. the disadvantages of the english constitution 233
perhaps a national bankruptcy, or an unsuccessful war, would restore

health and vigour to the constitution. Perhaps, on the contrary, they
would totally overthrow it. It would wholly depend on the good or
bad use of such public calamities. A certain degree of poverty pro-
duces an equality, which alone can render a free government durable.
CHAPTER SIX
METHODS PROPOSED THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE

TO PERFECT THE CONSTITUTION
1. That the counties alone shall henceforth have a right to send

members to parliament.
2. That each member should possess, in the county for which he is
elected, at least twelve months before the election, twelve hun-
dred pounds a year.
3. That each elector should possess, six months before the election,
five pounds per annum.
4. That every county shall send a member for every three thousand
pounds per annum it pays land tax, which, at four shillings in a
pound, would increase the whole number to above six hundred
and sixty.
5. If it should be found impossible to establish this system, and
deprive the towns and cities of the privileges they now enjoy; those,
at least, which do not pay three thousand pounds per annum land
tax, must be excluded. And those which do pay that sum, or
upwards, shall elect as many members as they pay three thousand
pounds; that is, one member for every three thousand pounds per
annum they pay land tax. If by chance there should be a county
which does not pay three thousand pounds per annum land tax, such
county shall concur with the neighbouring, and choose as many
members as together they pay three thousand pounds land tax.
6. That the right of election, for cities and towns, be not limited to
a certain class of men; but extended to every head of a family
resident in such cities, for two months before the elections, and
who has hired a house for a year at least, and is really an inhab-
itant of the town. If such head of family has five pounds a year
in the county, he has a vote at the election for a member of the
said county.
7. That the votes, in both houses of parliament, should be given by
secret ballotting.
vi. methods to perfect the constitution 235
8. That no member, lawfully elected, shall be expelled, unless he

refuses to submit to the rules of the house, for transacting the
business of it. Having been required thereto by the speaker for
two months; or unless he does not appear and take his seat in
parliament, within four months after he is summoned so to do,
in the town or county for which he is elected. In both which
cases a new writ must be issued to choose another member;
shewing, at the same time, for what reasons his seat is become
vacant. It is essential to the character of an agent, or represen-
tative, that he attend personally in parliament, otherwise the
county or town cannot be said to be represented, and conse-
quently nothing can be more absurd, than that a member should,
for any cause whatever, be permitted to be absent. All mem-
bers who do not appear, and take their seats in the house, within
four months after they are summoned, must be deemed dead
in law, and others appointed in their room.
9. That the house cannot expel any member, but for his non-
appearance, within the time limited as above, or for refusing to
submit to the rules of the house.
10. That the house may not take cognizance of any crime whatever
committed by a member, because the laws alone have a right
to do it. And if such a member, having been acquitted, or com-
plied with his sentence, appears within the time limited as afore-
said, to take his seat, he must be admitted: but if he does not
appear, then his seat becomes vacant by his non-appearance,
and another must be elected in his room.
11. The house cannot, consistently with a free government, punish
any man, and much less arbitrarily. They shall not therefore
take cognizance of any action whatever, committed by a mem-
ber or other; because the laws have provided a remedy against
every crime.
12. That the privilege of parliament should be limited to the time
of sitting, and to the personal liberty of the members in civil
cases alone.
13. To secure the liberty of the members, during the sittings, the
hindering them, by force, from attending, shall be felony, unless
they are taken up by a magistrate’s warrant, upon suspicion of
some crime.
14. That the speaker, in the name of the commons, may prosecute,
at common law, and before the proper court, any man who
publishes a libel against them in general. But if it is against a
member in particular, he may, like any other subject, recur to
the laws of his country. Justice requires that, as they may receive
damages, so they must pay them, when a verdict is given against
them; but they must not presume to take cognizance of any
crime whatever, because they thereby usurp the rights of the
laws and courts of justice. So that the motives which shall here-
after authorise the house to expel a member, are reduced to
two cases: 1. For not complying with the known and established
rules of the house, for transacting the business of it. 2. For non-
appearance within four months after the sitting of parliament,
and notice given thereof in the Gazette; or in the capital town
of the county whereof he is member; or in the town of which
he is a burgess, without considering the motives of his non-
appearance, which are foreign to the question. The speaker must
only consider, whether the member is present in parliament, or
not, within the time specified by law.
15. That the parliament be triennial.
16. That the number of peers should be encreased, so that one hun-
dred and fifty at least should be present in parliament.
17. That they have not a right to vote by proxy.
18. That they should be obliged to attend in parliament, unless pre-
vented by sickness, certified by his own oath, and that of his
physician; or to forfeit one thousand pounds every sessions. I
don’t doubt but this project will be treated as the dreams of a
Platonian or an Utopian, by those who have an interest in the
anarchy which now reigns. However, I flatter myself, that impar-
tial men will find that the establishment of the methods I pro-
pose, can alone save the constitution.
CHAPTER SEVEN
OF COLONIES
Although, in the course of the work mentioned in the preface, I

have occasionally treated of colonies. The importance of the object
had induced me to be more particular, and the more so, as they
are now, and have unfortunately been for some time past, the sub-
ject of public councils.
The ancients knew but two motives for settling colonies. The trad-
ing towns of antiquity having, by their industry, greatly increased
the population, they found themselves from time to time overloaded
with poor inhabitants, and the more so, as in general their territo-
ries were very small. It was therefore necessary to procure them a
subsistence. Their situation near the coast rendered transmigrations
easy, and secured an intercourse with the mother-country. Such
colonies were always established on some foreign coast, the better
to defend themselves against the people of the country, ever jealous
of new comers. It appears that these colonies did not acknowledge
the jurisdiction of the mother-country, or any other dependance but
that which is founded on necessity, and gratitude; they were gov-
erned by their own laws, always formed on the model of those of
their mother-country, who, on her part, never required any other
submission, than what is derived from the gratitude of her children.
The other species of colonies were entirely military, and formed
only with a view to secure the obedience of a people newly con-
quered, and at the same time to procure a subsistence for the old
soldiers and poor citizens, who, being very numerous, became the
instruments of some ambitious leader, to raise seditions and confu-
sion in the republic. Monarchs and tyrants seldom established colonies
abroad. Sometimes they permitted strangers to settle in their domin-
ions. So that it seems, that colonies in general can only proceed
from the liberty of a free government, where the people encrease,
and enjoy the liberty of going wherever they please.
It must be confessed that colonies established on these principles,
are extremely useful, and often necessary; nor do I think any means
more effectual to secure interior tranquility, provide for the poor

inhabitants when grown too numerous, and preserve new conquests.
If the Spaniards, when they took possession of the vast continent
of America, instead of destroying the inhabitants, had established
military and commercial colonies, on the coast, and in some prin-
cipal places within the country, at a proper distance, so as to be
able to keep up the necessary communication between each other,
and with the mother-country, Spain would have been at present one
of the most powerful kingdoms in Europe. By following a contrary
method, she had lost six millions of subjects in America, and at least
three in Europe. Unhappily for them, they neither saw nor searched
for any thing but gold, and the inhabitants were considered only as
animals made to find it; whereas, by time and humanity, they would
have been made useful subjects. America therefore became a source
of poverty and misery to the Spaniards, by introducing a prodigious
quantity of precious metals, which destroyed the inhabitants and
their industry.
The proud and indolent Spaniard found it was better to depend
on the court for his subsistence, than on his labour; so that indus-
try and civil liberty vanished together. The prince, being thus mas-
ter of an immense treasure, which continually flowed from America,
was enabled, and indeed obliged to create a prodigious number of
employments for such extended dominions. To augment this calamity,
he was ambitious, and foolish enough to aspire at universal monar-
chy, which raised him many and powerful enemies. Insomuch that
his coffers were exhausted of its treasures, and his kingdom of its
subjects. The few remaining had no other resource but in some little
employments, and in the charity of the convents, who, to dazzle the
people, distribute some small part of their superfluities to the poor.
The Spanish monarchy has always been on the decline, and though,
at present, it seems a little raised, and given to industry, the least
unfavourable accident will always shake it to its foundation.
The moderns have established another species of colonies, unknown
to the antients, being formed only with a view to extend commerce
and navigation. The colonists do not cease to be subjects, and directly
dependant on their mother-country. We must therefore examine this
motive, and see whether it really answers the end proposed by it.
Such colonies are generally settled in very distant countries, and, if
placed among a civilized people, it is morally impossible to fix them
upon a solid foundation, in the midst of a powerful nation, which
vii. colonies 239
cannot be reduced by force to become your subjects. No nation in

Europe is strong enough to conquer, and preserve in its obedience,
a polished people, at so great a distance. You may perhaps force
the inhabitants to abandon the coast, but never to submit, while
they have ground behind them, much less if their dominions are
extensive, you cannot follow them into the interior parts of the con-
tinent. The continual wars you must sustain against the inhabitants,
will deprive you of the fruits of their industry, and soon absorb all
the profits of your commerce, ruin the colony, and drain the mother-
country. The only method to be observed, on such occasions, is to
occupy some small island, near to the coast; large enough however
to supply the colony, and trading ships, with what is necessary for
their subsistence. From thence you may, with little expence and dan-
ger, trade with the continent, and, by humanity, honesty, and pru-
dence, secure to yourselves the fruits of their industry, in exchange
for what you furnish them from the mother-country. Care must be
taken not to lose their confidence and friendship by unjust dealings.
A war carried on at so great a distance, must finally terminate in
the ruin of you colony and trade, because the inhabitants become
your enemies, neither can, nor will, furnish you, with any thing or
take any thing from you. If such an island is not to be found on
the coast, the only remedy is by fair means to procure some good
harbour, where you must build, and fortify a town that will contain
three or four thousand people almost, otherwise the inhabitants will
upon the first occasion, exterminate them, and your trade is lost for
ever. The great art of carrying on trade in these circumstances, con-
sists, in an humane and benevolent, but at the same time, firm con-
duct, which shews you can obtain by force, what you chuse to owe
to their friendship. The French East India company was ruined by
following other maxims and I fear ours will share the same fate. As
the moderns trade to the utmost extremity of the earth, and in such
long navigations ships are exposed to great calamities for want of
known harbours, it may be necessary, to form, at convenient dis-
tances colonies, provided with what may be useful to repair ships,
and maintain them till the arrival of the proper season for failing
on their intended voyages; with this view the Dutch occupied the
Cape of Good Hope, and other places, to carry on their East India
trade. It were to be wished the English formed such establishments
near Cape Horn, and in the islands on the coast of Peru, in the
south seas. The Dutch, according to these principles, having expelled
the Spaniards and Portuguese from many of their settlements in the

East Indies, established on the continent nothing but factories, in
order to form their magazines, with proper agents to carry on the
interior trade with the inhabitants and very prudently formed their
seat of empire at Batavia; in an island, whose inhabitants they eas-
ily subdued, or at least forced to abandon the coast. By which means,
they are enabled to carry on an immense trade, at a very small
expence, compared to that of our East India company; having never
any wars with the princes of the continent. They trade in peace
wherever they come. Their chief force consists in a numerous fleet
which they occasionally send on the coasts, to inspire the inhabi-
tants with respect for the company and its agents. This plan, seems
to us, the only one which can secure a lasting and lucrative trade,
whereas that, followed by the English, must finally ruin the com-
pany, as it did that of the French.
If on the contrary, the country is inhabited by savages, and con-
sequently without culture, arts, or manufactures, nothing can be more
absurd than to settle colonies among them. Because having no indus-
try they can furnish nothing, and having few, or no wants, beyond
what their physical existence requires, it is plain they can take noth-
ing from you, nor have they wherewith to pay it; a few skins, can
never be an object, that deserves you should deprive your country
of a number of industrious hands, in order to obtain such an incon-
siderable article of trade; at present there is no nation in Europe,
excepting perhaps the Dutch, which has not a great quantity of good
land uncultivated; none, whose industry cannot be carried to a much
greater extent and perfection, than at present. Can there be any
doubt, but that a hundred thousand men, employed in their own
country, are much more useful than is transported to any other coun-
try whatever though its productions were ever so abundant and
rich, which can never be the case, unless the country is people and
civilized, in which case factories alone must be established and not
colonies. Even if instead of pebbles the fields were covered with gold
and silver, which are only useful to a nation, when the recompence
of labour and industry. It is upon this principle that the emperor of
China prohibits the working of mines, with which his empire abounds,
because the population being extremely great, the least obstacle to
industry would be followed by a famine, and the ruin of the empire.
If the three millions of English, said to be in America, were employed
in England, Scotland and Ireland, particularly the last; which together
vii. colonies 241
are nearly as extensive as France, though they contain little more

than a third part as many inhabitants, there is no doubt, but that
their industry would be infinitely more advantageous, than in America.
The English monarchy having its subjects thus concentred in two
islands, would be one of the most powerful in Europe, and invinci-
ble by any power whatever. It is now above a century and half,
since we have begun to settle America, and during that period the
nation has lost the industry of so many inhabitants, and moreover
spent great sums in supporting them, against the French and Indians;
which has embroiled the nation in unnecessary wars; such was the
last, which however successful, has ruined the nation, yet till lately
we have drawn little advantage from them. Their own consumption
would have been greater, if they had remained at home, so that the
only benefit we draw from them, is produced by the Spanish trade
they carry on, by which they have been enabled to pay for what
they draw from England. The Dutch from Saint Eustatia, carry on
this trade to much greater advantage, and a few islands on the
Spanish coast would have answered the end much better than our
colonies. However as they have no other means of paying for our
manufactures, one cannot imagine, what could induce the late min-
istry, to prohibit the colonies from trading with the Spanish, which
in fact was the same thing as prohibiting their taking any more
English goods. The Spaniards very justly, prohibit their subjects in
America from trading with any one whatever, because the govern-
ment by sending the quantity of goods they please, can fix a price
ad Libitum, and by that means draw as much as they will from them,
and as they carry this too high, smuggling will be carried on there
in spite of all the Guardacosta’s. We ought therefore no doubt to
have acted upon different principles, and, as much as we could, have
favoured the trade with the Spaniards. The fishery, of so much
importance to England, is intirely unconnected with the colonies,
and is carried on, by us and the French, without the least assistance
from them: a few ships stationed on the coast, during the fishing
season, is the only thing required.
It seems therefore from what we have said, that colonies should
never be established on the coast, because you cannot trade with
the inhabitants, unless you are in friendship with them, and then
you can do it much more effectually, and with less expence from
some neighbouring island, easily guarded. Whereas if you are settled
on the continent you must have troops, forts, &c. which naturally
renders the inhabitants dissident and jealous, and moreover absorbs

the whole profits of your trade; and if the country is uncultivated,
no production of it, whether natural, or procured by your industry,
can be as useful as, or equivalent to, the industry of the same num-
ber of men employed at home. The Dutch indeed, having a small
territory, and in general little fruitful, did right in settling colonies
in the different parts of Asia, where they have an immense trade;
but they made the islands the seat of empire, and are established
on such a solid footing, that all Asia together, could not ruin their
establishments, whereas ours are held by a silken thread. Our acqui-
sitions on the continent, require a great military force, which is
incompatible with every principle of a commercial society. The coun-
try, from whence you pretend to draw the articles of trade, is ruined,
and the inhabitants become your enemies. How therefore, and with
whom does the company pretend to trade? I have, in the work men-
tioned in the preface, treated the doctrine of trading companies at
length, to which I refer.
If the Spaniards had occupied only some islands and a couple of
ports, in the gulph of Mexico, and in the south seas, instead of
embracing the immense continent of America, they would probably
be now one of the first people in Europe; whereas, by extending
their dominions, they are, cæteris paribus, become the weakest.
It is proved to a demonstration, that the force and activity of a
given number of men, is in proportion as they are concentered and
united in a smaller space, consequently a trading nation should never
make war or conquests if it is possible to avoid it. According to this
principle, I would rather that England should possess Cuba and some
other islands, than all the continent of America. By which one may
judge of the advantages, of the late peace.1 The motives above men-
tioned are, in my opinion, the only ones, which should induce a
nation to settle colonies, and which can indemnify it, for the loss of
its subjects. When they are established on the present plan, and at
a great distance, their support must be very expensive, and the loss
of their industry great, and when they acquire, a certain degree of
force and riches, it is impossible to keep them in subjection any
longer than they find their account in it. They will soon be alien-
ated from the mother country, like all other animals, whose attach-
1
Peace of Paris (1763).
vii. colonies 243
ment to their dams lasts only while they want them. They will, by
little and little, form separate interests; and when they find them-
selves strong enough, will infallibly form a new and independent gov-
ernment. If you press them, they will become enemies. If you do
not, perhaps they may be induced to become your allies, and as
such, you may keep them. I do not chuse to enter into any detail
on the present state of our colonies; but will venture to affirm, that
no force whatever, can subdue three millions of inhabitants dispersed
over an immense continent; we may perhaps force them to retire
from the coast, and ruin their industry; that is, your own; and oblige
them to apply to agriculture for their subsistence. But you cannot
follow and conquer them. And the less so, as their religious princi-
ples, concur equally with their political, in their love of liberty and
hatred of tyranny. The man who gives room to dispute about power,
prerogative, liberty and religion, must ever be considered as little acquainted
with human nature, and common prudence. A wise and virtuous
minister will never try experiments on such delicate subjects. They
are like glass, which by much handling breaks in your hands, but
at the same time cuts it. He will therefore avoid every occasion,
which may possibly give room to examine them, because they can
never be terminated by words and reasoning. Force alone can solve
the difficulties.
If the colonies will no longer contribute to the support of the
mother country by any direct tax, which indeed is imprudently, and
perhaps, unjustly imposed;2 withdraw your troops intirely from the
continent, excepting Quebec, and some capital points in the river
of Saint Laurence. The natives, excited by their own turbulent dis-
position, and by French emissaries, will soon carry the ax into the
back settlements, which are too extensive and open to be defended
by the colonists. They will soon be forced to recur to your aid and
protection. I own I ever considered the taxing of colonies, as the
most absurd, inadequate, and unjust measure ever adopted by any
minister. They consumed yearly, for four or five millions, and, by
that very consumption, paid every kind of tax levied in England,
and all expences of the first materials, manufacturing, carriage, nav-
igation, &c. which are all included in the price. If you force them
to pay an additional tax, then you make them pay more than any
2
Stamp Act (1765).
subject in Great Britain, who finally pays, only, in proportion to his

consumption. Why therefore must a poor American pay more than
the most opulent Englishman? why must he pay more, than the
Spaniards and Portuguese who take off your goods? in the price of
which they really and truly pay every kind of tax, that is raised in
England; and all the expences, profits of the manufacture transport,
&c. which are at least ten per cent. more than any Englishman. So
that I do not doubt, but in the five millions, they pay for the goods
they take from us, they pay also at least one for taxes: you should
therefore, on the general principles of trade, not endeavour to dimin-
ish their consumption, but augment it, by all the methods possible,
as you would in trading with any other nation whatever. At least
four fifths of our industry are consumed in foreign countries, who
pay our taxes in that proportion. The government has encouraged
foreign consumption by every means possible. Pray why are the
Americans to be checked in consuming our manufactures?
CHAPTER EIGHT
OF IRELAND
No nation ever draws less advantage from a great, and powerful

province, than England does from Ireland. The climate, soil, and
situation are extremely good. The inhabitants are active, and in gen-
eral, very acute, and sensible. They are said to be lazy, which, if
true, must be attributed to want of circulation, which alone can ren-
der a people industrious. If properly encouraged, they would be
found equally so with the English. As yet, instead of animating, and
exciting them to trade, every means are used to hinder them. It is
therefore no wonder, they make so little progress in manufactures
and navigation, for which they are, by their situation, particularly
well adapted. The low price of provisions would enable them to fur-
nish foreign markets much cheaper than the English, and maintain
that superiority over the French, which can no longer do. It is I
conceive quite indifferent to the general good of the nation, what
province carries on this or that branch of trade, because finally the
profits must center among the subjects, and particularly near the
capital. The present king [George III], has greatly contributed to
perfect the government of that kingdom, by fixing the duration of
parliament, to eight years. It were to be wished, he would equally
fix the disposal of the revenues, as in England. The minister would
indeed lose much of his influence; but if he is able and just, he
wants none but what reason gives him, and when he recurs to other
means, he gives just room to believe he is diffident of his own abil-
ities and integrity. As circulation is greatly wanting in Ireland, it
would be useful to prohibit any member of the Irish parliament from
being one in England; and order that assembly to meet every year,
which would keep many of them at home; particularly, if an absence
of six months of any member should vacate his seat.
CHAPTER NINE
PARALLEL BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE FORCES

OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE
Among the many pamphlets, which have lately appeared, on the

state of England and France, two have been particularly distinguished
by the public. The one supposed to be written by a man, who has
occupied the first employments in the ministry; the other by a per-
son, more distinguished by his eloquence, than by his places or con-
nections with those in power; being only lately initiated into public
business. The first production may be considered, as the funeral ora-
tion of England, in which the author laments the impending fate of
his country; which, according to him, is on the point of expiring, as
well by inward diseases, and weakness, as by the power of its rival.1
In all this long elegy, the author has examined only the state of the
revenues, and has shewn much labour and precision in his calcula-
tions; which, whether just, or otherwise, prove nothing essential. The
sums, upon which he founds his remarks, being admitted possible,
are no way adequate to the evil. Two or three hundred thousand
pounds, is nothing, compared to a debt of one hundred and forty
millions. It was not therefore, worth while, to publish so laborious
a pamphlet, from which no one advantageous conclusion can be
drawn. The author of the second production has, with much ele-
gance, proved this truth.2 As to the sums they differ about, being so
inconsiderable, compared with the national debt, I do not think it
deserved attention. This gentleman will have us believe, that England
is by no means so miserable, as the other says; and this he proves,
by saying, that France is much more so, than England: supposing
this to be true, which, I fear, is not the case, it proves nothing at
all. I fancy a man, languishing with a consumption, would not be
1
William Knox, The Present State of the Nation; Particularly with respect to its Trade,
Finances, &&, addressed to the King and both Houses of Parliament (London: Printed for
J. Almon, 1768).
2
Edmund Burke, Observations on the Late State of the Nation (London: J. Dodsley,
1769).
ix. parallel between the forces of england and france 247
persuaded he was well, because his neighbour had the gout in the
stomach. Though I confess myself much inferior to these gentlemen
in every respect, I shall presume to examine the actual state of the
two nations in question, and that in so clear and impartial a man-
ner, that the results will have the force and exactness of a geomet-
rical demonstration. I am the more encouraged to this undertaking,
as truth is always useful; whereas falsehood, cannot, I conceive, be
of any advantage, and in general is attended with fatal consequences,
particularly in the conduct of public affairs. If in fact the French are
miserable, it does not follow, that we are rich and powerful. There
is no national advantage that can accrue from it, on the contrary it
may diminish our industry and attention to public business. But if
this opinion is ill founded, the consequences may, and indeed must
be fatal. At the last peace it was said the French and Spaniards were
ruined for an age to come. It was their interest we should believe
it. In the mean time, it is known they have a hundred sail of the
line, and are now making immense preparations of every kind; our
ministry, infatuated by our former successes, affect a certain tran-
quility, which is encouraged by French emissaries, and in all prob-
ability will be found established on a very precarious basis. When
vice and effeminacy had extinguished every principle of patriotism
and virtue among the Athenians, Philip [of Macedon], the most art-
ful and ambitious prince that ever existed, was projecting their ruin
in particular; their being the only power in Greece that could pre-
vent him from destroying the liberties of that country. Demosthenes
endeavoured to rouse them from their lethargy, and excite them, in
time, to oppose the ambitious projects of Philip, but in vain. Corrup-
tion, and the love of pleasure, had intirely enervated that, once brave,
and powerful people, insomuch that no sense of glory or danger
could induce them to take any step for their preservation. In these
sentiments they were confirmed by Philip’s emissaries, who were ever
declaiming on the power of the Athenians, and the weakness and
moderation of Philip; who being thus permitted to follow his plan,
in a short time put it in execution, and became the master of Greece.
I do not mean this as any reflection, on the elegant author, being
persuaded he is equally an eloquent orator, and a faithful subject,
truly attached to the good of his country. I mean only to shew, it
is dangerous to exalt the power of our nation, and depress that of
our rivals, if his opinion is not founded on real matter of fact; and
if otherwise it is useless, and cannot produce any one advantage. I
fancy this gentleman, dazzled with the pomp and magnificence of

some Nabobs and other inhabitants of this luxuriant capital, has too
hastily concluded that the whole nation, was equally opulent. Had
he considered the different price of provisions, and labour, in London,
and two hundred miles off, that alone, would have convinced him
of his error. At the same time he is too much a philosopher, and
politician, not to know, that luxury can proceed only from an inequal-
ity of fortunes, and the greater that inequality is, the fewer are rich,
and the more are poor. In fact no country of an equal population,
excepting Spain, and Italy, has so great a number of poor as England.
In so much that their maintenance costs perhaps four or five shillings
in the pound in some places; which added to their want of indus-
try, is a most heavy burden on the nation. Let us now return to the
question before us, and examine whether, in fact, England is so pow-
erful, and France so miserable.
It is an axiom, and therefore requires no demonstration; That the
absolute force of a nation, is in a compound ratio of the number of its inhab-
itants, and quantity of their industry. The last can be calculated only, by
the quantity of taxes they pay yearly to the support of government.
The relative force of a state will depend on many circumstances, of
which the most essential are, The nature of the government; situation of
the country; quantity, and quality of its productions, and the genius of the inhab-
itants. By comparing these different objects, in the two nations, we
shall be able to calculate their respective force, with almost a geo-
metrical precision. It is generally allowed, that France contains nearly
twenty millions of inhabitants, and we know for certain, that the
yearly revenues amount to four hundred and seven millions of livres,
which make nearly eighteen millions sterling; so that the absolute
force of France is 20+18, or thirty eight millions, or simply thirty
eight; whereas the population of the British islands, (for I cannot con-
sider the colonies otherwise than as a nation, which consumes our
manufactures, by which, like them, they contribute to pay taxes)
amount only to eight millions, and the quantity of revenues to ten
at most. So that the absolute force of England, compared to that of
France, will be as 18 to 38. And we must consider that the rev-
enues of the latter are so independent of navigation, that five sixths
at least arise from their European trade and sale of their produc-
tions; which are by custom, or otherwise become so necessary, that
no accident can diminish essentially the sale of them. This truth is
proved by the history of their finances; for when Lewis XIV came
to the throne, they amounted only to about seventy millions, which,

notwithstanding his continual wars, and the expulsion of above a
million subjects, had greatly diminished the population, increased to
the amazing sum of three hundred and seventy millions of livres,
ordinary revenues, and above a hundred millions sterling borrowed
on different conditions. And, during the reign of his successor, though
the nation made a bankruptcy, they still increased to the sum of
four hundred and seven millions, and above sixty millions debt.
During this period, the French marine and navigation were destroyed
to such a degree, that they had scarce a ship of any kind at sea.
However, neither the national bankruptcy, nor the great distresses
of the government, ever hindered the increase of their revenues, or
prevented their borrowing at a very low interest, considering the
quantity of circulation, which is not above half as great as ours; and
therefore the interest should be double to what it is with us. In this
period, their dominions and influence have been greatly increased,
their loss in the late war will turn out a national average. So that
it appears evident, their finances being established on their own nat-
ural productions, are not subject to be diminished by any tempo-
rary accident or misfortune; and though the weak conduct of a
ministry, may make a bad use of the national forces, yet it is impos-
sible to destroy their natural sources, being essentially connected with
the number of inhabitants, situation, and quantity of productions of
the country; a little order and oeconomy would soon raise it to a
degree of splendour and force superior to any power in Europe. In
ten years after the bankruptcy of the Mississippi, France added
Lorraine to its provinces, and gave law to the house of Austria. Since
the late war [Seven Years’ War 1756–63], they have augmented
their marine, whose ordinary expence amounts to twelve hundred
thousand pounds, to above seventy ships of the line, and thirty
frigates. The preset failure of the East India company has not in the
least affected the revenues of the state; whereas a bankruptcy of any
of our companies, or an unsuccessful war, that stopped for six months
only our navigation, would infallibly be followed by a national bank-
ruptcy, and make it impossible to raise five millions per annum; because
almost the whole national revenues depends on foreign trade and
navigation: so that the least check to these, would ruin the state.
Besides the French have about twelve millions free for the support
of government, after they have paid the interest of their debt, whereas
we have not above five; and if we consider the different price of
provisions, labour, &c. their twelve millions are equivalent to twenty

millions.* As to the nature of their government, we own it is not so
well calculated for industry, as that of England; because political and
civil liberty are essentially necessary to animate commerce: and though
in France the first is by no means to be compared to that of England,
yet the second is little inferior. The great men only being subject to
the stroke of despotism, the common people are permitted to follow
their business without any restraint: but monarchies are infinitely
more adapted to action and vigour. For the prince, being sole mas-
ter, he can employ, and direct the whole national force to any one
object he pleases, and his subjects must concur in his views. The
prodigious efforts made by Lewis the fourteenth and fifteenth are a
proof of this. They have sustained continual wars, and yet both their
dominions and revenues have increased; and I will presume to affirm,
* We have demonstrated in the work, indicated in the preface; 1. That the price
of provisions, labour, &c. is in proportion to the number of inhabitants and quan-
tity of circulation. So let C= to the circulation, and P= to the population, then
will C = P , the price of provisions.
P
The circulation of France in paper and money amounts to about one hundred
and fifty millions sterling and the population to twenty millions. So CP ==150 20
1=7 2
will
express the price of provisions, labour, &c.
In England the circulation in money and paper amounts to about one hundred
and sixty millions and the population to 8 millions so we shall have C = 160 = 20 .
Consequently the price of provisions, labour, &c. is in England to that of P = 8
France as twenty to seven and a half, which shews the reason why they can under-
sell us, in any market in Europe.
2. That the quantity of industry is in proportion to the quantity of circulation,
compared with the number of inhabitants. So that we shall have the same equa-
tion, viz. In France CP ==150 20
=7
1
2
. In England CP==160
8
= 20 . That is the industry of England
is to that of France, as twenty to seven and a half.

3. That the quantity of taxes, is in a compound ratio, of the number of inhab-
itants, and the taxes raised, compared to the quantity of circulation. So in France
= 150 C = 160
we shall have P = 20 +C taxes = 18 = 38
= 4 nearly. In England 1
P = 8 + taxes = 10 = 182=8 nearly. But as
this proportion is in a direct ratio of the taxes, and inverse of the number of men
who pay it, it follows that we pay in proportion to what the French pay, as four
to eight and a half nearly. That is each Englishmen pays 25 shillings and Frenchmen
only eighteen. For dividing ten millions taxes, by eight millions of subjects we find
each pays 11.5s.0d. and dividing eighteen millions with the twenty millions of French
pay it will be found each pays about 18 shillings; moreover the eighteen millions,
raised in France makes eight and a half of their total industry: whereas the ten
millions raised in England, makes only a twentieth part of our industry, which is
always in proportion to the quantity of circulation. As the species in France is sup-
posed to be about half the value of the paper in circulation; and in England some-
thing less than a fifth: it appears that a bankruptcy in France, would be less fatal
to their industry in proportion as two is to five.
were never so formidable as at present. The union of the different

branches of the house of Bourbon, and their connections with that
of Austria, enables them to direct their whole force against us, who
unhappily, have not one ally, who can contribute essentially to divert
their projects, nor indeed any one who will. They can employ every
mariner, in France and Spain, in their fleet, without any sensible
inconveniency, because their trade is chiefly carried on by the Dutch,
and other foreigners. France can reform fifty thousand men, and
employ that fund in augmenting their marine; and Spain at least
thirty thousand for the same purpose, without exposing either nation
to the least danger or inconveniency. Spain is so far from being
ruined by her losses in the last war, that she has augmented the pay
of her troops, being above eighty thousand men, a third; being more-
over absolute princes, they can suspend the payment of any partic-
ular branch, and employ the funds on another. Philip the Fifth3
made a bankruptcy, which indeed produced some occasional dis-
tress, but did not affect the state. The Spaniards have now built, or
are building, seventy ships of the line, besides frigates. The two
nations have, including what they can draw from Genoa, and other
parts of Italy, at least sixty thousand mariners, which they can, to
a man, employ on board their fleets, without diminishing any one
source of their revenues. It is true, they are not as able as we are
in that branch of war. Experience however proves, they are not so
despicable as we think. Lewis the Fourteenth though employed in
continual wars, which, with numerous public works, exhausted his
finances, in a very few years raised a marine consisting of one hun-
dred and twenty ships of the line, which, conducted by Tourville,
Du Gué, Frouin, Forbin, &c. ranged masters of the ocean for six
or seven years, though the Dutch and English were united. Why
cannot the house of Bourbon united much more powerful than for-
merly, and without any enemy to fear; Why, I say, is it impossible
for it, to form a marine, much greater than Lewis XIV did? The
great population of France, and their little industry, compared to
ours, enables her to employ any number of men in her fleets, with-
out checking the industry of any class; which we certainly cannot
do. I am persuaded, we could not at one time, employ fifty thousand
3
Philip V (r. 1700–46), King of Spain.
mariners and sixty thousand men in the army, without diminishing

greatly our manufactures and navigation, and consequently the sources
of our revenues.
The situation of France is, without comparison, so much finer
than ours, that if their marine was increased, they would be mas-
ters of the Channel, and indeed of great part of the trade now car-
ried on by the different powers of Europe; as no nation has a greater
variety of natural productions, nor of a better quality, or more gen-
erally used. If they only made their own commerce, that alone would
form a powerful marine, and a most extensive navigation. Their
colonies are few, but perfectly well situated for the Spanish trade in
America, and moreover supply then with sugars, indigo, &c. and
now being happily for them, got rid of Canada, which absorbed
immense sums of money, as well as men, they enjoy all the advan-
tages of colonies, without their inconveniency. The low price of pro-
visions, and their small industry, compared to us, enable them to
increase it double to what it now is. As to the genius of the inhab-
itants, it cannot be denied that they are ingenious, docile, and active,
which the increase of their revenues prove; for, in a little more than
a century, they are raised from seventy to four hundred and seven
millions of livres, as we have said. It is objected, that they are
oppressed by the burden of their taxes. To which I answer, that
they are far from being as opulent as the English, but they are not
oppressed. The proof is this: If by taxes, or other arts, you take from
the subject any thing, from what is necessary to maintain himself
and family, the animals, grain, &c. necessary to continue the culti-
vation of the arts, manufactures, agriculture, &c. it is impossible the
revenues can remain the same, much less increase; they must nec-
essary diminish the funds from which they are raised. Fact however
proves, that they have continually augmented, and therefore the
taxes, however heavy, did not destroy the funds from which they
are derived. Indeed they may, and indeed I believe they have, hin-
dered the increase of national industry, which might be carried much
higher, if their funds were encreased. Notwithstanding their taxes
and oppressions, their trade is of late greatly augmented in Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and the Levant, where ours has suffered in propor-
tion, as our merchants well know. The sources therefore of their
power and riches, are real and absolute, whereas that of their weak-
ness is accidental. A bad ministry may suspend the effects of their
natural advantages, but never can destroy them. The last war was
unfortunate, but not surely for want of means. A weak and disunited
ministry greatly contributed to their misfortunes. Good discipline has
rendered European troops nearly equal. The difference of valour
vanishes among the numberless causes which concur to secure the
victory. Our success in the last war will be a lasting monument of
our valour, abilities, resources; and I will add, good fortune, as well
as of their incapacity. Peace however has, in my opinion, given them
more advantages than a successful war. The fishery of Newfoundland,
and the loss of Canada, are probably equally advantageous to the
French. Were they still masters of it, we should not see our colonies
on the point of throwing off their obedience to the mother country.
Though the situation of England is by no means advantageous
for trade as that of France, it is much more so for interior safety,
and defence. For though our enemies may have numerous armies,
they cannot, unless masters of the sea, and for a considerable time,
make use of them against us, but in small numbers; and even sup-
posing their fleets superior to ours, they cannot attack us with any
advantage, because they can bring neither heavy artillery, ammuni-
tion, provisions, and cavalry, but in small quantities: insomuch that
with thirty-two thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse, chiefly
dragoons and light horse, with the militia, we could easily baffle all
their attempts. I would have three thousand foot, and one thousand
horse in Scotland, eleven thousand foot and five thousand horse in
England, besides militia, encamped in some central position, between
Dover and Portsmouth, and the remaining twenty thousand in Ireland,
in the province of Munster, and on the banks of the Shannon. Three
ships and four frigates on the coast of Scotland; a few frigates and
ships in the Channel to observe Dunkirk; forty sail of the line in the
Bay of Biscay to observe Brest and Ferrol; a squadron off Ireland,
and another in the Mediterranean. If these do their duty, we have
nothing to fear at home or abroad. Some cruisers in the Gulph of
Mexico, North America, and the East Indies, will be sufficient to
protect our trade, and ruin theirs. But, if you let the French and
Spaniards get out of their harbours, and unite their forces, there is
no answering for the consequences. If, in time, you do not take
effectual measures to stop their projects, even before they are ripe
for execution, it may be then too late; for, if they once get out, our
trade may be ruined before you can apply any remedy.
We have shewn that the absolute force of France is, to that of

England, as thirty-eight to eighteen nearly, and that their neat rev-
enues are as twelve to five at least. The nature of our government
is more calculated for the peace and domestic happiness of the sub-
ject. Theirs, on the contrary, is more so for action and conquest.
The situation and productions of their country are preferable to ours;
their industry and price of provisions much less; and the first may,
no doubt, with good management, be increased to double what it
is at present. They have the materials, and certainly do not want
either genius or activity. It is the fault of the ministry, if the national
industry and revenues do not augment. Whereas ours is already car-
ried to such a height, that it cannot be encreased, and probably
must diminish. 1. Because it is certain, that eight millions of sub-
jects cannot produce a greater quantity of labour, and the less so,
as the number of servants and beggars increase daily, which dimin-
ishes the quantity of national industry. 2. Because the high price of
provisions, labour, and luxury, make it impossible for our merchants
to support the concurrence of the French and other nations in for-
eign markets, where, consequently, the consumption of our manu-
factures decreases daily. 3. In case of a war, we cannot employ above
a certain, and very limited number of men in our fleets and armies,
without drawing the hands, which are necessary to carry on our
agriculture, manufactures, navigation, &c. The present state of our
colonies does not surely promise an increase of consumption of our
manufactures. The least check upon our foreign trade, an unsuc-
cessful battle at sea, might be attended with fatal consequences;
because our safety and power are intimately connected, with our
being masters of the sea, in such a manner, that we must be so, or
perish: there is no alternative.
Though, as I have said, our constitution is peculiarly adapted to
secure the person and property of the subject, and consequently to
animate his industry; it has however this inconveniency, that these
advantages are balanced by want of vigour: for discord, disunion,
and opposition, are ever the consequences of a free government.
Insomuch that no minister, however able and honest, has power
enough to exert the whole national strength. Opposition and envy
will for ever clog his measures. Besides, power and popularity never,
I think, concurred but in one minister, whom the impending fate of
his country called forth for its defence. Opposition was silenced, and
envy hid her poisoned head. The courtiers feeling themselves unequal
to the weight of that distress and calamity they had brought on their
country, willingly threw it upon his shoulders, hoping, in case of
misfortunes, which seemed unavoidable, to make him responsible.
But no sooner had he taken the helm, than, by his extraordinary
abilities, courage, and impartiality in the choice of able and virtu-
ous men to execute his projects, he saved his country from the ruin
which threatened it, and raised it to a degree of glory and power,
beyond that of any nation whatever of equal population. The courtiers,
no less enemies to this gentleman, than to the interest of their king
and country, forced him from his stations, and, having occupied it,
instead of crushing an enemy, laid at their feet, concluded a peace,
or rather a truce, whose consequences must finally terminate in the
ruin of their country.
Having thus compared, with truth and impartiality, the absolute
and relative forces of England and France, it is evident, I think, that
the first is by no means so flourishing, nor the other so depressed
as many affect to believe. I might have indeed added, that an unsuc-
cessful war, particularly at sea, would sink public credit, and per-
haps produce a national bankruptcy. That none of our alliances
abroad, can be of the least service to us, in a maritime, American,
or domestic war; because the French, by sending an army into
Westphalia, can force the Hessians, Brunswickers, and Hanoverians,
to disarm, or see their country ruined; which, according to their
usual prudence, no doubt they will avoid. They will in the mean
time, take our money, but cannot, in the cases mentioned, comply
with their engagements, and help us. The Austrians, who alone could
give us effectual succours, will be neuter, or against us. The Russians
are too far off: the Dutch weak and trembling for themselves. The
Prussian monarch has no natural connections, or common interest
with us, and moreover, never knew any but his own. The king of
Denmark4 alone can be of use to us; because the French cannot, by
intrigue, or force, hinder him from giving us the succours he may
chuse to send us. I wish therefore, and most humbly recommend to
those in power, the forming of a most intimate connection with this
prince, and enabling him to keep a body of twenty thousand men,
4
Christian VII (r. 1766–1808).
and ten ships of the line for our service, whenever we may want
them, and at the same time to abandon those ridiculous connections
with the little princes of Germany, who absorb immense sums, and,
when called upon, can be of no service. I must conclude with Delenda
est, Ubis maritima, Carthaginis.
Cato
Finis
III
AN ESSAY ON THE THEORY OF MONEY

(1771)
CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................ 265
Chapter I. Of Public Banks ...................................................... 269
Chapter II. Of General Circulation ........................................ 277
Chapter III. Population is in Proportion to Circulation ........ 278
Chapter IV. The Industry of a Nation, will be in
Proportion to the Quantity of Circulation .......................... 280
Chapter V. Of the Absolute Force of a Nation .................... 284
Chapter VI. Liberty is in Proportion to the Equality,
and Despotism to the Inequality of Circulation .................. 287
Chapter VII. Luxury, Corruption of Manners and
National Poverty are in Proportion to the Inequality
of Circulation .......................................................................... 294
Chapter VIII. Arts and Sciences are in a Compound
Ratio to the Quantity of Circulation and Liberty .............. 296
Chapter IX. The Price of any Merchandize whatever,
is in an Inverse Ratio of its Quantity, that is, the
Less there is of any Commodity Brought to Market,
the Dearer it will be, and Vice Versa ................................ 297
Chapter X. The Price of Metals Compared to each
Other, is in an Inverse Ratio of their Respective
Quantities ................................................................................ 301
Chapter XI. Of Coinage .......................................................... 304
Chapter XII. Of the Interest of Money .................................. 311
Chapter XIII. Of Bills of Exchange, and of the
Balance of Trade .................................................................... 313
Chapter XIV. Of Taxes ............................................................ 316
Chapter XV. Conclusion, and Recapitulation of the
Principles Established in the Preceding Chapters ................ 317
Within the pantheon of early economists—Adam Smith, David

Ricardo, James Mill for example—Lloyd’s name is absent. But his
ideas are not. The promised treatise on the different governments
established among mankind never surfaced; instead he amended his
larger manuscript and published anonymously an economic theory
in 1771. This short essay is a profound exposition on the influence
of money, especially its quantity and general circulation, on society
and politics. Culled from his reflections on England’s proto-indus-
trial economy and refined during his tenure in Italy, it stands as one
of the first works on liberal economic thought; there is no praise of
mercantilism and the public debt is to society’s benefit.
The essay is notable on several fronts. First, Lloyd provided the
modern concept and definition of money as the ‘universal mer-
chandise,’ to be bought and sold for any commodity whatsoever.
Lloyd also proffered an early equation of supply and demand. But
it is his mathematical concept of monetary circulation that makes
his ideas important. From it he fashioned the ‘Quantity Theory of
Money.’ Simply stated the more money in circulation the higher the
general price level of goods in the economy. Lloyd applied Quantity
Theory to society and politics. Not only was the quantity of money
important, but the equality of circulation (how rapidly it circulated
and through how many hands) could determine the general pros-
perity of society, the size of its population, political system, the level
of freedom, and its ability to wage war. From economics then emerged
a social science of politics and war. The earlier concept of a nation’s
‘Absolute Force’ he recast as the compound ratio of the population
and the quantity and quality of their industrial output. Thus, he ele-
vated his comparative geopolitical analysis into the realm of math-
ematical calculation.
Apparent too is the enlightened philosophe’s concern with virtue
and corruption. Luxury, poverty and despotism all stemmed from
an unequal circulation of money. To maintain liberty and preserve
the morals of society, money (regardless of its quantity) must flow
throughout all society and not just in a few hands. Dedicated to
Lord North, First Lord of the Treasury, Lloyd wanted the treatise
262 iii. an essay on the theory of money (1771)
to influence state policy and serve as a warning to a wealthy soci-

ety seemingly suffering systemic economic and social problems. But
it is difficult to judge the essay’s impact or influence on North or
other contemporaries. One reviewer remarked “the Author of this
essay is an ‘ingenius’ and able writer, and that he has thrown out
several observations, which merit the public attention.”1 Yet, Lloyd’s
adamant argument that England’s population was growing, though
correct, offended informed opinion. Today, economic historians con-
sider Lloyd an important link in the emergence of modern economic
thought and a major influence on Pietro Verri (1728–97) and the
Milanese Enlightenment.
Publishing History
An Essay on the Theory of Money. London: Printed for J. Almon, 1771.

An Essay on the Theory of Money. Ristampa anastatica della prima edi-
zione del 1771 con introduzione di Oscar Nuccio. Roma: Bizzarri,
1968.
1
Abraham Rees, ‘Review of An essay on the theory of money,’ The Monthly Review;
or, Literary Journal 46 ( January 1772): 75–6.
To the Right Honourable Lord North.1
My Lord,
Destitute as I am of parliamentary connections, I can neither oppose,

nor support your administration; and therefore, have not formed the
least expectations from your favour and protection: and the less so,
as I am convinced, no English minister can confer an employment
upon any man merely because he deserves it. The good opinion I
have of your Lordship’s ability and integrity is my only motive for
inscribing the following Essay to you, being persuaded, that if it con-
tains any thing useful to the nation, you will adopt and promote it.
I am,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s
Most humble Servant,
The AUTHOR.
1
Frederick North (1732–92). Styled ‘Lord North.’ The eldest son of Francis
North, Earl of Guilford, he became First Minister to King George III in 1770 and
guided Britain through the American Revolution. Lloyd’s dedication is fitting since
North had served as Pay-Master General, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and finally
First Lord of the Treasury.
PREFACE
The doctrine of money and circulation has engaged the attention of

many celebrated authors; it may therefore seem both unnecessary
and presumptuous to write upon the subject. But to me the man-
ner in which this important object has been discussed, does not
appear either clear, just or general; insomuch that the sovereign, as
well as the subject, are equally ignorant and embarrassed, whenever
the political influence of money comes to be considered. Wherefore
I propose to point out its effects upon the industry, manners, and
the different species of governments established among mankind.
However abundant, fertile and rich a country may be, however
easy the communication between its different parts, it can nourish
only a small number of inhabitants and animals, if they apply to
agriculture alone; because content with the mere necessaries of life,
their attention will be extended no farther. Hunting, the care of their
flocks, and an imperfect, and very limited, agriculture will be their
only occupation; and as these require a great extent of ground,
mankind will be separated into very small societies, insomuch that
scarce a considerable village would, in this hypothesis, be found upon
the face of the globe; arts, manufactures and commerce cannot with-
out money take place, but in small quantities, and of an imperfect
quality. There would be neither sovereign nor subject, because every
individual could by his own industry procure wherewith to satisfy
his wants, and therefore could have no motive to submit to the will
and caprice of another; and the less so, as no one would be so much
superior in riches to others, as to be able to purchase their submis-
sion, nor any one so poor as to be obliged to fell his liberty in order
to procure the necessaries of life. In a soft climate and fruitful soil,
the golden age, which the poets have so much vaunted, and an
almost perfect equality would reign among mankind; the odious dis-
tinctions of master and slave would be banished; age and virtue
would be the only titles of honour and respect. In such circum-
stances, societies would be very limited, because the difficulty of
transporting the productions of the earth a great way, would be an
insurmountable obstacle to their increase: Rivers, mountains, seas,
forests, &c. would hinder them from communicating with each other,
and consequently prevent their forming an extensive society. Each
small village would form a separate community, intirely unconnected
with others, though only a few leagues distant; and the more so, as
each finding within themselves wherewith to satisfy their necessities,
they could have no motive to seek at a distance any new connec-
tions; to which we may add, that man, as well as other animals, are
particularly attached to their native soil, sweet and alluring habitude
ties us to it, like a plant, which force alone can tear from its native
bed. In this case, the whole earth would be occupied by small soci-
eties established upon the rivers, and sea coast. The soft and fruit-
ful Asia would be more peopled than the rest of the globe; and the
number of its inhabitants would diminish in proportion to their prox-
imity to the poles, and to the line, because the fertility of the ground
(and consequently the facility of subsisting) depends upon heat and
humidity; the extremes of the one and the other are equally perni-
cious to fecundity, consequently near the line and the poles the
inhabitants are few and slothful. Whenever a society becomes numer-
ous, the members must separate, and occupy a greater extent of
country, and the difficulty, as well as inutility of carrying their pro-
ductions to their mother society, will force them to form a new, and
separate community. Chance and curiosity, no doubt, first introduced
the use of money, which by becoming an universal merchandise,
and by facilitating the communication between mankind gave birth
to all the arts, manufactures, sciences, and forms of government,
which we now see and admire in the different parts of the globe.
Some person having, by chance, found a precious stone, or piece
of shining metal, and having carried it to his village, excited the
curiosity of his neighbours, and their desires to obtain it, among
whom, one who enjoyed a superiority, gave a he, or some other
thing for it; animated by this recompense, the person who found it,
went in search of others, and so by degrees precious stones, or pieces
of metal, became an object of desire and search for all.
In proportion as their mass increased, the primitive equality among
mankind diminished; industry and chance gave more to some than
others; this disproportion produced naturally an inequality of power,
some were rich and potent, others poor and weak. This I think the
true origin of that inequality and subordination which we see estab-
lished among mankind; for without the introduction of an Universal
preface 267
Merchandise, riches would consist in numerous flocks alone, which

could never give any man a sufficient superiority of power over oth-
ers, to buy, or force their submission. In fact we see, that those peo-
ple, as well ancient and modern, who have not known the use of
money, have been separated into very small and wandering societies,
without arts, manufactures, sciences, or fixed forms of governments.
The community was governed by the advice of the old men, rather
than by fixed laws, or any established authority.
Money which I call Universal Merchandise, because it can, in all civ-
ilized nations, be exchanged for every species of productions, should
have the following qualities: 1st. It should be rare, and uncommon;
that a small quantity of it may serve as an equivalent, to a much
greater of any other production; and be easily transported from one
country to another. 2d, That it should not wear or be easily coun-
terfeited. 3d, That it be divisible, in order to facilitate its use, for
this reason metals are preferred to precious stones, which cannot be
divided into proportionable parts.1
The advantages, which societies derived from the use of money,
induced them to augment its course; for which reason they intro-
duced the use of Banks, public notes, &c. The necessities of the state,
as well as of individuals, gave birth to borrowing and lending, which
necessarily introduced the general use of public and private notes;
and when their credit is good, are received as an equivalent for real
money, and therefore produce the same effect having the same value,
where such private and public notes are established: I shall call the
one and the other by the general name of Universal merchandise or
general circulation.
In the following Essay I will examine, 1st, The nature of public
Banks and point out the advantages and disadvantages of them. 2d,
I will treat of circulation; and shew the nature of it and its effects
upon national industry: the different species of government, arts,
1
Lloyd’s definition of money as the ‘universal merchandise’ mirrors that found
in Pietro Verri, Meditazioni sulla economia politica (1771). This similarity led to a cool-
ing of relations between the two friends. For years the controversy so vexed Verri
that in the end he credited the definition to Lloyd. Pietro Verri to Alessandro Verri,
Milan, 11 aprile 1781, CCXII (1179), vol. 11 of Carteggio di Pietro Verri e di Alessandro
Verri dal 1766 al 1797, ed. Giovanni Seregni (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè, Editore,
1940), 304.
sciences, and morals of a nation. 3d, Of the proportion between the

quantity of circulation and the price of provisions, labour, &c. 4th,
Of the proportion between metals generally used, from whence the
theory of coinage will be deduced. 5th, Of the proportion between
the quantity of circulation and that of the taxes.
CHAPTER ONE
OF PUBLIC BANKS
A Public bank, is a place of deposit for money, for which notes are
issued, or bills, or draughts given, which have the same effect in
commerce as money itself: so that the circulation is increased in pro-
portion to the one, and the other; the institution of banks, at least
the increase of their funds, as with us, was owing to the necessity
of the state, which necessity neither ordinary or extraordinary taxes
being capable of supplying, loans became necessary and the use of
paper was therefore introduced in proportion to such loans. By this
means national industry rather increased than diminished; if instead
of loans, the state had augmented the taxes in order to raise the
sum required, it is evident that industry in general, particularly manu-
factures and commerce must have greatly suffered as we shall shew
hereafter, but by borrowing such sums, the circulation necessary
to support national industry being thereby increased, it suffered no
detriment.
Banks may be considered under three distinct views. 1st, With
regard to the state, insomuch as thereby, it is enabled to raise great
sums without laying any other tax than what is necessary to pay the
interest of such sums. 2d, With regard to national industry: and 3d,
With regard to the form of government.
Supposing it was now necessary to raise ten millions extraordi-
nary within a year, I believe it will be admitted, that it would be
impossible; no branch of the revenues, excepting the land-tax, will
bear any considerable additional duty, at least in any proportion to
ten millions which we suppose required; consequently such a sum
could not be raised otherwise than by loans, the interest of which
might easily be pad out of the sinking fund, or by some additional
duty on the articles of luxury and folly.
We cannot better illustrate the truth of our principles, than by
supposing, that during the last war,1 England had no bank and
1
Seven Years’ War (1756–63). Established in 1694, the importance of the Bank
of England for Britain’s eighteenth-century wars is indisputable. By 1697 the British
consequently must have raised the supplies within the year; and on
the contrary, that France had raised the extraordinary sums required
by loans; the first raised during that period above sixty millions extra-
ordinary, of which at least twenty were sent abroad, and France
raised and spent abroad a much greater sum; it is generally agreed
upon, that the quantity of specie in England does not exceed thirty
million, it is therefore evident that we could not have raised sixty
million extraordinary and spent twenty abroad, without the entire
ruin of the nation. We must therefore have fallen victim to the power
of France, because she, by loans was enabled to raise the necessary
sums, to carry on the war without any considerable detriment to
national industry which we, for want of such loans, could not have
possibly done.
In the war of the succession,2 Lewis XIV raised by extraordinary
loans, near an hundred and twenty millions sterling, and yet, it
was with the utmost difficulty that the monarchy was saved from
destruction.
I therefore ask, what would have happened, had he not borrowed
that sum, the tenth part of which could not possibly have been
raised otherwise than by loans, and consequently by introducing
paper circulation?
In the present state of Europe, when banks are generally estab-
lished, it is evident, that such nations as have them not, cannot sup-
port a foreign war for any considerable time, nor cultivate their
manufactures, agriculture or commerce in any degree comparable
with such as have which is proved by the fact itself; Russia, Poland,
Turkey, Spain, and Portugal prove this truth of this assertion, I am
persuaded that the form of government, and many other circumstances
concur to render those nations slothful: but the want of circulation
arising from those circumstances, is the immediate cause of it.
Whether it were best, that the use of the paper circulation should
be totally abolished or not, is problematic, because it is a question
if it is more useful, that nations should have more or less industry,
and be content with the common necessaries of life which would
government had spent £36 million fighting the Nine Years’ War and accumulated
a public debt of £16.7 million. It spent nearly £83 million to fight the Seven Years’
War, with between 30–40% being borrowed. Between 1756–63 the public debt
nearly doubled from £74 million to £133 million. See John Brewer, The Sinews of
Power: War, Money and the English State (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).
2
War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14).
i. of public banks 271
certainly be the case if paper circulation was abolished; for we shall

shew in the following chapter, that industry in general, and partic-
ularly arts, manufactures, and foreign commerce depend upon the
quantity of circulation, consequently as paper makes at least two
thirds of it, national industry would diminish in that proportion.
The Dutch, who have scarce any production of their own, carry
on a most extensive trade, with their paper circulation only.
Spain has no bank, and the whole circulation is reduced to about
25 millions, of which about three, are raised annually for the use of
the state, I do not include in this sum, what she draws from her
mines in America, which has nothing to do with the national indus-
try. If instead of three millions, ten were to be raised it would be
impossible to do it as the circulation is very small: the lower class,
which makes nine parts out of ten, can with difficulty pay their quota
of the three millions, were they obliged to pay above three times
that sum, they would be reduced to misery, and the whole national
industry would be extinguished.
I doubt therefore, whether in any nation, where there are no
banks, it would be possible to increase the taxes, at least in any
great degree, without reducing it to poverty and misery, such nations
therefore should in my humble opinion, establish banks, in order to
increase the national industry even though they did not want any
considerable sum, by this means, the state would readily find a
resources, whereas in their present situation they are always greatly
embarrassed to raise the most inconsiderable supply.
It is true that public debts have several inconveniences, 1st, They
increase the taxes and consequently diminish the national industry.
2d, They raise the rate of interest; as to the first the price of mer-
chandise is increased only in proportion to the taxes raised to pay
the interest of the debt, and the national industry will be diminished
only in that proportion: because the number of people that could,
for example, buy ten horses at the rate of 10L. a piece, could not
buy them at the rate of 12L. which we suppose to be the price, in
consequence of the additional tax, and so in all other articles, this
will necessarily diminish the consumption and consequently the
national industry, because nobody will cultivate more than what he
can dispose of; this increase in the price of provisions will have a
bad effect upon foreign trade, wherein we can no longer oppose our
competitors, with whom the price of provisions, labour, &c. is lower
than with us.
If, however, the general circulation is not already too great, the
loss occasioned by the new tax will be more than compensated by
the additional circulation of the capital sums borrowed: because the
national industry will increase in that proportion: whereas the price
of provisions will increase in proportion to the taxes levied to pay
the interest of it. But if the general circulation is great, which may
be known by the high price of provisions, labour, &c. it follows that
the least additional tax will be attended with fatal consequences, par-
ticularly if laid on the necessaries of life; it is for this reason that in
all great towns we see the number of poor increase so prodigiously;
we would therefore propose as a general maxim of finance that the
rate of taxes should be in the inverse ratio to the consumption of the
commodity, because the articles of luxury would raise a consider-
able revenue by their price, and the great consumption of necessary
productions would fully compensate the lowness of the taxes imposed
upon them; consequently there should be little or no tax upon the
common necessaries of life, and the less so, as the land hath already
paid it, and the rates should raise upon each article in proportion,
as it is least wanted: we shall in a future chapter explain more fully
the doctrine of taxes.
From what we have said it is evident, that no extraordinary sum
can be raised in any country without the aid of banks. 2dly, that
circulation and industry are greatly increased by the use of paper
currency, which is proved by the state of industry in those countries
where such banks are not established, as Spain, Portugal, Russia and
Turkey, where industry in general, arts and manufactures in partic-
ular are extremely limited.
It is objected, that banks increase the number of those who live
upon the interest of their money, and consequently that industry
decreases in that proportion: to which I answer, That were there no
banks, such people would either lend money to foreigners, or be
obliged to hoard it up, which would be a loss to the nation. 2d,
That their number is small compared to that, of those who are
benefited by the circulation of their capital, which is lent out at a
higher interest, than they receive for it. So that in fact nothing is
lost because it is the same thing to the state, whether the original
proprietor or another person employs the money in business; whereas
where there are no banks, great sums of money would lay dormant
and useless, or be lent abroad.
2d. It is said that the facility of borrowing money, often induces

Princes to undertake expensive wars no way necessary. This proves
only that one may apply the resources of a nation to bad purposes,
as a prodigal who borrows money to lose it at gaming.
3d. They say it would be better for a Prince to form a treasure,
which would supply any extraordinary demand without levying a
new tax; to which I answer, That a nation having no paper circu-
lation hath but a very limited industry: so that if the Sovereign would
hoard up a considerable sum, in a few years the national industry
would be extinguished for want of the necessary funds to nourish
and support it. Let us suppose, for example, that Spain had no
mines, and that the balance of trade was against her, it is evident,
that long since, she would have been exhausted, and reduced to the
barbarous situation of those nations, who do not know the use of
money. If instead of paying such sums to strangers, the king had
hoarded them, it would have produced the same effect upon national
industry. We must therefore conclude, that nothing can be more
prejudicial to any government than to form a treasure.
4th. It is said, that it would be better to raise the sum required
by an extraordinary tax within the year. I have already shewn that
it is impossible. If with difficulty we can raise what is sufficient to
pay the interest of such extraordinary sums, how can we raise an
hundred times as much?
A celebrated author,3 whom I greatly esteem and admire, says,
that the introduction of banks and paper circulation impoverishes a
nation by the extraction of our metals; of which, England, says he,
would have now a much greater quantity had paper circulation never
been introduced: to which I answer, that money cannot go out of
a kingdom, without receiving an equivalent, which is either con-
sumed at home, or resold with advantage. In the first case, it is evi-
dent, we must cease to make use of such commodities, many of
which are however absolutely necessary, particularly those we draw
from the north for the use of our fleet; the silks and wool we draw
from different parts of the world and for which we pray, partly with
our own productions, and partly with ready money; we must there-
fore either send out our money, or cease to buy such commodities,
3
David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (1753). See especially ‘Of
Commerce’ and ‘Of the Balance of Trade.’
however necessary: at least four-fifths of the trade of Europe is car-

ried on by means of paper circulation which enables the nations
possessed of them, to export ready money where it is wanted; which
could not be done if such paper circulation did not exist, this is so
true that the few nations in Europe who possess paper circulation,
carry on more foreign trade than the others, though these last are
infinitely superior in the number of inhabitants, the quantity and
quality of their productions, insomuch that I will venture to estab-
lish as an axiom, That industry in general, and foreign and active commerce
in particular are in proportion to the quantity of paper circulation;
this is verified by the state of Europe. A nation without mines or
banks, could not subsist in the neighbourhood of those who have
the one or the other. The Dutch do not employ in their commerce
the twentieth part of their own productions; it is carried on entirely
with ready money or paper. If the use of this last was any way
obstructed, it is evident that their ready money would soon be
exhausted, and they would become meer carriers. The English and
Dutch do not employ the fourth part of their navigation in carry-
ing their own productions, the remainder is employed in transport-
ing those of other countries, either as mere carriers, or as merchants;
in the first case their gain is very moderate, but in the other very
great; it is evident, that this cannot be done without ready money,
and it is equally evident, that so much ready money could not be
employed, unless it was in some measure replaced by paper circu-
lation, which supplies its place, till what has been laid out in one
country, returns by the sale in another, which requires much time,
not unfrequently years. It is with nations s with individuals, the more
money a man has the greater will be the extent of his trade: he
buys and sells when it is most advantageous, and by his riches, is
enabled to give more extensive credit, and for a longer time: whereas
a poor man, however industrious, can scarce get a livelyhood. What
is verified in one individual is equally true of a whole nation. Was
it possible for any one nation to produce the quantity and quality
of merchandize necessary to suit every other nation, then indeed it
might without money trade with them all, but as this is impossible,
we must buy from one nation, and sell to another, which cannot be
done without money and paper; we buy natural productions, and
then work them up to sell again with infinite advantage: we may
venture to affirm, that nineteen parts out of twenty of the trade of
Europe is carried on with paper, and if this was destroyed, indus-
try would instantly diminish in proportion. In England, for exam-

ple, not the tenth part of the coin is ever used in circulation: the
whole trade is almost carried on with paper, nor can it be other-
wise, for the transport of money is an invincible obstacle to an exten-
sive trade at home, and more so abroad. The whole trade of Europe,
two centuries ago, was not the tenth part of what it is now, and
this difference we conceive, is entirely owing to the establishment of
banks; a great part of the Indian trade is carried on with ready
money, which would have exhausted the nation long ago if it had
not been replaced with paper. Must we therefore renounce this trade,
or be ruined? No; what we draw from thence, is either consumed
at home, and supplies the place of other commodities, or is resold
with advantage.
With regard to the nation, paper is of much greater use than real
money; it is equally current in trade and is more easily transported:
Supposing I live in Wales, and want to buy goods in London, it is
evident, that it requires much time to send the money, whereas by
sending a bill, my business is immediately done; industry will there-
fore increase in proportion to the facility of procuring an equivalent
for it.
As banks are founded on credit, it is evident, that they cannot be
established in despotic governments; the fortunes of individuals are
too precarious, and attended with too much danger to be produced:
from whence we may establish, that the existence and advantages
of banks are in proportion to national liberty, for which reason they
are not established at all in despotic governments; in monarchies
they may be established, but their credit will be less extensive than
in republics, and free governments, where they are of singular use
and advantage; they promote circulation and industry, equalize the
fortunes of individuals, and form opulent bodies of citizens, who
oppose an invincible barrier to the despotism of kings and their min-
isters; the more numerous such bodies are, the more secure will be
national liberty.
We will therefore conclude, that banks are the only resource a
state has when any considerable supply is required; that they pro-
mote national industry, and national liberty.
It may be asked, what should be the proportion between the quan-
tity of paper currency, and that of real money? I believe it is impos-
sible to determine it exactly, we shall therefore only point out some
rules, which may contribute to form some idea of it: 1st, If the paper
currency is generally received without any discount, it shews that

credit is good, and that the quantity of paper currency is not too
great. 2d, If you can always realize your notes, it is a sign that there
is money enough. 3d, If the price of provisions is not so great as to
diminish your exports, or home consumption it proves that the quan-
tity of circulation is not too great. In proportion therefore, as the
contrary to what we have here established, happens, we approach
to a national bankruptcy, which would be followed by the ruin of
all commerce and manufacture: the more industrious a nation is,
the more general would be the calamity attending a bankruptcy.
Free governments would be overturned, monarchies would suffer less,
because circulation and industry are less extensive; and besides, the
army supports government, as it happened in France after the death
of Lewis XIV. In such a city as London, every thing is to be dreaded
from the despair of half a million of people reduced to want bread.
M. Montesquieu will have it, that banks are proper only for a
nation that makes commerce of œconomy, and by no means for
such as make commerce of luxury. With deference to this great man,
I conceive that banks have nothing to do with the nature of the
commerce carried on by a nation, their only and immediate effect
is to increase circulation and industry, which surely ought to be pro-
moted in every nation without exception. They would be equally
useful in monarchies, and in republics, could they be established
upon a firm basis. He seems to say, the are not proper for monar-
chies, he should have said, they cannot be established upon a solid
basis; because their credit will be always limited and precarious,
where every thing depends upon the will of one person: for which
reason, I do not believe there is one fund in France, where a man
can realize his paper without a considerable discount, particularly in
time of war.
CHAPTER TWO
OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
The author, whom we first mentioned in the preceeding chapter,

says, he never could comprehend the meaning of the word circula-
tion; he might as well have said, he did not understand the mean-
ing of the word circulation; he might as well have said, he did not
understand the meaning of the word exchange: for in fact, they both
have the same signification. In my opinion, no word can have a
more clear or distinct sense, than that of circulation, which we define,
The passage of piece of money, or current paper from the possession of one per-
son, to that of another.
From this definition it follows, 1st, That a piece of money can-
not, speaking of commerce, pass from one person to another with-
out receiving an equivalent: 2d, Consequently, if it passes successively
thro’ the hands of twenty different people, it proves evidently, that
twenty pieces of industry have been given in exchange for it; the
oftener therefore, such a piece of money circulates the greater will
be the industry and vice versa.
CHAPTER THREE
POPULATION IS IN PROPORTION TO CIRCULATION
The number of inhabitants will be in proportion to the facility of

subsisting: and the facility of subsisting in proportion to that of
exchanging one commodity for another: and this finally in proportion
to the quantity of circulation either of money or of paper circulation.
In order to illustrate the truth of this doctrine, we will suppose a
nation destitute of all circulation; in this case we say, that the whole
population will consist only of hunters, shepherds and husbandmen,
each of which must find within himself, wherewith to subsist by
mutually exchanging parts of their flocks and of the productions of
the earth, and in order to clothe themselves, each family would con-
tain also shoemakers, taylors, &c. For such classes of people could
not in our supposition possibly exist; How, for example, could a
shoemaker exchange a pair of shoes so as to procure twenty different
things which he may want? How could the farmer dispose of his
horse so as to procure the various things necessary for his family?
What we have said of these two, may be applied equally to every
other case, which evidently proves that all the inhabitants of the
earth would be reduced to the several classes abovementioned. From
whence it follows that the number of people now employed in the
various arts, manufactures, trade and navigation could not exist, con-
sequently we conclude, that the number of inhabitants will, ceteris
paribus, be in proportion to the quantity of circulation. The history
of mankind proves the truth of this conclusion, let us suppose, that
London or Paris was instantly deprived of all circulation. I ask, what
would be the consequence? I say, that those, who now bring pro-
visions of every kind would cease to do it, because it would be impos-
sible for them to exchange them for the productions of art, these
therefore must instantly separate, and become farmers in order to
procure their subsistance. It is impossible to form the productions of
art, labour, &c. in such proportions as to make them exactly, nor
even nearly equivalent to the various articles an individual may want:
How would you pay a labourer of any kind? From what we have
said, it seems evident, that the population of the antients was no
iii. population is in proportion to circulation 279
way comparable to ours. The north of Europe, had, a few centuries

ago, scarce any circulation, and therefore could nourish only few
inhabitants, and these being employed in agriculture, feeding their
flocks, &c. occupied necessarily a great extent of country and pro-
vided only for their own subsistance, whereas now, by the help of
circulation, a prodigious number inhabit towns who are nourished
by the farmers. If all those were to leave their respective professions,
and become farmers, it is certain they would for the most part per-
ish, for it cannot be supposed, the farmers would feed them gratis,
or supply them with the means to cultivate the ground.
The history of mankind proves the truth of our doctrine. Every
country in Europe is peopled in proportion to the quantity of cir-
culation. Let us compare England, Holland, and France, with Spain,
Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Russia and Turkey, and we shall find
that the population of the first is infinitely superior to that of the
last; from whence we may justly conclude that the population is in
proportion to the quantity of circulation; consequently that Europe
is now much more peopled than formerly, hence it is that Asia has
been, and always will be more peopled than most other countries:
the fertility of the soil, the softness of the climate, and the quantity
of metals enable many people to live in a small space, and popula-
tion will decrease where these circumstances are wanting; It follows
therefore, that Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland, neither have
been, nor ever can be peopled in the same degree, as England,
Holland and Venice. There are now ten towns for one that was ten
centuries ago; we are therefore surprised, how so many learned men
could imagine that our population declines.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE INDUSTRY OF A NATION, WILL BE IN

PROPORTION TO THE QUANTITY OF CIRCULATION
Industry in general, and arts, manufactures, commerce, and naviga-

tion in particular, will be in an inverse ratio to the space, which a
given number of men occupy: however rapid and swift the circula-
tion of a piece of money may be, it requires time to pass from one
to another; during this interval, exchanges must be made in nature,
which being impossible in a great measure, it is evident, that every
individual must remain satisfied with what he possesses, and conse-
quently industry must cease, a whole day would not be sufficient for
a man to dispose of a horse, cow, &c. in such a manner as to pro-
cure the articles he may want. There are daily brought to London
provisions to an immense value, the tenth part of which is not taken
in productions, nor one exchanged. It follows therefore, that if cir-
culation was to cease, the inhabitants must instantly separate, and
disperse; consequently that part of national industry depends intirely
on circulation, and agriculture in a great measure, because the farmer
cultivates his lands, and feeds his flocks in proportion, as he can dis-
pose of them, and as this will depend upon circulation, it is evident,
that every species of industry will be in an inverse ratio to the space
a given number of men occupy. Because in this as in mechanics,
the celerity of motion will be in that proportion; the more therefore
mankind is despersed, the slower will be circulation, and the less will
be their industry. Moreover, it is only by the means of circulation
that you can unite in a small space, such quantities of provisions,
merchandize, &c. as will maintain, and provide for a great number
of people: it is for this reason, that all arts, manufactures, &c. are
inclosed in towns, and are carried to great perfection, whereas they
diminish in proportion as mankind is dispersed, insomuch that one
may affirm, there would not be upon the face of the earth, one sin-
gle town of a thousand inhabitants if circulation ceased, in fact this
is the case in every country which has no money, as in North-
America and the northern provinces of Russia and Sweden, where
the inhabitants are dispersed over an immense space, in which there
iv. the industry of a nation 281
is not one considerable village. In all Siberia there is but one town
of any note; and in both the Laplands not one; and in all North-
America, excepting the European settlements there are not as many
inhabitants as in the single county of York; from what has been said,
it follows that extensive empires have, in proportion, less industry
than those who are less so; compare Holland, with Russia and Turkey
and you will find that the industry of the former though infinitely
less populous and extensive, is however much greater than the lat-
ter, the more mankind is contracted, the greater will be their wants,
and the greater will be their efforts to satisfy them, which will depend
intirely upon circulation and the facility of exchanging their mutual
productions; we shall therefore conclude that the industry of a nation
is in proportion to the quantity of circulation; however, we must
confess that this consequence admits of an exception, which is, that
the quantity of industry is limited, because a given number of men
can produce or consume but a given quantity of industry; whereas
circulation may increase ad infinitum. But we think it seldom happens
that in any country whatever, industry has been carried to the utmost
limits either in quantity or quality, and therefore we must adhere to
the principles we have established, viz. industry and circulation will
increase together.
Having shewn that mankind is industrious in proportion as they
are contracted, it follows, that in order to promote arts, manufactures,
&c. you must unite them, and facilitate the communication between
them. The invention of posts, paper-currency and navigation, have
been the real cause, at least the principal, one of European indus-
try, which alone proves, that the antients destitute of these succours,
were in this respect, as well as in population infinitely inferior to us.
Europe produces now twenty times more corn and cattle than it did
ten centuries ago, which, we necessarily suppose, are consumed. Al-
though metals are a principal spring of commerce, paper-currency
is much more so because it can with greater facility be transported
from one country to another, which in some measure contracts
mankind and increases their wants and industry: for this reason the
people who are situated upon the sea coasts, lakes and navigable
rivers, are more industrious and rich than those who inhabit the
mountains and interior provinces of the continent. If Carthage, Athens,
and Holland had been situated a hundred miles from the coast,
probably they never would have formed a people, much less arrived
to that degree of riches and power which justly excites our admiration.
The Swiss will never be rich; nor will they ever have arts or man-
ufactures but in a very limited degree, being separated by high and
inaccessible mountains, the communication between the different peo-
ple, is interrupted during a great part of the year, each village forms
a tribe, and must find within itself wherewith to subsist, or perish,
as they can draw no succours from their neighbours, though but a
few miles distant: it is for this reason, as we have already observed,
that great empires for want of an easy and speedy communication
between their different parts, have very little industry: and it will be
in vain to attempt to inspire them with a taste for labour, when
they can satisfy their wants by hunting, fishing, &c. sloth and poverty
will be in proportion to the extent of ground which a people occupy.
Look at Spain, Russia and Turkey and you will see an immense
country uncultivated; to what purpose has Russia above twenty mil-
lions of subjects, the greatest part of whom are dispersed upon an
immense space of sterile and uncultivated land without towns, vil-
lages, arts, or manufactures, and here and there only a few miser-
able cottages, whose possessors can, with difficulty, procure wherewith
to subsist, much less superfluities, from which alone government can
draw any advantage. While they continue thus dispersed in a mis-
erable country, covered with snow, and deprived of light a great
part of the year, it is impossible that the natural productions, or
those of art, can nourish a great number of people or animals, which
can neither subsist, nor increase, but in proportion to the facility of
providing themselves with the necessaries of life. In the northern cli-
mates, as well as near the line, the earth is in general sterile. The
extremes of heat and cold are equally hurtful to vegetation; it is in
vain therefore to expect industry and an increase of population from
people in this situation. That great and immortal Empress of Russia
[Catherine II, the Great] who makes it her glory to promote the
happiness and welfare of her subjects, will never succeed in her
attempt while they are thus dispersed, and separated from each other;
she must contract them into a narrow space, and fix them upon the
coasts of the Caspian and Black seas, and upon the navigable rivers,
which will facilitate the communication between them; from hence
their wants will increase, and their industry, in order to satisfy them:
all other means to enforce industry will be vain and fruitless; laws
and institutions may, and ought to direct the actions of mankind,
but cannot in any degree produce them. It is likewise in vain to
expect industry where liberty and property are precarious; it is upon
iv. the industry of a nation 283
this principle that the great Empress we have mentioned, and who
is justly the object of our respect and admiration, had ordered a
code of laws, as the only means to promote arts and industry; but
we humbly presume to assure her Majesty that without civil liberty
there can be no industry, Slavery and commerce are incompatible.
CHAPTER FIVE
OF THE ABSOLUTE FORCE OF A NATION
We have said The absolute force, because the relative force of a people,
will depend upon their situation, quality of productions, and various
other circumstances compared with those of the neighbouring nations.
We have already shewn that circulation is in an inverse ratio of the
space occupied by a given number of people, it is evident, that the
force of a people will be in the same proportion because the more
they are united the greater will be the quantity of action; this propo-
sition is equally true in the moral and physical world; an army of
an hundred thousand men will conquer a nation consisting of mil-
lions; all the great conquests particularly those of the Tartars under
Genxis Kan1 and other leaders were made by a handful of men,
compared with the vanquished nations; it is upon this principle that
the Tyrians, the Athenians, the Carthaginians and the people of
Marseilles among the antients; the English and Dutch among the
moderns, have made such extraordinary efforts against the most pow-
erful princes in the world; whereas great and extensive empires have
upon every occasion made but a feeble and inconsiderable resistance;
the Persians were conquered by thirty thousand men,2 Russia had
like to have shared the same fate when attacked by Charles the
Twelfth.3 Two or three battles decide the fate of great empires
because the whole force of the state, is concentrated in the army; if
this is beat the ruin of the empire is inevitable, it is for this reason
that the wars undertaken against great kingdoms are generally of
short duration, whereas those among the Greeks and Europeans,
whose states are less extensive, last several years. The subjects of a
great empire are too poor and too much dispersed to be collected
for the support of the state when once thrown into confusion. It was
1
Genghis Khan (1162–1227).
2
Reference to Alexander the Great’s Macedonian army that conquered Persia
3
Charles XII (r. 1697–1718), King of Sweden. A bold, daring military genius,
Charles triggered the Great Northern War against Russia and nearly overthrew
Peter the Great at the Battle of Narva (1700). Victory proved chimerical as attri-
tion and indecision marked the conflict Sweden sued for peace in 1720.
v. of the absolute force of a nation 285
with infinite difficulty that the Romans vanquished the Carthaginians,

but they only appeared in Asia, and made the conquest of it. It is
objected that the poor have in general conquered the rich, I answer
that the rich nations of antiquity were commonly occupied in trade
and commerce, which necessarily employed so many of the inhabi-
tants, that few could be disposed of in the defence of their country
without exhausting the very source of their power; moreover it is
not generally true, nor is it possible that the poor can vanquish the
rich, provided these do not occupy an extensive country. The sev-
eral people of antiquity we have already mentioned prove it; the
Athenians and Tyrians defended their country with a vigour not to
be found in the history of poorer nations, the Carthaginians when
reduced to their walls did the same; and so have in general all the
small and rich republics of antiquity. What could a million of bar-
barians do against France or Germany? Nothing; fifty thousand of
our troops would disperse them like sheep. When the northern peo-
ple over-ran the Roman empire, the extent of it was so great that
it was not possible to collect such a number of soldiers as were nec-
essary to defend it equally on every part, so that they penetrated
wherever they presented themselves; by this means the chain was
broke and the communication between the different provinces of the
empire intercepted, so that they could not mutually succour each
other; we therefore conclude that the Asiatic and Roman empires
were vanquished not because they were too rich, but too extensive.
In very great kingdoms, the chief is only rich, and corrupted, the
subjects must be miserable; a nation is not rich when the prince has
millions, on the contrary it is so when he has nothing and the sub-
jects a great deal; from the principles we have established, we con-
clude that extensive empires must continue to make conquests, because
the instant they stop they will find it impossible to preserve them:
a hundred thousand men will easily add conquest to conquest, and
by that means preserve their frontiers, but if they are separated they
will be incapable of making any where a solid resistance. The Turks
have always been upon the decline, since they have abandoned the
projects conquest. A hundred thousand Russians, if no power inter-
poses will easily put an end to the Ottoman empire;4 it is likewise
4
The Russo-Turkish War (1768–74) raged at the time of this publication. Catherine
appointed Lloyd Major-General in 1772. He partook in the final military campaign
in 1774 and commanded the Russian divisions that besieged Silistria.
upon these principles, as we conceive, that the French always begin

their wars by marching into the enemy’s country, by which means
one considerable army suffices to defend their own, whereas three
times the number would not be sufficient, if contracted within their
own frontiers.
CHAPTER SIX
LIBERTY IS IN PROPORTION TO THE EQUALITY, AND

DESPOTISM TO THE INEQUALITY OF CIRCULATION
An extensive circulation will in a short time become unequal, espe-

cially in very civilized nations, where in general, hereditary succes-
sions, and testaments take place, so that in a little time circulation
will be unequally divided, and the more it is so, the fewer will be
the number of the rich, and the greater that of the poor. That
inequality of riches, necessarily produces an inequality of power. It
is from this principle that republics, and free governments degener-
ate in proportion as they grow rich, and are finally overthrown,
when the riches and power which should be equally divided between
all those who form the legislative authority are concentrated in few
persons only. In monarchies an inequality of circulation and power
is a necessary consequence of that species of government, because
the monarch alone having the power of levying taxes, and of employ-
ing such as he pleases in all the different departments, it follows evi-
dently, that none can be either rich or powerful but such as are
dependent upon, and connected with the court; hence that abject
slavery, intrigue and dissimulation which characterizes that class of
men called, Courtiers; as they have no power nor scarce existence
but what is derived from the imperial nod. It is plain that in such
a constitution there is no man, nor body of men, who can, or will
oppose the violence and tyranny of the monarch. In despotic gov-
ernments the inequality of power and riches is extreme; the despot
is the sole possessor of every thing, insomuch that all power and
riches are annexed to personal employments which he can give and
take away at will, and so reduce in an instant any subject to a non-
existence; it is upon this principle, that in such governments there
can be no hereditary honours and successions, nor any general laws
to secure the person and property of individuals. The existence of
the one and the other depend upon the precarious will of the tyrant,
whose poisoned breath taints and infects the source of industry, inso-
much that the traces of it cannot be distinguished in their extensive
and sterile dominions. The progress of human affairs, seem to advance
in the following manner, poverty produces industry, from whence

riches flow and an inequality of fortunes, which produces despotism;
from whence a general poverty ensues never to be over-come: his-
tory informs us, that the poor republicks of antiquity preserved their
constitution longer than the others, as well against their fellow citi-
zens as strangers. It was upon these principles, that Lycurgus estab-
lished a general poverty, and consequently, a general equality among
the members of the republic, which preserved it free from interior
corruption and from the mighty efforts of powerful enemies for the
space of seven hundred years; nor was this famous republick at last
overthrown till the Asiatic gold had corrupted the principles of the
constitution. Athens on the contrary, forced by the sterility and small-
ness of its territories, and invited by its situation on the coast, to
trade and navigation, soon became rich, whence followed and inequal-
ity of riches, which produced faction and discord, and therefore was
continually tore and weakened by these, and at last fell a victim to
her enemies. Carthage enjoyed her liberty for a long time, because
the spirit of commerce maintained a certain equality and riches
between the citizens. At length however this equality ceased and con-
sequently the whole power of the republic was concentrated in a
few of the principal families and every thing was governed by the
caprice of the prevailing faction, so that the principles of the con-
stitution were destroyed, and even, had not the Romans interfered,
some ambitious citizen aided by his faction, would have made him-
self master of the republic; as it happened to Rome, which from the
time of Marius ceased to be free. England, being become rich, is
continually exposed to factions: its vast circulation has produced a
great inequality of fortunes and with it a general corruption of man-
ners. While few are rich, the number of the poor will be extreme,
these will necessarily be depraved, those not less so, with every addi-
tion of insolence, vice and folly, which their riches enable them to
gratify, till at length they are finally equally reduced to poverty,
which renders them the proper instruments of tyranny and oppres-
sion, ready to sacrifice the liberty of their fellow subjects. Had Holland
been formed of one single republic, and not of such a complicated
confederation, and had her dominions been more extensive, the great
quantity of circulation would long since have been concentered in
few persons who would easily have overturned the constitution. Before
the discovery of America and the Golden Coast, all the states of
vi. liberty is in proportion to the equality 289
Europe were more or less free: armies were very small and could
be maintained and kept together, but for a few days only; scarce
were they assembled when the want of money obliged the sovereign
to disband them; arts and manufactures were almost unknown and
consequently agriculture had made little progress. The feudal system
prevailed in all the monarchies of Europe, the rest of its inhabitants
were divided into small republics excepting Venice, Florence, Genoa,
and Pisa, whose situation enabled them to carry on, almost the whole
commerce of Europe and Asia: scarce did the gold and silver of
America appear, when the feudal government began to decline and
in a few years totally vanished, so that at present there remain no
traces of it, excepting in Russia, Poland and some provinces of
Germany whose situation made it impossible for the American gold
to penetrate in great quantities, consequently the sovereigns of those
countries till of late could not maintain sufficient armies, to oppress
their subjects; all the small republics are vanished, and without being
a prophet, we may venture to foretell, that in less than a century
there will not be above seven or eight sovereignties in all Europe
where formerly there were above a thousand; we will therefore con-
clude that liberty is in proportion to the equality of circulation; for
where all are equally rich or equally poor, they must me equally
powerful; on the contrary where one only is rich, the rest must be
slaves.
It follows, that those people who do not know the use of money
must be free, which truth is proved by the history of mankind, and
vice versa. Asia, fertile in all the productions of the earth, and par-
ticularly in precious metals, exhibits the most ancient, and most
extensive empires in the world; it is from thence that the arts, sci-
ences, and conquests proceeded. As their circulation and consequently
industry and population greatly increased, for the reason we have
assigned, the inhabitants were obliged to extend themselves in search
of new establishments; being confined on the south, and east by the
sea, they advanced to the north and west, and forced all those peo-
ple they found in their progress either to submit or quit their coun-
try, being too poor and dispersed to make any resistance; this we
think the true cause of those transmigrations which successively over-
ran and desolated Europe, part of Africa, and the western parts of
Asia. The history of that country during this period, would be very
interesting. The northern people originally poor and dispersed into
small tribes, consisting of hunters, and pastors, were, in quitting their

country, forced to unite and seek out new settlements. Being thus
united, they formed several immense bodies, too formidable to be
opposed by the poor and dispersed inhabitants; so that in a very
short time they over-ran all Europe; at length, the want of money
to keep them united, forced them to stop and form colonies, or
rather kingdoms, in the conquered countries, whose inhabitants for
the most part were reduced to slavery, and attached to the lands.
The several chiefs of northern tribes had districts appropriated to
them, and their followers, which we think was the origin of the feu-
dal government and of military tenure; we may affirm, that wher-
ever such a constitution has been established, the country has been
conquered; and that great part of the inhabitants, particularly the
nobility, are of foreign extraction; in this species of government, when
any enterprize was to be undertaken, it was necessary to consult the
several chiefs, without whose concurrence and assistance it could not
be executed; as the whole force of the nation was in their hands,
nothing could be done without them. Hence the origin of parlia-
ments. As the vanquished nations were divided into large districts
among the chiefs and their followers, they were too powerful to be
controuled by the prince, whose revenues were very limited, having
only his particular domain to support him. Hence arose those con-
tinual wars between barons; sometimes among themselves, and often
against their prince. Hence those civil wars, which for many years
desolated Europe, and destroyed every species of industry: at length
the introduction of circulation supplied the sovereign with the means
to form, and maintain regular armies, and raised a third class of
inhabitants, who by their industry had acquired riches and power,
and by degrees, formed a barrier against the insolence and tyranny
of the nobles, as in England in particular. Hence a more regular
and consistent form of government was established. In some coun-
tries liberty was fixed upon a permanent foundation, in others the
armies were employed to subdue, equally the nobles, and the rest
of the subjects; upon this increase of circulation, the feudal govern-
ment, as well as the smaller principalities disappeared in general,
and they decline every where, in proportion to the quantity of cir-
culation; for these reasons there were but two empires in America
when first discovered; that of Peru, and Mexico, whose rich pro-
ductions and great quantity of metals, enabled their respective sov-
ereigns to maintain constantly considerable armies, with whom they

extended their conquests. The remainder of that immense continent
was chiefly inhabited by savages, dispersed in small tribes, occupied
in hunting: the only regular governments besides the two above men-
tioned, were the republic of Tlascala, between Vera Cruz and Mexico;
and that of Arauca, between Lima and Quito, whose mountainous
situation had enabled them to preserve their liberty against the mighty
power of the two empires we have mentioned. From all which we
conclude, that whenever circulation becomes very great and unequal,
despotism will necessarily follow, whatever may be the climate, because
one person may, by a thousand accidents, be possessed of a sufficient
quantity of money to maintain armies, and force his fellow citizens
to obedience and dependency; and for a contrary reason, where cir-
culation is wanting, it will be impossible for any one person to pos-
sess the means sufficient to make himself the master of others. We
cannot therefore account for the infatuation of the celebrated Montes-
quieu, who says, that climate alone is the cause of that difference,
which we observe in the manners, customs, and governments of var-
ious nations. Our astonishment increases when we see that the direct
contrary is in general true, insomuch that the climate can have no
other influence but to furnish a greater or lesser facility of subsist-
ing. Circulation alone will, for the reasons we have adduced, form
a despotic government under the poles. All Greece was free, so was
Italy, Spain, France, England, Germany, and all the northern coun-
tries without exception; at present many are subject to the most
despotic governments, and the rest much less free than formerly, the
climate is the same, whence then comes this change? from circula-
tion, which already has in many countries, and no doubt will, in
less than a century, reduce all the rest to servitude.
If in a democracy, the quantity of circulation is great, and con-
sequently unequal, the principles of the constitution will soon be cor-
rupted. The whole power of the state will be centered in a few
persons, whereas it should be distributed equally, among all those
who partake of the legislative authority. This is the case with Geneva,
where industry has produced a great and unequal circulation. The
council of twenty-five had usurped the whole authority of the state,
and has brought it several times on the brink of destruction: to which
the French have greatly contributed by supporting the council against
the inhabitants, and had they prevailed, they thought it would be
easy according to the maxim of Machiavell1—Few are corrupted by

few—to open a communication over the lake of Geneva, into Savoy
and Piedmont. Peace is now restored, but cannot last, unless some
method be found to establish a general, and equal circulation, it will
soon degenerate into an aristocracy and oligarchy, and finally fall a
victim to some powerful citizen, or foreign enemy, who will avail
himself of their intestine quarrells, and subdue them: This has, and
always will be the fate of democracies.
In an aristocracy, where circulation is become unequal, and con-
sequently some few families are grown too powerful, these must be
employed in expensive employments in order to reduce them to an
equality with their fellow citizens. The Venetians adopt this maxim.
The most honourable employments are less lucrative than the oth-
ers; by which means, a certain equality is preserved, and at the same
time the poorer nobles are enabled to support themselves with proper
dignity. The Ostracism at Athens, was formed on this same princi-
ple; in general, we may establish as a fundamental maxim, in a free
government, that a perfect equality should be preserved among the
different bodies, who form the legislative power: whenever we devi-
ate from this principle the balance is lost, and the constitution sub-
verted. In every species of government, the good and prudent sovereign
will endeavour to promote a general circulation among his subjects,
and prevent any of them from growing to powerful, because the
national industry will depend upon it.
In England and Holland the quantity of circulation is probably
too great, which enhances the price of provisions, manufactures, &c.
as we shall shew hereafter, and will in time diminish foreign con-
sumption. The Dutch have obtained, in a great measure, the evils
which proceed from too great a circulation, and have kept the prices
low compared to us. 1, They are very parsimonious. 2, They have
accumulated prodigious sums in the bank of Amsterdam, where it
lies dormant, as if it did not exist. 3, They lend money to foreign-
ers: and, 4, They export a great quantity of silver into Asia, by
which means they are still enabled to carry on their foreign trade
at a cheap rate. Our luxury, on the contrary, increases daily as well
as our debts and taxes, which necessarily raises the price of labour,
and will finally ruin our foreign trade.
1
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527).
Though a great circulation must be attended with these conse-

quences, we think however, that in a poor country the sovereign
should introduce paper-currency, though he may not want money,
because without a certain circulation, industry must be very limited.
But in this case he must never assign the public funds to pay the
interest, as many have done, because the creditor will become a
monopolist and a tyrant. The prince will be no longer master of his
subjects, and in a short time will find himself, without any national
fund clear. If there is little circulation in a country, the coin must
be divided into small parts, in order to facilitate the exchange between
the subjects. Nothing can be more prejudicial to commerce in a poor
country, than large coins, as the quadruple in Spain, the three pound
twelves in Portugal, and the double souveraine in Austria; because
they can with difficulty be changed, so that very often a person can-
not buy what he stands in need of, for want of smaller pieces.
CHAPTER SEVEN
LUXURY, CORRUPTION OF MANNERS AND

NATIONAL POVERTY ARE IN PROPORTION
TO THE INEQUALITY OF CIRCULATION
A great inequality of fortunes necessarily implies a national and gen-

eral poverty. Some few, will have infinitely more than they want,
while the remainder can have only what they procure by their indus-
try, and as this is precarious, the least accident, the least interrup-
tion in trade, will reduce them to misery. The few who are rich are
naturally inclined, by the general principle of self-love and vanity,
to distinguish themselves in the enjoyment of every species of
superfluities,1 while the poor, who has no property but his labour,
will endeavour to apply it to the greatest advantage, and conse-
quently prefers the arts of luxury to those of necessity, because the
first are much more lucrative than the last. As it is impossible to
give employment to every one, many will want bread, the women
in particular; some out of necessity, but more from their natural
propensity to ease and voluptuousness will give their whole atten-
tion to attract the eyes of the rich: hence luxury, corruption of man-
ners, and general poverty, rise gradually from democracies to despotism.
It is true, that in the last, fear obliges the great to dissemble, and
confine their luxury within doors, but we may be assured, that this
constraint, so far from diminishing on the contrary increases it. Hence
that great number of slaves of all kinds in despotic governments. In
public the rich are not to be distinguished from the poor: it is dan-
gerous to excite the curiosity and attention of the despot; safety con-
sists in being apparently confounded with the vulgar: it is for this
reason, that the manners and dress of the orientals have been the
same without any variation for some thousand years. In monarchies,
where a certain degree of liberty prevails, the natural vanity of
mankind, will make them exert it in dress, equipages, and exterior
1
An early definition of conspicuous consumption.
vii. luxury 295
shew: hence the variation and changes which we observe in the fash-
ions, it is only by such external signs that a man can distinguish
himself. The great and sublime is prohibited, they will therefore
excell in trifles.
CHAPTER EIGHT
ARTS AND SCIENCES ARE IN A COMPOUND RATIO OF

THE QUANTITY OF CIRCULATION AND LIBERTY
Arts are the necessary consequence of luxury and riches, and exactly
proportioned to them, as we have already proved; poor nations have
never known them but in a limited degree. The sciences require
time, application, an easy fortune, and encouragement. Where cir-
culation is great all these circumstances concur to promote them.
The rich out of real taste or vanity protect and sometimes support
men of letters, and so they become an object of luxury, but never
the cause of it, as the famous Rousseau will have it.1 The Spartans
and Romans, ’till they became rich with the spoils of Asia, had nei-
ther arts nor sciences; nor the Swiss, excepting in the rich cantons.
As sciences will depend upon circulation and liberty, it is evident,
that in absolute monarchies some branches will be more cultivated
than others. The abstract sciences, and works of taste, will arrive to
great perfection, their stile will in general be correct and elegant,
their compositions exact; but in free monarchies, where individuals
enjoy a greater degree of liberty, they will excel not only in the
abstract sciences, but in history and eloquence, their compositions
will be less correct, but more vigorous; they will be distinguished,
rather by the energy than by the harmony of their diction. The his-
tory of literature proves the truth of our principles. The French have
no production to be compared with Clarendon, Hume, Robertson,
and the debates of our national assemblies.
1
See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondemens de l’inégalité parmi
les hommes (1755).
CHAPTER NINE
THE PRICE OF ANY MERCHANDIZE WHATEVER, IS IN

AN INVERSE RATIO OF ITS QUANTITY, THAT IS, THE
LESS THERE IS OF ANY COMMODITY BROUGHT TO
MARKET, THE DEARER IT WILL BE, AND VICE VERSA
If, for example, fifty bushels of wheat only, are brought to market,
and there is an absolute call for a hundred, it is evident, the price
will increase in that proportion.
Let us suppose, that the whole mass of national productions,
whether natural or artificial, be divided into a given number of parts,
and likewise that the money and paper-currency be also divided into
a given number of equal parts, so that one or more of these corre-
spond to one of those. The number of the parts of money, or paper,
which are to be given in exchange for any commodity is what we
call the price of it; from this definition it follows, that by increasing,
or diminishing the quantity of paper currency (which I shall here-
after denominate by the general term circulation) or that of the com-
modities, the price or ratio between them will vary, in proportion to
that increase or diminution, consequently it is impossible to fix it,
without prejudicing the buyer or seller.
Though the price of any commodity is in fact in a compound ratio,
direct s the quantity of circulation, and inverse of that of merchan-
dize, yet it may be simplified, and reduced to the expression we
have adopted, because it is the same thing, whether you increase
the circulation, or diminish the quantity of merchandize, or that you
increase this, and diminish that;
For example,
Let circulation be expressed by C, and the quantity of merchan-
dize by M, and the price or proportion between them by p; we shall
have the following equation, MC = P .
Now if CM==101 , we shall have p = 10, that is, ten portions of cir-
culation will correspond to each portion of M.
If as we have supposed C = 10, is multiplied by ten, we shall
C = 10 ⋅ 10
have the following equation, viz. M = p ⋅ 10 = 100 , that is the price of M
will increase ten times what it was before.
If on the contrary, C is diminished to the tenth part of what it

C =
10
was, we shall have the following equation, M = = 1 , that is, M will
10
p
10
be worth only one part of C.
We shall have exactly the same equations, if M be multiplied or
divided in the same proportions, C remaining the same.
Let M be divided by ten, we shall have C = 10 = p ⋅ 10 = 10 ⋅ 10 = 100 : p,
M
10
being as we suppose, equal to ten.
Let M, on the contrary, be multiplied by ten, then, we shall have
C = 10 p
= = 1 , that is, one part only of C corresponds to M, whose value
M 10 10
is diminished in proportion, as its quantity is increased; consequently
the price of M, will be in an inverse ratio of its quantity, compared
with that of circulation, we shall therefore include all the variations
in the price of M, in the two following formularies.
Let the proportion between M and C, be p, and let the augmen-
tation or diminution of M, be called y; then we shall have the fol-
C
lowing equations, viz. MC = P ; MC⋅ y = py ; = p ⋅ y .
M
y
Many learned authors have pretended that it is not true, that the
price of merchandize has increased in proportion to the increase of
circulation, because say they, This has increased above twenty times
since the discovery of America, whereas the price of merchandize
has not increased ten times since that period: to which I answer,
that it is very true, but proves nothing at all; they should have shewn,
that there is now twenty times more circulation than industry and
merchandize, which is by no means the case. If the quantity of cir-
culation has been much increased, that of industry has also; more-
over, a prodigious quantity of money has been exported out of
Europe, and converted into plate, lace, &c. so that what remains is
by no means equal to what has been drawn from America; for which
reasons, the price of merchandizes cannot be increased in propor-
tion to the quantity of metals imported into Europe, but in pro-
portion to what actually circulates, there, including paper currency.
The truth of our principles is demonstrated by experience. In all
capital towns the circulation is much greater than in the distant
provinces, and for this very reason, every thing is dearer in pro-
portion. The same thing happens, in comparing different nations
with each other. In France the quantity of circulation compared to
that of England is nearly one half, and we find that the price of
provisions, labour, &c. is also in that proportion. In Spain it is nearly
the same, and would probably be more so, if for many reasons, their
ix. the price of any merchandize 299
industry did not fall short of what otherwise it would be, which
increases the price of labour, provisions, &c.
Having shewn that the price of merchandizes increases in pro-
portion to circulation, it follows that in great towns the price may
grow to such a pitch, as to destroy industry, by diminishing our
domestic and foreign consumption, and particularly this last, because
foreigners, whose circulation is less than ours will be able to under-
sell us, which is the case between the French and us. The only
method to remedy this evil would be, to diminish the taxes upon
the articles of general consumption, and by every means prevent the
increase of the capital, and procure a more equal and general cir-
culation; scarce any manufactures should be carried on, in or near
the capital, but as near as may be to the places where the mate-
rials are found, and upon navigable rivers or near them. The col-
lectors of the land tax, and other duties, should not remit the money
to London but should pay it immediately to the regiments in the
counties where they are quartered, and also to the public works at
Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c. By this means, the money would remain
in the country, and the expence of offices, remitting backwards and
forwards, be saved. In France the cities make interest with the min-
istry to have troops quartered among them, in order to procure a
greater circulation. Perhaps some method might be found to regu-
late the quartering of our troops upon a footing that would make
it an advantage instead of a burthen upon the subject.
Among the numberless evils, which the increase of the capital pro-
duces, the most fatal, no doubt, is the decrease of agriculture; arts
and manufactures increase in proportion to the number of its inhab-
itants, which must be supplied from the country, hence the burials
surpass the births yearly by some thousands. The prodigious num-
ber of servants and horses in and about London, consume every
thing within eighty or a hundred miles, which increases the price,
as well for the carriage, as because almost every article passes through
a variety of hands, before it comes to market. It is said, that the
persons now in London are maintained by the distant counties, and
therefore consume here what they would consume there; this is true,
but for the reasons we have assigned, there is an immense difference
between consuming the provisions at London, or on the spot. This
evil might be diminished had we a good inland navigation. At pre-
sent the counties which lay very far from London, cannot possibly
send their productions there, and therefore they will cultivate only
what is necessary for their consumption, and so, a bad harvest will
reduce them to famine. The farmer finds it more his interest to feed
cattle than plow his ground, because he can easily transport them
wherever he pleases. The great increase of our arts, manufactures
and navigation had greatly diminished the population in the coun-
try, insomuch that I am persuaded a much less quantity of ground
is tilled now than formerly, which is the real reason why corn is
grown so dear; and if London goes on increasing as it has done,
within these twenty years past, corn will become so dear, that in the
end our manufactures will decline, and finally our foreign trade must
be ruined. In short I conclude, that we cannot diminish the price
but by increasing the quantity of provisions, and diminishing the
quantity of circulation, and this can be effected only by separating
the people, by far too numerous in London. I know it will be said,
that they can no longer subsist there; it is true, but it will be then
too late, and our foreign trade will be ruined before that happens.
The number of men-servants and of horses, must be diminished; a
high tax upon them, and upon wheel-carriages would produce this
effect, and furnish a great supply to government, at the expence of
vanity and folly.
CHAPTER TEN
THE PRICE OF METALS COMPARED TO EACH

OTHER, IS IN AN INVERSE RATIO OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE QUANTITIES
Let us suppose that there are in England fourteen ounces of silver

to one of gold. It is plain that this ratio of one to fourteen, may, by
diminishing or increasing either of the metals, change, and conse-
quently it is impossible to fix exactly the ratio between them: how-
ever, as in a few years this variation is not very considerable, for
the greater facility of commerce it is necessary that the prince should
fix the value of the respective coins, and the more so, as it would
be impossible for the people in general to prevent impositions, were
metals given out by weight only. Moreover, where various metals
are current, the prince could not fix the quantity of taxes without
settling at the same time the ratio between such metals, whether he
receives them by weight, or by nominal quantities; if, for example,
he orders a certain number of pounds weight of gold to be levied,
it is evident he cannot receive it in silver, unless the ratio between
them is fixed, and vice versa. But if there is only one species of met-
als current, he then could receive it by weight; in this case, how-
ever, a coinage would be necessary, in order to ascertain the weight
of each piece. Even where a variety of metals are current, perhaps
it would be more useful to distinguish each piece by its weight, than
by a particular denomination. Whether there is one or more species
of metals current in a country, it is impossible to derive any great
advantage from them, nor can they have an universal course unless
their respective value is determined; consequently coinage has been
established in every civilized nation, in order to determine precisely
the ratio between the respective metals, if however, this ratio, estab-
lished by public authority, is not founded upon the real proportion
between such metals, it is plain, that the one, or the other will be
extracted by foreigners, or melted down by the subject.
Let us suppose, for example, that the quantity of gold in a guinea,
is to the quantity of silver in one and twenty shillings, as one to
fifteen, and that the ratio between gold and silver bullion, is as one
to fourteen, it is evident, that the public by coining silver would lose

above six per cent. besides the expences of the Mint, and so in pro-
portion as the real ratio between gold and silver differs from that
established by public authority. If on the contrary, the real ratio
between gold and silver, in bullion, be as one to sixteen, and that
between gold and silver coin, only as one to fifteen, it is plain, that
in coining gold the public will lose above six per cent. because you
buy gold at the rate of sixteen ounces of silver for the one of gold;
and then, as we have supposed, you give it out in coin, at the rate
of fifteen ounces for each ounce of gold: as in the first case, you
buy silver at the rate of fourteen ounces for one of gold, and then
give it out in coin, at the rate of fifteen ounces according to our
supposition. In the first case, all the coined silver would be extracted
and melted down, because in the market, as we suppose, a man can
have only fourteen ounces of silver for an ounce of gold, whereas
by buying the silver coin he can have fifteen. In the second case,
the same thing will happen to the gold coin, because in the market
he must give sixteen ounces of silver for one of gold; whereas in
coin he gives only fifteen. In the first case gold will be over-rated
six per cent. and in the second, silver in the same proportion nearly.
In the first, according to our supposition, as fifteen to fourteen, and
in the second, as sixteen to fifteen.
From this source arises the adulteration of the coins. In the first
case, says a man, I can for fourteen ounces of silver, in bullion, buy
one of gold, it is therefore worth my while to melt down the gold
and recoin it, because I shall receive fifteen ounces of silver in coin
for it, he is at the same time induced to add a few grains more
alloy to increase his gain, hence gold coin is oftener adulterated in
England, than the silver. In the second case the silver coin will be
adulterated, because he can buy sixteen ounces for one of gold in
bullion, whereas he gives it out, coined, at the rate of fifteen ounces,
as we have supposed.
Hence it follows, that if the ratio between the respective coins is
different from that which there is between the metals in bullion, the
one or the other of the species will be melted down, or extracted
by foreigners; if, for example, the ratio between the gold and silver,
is in general in Holland, as one to fourteen; while it is in England,
as one to fifteen, it is evident, that the Dutch will get above six per
cent. in exchanging their gold for our silver, and so in proportion,
as silver is dearer with them than with us. This, with the increase
x. the price of metals 303
of plate, and our exportations to China, is the reason of the great

scarcity of silver in England.
It is true that the Dutch give gold in exchange for our silver,
which in a little time would augment the price of gold with them,
and diminish that of silver, and so put them upon a level with us,
and the more so as by bringing their gold to England and drawing
our silver out of it, the first would become cheaper, and the other
dearer, which I believe is the case, comparing our bullion to theirs:
but while the coin is kept up in the same proportion as formerly, it
is plain, that the increase of gold, and the decrease of silver only
augments the evil; for, in proportion as silver in bullion grows dearer,
and gold cheaper, the more of the former will be melted down, and
extracted: the principles we have here established may be reduced
to the common formularies adopted in the preceding chapters.
Let the silver be expresses by S, and gold by G, and let the
ratio
S
between
D p S
them, be expressed by p; then we shall have,
1. = p; 2. = ; 3. = p;
G yG yG
y
the variation in the gold being expressed by y.
Let the ratio between the gold and silver coin, in England, be
expressed by GS = p , in Holland by r, and in France by x.
It is plain that when p is + or – than r, or x, our gold or silver
will be extracted, by one or the other of those two nations, partic-
ularly if that difference is considerable.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
OF COINAGE
The principles we have established in the preceding chapter, lead

us naturally to consider the doctrine of coinage—The fixing, by pub-
lic authority, a nominal proportion between the current coin—as, for exam-
ple, that a guinea should be worth one and twenty shillings, and
one shilling equal to twelve pence.
I have called it a nominal proportion, because in fact, it seldom
is exactly the same as metals in bullion bear to each other; all sov-
ereigns ass a certain quantity of alloy, in order to defray the expences
of the mint; to prevent the coin from wearing too soon; and some-
times to raise an extraordinary revenue. It were to be wished that
all princes would agree to fix the same proportion between their
respective coins, because it would greatly contribute to facilitate trade
between different nations, and prevent the coins being extracted by
foreigners, or melted down by the subject. When the quantity of
alloy is very considerable, many bad consequences will necessarily
follow, particularly adulteration of that species which is debased.
During the last war the King of Prussia debased gold and silver coin
above fifty per cent. which in fact was a momentary resource, raised
at the expence of those who received such coin directly from the
treasury; for the merchants lost nothing; on the contrary, they raised
the price of their goods above fifty per cent. As he refused to receive
his own coin in payments, and continued to coin for some years,
he augmented greatly his revenue, but it was at the expence of
Saxony and his own country, where the money was spent. His majesty
thought it would be more prudent to debase the coin than to raise
contributions equal to that sum; it was, however, attended with
infinite loss to the people, because all the good coin was extracted,
or melted down and debased by the Jews, as well as by his majesty,
and it will be many years before those countries can recover them-
selves. It is said, that the French gain eight per cent. by their silver
coinage, I am surprised there is any silver left in the kingdom; it
cannot be conceived that a man should carry his bullion to the mint,
and sell it at a loss of eight per cent. when by coining it himself he
xi. of coinage 305
could get that money without any detriment to the public, and con-
sidering the scarcity of silver both in Holland and England, he could
sell his bullion there at a much greater price than he can get at
home; I am therefore astonished our Jews do not buy silver in France,
when the profits are so great: possibly the mint pays the silver bul-
lion with gold coin, and that the proportion between these, is such,
as to indemnify the loss arising from the sale of silver: in this, and
indeed, in every other case, it is impossible to form any opinion,
unless we knew the proportion between the gold and silver in coin,
and in bullion; whatever the quantity of alloy may be, there will be
so much loss to the subject: I would therefore add so much alloy
only as is necessary to harden the coin, and the expences defrayed
by the government; we have already said, that the doctrine of coinage
depends intirely upon the real ratio between the metals in bullion; if
there was but one species current, and the prince added a very con-
siderable quantity of alloy, we think no man would carry his bul-
lion to the mint, and the nation would in short time be deprived of
all its metal; if on the contrary, there are several species of metals
current, then there will arise two cases, 1, Either a proportional
quantity of alloy is added to each, or, 2, it is not. In the first case,
supposing the alloy to be equal to five per cent. it is evident, that the
nominal ratio will be proportional to the real ratio, and both species
will be extracted, and sold to those nations, who will give more than
what the mint does, because five per cent. is a sufficient profit to
induce men to run the risk of coining secretly, or sending the met-
als abroad; it is therefore necessary that the quantity of alloy should
be so small, as to prevent it. If on the contrary the quantity of alloy
is not proportionally distributed, as, that in the silver coin it should
be five per cent. and in gold eight; it is clear that the nominal ratio,
is no longer the same as the real ratio, and that the gold coin is
over-rated in proportion as eight is to five, or three per cent. nearly;
and the silver under-rated in that proportion, consequently it will be
melted down and extracted by foreigners.
Supposing as in England we have three species of metals current,
you cannot over-rate one species without diminishing the value of
the other two, in the same proportion.
Let the real ratio between the current metals be the same as the
nominal, that is, a guinea be equal to one and twenty shillings, and
one shilling equal to twelve pence. If out of the quantity of the sil-
ver now divided into twenty shillings, one and twenty were to be
made, it is evident, gold and copper coin, would lose five per cent.
and that the prince would lose by these, what he gains by the sil-
ver. Moreover, he would only gain once in paying out the new sil-
ver coin, because he must receive it again at the same value, so that
upon the whole, this change in the coin produces great inconve-
niences, and no real advantage; for the quantity of silver in the mint
is never so considerable as to furnish any great sum by debasing it:
and if the prince buys silver bullion to new coin it, he must pay for
it in gold, by which he will lose, what he may gain by the other.
If instead of debasing the silver coin, the quantity now in a shilling
be increased one fourth, for example, it is evident, gold and copper
coin will gain in that proportion, supposing the nominal ratio con-
tinues the same. It would seem therefore, that no change should
ever be made in the current coin, and most authors, who have wrote
upon this subject are of that opinion. If we attend only as these gen-
tlemen have done to the ratio, which coins have to each other, with-
out comparing them with that which metals have in bullion, they
are in the right, because it is indifferent what ratio, a guinea has to
a certain number of shillings. If there was no bullion it would be
the same thing, in trade, whether it passes for twenty or thirty
shillings; but when coin is compared to bullion, it will appear, that
no change can be made in any one species without affecting all the
others. Indeed no idea can be formed of coin, otherwise than by
considering the proportion it has with bullion: According to the prin-
ciples we have established; the increase of silver, for example, will
diminish its value, and therefore changes the ratio between it and
gold in the same manner, as if it were debased by adding a greater
quantity of alloy. Let us suppose that the real ratio as well as nom-
inal ratio between gold and silver be as one to ten, it is evident, that
this ratio will be changed either by increasing or diminishing the
quantity of silver in bullion, or nominally, by ordering a given quan-
tity of gold to be worth more or less than ten times the quantity of
silver: in both cases the public would be equally affected, which the
authors who have wrote upon this matter do not seem to have under-
stood; they considered only the bad effects of changing the nominal
proportion between the respective coins, without reflecting that the
real proportion is equally changed by the increase or decrease of
one of the species in bullion, and that this change in the real pro-
portion will necessarily affect the public, in the same manner, as if
the nominal ratio had been changed by debasing one species of the
xi. of coinage 307
current coin. As the whole doctrine of coinage depends upon fixing

the ratio between the coins, and comparing it, with that which the
metals bear to each other we will illustrate this principle, by the fol-
lowing examples.
Let the ratio between the coins be equal to that between the met-
als in bullion, and be as 1:14.
Whatever the quantity of alloy may be, is of no consequence to
the public, in receiving the one or the other, excepting at the mint,
where, in selling his gold or silver a man must lose an equivalent
to the quantity of alloy; if this is very great, the coin will be adul-
terated, and no bullion brought to the mint, for the reason we have
already adduced, but no advantage or loss, can be made either by
the subject or foreigners, in receiving one coin preferable to another,
because an ounce of gold in coin, bears the same proportion to a
given quantity of silver coin, as these metals have in bullion, and
consequently you can buy no more bullion with one species of coin
than with another. If this ratio of 1:14, be changed by an increase
of bullion, and become as 1:15, and the ratio between the coins con-
tinues, as 1:14; it is evident, that the gold coin is under-rated, and
the silver one over-rated 1/15, or above six per cent. consequently
your gold coin will be extracted. The same thing will happen, if you
fix the nominal ratio between the coins as 1:13. The real ratio between
the metals in bullion continuing the same, the gold coin will be
under-rated, and the silver over-rated 1/13, which is near eight per
cent. consequently in this, as in the preceding case your gold coin
will be melted down and extracted by foreigners.
If the real ratio between metals in bullion, be as 1:14, and you
make the nominal ratio between the coins, as 1:15, it is evident, that
the gold coin is over-rated, and the silver under-rated 1/15, conse-
quently the silver coin will be melted down, and extracted. The same
thing will happen if the quantity of silver decreases, or that of gold
increases, so that the real proportion between them in bullion, is as
1:13, while the nominal ratio between those metals coined, is as 1:14,
it is evident, that the gold coin will be over-rated, and the silver
under-rated 1/13, consequently the silver coin will be melted and
extracted, which is the case in England.
From whence it follows, that the variation which happens either
in the bullion or in the coins, produces exactly the same bas con-
sequences to the public, which the authors who have wrote upon
this subject did not comprehend, and therefore exclaimed against
every alteration in the coin, as if it were the only cause of such evils.
Whenever therefore the difference between the nominal and the
real ratio is considerable a nation must suffer in that proportion; sup-
posing that by debasing the gold or silver coin, the disproportion
became very considerable, would a new coinage be necessary? All
authors say yes; Supposing that the same disproportion arose from
the increase of one species of bullion, it would be equally prejudi-
cial to the public, and yet they will not admit of a new coinage; I
ask, Why? Let them answer if they can. If, in the first case it is nec-
essary, it is equally so in the second; the evil is the same though it
proceeds from a different cause, the same remedy must be applied.
We must now examine upon what principle a new coinage must
be regulated. As the evil proceeds from a great disproportion between
the ratio in coins, and that in bullion, no matter whether it arises
from debasing the coin, or from the increase or decrease of one
species of bullion: it is plain, that the only method to prevent it, is
to make the nominal and real ratios equal, not only compared to
what they bear to each other in your own country, but likewise, to
what it is in the neighbouring nations, and as these may differ, a
medium must be found; so that it is not worth while for them to
melt it down, or extract our coin.
Having shewn the necessity of changing the nominal ratio between
our respective coins, and fixing it upon a par with the real ratio
between the metals in bullion; we must now indicate the methods
of doing it, with as little loss and inconveniencies possible to the
public.
Let us suppose that the real ratio between gold and silver in bul-
lion, compared to that between the gold in a guinea, and the silver
in coin, be as one guinea is to twenty shillings, it is evident, that
while it passes for one and twenty shillings, it is over-rated five per
cent. which is a sufficient profit to induce people to melt down the
silver, or extract it; to prevent which, we must fix a nominal ratio
upon a par with the real, and reduce the price of the guinea to
twenty shillings.
This may be done in three different manners: 1, By an act of
parliament, ordering the guinea to be worth only twenty shillings.
2, By a new coinage of silver, and dividing the quantity of silver,
now in twenty shillings, so as to make one and twenty, letting the
guinea pass as usual for one and twenty shillings. 3, By new coin-
ing the gold, and adding five per cent. to it. Either of these methods
xi. of coinage 309
will reduce our nominal ratio upon a par with the real ratio between
the respective metals in bullion, and so prevent the extraction of sil-
ver coin.
Which ever method is adopted, it is plain gold coin will lose five
per cent. which ought to be indemnified by the public; for which pur-
pose a time must be given to the possessors of gold coin to bring
it to the mint or bank, where it must be received at the present
value. Care must be taken to pay the value in bank notes and sil-
ver, otherwise the same coin will be brought in several times suc-
cessively. During this time the bank must pay as little gold as possible
to the public, and when the time is nearly expired, the bank must
be indemnified for what gold it has in possession. Six months would
be sufficient to call in all the gold coin; that which falls short in
weight, may be received by the weight, or by its nominal value: in
this last case the expence to the public will be greater.
The first method we have proposed, is I think the best, because
it saves expence and trouble, and is attended with no other incon-
veniency but what arises from a change in the denomination peo-
ple are accustomed to.
The second method is attended with expence, but has the advan-
tage of increasing the circulation of silver coin, which is much wanted
in England. If this method is adopted, the old silver coin must be
called in, and received at its present value, for a limited time, which
being expired, it must be received by weight only. This method has
been adopted by the Venetians and Dutch not many years ago, with-
out any sensible detriment to the public, as the quantity of silver is
much greater than that of gold, a new coinage of the former will
be expensive, which however will be amply compensated, by calling
in the coins, which have been clipped and want weight, and pre-
vent its being melted, or extracted, until such time as the increase
or decrease of that metal changes the real ratio between it and gold,
so considerably as to require a new coinage of the one or other,
which probably may not happen in a century.
If the third method is adopted, and five per cent. added to the gold
coin, care must be taken to distinguish the new coin by some pecu-
liar mark, otherwise the new guinea lately coined, cannot be distin-
guished from the new coin, and the public will be imposed upon.
The possessors of gold will bring it to the mint, for they can no
where else change it with the same advantage: in this case it is evi-
dent the quantity of gold coin will be diminished five per cent. and
the silver increased relatively in that proportion, and the value of it

absolutely, which will prevent its being extracted. In this last method,
no indemnification is required, because it is included in the addi-
tional five per cent. which we have supposed in the new coinage of
gold.
Much more might be said upon this important subject, what we
have offered is, however, we think sufficient to prove the necessity of
a new coinage, and that it will not be attended with those bad con-
sequences, which Mr. Locke, and other learned men have imagined.
CHAPTER TWELVE
OF THE INTEREST OF MONEY
The primitive fathers of Christianity, regarded the lending of money,

as a capital sin; it must be confessed, that they were little acquainted
with the policy and interest of society; for they might with equal
reason, have thought it a sin to pay for what we buy, because in
fact interest is only the price we give for the use of the capital sum,
as we do for the rent of a house, lands, &c.
The lending of money is, moreover, one of the greatest promot-
ers of circulation and industry; if a man possessing a sum of money,
which he cannot himself employ in trade, or otherwise, was to keep
it by him, it would be lost to himself and to society, as much as if
it had never been extracted from the mines: whereas by lending it
at a moderate interest, he is enabled to live upon that interest, and
the borrowers employ it with advantage, by which, national indus-
try is increased: wherefore we conclude, that the lending of money
at interest, is both just and useful.
We define interest—The price which is given by the borrower for the use
of a certain sum, for a certain time.
It follows from this definition, that the interest will be in a com-
pound ratio, direct as the number of borrowers; and inverse as the num-
ber of lenders; that is, the greater the number of borrowers, compared
with that of the lenders, the higher will be the rate of interest, and
vice versa. It is plain that the more money is to be lent, and the fewer
the borrowers, the lower with be the interest: and the less money
to be lent and the more the borrowers, the higher will be the inter-
est; as the quantity of money to be lent will be in proportion to that
of circulation, we say that the rate of interest will be in an inverse
ratio to the quantity of circulation.
Let therefore the lenders be denominated C, the borrowers B, the
common interest I, and the variation in the quantity of money to
be lent, or circulation y; then we shall have the following formula-
B B I B
ries: 1. C = I ; 2. Cy = y ; 3. = Iy; as y is variable, it follows:
C
y
COROLLARY 1.
That it is impossible to fix the quantity of interest without preju-
dicing either the borrower, or the lender, in the same manner as in
the buying and of any commodity in the market.
COROLLARY 2.
If the interest is low, it proves that the quantity of circulation is
great.
COROLLARY 3.
Industry in general, and agriculture in particular, will increase in
proportion as interest is low; because those who cannot, by com-
mon interest, procure a sufficient fund to live upon, will apply their
money to more advantage, in arts, commerce, agriculture, &c.
COROLLARY 4.
When interest is low, the price of lands will increase.
COROLLARY 5.
By diminishing the interest of the public funds, agriculture and
manufactures will be promoted.
COROLLARY 6.
When interest is low, it proves that all species of industry is in
great perfection; and that they do not want a fund to carry them
on, otherwise it would be worth while to borrow at a higher interest.
COROLLARY 7.
As the rate of interest is an inverse ratio of the general circulation,
and this, as we have shewn, is in proportion to civil liberty, it fol-
lows, that the rate of interest is in that proportion; consequently.
COROLLARY 8.
The rate of interest will always be lower in republics, than in
monarchies or despotick governments: and in fact we see it rise grad-
ually from Holland to Turkey, and you may judge of the nature of
a government, in a great measure, by the rate of interest.
COROLLARY 9.
From the preceeding consequences we may conclude, that it is
highly advantageous to government, to diminish s much as possible
the rate of interest of the public debts; because the creditors will be
obliged to apply themselves to some species of industry: this will aug-
ment its quantity and consequently diminish the price; if the credi-
tors will not draw out their money, it proves that the quantity of
industry is arrived nearly to its height. After the last war the Empress
of Germany reduced considerably the rate of interest; which imme-
diately raised the price of every kind of production, lands, &c. which
necessarily increased the national industry in that proportion.
CHAPTER XIII
OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE,
AND OF THE BALANCE OF TRADE
A bill of exchange, may be defined—The nominal transport of a

given sum of money from one country to another: which answers
the same purpose, as if it was actually lent in specie or bullion.
From this definition it follows, that a bill of exchange necessarily
supposes two persons, viz. the drawer, who offers to pay a certain
sum of money in a given country, and the person, in whose favour
it is drawn, who wants to pay that money in the country proposed,
which sum he must send in specie or bullion; if he cannot get a bill
of exchange: the price of such bills will be in a compound ratio direct,
as the number of persons who want them, and inverse of those who
give them; that is, the fewer bills there are, compared to the call
for them, the dearer they will be, and consequently the price of such
bills; as in every other case will be in an inverse ratio of their quantity,
or number: which may be exemplified by the following formularies.
Let the number of those who give bills be called D, and that of
the persons who take or buy them, be denominated by B, and let
y express the increase or decrease of D; then we shall have,
B B I B
1. = I ; 2. = ; 3. = Iy .
D
D Dy y
y
In the first case, it is plain, there are as many bills, as persons

who want them, as much money to be remitted to Portugal, for
example, as to be drawn from thence, consequently the exchange
will be at par.
In the second case, there are more bills than persons who want
them, their price will therefore decrease, and will be below par.
In the third case, there are fewer bills than are wanted, their price
therefore will increase, and they will be above par.
The state of trade between any two nations will be in proportion
to the course of exchange. If the course of exchange is generally at
par, it is plain, that there is as much money to be remitted into
Portugal, for example, as to be drawn from thence; if on the con-
trary, they are below par, it shews that more money is to be drawn
from thence than to be sent thither, consequently the balance will
be against Portugal; and finally, if the course of exchange is above
par, it follows, that less money is to be drawn from thence than to

be sent, consequently that the balance will be in favour of Portugal.
As all Europe forms a chain, of which each nation is a link, it is
evident that you cannot touch one without affecting all the others
more or less: In order to understand the doctrine of exchange you
must not only be acquainted with the balance of trade and with the
ratio between the respective coins of two nations, but likewise with
the general balance, and with the proportion between the metals of
all the trading nations; for example, let us suppose, that the balance
between England and Portugal is in favour of the first; that the bal-
ance between England and Holland is in favour of the last; and
finally that the balance between Holland and Portugal is in favour
of this last: it is evident, that the English cannot pay the balance to
Holland, otherwise than by sending it in money or bullion, or by
sending bills upon Portugal, because as we suppose the balance being
in favour of the Dutch, there will be more persons who want bills
for Holland than there are who give them, consequently such bills
will be dear in proportion to their scarcity and to that balance. In
the second place the balance between England and Portugal being,
as we suppose, in favour of the former, there will be more bills upon
Portugal than persons who want them, therefore their price will
decrease in that proportion, consequently the English by paying the
balance due to the Dutch, with a bill upon Portugal, saves doubly,
1, The extraordinary price he must pay for a bill directly upon
Holland. 2, What he must lose by giving a bill directly upon Portugal,
and the Dutchman will for the same reason gain equally because
the general balance being between England and Holland in his
favour, he would lose by drawing upon the former, and being against
him as we suppose with Portugal, he will find it difficult to procure
bills at home for that country, and consequently he must pay dear
for them.
As the balance and proportion of metals change continually, it is
evident, that the price of bills of exchange will daily vary.
If the course of exchange is generally against a country, that is
to say, If the bills drawn from England upon Portugal are cheap, it
is a certain mark that the general balance of trade is in favour of
England, and vice versa; it is for this reason that the bills upon Portugal
are below par, and those upon Holland above par.
From what we have said, the reasons for drawing upon one coun-
try preferable to another, will easily occur.
xiii. of bills of exchange 315
COROLLARY 1.
It follows, that if upon an average of ten or twelve years, the price
of exchange is low in any country with regard to another, the bal-
ance of trade must be in favour of the former, unless some partic-
ular reasons concur, as with regard to Holland and England; for it
being supposed that the former have considerable sums in our funds,
the interest of which may be so great that though the balance of
trade be in our favour, yet we must be obliged to remit more than
that balance comes to, in order to pay the interest, which will nec-
essarily increase the price of bills in that proportion.
COROLLARY 2.
It follows likewise, that if the balance is greatly against us, the
price of bills will be so high that we must be obliged to remit it in
specie or bullion, which would in a short time extract all our met-
als, unless replaced by a balance in our favour from Spain and
Portugal, and that these two nations having a general balance against
them, would have been ruined long ago, by remitting their metals
to pay it, unless it was replaced by their mines. In case of a war
with these powers, a fleet in the gulph of Mexico, and another upon
the coast of Brazil, would soon reduce them to the utmost distress.
COROLLARY 3.
Having proved that the price of bills of exchange is in an inverse
ratio of their number, and that this is in proportion to the balance
of trade between any two nations, it follows that when the price is
high the balance must be against the nation which draws such bills.
We are therefore surprized that so many learned men, who have
wrote upon this subject should affirm that the high price of bills is
not a proof that the balance is in favour of the nation on which the
bills are drawn, and that their low price does not prove that the
balance is in favour of the nation by whom they are drawn.
It must be observed, we mean only that the course of exchange
for a given number of years in time of peace, will determine in
whose favour the general balance is: for in time of war, extraordi-
nary sums must be remitted, which have nothing to do with the bal-
ance of trade, though they will greatly enhance the value of bills,
insomuch that you cannot get them, and must remit the money in
specie or bullion; which the Spaniards and Portugueze are always
forced to do in time of peace, because the balance of trade is against
them.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
OF TAXES
The celebrated Montesquieu says, that taxes increase in proportion

to the liberty of the constitution, and consequently, that they are
higher in republics than in monarchies, and despotic governments.
The nature of a government, in our opinion, had nothing to do
with the rate of taxes, otherwise than by increasing or diminishing
national industry and circulation, by which alone high or low rates
of taxes can be measured: it is not the absolute sum which a man
pays, but the proportion that sum bears to what he possesses, which
makes it heavy or easy: though in republics in general, the subject
pays more, absolutely speaking, than in monarchies, yet compared
with the whole of what they possess, it is much less, as we shall
shew hereafter. An Englishman pays absolutely more than a Frenchman,
but comparatively to his means, not half so much: taxes therefore
are high or low, compared to the quantity of circulation, and by no
means, directly at least, depend upon the form of government.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CONCLUSION, AND RECAPITULATION OF

THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN THE
PRECEDING CHAPTERS
1st. We say, that money and public notes are an universal mer-
chandize, whose value is in an inverse ratio of its quantity.
2d, That the price of labour, merchandize, &c. is in a compound
ratio, direct as the quantity of general circulation, and inverse as the
quantity of such labour, merchandize, &c.
3d, That metals compared to each other are likewise in an inverse
ratio of their quantity, consequently their respective value is variable;
from whence it follows, that when the proportion between gold and
silver coin is considerably different from that which these metals have
in bullion, the one or the other of the coins will be melted, or
extracted. To prevent which, you must establish the ratio between
the coins, upon a par with that between the metals in bullion.
4th, That the interest of money is in an inverse ratio of the quan-
tity of circulation: that is, the more money there is to be lent, the
lower will be the interest, and vice versa.
5th, That the price of bills of exchange is in an inverse ratio of
their quantity, and that the balance of trade will be in proportion,
as the bills of exchange are cheap.
6th, That the industry of a nation is in proportion to the quan-
tity of circulation.
7th, That the absolute force of a nation is in a compound ratio
of the number of people, and of the quantity and quality of their
industry.
8th, That the liberty of a nation is in proportion to the equality,
and despotism to the inequality of circulation.
9th, That every nation originally poor, is more or less free.
10th, That if there was no money or some equivalent, all the
inhabitants of the earth would be free.
These principles enable us to compare the industry, force, price
of merchandize, taxes, and circulation of different nations, as will
appear by the following table. Though private circulation by notes
of hand and otherwise is no doubt very great, but as it is impossi-

ble to ascertain the amount of it, we must imagine that it is in pro-
portion to the general circulation, by which we mean the quantity
of money as well as public notes which circulate; it is generally sup-
posed, that in England the first amounts to near thirty millions ster-
ling, and public the debts to one hundred and thirty, so that the
general circulation may be computed at one hundred and sixty mil-
lions, and it is upon this principle that we compare different nations
with each other.
For the better understanding of the following table, we say, That
the general industry of a nation is in proportion to the general cir-
culation, and therefore dividing this by the number of people we
shall have the particular industry and quantity of circulation of each
individual. As the price of merchandize is likewise in proportion to
the quantity of circulation, it follows that the price of any particu-
lar merchandize will be in proportion to the particular circulation
of each individual.
Taxes are a certain portion of money raised upon the general cir-
culation and are in proportion to that circulation and to the num-
ber of people who pay them. In order to know who pays most,
divide the general circulation by the quantity of taxes, the different
quotients will shew the proportion of taxes between different nations.
We have said that the absolute force of a nation is in proportion
to the quantity of taxes and the number of inhabitants. I have cal-
culated that force in proportion to the taxes commonly raised, rather
than upon the general circulation, because the quality of the national
industry, though in proportion to the general circulation, nay be
such as not to admit of any great increase of taxes, whereas if they
bear them for a certain number of years; it proves that industry does
not diminish, therefore the force of a nation must be calculated in
proportion to the taxes.
We might no doubt have wrote a large volume upon this subject
had we chose to enumerate the numberless consequences which may
be deduced from the preceeding principles; however, what we have
said appears, sufficient to demonstrate the truth, and general influence
of them. If this essay should meet with the approbation of the pub-
lic, the author may be induced to treat the subject, in a more gen-
eral and extensive manner, so as to render it more useful.
xv. conclusion 319
Many celebrated authors have wrote upon the subject, yet no one
useful consequence can be deduced from their labours, they have
lost much of their time in vain and idle inquiries about ancient coins
which is equally useless, as if they had wrote upon medals without
confronting them with history and chronology, so their inquiries
about coin, without examining its influence upon government, indus-
try, arts and sciences is a matter of pure speculation. It is for this
reason that the doctrine of money, the most important of any, is
now as little understood, as it was a thousand years ago.
The vague definition which they adopted greatly contributed to
embarrass the subject: sometimes they call it merchandize, and some-
times a sign.
It is always a merchandize no way different from others, but by
the universality of its course and influence; we therefore define it an
universal merchandize or general circulation; this definition being
admitted, the principles we have established, flow naturally and scarce
require a demonstration. No author that I know of has shewn that
it is money alone which produces extensive industry, forms and
changes continually the face of human affairs: that money can fix
despotism in the poorest countries, and that without it the inhabi-
tants of the rich and fruitful Asia would still be free, and that there
would be neither despotism, nor monarchy, nor even a numerous
nation upon the whole globe. All travellers affirm that those coun-
tries, who have no money, have few inhabitants, and these divided
into small tribes of hunters and shepherds, without arts, manufac-
tures, sciences, &c.
There are now in England more cattle of every kind than there
was twenty centuries ago in the half of Europe; there is now more
industry in France and England than there was then in all Europe,
consequently the population of these countries and of Europe in gen-
eral is greater than it was formerly. This reason alone weighs more
than all the learned arguments produced to prove the contrary.1
1
That England was suffering a population decline was a shared assumption in
the 1760s. In fact population had increased 6.5% during that decade. In 1771
England’s population numbered 6.4 million, 300,000 more than in 1761. Edward
A. Wrigley, R.S. Davies, James E. Oeppen, and Roger S. Schofield, English Population
History from Family Reconstruction, 1580–1837 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997): 614–15.
Relative Force of Nations

Population Circulation Industry Price Taxes Absolute Comparison
of Mer- Force of Taxes
chandise
England 8,000,000 160,000,000 20 20 10,000,000 8+10=18 1/16

France 16,000,000 150,000,000 9.38 9.38 18,000,000 16+18=34 1/8
Spain 7,500,000 25,000,000 3.33 3.33 3,000,000 7.5+3=10.5 1/8
Portugal 2,000,000 15,000,000 7.5 7.5 2,000,000 2+2=4 1/7.5
For the explanation of the foregoing table we must observe, that the
population of the different nations, is supposed to be nearly as we
have marked it. That the circulation in money and public funds are
also, what we have set down. That national industry is in propor-
tion to the total circulation, and consequently, proportionable to pri-
vate and public circulation, but it being impossible to ascertain the
first, and persuaded that it is in proportion to the last, we have taken
this for a data to serve as a basis for our calculation. By dividing
the public circulation by the population we shall have the particu-
lar circulation and industry of each individual, which will mark the
proportion, between them; and this is what we call the price of each
part of particular industry, which must be in proportion to the par-
ticular circulation; It follows, that the industry of England in quan-
tity and quality is to that of the other nations, as 20 to 9 6/16, 3
1/3, 7 1/2: the price of merchandize, labour, &c. will be in the
same proportion, we must however observe, that in the capitals the
circulation is nearly equal, and therefore there will be no very great
difference in the price of merchandize, labour, &c. but comparing
the prices in the different provinces, experience proves that our cal-
culation is just, and that the price of every thing is, in general, in
England double to what it is in France, and so in the proportion
we have marked in other countries. The taxes of every denomina-
tion are likewise nearly what we have put them. We have said that
the absolute force of a nation is in proportion to the number of
inhabitants, and the quantity of taxes. England, therefore, is strong
compared to other nations in the proportion we have put it in the
table; though an Englishman pays more absolutely, than the subjects
of the other nations, yet relatively, not half so much, for he pays only
1/16, whereas the others pay one eighth of what they possess. We
xv. conclusion 321
therefore conclude, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Montesquieu, that

in free governments, the subject pays relatively much less than in
absolute monarchies, and despotic governments, and that taxes grad-
ually rise in proportion to despotism, because general circulation
decreases in that proportion. A Ducat of Capitation in Turky is an
immense sum for a poor man, who has not perhaps another in the
world. Montesquieu was deceived by seeing that in Turky, and other
despotic governments, the taxes and duties were low, compared to
what they are in England and Holland; he should have considered,
what proportion these taxes and duties bear with the riches of indi-
viduals; not what they pay, but what remains after they have paid.
N.B. As Spain draws yearly, directly or indirectly, about three mil-
lions from America, independent of national industry; this sum must
be added to the three raised by domestic taxes, at least, in time of
peace; because in time of war it is precarious. The price of provi-
sions, labour, &c. in Spain, will therefore, be 6 ½, and the absolute
force of 13 ½, and not 3 ½, and 10 ½, as is marked in the table.
The same thing must be said of Portugal, which draws about a
million from America, consequently the price of labour and mer-
chandize will be 8 ½, and the absolute force 5.
IV
A RHAPSODY ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF FRENCH POLITICS; ON

THE PROJECTED INVASION, AND THE MEANS TO DEFEAT IT (1779)
‘Pro Aris & Focis’

—Charles XII at Bender
CONTENTS

Chapter I. [Untitled] .................................................................. 334
Chapter II. Of the Force of Nations ...................................... 341
Chapter III. Of the Analogy between the Form of
Government and the State of War ...................................... 342
Chapter IV. Of the Invasion Expected .................................... 345
Chapter V. Observations on the Method of Ranging
the Troops, and of Making War, &c. .................................. 362
Chapter VI. Of the Order of Battle ........................................ 366
Chapter VII. Of the General Method of Making War ........ 369
Of all Lloyd’s published writings his treatise on homeland defense

has perhaps the most peculiar history. It is essentially a pamphlet
that addressed the prospects for a Franco-Spanish sea-borne inva-
sion in 1779 at the height of the American Revolution. The Treaty
of Aranjuez (12 April 1779) called for the defeat of Britain’s chan-
nel fleet followed by an assault on Portsmouth with 25,000 under
the command of Noël Jourde, comte de Vaux, and subsidiary attacks
on both Gibraltar and Minorca. Bourbon operations suffered com-
plications when smallpox ravaged the invasion fleet and its expedi-
tionary force in July. The beleaguered sixty-six ships of the line
arrived late in the English Channel and met stiff winds in August.
Admiral Charles Hardy’s (1726–80) smaller fleet of thirty ships never
engaged the enemy, and fog kept the them from meeting for a deci-
sive clash. In October France cancelled the invasion, while Spain
chose to commence a four-year siege of Gibraltar that ended in fail-
ure. The attempted invasion had triggered widespread panic through-
out Britain. General Lloyd’s Rhapsody sought to calm the public and
invigorate preparations and resistance.
Perhaps no other Britain better understood homeland defense and
the numerous French plans to invade England. Lloyd had partici-
pated in Bonnie Prince Charlie’s Jacobite invasion of 1745 and spent
time surveying the Channel coast for France at the outbreak of the
Seven Years’ War. He provided a general survey of French foreign
policy since Louis XIV and categorically believed any invasion by
the Bourbon powers would fail. They could land an army, but had
no way to support and supply it from France without first destroy-
ing the British Channel Fleet under Hardy; a feat they could not
accomplish nor even attempt if the Royal Navy avoided a show-
down. The events confirmed the sagacity of his conclusions. But even
if the unlikely defeat of Hardy’s fleet occurred, Lloyd posited the
smaller British forces could contain and halt the larger Franco-Spanish
army simply by utilizing the strength of the southwestern English
countryside. Geography, always central to his military thought, became
the pivotal element of British national survival.
328 iv. on the present system of french politics (1779)
But Lloyd did not simply provide patriotic analyses of Bourbon

prospects. True to his enlightened philosophe outlook the pamphlet
contains harsh criticism of the British war effort led by Lord George
Germain and Commander-in-Chief Jeffrey Amherst. Colonial policy
that triggered the American rebellion, excessive merchant influence
in Parliament, and the lack of strategic direction are but a few of
Lloyd’s censures against Lord North’s ministry. In addition, he added
the first outlines of his ‘New System’ of tactics and operations, which
he believed would return decisiveness to battle and warfare in gen-
eral: themes he would focus upon in his forthcoming philosophical
treatise on war. If Lloyd envisioned the pamphlet as a patriot’s
attempt to rally the nation around King George III, Amherst and
others saw it in a different light. The government paid Lloyd for its
suppression before publication even though manuscript copies floated
among friends and government officials. After Lloyd’s death the gov-
ernment bought up the remaining copies, but his agent reprinted
the work several times during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars. Lloyd received a measure of posthumous fame he rarely
received in his lifetime. Regrettably his impolitic arguments no doubt
undermined Henry Clinton’s attempt in 1780 to appoint him com-
mander of the Loyalist troops in America.1
Publishing History
A Rhapsody on the Present System of French Politics; on the Projected Invasion,

and the Means to Defeat It, by a Chelsea Pensioner. Illustrated with Plans,
on Three Copper Plates. London: Printed for W. Faden, 1779.
A Political and Military Rhapsody on the Invasion and Defence of Great Britain
and Ireland. Illustrated with three Copper-plates. To which is annexed
an Introduction, and a short Account of the Author’s Life. London:
Sold by T. and J. Egerton, and J. Sewell, 1790.
A Political and Military Rhapsody, on the Invasion and Defence of Great Britain
and Ireland. 2d ed. Illustrated with three Copper-plates. To which
is annexed, a short Account of the Author, and a Supplement by
1
See William Dalrymple to George Germain, London, 7 December 1780, 139:5;
and Leonard Morse to Benjamin Thompson, Whitehall, 1 January 1781, 139:6,
Henry S. Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
the Editor. With additions and improvements. London: Sold by

Debret; Sewell; Clark; and Mayler, Bath, 1792.
A Rhapsody on the Present System of French Politics; on the Projected Invasion,
and the Means to Defeat it. London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1793.
and Ireland. 3d ed. To which is annexed, a short Account of the
Author, and a Supplement by the Editor. London: Sold by J. De-
brett; J. Egerton; and J. Mottley, Portsmouth, 1794.
and Ireland. 4th ed. To which is annexed, a short Account of the
Author, and a Supplement by the Editor. London: Sold by Debrett;
Egerton, 1795.
and Ireland. Illustrated with three copper plates. To which is annexed,
a short account of the author, and a supplement by the editor.
5th ed. With additions and improvements. London: Sold by Egerton,
Debrett and by the principal booksellers in Great Britain, 1798.
Mémoire Politique et Militaire sur l’Invasion et la Défénse de la Grand Bretagne.
Limoges: Barrois l’aîné, An IX [1801].
and Ireland. 6th ed. To which is added a supplement by the edi-
tor and in this edition, the sketch of an original plan for the
fortification and defence of London. With improvements and cor-
rections. London: Printed by W. Bulmer and Co., 1803.
Memoria Politica e Militare spora l’Invasione e la Difesa della Gran-Brettagna,
e Riflessioni su l’Invasione di Francia, del Generale Lloyd. Translated and
edited by Lorenzo Manini. Milano: Presso Pirotta e Maspero, 1804.
To Robert Clerk, Esq; Lieutenant General of His Majesty’s Forces.1
Sir,
In the course of our acquaintance, we, or rather you, have discussed,

almost every point of military knowledge. If there is any thing wor-
thy the attention of the soldier in the following discourse, I owe it
to you: it is therefore just I should acknowledge the source from
whence it sprung; accordingly I inscribe it to you, and at the same
time thank you for the many favors you have conferred upon me.
I have the honor to be with the highest esteem and respect,
Sir,
Your most grateful,
Humble Servant,
G. Ll.
1
Robert Clerk (d. 1798). An enigmatic figure, Lt. Col. Clerk, or Clarke, partici-
pated in the disastrous Rochefort expedition of 1757. He received a Colonel’s com-
mission in the Portuguese army in 1762 to defend against a Spanish invasion. He
rose to the rank of Field Marshal in 1763. In 1772 he rejoined the British army
with the rank of Major-General. He became full General in 1793. He and Lloyd
tried in vain to persuade Lord North to create a northern alliance with Prussia,
Russia, and Denmark, that would have sent 20,000–30,000 Russian and Prussian
soldiers to attack St. Domingo. See Robert Clerk to Lord North, London, 10 August
1779, Add. MSS. 47563, f. 44, The British Library, London.
A Rhapsody on French Politics, &c.
It is impossible to calculate, with any degree of probability, the duration and

event of a war, unless we are acquainted with the political system, principles of
government, and resources of the contending powers. I shall, therefore, give a
short view of them, which will enable the Reader to form some judgment of the
present state of affairs.
CHAPTER ONE
While the House of Austria was all-powerful in Europe, and pos-

sessed of many provinces on the west side of the Rhine, now united
to France, it was evident that the French nation could have no other
permanent system of politics, but that which tended to reduce that
House within narrower bounds, particularly in the Low Countries,
and towards the Rhine. Accordingly, we find France continually
employed in raising disturbances in Germany, Italy, Spain, &c. and
exciting the different powers of Europe and Turkey against Austria.
Richelieu1 having reduced the Hugonots, took an active part at the
latter end of the war,2 which had been maintained in Germany for
nearly thirty years; and by the treaty of Westphalia, the French, as
one of the guarantees, obtained a right to interfere in the affairs of
Germany, of which they have availed themselves on every occasion
to embarrass the House of Austria. More than once, they brought
her to the brink of destruction, and had it not been for the power-
ful support and assistance of the maritime powers, particularly Eng-
land, she must have fallen a victim to the ambition of France. Those
powers who feared Austria, very naturally looked up to France for
protection, and increased her strength by the addition of their forces.
During the minority of Lewis XIV the administration of Mazarine3
was almost totally confined to domestic occurrences, which were
sufficiently embarrassing to occupy his whole attention.
Lewis XIV on taking the reins of government, pursued the sys-
tem of his predecessors with regard to Austria. Having, in the begin-
ning of his reign, met with great success in war, and added some
1
Armand-Jean du Plessis, duc de Richelieu (1585–1642). French Cardinal and
Statesman during the reign of Louis XIII (r. 1610–43). A practitioner of secular
diplomacy Richelieu orchestrated France’s anti-Habsburg policy during the Thirty
Years’ War, thereby supporting and legitimating the Protestant cause in Germany.
His policies toward the Huguenots reflected political concerns more than religious
bigotry.
2
Thirty Years’ War (1618–48).
3
Jules Mazarin (1602–61). Italian-born French Cardinal and regent to the infant
Louis XIV. He brought the Thirty Years’ War to an end with the Treaties of
Munster and Westphalia, and ended the Spanish war with the Treaty of the Pyrenees
(1659). Lloyd refers here to the Fronde rebellion that plagued the monarchy in the
1650s.
i. [ untitled] 335
provinces to his crown, he became ambitious, from that principle,

rather than from necessity, (for he was already sufficiently powerful
to have nothing to fear from Austria) Lewis did not cease to embroil
Europe, almost during his whole reign. In the course of his wars,
he found himself checked, chiefly by the maritime powers; England
was out of his reach; without ships of war nothing could be done
against her. Seconded by able ministers, in a few years, to the aston-
ishment of all the world, he raised a powerful fleet, and, for a lit-
tle time, maintained a superiority at sea, of which he availed himself
in an attempt to reinstate James II on the throne of England, but
without success. The confederacy formed against the French monarch
on the continent became so powerful, particularly towards the close
of his reign, that the whole force of his kingdom was scarce sufficient
to resist the progress of the allied armies. The marine was of course
abandoned, and sunk nearly into the insignificant state in which he
found it. Soon after Lewis XV had mounted the French throne,
Cardinal Fleury became prime minister; happily for France, who
wanted peace to recover from the innumerable losses which the
ambition of Lewis XIV had brought upon her. This prelate, from
principle, as well as temper, pursued invariably a pacific system; the
wars excited by the turbulent spirit of Alberoni4 for the Kingdom
of Naples, and that on the Rhine, occasioned by the pretensions of
Augustus II to the throne of Poland, were transitory, and of very
short duration. The House of Austria having imprudently engaged
in that quarrel, Fleury availed himself of her distressful situation, to
tear Lorraine from her, which connected and completed the French
frontier on the German side.5
On the death of Charles VI a new and general war broke out in
Germany, wherein the maritime powers engaged also.6 Cardinal
4
Giulio Alberoni (1664–1752). Italian-born Spanish Cardinal and statesman under
King Philip V (r. 1700–46). Alberoni became Philip’s de facto prime minister and
pushed for the expulsion of Austrian influence from Italy. His machinations pro-
voked the creation of the Quadruple Alliance (1718) of Britain, the Netherlands,
France, and Austria, which compelled Spain to yield. Philip dismissed and banished
Alberoni in 1719.
5
War of the Polish Succession (1733–35). A dynastic war between the Franco-
Spanish candidate for the Polish throne, Stanislaus I, and the Austro-Russian backed
Frederick Augustus II, Elector of Saxony. The Treaty of Vienna (1735) gave Frederick
Augustus the Polish throne, legitimized French occupation of Lorraine, and ceded
Naples and Sicily to Spain.
6
War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48).
Fleury wished to keep France neuter, believing that Austria would

find sufficient employment from the several Princes who formed pre-
tensions to the Emperor’s succession; and that by remaining neuter,
the French might mediate and dictate the terms of peace, without
partaking of the dangers and expences of the war: Or, perhaps, judg-
ing that France, recovered from her losses, and strengthened by her
new acquisitions, would always be a match for Austria hereafter,
whatever might be the event of the war. The cardinal, however, was
overuled, and a general confederacy was formed against the House
of Austria, which tended to annihilate her entirely: Indeed the suc-
cess did not answer the hopes and expectations of the confederates,
and things remained in great part, as they were at the commence-
ment of the war. The King of Prussia acquired Silesia, the King of
Sardinia7 increased his possessions in Lombardy, and a settlement
was procured for Don Philip,8 in the same country. The French and
Spanish trade suffered greatly in the course of this war; for the
expences of the land armies in Germany and Italy were so exces-
sive, that no effort could be made by these two powers to establish
a marine; so that we remained entirely masters of the sea. Our trade
and navigation increased, and furnished the means to pursue the
war on the continent. France in the mean time, excited disturbances
in Scotland,9 which soon were quelled; because, for want of a marine,
she could not support them, had she really meant to do it.
The last war10 offers us a new system of politics adopted by the
French, contrary and opposite to that which they had for many ages
prosecuted. The House of Austria being no longer an object of fear
or jealousy, they engaged in a confederacy, calculated for her aggran-
dizement, at the expence of a Prince whose alliance they had hereto-
fore, and ought always to have courted. However formidable they
might believe France to be, Austria had likewise encreased in wealth,
power, and, above all, her administration, in regard to finances, &c.
was much improved. It seemed, therefore, highly advantageous for
7
Charles Emmanuel III (r. 1730–73), King of Sardinia-Piedmont.
8
Don Philip. Younger brother of King Charles III of Spain (r. 1759–88). He
received the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla in Italy via the Treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).
9
The Jacobite rising of 1745 led by Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender
(1720–88). Lloyd is circumspect about this adventure no doubt due to his own
involvement.
10
Seven Years’ War (1756–63).
i. [ untitled] 337
the French that there should be Princes in Germany, able, in some

degree, to check the power of Austria. Prussia was, of all others, the
most proper to be opposed to her, as they had done it with success
during the preceding war. There is no explaining a system so very
contrary to the apparent interests of France, unless we suppose that
court had an after-game to play, as circumstances might offer, dur-
ing the course of the hostilities.
The French originally engaged to furnish only twenty-four thou-
sand men, avowedly to deliver Saxony; and, if that had been effected,
’tis probable they would have forced the contending parties to con-
clude such a peace as they approved of. They had a numerous army
to enforce their mediation. I cannot think they intended seriously to
promote in the least the greatness of their ancient rivals in power,
and much less at the expence of Prussia, whom they will find a pow-
erful and necessary ally, in case of any future war with the former.
The negotiations at Teschen11 last year, and the part they acted
there, evince that they are not real friends to the House of Austria.
By engaging partially in the war in Germany, it is probable the
French thought they might direct their principal attention to their
marine, and to the defence of their colonies. All their schemes were
defeated by the extraordinary efforts of the King of Prussia, and the
allied army. Their new-raised fleet being beat and dispersed, our
superiority at sea enabled us to overcome every obstacle; we con-
quered all we attacked, and reduced the House of Bourbon so low,
that we might have prescribed any terms of peace. Unhappily we
mistook entirely in the choice of our acquisitions, some of which, so
far from being advantageous have been one of the principal causes
that brought the present calamities upon us. We attend too much
to the contracted, and very often selfish, views of the merchants; we
act upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a power-
ful nation. In forming treaties, a Minister should have the whole
globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or
that province, or branch of trade; these are not to be overlooked,
but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you
11
The Treaty of Teschen (1779) ended the War of the Bavarian Succession
(1778–79) between Prussia and Austria. Emperor Joseph II (r. 1765–90) attempted
to augment Habsburg power by occupying lower Bavaria after the death of the last
elector. France refused to support its Austrian ally, which prompted Frederick the
Great of Prussia to invade northern Bohemia. French and Russian mediation at
Teschen dashed Joseph’s hopes of acquiring Bavaria.
mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people.

Towards the end of the war the Duke of Choiseul12 became all-pow-
erful in the French ministry. He is a man of bold, extensive, and
enterprising genius. His country found in him the vastness of Richelieu,
the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay,13 the ami-
ableness of Pompone14 and . . . they dismissed him. He projected and
concluded the Family Compact,15 which unites the different branches
of the House of Bourbon in the closest connection, and we now see
the effects of that master-piece of politics.
The great losses that the French suffered during the last war, the
imminent danger with which the taking of the Havannah,16 in par-
ticular, threatened the rest of the Spanish dominions in America,
very naturally drew the whole attention of both nations to us. It was
obvious that while we were superior at sea, notwithstanding the dis-
proportion of our land forces, in any future contest, their Colonies
would always be exposed to the same danger, and if lost, might not
always be restored at a peace. They have therefore attended to their
marine alone; and have pursued this measure with such industry and
activity, that a fleet has been raised by them which astonishes Europe,
and must be very alarming to England. It is impossible to foresee
how far success may correspond with their force or their ambition.
Their views are great, and tend to reduce us within very narrow
limits. That nothing should divert them from their main object, the
French have, with the utmost care, avoided and prevented a German
war, which might have engaged a part of their forces, and frustrate
the general design against our country.
The present state of affairs enables us to resolve a political prob-
lem, often discussed within and without doors, viz. Whether conti-
nental connections are useful or otherwise to this nation? I need not
recapitulate the arguments for and against them; suffice it to say,
12
Étienne François, duc de Choiseul (1719–85). Foreign Minister under Louis
XV, who worked doggedly for revenge against Great Britain by embarking upon
a vast naval build-up. He was preparing for war in 1770 when he was dismissed.
13
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Seignelay (1619–83). Louis XIV’s finance
and naval minister who created France’s mercantilist economic system.
14
Pompone de Bellièvre. Minister of King Henry IV of France (r. 1589–1610).
15
The Third Family Compact (1761) facilitated Franco-Spanish military coopera-
tion against Great Britain during the Seven Years’ War and was the basis for the
projected invasion of 1779.
16
Captured by a British amphibious assault in 1762.
i. [ untitled] 339
that while we paid allies on the continent, the attention of France

was so intirely taken up in the different wars in Germany, that she
could not raise a marine in any degree proportioned to ours; that
we have constantly maintained a superiority at sea, which increased
the power, glory, and political influence of the nation, notwithstanding
the immense sums which were sent abroad for such connections;
that since we have abandoned the continental system, France had
acquired an unlimited influence in the different courts of Europe;
without anxiety on that side, she has been enabled to direct the
whole force of the House of Bourbon against England alone, and
God knows what may be the issue of this, I fear, unequal contest.
Let us draw a veil over such an alarming prospect: Let every man
exert himself to the utmost of his power for the service of his King
and Country, that we may avert the storm which hangs over our
heads, and battle the efforts of our combined enemies.
Whoever considers the position of England, and of its Colonies,
will perceive that our very existence depends on this circumstance
alone, viz. that we should be superior at sea; all our politics ought
therefore to be directed to that object singly. Had we millions of
armed men, equal in discipline to the Prussians, they can be of no
use to defend our trade or Colonies; and if we are reduced to defend
England, all is over. Why has our fleet been neglected? Why have
the national funds been consumed and exhausted to multiply land
forces, instead of being applied to raise a powerful fleet, which is
the only force that can protect us? It is impossible to explain this
by any principle of reason; our militia alone are more than sufficient
to repel any invaders, if our fleet be superior to theirs; and even the
idea of an invasion in that case is absurd. Standing armies appear
an useless burthen; and now, to our cost, they will be found totally
inadequate to the defence of England and its Colonies.
Having abandoned continental connections, it became more than
ever necessary to apply all our resources to the fleet. The question
is by no means, whether it be equal or superior to what it was at
any other period? I ask, why it is not superior to the fleet of the
House of Bourbon? Does it arise from want of funds or men? Why
do we not appropriate the sums employed in levying numberless
corps, to build ships and raise twenty or thirty thousand marines?
Why are not the new levies converted into marines? With proper
encouragement this may be done, and unless it is done, we sink
under the superior forces of the enemies.
Land forces are nothing. Marines are the only species of troops
proper for this nation; they alone can defend and protect it effectually.
During the peace they garrison all your ports in each quarter of the
globe; in time of war your fleet is instantly manned; and by employ-
ing many of them, fewer seamen are wanted in proportion. Besides,
a fleet having on board twelve or fifteen thousand marines, is equal
to almost any enterprize against the enemy’s settlements, and keeps
them in continual anxiety in every part of the world. By this means
the expence and delays attending the embarkation of a considerable
body of land forces, destined to attack the enemy, would be spared,
and the success become more certain. Every other method to pre-
vent the final ruin of this country will be hurtful or ineffectual. A
powerful fleet and thirty thousand marines, I repeat it, will save us from
destruction, and nothing else.
CHAPTER TWO
OF THE FORCE OF NATIONS
No author that I know of has given any data which can enable us
to calculate the force of nations; it is therefore with diffidence that
I propose my ideas on the subject. I think that the power and strength
of a nation depend on the number of its inhabitants and the quan-
tity of their industry. This can be found and estimated only by the
yearly revenues raised on the subject, which bear a given propor-
tion to the yearly production of the whole nation. It is the revenue
which enables a Sovereign to maintain fleets and armies. It is the
number of inhabitants which furnishes men for the one and the
other; and in these I place the absolute force of a nation; for its rel-
ative force will depend on position, quality of industry, strength of
contiguous powers, military system, nature of the government, &c.
which vary often in the course of a few years. It is therefore nec-
essary we should attend only to the absolute force of nations, when
we compare them with each other, in order to form a general scale,
by which we measure their strength.
France contains above twenty millions of inhabitants: the yearly
revenues of that Kingdom amount to above sixteen millions sterling,
five of which being appropriated to pay the interest of the national
debt, eleven only will remain free, and according to our system, the
absolute force of the French nation will be thirty-one.
Spain contains more than seven millions and a half of inhabitants
in Europe, and above two in America, with a yearly revenue of
above five millions; so that her absolute force will amount to about
fifteen. Consequently the absolute force of the House of Bourbon
will be found equal to forty-six.
To this sum may be added that of our Revolted Colonies, which
increases still the force united against us.
I wish that others, better informed than I am, would calculate the
force of my own country upon this principle, and compare it with
that of the House of Bourbon: though the contrast might appear
very unfavourable to England, I don’t doubt but her relative force
compared also with that of her enemies, would make amends for
the enormous disproportion in point of inhabitants and revenues.
CHAPTER THREE
OF THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE FORM OF

GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE OF WAR
Despotism acts with the rapidity of a torrent; like it it leaves deso-

lation and solitude behind, or it declines into a lethargy. In despo-
tism there is no system; its motions are instantaneous, and arise from
trifles, or the caprice of a moment. They are extremely violent, but
transitory. If you can resist, or more safely avoid, their first impetu-
osity, you will easily conquer in the end.
Monarchy, though not so violent and rapid in its motions, is
sufficiently strong to collect and exert the national forces. When
endowed with wisdom, it directs them, so that they procure the most
general and permanent advantages. It is like a majestic river, which
if kept within bounds, and its waters judiciously distributed, embell-
ishes and enriches the country. But when Administration is too vio-
lent, this beneficent river becomes a torrent, and ruins the country:
If weak, it branches out into a thousand small rivulets, which finally
dwindle to nothing.
As in monarchies the whole power of the state is centered in one
man, and the exercise of it depends upon his will alone, to prevent
a sudden and capricious use of it, which in a short might ruin the
state, it ought to be a maxim established in this kind of government,
that the administration should be confided to many people, that the
departments should be separated, and that the council of state should
be numerous, because the government of one man being naturally
quick and violent, it requires a number of checks to prevent an
improper use, or rather abuse, of such extensive powers.
As all military operations require vigour and constancy, it is evi-
dent that a monarchical government is singularly adapted to war.
Different from despotism, regular plans and systems may be pur-
sued, and the government is sufficiently strong to execute them with
the necessary vigour. As the subjects are attached to the Sovereign
chiefly by the idea of glory, they chearfully concur with him in sup-
porting an offensive war; if successful, their efforts increase, and
therefore are not easily checked. Misfortunes, and consequently a
iii. of the analogy 343
defensive war, allay their courage. They soon perceive they do not
fight for themselves, and feel only the miseries of the war, which
they suppose is carried on to gratify the ambition and caprice of the
sovereign, or of some favourite. Hence it is, that monarchies in gen-
eral are more adapted to an offensive than a defensive war.
Pursuing the metaphor adopted above, I will say that a republi-
can government is like a great river, formed by a multiplicity of
springs and rivulets, different in that from a despotic, or a monar-
chy, which arises from one alone. If the comparison be just, it fol-
lows, that in this kind of government there should be a sufficient
force to collect and unite the different springs, and give the whole
that precise direction which is most advantageous. A republican gov-
ernment however labours under this very great disadvantage: It is
almost impossible to determine what degree of power ought to be
vested in the executive part of the state, so that it should be sufficient
to answer every purpose of government, and how to form such checks
as may effectually prevent any abuse of that power to the danger
of the state. Is it too much, liberty is gone; is it too little, anarchy
ensues. The very long duration of the republic of Venice would
induce one to conclude, that those wise republicans had resolved
this very difficult problem.
The extreme difficulty of collecting, uniting, and directing the national
forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means cal-
culated for war, and much less for an offensive one. Its principles
being founded in equality, it is evident that war of every kind ought
to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into
the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government.
It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the
powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have
failed in their schemes, if the war has been of any duration. The
famous league of Cambray,1 the leagues formed against France at
different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last
war, and a hundred more, were dissolved without producing any
effect proportioned to their forces.
Republics, unless formed upon military principles, as was that of
the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the
1
The League of Cambrai (1508–10) was an alliance between the Holy Roman
Empire, France, Rome, and Aragon that successfully checked the territorial expan-
sion of the republic of Venice.
Greek republics against Persia, till the time of Alexander the Great,
when they had nearly lost their liberty; but when attacked, what
prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause. It is
certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense
of danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry
on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper
only for a defensive war. There, indeed, their efforts increase in pro-
portion to the danger with which they are threatened; and if the
motives arise from civil or religious principles, they generally become
invincible. When such motives disappear, and the sense of danger
vanishes, each party pursues its own interest, and the confederacy is
dissolved.
I am so convinced of the truth of this reasoning, that I have not
the least doubt, if we could hold New-York, Long Island, Rhode
Island, and Philadelphia, and cease to make those fruitless and
unmeaning excursions in the American woods, that the Congress
and the rebel people, no longer united by the sense of fear, would
soon dissolve their confederacy, and a more favourable opportunity
would offer of restoring peace and union between them and the
mother country. The troops employed on the American Continent
might enable us to strike some capital stroke in the West Indies,
which would constrain our enemies to bring a great part of their
forces to that country; for in the West Indies is their weak part, and
there they may be attacked with advantage.
CHAPTER FOUR
OF THE INVASION EXPECTED
While the terrors of an invasion and its consequences hang over our
heads, it is the duty of every man to contribute with his person and
advice to the support of the state, and point out the means which
appear proper to defeat the designs of our enemies. With this view
I have wrote the following discourse on the supposed invasion, and
hope it may serve, in some measure, to render it fruitless, and inspire
government, as well as the nation in general, with that confidence
which the situation of our affairs require. Without confidence, his
Majesty cannot avail himself, with any prospect of success, of the
national forces.
The enemies, superior at sea, and moreover, having a land force
sufficient for any purpose, may have three objects in view. The first
and most capital would be to land a powerful army in England. If
success should follow their operations, it is evident we must conclude
a peace on any terms, and the war is soon brought to an end. This
enterprize is decisive, and therefore preferable to any other.
Their next object might be to take possession of the Western
provinces, and to maintain themselves there for a few months only,
without making any further progress into the country; then our com-
merce would be totally intercepted, and our whole attention confined
to the immediate defence of the state; so that our foreign settlements
would, in a short time, fall of course into their hands. Such an expe-
dition is very bold, but it is equally dangerous, and it might prove
fatal to their army. It is possible, therefore, that their shew and
parade should be intended only to keep us at home, and ruin our
trade, while, with the rest of their forces, they attack our colonies,
Gibraltar, Minorca, &c.
Finally, to increase our distress, the combined enemies may land
fifteen or twenty thousand men in the Bay of Galway, and cover
themselves with the Shannon. The inhabitants of Connaught, equally
poor and ignorant, might be induced to join them, and it would not
be an easy matter to drive their army out of that country, if their
fleet could support their army with provisions. Such a scheme offers
all the advantages of the former, without being subject to the same
difficulties as the second; the season being now far advanced, it is
probable they may not think it eligible to attempt an invasion in
England for the present, and next year we shall be much better pre-
pared to receive them. Perhaps they may then find it too danger-
ous an undertaking, and without adopting any of the two first plans
we have supposed, they will attempt to land in Ireland, or only shew
themselves in the Channel. However, as an invasion of England,
with a powerful army, may be attended with fatal consequences, I
shall confine my observations to that alone, and endeavour to shew
how it may be frustrated.
The appearance and force of the combined fleet prove the inten-
tion of bringing affairs to a speedy conclusion, and had they met
with us, and fought with success, I have not the least doubt they
would have invaded this kingdom with a formidable number of
troops. Every thing was then, and is now, prepared for that pur-
pose: when I consider their immense superiority, and foresee the
probable event of a battle, I cannot help applauding those councils
which tended to avoid it, as well as the prudence with which they
were followed. Time and delays, at this moment, and at this season
of the year, are a victory. Had we beat the combined fleet, little
more would have been attained, whereas the loss of a battle might
have been fatal.
While our fleet is entire, though we may, for a time, be forced
out of the sea, yet I am persuaded that no invasion can take place.
It is always a dangerous enterprize, and not to be attempted while
there remains a possibility of our appearing at sea; which may hap-
pen from a thousand circumstances arising from wind and weather,
in the winter especially, when the combined fleet must separate, and
all communication with the army they may have landed must be
cut off. Our fleet, in the mean time, may intercept their convoys,
and block up the harbour when they have established their dépôts;
so that in a short time their troops must perish. It is not enough
that they debark an army, it must be continually supplied and pro-
tected from France, otherwise, however numerous, it cannot make
any progress or penetrate into the country.
If contrary to our hopes and expectations, the British Fleet is beat
and drove into some harbour, and the enemy does land a power-
ful army, we must not despond, nor by groundless fears facilitate
the success of the invaders; a just and entire confidence in govern-
iv. of the invasion expected 347
ment is necessary to our preservation, and the common danger should

produce an union of all parties in the defence of their country. It
is needless to trace the causes which have brought our affairs to this
crisis; such a talk would only tend to sow division and discontent,
when concord and harmony are most required. But I would beg
leave to recommend to the stockholders not to be alarmed, and let
their fears prevail over their reason. If, to secure their property, they
draw on the bankers, and attempt at once to realize their securities,
they will infallibly bring ruin and destruction on themselves and fam-
ilies. For though there be a sufficient sum to answer every purpose
of trade and circulation, as well as to pay the interest allowed on
such securities, successively as it becomes due, yet is there not in
this, nor in any other country, money enough to pay off all the prin-
cipals, and if it is attempted, a bankruptcy must ensue; the monied
men are ruined, and the whole nation is thrown into a convulsion,
which may prove incurable, particularly if the enemy is in the coun-
try. Whereas if they remain quiet, and repose a proper confidence
in government, we shall, no doubt, be able to repel the danger which
threatens us. The resources of this country are numerous. They are
great, and when properly exerted, will enable us to overcome our
enemies, however formidable, and force them to lay down their arms.
Though the frontier of a country, as is that of England, may be
very extensive, and therefore seems very difficult to be defended; yet
upon a due examination, it will be always found, that such a fron-
tier can be attacked only in few points, and that these points are
fixed and determined by the nature and position of the countries at
war. An army, like a traveller, must necessarily depart from a given
point, and proceed to a given point in the enemy’s country. The
line which unites these points, I call the Line of Operation.1 It is man-
ifest that all deviation from this, and all delays in pursuing the march,
are so much time lost; and in the end, will force an enemy to return
either for want of subsistence, or by bad weather, &c. To diminish
the difficulties which oppose the progress of the main army on the
Line of Operation, some times a corps is made to act on another
line to create a diversion; but such a corps can never produce a
solid advantage, if you attend to the main point, and frustrate the
designs of the principal army.
1
Lloyd’s first use of the term.
When the frontiers of the contending powers are contiguous, the

magazines formed in the country which attacks may for some time
supply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take
some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy’s country
sufficient to form a new dépôt to support the whole, or a great part
of the troops, during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evi-
dent the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to
its own country. In proportion as an army advances into the enemy’s
country, new dépôts must be continually formed, and these as near
as possible; for when they are at any considerable distance, the con-
voys arrive slow, require strong escorts, and are so precarious, that
the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close
and the enemy active: let him give his whole attention to attack your
communications, and he must live day and night on your Line of
operation. In general commanders mistake the principles of a defen-
sive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress
of an enemy, by opposing him in front in some advantageous post,
which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You
are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be
fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some
part of the country, from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins
his operations sooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot
be done if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part
of your forces on his Line of operation, which is the only effectual
and sure means to stop his progress; let him advance in front, the
length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and
decisive success.
If the frontiers are not contiguous, and be separated by the ter-
ritories of other Princes, by forests, deserts, mountains, and above
all by the sea; it is clear, that so many difficulties will occur in such
an undertaking, as that of an invasion, that it is almost impossible
it should succeed.
An army which acts over a branch of the sea, must occupy some
convenient and safe harbour; gain a great and decisive battle, or by
skilful manœuvres force the enemy to abandon such a tract of coun-
try as will, in a great measure, support the assailant; for if he depends
in the smallest degree on shipping, and a precarious navigation for
supplies, he cannot prosecute any solid operation, and successive
campaigns will be consumed in fruitless and unmeaning excursions;
troops must, however, return to the shore to take up their winter
quarters, and at last his men and money being exhausted, he per-
ishes totally, or abandons the enterprizes with loss, and ignominy.
From hence it appears that an offensive war must be prosecuted
with the utmost vigour and activity; for nothing less than compleat
victories can render it successful. Consequently a defensive war must
be carried on with caution and prudence, and, above all things, a
general action is to be avoided. You oppose the enemy in front by
occupying strong posts, and with the remainder of your forces you
act on his flanks and rear; which in a short time will reduce him,
though much stronger, to fall back and approach his dépôts. If King
Harold had followed this doctrine it is probable we should have
known William the Conqueror by his defeat only.
Let us now apply the principles established above to the present
case.
It is evident that Brest is the point from whence the French must
depart; because all their operations, even when they have landed,
are connected with and depend upon their fleet. But, as all opera-
tions which depend on navigation are, from its nature, precarious,
and liable to a thousand difficulties, they must have likewise a place
of arms in this country, a spacious harbour, as near their own coast
as possible, &c. and besides these advantages, absolutely required,
the place must be so situated that by marching a few miles inland,
they can occupy such a post as will render them masters of a tract
of country behind their army sufficient to supply it with subsistence
on their stops; without which no progress can be made, nor can
they remain for any considerable time in any part of the country.
The plan which offers these advantages is the most eligible of any
they can fix upon.
Plymouth answers perfectly this description. It is a safe and con-
venient harbour, near the coast of France; and by marching only to
Chudleigh, the invaders will be masters of Cornwall, Devonshire,
and part of Somersetshire, where they can find provisions in abun-
dance; which will enable them to prosecute their operations and pen-
etrate further into the country, or, if they chuse to remain there, it
would be a difficult matter to drive them back, as they would have
a fleet at Plymouth; and our trade being once destroyed, we must
conclude a peace on the terms they chuse to impose upon us. I am
happy to find that such measures have been taken by Government
for the defence of that very important place, as leave us no room
to fear for it.
When a coup de main only is intended, you must debark as near

the object you have in view as possible, because the success depends
on secrecy and surprize; but when you propose to wage war in a
country, you are to land your troops at a distance, that you may
have time to bring your stores on shore, fortify a camp, take some
capital position, and then proceed gradually towards the point you
have in view. General O’Reilly,2 in his expedition against Algier,
adopted another mode, and failed in the enterprize; he lost great
part of his army, and his reputation as an officer.
Next to Plymouth, the only place which can serve the purpose of
the enemy, is Portsmouth. It has two fine roads, St. Helen and
Spithead, and a very safe harbour. The town and the dock on the
land side are fortified, and cannot be taken without a regular siege,
the undertaking of which is very difficult, though we had no ships
to defend it. The Island of Portsea lies very low, and does not fur-
nish the necessary materials to carry on the works required on such
occasions. The enemy must occupy Gosport with part of his army,
while the remainder carries on the siege; and if we are masters of
Ports Down, and can confine him to the island, we are always able
to succour the place, and force him to retire, which he would find
no easy matter. The lines of Gosport are of no use, and those towards
Ports Down are against us, if the invader is in the island, being cal-
culated only to stop an enemy coming from Ports Down, which I
presume he will never be permitted to occupy. The lines of Gosport
are equally imperfect; a good fort should be raised on a rising ground,
a few hundred yards off, which would render it impossible for the
enemy to attempt any thing on that side. In case he should ever
land in the island of Portsea, a few redoubts must also be added
before the front of the works which cover the dock, to prevent his
approaching near enough to throw shells into the dock, which he
might now do, as those works are not advanced far enough into the
country; an unreasonable respect for private property having occa-
sioned their being kept too far back.
2
Alejandro O’Reilly, Conde de O’Reilly (1725–94). Irish-born Spanish general.
Although permanently maimed early in his career he served with distinction in
Spain’s Hibernia Regiment. In 1757 he joined the Austrian army and served two
campaigns under Franz Moritz, Graf von Lacy. In 1759 he joined the French army,
but later returned to the Spanish service with the rank of Colonel where he com-
manded a detachment in the ill-fated 1762 invasion of Portugal. Later promoted
to Brigadier-General his reputation suffered after the failed attack on Algiers in
1775. He died in 1794 en route to fight the French Revolution.
When I considered at first the position of the Isle of Wight, I

thought that an enemy might occupy it, and with fifteen or twenty
thousand men keep possession of the whole ground; but having lately
examined it with proper attention, I believe now that it is absolutely
impossible. This island runs from East to West, and is generally
intersected with very high mountains, whose basis run quite to the
shore. On the South side of the island they rise like ranges, like an
amphitheatre, almost perpendicular, forty or fifty feet high, and the
summits, excepting in very few places, to above a thousand; so that
if any troops are posted on them, there is no possibility of landing.
The only place where it is less difficult is in Brading Bay, opposite
St. Helen’s Road. This is a small creek between two very high hills,
which being occupied, will prevent a landing. On the South side is
a bay, where the shore is low, and very proper for debarking troops;
but Sandown Fort defends that bay very well. From thence to the
westernmost point and the Needles, no place is found where a land-
ing can be attempted, if there is the least opposition: Besides the
coast is so open and dangerous, that a boat, much less a fleet, can-
not lay at anchor an hour without the utmost risk of perishing. From
the Needles to Ride you may land any where, and a fleet may
anchor in safety, there being sufficient depth of water for men of
war to come through the Needles, and all the way up to Spithead.
The channel between the Needles and Hurst Castle is narrow, but
it is safe for the largest vessels. The Castle does not seem sufficiently
strong against ships of force; but if two considerable batteries were
erected on the two points which project into the sea opposite the
fortress, I believe that pass would be perfectly secured.
Though the difficulties which occur in landing on the South side
of the Isle of Wight and indeed of approaching it, seem insur-
mountable, yet if no opposition is made, it might be effected; how-
ever, if we consider the extent of the island, the great number of
very high mountains, and of places to land from our side, it will
appear that twenty thousand men would not be able to occupy it
in such a manner as to prevent our taking it from them. They must
fortify all the shore opposite the New Forest, as well as all the downs
or mountains behind them; for there is no one spot on the whole
island where the most extensive fortress could, in any degree, secure
the possession of it to the French. If it is placed on the South shore
there is neither bay nor harbour; and by occupying some neigh-
bouring mountains the garrison would be starved in it. The same
difficulty will occur, if placed in the centre, or on the Northern shore,

as Cowes, Yarmouth, &c. from whence I conclude, that while England
exists as a nation, an enemy cannot keep the Isle of Wight a month,
though there were thirty thousand men in it.
From Portsmouth to Harwich there is no harbour or road which
can, in any degree, answer the purposes of an enemy who intends
to land a considerable army, and make war in the country. The
difficulty, though very great, does not consist in debarking forty thou-
sand men; it is also necessary, as I have already demonstrated, that
they should have a commodious and safe harbour, a place of arms,
and be so situated as to keep a sure and easy communication with
France, especially with Brest. Such a place is not to be found on
the whole coast, except Plymouth and Portsmouth, of which enough
has been said already. The Dutch fleet, they say, came up the river
well; but how long did they remain there? A few hours only. Con-
sider, besides the great difference there is between coming from the
coast of Holland with twenty men of war to make a ridiculous
bravado, which lasted twenty-four hours, or coming from Brest with
a fleet and four or five hundred transports to invade us, and carry
on a war into the heart of our country. The one is easy, the other
impracticable.
Though I am convinced such an attempt neither will, nor can be
made, in Sussex, Kent, or higher up: I don’t think it impossible,
that in order to facilitate the operations of their main army, the ene-
mies may threaten different and distant parts of the coast; but no
solid operation can in my opinion be executed but in the West.
Upon this supposition, it appears, that our troops are too much
scattered, and cannot be brought together without a great loss of
time, wherever the enemy may land.
Whenever a tract of country is to be defended, reason points out
the necessity of occupying some central positions, with strong corps
to the right and left, to stop the enemy till the whole can be col-
lected. This line we have to defend extends from Plymouth to Dover. Ports
Down is the central point on that line. I would therefore recom-
mend, that a third part of our army be placed there, another third
on Hall Down, or Haldon Hill, beyond Exeter, and the remainder
on the limits between Sussex and Kent. If an attempt is made to
the Westward, the body encamped at Portsmouth will march thither,
and join that on Hall Down, which I suppose instantly in motion
where the invasion is attempted. The body placed in Sussex may
remain there, and by a movement to the right or left, be any where,

as occasion may require, and easily repulse every attempt made on
that coast.
Should the enemy land at Plymouth, which I think most proba-
ble, for the reasons already assigned; the regiments now there will
be able to dispute the ground, until those on Hall Down can come
to their assistance; and it does not require twenty four hours march.
Opposed in front by the corps at Plymouth, which is covered by
the works now raising there, as well as by the natural strength of
the country, and attacked in the rear by the troops coming from
Hall Down, an enemy, though far superior in number, would find
himself greatly embarrassed. Surrounded by the sea, by strong forts,
and a stronger country occupied by fifteen or twenty thousand men,
without ground sufficiently extensive to form a line, I don’t conceive
it possible how he could avoid a total overthrow. There is not a
spot about Plymouth, if properly occupied, and protected by the
most inconsiderable work, but will require a siege to force you, which
cannot be undertaken while you have any body of troops in the
neighbourhood.
The same difficulties, and much greater, will occur to an enemy
in the island of Portsea; he can either subsist there, nor from the
adjacent country, if we have a camp on Ports Down, and another
in the New Forest.
From what we have said, it seems evident that no invasion can
take place, until our fleet, intirely drove out of the sea, is forced to
hide itself for a considerable time, in some harbour; and that such
an invasion cannot be prosecuted with any probability of success,
unless the enemy is master of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Let us now
proceed to examine, what may be the consequences, in case such
an event should happen.
Supposing the enemy is in possession of Plymouth, he cannot
remain, there for ever; he will, in a short time, be forced to pene-
trate further into the country, in order to procure supplies of pro-
visions, or abandon his post for want of them. To remain there with
any safety, he must occupy and fortify Mount Edgecombe, and the
ground behind the King’s Brewhouse, as well as all the ground
between the Tamar and that branch of the sea which runs under
Mr. Parker’s garden to the bridge at the three mile stone, coming
to London; he should moreover have a body of troops in Mr. Parker’s
ground. Forty or fifty thousand men would not be sufficient for the
Map 9. Plate I: A Military Sketch of the Line to Defend from Plymouth to Dover.
purpose, because these being separated by the sea and the Tamar,
could not, in case of an attack, support each other; and if one only
of them is defeated, the others must fall successively, and in a very
short time. The greatest part of the invaders army will naturally be
posted between the Tamar and the sea, by the bridge above men-
tioned, which puts the Dock, Storehouse, and Plymouth behind them;
this distance is near five miles, and requires twenty thousand men
to defend it, which they cannot easily do, for the ground rises grad-
ually from the shore to Dartmoor, so that you have every possible
advantage in attacking their posts. The most sure method, however,
would be to attack the corps placed at Mount Edgecombe, which,
being beat, the others must of course be destroyed. Mount Edgecombe
is the key of Plymouth, and must be kept with care.
Though the enemies are in possession of all the different posts
above mentioned, and have thereby a place of arms and a fine har-
bour for their fleet, with which, for a time, they may put an entire
stop to all our trade and navigation, yet it can only be for a time.
The combined fleet cannot always remain there, and the army, con-
sisting of fifty or sixty thousand men, cooped up in such narrow lim-
its, cannot subsist by the supplies brought from France. They must
therefore advance into the country or abandon it. The only decisive
operation they could execute would be, to leave ten thousand men
at Plymouth, and with the remainder proceed directly to Hall Down,
between Chudleigh and Exeter, which is about thirty-six miles from
Plymouth. This position is very strong, whether it is taken with the
front towards Exeter, or towards Plymouth. There is no passing
between the enemy’s right and the sea; and, by an easy movement
on the left, he is in the mountains, through which all the western
roads must pass towards Cornwall. By taking this position, the enemy
would be master of Devonshire, Cornwall and part of Somersetshire,
which would furnish subsistence in abundance, and having Teignmouth
and Dartmouth very near, he would also receive from France what-
ever he wanted. Possessed of these advantages, and having a very
strong country easily to defend, it would become difficult to drive
him back; and while his fleet, destroying our trade, rode triumphant
at sea, we should be reduced to accept of any peace he chused to
dictate. It is therefore incumbent upon us to post ourselves so, that
we may be near enough to prevent an invading army from pene-
trating into the country, if we cannot hinder it from taking Plymouth.
The means and method of doing this, depending chiefly on the
nature of the country, I shall therefore give a description of it so

far as it relates to military operations.
All countries are either Open or Close. By an open country, I mean
that where an army, or a considerable body of troops, can almost
any where find sufficient room to form in, and to act; consequently
by a close country I mean that where an army in the course of
many miles cannot find room to form and act in. By the word Defile,
I mean a narrow pass, formed by mountains, hills, forests, rivers,
morasses, hedges, &c. where the road is so contracted, that few men
only can advance in front. In the first species of country it is evi-
dent that superior numbers must prevail, if the troops are equal in
goodness, and the commander knows how to avail himself of that
superiority; for this plain reason, that he can bring a greater num-
ber of men into action at any given time, and at any given point,
than his adversary. Whereas in a close country, number is nothing,
and disposition is every thing. In such a country points only can be
attacked, and by a given number of men only. So that if you occupy
these points, though otherwise much inferior to the enemy, you may
bring more men into action than he, and consequently prevail;
besides, these points may be such as to enable you to attack him in
front, flank and rear at the same time.
England, in general, is of this last kind; the western country is not
only very hilly, but also, for the most part, full of inclosures. As you
come from Exeter towards London, it is so inclosed with hedges and
ditches, that for many miles together you do not find ground sufficiently
open to form twenty battalions upon; so that the high road, where
an army can alone march, is one continued pass, or defile, winding
at the foot of the mountains, or through the inclosures, of which
you may see the specimen in Plate II. Those mountains and hedges
being properly occupied, an enemy cannot advance a step, and if
he is once engaged in them, he can never extricate himself out of
the narrow labyrinth, and will be forced to lay down his arms.
There are two roads which may be called military roads, from
Plymouth to Exeter; the one passes by Ivey Bridge, Chudleigh, and
Ashburton. The other by Ivey Bridge, Totness, Newton Bushell and
over Hall Down to Exeter. On the first road there are but two
places, viz. Hall Down, four miles beyond Exeter, and a heath two
miles beyond Chudleigh, where any considerable body of men can
form upon. The remainder of the road is one continued defile, inter-
sected by mountains, ravins, hedges, and numberless rivulets, besides
Illustration 8. Plate II.
the Teign and the Dart, which come from Dartmoor and fall into
the sea: Though these are not very deep, yet being near the moun-
tains, they are very rapid, and when the rain falls become very dan-
gerous torrents; their beds are full of large stones, and the banks
high, so that you can get over them only at the bridges, where the
high road passes. The whole country between this road and the sea
coast, from Exmouth to Plymouth, is exactly the same, so that an
army can march but in one column. If to avoid the difficulties which
arise from such a disposition, the enemy should separate his forces,
and advance in two columns, along the two roads above mentioned;
there being no communication be means of cross roads, you may
attack either or both columns separately, for they cannot support
each other until they come to Hall Down: Nor in all that tract of
country is there a single spot where you may not attack the enemy
front, flank and rear, since the road is continually winding round
the foot hills.
Between the Teign and the Dart the ground is rather more hilly,
and more easily defended. There is but one narrow road, which
goes from Dartmouth to Newton Bushel, near which the tide flows.
A few miles from Dartmouth a branch of it turns off to Totness,
and several paths from the towns on the coast, as Torbay, Paynton, &c.
come into the main road. However, a body of men landing between
Dartmouth and Teignmouth, must finally pass through Newton Bushel
in their way to Exeter, or through Totness going to Plymouth. There
goes likewise from Dartmouth to Plymouth a road over the moun-
tains by Modbury. All these roads are equally difficult, insomuch
that no wheel carriages are used by the farmers, who carry in their
harvest on horses. The only proper place between Plymouth and
Exmouth where ships can approach, are Dartmouth and Teignmouth;
but as the entrance is very narrow, and entirely commanded by the
mountains, a few battalions would easily prevent a landing.
From Teignmouth, towards Exeter, there runs a very high moun-
tain called Hall Down, or Haldon Hill, already mentioned. The top
is a fine plain, where a numerous army might camp and act. All
the roads, as I have said, to and from the West, pass over it; but
an army can come upon it only by the two roads, leading from
Newton Bushel and Exmouth, both very difficult. On the South side
towards the Teign and Newton Bushel, the hill is rapid. On the
West side it falls gradually, and forms many small hills, like an
amphitheatre; at the bottom is a wide valley, very much inclosed,
on the other side of which are high mountains, which rise continu-
ally, as you advance westward. On the East side of Hall Down
towards the sea are numberless hills, whose basis form very deep
ravins; these hills project quite into the sea, which does not admit
of any convenient place for landing troops, and is moreover so shal-
low, that no ships of burthen can approach the shore. Upon the
whole, the country from Exter to Plymouth is so extremely close
and difficult, that a few men properly disposed will stop and ruin a
numerous army.
From Exeter, where most of the western roads join, there are but
two roads towards Salisbury, which may be practicable for an army;
to Axminster there is only one. At this place begin the two, one to
the left through Yeovil, Sherborne, Shaftsbury, and over the Downs;
the other to the right by Bridport, Dorchester and Blandford, to
Salisbury. The first road as far as Shaftsbury is intersected by num-
berless hills and vallies, extremely close and cultivated, so that an
army can march only in one column. There is scarce a spot where
you cannot occupy some post across the road to prevent an enemy
from advancing, while the hedges on both sides, lined with your
infantry, would so embarrass him, that he could neither advance or
retire, or indeed make any defence on the ground for want of room
to form a line. From Shaftsbury to Salisbury the road passes over
a narrow down having on one side a high ridge of mountains, which
runs toward Blandford, and Cranbourn chace, and on the other a
deep and wide valley very close. This down is also cut by a great
number of ravins, so that very often, there is not room to form a
single battalion. If the ridge of mountains, and the valley are occu-
pied, no army can proceed on the high road; nor can it be sepa-
rated into several columns, without exposing them to be beat in
detail, as from the nature of the ground they cannot support each
other. The road which goes by Bridport is extremely difficult till you
are about two miles beyond the place; then the country opening as
far as Salisbury, becomes less inclosed, and offers every where ground
sufficient to form a numerous army upon, and very proper for a
general action, if you are superior in cavalry.
From Salisbury two roads go towards London; the first by Andver,
Basinstoke, Bagshot, Egham, &c. Near the seven mile stone a branch
goes by Stockbridge over some very high hills, and joins it at
Basingstoke: this branch passes through an open country, which how-
ever being very high, offers many excellent camps. The first is also
carried for some miles through an open country; but about Andover,
and from thence to Basingstoke, and Hartfordbridge it is very close.
The other road goes by Rumsey, Farnham, &c. through a country
which is still more close than the former, and in proportion affords
greater advantages in attacking the enemy.
It is needless to prosecute this description any further, because I
am persuaded, that no army, however numerous, will ever be able
to penetrate forty miles into the country, if proper methods are taken
to oppose it, and if we know how to avail ourselves, of the num-
berless resources, which may be drawn from the face of the coun-
try. And I have no doubt from the known experience, firmness, and
abilities of the commander in chief, but that the event, should an
invasion take place, will justify the high trust that his Majesty has
placed in him, and fully answer the expectations of the public.
The description I have given is exceedingly imperfect, as no map,
plan, or drawing, can convey a true military, and adequate idea of
any country. The eye alone, and a good one, accustomed to view
ground on a grand scale, very different from that of a parade, can
do it effectually. I think however, that what I have said, if read with
attention, accompanied with the Map annexed (Plate I ), will shew
the lines on which the enemy can act, as well as the advantages or
disadvantages of the country, through which such lines must neces-
sarily pass. The commander in chief,3 and his officers, upon exam-
ining the ground, will easily fix the particular points where to act,
while these points, and the motions of the enemy, will shew how to
act, as circumstances may require.
3
General Jeffery Amherst, Baron Amherst (1717–97).
CHAPTER FIVE
OBSERVATIONS ON THE METHOD OF RANGING

THE TROOPS, AND OF MAKING WAR, &C
The French army has no doubt some advantages over ours: It is

composed of old corps which have been accustomed to exercise, and
discipline for many years: The officers of the higher ranks have seen
service, and many of them have commanded separate corps during
the last war. The habit of being united for a long time together,
gives them a facility in manœuvring, a consistency and an adher-
ence of parts, if I may so call it, not so easily broke as in new levies;
all which must insure them a great superiority in a plain and open
country, and in a general action. In a close country, where the com-
bat is partial, and confined to particular posts, valour and a good
disposition will supply in a great measure the defects inherent to
new corps.
Though in point of discipline our enemies enjoy some advantages
over us, we possess so many over them in every other respect, that,
if we avail ourselves of them, there can be no room left to fear the
event.
1st, The face of the country forces them to march in one column;
and this difficulty alone overbalances almost every other advantage.
2dly, They have but little cavalry, which from the nature of the
country may not, if we chuse it, ever have an opportunity of acting.
3dly, They can have no heavy artillery, and not many field pieces,
compared to what we can bring into the field.
4thly, They can have no other provisions but what they bring
with them, which, however abundant it may seem, will last only for
a very short time.
5thly, They can never have a sufficient number of horses and car-
riages to transport their stores, artillery, baggage, provisions, &c.
which will retard their march, so that they cannot advance above a
mile or two a day.
6thly, When they proceed from the shore, they can form no mag-
azines in the country, and must be supplied from their original dépôt;
and when their line of communication is protracted to a certain
v. observations 363
length, half their army will not be sufficient to escort their convoys,
which you may, and must intercept. This will not only retard their
progress, but very soon stop them entirely, and force their army to
go back. They have but this alternative, to gain a great and deci-
sive victory, or abandon the enterprise. They cannot remain on the
spot, in a close country, surrounded by mountains on every side,
and those occupied by our troops: and we have nothing to do but
to profit of these advantages, and avoid a general action.
7thly, They cannot send detachments, or deviate from the great
road, without being exposed to certain destruction: Whereas we,
availing ourselves of every cross road, and path, can without risk
attack their whole line of march, and soon throw it into confusion.
They can act on that line only; whereas we can act where, and
when we please.
To these natural advantages we may, I think, procure others from
a different manner of ranging the troops, and of carrying on the
war.
The present mode of ranging the infantry three men deep, armed
with muskets only, is subject to many and very great defects.
First, The line becomes too extensive, and is therefore weak; it
cannot advance in any ground, particularly in a close one, without
the greatest difficulties and delays, contrary to the very principle of
military operations, which should be as quick as lightning.
Secondly, It is inadequate to almost every purpose of war, as well
against infantry as cavalry, and proper only for fighting at a dis-
tance. If you approach the enemy, the line is too weak, the arms
too short for a shock, and veteran troops will have a decisive supe-
riority. Placed behind entrenchments, hedges, ditches, &c. which nat-
urally offer great advantages, you can make no resistance from the
moment the enemy attacks them, so that unless you keep him off
by your fire, he penetrates somewhere, and you must abandon the
whole, or be taken in flank, and cut to pieces.
To remedy these defects, I humbly propose, that the infantry be
ranged four deep, and that the fourth rank be armed with a Pike
eleven or twelve feet long, two feet of which must be made of steel,
without any hatchet, or cross bar, that it may easily pass through
the hedges. This fourth rank must be composed of the tallest and
strongest men.
This formation will render the line less extensive, stronger, and
much more active, is proper for every operation, and particularly
adapted to our country, every where inclosed with hedges and ditches.
In a plain, no infantry formed in the usual manner can resist its
shock, an instant, or even approach your line, much less if this is
placed behind an entrenchment, or hedge. Moreover, if you form a
battalion or two into squares, protected by some howitzers on the
flank, no cavalry, however brave, can overturn them. The three first
ranks protected by a row of Pikes, which project before them at
least five feet, will feel the advantage, and soon find their superior-
ity in whatever ground they are attacked, as well as in attacking the
enemy (Plate III ): Let an experiment be made, the event will shew
the superiority of the method I propose over that now in practice.
It is a novelty. Very true; and this novelty will not a little discon-
cert the enemy.
Illustration 9. Plate III.
CHAPTER SIX
OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE
The order of battle now adopted in Europe is in many respects

defective and absurd. The infantry and cavalry formed three deep
make the line so very extensive, that it loses all its activity, which
is the soul of military manœuvres, and alone can insure success: inso-
much that it may be established as an axiom, that the army which
moves and marches with the greatest velocity, must, from that cir-
cumstance alone, finally prevail. Our military institutions exclude
every idea of celerity; hence it is that our victories are never com-
plete and decisive, and that our attacks are reduced to some par-
ticular points, which gained or lost, the battle is over; the enemy
retires generally in good order, because from the extent and slow-
ness of our motions we cannot pursue him with any vigour; he occu-
pies some neighbouring hill, and we have to begin again. Moreover,
the position of the cavalry in a line on the flanks of the infantry, is
such, that it retards the motions of the whole, because none can
advance unless the whole line does; besides it cannot from its situ-
ation there support the infantry, or be supported by it: the moment
is lost before you can bring the cavalry where it is wanted. The rea-
son assigned for placing the cavalry on the flanks is absurd, viz. to
cover the flanks of the infantry. Pray, is not the flank of the cav-
alry much weaker than that of the infantry since it cannot in any
manner form a flank to protect itself, much less will it protect the
flank of the infantry. Three or four battalions, armed with pikes,
and formed into oblong squares, are the only flank which can
effectually cover the line against infantry or cavalry, and they must
have besides field-pieces, ten or twelve twelve-pounders, and a few
howitzers (Plate III ).
Cavalry must never appear but in the moment it is brought to
action, action being the very essence of the cavalry. When the ground,
or other circumstances, do not permit you to bring it to action, it
must be kept back behind the infantry, whose flanks secured as I
propose, have nothing to fear. If you think your line too weak,
though it is much stronger than any other formed in the usual way,
vi. of the order of battle 367
let every third or fourth battalion in the line be formed into squares,
as those in the flanks, and be assured nothing can resist their efforts,
much less overturn and break the line.
In the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army
is engaged, and that successively; so that numbers are of no use,
and only serve to retard its motions, and increase the expence. To
remedy these defects I would humbly propose, that all the infantry
be formed in such a manner, that between each battalion, or regi-
ment an interval of one hundred and fifty yards be left; behind these
intervals I would have the cavalry placed in two lines at a proper
distance, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon
(Plate III ).
The first advantage resulting from this disposition is, that you may
extend your line to any length, without danger. The second, that
you bring the whole into action at once, and though the enemy be
double the number, you may out-flank him, and are in reality stronger
than him, for you attack his whole front with superior forces. The
third, that the motions of the whole line are more rapid, as each
regiment or battalion moves and acts by itself; and though some
may be more advanced than others, no inconvenience can arise from
it, because if the enemy is imprudent enough to break his line to
attack such advanced battalion, upon the right and left, he will find
those formed into squares to take him on both flanks; and if he
advances a certain length out of his line, you order your battalion
to stop, or even retire à la débandade, and in that instant you order
some of your squadrons to move forwards thro’ the intervals, full
gallop, and charge pell-mell, as one horseman acting in this man-
ner has more real activity than seventy who advance and attack in
a line as usual. I saw once three hundred horse attack a column of
seven or eight thousand foot in this way, which they defeated and
dispersed in three or four minutes. The fourth advantage is, that if
your line is broke in some places, the enemy cannot avail himself
of the disorder, because your cavalry advances, and gives the infantry
time to recover. The fifth, that if your infantry breaks that of the
enemy in any point, then advance your first line of cavalry to attack
and disperse it, the whole moving forwards rapidly at the same time,
which will infallibly produce a general slaughter, and your victory
is complete and decisive. The last advantage of this order of battle,
which I shall mention, is, that it is general, and equally adapted to
every species of country, when an army can act in the least. In an
open country you combine the action of cavalry, with that of the
infantry, and heavy artillery. In a close country, where an extensive
line cannot be formed, the original formation of the troops enables
you to act separately, as the ground may require, by corps, detach-
ments, brigades, or regiments, and that always with superior vigour
and activity. It is peculiarly adapted to our country; I hope, there-
fore, it will be received and applied on the present occasion.
CHAPTER SEVEN
OF THE GENERAL METHOD OF MAKING WAR
Our armies, however numerous, are united in one body formed in

two or three lines. Between this army and that of the enemy, at a
certain distance, the light troops, very often amounting to twenty
thousand men, form another army, which is called a chain to observe
the enemy, prevent his coming upon you unawares, and cover the
march of the grand army. Sometimes also detachments of them are
sent to escort your convoys, or to cover a certain district, while the
army acts on another line. These light troops, though very numer-
ous, they consider only as mere scouts to observe the enemy, inso-
much that on a day of battle they are not to be found, and seldom
or ever take part in the action. Whether you advance to the enemy,
or the enemy comes to you, the light troops disperse to the right
and left, and you hear no more of them till the next day. Why on
such occasions they do not form to the right and left of the army,
at a convenient distance, and attack the enemy on the flanks, is to
me as inconceivable, as the use now made of them appears ridicu-
lous and absurd. Four or five hundred men, including one hundred
hussars, distributed into small parties in the woods, behind the hedges,
near the high roads, would observe the enemy much better than ten
thousand men. The motions of such a body as that of an army of
light troops, are too slow, and always before the eyes of the enemy,
so that he can mark them, and make some capital manœuvres with-
out your knowledge. Whereas a chain of small parties going every
where, unite or disperse in a moment, and are always invisible, so
that it is impossible for the enemy to make any kind of movement
without your having timely notice.
The great defect of the present method of acting is, that however
numerous your army may be, if it is formed in one body, your
motions are extremely slow. Secondly, the enemy may direct his
march so that he outflanks you. Thirdly, you must have a great
body of troops between you and him to watch his motions. Fourthly
and finally, by marching against him in a line whose direction is
perpendicular to his front, you cannot out-flank him. To remedy
these very capital defects, I would beg leave to propose another

mode of distributing the troops of which our army is composed.
In order to explain what I have to say on this subject, I must
premise, First, that a man or body of men, as an army, can defend
themselves only in front; consequently, if you attack them on either,
or both flanks, you will easily beat them, and much more so if you
come upon them in the rear. Hence it is that Nature points out the
danger, and raises that Panic with which an army is seized when the
men apprehend that they are attacked in the rear; conscious of their
weakness, they generally fly in confusion. Sometimes the face of the
country obliges an enemy to contract his front, as when he comes
upon you in columns: then the moment is favourable to attack him,
before he has time to form his line. Sometimes by your throwing
up some Redoubts* before your front, he is obliged to break his
line, and to advance in columns: this likewise is an occasion to attack
him with advantage. Both are, however, too generally neglected. Men
for the most part fix on a given spot to fight, which they will not
quit, though the enemy in his progress gives many opportunities to
a successful attack. They make their arrangements on paper, and by
the slowness of their movements abide by them, being utterly unable
to form and execute new dispositions, as circumstances may require.
Besides the circumstances just mentioned, which force an enemy to
contract his front, there is a method of extending yours, so that you
may always out-flank him, though he be much superior in number.
If you can form on a portion of a circle, whose branches project beyond
his flanks, and the enemy persists in advancing within that circle, or
remains in a line as usual, while you extend yours in a curve, so
that you come on either, or both his flanks, it is evident that if you
attack him in that disposition, he must be beat. I therefore propose
that your army be divided always in five parts, three placed in the
centre, one fifth on the right, the remaining fifth on the left, and
each advanced more or less, as the nature of the ground permits.
They must not be behind the enemy, and liable to be cut off, as
happened to the Prussians at Maxen,1 unless the whole of your army
* I must observe here that a body of men will raise a sufficient number of
Redoubts to cover themselves in eight hours; and that they will compleat the work
in six, if they are provided with fascines or faggots.
1
Battle of Maxen (20 November 1759). Lloyd fought at Maxen in which Marshal
Daun won an overwhelming victory against a large Prussian corps by a three-
pronged envelopment by infantry columns.
vii. of the general method of making war 371
is opposed to the enemy’s flank; then indeed you may place one or
both corps nearly behind him, if the ground is advantageous. They
must however, wherever posted, have some certain and secure retreat,
otherwise you expose them to great risk, and perhaps to utter ruin
and destruction.
The advantages arising from this distribution of the troops are
many. First, In whatever ground you act it is equally applicable.
Secondly, The motions of the whole army are more simple and
quicker. Thirdly, The enemy can make no manœuvres without your
knowledge. Fourthly, Whether he advances to the right or left, (for
he cannot without exposing his army to the most imminent danger,
advance against your centre), your corps, which he is attacking, may
fall back, or be supported by the centre, while the other attacks the
flank opposite to it. If the enemy keeps his ground and waits your
attack, then you act against both his flanks at the same time; or by
lengthening your line to the right or left, enclose his flank while you
attack his front. In short, while you can force him to act within a
portion of a circle, the victory is yours. This method, I repeat it, is
general, equally proper for all cases; but more particularly advanta-
geous, and even necessary for a defensive war.
Every army acts upon two lines, that on which it stands, and that
which is drawn from the post it occupies, to the province it means
to cover, or the places from whence it draws its subsistences. An
army acting offensively, departs from a given point where its dépôts
are lodged, and goes to a given point in the enemy’s country. It is
often and indeed generally adviseable for those on the defensive to
avoid battle; because the consequences are, or may be fatal. But it
does not follow that you are to remain inactive: what is then to be
done? The answer is obvious. The centre must occupy some advan-
tageous post, strongly fortified, while the two corps or wings must
act day and night on the enemy’s line of operations. If this executed
with vigour, he will soon be reduced to the necessity of attacking
your centre, which you may avoid by taking a new position, and
gain time or wait for it, while the two wings attack his flanks dur-
ing the action; or else he must fall back to be nearer his dépôts, or
finally send strong corps against yours; and as these retire not on
your army, he loses his time and labour. By this disposition of your
troops you cover your country effectually, and prevent the enemy
from advancing towards your centre. The further he advances the
more danger he runs; for his line of operations will be longer and
the less easy to be guarded. If, on the contrary, you act offensively,
Illustration 10
vii. of the general method of making war 373
Illustration 11
the enemy may find a thousand strong camps, from whence you
cannot force him by any attack on his front; but if you act by corps,
as I propose, and direct your march on either flank, which enables
you to act on his line of operation, you will in a few days force him
to abandon his camp, and fight you on your own terms, or aban-
don the country. If he permits you to approach him, you may not
only force him to abandon the country, but oblige him to retire in
a given direction. I do not therefore understand a General where
he says, the enemy was posted in such a manner that he could not
be forced. I admit it could not perhaps be done by attacking his
front; but unless his subsistence grows under his feet, he may be
forced to abandon any camp, if you act on his flanks and line of
operation, which he cannot prevent but by taking another positions.
The march of an army is justly considered as one of the most
capital operations in the art of war; I shall therefore beg leave to
point out the principles on which it is to be formed.
First, That it be executed in the least time possible.
Secondly, That the columns may be formed into a line with the
greatest facility.
It follows from hence, that if the whole line, or lines, could march
in front from one camp to another, this would be the most perfect
way of marching, because no time would be lost in forming the
columns for the march, or in replacing them in a line. Every officer
will conceive that I mean a common march, when you advance in
front towards the enemy: for if you move on his flanks, you have
nothing to do but to make the army, as it stands in two or three
lines, march on its right or left; then you are in order of battle, by
a simple movement to the right or left, on the ground where you
stand. But as no country is sufficiently open for an army to advance
in a line, for any considerable distance, you must of course break
that line, and march in several columns. The more numerous these
columns are, the better for the reasons above mentioned. The worst
of all consequently, is that when you can march in one column only,
because it supposes the whole army is in a defile, and exposed to
be cut in pieces by very few men, who occupy the ground through
which such a column is passing. This must be the case with the
French, if they attempt to penetrate into this country, as appears
from the description we have given of it.
Finis
V
CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR IN

GERMANY, BETWEEN THE KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE EMPRESS
OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES, PART II (1781)
CONTENTS

Advertisement .............................................................................. 383
Part the First. An Analysis of the Grecian, Roman,
and Modern Military Institutions, together with a
New System ............................................................................ 385
Chapter I. Of the Composition of Different Armies,
Ancient and Modern .......................................................... 385
Chapter II. Of the Composition of an Army .................... 387
Chapter III. Of the Phalanx ................................................ 389
Chapter IV. Of the Legion .................................................. 391
Chapter V. Of the Modern Institution of an Army .......... 393
Chapter VI. Of the Advantages and Defects of Missile
and Hand Weapons .......................................................... 397
Chapter VII. Of the Formation of Battalions and
Squadrons ............................................................................ 399
Chapter VIII. Of the Cavalry .............................................. 401
Chapter IX. Of the Modern Order of Battle .................... 403
Of a Battle .......................................................................... 406
Chapter X. A New System .................................................. 410
Chapter XI. Of the Dress of the Soldier ............................ 412
Chapter XII. Of Defensive Arms and Armour .................. 413
Chapter XIII. Of the Formation of Battalions .................... 415
Chapter XIV. Of the Cavalry .............................................. 419
Chapter XV. Of the Formation of a Squadron ................ 421
Chapter XVI. Of the Constitution of an Army .................. 422
Chapter XVII. Of the Order of Battle ................................ 425
General Reflections ............................................................ 434
Of Contractors .................................................................... 436
Part the Second. The Philosophy of War: Of the Rise
and Progress of the Passions, and their Application
Relative to the Conduct of an Army .................................. 437
Chapter I. Of the General .................................................... 437
Of the Passions .................................................................. 445
Chapter II. Of Animal Fear .................................................. 448
Chapter III. Of Honour and Shame .................................. 449
378 v. the late war in germany, part ii (1781)
Chapter IV. Of Riches .......................................................... 451

Chapter V. Of Liberty .......................................................... 452
Chapter VI. Of Religion ...................................................... 454
Chapter VII. Of Women, and their Influence on
the Human Heart .............................................................. 455
Chapter VIII. Of Music ........................................................ 457
Part the Third. The Policy of War: Of the Analogy
between Military Operations and the Different
Species of Government .......................................................... 458
Chapter I. Of the Connection between the Different
Species of Governments and Military Operations .......... 458
Chapter II. Of Despotic Governments ................................ 459
Chapter III. Of Monarchical Governments ........................ 464
Chapter IV. Of Republican Governments .......................... 470
Chapter V. Of an Aristocracy .............................................. 474
Chapter VI. Of Civil Wars .................................................. 476
Part the Fourth. The Principles of War Demonstrated .......... 479
Chapter I. Of the Camp ...................................................... 479
Chapter II. Of the March of an Army, and of the
Front of the March ............................................................ 480
Chapter III. Of the Line of Operations .............................. 484
Chapter IV. Of an Offensive War ...................................... 488
Chapter V. Of a Defensive War .......................................... 491
Chapter VI. Of Light Troops .............................................. 495
Chapter VII. Of the Frontier Line ...................................... 496
Part the Fifth. The Application of those Principles to
the Military Constitution of the Different Powers
of Europe; with Maps of France, Hungary, Poland,
Turkey, Germany and Russia, with an Analysis of
their Different Frontiers, wherein We Examine
whether and How they may be Attacked with
Advantage ................................................................................ 499
Chapter I. Of the Frontier of France .................................. 499
Chapter II. Of the Austrian Frontiers .................................. 507
Chapter III. Of the Turkish Frontier .................................. 518
Chapter IV. Of the Russian Frontier towards Europe ...... 519
Chapter V. Of America ........................................................ 531
The iconoclastic quality of Lloyd’s military thought permeates the

misnamed Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany. Rather
a treatise on his philosophy of war, it contains no operational nar-
rative. He intended it to be a reflective testament on his career,
experience and general outlook. It attacks and demolishes the shib-
boleths of modern war: the dependency upon massed firepower, lin-
ear tactics, and guarded strategy. Warfare had become indecisive
due to the over-reliance on artillery, fortifications, and the penchant
for attacking posts rather than destroying enemy armies. A military
malaise affected Europe, which created a lethargic, stale, and uni-
formed practice of war. Such a state of affairs, according to Lloyd,
was the legacy of Louis XIV’s France. He argued in favor of return-
ing the ideals of mobility and decisive victory to their primacy. As
a philosophe it was his duty to overturn the tyranny of custom and
the ignorance of accepted dogma, not unlike Voltaire whose dogged
anti-clericalism sought to break the hold of the Church over a super-
stitious society. As he simply stated, ‘war is a state of action.’
If Lloyd’s musings appear mechanical to modern readers, it is
because the era understood all phenomena as being part of a large
celestial machine. He transposed that concept onto army organiza-
tion. The modern order of battle of arraying infantry battalions into
long lines of two or three ranks should give way to his ‘New System’
that adopted both progressive techniques and utilized reactionary
methods. A deeper formation of four ranks with the last armed with
pikes and whose firearms could be converted into lances might solve
the problem of closing with the enemy. Armed with melee weapons
the battalion could fight in close order and make battlefield victory
decisive once again. The use of light troops as well as the breaking
of the lines into mutually supporting divisions would provide much-
needed tactical flexibility. If his New System received little contem-
porary fanfare, Lloyd prophesized the importance of light troops,
columns, and unconventional tactics. An army was a machine that
one could fine tune, manipulate, and rebuild: a true statement of
the enlightened belief in the importance of physics.
But Lloyd knew that an army, however similar to a machine, was

composed of thousands of individual wills: in fact he referred to it
as a near uncontrollable sea. The officer, unless an intuitive genius,
must understand human nature. Here the utilitarian morality of plea-
sure-pain and honor-shame formed his basic conceptual outlook. A
commander did not lead through fear or physical compulsion, he
led by example and through the exhortation of the soldiers’ passions
for glory, riches, and reward. Reflecting the humanitarian spirit of
the age, Lloyd firmly believed in treating soldiers with respect, honor,
and kindness. But political culture also formed the soldier. A gov-
ernment’s status as despotic, monarchical, or republican contoured
the goals, methods and duration of war. Reflecting the pervasive
influence of Montesquieu, Lloyd’s analysis presented a prototype for
military thought as social science.
In the realm of operational doctrine Lloyd emphasized and at
length elucidated his concept of the ‘lines of operation.’ Intrinsically
tied to geography, lines of operations should be the guiding tools for
war planning, strategy and execution. Armed with this knowledge a
general could orchestrate a campaign to crush an enemy using flank
attacks and envelopment of the kind later seen in the Napoleonic
wars. Lloyd augmented this abstract reasoning with his own experi-
ence. The influence of Russian service is evident, especially at the
tactical level. But it was the fluidity of warfare in eastern Europe
that so impressed Lloyd, and it is that ‘pell-mell’ ferocity that ani-
mates his criticism, analysis and proposals.
Published along with a reprint of the 1766 operational history,
originally Lloyd’s ‘Reflections on the General principles of War’ pref-
aced this new volume. Due to its inclusion in an earlier section I
omitted it here for sake of repetition.
Publishing History
Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany. Part II. Illustrated
with a Number of Maps and Plans. By Major-General Lloyd, who
served several Campaigns in the Austrian Service. London: Printed
for the Author, and Sold by S. Hooper, 1781.
Abhandlung ueber die allgemeinen Grundsaetze der Kriegkunst. Tr. Hermann
Flensberg. Frankfurt und Leipzig: Ph. H. Perrenon, 1783.
Histoire de la Guerre d’Allemagne en 1756; entre le Roi de Prusse et l’Impératrice

d’Allemagne et ses Alliés. Traduite par le C. Roux Fazillac. Lausanne:
[s.n.], 1784.
Introduction à l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne, en MDCCLVI entre le roi
de Prusse, et l’Impératrice reine avec ses Alliés, Ou, Mémoires Militaires et
Politiques du Général Lloyd. Traduit et augmenté de notes et d’un
précis la vie & la caractere de ce général. Londres, 1784.
Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem Könige von
Preussen und der Kaiserin Königin mit ihren Alliirten, vom General Lloyd.
2 Volumes. Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1785–94.
De la Guerre de Campagne á l’Usage d’un Officier Général Henry Lloyd.
Maestrict: [s.n.], 1786.
Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du Général Lloyd, ou, Extrait de l’Introduction
a l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1756 entre le Roi de Prusse et
l’Impératrice-reine et ses Alliés. Basle: J. Decker, 1798.
Mémoires Militaires et Politiques du Général Lloyd: servant d’Introduction à
l’Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1756, entre le Roi de Prusse et
l’Impératrice reine avec ses Alliés. 2 vols. Traduits et augmentes de
notes et d’un precis sur la vie et le caractere de ce general, par
un officier francais. Paris: Magimel, 1801.
en partie de l’anglais de Lloyd, et en partie redigee sur la corre-
spondance originale de plusieurs officers francais et principalement
Mémoires Militaires et Politiques du Général Lloyd. Bibliothèque historique
et militaire, tome V. Paris, 1851.
Continuation of the History of the Late War in Germany. Part II. (Cambridge:
Ken Trotman, 2002). This is a facsimile reprint of the original
volume.
ADVERTISEMENT
The Author has been advised to publish this Part of his Work as
mentioned in his Proposals, for the Continuation of the History of
the late War in Germany, &c. In the mean while the Remainder
of that Work is going on with all Expedition; the Author being now
revisiting the several Countries (the Subject of the History) in order
to locate the Scenes of Action with more Precision.
The Preface to the former Volume being so immediately con-
nected with the Subject of the present Publication, that the Author
flatters himself will apologize to the Purchasers of that Work for its
being prefixed to this.1
In order to elucidate in one View the particular Reflections and
Descriptions contained in this Work, as well as in Military History
in general, a Map on a large Scale is now engraving, that will com-
prehend the countries between the Meridian of Paris and that of
Petersburg, and from the Latitude of the last mentioned Place, to
that of Constantinople; on which will be traced the natural Lines of
Operation, leading from the Frontiers of the respective Countries;
as also the Lines on which the respective Armies did really act in
the several Campaigns during the War we describe, which will enable
the Reader to see and judge of the Propriety of their Operations.2
This Map will be given to Purchasers of the Work; it is therefore
requested, that Gentlemen will give their Names and Address to each
respective Bookseller of whom they buy it, which will entitle them
to the Map on producing this Note.
1
Referring to the ‘Reflections of the General Principles of War’ affixed to the
first volume of the history published in 1766.
2
I have been unable to locate a copy of this map.
PART THE FIRST
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GRECIAN, ROMAN, AND

MODERN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, TOGETHER
WITH A NEW SYSTEM
Chapter I. Of the Composition of Different Armies, Ancient and Modern
War is a state of action. An army is the instrument with which every

species of military action is performed: like all other machines it is
composed of various parts, and its perfection will depend, first, on
that of its several parts; and second, on the manner in which they
are arranged; so that the whole may have the following properties,
viz. strength, agility, and universality; if these are properly combined,
the machine is perfect. Care must be taken that not any one of these
properties be increased by diminishing another, but that the whole
may be in proportion.
By strength in an army, I do not mean that force which arises
from numbers, but that which proceeds from the mode in which
troops are ranged and armed. This strength must be adequate to
every purpose of war; equally proper to resist or attack an enemy,
whether cavalry or infantry, in an open or in a close country.
By agility I mean, the celerity with which an army marches and
performs the various motions required in the conduct of a campaign.
This property is the most essential, and cannot be acquired but by
continual exercise, nor even then, unless the original constitution of
the troops be calculated for a facility of motion.
The first problem in Tactics should be this: how a given number
of men ought to be ranged, so that they may move and act with
the greatest velocity; for on this chiefly depends the success of all
military operations.
An army superior in activity can always anticipate the motions of
a less rapid enemy, and bring more men into action than they can
in any given point, though inferior in number. This advantage must
generally prove decisive, and insure success.
A Battle is a changeable scene, in which every circumstance is
instantaneous and transitory, without activity, those favourable oppor-
tunities, which always occur in days of action escape, and perhaps

do not return in twenty campaigns.
By universality I mean, that the mode and form in which the
troops are ranged, should be equally proper to act in different kinds
of ground, and against every kind of troops, to attack or defend;
because an army once formed into line, and near the enemy, can-
not without much difficulty change the order in which it is formed,
or indeed make any motion, but forwards; therefore when any change
is required, recourse must be had to the second line or reserve, and
generally without success: it is therefore highly necessary that the
first formation of the troops should be so general as to be applica-
ble to every particular case, and require no change during the action,
unless in employing more or fewer men against any given point.
If such are the properties (I mean strength, agility, and univer-
sality) which render any army perfect, it is evident that the arms
made use of, the manual exercise, and the different evolutions in
which the soldier is to be instructed, ought to be analogous to these
principles, and whatever is not conformable to them should be
exploded as vain and insignificant at least, if not, as very often hap-
pens, dangerous and impracticable.
I know that it is much more easy to conceive and point out the
principles which ought to guide us in the construction of a machine
than to put them in practice; for whatever passes through the hands
of man participates of his imperfections. We should not however
despair; if the perfection we aim at is not attainable, to approach it
is a great merit, and will in some measure answer the end proposed.
For want of certain and known principles in the constitution of
army, caprice and imitation seem to have been our only guides;
whence innumerable changes and novelties are continually intro-
duced into our modern armies. Error and folly succeed each other
like modes and fashion in dress; what is to-day an object of applause
and admiration, is to-morrow exploded, and succeeded by some new
chimera equally absurd and transient.
A certain great prince,1 in the course of his reign, has undoubt-
edly performed some very extraordinary acts; and therefore our mil-
itary gentlemen have implicitly adopted the dress, exercise, evolutions,
&c. used in his armies; I believe without sufficiently weighing the
1
Frederick II, the Great of Prussia.
part the first. an analysis 387
matter, or considering that the success of his operations ought prin-

cipally to be attributed to his situation, as a sovereign of uncommon
abilities at head of his armies, and to the particular circumstances
of his enemies; advantages which are but rarely combined so as to
produce that unity vigour on which success in war almost intirely
depends.
The continual attention paid to the discipline of his troops, gives
them a facility in manœuvring superior to that of his enemies, which
certainly contributed to his victories; his head and heart did the rest.
Mode of dress, and a thousand insignificant objects with which he
torments his army, had nothing to do in the matter. To obviate this
phrenzy of imitation, and if possible to fix some certain principle for
the composition and direction of an army, is the object of the fol-
lowing discourse.
Chapter II. Of the Composition of an Army
The different operations of war, and the variety of the ground in

which they are performed, indicate a necessity of different species
of arms as well as troops; accordingly we find at all times armies
composed of infantry and cavalry, and these armed with different
kinds of weapons; some carried missile weapons, others hand-weapons:
by missile weapons, I mean those instruments with which a man
throws darts, stones, balls, &c. at an enemy when at a certain dis-
tance. By hand-weapons (I cannot otherwise translate what the French
call Arme-Blanche) I mean those weapons which a man holds in his
hand while he strikes the foe with the other end; such as swords,
pikes, bayonets &c.
It is needless to observe that there is a constant and invariable
connexion, or at least there ought to be, between the species of arms
made use of by the troops (infantry or cavalry) and the mode of
ranging them; because they must be formed in such a manner as
to be able to manage their arms with advantage: though this prin-
ciple is self-evident, and essentially necessary to be observed in the
composition of an army, yet we shall find in the sequel it has been
almost totally neglected by the moderns.
The missile weapons of the antients were extremely weak, if com-
pared with ours; the shield was sufficiently strong to parry, or at
least diminish their effects; however they were found necessary, and
generally adopted. It is evident that men armed with missile weapons

could not be formed into one mass, or in a deep order of battle,
because in that case they could not possibly have made use of their
arms with any advantage; they were therefore left to themselves, that
is, they chose the time, place, and object; and advanced or retreated
only upon a general signal.
The use of such troops was very considerable; they could inter-
rupt and harass the motions of more massive bodies, though for
want of consistency and strength they could not break them. No
species of ground could be absolutely improper for those light troops,
and a close country was particularly favourable to them; plains and
cavalry were to be avoided; in every other circumstance they could
act with advantage; but cavalry and massive bodies could neither
move nor act but in plains and open countries.
No army could therefore be complete unless it was composed of
three species of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, and light troops; and
accordingly we find the antients and moderns have adopted them
in the constitution of their armies.
Of the antients the Tartars, and all the Asiatic people, thought
that velocity was the peculiar advantage of the cavalry, and that this
property might be exerted to advantage; it seems they fought pell-
mell loosely, a la dedondade: at least the Romans did so very often;
for we are told that the cavalry dismounted in heat of action, and
fought on foot, which they could not have done had it been formed
into great squadrons, and attacked in a line in the modern Euro-
pean way.
A cavalry thus constituted was of great and general use, particu-
larly in pursuing a broken enemy, who were necessarily extermi-
nated, which is now the case with the Tartars and Spahi’s.2 Their
extreme activity and velocity prevent all disposition in the infantry
for a retreat, unless they are favoured by a very broken ground,
where cannon may be placed. As they move separately, and in very
small bodies, they penetrate every where; and as no road is imper-
vious to them, they in an instant surround their enemy, whom they
generally cut to pieces.
We have endeavoured to unite mass and solidity to the velocity
of the horse, but I think without success; activity, the peculiar property
2
Sipahis were the provincial feudal cavalry of the Ottoman Empire.
of the horse, is diminished, and almost totally destroyed by the mode

in which our cavalry is formed; all bodies lose their velocity in pro-
portion to the augmentation of their mass: though the advantages
derived from cavalry and light troops, made the use of both absolutely
necessary, yet as their manner of fighting was neither general nor
decisive, the principal force of an army was thought to consist in a
good body of infantry, and with reason if it is properly formed: its
operations are, or may be more general, solid, and decisive, than
those of other bodies.
All troops, I believe, have been formed into squares, or parallel-
ograms; because these are the only figures or forms in which a body
of men united can move or act. The circle which was used by Caesar,
and which is so much admired by Puysegur,3 could be proper only
when it was surrounded, and confined to a particular spot, which
was the case when it was used by Caesar.
Chapter III. Of the Phalanx
The Greeks ranged their infantry in a mass called a phalanx; it con-

sisted of about 16,000 men; whether it was a square or an oblong
figure is not material. This mass moved and acted in one body,
when the nature of the ground permitted: necessity only made them
divide into smaller sections. It is evident,
First, That such a mass could be armed only with hand-weapons,
because none but the foremost ranks could possibly make use of any
other, and even these with little effect, the whole mass being formed
in a close order with small if any intervals.
Second, The least inequality of the ground interrupted, or totally
suspended its motions, and consequently by driving the phalanx into
broken ground, and avoiding its shock and impulse, any troops
formed upon more active principles would soon throw it into con-
fusion, break and defeat it. The phalanx vanquished the Persians,4
3
Jacques-François Maximo de Chastenet, marquis de Puységur (1656–1743). His
posthumous, Art de la guerre par principes et par règles, 2 vols. (Paris: Claude-Antoine
Jombert, 1748), was a popular mid-century treatise that expounded a general the-
ory of warfare.
4
The Battle of Marathon (490 BC) for example, where the dismounted Persian
army fought the phalanx in open terrain and suffered a devastating defeat.
because they, confiding in their numbers, fought in plains; they were

indeed likewise vanquished by the Romans; but that was because
the legion was formed on more active principles than those which
modelled the Asiatic armies.
Hence it is that no massive bodies, such as a phalanx, or the col-
umn proposed by Folard,5 can act or defend themselves against much
smaller numbers armed with muskets, and that the use of missile
weapons is incompatible with every deep and massive order.
The advantages of massive bodies arise from their natural weight
and strength, and from the hand-weapons which they must neces-
sarily use: the foremost ranks pressed by those behind are forced to
advance; the slain and wounded are instantly succeeded, and though
the number is diminished, the front is equally closed and extended,
and the action is prosecuted with the same vigour, so that if the
ground permits them to act at all, they must act with success when
they can approach the enemy.
The use of hand-weapons brings the men so close together, that
no alternative is left but to die or conquer. Hence the victories of
the antients were so complete and decisive, that a battle or two con-
cluded a war.
The length of the Peloponnesian and Punic wars arose from other
causes, which we shall explain hereafter. The phalanx could not
abandon its original institution, nor deviate from the line on which
it acted to pursue a broken enemy; this was left to the cavalry and
light infantry, which generally did the business so effectually that few
escaped.
The Grecian cavalry seems to have been good, but small in num-
ber. The country in general was improper for cavalry, and besides
as it was divided into a great number of states, the territories of the
contending powers were too contracted to admit of a numerous cav-
alry. Their wars were confined to excursions of a few days, and pro-
duced rather skirmishes than battles. The weaker kept within the
walls of the capital; the stronger ravaged the small dominions and
retired; and thus ended the campaign.
5
Jean-Charles, chevalier de Folard (1669–1752). His six-volume magnum opus,
Histoire de Polybe; avec un commentaire au un corps de science militaire enrichi de notes critiques
et historiques (Paris: P. Gondouin, 1727–30), expounded the revival of deep infantry
columns to remedy tactical indecisiveness. See Jean Chagniot, Le Chevalier de Folard:
la Stratégie de l’incertitude (Manaco: Éd. de Rocher, 1997).
In the course of the Peloponnesian war [432–404 BC], so well

described by Thucydides, which lasted above twenty wears, no great
battle was fought, which was the cause of its duration; and the face
of the country was such, that an enemy could not be forced into
action: to this we may add, that the armies on both sides were com-
posed of confederates, which necessarily weakened or destroyed their
own activity and vigour.
Chapter IV. Of the Legion
This body of men formed a complete army; it was composed of

heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry, armed with missile and
hand-weapons; it was ranged like our troops in a rectangle, the more
extended faces of which fronted the enemy. The legionary infantry
was placed in the center, the cavalry on the wings, and the archers
and slingers were distributed along the front of the line, and fought
where they could, without interfering with the heavy infantry. They
were very active in a day of battle, often mixed with the cavalry,
and supported it, let no opportunity escape where they could annoy
the enemy; very unlike the light troops in Germany, who generally
disappear on a day of battle, and very often cannot be collected in
two or three days after.
Montecuculi6 says, that it is absolutely necessary to intermix small
detachments of forty or fifty foot with the horse, and that at the
battle of Saint Gothard fought upon the Theisse, in Hungary, against
the Turks, these detachments contributed much to his victory.
I am so far persuaded of the utility of this method, that I am sur-
prized it is not generally adopted, because a company of foot may
be formed in such a manner as to oppose cavalry with success in a
plain, as we shall shew hereafter.
The legionary infantry were ranged nine or ten men deep. Authors
vary on this point, which is not material. Each man had three feet
square to act in, that he might use his arms offensive and defensive
6
Raimondo Montecuccoli (1608–80). Imperial officer who fought in the Thirty
Years’ War (1618–48) and rose to the rank of generalissimo of all Austrian forces
after defeating the Turks at the Raab River, or St. Gotthard (1 August 1664). He
wrote widely on military matters and became the ‘Clausewitz’ for the eighteenth-
century theorists. See Raimondo Luraghi, ed., Le opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli, 2 vols.
(Rome:Stato maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio storico, 1988).
with advantage. The subdivisions of the legion corresponded exactly

with our brigades. I do not know how their cavalry was formed,
whether in great or small divisions, though I believe in the latter,
nor in how many ranks. It seems they fought in small parties of
about thirty or forty men, and in four ranks, but on this point I am
not certain.
The infantry being formed in nine or ten men deep, a Roman
army of equal strength with a modern one, occupied only a third
part of the ground which is requisite for the latter: it follows, that the
motions of the whole line were more rapid in that proportion. The
nature likewise of their arms did not require that the action should
be at all interrupted; consequently a battle was begun, prosecuted,
and concluded, in less time than ten of our battalions would take
to pass in review on Wimbledon-Common. The advantage of the
phalanx was in its impulse and shock only, that of the legion in its
activity, sufficient strength and superiority to the phalanx in velocity,
the legion prevailed over the phalanx, and every other arrangement.
I agree with the illustrious and sagacious Polybius,7 that the legion
was the most perfect order then known, or perhaps that can be
invented. It was strong, and formed for activity, analogous to the
arms it bore, and therefore was so far perfect; yet in the distribu-
tion of the whole, it had, I think, one capital defect common to the
phalanx, and to our modern armies. Its cavalry was placed on the
wings of the infantry; indeed it could not be otherwise in the Grecian
order. This I presume is a very great defect, and I think I shall
prove it in the sequel of this work. The cavalry thus disposed was
too weak, so that it could not act an independent part; and being
placed at the extremities of the lines, it could not be supported by
the infantry; the horsemen were obliged to alight and fight on foot:
accordingly we find that the Roman cavalry never made any figure
in the numberless battles which that military republic fought. It might,
like our hussars, render a victory more complete; but it seldom con-
tributed to gain one. Whenever the infantry was broken, it was gen-
erally cut off; this in such a disposal of troops must always be the
case, if the enemy is superior in cavalry, and if the ground permits
that cavalry to act. The same event must likewise ensue to the cav-
alry if it is broken, and vigorously pursued, unless it be protected
7
Polybius (c. 200–118 BC). Greek historian whose Histories chronicle Rome’s rise
to mastery over the Mediterranean world.
and supported by some infantry posted. These considerations evince

the necessity of placing both cavalry and infantry in the line, in such
a manner that they may afford aid and mutual support to each
other, and that their efforts may be combined, and directed to the
same point, in which we think the perfection of an order of battle
consists. It is the unity of action which alone can insure victory, and
this unity is, I apprehend, totally incompatible with the antient and
modern mode of ranging cavalry. The close manner in which the
Roman cohorts and our battalions are formed, with very small inter-
vals, obliged them and us to place cavalry on the wings; but I would
ask, is it absolutely necessary they should be so placed? I think not:
in such a disposition I see many defects, and not one advantage.
Chapter V. Of the Modern Institution of an Army
Custom is a tyrant, who governs mankind with more despotic sway

than an Eastern monarch. To oppose him is treason and rebellion.
An opinion, well or ill founded, is not to be irradicated by any direct
argument; it can only be extirpated by time, and favourable cir-
cumstances. The modern philosophy, though for the most part founded
upon mathematical principles, has not in the course of more than
a century been able to expel entirely the dreams and visions of Plato
and Aristotle. It is no less odious than difficult to convince a man
he is in the wrong, and that his opinions are absurd. Few have incli-
nation to investigate their grounds; and still fewer have the capac-
ity to investigate them effectually. Hence they prefer travelling in
the known path, to the trouble of enquiring after a new one. In
matters of religion and politics, I should not hazard any new opin-
ion, because true or false it might produce doubt and discord, which
a good subject ought to avoid. Peace and harmony should be the
guide and principles of his actions; but in military affairs my errors
can do no harm; they will be treated with contempt and vanish. I
have therefore only to request the reader to examine impartially
what I shall say on this important subject, before he pronounces
judgment on my labours.
We have already shewn, that the mode in which a body of men,
whether infantry and cavalry, is formed, ought to be analogous to
the species of arms they carry, and that the whole machine should
be strong, active, and universally adapted to every operation of war.
The phalanx was properly armed, and possessed the first property,
strength, in an eminent degree. The legion was likewise well armed,
and was both strong and active; but as we observed before, it was
defective in the arrangement of the whole: the cavalry placed on the
wings could not support, nor be supported by the infantry.
We can by no means determine whether or not our troops are
properly ranged, till we have carefully examined the nature and
effects of fire-arms, which are now the only weapons made use of
by the infantry. The sword is a useless burthen to the soldier; and
therefore it ought to be rejected.
Our fire arms are certainly superior to the missile weapons of the
antients; and if we consider only their force, and the facility with
which they are managed, it will appear surprizing that whole armies
are not totally destroyed in a few hours: it is certain, however, that
the musket is by no means so dangerous and fatal as the sword and
pike. When the infantry was armed with these they came necessar-
ily to close fight; the greater part of the vanquished, and many of
the victors were of course slain or wounded, and the victory was
more decisive; for a regular retreat was impossible. But the use of
missile weapons and fire-arms has introduced a new mode of wag-
ing war, less bloody and decisive. A considerable distance generally
intervenes between the two armies during a great part of the action,
and sometimes during the whole; for the two lines very rarely join,
and engage with swords and bayonets. This reciprocal situation
enables the whole, or any part of an army frequently to change its
position, or quit the field entirely, as circumstances may require,
without difficulty or danger, and with little loss.
A musket, and every species of fire-arms, are the most delicate
instruments of war, and most uncertain in their effects. Independent
of the quantity and quality of the powder, the manner of loading
the piece, the state of the atmosphere, the agitation of the soldier,
&c. cause such variations in the direction of the piece, as renders
its effect very uncertain; insomuch, that by calculation it appears,
that not above one shot in four hundred takes place. The distance
between two armies, and the uncertainty of the effects of fire-arms,
are the causes why our battles are never decisive; few are slain, and
the remainder have time to retire. Wars are not now as formerly
terminated by battles, and complete victories. An army, though much
inferior in number to the enemy, and even in point of goodness,
when commanded by an able leader, will occupy some advantageous
post, stop the progress of the mighty and victorious for years, till
victor and vanquished are almost equally exhausted and ruined, and
peace is become necessary to both parties, for want of means to
prosecute the war. The monarch, ignorant of their miseries, sits down
in peace, enjoys his pleasures, regardless of the ultimate event, because
it seldom affects his throne. He makes war or peace to gratify his
own caprice, or that of a favorite.
If the natural defects of fire-arms are such, and so many, that a
good marksman, left entirely to himself, cannot once in ten times
hit an object placed at any considerable distance, what can be ex-
pected from an ordinary soldier in the ranks, pressed before, behind,
and on every side, his motions continually interrupted by those of
his comrades; agitated by the cries of the dying, and by the terror
of death floating before his eyes, himself and the object he aims at,
if any, in perpetual motion? Very little can be expected from this
man, as we have already shewn. When to all this you add the motions
of the horse, it will appear evident that fire-arms, excepting a pair
of pistols, when the enemy is near, are totally incompatible with cav-
alry, as well as with all massive bodies; because neither can use them
with advantage. It is difficult, and perhaps impossible to find out a
method to range the infantry, so as to make use of fire-arms with
any degree of success. If it is formed of several ranks, three or more
deep, and likewise with the ranks and files close, as is now the mode,
they cannot make use of their arms; and if formed in few ranks,
with ranks and files open, they cannot fire at all; and being thus
disunited, they can neither move nor act for want of strength. On
the whole, therefore, it seems impossible to range a body of men
armed with muskets so that they may have the properties required,
viz. strength, activity, and universality. These difficulties have obliged
the moderns to try several methods to diminish them, by introduc-
ing different manners of firing. Some have thought it was best to
fire by ranks, others by files, as platoons, divisions, &c. Count St.
Germain,8 in a valuable treatise published since his death, rejects
both methods, and proposes it should be done by single files, begin-
ning at the right or left. The firing by ranks, if you begin with the
last, then the second, and first successively, is undoubtedly the most
8
Claude Louis, comte de Saint-Germain (1707–78). French war minister after
the Seven Years’ War, St. Germain was noted for advocating adoption of the
Prussian drill, dress, and discipline. See his Memoirs (Amsterdam, 1779).
simple mode of any, and the least subject to difficulties and confu-
sion. The last rank having fired falls back three steps, the second
one, and the first remaining in their place. Then they close the ranks,
and begin with their third rank as before, advancing gradually ten
or twenty paces, and then halt to fire as before. The platoon firing,
especially if done in small divisions, does not continue two minutes,
it is all confusion, to which the noise of the officers in giving com-
mand does not a little contribute. The method proposed by St.
Germain is subject to the same and greater difficulties. Whence it
appears that a musket, and indeed every other species of missile
weapon, can be used with advantage only by men placed singly.
The firing by ranks in the manner proposed approaches the near-
est to it, and therefore ought to be preferred to all others. It might
be continued for several hours regularly, and without any interrup-
tion or confusion, which cannot be done in any other method. I do
not propose this method is perfect; I believe it is impossible to find
any that is not subject to numberless difficulties. This seems to me
to have fewer than others.
In whatever manner the troops are ranged, and in whatever man-
ner they fire, it is certain the effect is confined within a very nar-
row compass. When the ground between you and the enemy is very
close, so that they cannot approach you without much difficulty, or
not at all, then indeed, the use of fire-arms is indispensible, and very
advantageous; the enemy must overcome the obstacles which they
throw in his way, and which hinder him from making any great use
of his arms, while yours are more or less covered, are fired with
ease, and generally with success. But when the enemy can and will
approach you, which he ought to do if he attacks, it is evident that
the use of the musket ceases, and the combat must be finished by
some other weapon, unless your troops are frightened, and run away
before the enemy approaches.
From these premises I draw two conclusions: 1st. That the mus-
ket is not adequate to all the purposes of war: 2nd. That the use
of fire-arms is particularly adapted to a defensive war. In a plain
and open country, where the enemy’s cavalry or infantry can approach
you, fire-arms soon become useless; and in a close country you can
find a thousand strong camps, which neither cavalry nor infantry
can approach without much difficulty: then fire-arms are of infinite
use, and the only arms which can be of any service.
But, as in war, it is necessary to attack as well as defend; and it

was found that the musket was proper only for the latter, and that
every institution would be imperfect, unless a troop was armed with
hand weapons as well as missile; we have attempted to unite the
advantages of both by adding the bayonets, but without success: for
the whole is too short and cumbersome as a hand weapon, and the
bayonet serves only to render the use of the musket more difficult,
and its effects less certain.
Chapter VI. Of the Advantages and Defects of Missile and Hand Weapons
Let us examine and compare the advantages and defects of missile

and hand weapons: this will lead us to conclude, that both are
absolutely necessary to form the institution of a complete body of
men. Fire-arms are calculated for a defensive war, and to keep the
enemy at a distance, which prevents a total overthrow; but are of
no use when he can approach you.
Hand-weapons, on the contrary, can be of no use at a distance;
but are absolutely necessary when the armies approach each other.
The former are proper for a close country, the latter for an open
one. The effects of the one are precarious and undecisive; those of
the latter certain and complete. The musket is the resource of pru-
dence and weakness; hand-weapons are the arms of valor and vigor.
An able general, at the head of troops armed with fire-arms,
though inferior in number to the enemy, may protract a war many
years, and finally prevail over a less able leader; which cannot be
effected if the armies carry hand-weapons: for they must necessarily
soon come to an action, and that action must, from the nature of
the arms, be decisive: hence the art of war, among the ancients, was
simple and decisive; and hence it is complicated and scientific among
the moderns.
The art of war of the ancients was confined to what we call evo-
lution, directed to the purpose of fighting only, which they consid-
ered as the sole means of finishing a war. In short, their whole
attention was directed to discipline, to the exercise of the troops,
and to the field of battle.
But we study camps, positions, and lines: our plans of operations
are very extensive, and often embrace a hundred leagues, which we
cover by occupying a given position: those of the ancients were con-

tracted and confined within a narrow compass; seek the enemy, and
fight him, was their favorite military maxim: they did not seem to
think it possible to protract a war by skilful manœuvres: accordingly,
their wars were of very short duration, unless some exterior cir-
cumstances, arising from the nature of the ground, that of the troops,
and finally, from the different political systems of the contending
parties, tended to protract them; which we have shown to be the
case in the Peloponnesian war, and which, we shall hereafter see,
was the cause that made the Punic wars so long.
The principles of an active and defensive war were little known
to the ancients. Jugurtha and Sertorius9 seem to have been the only
generals of antiquity who understood and practised them: but none
of wars can be compared, for vigor and activity, with the late war
in Germany; in which more battles were fought in two campaigns,
than in any century among the ancients.
The result was very different from the usual effect of ancient wars.
A great part of the globe changed masters during the sixth century
of the Roman republic; whereas the empire of Germany remained
in its former state, at the peace of Hubertsburg:10 this difference
arose, we think, entirely from that of the ancient and modern arms,
and consequently from the different mode of conducting war.
We are often obliged to act a defensive part to cover and protect
an immense tract of country against a superior enemy: prudence
requires that we should avoid a general action; and when we think
it adviseable to risk one, aided as we are with fire-arms, a thousand
strong camps may be found where we may engage an enemy with
advantage.
A given position will enable a good general to harrass and check
the progress of an enemy during a whole campaign, whereas the
ancients, armed with hand-weapons, came so near each other, that
it was almost impossible to avoid a general action, which, from the
nature of their arms, was decisive.
9
The Numidian King Jugurtha refused to accept Roman jurisdiction and rebelled
in 112 BC. His operations consisted of guerrilla campaigns launched from his desert
headquarters, which ended with his capture by Sulla after six years of war. Quintus
Sertorius (c. 126–73 BC), a Roman general and supporter of Marius, rebelled against
the dictator Sulla in 80 BC and managed to defeat several armies sent against him
by a combination of deft maneuver, guerrilla tactics, and conventional strategy.
10
The Treaty of Hubertusburg (15 February 1763) ended the Austro-Prussian
conflict of the Seven Years’ War and implemented a virtual status quo antebellum.
Fabius,11 aided by a very close and mountainous country, with

difficulty protracted one campaign without coming to battle, because
Hannibal’s forces consisted chiefly in cavalry, which, in such a coun-
try, could not act with advantage.
Troops, armed with hand-weapons, are rapid in their motions,
and decisive in their actions; less scientific than the former, but sin-
gularly proper for an attack.
It seems, therefore, that to render an army perfect, and adequate
to every purpose of war, it should be provided with both kinds of
weapons.
If one species of arms cannot be made so as to serve the purpose
of a musket and a hand-weapon, which I believe is the case, a body
of men must be so formed as to manage both kinds of arms; or,
finally, different bodies of men armed differently, must be ranged in
such a manner that they can aid and support each other. We shall
examine this theory hereafter. How far modern armies are endowed
with the perfection we aim at, will appear in the course of our inves-
tigation. I beg the reader’s pardon for having dwelt so long on this
subject, and for having used so many repetitions; but I consider what
I have been advancing as the foundation of all tactics, which alone
can offer us some certain and fixed principles to form and conduct
an army: I hope, therefore, and recommend to all military men, that
what has been said in this chapter may be examined and weighed
with the attention it deserves.
Chapter VII. Of the Formation of Battalions and Squadrons
The moderns have adopted the musket as an universal weapon, and,

of course, endeavoured to range the infantry relatively to its form
and use; but without success: for we have already proved, that a
body of men, ranged three deep, cannot make use of fire-arms with
advantage, which the experience of every battle, and the millions of
shot fired without effect, prove to a demonstration. Besides, this mode
of ranging the troops is attended with many inconveniences, and is
subject to some capital defects.
11
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (d. 203). Roman commander during the
Second Punic War (219–202 BC). As dictator in 217, he successfully frustrated
Hannibal’s forces by using delaying tactics and hit-and-run raids rather than head-
on battle. He earned the nickname ‘Cunctator’ (Delayer) for his actions.
First, a line of three ranks wants strength: it cannot withstand

shock either of horse or foot, if the former act with vigor, and if
the latter are formed on more solid principles, and are properly
armed. This extreme weakness is the cause that two or three bat-
talions cannot advance half a mile on a plain, on a day of review,
without floating: one part or other always projects; and you are
forced to stop continually to rectify the line, and make it proceed
regularly.
Second, this very thin order necessarily obliges you to extend the
front, whose motions become more difficult in proportion; and activ-
ity, the most essential quality an army can possess, is entirely lost.
A line, consisting of thirty battalions and fifty squadrons, occupies
five or six miles from one end to he other. It is easy to conceive,
that however open the country may be, so extensive a line must
move with great slowness and difficulty; and if the ground is close,
and intersected with hedges, ravins, &c. it can neither move nor act
at all; and the whole is continually stopped, sometimes for many
hours, before you can advance a single mile: and when at length
you come near the enemy, your attacks are weak and partial, confined
to some particular points, which are often not the most favorable:
whereas a general effort should be made against the enemy’s whole
front, while at the same time particular ones are carried on against
those parts which offer the greatest advantages.
The slowness of your march gives the enemy time to prepare
themselves for your reception, to change their position, or to retire
so prudently, that these mighty preparations finish in a few incon-
siderable skirmishes.
It matters not how numerous an army is, unless, by superior activ-
ity and disposition, you can and do bring more men into action
against the different points you attack, than the enemy can oppose
to you.
It was to this advantage only that the king of Prussia owed many
of his victories in the last war; for his army, except at the battle of
Prague,12 was always inferior to those of his enemies: add to this,
that such an extensive line must necessarily have many weak parts
from unfavorable ground, of which an able general will avail him-
self, and attack you there with advantage.
12
Battle of Prague (6 May 1757). See Lloyd’s narrative in The History of the Late
War in Germany, vol. 1.
Finally, your disposition being once made, it must be prosecuted,

and the line must advance on its original track; for its extreme length
and natural slowness do not permit any alteration to be made the
enemy, however, necessary it might be; and if a brigade or a regi-
ment is thrown into confusion, the whole line must stop; and if some
remedy is not instantly applied, drawn from the second line, the bat-
tle is lost: for the enemy penetrates through the interval, attacks your
army, thus cut in two, on both flanks, and beats you; which hap-
pened exactly in this manner at the battle of Prague, as we shall
see hereafter. Much more might be said to prove, that the modern
method of ranging the infantry three deep, renders it totally defec-
tive in two essential properties—strength and agility.
This method of ranging the infantry three deep is likewise so far
from rendering it universally proper for all operations of war, that
it can march in that order only in a plain, at the risk of being cut
to pieces by a resolute cavalry, or by infantry formed on more solid
and active principles; and it can fight only, when covered by a strong
country, by intrenchments, &c. where an enemy can approach it
with difficulty: so that, upon the whole, it seems defective in three
points, viz. strength, activity, and universality; in which we think the
perfection of an army, and indeed of every machine, doth princi-
pally consist. This we give as our opinion only, without the least
pretensions to infallibility: let the more able examine and decide.
Chapter VIII. Of the Cavalry
Though I have not served in the cavalry, yet, as I have several times
commanded considerable detachments of horse, I hope it will not
be thought impertinent, if I presume to give my opinion upon this
subject.
Cavalry are generally, like the infantry, ranged three deep, and
armed with muskets, pistols, and swords. The difficulty with which
the infantry manage the musket, proves that the cavalry cannot use
it at all, particularly the two last ranks.
The Hussars, and such troops as generally act singly, may be per-
mitted to continue the use of muskets; but those who are formed
and ranged to act in a mass, and sword in hand, ought not to carry
them, because they are expensive, troublesome, and totally useless.
It will be objected, that if the cavalry do not carry a musket, a
few Hussars, or other troops who do, will be able to harrass, and
perhaps beat double the number of the best cavalry, who can nei-
ther remain quiet on the spot, nor pursue in a line; the only method
they have in acting against a scattered and light enemy. The mus-
ket, therefore, is necessary in the cavalry.
This argument appears plausible; but in fact has, in my humble
opinion, little weight: for whether they carry muskets, or not, they
will lose their labour if ever they pretend to skirmish with the light
horse; their men and horses will be harassed; and they will be finally
beat back to their line, from which they ought never to depart.
Cavalry neither can, nor ought to fight but with sword in hand;
when the ground, or the troops they contend with, do not permit
this to be done, they must be kept back, or else mixed with strong
detachments of infantry, formed in such a manner as to be able to
resist the charge of the enemy’s cavalry; of course the musket must
be laid aside.
The ranging of the cavalry three deep is intended, no doubt, to
enable them to resist the shock of an enemy; but as we have said
before, they ought not at any time to wait for the shock, because
even a light and weak cavalry, on full gallop, will break through any
line of horse, however massive, if it waits the shock.
The ranks being closed, the first overthrown, necessarily falls on
the second, this on the third, and so on; and the whole runs away:
but if the ranks were kept at some distance from one another, when
the first was broken, the second might advance and attack the enemy,
already checked and in disorder, and easily put them to flight. But
being formed, ranks and files closed, there is no remedy at all for
a disaster, except from the second line or reserve, as in the infantry:
and even this resource will fail of success, if the enemy pursues his
advantages with vigour. For the first line will probably throw the
second also into confusion, because there are not sufficient openings
in the second for the first to pass through, which there ought to be:
then indeed the second line, on seeing the first in confusion, ought
to advance sword in hand, and might thus probably gain an easy
victory. The broken line in the mean time recollects itself, and forms
again behind the second, which is now become the first.
The sword is too short, and particularly, as the soldier is taught
to sit with long stirrups; he kills the horse by a dead weight, always
bearing without intermission on the same parts: this may be graceful
for aught I know, but it is very oppressive to the horse, and hinders
the man from reaching the enemy. Pistols are necessary in case the
man loses his sword, that he may not remain totally defenceless.
People talk very much of the shock of the cavalry. If they mean
that two horses push each other, and strike with their breasts, which
the French, who abound in unmeaning words, call coup de poitrail, it
is an absurdity; for the head and neck being projected in a right
line before the horse’s breast, it is impossible to strike with it; some-
thing, however, considerable is, and may be done, when a squadron
either waits for, or encounters another.
The horses being pushed on vigorously, and finding themselves
checked by the head of those in front, endeavour to pass between
them; and in such case, it is certain that the cavalry, which moves
with the greatest velocity, whatever may be the opposite mass, will
undoubtedly penetrate and overthrow it. Hence it is that velocity is
every thing in the cavalry: if you are deficient in this, your cavalry
is not worth keeping. I saw once an example of this kind during the
last war near Gourlitz in Lusitatia.
Ziethen’s regiment of hussars13 fell in with the Austrian carabi-
neers, and was repulsed; but on seeing the king’s army arrive they
rallied, attacked the carabineers (who imprudently waited quietly on
the spot) broke them, drove some hundreds into a morass, where
they were killed or made prisoners in sight of the Austrian vanguard,
consisting of eight or ten thousand men, who could not relieve them;
for the action lasted only a few minutes.
Chapter IX. Of the Modern Order of Battle
By order of battle, I mean the distribution of the different species

of troops of which an army is composed, not including those which
pass under the denomination of light troops, as they never enter the
line.
In general, the whole is ranged in two or more lines; because,
first, the being formed only in three ranks, it would take up so much
ground, that it would be impossible to range or manage a numer-
ous army. Secondly, to supply the defects and weakness of the first
13
Prussia’s 2d Hussar Regiment, or ‘Red Hussars,’ distinguished itself in the
Seven Years’ War at the battles of Prague (1757), Zorndorf (1759), Hochkirch (1759),
and Torgau (1760).
line, by supporting it, and replacing the whole or any part of it,
which may be broken and thrown into disorder, by the second.
The cavalry and infantry form separate bodies: the former are
generally placed on the flanks of the latter.
The perfection of an order of battle consists, as we apprehend,
first, in placing each body of men; where they can act with most
advantage. Secondly, in bodies of different species, being so placed
as to be able to support each other that the victory may be com-
plete; otherwise it often happens, that while your cavalry are victo-
rious, the infantry are beat, and the battle lost, or vice versa. Thirdly,
in your armies being so ranged as to be universally adapted to
different species of ground, so as to require no material alteration
in marching up to the enemy, or during the action.
First, It is evident, that if the cavalry are placed on the flanks of
the infantry, they can neither support, nor be supported by it, which
disposition I therefore conceive is a most capital defect.
Second, Both in marching, camping, and fighting, it may and gen-
erally does happen, that the infantry and cavalry are placed on
improper ground, where, however, they must so remain; because it
is in general impossible to change the original disposition; therefore,
upon the whole, it seems deficient in all the points, which constitute
a solid and active order of battle.
Moreover, as both lines are formed in a close order, if the first
is broke and vigorously pursued, it overthrows the second for want
of sufficient openings. This cannot advance with celerity, and in a
firm order to stop the enemy; so that both generally go off together,
and the battle is lost. Whereas, if at least the second line had inter-
vals to let the first pass through them, and at the same time advanced
in good order, while the enemy is in some degree of confusion, they
would not only check them, but probably would gain an easy victory.
The reason given for placing the cavalry on the wings is, to pro-
tect the flanks of the infantry, which I think is the most absurd rea-
son that can be alledged, because this may in a moment fortify its
flanks against infantry or cavalry, by forming a square or a column,
which the cavalry cannot do; its flanks are naturally so weak, that
they offer no kind of defence.
M. St. Germain, in a work published since his death, for this very
reason advises, that the cavalry should camp behind the infantry,
because, says he, if it is attacked in the night, it is totally defeated
before it can be put in a state of defence.
Numbers, beyond a certain point, can add nothing to the force

of an army, unless they can be made to act together; they increase
its inactivity, and render it altogether unmanageable. By thus sepa-
rating the cavalry from the infantry, it very seldom happens that
they can be brought to act in a proper place, and in a proper
moment: they really, in a day of action, form two separate armies,
and act separately, and very indirectly contribute, if at all, to the
success of each other.
If either is beat, the other must fall back and retire: whereas if
they were formed on other principles, the whole must be vanquished,
or none, because they would form only one army, though composed
of different species of troops, and mutually support each other.
Before I conclude this discourse, I must, first, beg leave to reca-
pitulate, briefly, what we have said, that the reader may see it at
one view, and be enabled to examine and form a clear judgment
of it. Secondly, to give a description of a battle, which will corrob-
orate and illustrate the opinions and arguments that I have endeav-
oured to establish.
First, The general use of fire-arms, and every kind of missile
weapons, is not adapted to all the various operations of war, but is
singularly proper for a defensive war, and consequently for a close
country, where the troops being covered and protected by the obsta-
cles which such a country offers, the enemy can with difficulty
approach you.
Secondly, That the use of missile weapons has rendered the art
of war much more scientific than it was among the antients, when
it was confined chiefly to the arrangement of the troops, the exer-
cise, and evolutions: what we call manœuvres, on an extensive line,
seem to have been little known to them; and fighting was the only
method adopted by them for finishing a war, which the nature of
their arms soon brought to a conclusion.
Thirdly, That our battles neither are nor can be decisive, and
may be considered rather as great skirmishes than general actions,
very few slain in comparison with what happened when hand-weapons
alone were used.
Fourthly, Though our infantry were formed three deep, with a
view to the musket they carry; yet can they make but a very imper-
fect use of it, and the cavalry cannot use it at all.
Fifthly, That by forming both infantry and cavalry in three ranks,
they are too weak to march with firmness and consistence, to attack
or defend themselves against troops formed on more solid and active

principles.
Sixthly, This method of forming the troops necessarily lengthens
the line, so that it cannot march with any velocity in a plain, much
less in a close country.
Seventhly, That a line of five or six miles; does of course meet
with improper ground for the kind of troops which may happen to
be placed there; yet no alteration can be made in the line, however
necessary it may be.
Eighthly, That the whole front must advance together, which ren-
ders it totally inactive, and gives the enemy time to take their mea-
sures for fighting or retreating at their pleasure, which reduces the
battle to an inconsiderable skirmish.
Ninthly, That the general cannot possibly see and conduct all the
operations o such an extensive line, so that, by the neglect, igno-
rance, or malice of the officers under his command, the action is
always very imperfectly carried on, and fails of success in more than
one point; which may render that of the other attacks useless. It
wants, in short, unity of action and activity in the execution.
Tenthly, To prevent the line from being protracted without end,
we are obliged to form several; so that if we consider the few men
who act together in the first, and that none at all act in the others,
unless successively, and when it is commonly too late; we shall find,
that not a sixth part of the army is engaged at one time, and of
that sixth part not one, perhaps, at the most eligible point of attack
or defence.
All these defects, and many more which could be enumerated,
proceed originally from our making the musket the general instru-
ment; and from our adapting both the formation of the troops and
order of battle to that instrument, as we have clearly proved in the
preceding chapters.
Of a Battle
I can no way better expose the defects of our military arrangements,

than by relating in a few words, how this great machine, an army,
is brought into action, how a battle is fought and concluded, and
what are, in general, its consequences, which I have seen in the
course of several campaigns.
After many marches and counter-marches, which often take up

the most favourable part of a campaign, a battle is at length resolved
on: all those who are informed of this resolution, and too many
always are, put themselves in motion to solicit some command, or
to carry the news of the expected victory; in obtaining which favour
and intrigue generally prevail, to the prejudice of the truly brave
and deserving officer.
Several days are employed in examining the position of the enemy,
which might be done in five minutes; for a general who cannot, in
one instant of time, see and determine the manner of attacking any
camp, is unworthy to command an army: during such delay, the
enemy prepare themselves to receive you, fortify themselves, change
their position, or retire; so that you have fresh and great difficulties
to encounter, or perhaps you lose your labour, and must follow the
enemy so seek another opportunity, which may not offer in a whole
campaign; especially if under an able general, who wishes to avoid
an action.
The mode of attacking is at length fixed, which, ten to one, must
be altered, because the enemy, while you lose your time in prepar-
ing yourself, have materially altered their position. If you are not
apprized of this in time, and you march up to them, your original
disposition is lost, and you are unable to form another that may be
proper to answer the present circumstances, which may require that
your cavalry or infantry should change the ground, and replace each
other. Nothing of this can be executed before the enemy, without
offering your flanks, and consequently exposing yourself to a total
defeat. When any alteration in the order of battle is required, it
should be done a day or two before you quit your camp, otherwise
such confusion will ensue as cannot be remedied.
The battle of Lignitz, in 1760,14 was lost, and the brave Laudhon15
sacrificed to malice or ignorance, because the quarter-master gen-
eral16 of M. Daun’s army would, the evening before the battle, change
entirely the original order of battle without any apparent reason.
The consequence was, that the main army arrived upon the ground
about ten hours too late, when we found Laudhon had been well
14
Battle of Liegnitz (15 August 1760).
15
Gideon Ernst, Freiherr von Loudon (1716–90).
16
Joseph, Graf von Si“kovíc. Lloyd’s decision to leave the Austrian army in 1761
was due in large part to his conflict with Lacy’s replacement.
beat, and the king ready to receive us; but as our original plan was
frustrated, we could not form another, though we had sufficient time,
and though with Laudhon’s army we were above twenty thousand
men stronger than the enemy, whom we permitted to continue his
march to the Oder unmolested: the reader will pardon this digression.
The different brigades of artillery generally precede the columns,
to favour their development; that is, to prevent the enemy from
opposing the forming of the line, and because the general and the
soldier think nothing can be done without it, though in truth it
produces more noise than any real advantage. This prodigious train
of cannon, and its concomitants, continually stop and retard the
march of the troops by some accident or other, so that seldom or
ever they arrive together, and in time, on the ground where the line
is to be formed.
This is a very critical moment, if the enemy knew how to avail
himself of it: for if he is perfectly acquainted with the ground between
his camp, and that which you have left, he will know all the roads
by which you march, and consequently by advancing to meet you,
in order of battle, he can attack the heads of your columns, and
defeat them all singly, without giving them an opportunity of ever
forming the line, in the same manner as one attacks a rear-guard:
but happily for you, he confides in the strength of his post, and
suffers you to do what you please.
His army is like a set of china-ware on a chimney-piece, it must
not be touched or moved, for fear of breaking it: after three or four
hours cannonading and skirmishing your army is formed, and advances
towards the enemy preceded by the artillery, which retards the march
very much, and occasions the loss of many men, which could be
avoided by marching rapidly to the enemy.
Supposing the army consists of sixty thousand men, the first line
will occupy fix or six miles; in this extent of ground a thousand
obstacles both by art and nature occur, which necessarily retard your
progress, because the whole line must advance together; for if some
parts precede at any, though small distances, the others, a vigilant
enemy, by marching rapidly through the intervals, cuts your army
asunder, takes you in the flank and gains the battle; which so hap-
pened exactly at the battle of Prague.
To avoid such an inconvenience, by keeping your army together,
and advancing in a line parallel to that of the enemy, you are some-
times several hours in getting over a mile of ground, which ought
to be executed in a few minutes. If by the firmness of your troops,

and the inactivity of your enemy, you come up with him, and suc-
ceed in one or two points of attack only, the battle is won, though
perhaps only two or three battalions have been displaced’ and if you
fail in what you suppose the principal attack, you retire unpursued,
and you have lost the battle.
In the former case, the enemy has no resource in his first line,
which can make no movement but forwards or backwards; so that
if you can maintain yourself on the ground you have gained, the
enemy retires successively, and goes off. This is a critical moment
also, if the enemy knew what to do.
If instead of endeavouring to regain the points lost, he advanced
part of his second line to prevent your going farther, and oblige you
to bring the greatest part of your forces to maintain the ground
gained, which is generally done; and if with the rest of his army he
made some considerable effort on the rest of your line, in all prob-
ability he would succeed, and force you by this means to relinquish
the advantages you had gained to prevent this part of your army
from being cut off, which would certainly happen, if any other part
of your line was driven back and defeated: sometimes, indeed, such
a movement is made, but generally with a view only to favour a
retreat, and seldom or ever to gain a victory.
As your attacks are successive, so must your advantages be, and
you gain one part after another, or rather the enemy abandons them,
you can make no general effort in attacking or pursuing the enemy,
who has time to retire at his leisure.
Your army who have, perhaps, been twenty-four hours under arms,
are so fatigued with that situation and with the combat, that they
are unable to move, and much less to prosecute the advantages they
have gained with any vigour.
The light troops are sent after the enemy, but with small success,
for they are generally attentive only to plunder; and moreover, a
few battalions thrown into a wood or village put an end to the pur-
suit; and the enemy, who probably have lost only a few cannon and
prisoners, occupying a neighbouring hill, and your victory is reduced
to nothing more than barely the field of battle.
Such have been the victories I have seen, and such the conse-
quences, which I can attribute only to the natural slowness and inac-
tivity of our armies, which proceed, as we have shewn, from the use
of fire-arms, and from the consequent mode of ranging the troops.
Sometimes, indeed, a commander of very superior abilities may,

from such an imperfect victory as I have described, draw great and
signal advantages, as it happened after the battle of Lissa,17 where
the Austrians, in the course of a month, lost successively the greater
part of their army, without any apparent necessity for the loss.
But when the commanders are nearly equal in abilities, a whole
war may pass in skirmishes, without their ever coming to a general
and conclusive action, which happened on the Rhine when Montecuculi
and Turenne18 were opposed to each other.
Indeed our battles, as we have seen, are commonly nothing more
than great skirmishes; and therefore, as I have said before, wars are
not now, as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want of means
to protract them.
Chapter X. A New System
Having shewn, in the preceding chapters, that the use of fire-arms

exclusively; the arrangement of our infantry and cavalry in three
ranks in consequence of using those arms; and finally, the order of
battle, are imperfect, and render an army inadequate to almost every
operation of war; it remains, that we should examine, whether and
how a given number of men, horse or foot, may be armed and
formed, and the order of battle so contrived, that it may be free
from those defects to which our modern institutions are subject; and
that it possesses strength, activity, and universality, in which we make
the perfection of an army to consist.
While we make use of fire-arms alone, as is now the case in the
infantry (for the bayonet and sword are of no use to the soldier) it
is evident, that no system can be formed which will in any degree
diminish the imperfections of our armies: if you range the men in
two ranks, for example, that they may use the musket with more
advantage, the line will be so extensive and weak, that it cannot be
17
Battle of Leuthen (5 December 1757).
18
Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne (1611–75). French field
marshal who fought in the Thirty Years’ War and under King Louis XIV. He
gained lasting fame for his campaigns against Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de Condé
(1621–86) during the Fronde rebellion (1648–53) and Raimondo Montecuccoli dur-
ing the War of Devolution (1666–68).
managed at all, or scarce be put in motion; much less will it be able

to resist the shock of the enemy: and if, on the contrary, you range
the troops in four or five ranks, all the arms they can carry will
become totally useless.
It follows, therefore, that a certain number of men should be
armed with pikes: this alone can enable us to form a number of
men in such a manner, that they shall have strength to resist the
shock of an enemy, horse or foot, and to act in every kind of ground
with equal advantage; it must combine and unite the solidity of hand-
weapons with the advantage of fire-arms. If this can be accomplished,
we approach very near the perfection we aim at; and undoubtedly
render an army, formed on these principles, superior to any other
now existing.
The use of hand-weapons necessarily requires defensive weapons,
sufficiently strong to parry or diminish their effects; they are so con-
nected, that they ought never to be separated, particularly in the
cavalry, where the action passes sword in hand.
Armour of any kind in the infantry, opposed to infantry, armed
as it is at present, is less necessary, though always useful: it gives
confidence to the men, and likewise diminishes, and sometimes
destroys entirely the effects of a musket-ball when fired from a cer-
tain distance, or with a considerable angle, above or below the hori-
zon and direct line. And as infantry may be; and very often is
opposed to cavalry, and closes with infantry, I think it ought to be
provided with such an armour as we shall propose hereafter.
It is well known, that a third or fourth part of an army, in the
course of a few months, by death and sickness, goes off; of which
diminution many causes may be assigned, as bad and scanty food,
and neglect of the sick in the hospitals. The principal cause how-
ever is, I think, the dress, which does not cover the soldier against
the inclemency of the weather, and seems calculated only for parade
and shew, in a sunshiny day, before the ladies, like the dress of other
petit-maitres. Whereas it is evident, that both the dress, arms, and
exercise, should be made with a view only to health, and to the pur-
poses of war: and it being impossible for the soldier to carry every
thing which may, once in an age, be useful to him, we must fix
upon such equipments only, as he will find always necessary and
useful.
Chapter XI. Of the Dress of the Soldier
He must have three shirts of strong cloth, without those gewgaws

ruffles; two pair of drawers; two pair of breeches made of ticking,
and long enough to come almost to his ancles, such as the Hussars,
Croats, and Hungarian infantry wear; two pair of strong thread
stockings; and four pair of socks, to keep his feet clean, and prevent
them from galling and blistering, which is always the case when the
wool is next the skin.
He must have two waistcoats of the same stuff with the breeches,
and two under-waistcoats, unless the upper ones are lined, which I
would prefer.
He must, for the winter, have the same number of woolen stock-
ings, a pair of breeches, waistcoat, and coat of strong and thick
woollen cloth. The coat must have a lapelle to come to the waist-
band of his breeches, and to button from top to bottom. The flaps
of the coat and waistcoat must not be so open and gallant as the
present mode.
He must also have a good great coat, with sleeves, to come below
the calf of the leg, with a small cape or collar to button about his
neck, and a hood to come over his head, under his hat.
All the winter apparel may remain with the depot of the regiment
until September, excepting the great coat: that will keep him warm
enough, though the rest of his cloaths are only of linen or cotton.
He must have a black leather stock, quilted within, to keep him
warm, and at the same time to keep the stock in a proper shape.
He must, finally, have half boots, which are handsome, and much
better than shoes; they prevent the wet in a great measure and the
dust, sand, and gravel, which always get into the shoes, and gall and
cripple the man.
I would have a button fixed on the waistband of the breeches,
and a loop to the waistcoat, to keep the former up, without tying it
too hard, which heats the loins, and hinders the free motion of the
limbs. As part of the dress always remains at the regiment’s depot,
the soldier may carry the rest, and what he really wants, with ease.
I have omitted speaking of the hat, that very useless, if not ridicu-
lous piece of dress, because I intend substituting in its place another,
which will both cover and protect the head, neck, and shoulders.
Chapter XII. Of Defensive Arms and Armour
The first part naturally to be covered is the head. For this purpose,
I would have a hat made of strong leather prepared in the same
manner as that of which jack-boots are made, such as the couriers
abroad use: it must be quilted within to make it sit easy. The brim
must be three inches broad to cover the face and carry off the rain:
to this brim I would have fixed five or six small chains, made of
strong wire, to hook to the breast-plate or cuirass, which he must
also have. Such a hat will effectually protect the upper part of his
body against the sabre, in whatever manner it is used, either by
striking as the Europeans, or pushing horizontally, as the Turks and
Asiatics do.
I would recommend that a plate of brass be put on the hat, sig-
nifying the number or name of the regiment, battalion, and com-
pany, all which must be numbered. It is incredible how much this
trifling circumstance would contribute to enforce discipline and valor.
The impossibility of escaping a deserved censure would prevent
men from becoming obnoxious to it. There must be no distinction
in the dress and hat between the private man and the officer.
The next piece of armour is the cuirass, which must be made
likewise of leather, and of that leather of which the soles of our
strong shoes, called double channel, are made. It must be long enough
to cover the body from the neck to the waist; so that with this and
the hat, all the mortal parts are effectually covered and protected
against the efforts of all species of hand-weapons, and diminish con-
siderably the effects of many musket shots.
So much for the dress and defensive arms of the soldier: let us
now proceed to his offensive arms; and first of the infantry.
We have already shewn that the musket or bayonet is cumbersome,
top-heavy, and too short as a hand-weapon; and that the sword is
totally useless, and should therefore be laid aside. I would have the
barrel of the musket shortened ten or twelve inches, made much
stronger towards the breech, which would throw the center of grav-
ity between the two hands when presented, and consequently ren-
der it infinitely more manageable and less top-heavy than at present.
General Clerk19 had invented one which I much approve of, and
recommend it as a good model. Instead of a bayonet, I would have
19
Lt-Gen. Robert Clerk (d. 1798).
a short lance, four feet long, made of light and tough wood: six
inches of which should be of good steel, about two inches broad,
tapering into a point, the rest of the wood must be covered with
two thin plates of iron, to prevent its being cut. This lance is flung
under the left arm, with the point downward. It must be made to
fix on the barrel of the musket, with two little sockets instead of
one, which will make it firmer than the bayonet.
When the soldier had lost his musket, or if it is damaged in the
action, or when he mixes with the enemy, and firing of course ceases,
this lance will be of infinite use to him alone, as well as when fixed
to the musket, to attack or to defend himself against cavalry or
infantry. It may be objected, that if the barrel is shortened, the fire
of the last ranks may injure the first; but this objection is invalid. If
you fire by ranks, which can be done with more temper and safety
than by files, and particularly if the lance is not fixed to the mus-
ket, which I think ought not to be done, until you come within a
hundred yards of the enemy, then, according to our institution, you
march up to the enemy.
Three fourths of the infantry must be armed with this musket and
lance. The other fourth part must be armed with a pike, twelve feet
long, a good sabre and a pair of pistols, which they are to carry at
their belt.
The cavalry should be dressed in every respect like the infantry,
excepting that they should wear good boots instead of half boots.
Their arms must be a lance of seven feet long, which they are to
carry, slung to the saddle, on the right side, so that the horseman
can instantly seize and use it. Their other arms must be a sabre,
four feet in length, and a pair of pistols.
The light cavalry and Hussars must be armed in the usual way;
because as they are often sent a reconnoitering, where infantry can-
not follow them, they must have muskets, that they may be on equal
terms with the enemy. The light infantry must be armed, like the
rest, with a musket and lance, without any sword or pistol.
Having thus cloathed and armed our soldiers, we must now pro-
ceed to range them, and in such a manner, that they may make
use of their arms to advantage. I would have the infantry formed
in four ranks, and the three foremost armed as I have directed with
a musket and short lance only; the fourth and last rank with the
long pike, sword, and a pair of pistols.
The shortest men to be placed foremost, and the others succes-

sively, according to their size; so that the fourth rank be the tallest.
This disposition will greatly facilitate the use of their arms; whereas
the method used has a contrary effect; it is absurd, and calculated
for shew only.
The three foremost ranks, protected by the pikes when they
approach the enemy, will, if they fire by ranks and with temper, do
it effectually, and when at a distance, before they have fixed on the
lance to their musket, can manage it with great ease, and conse-
quently with effect.
It is needless to observe, that a body of men ranged in four ranks
march more steadily than in fewer, and faster. It is true the line will
be shorter by a fourth part; but this circumstance is so far from
being a defect, that on the contrary, it renders the line stronger and
more active, which we reckon the greatest of all advantages. But it
may be said, if your line is shorter, the enemy will attack one if not
both your flanks. This objection will fall to the ground by the gen-
eral arrangement of the whole, as will appear hereafter.
For the present let it suffice to prove, that a body of men formed
three deep cannot resist the shock of one that is four deep, and
armed with lances, muskets, and pikes, and the quantity of fire is
nearly equal; for that part of the enemy’s line, which extends beyond
your flanks, is of no use while at a distance, as the men in a line
cannot be brought to fire on the right and left, so their fire is lost;
and when you approach the enemy, you must march rapidly up to
him, which will soon put an end to the dispute. But this Out-Flanking
of you cannot happen, by the mode in which we propose to range
our battalions.
Chapter XIII. Of the Formation of Battalions
I would have a battalion consist of five companies, one of which is

to be called light infantry; the other four heavy infantry, all armed
alike, excepting that the lance, which is to serve instead of the bayo-
net, may be made a foot longer for the light than for the heavy
infantry, because they generally act singly, and therefore can man-
age it with ease.
Each company of the heavy infantry is to consist of one hundred
and twenty-eight men, rank and file, not including officers and under
officers; the company of light infantry being much oftener called
upon duty, should be much stronger, they might even amount to
two hundred, for they would decrease probably much faster than
the others.
Each company of heavy infantry will form a front thirty-two men,
the battalion consisting of four companies, one hundred and twenty-
eight files, to whom I allow one hundred yards or something more
of ground; because I would not have the files close and pressed, as
that situation hinders them from using their arms.
Four companies of heavy infantry will make: 512
One of light infantry we will suppose: 200
712
A Regiment of two battalions will make eight companies of heavy
infantry, and two of light, which in the whole amount to about one
thousand four hundred. It will be asked, why so many light infantry?
My answer is this:
Let the regiment be formed as in the annexed plate [I ], with an
interval of one hundred yards between each battalion, who must
have on their flanks, one three or four pounder, and one seven or
eight inch howitzer.
The two companies of light infantry will be placed opposite the
opening between the two battalions, and on the flanks. As these may
extend themselves at leisure fifty yards to the right and left or more,
and even the interval between the two battalions may be made to
extend one hundred and fifty yards without inconvenience or dan-
ger, it is evident that the whole ground occupied by our regiment,
though formed in four ranks, greatly out-flanks the same number of
men in three only.
The fire of our two light companies will alone produce a greater
effect than that of the enemy, for this obvious reason, that our light
infantry acts where and how they please, aims at their leisure, crosses
their fire along the enemy’s whole front, goes upon their flanks, &c.
in short, it acts with all the advantage of real and expert chasseurs.
If to this you add the solid fire of the heavy infantry, it will appear
undoubtedly true, that upon the whole, we shall in this be superior
to the enemy, as we shall be in the extent, strength, and activity of
the line. [See Plate I, figs. 4 & 5 ]
I ask, what will the enemy do? Will he advance within that por-
tion of the circle, and come to the shock? What chance has he with
his short musket and bayonet against my musket and lance, and a
Illustration 12. Plate I (Figs. 1–5).

row of pikes, which project six feet beyond the firs rank, and pre-
vents him from approaching it, and much more from breaking it?
If he waits your approaching him, he is overthrown in a moment:
when you can come up to him you must conquer.
Supposing the country is much inclosed, it is evident that here
likewise you have the advantage; for he cannot possibly drive you
from behind a hedge, ditch, or an entrenchment; and if you attack
him, having come so near, to be within reach of your pikes, he must
fly: and finally, if you cannot approach him with your line, the two
companies of light troops may get on his flanks, and force him to
abandon his post, however strong: therefore, in whatever species of
ground you act, you must necessarily prevail over the enemy.
So much for infantry opposed to infantry. Let us now examine,
whether formed and armed on our principles, it may not likewise
be opposed with equal success to cavalry, in a plain and open coun-
try. If this can be done, then we may declare, that our institution
is perfect.
Let each company be divided into four parts, and form a column
of eight men in front, and sixteen deep; and let the companies, thus
thrown into columns, be ranged as in the plate, with the light infantry
and cannon. [See Plate I ]
I suppose this battalion is attacked in a plain by ten squadrons.
My light infantry and cannon keep off the cavalry, probably effectually;
particularly, if the first and second ranks advance one after the other,
and fire like the light infantry, which they may do without any risk,
at the distance of twenty or thirty yards; because if they are pressed
they resume their post, and the light infantry fills up the intervals
between the companies.
I will let the cavalry advance full gallop, undismayed by the fire
of the columns; and I oppose to them eight ranks, the three first
armed with the musket and lance; the fourth and fifth with long
pikes, while the sixth, seventh, and eighth can fire at the enemy,
who is so much higher, without any inconvenience to themselves, or
danger to the preceding ranks, as is evident.
Now I would ask Seidlitz,20 were he alive; I ask Wagnitz21 in the
20
Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz (1721–83). Frederick’s valued cavalry general
who gained lasting fame for his leadership at the battle of Rossbach (5 November
1757).
21
Dietrich-Wilhelm von Wackenitz. Prussian cavalry officer who fought in the Seven
Years’ War. He joined the Hessian service thereafter rising Finance Minister in 1773.
Hessian service; I ask Sir William Erskine22 in ours, Whether they

think they can, at the head of two thousand Elliots,23 break this col-
umn? They can. Well, I will join the four companies, and form a
complete square; can they break this? No, they will not say they
can: for, exclusively of the musket, lances, and pikes, I will venture
to say, that no body of horse, with any degree of velocity, is able
to break through a body of infantry of sixteen ranks, because the
quantity of action produced by a horseman on full gallop (for one
only shocks at a time) is not equal to the resistance of sixteen men
placed behind each other, so near as to support in a mass the shock
of the horseman.
I conclude therefore that, armed as I propose, a battalion of
infantry will beat in the open field twice the number, or indeed any
number of horsemen formed and armed as they are at present.
Chapter XIV. Of the Cavalry
The more I consider the cavalry, the less I am able to say or write
any thing which can satisfy myself, much less those who are better
informed than I am in this branch of military knowledge.
Whether it is ranged in three or in thirty ranks, it is always cer-
tain that the first rank alone can act, be they armed with fire-arms,
or with swords, or with both. And if the first rank is broken, and
thrown in confusion, the whole must give way.
Secondly, That if a body of horse remains on the spot, any troop,
cavalry or infantry, armed with a musket, will beat it, and force it
to retire, or to advance sword in hand, which avails nothing against
infantry covered, or against light cavalry which skirmishes, because
it cannot approach the former, nor reach the latter, without break-
ing the line: then it is inferior to them; because their superior veloc-
ity enables them to baffle every pursuit of heavy cavalry. If these
charge, the foremost rank alone can use their weapons; the others
are of no use, but to supply the place of the slain or wounded in
the first; so that a third part only of your cavalry can act at the
22
William Erskine (1728–95). Scottish Major General and Quarter-Master-General
under Henry Clinton in the American Revolution, whose planning won the battle
of Long Island (Brooklyn Heights) in 1776.
23
15th Regiment of Light Dragoons raised by Col. George Augustus Eliot
(1717–90) in 1759.
same time, and two-thirds remain idle spectators. Activity is the most
essential property of the horse: in the present mode of forming it
there is none.
It is an axiom, that you ought to bring as many men into action
at once as possible; but though the ground is quite favourable, you
can bring only a third part. How is this to be remedied? I don’t
know. In whatever mode the cavalry is ranged, it is impossible to
diminish the defects above-mentioned; and if to these you add those
which arise from the difficulty of ground which the enemy may
chuse, so as to render your cavalry useless for a whole campaign,
one would be tempted to abandon it almost entirely, excepting such
a number as is required to patrole, keep guard before the camp,
&c. because the expences of it are immense, and its utility insignificant.
If the infantry, such as we propose, is superior to the cavalry even
in open ground, it seems evident that a much smaller number of
cavalry, than what is commonly used in our armies, would be
sufficient, and we shall establish the proportion between the one and
the other accordingly. But whether the cavalry be few or many, how
are they to be ranged and distributed?
We have shewn that the present mode is bad. Must they then,
like the Turkish and Asiatic cavalry, scatter and disperse themselves
over the whole country, skirmish with the enemy’s line at a distance,
surround it, draw it into improper ground, wait till it is in motion
and broken, and then attack it sword in hand?
I cannot resolve this question; but certain it is, that in such a case,
ten squadrons acting in this manner produce more real action than
fifty formed and acting like ours.
Nor do I see how a line of horse can extricate itself from troops
who act like the Spahis, whether it remains on the spot, or advances:
this light cavalry will not resist the shock of our line: granted. It will
not wait for the shock, but disperse itself, harrass you, and wait for
a more favourable opportunity.
But it will be objected, when the light cavalry retires, ours may
attack the enemy’s infantry, and defeat it: No; if it is formed as we
propose: but if the enemy’s infantry is broken, a few of our squadrons
will drive them off the field. Very well; but light cavalry will do that
much more effectually; so that which-ever way I consider this sub-
ject, I am at a loss what to determine.
I lay down, however, as a maxim, that the cavalry should be
ranged, and distributed so, that it may act more or less in every
kind of ground. Secondly, That whenever any part advances to attack,

each individual horseman should really act, and not the foremost
rank only, as now is the case.
I am conscious I walk on a slippery path; however, I think the
order of battle I shall propose will, in a great measure, procure us
the advantages we aim at.
Chapter XV. Of the Formation of a Squadron
I would have a squadron consist of 160 men rank and file, not
including officers and under-officers; because, if it is less numerous,
it will soon be reduced to nothing, either the horse or man, or both,
being ill, you have no force to take the field.
A Regiment shall consist of four such squadrons, and of one of
light cavalry, which may amount to 200 men, as these are obliged
to greater duties than the others; so that the whole regiment will
amount to something more than 800 men. Each squadron, armed
as we have already proposed, shall be formed into four ranks, which
make forty files; and these shall be divided by eight: so that each
squadron is divided into five parts, whose front is eight, and depth
four men.
I have preferred this division to any other, because the front will
be nearly equal to the depth; so that when they march in columns,
they can with ease form the front any way, when it is double to the
depth: besides, such a front can march almost in what direction they
chuse; and though the ground may force the squadrons to separate
in advancing, yet the being from this square figure very active, and
at the same time stronger than in the usual form, a division may
manœuvre, and chuse its ground till the others come.
I would have some intervals left between these divisions and
squadrons, as well in advancing as attacking, which will give them
a superiority in activity. These intervals, besides the advantage in
velocity, offer another no less important, which is, that the division
can always out-flank the enemy, though superior in number: they
being, as usual, formed in a close line, when they approach to charge,
cannot avail themselves of the intervals; and where the action really
passes, they are inferior in strength and velocity.
The intervals between each division must be of few yards only to
distinguish them, because they must be conducted, in marching and
fighting, by a particular officer, and the whole subject to the com-

mander of the squadron. The interval between the squadrons must
be nearly equal to the extent of the whole front, which will give
them a great facility in moving forwards, or on either side, as cir-
cumstances may require; whereas, as we have shewn, a line of cav-
alry, formed as it is in a close manner, can move only in front, and
then very slowly, being continually stopped by some obstacle: and
should they come to the charge, my squadrons being so much stronger
and more active, must break through the enemy’s line; and if once
broken, pursue them with a superior activity: I do not think they
can ever rally.
If the enemy pretends to detach some of his squadrons to pass
between the intervals, his line will be broken, and offer you the same
advantages; and to such squadrons I oppose all my light cavalry,
which, fighting pell-mell like the Hussars, will give them sufficient
employment.
Moreover, the order of battle which I shall propose hereafter, will
remove every objection which may be raised to this mode of rang-
ing the cavalry in four ranks, with intervals: therefore I shall omit
saying any thing more at present on the subject.
Chapter XVI. Of the Constitution of an Army
By the constitution of an army I mean, first, the number of troops

of which an army (adequate to every purpose of war in the field)
ought to be composed: and, secondly, the proportion between the
different species of troops, as heavy infantry, light infantry, heavy
cavalry; and light cavalry, to which we shall add artillery.
According to our plan, a battalion of infantry consists of about
700 men, of which let a fifth be light infantry. The number of the
latter may appear too great; and in fact it is so, if they are confined
to that kind of service only in which they are now employed, viz.
in watching the enemy, and patroling between the piquets of both
armies, and disappearing when these come to a battle.
But according to our plan, they will perform all the duties com-
monly done by light troops; and likewise in a day of action, they
shall be employed in such a manner, as will enable them to render
more real service than the heavy infantry, as will appear from the
inspection of our order of battle. The same reasoning will equally
hold good for the great number of light cavalry; and it is therefore
unnecessary to repeat it.
My army shall consist of sixty battalions and forty squadrons. The
former will amount in all to about 42,000, and the latter to above
6,500; consequently, the whole army will be 48,500, which number
we think equal to every operation of a campaign. What it may want
in numbers, is amply compensated by strength and activity; in which
properties we place the greatest advantages an army can possess.
As we shall employ light cavalry, and the infantry of the same
species only to patrole and reconnoitre the enemy, and always together,
very few men will be sufficient for that duty. A hundred foot and
forty horse will do it more effectually than ten times the number;
because a few may approach the enemy unnoticed, which cannot
be done by a corps consisting of thousands.
A few may know always where you are, mask your great corps,
and perform any manœuvre they please without your knowledge;
whereas, if a thousand men are placed properly before your front
in the most hidden and covered places, they must inevitably be
observed. They must carefully avoid being seen on the high roads,
but must place themselves so as to be able to observe whatever
passes there.
Great corps, like an army, are more anxious to prevent the enemy
from observing them, than to observe him; they are afraid of being
attacked, which their whole attention is directed to prevent: but the
small detachments which I propose cannot be attacked; for when
they see a superior force approach, they disperse and retire to the
right or left, or to any quarter. The enemy cannot pursue them.
I establish it as a maxim, that light troops are not to fight when
placed before the front of the army, but to see what the enemy does,
and give notice in time. If this doctrine is followed, very few of them
will be necessary, and even these must be made useful in a day of
action.
The author of this work, at the head of two hundred chasseurs and
a hundred dragoons, did, during the whole campaign of 1760, keep
so near the king of Prussia’s army, that he never lost sight of it for
an hour, though the Austrian army, and the corps he belonged to
were generally two or three marches off: and though he was always
in sight of the enemy, and scarce a day passed without some skirmish;
yet, in the course of the campaign, he did not lose twenty men; and
one only was taken prisoner, who got drunk, and staid behind.
The author does not give this military anecdote to shew his par-
ticular merit, far from it: he considers it as a matter of course, which
any man of common sense, with activity and vigilance, can equally
perform: in fact, there is nothing more simple. Detach thirty or forty
chasseurs, who place themselves in small parties along the road to
the right and left, covered with hedges, woods, walls, &c. then send
twenty horseman, who advance by two or three, so that the fore-
most goes far enough to view the enemy by day, and hear his com-
ing by night. These turn a little out of the road, and listen; if they
hear any thing approach, they retire without noise to the infantry,
and wait behind: a shot or two from these will soon stop the patrole:
and, if it is not strong, let them pass, and make them prisoners.
Moreover, you can always know the different roads by which the
enemy can march from his camp; and likewise guess, with certainty,
what will be the direction of his march. You must have some in-
telligent person placed, so as to observe instantly when he com-
mences his march, and whither it tends: all which may be easily
done, if you have few men only, and if they are employed as we
propose.
But if you are at the head of thousands, you move and act with
the same difficulty as the enemy; you cannot change the positions
of a corps, as you do those of a company of chasseurs, and a hun-
dred light horse, nor place yourself covered, and in the proper sit-
uation for reconnoitring: you must have a camp, and that camp is
instantly discovered, which makes it difficult to watch the enemy
with success.
This camp is the center from which all detachments must be sent,
and to which they must return; the enemy, apprized of all this, stops
them short, occupies some commanding hill, makes a shew of attack-
ing you, amuses you a whole day; in the mean while his army has
performed its march unknown to you.
I have seen a thousand examples of this. In the morning a report
comes from a corps of 10 or 12,000: the enemy is gone, detach-
ments are sent after him; in eight or ten hours, perhaps, you have
some intelligence, and perhaps not; but always too late: whereas, if
small parties were employed in the manner we propose, the enemy
could not move unperceived; and I can with truth aver, that I have
seen such small parties accompany the enemy during the whole cam-
paign, and often within twenty yards of his columns, and never out
of his sight.
I beg the reader’s pardon for having dwelt so long on this arti-
cle; but it serves to prove, that fifteen hundred men will perform
this kind of service much better, than so many thousands which are
now employed. I am so convinced of this, that I would undertake
to do it, though the enemy’s army amounted to a hundred thou-
sand men.
Folard, and many other judicious writers, observe, that in pro-
portion as the infantry is bad, and the military art declines, the num-
ber of horse increases in our modern armies; because, say they, an
able general at the head of a good infantry can do any thing, and
wants but a small cavalry. It is certain that when the infantry is
good, much may be done with it; and if it is bad, you must increase
your cavalry, to keep the enemy at a distance, as you must have a
great quantity of heavy artillery for the same purpose.
In a numerous, and particularly in a heavy cavalry, I find three
capital inconveniences, viz. The prodigious expence; the difficulty to
provide subsistence; and, lastly, that it is not of general use. For in
a close country, such as is a great part of Europe, ten campaigns
may pass without an opportunity for your cavalry to come to a gen-
eral action, if the enemy is able, and chuses to decline it: whereas
it is our opinion, that no species of troops or arms should be employed,
but in proportion to the general advantages which they procure.
For these reasons, I do not by any means approve of the mod-
ern fashion of employing so many horse. Generally a fourth or fifth
at least of the army must be composed of cavalry; I think an eighth
will be sufficient, provided the infantry is good, and formed on the
principles we have proposed, and that the cavalry be ranged, and
placed where it can act; and where it is always supported by artillery
and the infantry, which we have endeavoured to combine in our
order of battle.
Chapter XVII. Of the Order of Battle
Let any given number of infantry be divided into twenty

battalions, and let each of these, formed into three ranks,
occupy one hundred fathoms: these will have a front of ........2,000
Let three thousand horse be formed likewise in three ranks:
these will amount to a thousand files, each at half a fathom,
which will amount to ......................................................................500
For the small intervals generally left between the battalions

and squadrons, I allow ....................................................................300
The whole extent of such a line will amount to ......................2,800
Let the same number of foot be ranged in four ranks, each
battalion will occupy only seventy-five fathoms: the twenty
will occupy ....................................................................................1,500
I leave an interval equal to the front, which will be
consequently ..................................................................................1,500
3,000
Out of which deduct seventy-five, because there are only
nineteen intervals ................................................................................75
2,925
My line of twenty battalions, consisting of the same number of men,
will surpass the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms.
The Plate No. II represents the two orders of battle; the one, fig. 1
according to the usual mode, the other, fig. 2 according to our prin-
ciples. Let us analyse them.
In the first place, ours outflanks the other by one hundred and
twenty-five fathoms, which enables us to attack the enemy’s flank,
while it is likewise attacked in front.
Secondly, Our intervals are filled by three or four thousand light
infantry, who fire at their ease, chuse their time and object; and if
they are directed to fire obliquely along the enemy’s line, and fix
the officers in particular, it is probable that the fire of these alone
will produce a more real effect than that of the enemy’s whole line.
If to this you add the fire of the battalions by ranks, as we propose,
they will undoubtedly have a very great superiority over the enemy.
Thirdly, When the two lines approach each other, and come to
hand-weapons, it is not presumed that our modern battalions, armed
with their bayonets, and three deep, can resist a moment the impulse
of four ranks armed with pikes and lances, and likewise protected
by their defensive armour, so that in the use of missile and hand-
weapons, ours have most certainly the advantage.
I cannot imagine any mode by which a modern line can be put
on an equality with that which we propose. If it abides by its fire
alone, it is unequal; if it comes to a shock and the use of hand-
weapons, it is still much more so. Will it break its line and send
detachments after our light infantry? This is in fact adopting our
plan, and confessing it cannot be beat but by one similar.
part the first. an analysis
427
Illustration 13. Plate II (Figs. 1–2).

In our case this will not avail, because should they send such a
detachment, our two companies to the right and left of our battalions
will form a column, which will take such detachments on both flanks,
while the company of light infantry attacks them in front, and when
they are thrown into confusion, which must soon happen, a squadron
or two placed opposite the interval, as marked in the plan, will
advance sword in hand and attack them pell-mell, that is, ride through
them, which must in a few seconds exterminate them.
I saw at Silistria,24 in Turkey, two squadrons attack a column or
mass of above six thousand Turks, in this manner, whom they
defeated and dispersed in less than three minutes; and had they not
covered themselves under the banks of the Danube, whither the cav-
alry could not pursue them, they would have been all cut to pieces.
Colonel Carleton25 was present at this event.
It may be objected, that it is not easy for the two companies to
form the columns proposed; to which I answer, that such an oper-
ation does not require twenty seconds: and moreover, supposing it
was not done at all, my company of light infantry, supported by a
squadron of horse, armed with the musket and lance, will be more
than a match for the enemy’s detachment, which, in fact, admits
not of the least difficulty till a flank is formed; for the operation is
made under the fire of the two remaining companies and one of
light infantry.
I conclude, therefore, that a modern line is in every respect infe-
rior to that which we propose. I may be prejudiced in favor of my
principles; I therefore earnestly intreat experienced gentlemen of my
profession, to examine this subject with attention, and if they differ
in opinion, I shall be extremely obliged to them if they will com-
municate their sentiments. Truth is my object.
So much for infantry opposed to infantry. Let us now examine
that part of the line which is opposed to the enemy’s cavalry. Many
people will suppose that our four ranks, though armed with lances
and pikes, are not sufficiently strong to resist the shock of a line of
horse in three ranks; I am of a different opinion, and fully convinced
24
Siege of Silistria ( June–July 1774). Lloyd commanded the Russian division that
blockaded the fortress so General Rumiantsev could operate freely against the
Ottoman army at Shumla. This decisive campaign led to the Treaty of Kutchuk-
Kainardji (16 July) that ended the Russo-Turkish War (1768–74).
25
Col. Thomas Carleton, 20th Regiment of Foot.
that they are; because one horse alone can come to the shock at
once; and if killed, wounded, or stopped, the other two behind can-
not advance, so that the united force of our four men is in fact
opposed to that of one horse only, and if these forces are mechan-
ically computed, it will be found that the latter is by much inferior
to the former; and if to this you add the effects produced by the
fire first, and then by the lances and pikes, no doubt can remain;
for the horse has nothing but his weight and velocity. However, be
this as it may, I will admit that my infantry is in fact too weak; I
will, therefore, form a column of each company, whose front is eight
men, and flank sixteen. I hope no one will think this too weak, to
resist a line of horse, or rather, as we have shewn, one rank, which
alone can act.
According to our proposed plan, seven battalions, and as many
squadrons, are opposed to twenty squadrons; these battalions have
seven howitzers, and as many field pieces. The light infantry is placed
before the intervals, and my seven squadrons behind them. The first
and the artillery keep up a constant fire against the cavalry. Now I
ask, will it support this fire, and for how long? I believe not long,
it must either advance or retire when you approach it; I suppose
the former, which can be done only between my intervals. My light
infantry and my cavalry post themselves as marked in the plan. Only
part of the enemy’s cavalry can pass at once, and these will receive
the fire of two columns in their flanks, and when they have passed
will be fired at by the light infantry in their backs; in that instant
my seven squadrons will attack them in flank and rear, and I think
totally disperse them.
Indeed, I am so persuaded of the superiority of my infantry ranged
and armed in the manner proposed, that I do not think any cav-
alry, however resolute, can approach, much less break me; insomuch,
that I would venture to attack it in an open country. If the enemy’s
cavalry retires, you must send yours after them, who pursue them,
not in line, but like our hussars.
The second plate shews our order of battle advancing to the
enemy, and whoever considers it with attention, will perceive, that
though there are intervals between our battalions, the enemy can-
not avail himself of them, for he dares not penetrate between them
without ruin, as he will be opposed by our light infantry and cav-
alry. Moreover, he must break his own line, and leave an interval,
which cannot be guarded but by the second line, which is generally
too far off. In the mean time the disposition of our line enables it
to advance without any interruption, as no inconvenience can arise
from one part’s being more advanced than another, for that part is
protected by the cavalry and light infantry. Even, if many of our
companies or battalions were broken, the enemy cannot pursue them
without breaking his line, and exposing such detachments as he may
order to advance, to be attacked in front and flank. And lastly, the
march of the whole is infinitely more rapid than if the line was close
as usual. I therefore conclude that our order of battle is much supe-
rior to any other, and probably is that, which has the fewest defects
of any which can be invented and in which are combined the many
advantages of missile and hand-weapons.
The next plate [III] shews our order of battle, when our troops
approach within thirty or forty yards of the enemy, which they can
get over in as many seconds.
The meaning of this disposition is obvious. The two columns on
each flank of the battalions, when they have broken the enemy’s
line, fire on the flanks, while the other two companies continue to
fire before them on those who run away, and pursue them without
intermission, while the cavalry advances very little before the inter-
vals, and leaves the pursuit to the cavalry.
If our line advances in this manner with rapidity, the enemy’s first
line will be cut to pieces, and the second share the same fate, if it
does not retire in time. The same superiority of force and activity
will always prevail, and the victory must from the mode of attack-
ing be complete and decisive.
By my order of battle, all the infantry is placed in one line, and
all the cavalry in the second: different in this as in many other things
from the modern, as appears from the inspection of the plan in Plate
No. II. My reasons for this arrangement are;
First, That I think it sufficiently strong to overturn a modern line
formed and armed on weaker principles.
Secondly, Because all my infantry acts at once, and my cavalry
is brought into action only when the enemy’s line, infantry, or cav-
alry is thrown into disorder, when mine can act with advantage.
Thirdly, That every species of troops, infantry, cavalry, light infantry,
and artillery, support and assist each other: so that the total quan-
tity of action produced by my line is greatly superior to that of the
enemy, and consequently must conquer. As according to the con-
stitution of our army, it consists of sixty battalions, and forty squadrons,
if the first are formed in one line, it will be extremely long and
difficult to manage; we therefore propose, that forty battalions only
should be united in one corps; these will occupy a space something
more than forty battalions and forty squadrons of the enemy.
The remaining twenty battalions I would have formed into sepa-
rate corps, as marked in the plan, Plate III, fig. 1 to attack the enemy
in flank, while the forty attack him in front. The advantages of such
a disposition are too obvious to require an explanation.
If notwithstanding what we have said, our order of battle is thought
too weak, being in one line only; then we propose that the twenty
battalions should be divided; viz. Seven should be placed behind the
right wing, seven behind the left, and six behind the center, as it is
marked in the plan, Plate III, fig. 2 with the cavalry in the second
line. This disposition will satisfy those who are accustomed to two
lines and a reserve: but I prefer the other disposition for many rea-
sons, which will occur to every person who will examine the two
plans with attention. I shall only observe, that the first disposition is
most proper for attacking, and the second for defending. The first
has however two great advantages. First, That all your infantry act
at the same time, and not successively as in the second. Secondly,
That you necessarily attack the enemy on both flanks, as appears
by the plans themselves.
It seems needless to observe, that if the enemy opposes cavalry,
as probably he may, to the corps, A.B. This must be thrown into
columns, as we directed, and as is marked on the first plan, Plate I
but if opposed to infantry, no alteration to this reference is required.
We have already shewn, that the modern mode of ranging an
army, and the use of missive weapons, renders it totally inactive,
and proper only for a defensive war, and to fight at a distance, to
receive an enemy rather than attack him. To increase this inactiv-
ity, the general, as well as the soldier, seem to place all their confidence
in the artillery, rather than in the valour of the soldier; accordingly
the cannon is become the soul of our military establishments.
At the battle of Prague there were above five hundred pieces of
heavy cannon, which at a moderate computation, with the train,
cost more than forty thousand foot would have done; and yet they
did not produce any effect proportionate to such an immense expence.
I have three capital objections to this abuse of artillery—the expence
of it, the number of horses required to attend it, and the great delays
it always occasions in the motion of the army.
Illustration 14. Plate III (Figs. 1–2).

In sieges there cannot be too much, nor in the field too little
artillery. In this last case, the use of heavy cannon is very much
contracted, it can be carried but in few roads, cannot advance with
the line, and must be employed only to protect the heads of the
columns while they come out from a defile, and form the line, to form
a battery against some point of attack, or to defend an intrenchment.
If the enemy is at all acquainted with his business, he may order
his men to lie flat on the ground till your troops advance, and then
attack them, or wait till they come up, in which cases the artillery
has little or no effect; and by a quick motion he comes up to your
intrenchment, and attacks it sword in hand, which will render your
cannon useless. When a battery is directed against a defile, you may
always avoid it, by turning to the right or left.
A good van-guard with the field pieces will protect the heads of
your columns better than all the batteries you can raise; besides, if
the defiles you pass through are within reach of the enemy, he may
either oppose artillery to artillery, or, which is much better, advance
rapidly and attack them. The instant he approaches, the cannon
ceases to be of any use.
Upon the whole, therefore, I conclude, that when you propose
waiting for the enemy in some fortified post, as in a fortress, you
must have abundance of heavy artillery: but as we place the great-
est perfection of an army in its velocity, and our system is, we think,
particularly calculated for that, and the use of hand-weapons, which
renders missive weapons of every kind less useful, we reject of course
that prodigious quantity of artillery, and we think thirty or forty
twelve pounders more than sufficient for an army of fifty thousand
men.
In ten campaigns, you may not find an occasion where these are
necessary, and where common field pieces would not do the busi-
ness equally well. As we have said already our troops have much
confidence in a numerous artillery; merely to indulge them in this
opinion, though erroneous, I conceive that each battalion should
have a field piece, and a seven inch howitzer, until they are accus-
tomed to the use of hand-weapons, and to face the enemy, then
they will perceive, that artillery in general is so far from being use-
ful, that it retards their marches, and exposes them, during these
delays, to much greater losses and danger, than if they left their
artillery behind them, and thus disincumbered advance rapidly to
the enemy.
General Reflections
What we have said regards an army in the field. It remains we

should examine how such an army is to be prepared for action dur-
ing peace, and how supported while in the field.
One of the greatest difficulties which occur, is in supporting the
army in the field, I mean in furnishing recruits and cloathing. In a
campaign or two, recruits are wanted, and the troops are almost
naked.
The first are raised in the country, very often at a great distance
from the seat of war; so that many perish before they arrive; oth-
ers are totally unfit for service, and the few remaining placed in reg-
iments, are quite raw, and before these can be rendered useful, many
go to the hospital; hence one may safely affirm, that not one fourth
part ever arrives to a state of maturity and become real and useful
soldiers. What a waste and destruction of men! Forty years peace
and a good government will not atone for the calamities and losses
of a six years war.
During the late war in Turkey,26 the Russians raised above three
hundred thousand recruits, and yet the principal army under M.
Romanzow,27 at the conclusion of it, did not amount to above thirty-
six thousand; and that in Crimea, under Prince Dolgorouki,28 to
about twelve thousand, and all were in want of many necessary arti-
cles, which is always the case, particularly if contractors are any way
concerned.
What prevention of these evils can be found, it will be naturally
asked? The best I can think of is as follows:
Let the regiments have what we call perpetual quarters; that is,
they must always during peace, remain in one fixed place: and these
places must form a chain on that frontier, which most probably may
hereafter be the seat of war. For each regiment must be built a small
town in separate caserns, to prevent fire from communicating to the
whole. A certain quantity of land must be assigned to them. If the
frontier is subject to sudden attacks from small parties of the enemy,
26
Russo-Turkish War (1768–74).
27
Field Marshal Count Petr Aleksandrovich Rumiantsev (1725–96). Russian com-
mander whose 1773 campaign proved disastrous. He salvaged his reputation in
1774 and won a decisive victory for Catherine the Great.
28
Prince Vasilii Mikhailovich Dolgorukov-Krymskii. As General-in-Chief, he won
Catherine’s coveted Order of St. George for his conquest of the Crimea in 1771.
I would have a good intrenchment drawn about the caserns or bar-

racks, with a good ditch well palisaded, where the peasants may
remain in safety with their cattle, &c.
The recruits must be delivered to the regiments who are to take
care to have them exercised. All the materials which serve to cloath
the troops, must likewise be delivered into this depot, and there
worked and made up by the soldiers and their wives, which would
produce a vast saving to the sovereign, and the soldier would be
better cloathed.
In time of war, a battalion remains here to train the recruits, and
provide the cloathing for the whole regiment.
All the sick and invalids, wounded, &c. officers and soldiers, must
be sent to this depot, where they can always be of service, though
unfit for military duty in the field. If a sufficient quantity of land is
assigned, it will maintain them comfortably with their pay; and the
state is not burthened with half pay, or to turn numberless poor
creatures adrift, which is now the case.
In this system, the soldier may and ought to be permitted to
marry, that his children may supply the immense losses occasioned
by the war. The women may help to cultivate the lands, and sup-
port the community, whereas they are now the pest of the army.
The army will receive the recruits formed and healthy, and will be
always complete and fit for action; whereas now half the campaign
passes in exercising them, before you dare approach the enemy: and
in case of a considerable defeat, a battalion may be sent to the
depot, and replaced by that which was there.
Each male child, when he arrives at ten years of age, must have
a portion of land allotted him, and he becomes a soldier. In short,
by this method, the whole army becomes military colonies; and each
soldier having, by this means, a certain, honourable and good retreat
in his old age, serves cheerfully and well, becomes a member of the
state, and has something to lose. No greater misfortune can happen
to him than to be turned out of his regiment, which, in fact, is dis-
possessing him of his inheritance. Moreover, a man accustomed to
live in a certain community, is more upon his guard than when he
is continually strolling from one quarter to another; insomuch, that
a regiment seldom passes through a village in its march, without
leaving traces of insolence and disorder behind it.
What I have said of the infantry holds equally good for the cav-
alry; each regiment of which should be composed of six squadrons;
one remains at the depot, and performs exactly the same duties as
the battalions; so I need not dwell any longer on the subject.
Of Contractors
There is nothing performed by contractors, which may not be much

better executed by intelligent officers. I object to contractors for the
following reasons:
First, They make immense fortunes at the expence of the state,
which ought to be saved.
Secondly, They destroy the army, horse and foot, and even the
hospitals, by furnishing the worst of every thing.
Thirdly, It is always in the power of the contractors to check, and
intirely stop the progress of an army.
And, finally, Men so extremely covetous, may be easily induced
to take money from the enemy, for revealing the secret, which they
can guess at from the disposition of the depots, or for not furnish-
ing the provisions on time.
In an army, there are always men of honour and activity to be
found, who would do all the contractors do much better, save mil-
lions, and serve the troops effectually. These must be employed, and
these only.
PART THE SECOND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR:

OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE PASSIONS,
AND THEIR APPLICATION RELATIVE TO THE
CONDUCT OF AN ARMY
Chapter I. Of the General
In the preceding part, we have considered an army as a machine,

with which the different operations of war, are to be performed; and
endeavoured to point out the method which appears to us most
adapted for the construction of it, so that it may have the proper-
ties required to render it perfect. An army, however, differs essen-
tially from a pure machine: this is formed in such a manner, that
when applied, it must necessarily produce a given effect, in propor-
tion to its strength. It can have but one principle of motion, whereas
in an army, each individual part has, within itself, the spring and
source of action, which it may exert or not at pleasure. It follows,
therefore, that however advantageously the pars, that is, the men
are ranged, the whole will remain motionless, if the leader, who has
the direction of their forces, cannot offer such motives as will induce
them to act, and in the manner he prescribes. He cannot create
action in individuals, he cannot force them to act, h can only per-
suade and direct. His orders are ineffectual, the instant an army, or
a great part of it, chuses to disobey. Coercion can have no room
against superior forces. Authority, in which alone the strength of the
general consists, vanishes the instant it is not acknowledged; he must
not therefore rely upon it intirely. In the common course of things,
as our armies are constituted, it does very well; but upon many, and
indeed upon all extraordinary occasions, he will find it deficient,
unless he possesses the art of persuading, which can be done only,
by offering such motives to the troops as naturally tend to raise their
courage when depressed, and check it when violent or insolent, so
that he becomes intirely master of their inclinations, and disposes of
their forces with unlimited authority. This is what I call the philosophy
of war, which, in my opinion, is the most difficult and sublime part

of this or of any other profession. It supposes a perfect knowledge of
the passions, because it is from that source, a general must draw his
arguments to persuade or dissuade, as circumstances may require.
No author has treated this subject so far, as it regards the conduct
of an army, though it appears evident from history, that all the great
captains of antiquity practised it; of which we shall give some exam-
ples in the sequel. If, as the matter is new, we shall discuss it imper-
fectly, we hope the reader will excuse it, overlook our errors, and
avail himself of the few truths we shall propose to his consideration.
An army, like the sea, is sometimes calm and slothful, at others,
furious and outrageous, wholly ungovernable; both extremes are to
be equally avoided. It must have such a degree of motion as is
required to perform whatever is prescribed, and no more, that it
may be confined and directed to a certain end.
Extreme rapidity is incapable of direction, and often overwhelms
those who attempt to moderate it. When the whole, or a great part
of an army is disaffected, sullen, or breaks out into open disobedi-
ence, it is obvious that compulsion is impracticable: this reaches only
individuals; you must have recourse to persuasion, which supposes
uncommon abilities and personal authority in the leader: if deficient
in these points, he will find, that his orders will be ineffectual.
Armies are corrupted equally by good and bad success, and by
idleness; from whatever causes the corruption and discontent pro-
ceed, a general must know how to calm the fury, as well as raise
the spirits of his men: he must above all take care, that no cause
of complaint can be imputed to him, nor even the least neglect, for
both destroy his credit with the men; and it will be extremely difficult
to pacify them, if they are personally prejudiced against him: it is
no less dangerous to impute the evil complained of to the, unless
they have, by some shameful act of cowardice or disobedience,
brought it on themselves.
In that case, even the general must have great personal author-
ity over them, and reprimand them with much delicacy and cir-
cumspection; for a harsh expression will exasperate them, and aggravate
rather than cure the evil. It is difficult to know what to say to an
enraged multitude, animated perhaps against their leader, who,
notwithstanding his probity and abilities, may be suspected and hated,
and fall a victim to their wild and ungovernable fury.
part the second. the philosophy of war 439
Cicero,1 in describing the character of a perfect orator, supposes

him a complete master of every science. If such extensive abilities
are required to controul and guide the passions of an unarmed and
peaceable assembly, subject to no fears, nor intimidated by the pres-
ence of any immediate danger, surely much greater wisdom, forti-
tude, and abilities are necessary to allay the fury of an armed
multitude, to inspire the depressed and unfortunate with fresh courage,
bring him unreluctantly, and even with confidence, to face and engage
the victorious enemy, affront the greatest danger with alacrity, court
the toils and perils of war with the same assiduity others do their
pleasure.
To induce men to act a dangerous part, is much more difficult
than to persuade them to adopt an opinion, which, for the most
part, does not engage in any hazardous enterprize.
In the senate, the orator is prepared, and his auditors more or
less disposed to hear him, his mind free and undisturbed; whereas
a general is surrounded with difficulties and dangers. The soldier is
a rude, ignorant, untractable being; and when many are united, an
expression misunderstood puts them in a flame; argument, and a
long chain of reasoning, have no influence over them. No fault,
words, or actions escape their notice and censure; whence, if once
disaffected, misfortunes, which proceed from the cowardice of the
soldier, neglect or ignorance of the officers, even those caused by
accident, a torrent, breaking of a bridge, &c. are all imputed to the
general. His reputation and his authority over the soldiers depend
entirely on success, which, notwithstanding the most extensive abil-
ities, wisdom, and heroism, does not always answer our expectations;
because the concurrence of a great number of persons is required;
and if one or two only of the principal officers, from malice or igno-
rance, fail in executing the part assigned to them, the whole project
miscarries. What penetration in the choice of his principal officers,
what dignity and popularity to conciliate their esteem and affection,
as well as those of the army in general!
It is not enough that they know, and can perform what is pre-
scribed to them, they must de desirous and anxious to second your
1
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC). Roman orator, politician and foe of Julius
Caesar.
intentions at the risk of their lives; they must be determined to suc-

ceed or perish in the attempt.
To infuse such sentiments into all ranks of men under your com-
mand, from the general to the soldier, demands uncommon quali-
ties, some of which we shall endeavour to trace, and give an imperfect
idea of what we think the leader of an army should be.
I take it for granted he is perfectly master of the mode in which
men ought to be armed, and ranged to the greatest advantage; and
that he knows how to direct and execute every operation of war
without exception. The object we have here in view, is to shew, how
he must acquire that degree of personal authority, as will enable
him to gain the respect, confidence, and affection of those under his
command; and render him so entirely master of their inclinations,
that his will is the only rule of their actions.
His conduct must be irreproachable, and free from all kind of
vice, and even of any remarkable weakness either of body or mind.
If he is given to women, gaming, or debauchery, his example will
be followed, and a general dissipation will ensue, which will spread,
infect, and corrupt the whole army. These vices are not only per-
nicious and shameful in themselves, but very often lead men into
crimes in order to procure the means to pursue them. They weaken
the mind and corrupt the heart, render him unable to perform the
duties of his employment, lay him open to the wicked designs of
bad men, expose him in a fond or jovial hour to betray the secret
of his projects, by which they miscarry; and above all destroy his
credit, reputation, and influence on the troops, whose good opinion,
however, is the only solid foundation of success and glory. These
are not only vices, but fatal in their consequences, when a com-
mander is infected by them: avarice and rapaciousness are crimes
of the deepest die, at least are the source of them. They cannot be
satisfied but at the expence of somebody, and probably of such as
are least able to support the fraud; and when gratified at the expence
of the poor soldiers little pittance, or conniving at the abuses and
frauds of the contractors, to partake of the plunder, there is no pun-
ishment adequate to it. The person guilty of it ought to be banished
from the sight of men. It would seem incredible, if daily examples
did not prove it, that a general should be so absurd as to prefer
such unlawful gain, which he cannot want but for his vices, to the
satisfaction and advantage of being respected and beloved by his
army, whose affections he most certainly forfeits, if once suspected

on this head.
Pride is an affectation of superiority over others, which always
offends, and makes men enemies: they will obey no farther than they
must, to avoid censure or punishment; and so far from exerting
themselves to obtain the victory, will secretly rejoice at your defeat,
and perhaps contribute to it, when they can do it without danger.
It is inconceivable, that any man in his senses should act in a man-
ner which, upon the least reflection, he must know will give offence
to those very people, on whose good-will success depends: however
elevated his rank and station may be, he can offend no man with
impunity, particularly in an army, where the affection of all is more
or less necessary. Pride arises from immoderate self-conceit, and an
opinion of our superior abilities. Be it so, you are what you imag-
ine yourself to be. Avail yourself, however, of what talents your infe-
riors possess, encourage them, they will improve by your instructions
and example, and gratefully acknowledge the superiority of a mod-
est and humane commander. Ostentation and pride are no proof of
merit; actions alone shew it. No man is sufficiently impartial to judge
of himself; he must abide by the sentence of the army, which, I
believe, is always just; it is madness to pretend to force men to
respect and love you, if your conduct is weak, irregular, and inso-
lent. Benevolence and affection create similar sentiments; pride is
sullen and disdainful; vanity is open, and loquacious to intemper-
ance; both proceed from the same origin; a high opinion of one’s
self, and contempt of others, both are equally pernicious, hateful,
and equally to be avoided in every station of life, and most so in a
person placed at the head of others.
Envy and jealousy are inherent to low minds, and to men of mod-
erate abilities, who aspire to great commands, incapable of doing
any thing that is praise-worthy, which can intitle them to the esteem
of mankind, they are continually plotting against men of merit. When
princes, and persons invested with great power, are infected with
these passions, they degenerate into open cruelty. In persons of lower
rank, calumny and intrigue are the weapons they use to destroy
those they hate, for no other reason than because they have merit,
and deserve their esteem and friendship. These passions are more
common than one would imagine, insomuch, that few are exempt
from them. There is something absurd in this passion, that a general
officer should be jealous, and consequently endeavour to crush and

destroy those men who are most capable of promoting his designs,
appears to me the excess of folly: yet so it is, few men have mag-
nanimity enough to suffer, much less acknowledge, equal or supe-
rior merit in others. This vice makes a man unhappy in himself,
obnoxious to others, and for the most part leads him to injustice,
which finally becomes fatal to him. It throws him intirely into the
hands of artful, base, and low people, who can be of no service to
him, and alienates the affections of all good and sensible men, and
in time those of the whole army, in which chiefly we lay the foun-
dation of success.
A sullen, sulky, and morose temper is totally unfit for any com-
mand, it will soon produce an universal hatred, as levity, affectation
of wisdom expressed by the nods of the head, or other such gri-
maces, expose him to contempt and derision. Above all things, a
genera must avoid warm, harsh, and intemperate expressions, or any
word or motion which favour of insolence or contempt, which gen-
erally give greater offence than the most severe treatment. Such is
human nature, particularly in men of sentiment and education, noth-
ing hurts more than the idea of being despised: it is an insult never
to be forgiven, and waits only for an opportunity to revenge itself.
A warm temper blinds a man of his judgment, and exposes him to
say and do a thousand rash and inconsiderate things, which will
involve him in dangers and inextricable difficulties.
Thus far we have shewn what a general should not be, if he pre-
tends to deserve the name; it is not sufficient he should be free from
the vices and crimes above-mentioned; every man should be so for
his own sake; he should be possessed of eminent and useful virtues,
great qualities, by which alone he can acquire true dignity, that per-
sonal authority and supreme ascendancy over the minds of men,
which the scepter cannot give.
Honours and riches may be conferred on any man, though unde-
serving of them; but reputation and glory can proceed only from
ourselves. High birth, and other accidental circumstances, if prop-
erly applied, contribute much to acquire and establish personal con-
sequence, because they place a man in a situation where he can
give scope to his genius; whereas another, though possessed of the
most extensive abilities, if deprived of these advantages, is continu-
ally checked and kept under by the superior influence, jealousy, and
malice of the great, who think they have a right to every thing, with-
out being at the trouble to acquire the knowledge and science nec-
essary to fulfil the duties of the employments they aspire to. Hence
it is that obscure merit, particularly in monarchies, seldom or ever
raises a man to any very eminent post, unless the extreme distresses
of the state call him to the helm, which he is permitted to guide
only while the storm and danger last; when these subside, tranquil-
ity and vigour restored to the state, he must give way to some intrigu-
ing courtier, retire and sink into oblivion, of which we have too
many examples, antient and modern.
When a general has acquired personal authority, is esteemed and
beloved by his army; when they have confidence in his wisdom and
abilities, experienced his valour, and seen his conduct crowned with
success, there is no enterprize, however difficult, above his reach;
whereas, destitute of these advantages, though otherwise a man of
merit, he can undertake nothing of consequence without trembling
for the event.
But how is this personal authority, this ascendancy over the sol-
diers to be acquired? I answer, first, by being free from vice: sec-
ondly, by shewing, by his words and actions, he is as much superior
in merit as in rank, and in every respect worthy their confidence
and affection; brave without ostentation, as a thing of course; unmoved
by the presence of the most imminent danger; calm, serene, a chear-
ful and open countenance at all times, chiefly in a day of battle—
This inspires soldiers with courage and confidence, and insures a
victory.
In any very great danger, the soldier looks up to his officer, and
if he perceives the least sign of timidity, anxiety, or doubt, he con-
cludes all is lost, and generally consults his safety by flight. The gen-
eral must share the toils and dangers of war with his men as
circumstances may require, and they ought to share the advantages
of the victory with him: but, alas! they have nothing to expect; above
all things, he must be just in the distribution of those favours which
pass through his hands; if merit alone is attended to, he conciliates
the affections of all good men, and even the bad will endeavour to
deserve his protection; a general emulation will ensue: whereas, if
he suffers himself to be influenced by any authority whatever, or
seduced by the intrigue of courtiers, his followers and sycophants, a
general discontent will follow; he is deserted, abandoned, and hated
by every one; the ordinary duties of the army are performed with
reluctancy; murmurs and mutiny are not seldom the consequences
of the injustice of a general.
Favoritism is always, sooner or later, fatal to every man who gives
himself up to any individual, because, independent of the weak or
wicked counsels, a favorite may give his superior, it makes him odi-
ous, and deprives him of the support of good men. If he consults
the opinion of his army, he will seldom be deceived in the choice
of his friends and advisors; they never love or esteem any man that
is not in some degree deserving of it: but a general, like a sover-
eign, is surrounded by a class of men, whose interest and influence
depend on keeping him in the dark, and preventing the least ray of
light from penetrating into his recesses; he employs this or that man,
not from any personal knowledge he has of his abilities, but from
the recommendation of some artful and ignorant favorite. If, in spite
of fate, and the malevolence of these people, an officer’s endeavours
are crowned with success, all is in an uproar; his victories are depre-
ciated, his conduct criticized and calumniated, until he falls a vic-
tim to their jealousy.2
Many things must be connived at and dissembled, others are reme-
died by private reprimand, if few are concerned, and publickly if
many. None but great and capital crimes must be punished rigor-
ously; and in that case I would have it done publickly in the Roman
manner, in the presence of the whole army, or at least, in that of
the corps to which the delinquents belong, and not by an obscure
court-martial, where a brave man is often sacrificed to the envy and
jealousy of some great person, and many a villain escapes. Rewards
should go rather beyond, and punishments below the mark. No man
is infallible, and errors must be forgiven.
Every man under your command must partake of your kindness
and generosity, when he is in want and needs it, particularly the
poor soldier, and poorer subalterns, who often have nothing but their
pay to subsist upon, to whom the loss of a horse is a capital mis-
fortune; the general should have a particular list of these, and should
omit no opportunity to relieve them; he must pay the most scrupu-
lous attention to the management of hospitals, where some general
officer of humanity should preside; must not shut himself up like a
2
No doubt venting his sometimes frustrating experience in the Austrian army.
sultan, and appear only in state and pomp to display his greatness:
on the contrary, he must not fail to appear before the line every
day, if possible, with one or two adjutants only; stop at each regi-
ment, enquire into, and see the state of it (I do not mean that they
are well curled); but whether they have their allowance of bread,
provisions, &c. and that these are of the best kind which can be
procured; and if he finds there is the least prevarication on this head,
punish the authors, contractors, and colonels with the utmost rigour,
and force them to refund their criminal gain, hang or dismiss them
for ever. It is a certain truth, benevolence creates affection. The poor
soldier is beyond all men grateful, and repays a thousand fold the
kindness shewn him by his superiors. It is duty and interest of the
general to be just, humane, and kind to those he commands, and
particularly to those of the lower class.
I hope the reader will excuse the length of this discourse, which
gives some, though very inadequate idea of the qualities which a
general should possess; these applied properly will enable him to per-
form great things, and on many occasions, supply the want of mil-
itary skill, and repair errors to which all men are subject: whereas
the most extensive knowledge of the art of war will miscarry in its
projects, if the army does not heartily concur in the execution.
In the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to point out some
of the moral qualities which a chief should possess: we proceed now
to shew what men are, and from what sources he must draw such
arguments and motives, as may induce them to exert their faculties
to the utmost of their power; it is not enough they know how to
perform this or that operation; they must be willing and desirous to
do it; success will be the consequence.
Of the Passions
It is needless to discuss minutely and metaphysically the number and

variety of the passions. Suffice it to trace their source and origin,
and indicate those motives which appear best adapted to raise and
excite, soothe and calm them, as circumstances may require; so that
an able commander, by applying them properly, be always master
of the actions of the troops committed to his care.
From sensibility arise agreeable or disagreeable feelings, and from
these pleasure and pain; such as are indifferent to us produce only
a transitory, or no impression at all, and consequently leave man,

or other animal, in the same state he was before: whereas agreeable
or disagreeable feelings necessarily put him in motion, or at least
inspire him with a desire to act. Fear of, and an aversion to pain,
and the desire for pleasure, are the spring and cause of all actions
both in men and other species of animals. They have two origins,
interior and exterior. The first is inherent to all animals without
exception, because it proceeds from sensibility. The second is pecu-
liar to man, and proceeds from his position in society with his fel-
low creatures; were he alone in a desart, he might perhaps differ
from other animals, perhaps in sagacity, and perhaps not.
Pain and pleasure, arising from interior and mechanical causes,
and the gratifications of these wants, I call sensual or animal; and
those which proceed from the position of a man in society, I call
social. The first are few and limited, and may without much difficulty
be gratified, which reduces animals of all kinds to a state of sloth
and indolence, until their wants are renewed, and pain forces them
to action.
In proportion as society is imperfect and uncivilized, man will be
found to resemble the most common animal; a savage and a slave
differ very little from animals, being moved to act by their sensual
wants alone: however, as man is always placed in some kind of soci-
ety, natural or civil, where his animal wants are satisfied, there is in
him a principle of action, not to be found in other animals, which
characterizes and distinguishes him from all others; this principle of
social action is, I think, general, and to be found in every man,
more or less: it is the desire of pre-eminence and superiority; though
the means, by which it is obtained, may and do vary according to the
different situations in which men are placed; yet is pre-eminence the
ultimate object of social action, and operates upon him when his
animal wants are gratified; whether it is coveted as a means to sat-
isfy sensual pleasures, as Helvetius3 supposes, or, as I think, more
probable, to secure our independence, which cannot be done oth-
erwise, than by a real superiority, or both, is not material; it is cer-
tain we affect and desire to hold a superiority over men much more
3
Claude Adrian Helvetius (1715–71). One of the first utilitarian moralists, his
popular De l’Esprit (Paris: Durand, 1758) argued for the centrality of pleasure and
pain in human motivation and decision-making.
than over women, though the former cannot contribute to gratify

sensual pleasure.
Glory, acquired by great actions, study, mathematics, eloquence,
&c. do not tend to gratify the senses, yet are more anxiously sought
after, than those objects which do; this proves, that intellectual plea-
sures and pains affect the human heart more than those which pro-
ceed from the senses alone. The desire of pre-eminence increases,
as man rises in society: in whatever position a man is placed, if
above want, he aims at some advancement in that class, of which
he is a member; when arrived at the top, he wishes to enter into a
superior class, and so on to the end of his career.
When a man is placed low in society, and intirely taken up in
procuring food and raiment, he is precluded from the hopes of
obtaining social advantages, and approaches to the condition of ani-
mals: also a rich and powerful man at the head of society, enabled
to gratify his wants without labour, his desires, activity, and princi-
ples of action are stifled in their birth, his attention is directed to
vary his pleasure of sense, or some trivial amusements, as gaming,
hunting, drinking, &c. In the midst of plenty and superfluities, he is
unhappy, and is surprized at it; whereas he should consider that
pleasure derives from some degree of pain, which creates in us some
want or desire, and therefore the immediate gratifications of them,
whether they proceed from animal or social origin, necessarily destroys
the pleasures of enjoyment, and consequently that activity by which
they must be obtained; for this can be exerted only during the inter-
val, which intervenes between the time we wish for such a thing,
and the enjoyment of it: hence it is, that the greatest degree of social
activity is always in the intermediate classes, between the extremes
of poverty and of riches.
By social activity, I mean that which tends to advance our rank
in society: by animal activity, that which tends to gratify those wants
on which our preservation, or that of the species depends: it is vain
to preach ambition, glory, honours, &c. to a man oppressed with
misery; heroism, valour, courage, are incompatible with extreme
poverty, consequently these and other such affections of the mind
can be found only in men placed above want, on whom alone the
desire of pre-eminence operates; the mode of acquiring it, and the
object vary, according to the different positions of men; in order to
increase their activity, you must propose means and objects, analo-
gous to their different situations: the ambition of a merchant is
different in its objects from that of the soldier, clergyman, philoso-

pher, &c. whence the several classes, in which society is divided,
have their peculiar characteristics.
Chapter II. Of Animal Fear
Animal fear arises from the apprehension of some danger, which

man and other animals feel inimical to their preservation, and there-
fore avoid it with the utmost care and caution: the natural effect of
fear is flight, unless restrained by superior fear. No animal can be
induced to encounter danger without compulsion; when the danger
is great, and the hopes of escaping it entirely lost, then despair
inspires courage, which produces the utmost exertion of our forces,
and generally is crowned with success.
Animal want always produce action in some degree or other.
Extreme fear and pain, arising from want, produce extreme exer-
tion; it is dangerous to contend with man or other animal animated
by such powerful motives.
When the soldier is, or thinks himself, placed in a dangerous sit-
uation, without a possibility of escaping, every thing may be expected
from him; placed between death and victory, he becomes a hero;
but if you expose him for a long time to great danger, and there
remains a possibility of avoiding it by flight, he will fly; because the
idea of present danger will prevail over the fear of a more remote
punishment, which he may hope to elude. Moreover a considerable
body of troops are not susceptible of the fear of punishment, because
they cannot be all punished, and individuals suppose each in par-
ticular is, that they are not to be sacrificed: hence it appears, that
fear is not a powerful nor effectual principle of exertion, unless
extreme and desperate; whereas the desire of gratifying our wants
is; I am therefore surprized to see generals act upon the contrary
system; they suppose fear the only principle of action in the soldier,
as if he were an animal of a different species; for, surely, they will
not acknowledge it as the motive of their own actions.
In our armies, the soldier is in fact reduced to the condition of
an animal, and like them moved to action by bodily fear and ani-
mal wants, being totally excluded from the advantages of society: I
ask, is it necessary it should be so? No, every man is by nature sus-
ceptible to passion, his position in society may increase or diminish
the ardour with which he pursues a given object; but all men, when
free from danger, and their animal wants gratified, are perpetually
in search of something, from whence they expect to derive pleasure;
no class of men is exempt from the general influence of ambition,
consequently all by some motive or other, analogous to their situa-
tion, may be excited to perform great actions, if the class to whom
a man belongs is susceptible of it, and in proportion as it is elevated
above others.
Chapter III. Of Honour and Shame
Honour proceeds from a desire to gain the public esteem; shame

from the fear of losing it. The particular qualities esteemed hon-
ourable are peculiar to each class; valour and contempt of danger
in a soldier; wisdom in a statesman; piety and learning in ecclesias-
tics, &c. because these in each class are most useful to the com-
munity at large.
When the principle of honour and a sense of shame are firmly
established in the human heart, they operate more forcibly than the
fear of death, and are the source of all great and heroic actions: the
more elevated the class to which a man belongs, and his position
in it, the greater will be his exertions to gain the esteem of the pub-
lic. A man buried in obscurity is little affected by honour or shame;
the desire of pleasing ceases, and he degenerates into a savage, and
approaches to the state of animals: hence it is that gentlemen are
in general more anxious and delicate in what they suppose concerns
their honour, than members of other classes; instead of depressing
that class of men called soldiers, as we do at present, every method
possible should be used to raise and exalt it: as the difference of
classes produces more or less activity in the pursuit of those objects
which are peculiar to them, so does that government, which stamps
on the whole nation a certain character different from that of oth-
ers; some tend to promote honour and virtue, others to depress them.
In despotic governments, there is but one class of men, viz. that
of the soldier, the rest are an aggregate of individuals, whose con-
dition is nearly on a level with that of animals, and like them is
totally occupied in procuring the necessities of life.
The ambition of the soldier, confined to his class in time of peace,
having no motive or opportunity of exerting itself, sinks into sloth
and indolence; hence that lethargy and inaction which prevail in this
kind of government, where a man cannot, by any exertions, obtain
the public esteem; where it is dangerous to attempt it, fear will be
the only ruling principle which tends to inaction; honour and sense
of shame are utterly unknown.
In monarchies the subjects are divided into several classes, more
or less distinguished; all may, however, partake of the public esteem
in some degree. A man is excited to exert himself by the emolu-
ments peculiar to his class and situations, and by those which he
may reap from society in general, and consequently many and pow-
erful motives concur to promote honour, virtue, and activity, when
the sovereign is a man of genius; but if weak and indolent, the activ-
ity of the subject will be directed to parade, and extravagancy, art,
and intrigue will supplant virtue; the talent of pleasing will be deemed
the most important; that which is agreeable prevails over what is
useful.
Great exertions are seldom found in monarchies, because they are
not always the most sure means to obtain the esteem of the prince;
that of the public, which is the most powerful incentive to great
actions, is unknown: the prince is every thing, the rest are nothing;
the esteem of the former is the only object of attention, and may
often be obtained by very inconsiderable exertions, and by means
inconsistent with honour and virtue.
The class of soldiers being considered as the most honourable,
those of the higher rank in it are restrained from committing any
unworthy actions by the sense of shame; but as the great emolu-
ments and rewards are peculiar to the nobility, they expect them
from their connections, the favour of the prince and his ministers
or favourites, rather than from any exertions of their own; hence it
is, that the certainty of obtaining them in the nobility, and the equal
certainty of not obtaining them in the other classes, diminishes, or
rather extinguishes the principles of heroism in all.
In republics, where all are equal, pre-eminence can be acquired
only by personal and superior merit; public esteem is the reward of
great and useful actions: hence it is that republics, antient and mod-
ern, have produced more great men than all the monarchies put
together.
In these, favour procures every thing; in those, nothing. In republics
the utility of the whole is considered as worthy of rewards. In monar-
chies the pleasure of the prince and of his favourites is the path
which leads to pre-eminence. From the different modes of obtain-

ing pre-eminence arises the prodigious difference we observe in the
characters, manners, and exertions of men, as they are influenced
by the different species of governments.
We have seen that motives arising from bodily fear, and the neces-
sity of gratifying our animal wants, unless extreme, do not produce
any great effects, and that they are not either constant or general;
and therefore cannot be always applied with advantage. Those which
arise from the position of a man in society, are indeed numberless
and permanent, but not applicable to all; pre-eminence, and the
means by which it is obtained, are within the reach of few persons
and classes only; those of inferior rank are excluded entirely; so that
like animals, it is by fear and want they can be compelled to act;
we must therefore seek for a more general motive which operates
on every class of men, and on every individual.
Chapter IV. Of Riches
When a people is corrupted by luxury, vice, and folly, the influence

of riches is superior to that of every other passion, because they are
an universal medium, by which they may all be gratified. Whoever
possesses great riches, is the master of others in proportion as he
can and will satisfy their wants, according to the expression of Virgil,
‘Nam Deus, mihi semper erit, qui,’ &c. The rich and powerful are treated
and adored like a divinity by his worthless votaries: as the influence
of riches increases, that of honour and virtue declines; insomuch,
that not the least traces of them are to be found. However, as we
cannot form men to our wishes, and must take them as they are, it
is necessary to apply that motive which is analogous to their ideas
of good and evil, that we may secure their submission, and induce
them to exert themselves in over-coming difficulties and dangers to
which the soldier is particularly exposed. As in our system he is
excluded from the advantages of society, viz. honours, rank, &c. we
must apply that only medium left to us, which can excite him to
perform great actions, pecuniary rewards; they must however be
transitory, and the recompence of victory and some extraordinary
act of valour; they must not be excessive, and such as put the sol-
dier above want. Lands should never be granted to a soldier, but
when he retires from the service; when by successive victories an
army is become rich, loaded with spoils, baggage, &c. it is soon cor-
rupted and ungovernable. I approve of the example of Alexander;
Burn them all, dismiss the old soldier, and send him home rich. The
toils and dangers of a soldier are great, his rewards and enjoyments
must also be great and infinite, but of short duration; his hopes must
for ever be kept alive, and his wants sometimes gratified, even to
excess.
The Greek and Roman soldier, was animated to encounter dan-
gers, by the hopes of plunder, and the prospect of obtaining all the
honours of the state, to which military virtue most certainly led him;
the Mahometans [Muslims] by plunder and enthusiasm; the Tartars
and free-booters, in the American seas, by plunder alone; all have
performed such actions of valour and heroism, as appear incredible
to us.
When we compare the motives which inspired the different nations,
with those applied by us, we cannot be surprized at the prodigious
difference we find in the effects: the cane may make a tolerable
slave, but can never form a hero; besides these motives of exertion,
drawn from fear of bodily pain, from the advantages of society, as
honours and pecuniary rewards, there are others less general, but
more powerful in their effects, viz. Liberty and Religion.
Chapter V. Of Liberty
The love of liberty and independence is inherent to all animals with-

out exception; their existence depends upon it; they must all enjoy
it in some degree; they must seek their food, and be able to pre-
serve themselves by resistance or flight. Man has subdued a great
part of the animal species to his dominion; the greatest, or rather
all the human species, is also brought to submit to the yoke of a
few whom nature had made equals: habituated to his situation, man
submits with patience, because he knows not the advantage of lib-
erty. In the animal creation those individuals, who are not subdued
by man, enjoy absolute liberty; but the human species, constituted
in natural or civil society, cannot enjoy that degree of liberty, nor
yet be reduced to absolute slavery; he must like other animals have
some degree of liberty to preserve his life, but he can never attain
to absolute independence; born and bred in society, he is necessar-
ily connected with many persons by the reciprocal wants and suc-
cours, which each in particular stands in need of: no man, however

low or exalted his station may be, can live absolutely independent;
their wants, both natural and social, chain them together, and this
is the cause and origin of society, of which man alone is suscepti-
ble; other animals aggregate, but are independent of each other:
man associates because his wants cannot be gratified by his own
industry alone: our wants and our dependence increase together, and
produce a voluntary submission to the will of him or them, who are
enabled to gratify them; he obeys unreluctantly, because it is a
medium by which alone he obtains what he wishes for; but when
he expects no advantage from his compliance, every command is
considered as an oppression, in proportion as it tends to deprive him
of liberty, property, honour, &c. he will hate the authors, and embrace
the first opportunity of shaking off the yoke, and resume his natural
liberty. There is in the nature of man a certain degree of sufferance
only, beyond which power cannot be exerted with impunity; it pro-
duces despair, which if supported by any, the most trifling means,
and conducted with wisdom, is invincible: tremble, ye mighty mon-
archs, and beware, the effects of despair are terrible.
A people reduced to the necessity of taking up arms against their
sovereign, is obliged to exert itself by the fear of a revengeful mas-
ter, death and slavery, and by the hopes of independency, and all
the advantages which attend it; such powerful motives generally ren-
der their efforts successful.
The first cause and object of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or
supposed; the second is to provide for future security, which can
never be effectually done than by destroying the sovereign author-
ity: it is during this contest that the greatest efforts are made, because
there is no alternative; freedom or slavery is the result of it. In pro-
portion as the revolters succeed in their attempts, and their danger
diminishes, their exertions will also decline, and if left to themselves,
will probably go no farther; but if you persevere in attacking them,
and treat them with cruelty and contempt, they will not be satisfied
with any conditions you may grant them, but, moved by revenge,
which is a very active principle, pursue their oppressors to destruction.
Had Tarquin,4 had the Spaniards given the revolters time, and
dissembled their resentments, a more favourable opportunity of
4
Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (r. 534–510 BC). By legend the last king of Rome
who was deposed by Lucius Iunius Brutus after his son’s rape of Lucretia.
regaining their lost power would have offered, and perhaps the
Roman and Dutch republics would never have existed. It was the
sense of danger, with which they were threatened, which rendered
them invincible, and finally crowned their endeavours with success.
From all we have said, it follows, that the sovereign in conduct-
ing such a war should, by a moderate conduct, diminish the idea
of danger, and leave room to a solid and hearty reconciliation; and
that the leaders of a revolt, on the contrary, should shew, that no
confidence or reliance can be had in the promises of an irritated
master, which are only snares to divide, and then punish and enslave
those whom he cannot conquer. Men truly animated with the enthu-
siastic fire of liberty, if properly conducted, are always superior to
those who fight for the power and emoluments of a master; the
difficulties are all in the beginning of the contest. When on one side
is an army disciplined, and abundantly provided with every thing
which may render its operation successful and victorious; on the
other, nothing but courage and despair, which arise from a sense of
injuries.
Chapter VI. Of Religion
All religions are not equally calculated to produce a spirit of enthu-

siasm, some lead to an active, others to a speculative life; the
Mahometan is among the first, and the Christian among the latter.
No religion, I know of, offers more powerful motives to action than
the Mahometan, none less than the Christian. The former promises
rewards analogous to the nature and inclination of men in general,
and particularly adapted to the manners and mode of living of the
oriental nations.
Victory is rewarded with the spoils of the enemy; death in the
combat expiates all crimes, and, moreover, leads to pleasures, which
in this world, are considered the greatest man can enjoy, and in the
next, are believed to be infinite in intensity, variety, and duration,
embellished with every beauty which a heated imagination can bestow
on them. Inspired with such powerful motives, it is no wonder the
Arabs performed such wonderful atchievements.
The rewards proposed by the Christian religion are vague, inde-
termined, and incomprehensible, no way analogous to the wants and
situation of a human being: the general tenor of it is peace and sub-
mission, and therefore extremely well adapted to promote the designs

of tyranny and despotism in whomsoever power is lodged.
The Christians take not arms, like the Mahometans, to propagate
their dogma which prohibits it.
The ambition of the clergy has, however, covered the earth with
blood and slaughter; violated rights, oppression real or supposed,
were the pretext, but generally ambition was the true cause. Whenever
religion is made a motive of war, the effects are more vigorous and
decisive, than when it proceeds from other causes.
Eternal pains and pleasures are motives which act more forcibly
than any other derived from human and transitory origin. These
wars are generally cruel, and every means to destroy the enemy are
esteemed lawful; hence treachery, assassinations, breach of faith, &c.
are common in such wars. They fight for the honour of the Divinity;
to murder his enemies is a grateful sacrifice: against men animated
by religious enthusiasm, much caution is required, particularly against
the attempts of individuals; avoid the first impulse, victors or van-
quished, trust them not.
Ignorance, the only foundation of clerical power and influence, is
greatly diminished in Europe, and a spirit of toleration prevails. If
the people are suffered to enjoy their opinions in peace, they will
no longer be made the tools of the ambitious and intriguing clergy,
to disturb and subvert the state. The clerical order, in most reli-
gions, is very dangerous, and must be watched with a vigilant eye;
unless he is totally subordinate to the civil power, he will disturb
and usurp it if he can; he must be strictly confined to the exercise
of his pastoral functions, and never suffered to interfere in public
affairs.
Chapter VII. Of Women, and their Influence on the Human Heart
The origin and foundation of that attachment, which the two sexes
fell for each other, is without doubt in our animal wants, and if
confined to this alone, would upon gratification, as in other animals,
be immediately dissolved; but our social wants cement that union
by habit, and in proportion as they can, will aid and support each
other. It is observable, that this reciprocal attachment and friend-
ship are much stronger in the lower and middling classes of society,
than in the more elevated. The first by their situation are, in a great
measure, precluded from the pleasures and amusements derived from

general society, being chiefly employed in procuring the necessities
of life; confined within a domestic circle, it is there alone they must
find content and happiness. They stand in need of each other con-
tinually for the support and pleasure of life; habit confirms the union,
friendship, calm and peaceable friendship, succeeds that tumultuous
and transitory passion called love.
People of high rank, are much less attached to each other, because
they stand less in need of each other; so that when their sensual
wants are gratified, they do not feel that mutual dependence, which
is the only chain by which man and woman, as well as society in
general, are tied and linked together; hence it follows, that they recur
to foreign aid (if I may so call it) for pleasure; the domestic chain
is broke, a general dissipation and reciprocal coolness ensue, and
nothing but the appearance of an union between man and wife sub-
sists. The great have such a facility in obtaining the objects of their
wishes, that they anticipate pleasure, and by that means debilitate,
and finally destroy the powers of enjoyment, which reduces them to
a state of apathy and insensibility; hence that ennui and melancholy
is the cause and origin of suicide.
There are two periods in a man’s life, in which the influence of
women is great and almost irresistible; youth and old age: in the
former our sensual wants, and the passion arising from them, make
the gratification of them a physical necessity, which, like other pas-
sions, increase in proportion to the obstacles we meet with, so that
it may produce rage, fury, and madness.
The passion of love, that is, the desire of enjoying a particular
woman, arises from the difficulty of obtaining her; would she instantly
comply and gratify our wishes, our attachment would cease, unless
by her art in managing our other passions, she can substitute social
wants, which never die, to those extinguished by a too easy gratification.
Men advanced in years are thrust out of general society, which
obliges them to live within the compass of a narrow circle of acquain-
tance, much at home, man is in continual want of support to prop
him up like an old tree. In these circumstances, his wife, or some
other favourite, has a powerful influence over him, and directs all
his measures. The result of all this is, that if women lived more
retired, their influence would increase in proportion, as they keep
men at a distance, as we see in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, &c.
Our manners in Europe are incompatible with the power which
women might enjoy in the state; could they be made the recom-
pense of honourable actions, we should see great exertions to deserve
their esteem and favour.
Chapter VIII. Of Music
The power of music, over the heart, is very great and might there-
fore be made use of to raise or calm the passions. It were to be
wished some able musician and philosopher would make experiments,
by executing different pieces, to a promiscuous audience of men and
women of different ages, soldiers in particular; the result would shew
what species of harmony was most adapted to raise courage in the
troops. I would recommend this to Mr. Harris5 of Salisbury, whose
abilities and penetration are known and esteemed by all: a treatise,
the philosophy of music, would be a new and important work wor-
thy of his pen.
5
Possibly referring to James Harris (1709–80), politician, esteemed classical scholar
and music enthusiast. By the time of publication, however, he had died.
PART THE THIRD
THE POLICY OF WAR:

OF THE ANALOGY BETWEEN MILITARY OPERATIONS
AND THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT
Chapter I. Of the Connection between the Different Species of

Governments and Military Operations
As our armies are armed and disciplined in the same manner, it is

natural to conclude, that the final success of a war depends intirely
on the goodness of the troops, and the abilities of the commanders.
Though this may be true in general, there are, I think, other causes
which must concur with those above-mentioned; for, in the history
of various wars, I find that some very extensive and apparently pow-
erful empires have been easily subdued; whereas other inconsider-
able states have made an incredible, and often successful resistance.
When I consider the wars carried on by the Persians in Greece,
with those of Alexander the Great in Asia, between the Romans and
Carthaginians, those of the Tartars in China and other parts of Asia,
those of the Mahometans in Asia and Europe, I perceive a prodi-
gious difference in the duration and final success of them; from
whence I infer, that the difference of government contributed as
much towards it, as the goodness of the troops, or the genius of the
commanders.
We must investigate the reason, why in such circumstances, and
against such an enemy, a victory or two have been followed by the
conquest of an empire, whereas twenty obtained against a much
weaker in appearance, have produced no decisive advantage. For
want of examining this subject, we consider all enemies as perfectly
alike, we have but one mode of acting, though surely there is an
essential difference, both in theory and practice, between despotic,
monarchic, and republican governments, which operates continually
on every branch of administration, civil and military; it will there-
fore be highly necessary to shew, that this difference ought to be
considered as a principal circumstance in forming a plan of war,
because on weighing it maturely, we shall find it to be the main
part the third. the policy of war 459
spring of military operations, and that, as this is strong or weak,

active and rapid, slow and languid, so will finally be the results of
them.
Chapter II. Of Despotic Governments
It is by no means easy to define the meaning of words, and with-

out exact definitions, our reasonings will be vague and unconclusive.
Montesquieu defines this species of government, ‘a government by
caprice,’ as if the edict of the monarch, a plebisite, or an act of par-
liament might not equally be the effect of caprice, as an order of
the sultan. This definition, like many others of the same author,
signifies nothing.
The sovereign power, whether placed in one or more persons, is
by its nature arbitrary and absolute; the mode in which it is exer-
cised varies, which gives a peculiar character to each government.
This difference in the mode of administering the sovereign power
arises, first, from the different manner by which it was acquired, and
must be analogous to it, varied more or less, according to the phys-
ical and political mode of existence of the subjects.
Dominion is acquired sometimes by dispossessing the sovereign
only; the conqueror assumes his place, the people submit, and the
conquest is complete. This always happens in despotic governments,
where the whole power of the state, or rather, I may say, the state
itself, is centered in the person of the sovereign: when he is destroyed,
the war is finished; for there is in the power of no other man, or
body of men, a right, or a sufficient power to collect new forces
capable of making the least resistance. Submission is the common
lot of all. In such circumstances there can be but two classes of men,
the one slaves, and the other armed, composed of the conquerors,
comparatively less numerous.
The country can be no otherwise kept in subjection, than by dis-
tributing the troops in the different provinces, whose first object is
to destroy whatever may give suspicion of a revolt, the next is to
raise tributes. The manner of putting these instructions in practice,
must necessarily be arbitrary, and depend totally upon the will of
the Pacha, in whom, like the Roman proconsuls, in conquered
provinces, all power, civil and military, is vested. The people pos-
sessing nothing by any species of right, there is no room for laws,
or any tribunals to interpret them; the will of the governor is the

law, from whose decision there is no appeal, for this supposes rights,
laws, tribunals, &c.
The different provinces, are not in Asia, as in European govern-
ments, united to the throne by the ties of general laws and mutual
obligation, which form a common center, to which all tends, and a
general system of union and intercourse between the different parts
ensues, which makes what is called a Nation. It is not a society polit-
ical or civil, but a simple aggregation of individuals, like a flock of
sheep, whose existence depends on the will of the Pacha or gover-
nor. Hence it is, that the despot does not himself, and by general
laws, govern his dominions, nor do the different provinces form one
political empire, but so many tributary provinces, whose chiefs, under
different characters, govern them with an absolute sway, on con-
dition of keeping them in subjection, and paying yearly a certain
tribute.
The situation of the Pacha being precarious, he has no interest
in the welfare of the subject, his administration tends only to enrich
himself, that he may secure an interest at court, which often pro-
duces a contrary effect; he is sacrificed to appease those whom he
has plundered; his treasures are his real crime.
From conquests arose every where a kind of fœdal system: hence
the nabobs1 in India, the timariots2 in Turkey, and barons, counts, &c.
in Europe, among whom the conquered lands were distributed on
different conditions; at first at the pleasure of the prince only, as now
in Turkey, but in other parts, as in Germany, and the rest of Europe,
they became hereditary; we make acquisitions, but no conquests.
In making, as well as in securing conquests, it is evident that the
whole force of the state is placed in the military, which, indeed, is
the only class of men, united by some general rules, whose object
can be no other than military discipline and subordination.
In time of war the soldiery is kept in order by the fear of the
enemy, and the hopes of plunder, induced to obey, and execute the
commands of his superiors unreluctantly; but when the conquest is
made, and the country totally subdued, no longer awed by the pres-
ence of an enemy, nor kept together by any sense of danger, he
1
Nawabs were provincial governors.
2
Soldiers raised from the non-hereditary, feudatory grants called timars.
feels himself the master, both of the enslaved people, and of his sov-
ereign, grows slothful, insolent, and formidable to both. An attempt
to inforce order and discipline is followed by a mutiny; the com-
mander’s head must be taken off to appease it. That once formi-
dable and victorious army is now degenerated into a tumultuous
rabble. The sultan is indeed perfectly secure against the subjects, but
exposed to much greater danger, which continually threatens him
from his own troops.
The governors of the distant provinces, cannot by force, be kept
in due subordination, and from fear of punishment, which they know
they deserve, are often tempted to revolt. In this case, the sultan is
obliged to dissemble, and recur to assassination, or oppose a suc-
cessor; he dares not march in person at the head of his guards to
quell a revolt, being equally afraid of an armed force, wherever
assembled, and by whomsoever it is commanded.
To preserve the tranquillity of the state, and keep danger far from
the seraglio, is in this government a maxim of state; for this pur-
pose, the troops are dispersed in small bodies over the empire; so
that there is no where any considerable force, excepting in the cap-
ital, who, feeling themselves the masters, are dangerous to the prince
and his ministers, and intirely corrupted by sloth and indolence.
An army cannot acquire strength, discipline, and subordination,
unless the troops are kept together in time of peace, continually exer-
cised in the garrisons and in the field, and often engaged in actual
war; all which is incompatible with the principles of a despotic gov-
ernment. All armies degenerate by a long peace, and chiefly those
of a despot. Dispersed, as they are, over an immense country, it is
with great difficulty they are collected together and brought into the
field, which is always very late, and never until the corn is grown,
to feed their numerous cavalry. For the same reason they cannot
continue long in any given spot, and the campaign lasts only a few
months; they must retire for want of provisions.
The greatest part of the Turkish army, like our ancient militia,
serve only for a certain time, when this is elapsed, they go home,
and abandon the posts confided to them, whether they are relieved
by other troops or not, which happened at Georgowa and Ibrailow,
on the Danube, a few days after they had repulsed the Russians
with very considerable loss. Unaccustomed to the discipline and sub-
ordination of a regular army, they do not act on a constant and
regular plan; they march, camp, and fight in a loose and disorderly
manner, insomuch, that if attacked briskly, they can never form, so

as to make any tolerable resistance.
Chance, the caprice of a Pacha, or of a few men who advance
to skirmish, very often bring on a general engagement, or rather a
multiplicity of partial actions, without any unity of object or design.
In their attacks, from ignorance and the irregularity with which they
are made, totally unconnected with each other, they are the more
violent and impetuous, and extremely dangerous, if not opposed with
vigour and firmness. The defeat of this or that body does not, as
with us, prevent the others from advancing and breaking your line
if they can; and if they succeed in one or two points, the great num-
ber of horse, who act singly, gives them a prodigious activity. They
over-run and spread themselves over the whole country; no ground
is impervious to them; so that an army, once broke, can scarcely
avoid a general destruction, unless favoured in its retreat by some
particular circumstances, and an uncommon firmness and conduct
of the general. For these reasons such troops are formidable and
dangerous in their assaults; but weak, when attacked, and easily
thrown into confusion, broke, and totally dissipated if pursued with
vigour, but with great order and caution; for sometimes strong par-
ties will stop short, and if they perceive you are in disorder, will
attack you with impetuosity, and often with success.
The Asiatic troops generally carry into the field all they possess,
which greatly embarrasses them, and in case of defeat, makes their
loss irretrievable; for not being able to make any kind of disposition
for a retreat, camp, artillery, equipage, &c. is abandoned to the vic-
tors, and all without exception seek their safety in flight; a great part
goes home and returns no more. At present, that enthusiasm, which
rendered them for the most part victorious, is totally extinguished;
plunder is now the only motive which spurs them to action; if suc-
cessful, they are extremely formidable; if otherwise, they despond,
and can with difficulty, and generally not at all, be brought a sec-
ond time to face the enemy. A defeat, for the most part, is followed
by the disgrace and banishment or death of the Vizir, to appease
the troops who cannot be punished, and must not be supposed guilty.
A new general, a new army, much worse than the former, is col-
lected with difficulty, and brought into the field very late in the sea-
son. This, intimidated by the defeat of the former, scarce can be
induced to approach the enemy, and far from attacking or oppos-
ing him with vigour, retires, or rather flies as he advances, aban-
doning one post after another, and finally the whole province; so
that you have nothing to do but march to the capital, which you
will certainly find deserted.
The Sultan, corrupted by ignorance, flattery, and a false opinion
of his greatness and power, is terrified at your approach, intimidated
by the clamours of the rabble and a mutinous army, has no other
resource for his personal safety, but in a precipitate flight. The instant
the despot disappears, resistance is at an end; as the whole force of
the state is placed in the army. This being defeated, if pursued with
vigour, the conquest of the empire is rapid and complete, which
nothing can retard but want of provisions; these being secured, pro-
ceed with confidence and be assured of success.
In general, despotic empires are very extensive, from whence arise
two bad consequences: first, their frontiers must be weak, in pro-
portion to its extent. Secondly, That their armies come late into the
field, and being loaded with equipages, and moreover accompanied
by a crowd of followers under different denominations, subject to
no order or discipline. The country is soon exhausted, so that they
cannot keep the field above three months; if you can check their
operations in the beginning, they retire and leave you at liberty to
prosecute your plan without any opposition.
From ignorance, or rather from design, they have no strong places;
so that nothing can retard your operations but their army, or want
of subsistence, and that being defeated, and this subsistence pro-
vided, you meet with no other obstacles but such as arise from the
nature of the country. As these armies are very numerous, particu-
larly their cavalry, it is dangerous to act against them by detach-
ments, unless they are intimidated by a previous defeat, then indeed
it may be done with less danger, but never with success, and you
are prevented from acting vigorously in any part if you pretend to
act in many at the same time.
Romanzow [Rumiantsev] followed another plan, and lost many
detachments, and if the Turks had known any thing of war, his
whole army would have been destroyed separately. By this prepos-
terous mode of making war, it was protracted till the Russian empire
was intirely exhausted, insomuch, that the whole force, which could
be collected against the Turks in 1774, did not exceed 50,000 men,
though above 300,000 recruits had been raised during the course of
the war. When the peace was concluded, there was subsistence only
for six weeks. Poland was totally ruined.
In the winter previous to the last campaign, the author of this

work, then a general officer in the Russian service, had the honour
to present a plan for the ensuing campaign, to the empress, shew-
ing the necessity of passing the Danube, as the only means of obtain-
ing an honourable peace, which a battle or two at most would
procure.
The plan was adopted, and had the most complete success. Two
vigorous actions, the one conducted by lieutenant-general Kamenskoi,3
and his subsequent operations, and the other by the author of this
history, forced the Vizir to conclude a peace within a month from
the opening of the campaign; had not some political reasons, and
the interior disturbances raised by Pugacheff 4 interfered, the Russian
army might in a few weeks have been in possession of Constantinople.
The conclusion of what we have said is, that a defensive war can-
not be made with success against this species of troops, and conse-
quently you must always attack them with all your forces, guided
by prudence and caution, and supplied with provisions, success and
conquest will be your reward. In despotic governments resistance
diminishes as you approach the capital, where it vanishes intirely.
Chapter III. Of Monarchical Governments
Though in this species of government, as well as in those called

despotic, the whole power of the state, legislative and executive, are
united in one and the same person; yet they differ totally in the
mode of exercising the sovereign authority. This difference arises
from many causes.
First, From the different state of the conquered people; if these
are civilized, enjoy fixed and hereditary property, and of course are
governed by known and permanent laws, the civil government will
be in a great measure preserved, as in China, India, and England,
3
General Mikhail Kamenskii defeated the Ottomans under Reis Effende at
Kozludzhi (20 June 1774).
4
The Pugachev Revolt (1773–74) was the largest peasant uprising in Russia prior
to the Bolshevik Revolution. Led by Emel’ian Ivanovich Pugachev (1742–75), an
illiterate peasant soldier who claimed to be Peter III, the movement ravaged Russia
from the Volga to the Urals. It ended with his arrest and dismemberment in
Moscow.
in the conquest of which countries the sovereign was displaced rather

than the nations conquered; for in all of them property was fixed
in somebody, and the civil government more or less preserved. If
the subjects of a conquered country were slaves, they continue in
that state because the victors are more intent on securing their con-
quests, than in forming a code of laws.
Secondly, From the different condition of the conquerors, if these
were slaves and mercenaries, the new government will be military
and arbitrary; the chief will be considered as sole and universal pro-
prietor of the country and the people subdued; but if the victors
were a free people, a certain degree of freedom will prevail in the
government of the conquered country.
The northern people, who subdued the southern parts of Europe,
were an aggregate of free tribes, or small nations, each conducted
by its particular chief, subject in the field to one elective general.
When the conquest was made, the lands were divided among these
chiefs, and sub-divided by them among their followers; the van-
quished were made slaves. The victors preserved their ancient rights
and liberties, exercised every species of jurisdiction within their respec-
tive domains.
The king had scarce any authority over the lords, nor could any
public measure be adopted without the consent of parliament. The
king, like them, lived on the revenues of his private patrimony; for
it seems there was not then, as now, a constant and public revenue;
wherever the property is fixed and hereditary, civil liberty must sub-
sist, and be an insurmountable barrier to despotism, and, vice versa,
a military government will necessarily ensue, when property is
fluctuating, uncertain, and dependent on the will of any one per-
son. This is the true and only characteristic by which these different
species of governments are distinguished. In the first case, the sov-
ereign authority is administered by known and general laws. In the
other there can be none; and every operation of government is par-
ticularly isolated, and adapted to a given circumstance, without
antecedent, or consequent, in the same manner as in the conduct
of an army in the field.
The clergy, by their great possessions, and their influence over the
people, became very powerful and formidable, when their religion
was embraced by the conquerors. As they alone possessed the little
learning then known, they were placed every where at the head of
affairs.
The Roman law was introduced into all courts of justice, and it
may be truly said, that the popes were the universal legislators of
the christian world. Having acquired fiefs, the heads of the clergy
of course had seats in the national assemblies, like the temporal lords,
and exercised the same jurisdictions within their domains.
As all the landed property was in the lords and their followers, it
is evident that the government was an aristocracy, like that of Poland,
where the king is nothing, and the people in general are slaves; so
far from encroaching on the rights of others, the king could not pre-
serve his own, but by opposing parties to parties, and fomenting the
quarrels then very frequent among the great, because the executive
power was too weak to controul them.5
It is easy to perceive, that the military art was then at a very low
ebb: in this anarchy Europe remained for some centuries; at length
industry produced a new order of men; the people became free,
acquired riches, privileges, and power; towns were incorporated, and
shared in the legislative power; a system of rights was established;
the influence of the crown increased with that of the people, while
that of the lords was diminished and reduced within proper bounds;
violence and disorder vanished, a certain degree of vigour in the
administration of affairs prevailed, which of course produced peace
and tranquility in the state.
Such a distribution of the sovereign power in king, lords, and
commons, seems the most perfect of any which human wisdom can
invent, provided they are kept separate and independent of each
other; whereas nothing could be more absurd and inconsistent with
the happiness of mankind, than the fœdal [feudal] system, which
supposes the slavery of the greatest part, and where the violence and
oppression of the few could not be checked, punished, or controlled.
The happy system of government above-mentioned continued for
some centuries throughout all Europe; a just distribution of power
secured political and civil liberty to all in some degree. At length,
however, the king, in whom the executive power was lodged, by
time and perseverance, destroyed in most states the fœdal and hered-
itary jurisdictions; by keeping standing armies, introducing pomp,
5
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century had en elec-
tive monarchy. The Sejm, or parliament, controlled the government but its pro-
ceedings could be nullified by any single representative: the so-called liberum veto.
parade, and expence, he reduced the nobility to want and a total

dependence on the crown; what would never have been executed
by force, was imperceptibly and peaceably done by luxury alone;
neither nobles nor burghers participated any longer of the legisla-
tive power, they retained their civil rights and some personal privi-
leges, ad honorem only; so that the whole power of the state, legislative
and executive, was made hereditary in one family, and of course
political liberty vanished.
Thus a free government, the most perfect of any that ever sub-
sisted, was destroyed, and that of one man substituted in its room,
which must generally happen, “because the executive power acts
constantly and systematically against the legislative, and being in pos-
session of the forces and revenues of the state, will, by force or seduc-
tion, reduce it to dependence and servitude, which is proved by the
history of all republics.”
Though the monarch possesses all the powers of the state, like the
sultan, yet he cannot exercise them in the same manner; for in
monarchies the subjects enjoy the same civil rights, privileges, and
immunities, which they possessed while the government was free,
excepting those by which they partook of the sovereign power: hence
it is, that the different mode of acquiring the sovereign power, and
the different situation of the people in Europe and Asia, necessarily
oblige the monarch to exercise his powers by general laws; whereas
the despot must act occasionally as circumstances require, that is, in
a military manner.
While the fœdal system prevailed, and even for some time after,
the third state, or the burghers, participated of the legislative power.
The militia was connected with the state, but raised and armed only
at certain times when thought necessary. The revenue of the crown
was not sufficient to maintain an army constantly, nor did the nature
of that kind of government admit it. The crown or executive power,
which in every government is inimical to liberty, pretended to find
that the militia was ineffectual to defend the state; every method was
used to abolish it, and substitute a standing army in its room, which
should depend intirely on the will of the king.
This scheme succeeded, and from that moment political liberty
vanished, and civil liberty became often precarious. The army as
such, is no longer a class in the state, but a mere instrument of
power in the hands of the crown, and the more dangerous when
composed of men without birth or fortune, because they depend
more intirely on the will of their leader. It is now formed of two

species of men, the highest and lowest in the state.
The nobility deprived of that consequence, which they enjoyed by
the fœdal system, very naturally resumed the profession of their fore-
fathers and took to arms; they retained many of their ancient priv-
ileges, and by attaching themselves to the sovereign, acquired new
honours, employments, and riches; he alone was therefore consid-
ered as the fountain of all advantages which could be acquired in
the state.
The manners of a court naturally produce great expences, which
render those connected with it totally subservient to the will of the
prince.
The nobility and gentry form the first class in this species of gov-
ernment, and are immediately connected with the monarch.
The class of the law derives its importance from the laws, and is
therefore attached to their due execution in opposition to government,
who always considers them as an obstacle to arbitrary administra-
tion: whenever this class of men are reduced to few, easily intimi-
dated or corrupted, a civil tyranny (the most barbarous of all tyrannies)
will ensue, as in Rome during the government of the Cæsars.
The other classes of the state look up to this as the only protec-
tor of their rights and liberties; individuals may be seduced, but this
whole body cannot be so for any considerable time; it is against its
interest, because it would be destroying the source of their existence
and importance.
Though in monarchies the armies are mere mercenaries, yet will
they concur to enforce arbitrary power only to a certain length,
because the greatest part of the officers, chosen from the nobility
and gentry, enjoys privileges which give them consequence inde-
pendent of the prince, and unite them in some degree to the state;
these are perpetual and hereditary, whereas the advantages they
derive from the prince are temporary and personal, and when put
in opposition to each other, they first prevail, particularly if any
attack is made, which affects the body of the nobility and gentry.
These circumstances, we conceive, prevent a monarchy armed
with a numerous band of mercenaries from degenerating into a mil-
itary and despotic government, which always happens in those states,
where the soldier is unconnected with the state, and intirely depen-
dent on the monarch.
In the preceding chapter, we have shewn, that a mercenary army
is equally fatal to the nation and to the sovereign; it is therefore sur-

prizing princes should be so desirous to establish an arbitrary and
military government.
When we consider, that all power is centered in the monarch
alone, one would conclude, that he should act with more vigour
than is usually seen.
The administration of all civilized governments, where the people
are divided into various classes, and enjoy certain privileges, will be
found intirely republican, being divided into many separate depart-
ments, and the mode of administering the provinces various, there
cannot be that unity and energy as in despotic governments, the
wheels of this complicated machine are necessarily clogged, and with
difficulty can be brought to act together uniformly and vigorously.
The different departments have not an equal share of activity; inter-
est, ignorance, and intrigue interfere, so that the whole moves more
slowly than could naturally be expected from this kind of govern-
ment; for which reason, military operations, whose essence is celer-
ity and vigour, are not attended with the same success as in despotic
governments, unless the sovereign is an able man, and leads his
armies in person. In this case, they are nearly equal in vigour, and
much more consistent than in any other species of government.
The sovereign and his officers are, however, chained to the empire;
they have a home, where they expect the reward of their actions
and enjoyment of life. Hence it is, that after a few months cam-
paign, they continually look back, and with impatience wait the
happy moment to retire; there is nothing so arduous but the troops
will execute, provided it leads to a conclusion. The want of success
and long wars disgust them intirely, a general ill-will, murmurs, and
want of subordinations ensue.
Such armies, therefore, are not calculated for extensive conquests,
they grow tired and want perseverance. In this, however, they resem-
ble those of despotic governments, they are very violent and rapid
in their motions at the beginning of a war, and therefore must be
opposed with much caution; they grow languid more and more in
the prosecution of it, wear out, and are easily subdued by a more
firm and patient adversary. In other respects they are like republi-
can armies, much resistance is to be expected, as you advance into
the country, because there is no man, or any class of men, who does
not feel that the preservation of the state is closely connected with
his own.
To men accustomed to a particular mode of government to one

family, a similarity of religion, manners, &c. and enjoying civil lib-
erties, the idea of being subdued, and dependent on the arbitrary
will of a conqueror is terrible, and generally excites them to per-
form extraordinary exertions. However, it is generally true, that in
monarchies the nobility and great men fill the court with intrigues,
where men of merit and probity have seldom the advantage, which
greatly weakens the operations of monarchs.
There is as little unity here as in democracies; a great sense of
danger only can calm the storm, which agitates the state, and make
room for the able pilot; but no sooner does the tempest subside,
than he is removed and replaced by some insignificant favourite; so
that this government, which should be possessed of great vigour from
its principle of unity, is in fact weak and fluctuating, as the charac-
ters of the favourites, which rapidly succeed to each other, differ.
Their wars, when carried into distant countries, are without plan or
vigour; parry only the first impetuosity, their efforts will successively
diminish, and at length vanish intirely.
Chapter IV. Of Republican Governments
From what we have said of the military state, it appears that repub-
lican governments are not in general analogous to it, particular cir-
cumstances may however give them the activity required to operate
with vigour abroad and at home; if pressed they seldom want it.
In democracy there can be no standing army, nor mercenaries,
such power lodged in the hands of one man, which we think essen-
tial for the command of troops, is incompatible with the safety of
the state; the military force must be formed out of a militia of cit-
izens, who from their situations cannot act far from their country,
nor for any considerable time. An offensive war is, therefore, con-
trary to the principle of existence of a democracy; even a defensive
war, unless the dominions are extensive, would soon exhaust the
state, because the taking great numbers from their daily labours
would soon reduce them for want of subsistence.
The wars of such a people are generally of short duration, and
confined to an excursion of a month or two, which may be repeated
for many years, as in the Peloponnesian war, a great battle, which
seldom occurs, puts an end to the contest, if the dominions are much
contracted, which was the case in Greece and in Italy; during the
first five hundred years of Rome, we read often of a war being
finished in a very few days.
From what we have said, it appears, that a republican govern-
ment is by no means calculated for long and distant wars; the main
spring is too complicated to produce that vigour, unity, and perse-
verance required to conduct military operations; accordingly we find
that such enterprizes have been generally fatal. But as every citizen
considers himself as closely united to the state, they concur heartily
in its defence, and always exert themselves in proportion as they are
pressed, and dispute the last inch of ground with more vigour than
the preceding. The idea and advantage of liberty recur in their full
force, and very often excite an ardour and enthusiasm not to be
overcome, which is verified by a thousand examples; a democracy,
therefore, is of all others best calculated for a defensive and the least
for an offensive war. Particular circumstances, and for the most part
local, determine and stamp a character on each republic, according
to its mode of existence.
Carthage, situated on a barren shore, confined on the land side
by various and powerful nations, was necessarily forced, like the
Dutch in our own times, to turn their thoughts to industry, com-
merce, and navigation, which led them by degrees to explore, and
then to conquer, or acquire settlements in Spain, Portugal, Sardinia,
Minorca, &c. which often involved that republic in wars, which could
not be carried on at such a distance without standing armies, the
people almost wholly employed in arts and trade could not compose
those armies, which in time became a checkered multitude of mer-
cenaries and allies, of various nations, which wanted unity, on which
chiefly the force of armies depends: they were, however, sufficient
against the different people they contended with, particularly when
their operations were confined to the islands and the coast, because
their fleets could co-operate with success, and had they carried their
views no farther, they might probably have existed many ages longer;
but long and distant wars, supported only by money and merce-
naries, brought on necessarily their distress and final destruction.
The power of a republican government being very complicated,
loses its force in proportion as it is extended, like the spring of a
watch, and acquires vigour as it is compressed; moreover, distant
and military commands require and assume greater powers than are
compatible with the safety of the state: hence those eternal jealousies
and intrigues against their commanders, which always weaken his

operations, and often render his victories useless, because in fact they
might become dangerous.
It is easy to see, that confederate republics being more compli-
cated, are still less proper for war, either offensive or defensive; their
total want of unity, or rather total separation of views and interests,
render their resolutions slow, and their operations languid; insomuch,
that is any member of the confederacy is pressed or subdued, he
seeks his safety in submission, rather than expect the support of his
confederates.
Switzerland, aided by the nature of the country, and by a good
militia, formed in the arts of war at the expence of European princes,
is an exception to this rule, and, I am persuaded, would make suc-
cessful efforts against any invader.6
Such being the mode of existence of a confederate republic, I am
surprized Rousseau should think it possible to give it a force and
energy equal to that of the most powerful state.7 If many, or all, are
placed in a country accessible at all, by occupying any post, you will
cut off the communication between them, and prevent them from
ever uniting their forces, and by pressing one member alone soon
break the confederacy, which is proved by the examples of the sev-
eral Grecian confederacies.
The resistance and final success of Lewis the Fourteenth arose
from the nature of his enemies, the defection of a principal ally ren-
dered ten successful campaigns fruitless, in the war 1740. The lan-
guor and fear of the Dutch, the nature of a confederate army,
opposed to a monarchical one, independent of the difference of abil-
ity in the commanders, gave that war the issue it had.
The superior talents of a chief may give force and unity to an
army composed of troops of various nations, as Hannibal did; but
nothing can for a considerable time, particularly if unsuccessful, give
it to a confederate army, when the numbers of the confederacy are
nearly upon an equality.
6
The Cantons created the Confederation by constant warfare with their titular
Imperial overlords in the 14th century. Peasant soldiers wielding halberds and pikes,
proved more than a match for the armor-clad knighthhood of Austria at the bat-
tles of Morgarten (1315), Laupen (1339) and Sempach (1386).
7
See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contract social, ou, Principes du droit politique (Amster-
dam, 1762).
The views of the different parties seldom coincide in the various

points, which occur in a long and extensive war; when opposed to
such an army, temporize, use insinuations and seductions; some one
or other of the parties will grow tired and fall under the tempta-
tion, or attack vigorously the dominions of one of the members; this
will create a powerful division, and probably bring on his defection,
which will soon break the confederacy.
It is dangerous to oppose such an army in front the first cam-
paign; emulation and hopes of success give them vigour; it were
expedient to anticipate their union by occupying some capital post,
and prevent them from joining at all, which is easily done, as the
motions of such troops are generally very slow, and recruits, stores,
&c. brought from different places, and often from a great distance.
Rome in its infancy, surrounded by many different people, was
placed in that critical situation, where it was necessary to perish or
conquer. It happened, as it generally does with men thus situated,
they conquered successively all their adversaries; they acquired by
the sword, and must preserve their acquisitions by the sword.
This celebrated people, if placed at the mouth of the Tiber, thirty
miles from the spot they occupied, would have become fishermen
at first, and perhaps a small commercial republic, and disappeared;
but place where it was, their existence depended on the sword alone.
After the expulsion of their kings it became a democracy, and
every citizen was bred and trained a soldier; it was the only trade;
the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief
occupation was war, which continued without intermission for near
five hundred years, attacking or attacked; scarce a year passed with-
out some military operation.
Necessity first made that republic purely military, their particular
form of government rendered it so afterwards; the right was in the
people, but the power really in the senate; the continual abuse of it
occasioned those disputes and contentions which disturbed the tran-
quillity of the state, and more than once brought it on the brink of
destruction.
The senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people,
became daily more wanton in their oppressions; to secure their
usurpations the most proper method was, to engage the people in
continual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance.
This was a temporary remedy, but in the end proved fatal to the
republic; for the force of the people was great, and wanted only a
head to direct it, which, sooner or later, must be found. Marius and
Cæsar, or any leader with superior talents and ambition, must, aided
by such forces, easily overcome the senate, whose power was founded
in opinion, art, and cunning only.
A people thus constituted, trained in the practice of war during
the space of six hundred years, must acquire a degree of art and
address infinitely superior to that of other nations, who made war
only occasionally. The necessity of a vigorous discipline and subor-
dination must appear evident; from being always in the presence of
the enemy, it became a habit, and continual exercise made every
operation of war familiar and easy. To their superior knowledge
were added superior motives to exert their talents. Victory was a
means which led to pecuniary advantages, to a pre-eminence and
advancement in the state.
The virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the
citizen, no human reward was refused to great military merit. With
that knowledge the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can
excite a man to a vigorous exertion of his forces; such a people must
necessarily become finally superior to every other people placed in
different circumstances.
This difference alone rendered Rome a military republic superior
to Carthage, a commercial one. The first species of republics must
probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the last by those of a foreigner.
Chapter V. Of an Aristocracy
This species of republics, whose authority is supported by opinion,

rather than force, is obliged to adopt many of the maxims of despo-
tism, particularly if confined within narrow limits. Jealous and suspici-
ous, private executions are employed oftener than public. They fear
each other, the people if numerous, and likewise their neighbours.
The command cannot with safety be committed to the care of an
eminent citizen, nor even to a stranger of superior abilities; he must
be watched and environed with spies as well in peace as in war.
The necessary powers to conduct an army with vigour, and enforce
discipline and subordination, cannot be granted him, both himself
and the troops must be kept low in the opinion of the public. Hence
it is that such troops do not deserve the name of soldiers, being cal-
culated only for show and parade, are totally incapable of action.
However, if the people have been governed with moderation and
wisdom, they may be induced to exert themselves strenuously in the
cause of their masters, and more than once have shewn uncommon
vigour, when the republic has been threatened with great and immi-
nent danger.
Wars in general, and particularly those carried on at a distance,
conquests, &c. are incompatible with an aristocratical republic. In
this sort of government the people must be caressed, protected, and
treated with humanity and an equal distribution of justice, the nobles
awed by fear, and the neighbouring powers kept friendly by policy:
to these maxims the ancient and most illustrious republic of Venice
owes its glory and duration.
Mixed and limited monarchies are in fact republics, must be gov-
erned on the same principles; as the executive power is here much
more uniform, simple, and strong, so the state has more vigour
abroad and less convulsions at home. Sooner or later the equilib-
rium is lost, and the balance intirely on the side of the executive
power, which, contrary to the opinion of Montesquieu, ought for
ever to be separated from, and dependent on the legislative power,
and in no case whatever be made part of it; that is to say, the same
person or persons entrusted with the executive power must not be
likewise a part of the legislative, otherwise it will finally become an
absolute monarchy.
All general assemblies centre finally in few, and perhaps in one
person. The army is commonly mercenary, and totally dependent
on the chief magistrate; yet the complicated principles of the gov-
ernment puts the executive power often in opposition to the leg-
islative; so that the measures of the former, however wise and just,
are thwarted, and the operations clogged with so many restrictions,
that it wants the necessary vigour to prosecute a war with success,
particularly in the beginning. A common and pressing danger, how-
ever, gives them unity and consistency, so that, contrary to what
happens in despotic and military governments, more vigour appears
in the prosecution of a war than in its beginning. When by great
successes it draws towards a conclusion, new intrigues, factions, and
disputes arise, the principle of action subsides, every body grows
tired, and peace at any rate, even a bad one, must be had.
Chapter VI. Of Civil Wars
While the fœdal system prevailed in Europe, it was almost a con-

tinual scene of civil wars, discord, and contention; the great lords
were too powerful, and the crown too weak to preserve the peace
or restore it when disturbed. Within these two centuries industry has
raised a new order of subjects; the crown has continually increased
in strength.
The fœdal system and a national militia have disappeared, and a
regular army substituted in its room. The nobility, formerly the tyrant
of the vassal, and a terror to the prince, is now become the most
abject tool of unlimited prerogative, which can be checked and con-
troled by no one. The whole force of the state being centered in
the prince alone; his authority, thus supported, knows no limits but
his own discretion; it is therefore almost impossible there should be
any civil wars in Europe.
On the least appearance of an insurrection, troops may be instantly
dispatched to disperse and dissipate the few who have had the temer-
ity to assemble. The nobility having no longer any influence over
the people, and by excessive luxury reduced to a blind obedience
to the court, neither can nor will disturb or oppose its operations,
and the people in general dispersed, and without a chief, cannot be
united or brought to act on any regular plan of opposition.
Some transitory efforts and discontent may arise in great cities,
but on the appearance of a regular army must vanish. The rabble
acts for a moment only, there is no possible means of keeping them
together, or to direct them on a given plan: those who possess any
thing recur to the protection of the state, and are happy, if per-
mitted to enjoy what they have in peace.
Various circumstances may occasion a revolt, and render it dan-
gerous, when the motives are permanent and of great importance
to the whole community. Such as religion and liberty, men will unite
in the defence of both, and exert themselves in proportion to the
danger with which they are threatened. It is not a partial or tran-
sitory evil, but a general one, and the greatest of all calamities they
fear, and, therefore, while the least probability of a successful resis-
tance appears, they will to the last moment defend themselves, and
the more so, as a war carried on upon these principles leaves no
room for reconciliation.
There is no medium between eternal happiness and damnation,

a total submission or a total independence; the one or the other of
the parties must be intirely conquered. Notwithstanding such pow-
erful motives, it would be very difficult they should produce una-
nimity and come to a head, if in the beginning government acts
with vigour: on one side there are strength, authority, opinion, armies
ready collected and prepared for action; on the other a total want
of all these. It would therefore seem impossible that in such cir-
cumstances any rebellion should be formed at all, much less become
dangerous, unless neglected at first, particularly if the province is
contiguous and within reach of government, but when they are placed
at a very great distance, intercepted by the seas, or any very difficult
mountains, the people numerous, and animated by the motives above-
mentioned, they will have time to confer together, unite, form some
plan of government, and act upon some certain line. They are pre-
pared in some measure to oppose in any attack to be made on them;
the more extensive the country, the more easily defended, because
those who attack must act on one line only, whereas they who defend
themselves may oppose you on many.
There is scarce a point in the whole country, from whence sup-
plies of some kind may not be drawn, whereas the assailant can
draw it from one alone. These advantages are so very considerable,
that in the end, those possessed of them must finally prevail, if they
confine their views to a defensive war; unless you contract your line
of operation by a great and decisive victory (which gives you a
sufficient tract of country to subsist upon, that you may proceed
gradually to subdue the whole) no solid operations can be executed.
They will confined merely to fruitless excursions, and at the end of
every campaign you will find yourself less able to prosecute the war,
which grows languid, is neglected, and finally abandoned for want
of means to continue it, and the people are separated from you for
ever.
Such has been, and generally must be, the issue of wars prose-
cuted at a great distance, unless the first campaign gives you a deci-
sive superiority; it follows of course, that the success of such enterprizes
depends intirely on the vigour of your operations: if in the begin-
ning they are not decisive, they never will be so hereafter.
Victory, terror, and a general pardon may force the people to
submission, re-establish union and the public tranquillity. If the
people in general have not from personal motives revolted, but have
been excited by the ambition and authority of a few considerable
men, means may be found to sow dissension among them; a par-
don may then incline them to disperse.
From whatever motives the revolt proceeds, the authority of the
sovereign must be supported sword in hand. There can be no nego-
ciation between the sovereign and the subject; the first must never
speak in vain, nor the last resist with impunity, otherwise govern-
ment is at an end. With that caution then should the sovereign avoid
every measure which may possibly bring his authority in question,
when the contest must finish in the ruin of his subjects or himself.
It is a ground sown with difficulties and precipices, destruction is
unavoidable; all other wars leave some opening to a reconciliation
and peace; this none, it is inexpiable.
PART THE FOURTH
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR DEMONSTRATED
Chapter I. Of the Camp
To judge of a Camp, you must draw a line from one wing to another,
extending it a mile beyond them which will mark the front of it,
and shew you all its advantages and imperfections at one view, and
the points which command: any one of those being carried, forces
the enemy to retire, and insures the victory.
Secondly, You must draw three more lines, perpendicular to the
camp line above, toward both wings and the center, which gives you
the profile of the ground before the camp. The consideration of
these four lines will shew you what points you ought to attack, and
how, and with what species of troops.
Sometimes and army is not encamped on a right line, but forms
an irregular one, as in Plate IV, fig. 5. It is evident that the parts of
it which project must be attacked, because you can invelope them,
whereas if you leave them behind you, and advance against the
inward parts, the enemy invelopes you, and attacks one or both your
flanks. This rule is equally true, whether the line be natural or
artificial, as those of a fortress. The bastion must be attacked before
the curtain: the first being taken, the other parts cannot resist. The
same thing will happen in every species of irregular lines.
If on examining the four lines, which give the front and profile
of the enemy’s camp, you find it too strong, and you cannot force
him by any direct attack to abandon it, you must leave him there,
and place yourself on the one or the other of his flanks, as in Plate
IV, fig. 6 and extend your line, so that it may act on his line of
communication, which will soon force him to change his position,
and fall back. The least delay or neglect on his part will enable you
to attack him with advantage, and, if you act with vigour, to defeat
him intirely, particularly if his other flank is posted on a river, a
morass, a precipice, &c. which is generally the case, to secure, if an
enemy post himself on the other wing, you cannot avoid a total
overthrow, if he attack you with vigour; wherefore, contrary to the
general opinion, I advise that your flanks may be secured by the

natural strength and disposition of them, which may be easily effected
rather than by such adventitious and dangerous methods.
If instead of acting on the enemy’s flanks and line of operation,
you advance in front against him, it is plain, that though you are
much superior to him, yet if the country is close and favourable to
him, you may not in a whole campaign have an opportunity to
attack him with advantage; and thus no action can in such cir-
cumstances be either general or decisive, which must ever be the
main object of a general who acts on the offensive, as that of him
on the defensive must be to avoid it. No solid and important oper-
ation can be executed while the enemy can keep the field; you must
therefore by a decisive victory, or by good manœuvres, force him
to retire, and give you room to act uncontrolled.
Chapter II. Of the March of an Army, and of the Front of the March
There is quackery in every thing. A quarter-master general is very

proud, if he can put in the Gazette that the army has marched in
a great number of columns, as if that was the result of his wisdom.
The number of columns on which an army marches, depends intirely
on the number of practicable roads.
In a populous and cultivated country there are many roads, because
there must necessarily be communications between the villages, towns,
&c. whereas in a close country, intersected by narrow passes, moun-
tains, ravins, valleys, torrents, rivers, woods, &c. there are few prac-
ticable roads, and those not very good, which of course oblige an
army to march in few columns.
If in such a country you pretend to march in many, the army
cannot easily be formed in order of battle in front, or on the flanks.
A vigilant enemy may oppose it in front, and prevent the forming,
while at the same time he attacks the columns on the flanks, retards
your march, and perhaps defeats your army intirely, which has fre-
quently happened. Much caution is required in making war in a
close country. In an open country you march in several columns,
see the enemy at a distance, and therefore have time to form your
line, and prepare for his reception.
In marching, as well as in every other operation, it is an axiom,
that you must perform them in the least time possible.
part the fourth. the principles of war demonstrated 481
Illustration 15. Plate IV (Figs. 1–10).

The purpose and direction of your march must determine the

mode and manner of executing it.
Supposing you are opposite the enemy, in a parallel line, as in
Plate IV, fig. 7.
It is evident, that the direction of your march must be either
towards him, from him, on one or other of your flanks, or in an
oblique direction, to place yourself on one or other of his flanks.
The mode in which your army is encamped, will facilitate the
execution of your march: I therefore recommend that represented
in Plate IV, fig. 6 which is that in which I would have you fight, for
the reasons assigned in the preceding chapter. Your march must be
always analogous to the mode in which you encamp and fight, and
be regulated by them.
The facility and celerity of the march depend on the mode of
forming columns.
First, The line is divided into so many columns as there are roads;
then by a demi-tour to the right or left, each column marches by
the road assigned to it.
The line being formed in three ranks, it follows, that the front of
each column has only three men in front, which renders the march
slow and difficult, in proportion to the length of the columns. A col-
umn of horse will, according to this method, occupy in marching
more than double the ground it does in order of battle, because the
length of a horse is more than double his breadth or thickness; for
which reasons, an army should never march in this manner, except-
ing in two cases only; that is, when you propose placing yourself on
the enemy’s flank, as in Plate IV, fig. 7 or that both enemies march
in parallel directions; because in whatever point of the march the
enemy approaches you, your army is in order of battle in a moment,
by making the front to the right or left, as the enemy stands. Your
march in this, as in every other case, must be covered by your light
troops, placed between you and the enemy, particularly towards that
flank of the enemy where you intend going, and the rear of your
march, that he may not attack either the head or rear of your
columns, both which are very weak, having no more than three men
each in front, and being as near as may be to each other. They are
all easily enveloped, even by a small body, and defeated. You can
never form a line in the front or rear of your march, capable of
making the least resistance.
Secondly, The second method of forming a column is, by divid-

ing the battalions into several parts, each consisting of eight or ten
men in front, more or less, as the roads permit. Then each division
wheels to the right or left, as in Plate IV, fig. 8 and marches off to
the roads assigned them, leaving an interval between each division.
This method is generally made use of by the Prussian; though
improper for all marches in whatever direction they are made. In a
review they do very well, because you can thereby discover the posi-
tion and march of the ranks.
A column formed in this manner with intervals, occupies the same
ground as in order of battle, so that nothing is got by it. After a
march of a few miles, the distances are lost; some will be found
greater, others lesser, than they ought to be; therefore it is impossi-
ble to restore the order of battle, if the enemy approaches either
flank: and if you intend to form the front, perpendicular to your
line of march, it is evident that operation requires equal time, what-
ever may be the front of your several divisions, because the distance
from the van to the rear will be the same, whether their fronts be
of three or thirty men, as the intervals between them are equal to
the front they occupy, when ranged in order of battle, in three ranks.
From whence it follows, that this method has no one advantage, and
is attended with many difficulties, both in marching and in forming
the line, and therefore must be entirely exploded.
Thirdly, The third method of forming the column of march is the
same as the second, viz. by divisions, wheeling to the right or left,
with this difference, that the several divisions close and leave no
interval between them, excepting very small ones, to distinguish the
battalions and regiments, as in Plate IV, fig. 9.
By this method it is plain, that if the front of each division is nine
or twelve men, the length of your column will be only the third or
the fourth part of what it will be if formed in the first or second
manner above-mentioned, though composed of an equal number of
men, and consequently requires only a third or fourth part of the
time to be restored and formed in order of battle; therefore I pre-
fer it to all others, excepting in the two cases above-mentioned, viz.
when you march on the enemy’s flank, or when both armies march
on parallel lines, and so near, that an attack on either side may be
intended, or possible, because in such circumstances it is necessary
that an army should in an instant be in order of battle.
Various methods may be adopted to form columns of march, that

is, supposing a battalion is divided in five or more parts, it is plain
that neither of them may be made the van of it, Plate IV, figs. 10,
11, 12.
M. Guibert,1 whose writings do him and his country honour, if I
remember well, proposes the divisions on the right and left should
march by the diagonals, those of the right before that of the cen-
ter, and those of the left behind it; because he supposes this the
shortest and most expeditious method of doing it, which is true only
in part; that is, it is shorter than if the right or left division was
made the head of the column, as in this case the other divisions
must march double the ground.
This method is subject to one very great inconvenience, both in
forming the column and in opening it. The division which forms
the head, marches before the front to take its place, covers it so
intirely, that no part of it can act if the enemy advances, which is
a capital fault, because every motion made near the enemy must be
supported by some corps in order of battle. Moreover, those differ-
ent motions, some forward and others backward, will easily produce
confusion.
The best methods I know is, either to order the division of the
center to advance briskly, and the other divisions to the right and
left, as in Plate IV, fig. 11 to march behind it alternately, or rather
from the right or left, which is the best of all.
When the columns come to the ground, where they are to per-
form the line, the head marches slowly, and the other divisions march
to the right and left alternately, or to the left in the second case, as
in Plate IV, fig. 12 to take up their ground, which is done with sim-
plicity and quickness.
Chapter III. Of the Line of Operations
When, like the Tartars, you enter an enemy’s country, with an inten-
tion only to ravage and plunder it, you must, like them, be mounted
1
Jacque Antoine Hippolyte, come de Guibert (1743–90). His Essai général tactique
(London, 1773) created the ordre mixte that called for infantry to maneuver in columns
on the battlefield but deploy in line to engage the enemy.
on light cavalry, enter at one part, sweep all before you, and retire
with your booty by another as fast as you can.
If this cruel and inhuman method of making war was adopted,
hundred thousand horsemen, so equipped, would in short time lay
all Europe waste, and cover it with desolation, in spite of your fine
armies, artillery, heavy squadrons, &c. because activity is every thin
in war, in which our armies are totally deficient, being chained to
some fortress where their depots are lodged, they cannot advance a
hundred miles, and are continually turning about in a narrow cir-
cle, of which the magazines are the center.
The Tartars neither have, nor want depots; by the rapidity of
their motions they must and do find every thing on the spot. But
when we penetrate, with our great and very heavy armies, into an
enemy’s country, it is with a view to conquer some provinces, for-
tresses, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to subsist upon, we
have fixed and determined points to lodge our stores and provisions,
from whence they are transported to the army, which must proceed
from those given points to other fixed and determined points in the
enemy’s country, if you carry on an offensive war; or from a given
point in your own, towards another on the frontiers, if you are on
the defensive.
The line which unites these points, on which every army must
act, is called The Line of Operation; and, of all those we have men-
tioned, is the most important. For on the good or bad choice of this
line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill chosen all
your successes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be found useless.
Let us illustrate this doctrine by an example; we will suppose an
army of forty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, besides those
required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers horses, &c.
which will amount to as many more. This army is at Exeter, and
proposes to advance to London, and has its magazines all at Exeter.
I have only thirty thousand men: I encamp as near Exeter as I can,
and by occupying advantageous posts, I will force him to employ a
fortnight in marching to Dorchester or Blandford; till then I oppose
the enemy in front with small parties only on his flanks, but when
he is arrived thirty or forty miles from Exeter, from which place
alone he draws his subsistence, instead of opposing him in front with
all my forces, I place ten thousand on his line of march, ten on his
left flank, and the remaining ten along his line of operation, which
goes from his camp to his depots at Exeter. The last will be distributed
in four or five corps along that line, and form a chain from one
end to the other, so that a single waggon cannot pass unobserved,
and consequently will be taken or attacked by some one or other
of these parties. A hundred men will destroy as many waggons by
dispersing the drivers, taking away or killing the horses, breaking the
carriages, &c. The enemy must, therefore, send a strong body of
troops, ten thousand men for example, to escort a great convoy. I
then make a motion to the right with my whole army; so that my
left comes across his left, my center and right go many miles beyond
it. In whatever manner the escort is distributed, as part in the front,
part in the center, and part in the rear of the convoy; I say, that
neither ten nor twenty thousand can preserve it; because these are
chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the station they
occupy; whereas my troops can engage and attack, how, when, and
where they please: they can attack and amuse the escorts in a pass
or a wood, which of course obliges the whole to stop, while two or
three thousand men, dispersed in small parties, attack the chain of
waggons from one end to the other. If they succeed in some places
only, the whole will be soon dispersed.
It would be adviseable to attack that part, which proceeds at the
head of the convoy, with the greatest part of your forces, if it goes
ten or twelve miles from the camp; because you may then cut it off
intirely, and the whole convoy and the remaining part of the escort,
unless the enemy falls back immediately to assist them, which is no
easy matter, as you have the center and left of your army on his
flank and rear in his retreat; and most certainly he will arrive too
late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our object.
If instead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as we
suppose, he is a hundred, at Salisbury, for example; I always sup-
pose that all his provisions, without exception, come from thence,
or from any where else, a hundred miles off. I say, that such an
enemy as we suppose, cannot remain a fortnight in that camp, though
the convoys meet with no other difficulty, but such as arise from
the length of the road, bad weather, accident, &c.&c.
It is impossible to collect and maintain a sufficient number of
horses, carriages, &c. to supply an army of fifty or sixty thousand
men, including those who follow the camp, with provisions, stores,
forage, &c. and to supply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their journey
to and from the camp: two hundred miles, we suppose, which can-
not be performed in less than twenty days. I am so convinced myself

of this, that if you place twenty thousand foot, and five thousand
horse, on any spot, so that they subsist only upon what is brought
from one given point, a hundred miles off, they must in a week go
and meet their convoy, disperse, or perish.
Now, if to these natural and insurmountable difficulties, you add
those which an able leader can create by acting on the principles
we have established above, it will appear evident, beyond contra-
diction, that no army, great or small, can act in a line of operation
of a hundred miles, provided you can keep the field; of course you
must avoid a general action.
The more the country is inclosed and intersected by woods, moun-
tains, rivers, passes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will meet
with: the more cross roads, the more advantageous for you; because
they enable you to act continually on his line of operation. In such
a country, you may in almost every spot lay snares for his parties,
even for his whole army, with success. Whoever weighs what we
have said, will be convinced that the ideas and fears of an invasion
were vain and absurd.
This reasoning, which arises from experience we are persuaded is
just, will shew why our efforts in America have not been crowned
with success; and why, though in every respect infinitely superior to
the Rebels, we have never been able to penetrate fifty miles into the
country, nor keep any one given point, though but twenty or thirty
miles within land. From all which we deduce the following conclusions.
First, That in the choice of your line of operation, when the nature
of the frontier you intend to attack, and the position of your depots,
leave you any choice, you must chuse the shortest and the least
difficult.
Secondly, That the direction be such that the enemy cannot act
on your flanks, and of course on your said line, which must hap-
pen if the provinces on the right or left of your march are in his
possession. The longer you proceed on such a series, the more cer-
tain is your destruction; for in a little time you will have no line at
all; you will be intirely surrounded, and you are lost.
Thirdly, That it leads you to some decisive object, otherwise ten
campaigns, however fortunate, will give you nothing worth having.
If the difficulties are always in proportion to the length of your
line of operation, it follows, that when other circumstances are nearly
equal to that army which acts on the shortest lines, must from that
circumstance alone prevail; even though much inferior, provided it
is conducted with prudence and activity.
From these conclusions we deduce the principles of an offensive
war.
Chapter IV. Of an Offensive War
When you enter an enemy’s country, it is with a view to raise con-

tributions, destroy his magazines, &c. or make a diversion to favour
and facilitate the operations of an army which acts in another line;
or finally to conquer some province.
The mode of acting, in these three different cases, will be different
of course, and must be regulated by the different objects you have
in view. In the two first cases, prudence, and above all, celerity: in
the last, prudence, activity, and solidity must be employed.
In order to explain what I have to say on the subject we are dis-
cussing, I must propose the following questions.
First, Is the province you propose to conquer fortified or not?
Secondly, Is it separated from the other provinces of your enemy,
by some considerable river which never freezes, or by some very
high and difficult mountains, which have few roads and narrow, as
is usually the case?
Thirdly, or finally, Has it no fortress, river, or mountains, but is
like the provinces contiguous to it, open more or less?
All provinces whatever come under one or other of these denom-
inations, and therefore your mode of carrying war into them, and
the result of your operations, will be analogous to them.
In the first case you must take the fortress, because that alone can
enable you to separate your army, and take your quarters there dur-
ing the winter.
If the place is considerable, and your enemy has a good army in
the field, it will be a very difficult enterprize, and require much
vigour and sagacity to execute it with success, particularly if the
country is close and favourable for a defensive war; and your line
of operation is long and intersected by rivers, mountains, passes, &c.
To facilitate your undertaking, I advise you to march up to the
enemy, and force him to a battle; or by skillful manœuvres drive
him so far beyond the fortress, that he cannot trouble you in the
siege.
This supposes you are much superior to the enemy, and that you
can keep him at a distance with one part of your forces, while with
the remainder you prosecute the siege, escort the convoy, &c.
If you are superior to him only by a third part, and he is an able
man, ten to one you will miscarry, and be obliged to raise the siege
with shame and loss.
If the place is situated close on the frontier, then by marching
eight or ten miles into the country, you put it behind you, and carry
on your siege, without any great obstacle on his part, because your
line of operation is short and easily guarded. He cannot force you
to abandon your enterprize, but by a victory.
But if the place is situated thirty or forty miles within the coun-
try, by avoiding a general action, and acting with the greatest part
of his forces on your line, he will probably take your convoys, and
cut off your communication with your depots, and by that means
oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your retreat will be
attended with great difficulties, because your army will or may be
attacked in front, flank, and rear.
From this I draw one conclusion; if your situation is such, that in
general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier, your
fortresses can never be too near them, because your line of opera-
tion will be the shorter.
But if such places are intended to cover the country, they must
be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unless some par-
ticular circumstances intervene, as a great river, a pass, &c.
If you attack a place forty miles within the enemy’s country, I
would advise forming a camp in the Roman manner, about half
way, with some redoubts before your entrenchments, to prevent the
enemy from approaching them, and throwing shells and combustibles
into your camp, and burn your stores, while you are employed in
keeping the enemy at a distance and foraging the country. All your
stores, provisions, artillery, &c. are placed in this camp, and from
thence brought to that you occupy about the place without danger
or difficulty, which could not be done if they were brought forty
miles off, because a line of that length cannot be guarded.
In order to force your enemy to a battle, or to abandon the coun-
try, you must naturally employ all your forces united. Detachments,
excursions, &c. must of course be avoided, because they weaken your

army, are exposed to be cut off, and ruin the country, which you
must preserve, if you mean to stay there.
Instead of attempting to ruin his small depots, scattered about the
villages, which are the only your detachments can attack, preserve
your own, and secure all that lays behind you in some place as you
advance. You can act only on one line, which must be determined
by the position of the enemy, until you have drove him beyond the
place you propose besieging. From that moment you act in the defen-
sive, and your line is then determined from the camp you occupy
to your depots: your whole attention must be directed to carry on
the siege, protect your convoys, &c. It is then that the enemy changes
his system from a defensive to an offensive war: you are chained to
your line, whereas he is perfectly at liberty, and will employ that
liberty to act against you day and night, how, when, and where he
pleases.
It is probable the enemy may have several lines of operation drawn
from his camp, wherever it is, to the different fortresses and depots
which he may have behind him. In this case he will play with you
a whole campaign, shifting from one line to another, without a pos-
sibility of bringing him to a battle, or of driving him out of the
country. Your army will be soon exhausted and wore out with march-
ing and counter-marching, continually changing your line to follow
him, till your provisions fail, and oblige you to retire without attempt-
ing any thing with an army now half-ruined. This is exactly the case
in America.
In such circumstances nothing remains for you to do, but to march
against the place you intend besieging, which of course will force
the enemy to follow you; and if you can secure your line of oper-
ation, he must risk a battle, or suffer you to take the place, which
is the object you have in view.
If the enemy has several lines behind him, you must endeavour
to force him to act in one only, which must be done, if it can be
done at all, by acting on one or other of his flanks, which will force
him to leave his camp and take another. Supposing the enemy has
three lines behind him, and that he is encamped on the middle;
while he is on that line he laughs at you, and consequently you must
force him to take that on the right or left. If that on the right appears
more advantageous to your views, of course you encamp athwart his
left flank, and act in his rear, as is marked in Plate IV, fig. 6.
This will force him to quit his camp, and retire on his right flank:
by repeating this operation, you will drive him where you please.
The success, however, depends on superior velocity, which you can-
not have, if the line you act upon is longer than his, and he is in
any degree an able man; so that unless you are much superior to
the enemy in numbers, goodness, and your army so constituted, as
to be also superior in velocity, he will undoubtedly baffle all your
attempts, and oblige you to return home.
If the country has no fortress, but is separated from the other
provinces by a great river or mountains, as we have supposed, is
not very extensive and open, and you are superior in cavalry, you
may, by skillful manœuvres, force him to pass the river or moun-
tains, and by placing your troops properly, keep possession of it,
otherwise not; of course, if the country has neither fortress nor rivers,
&c. you may, like Barbarians, ravage and plunder the country, and
like them abandon it in haste, but you can never make war on a
solid foundation.
These are, in my opinion, the principles of an offensive war,
deduced from reason and experience. Whenever generals have been
regulated by them, for the most part they have been crowned with
success; and on the contrary, have generally been unfortunate, when
they have deviated from them, which is confirmed by history. It
remains with the general to know how to supply them as circum-
stances require.
Chapter V. Of a Defensive War
If the principles of an offensive war are such as we have indicated

in the preceding chapter, it follows, that those of a defensive war
are exactly the reverse. If he who attacks you must immediately
bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to besiege
some place of importance, form new depots, and advances further
into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole or make
peace on the terms he prescribes, it is your part to avoid a general
action; for while you have an army in the field, and know how to
manage it with advantage, he may, though much superior, be forced
to abandon his project, and retire with a ruined army. Were you in
a condition to venture an engagement with probable hopes of suc-
cess, you must not do it, because if you are beat, the consequence
may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him to retire, which
you may do without any risk, if you adhere to what I shall say on
the subject. The enemy has chose his line of operation, which of
course determines yours; you advance as far as you can to meet
him: if you can anticipate his motions, pass your frontier, destroy
his small depots, carry off the horses and cattle, and the corn if
threshed; when he advances, you retire gradually from one strong
camp to another, skirmish often, but never fight a battle. If there is
a river in your country, or in his beyond the frontier, place your-
self behind it, and encamp with three-fifths of your army in the cen-
ter, and two-fifths to your right and left, so that the whole of it
consists of 40,000 men, will occupy at least fifteen miles, within which
distance he must pass: for if you place yourself across his line of
operation, he cannot deviate from it twenty miles to look for a pas-
sage. This disposition being made, and patroles sent from the extrem-
ity of your wings, he cannot throw a bridge, and pass unobserved.
If the ground is at all favourable to you, the eight thousand men
we suppose on your right or left, will be strong enough to prevent
his passing, by attacking vigorously such as have passed, and is
entrenched on your side, then encamp on some neighbouring hill,
in three corps as usual, in a circular form. Fortify your right and
left, and place your heavy artillery on them. I say, he dare not leave
his entrenchments and attack you, and must therefore repass the
river, as it happened to Prince Eugene on the Adige, which we have
already mentioned.
The only method the enemy has to pass a river thus guarded,
will be to send a strong detachment thirty miles off to throw a bridge
and fortify it. This is a very long operation, and will give you time
to oppose it. When finally the enemy has passed, which I think
impossible, if you act as we prescribe, you retire of course to another
strong camp.
If the country has many passes in it, you may oppose his progress
with success on almost every spot, and force him to send a corps
on your flanks and rear, which by acting on your line of operation,
will force you to abandon a thousand camps successively, unless you
attack and beat this corps, which you may easily do, if the country
is mountainous, for you may probably cut off his communication
with the main army, and destroy it totally, which I have seen done.
In short, one way or other, you must get rid of this corps, because
no man, or body of men, can long withstand an attack in front, and
another in flank at the same time, or remain in any given post,

if a powerful corps is placed so as to be able to act on its line of
operation.
An enemy may be situated with regard to you, in three different
manners; 1st, in front; 2dly, in front and flank; 3dly, in front and
rear. In the first case, you may find numberless strong camps, where
you can stop him, though much superior, and where you may risk
a battle, because as our armies are constituted, a defeat is danger-
ous only to a certain degree, whereas in the second and third cases
they must be fatal; if you remain on the spot until the enemy
approaches and attacks you. No army conquers merely by resisting;
you may repel an enemy, but victory is the result of action.
If you are inclosed by two armies, you must march by the right
or left, and slip away if you can, if not, you must fight. Ancient his-
tory furnishes us with two events of this nature, from whence we
shall draw a general rule for the conduct of a general who may hap-
pen to find himself in such an unhappy situation.
The Gauls had invaded Italy, and having plundered it, were as
usual returning homewards loaded with spoils. A consular army fol-
lowed them, in hopes of some favourable opportunity to attack them
and retake the plunder. Being arrived in Tuscany, they were alarmed
by the approach of another army coming accidentally to meet them.
Thus on the point of being attacked in front and rear, they formed
their army, so that it presented a double front, and waited the event.
They were attacked, and all cut to pieces.
The other is in the history of the Jews; Jonathan and his brother,
I think (no matter who) commanded the Jewish army, which was in
the same situation as that of the Gauls. Jonathan divided his army
in two parts, formed a line of chariots, waggons, &c. behind which
he placed the weakest part under his brother to oppose one army;
with the other, and best part, he advanced against the other army
of the enemy, which he attacked with that vigour and fury, which
such a situation inspires, and of course defeated the enemy totally;
that part opposed to his brother, on seeing this event, gave over
attacking the chariots, and ran away. There is not a finer manœu-
vre recorded in history: imitate this noble example.
When two armies march against you, in the manner just men-
tioned, and come from a considerable distance; if your country is
strong, and has some good fortress in it, where your depots lay,
occupy a strong camp and be quiet; such numerous armies in such
a situation cannot remain a fortnight; they must separate for want

of provisions. In this manner the king of Prussia baffled the attempts
of the Austrians and Russians for four campaigns.
If your country has no such fortress to cover you, of course you
must either beat one of the armies which marches against you, or
by placing yourself on the outward flank of one of them; force them
to unite, and act upon one line: avoid a battle, which you may then
do as long as you please. They must separate and retire, because
two such armies cannot subsist on the shores provided for one only.
If finally two armies act in different lines, and attack distant
provinces, you must of course oppose an army to each of them. If
you cannot do it, abandon that which is far off, collect your forces,
and attack that which is nearest to you, and most dangerous. When
your forces do not permit you to oppose your enemies at once in
every point, you must act in part on the defensive, and in the other
offensively. If you are too weak to act in many points at once, you
must abandon some of them, that you may act with more vigour
in others.
Having pointed out all the different situations in which an enemy,
with one or more armies, can be with regard to yours, and shewn
what you are to do in such different circumstances, we now return
to our subject; and we will also shew, how you may check the
progress of the most powerful adversary.
When he has penetrated thirty or forty miles into your country,
and you cannot or will not oppose him in front; when you cannot
defend your own line, you must either retire as he advances, till he
has drove you out of the country, or attack his. The method of
doing this with success, we say, is, to leave on your line, to oppose
the enemy in front, a fifth of your army, chiefly cavalry; three-fifths
on the flank of his march; the remaining fifth, all of light troops,
horse and foot, must be placed along his line of operation in small
bodies of one or two thousand men, who occupy the most advan-
tageous spots, as woods, passes, &c. where they remain concealed.
Parties must be sent from one to the other of about a hundred men,
so that there is not a single point of the enemy’s line which you
cannot attack with success in an instant. Half his army cannot pro-
tect his convoys on a line of thirty miles. If he sends two or three
strong detachments to escort a capital convoy, perhaps of three thou-
sand waggons, because you have taken or dispersed his small ones,
such a convoy will occupy near thirty miles: I suppose the escort to
consist of twenty thousand men; these will be posted in several corps,

in front, rear, and along the flanks of the march; you are informed
of his disposition, you may reinforce that part which we suppose
already placed on his line, whether you do or not. I say, that the
ten or twelve thousand light troops may unite in a short time, and
be superior to the enemy’s escort in any given point, and beat it;
stop the front of the convoy, while your small parties break the car-
riages, take away the horses or kill them. If a hundred only of the
carriages are destroyed, all those which are behind must stop. The
escort is chained to the convoy, even to particular points of it. If
you cannot beat it, amuse it by skirmishing; your parties in the mean
time do the business.
By acting in this manner, the Austrians took or destroyed a great
convoy going from Neiss to Olmutz, which obliged the king to raise
the siege of that place next morning, and to abandon Bohemia in
a few days.
If in the conduct of a defensive war you adhere to the principles
we have laid down, and the enemy’s line of operation is only thirty
or forty miles long, much more if it is a hundred, you will triumph
in the end, and enjoy the fruits of your prudence and activity, which
is every thing in war, particularly in a defensive one, where they
must supply the want of force.
From the nature of a defensive war rises the utility and necessity
of light troops, of which we shall treat in the following chapter.
Chapter VI. Of Light Troops
During the wars which we describe, the Austrians had, I believe,

near thirty thousand of this kind of troops distributed in the different
armies and corps. The only use I ever saw made of them was to
observe the enemy placed, as they generally were, before the front
of our armies, they could do no more, and even this they did very
imperfectly, because they were too numerous, encamped in such con-
siderable bodies, that they were totally deficient in activity, and pre-
served nothing but the names of light troops. Observed by the enemy,
he masked them whenever he chose to march by his flanks, or to
retire, so effectually, that for the most part we had no intelligence
of his motions, till it was too late to avail ourselves of any favourable
circumstance which might offer, insomuch, that I do not remember
we ever attacked his rear guard with success, though great bodies
of light troops, and very often the main army, were near enough to
do it with advantage.
When the enemy advanced towards us, after skirmishing a little,
these light troops dispersed and retired where they pleased; and if
a battle ensued, they disappeared, and were lost for several days.
Many of these corps observed so ill, that very often they were sur-
prized, made prisoners, or totally dispersed. From whence I con-
clude, that a regiment of Hussars, and a few hundred Croats, will
observe an enemy much better than so many thousands, for this
plain reason, they are or ought to be invisible, and so posted near
the high roads, before the enemy’s front, and on his flanks, that he
cannot move without their knowledge. It is therefore absurd to employ
ten thousand to do that which a thousand can do much better.
The number and use of light troops depend on the nature of the
war chiefly. In an offensive war, whose principles is to seek and fight
the enemy, you must concenter your forces, and by no means dis-
perse them, and lose time in fruitless and laborious excursions: your
enemy is before you, advance in front: your army must have strength
and consistency, of course it must have a heavy cavalry, infantry,
and artillery, so that your real and physical force is superior to that
of the enemy.
In such circumstances, you can want no more light troops than
are necessary to explore the front and flank of your march: but if
you are on the defensive, you must avoid a battle, because you are
too weak, and must act on his flanks in the manner we have pre-
scribed, which can be done only with light troops, as is evident from
the nature of this service; you cannot therefore have too many of
them. An army of forty thousand men, half of which being light
troops, if ably conducted, in a close country, when the enemy’s line
is of any considerable length, will most certainly force him to aban-
don his projects and retire.
Chapter VII. Of the Frontier Line
Supposing this line to be like that marked in Plate V ‘x.x.x.’ &c.

which as most lines of any considerable extent projects in many
parts: I say, that however extensive such a line may be, the points
on which it can be attacked are determined by the number and
Illustration 16. Plate V.
quality of the roads which lead to it, and by the position and dis-
tance of the respective capitals, and other strong places within a
hundred miles of it, beyond which no army can act with advantage;
that is, no army constituted as ours are, can act, if its depots are
distant above a hundred miles, unless there is water-carriage.
If there are no such places of arms at all, or on the one side of
the frontier line only, it is evident, that no solid operation can be
executed, and that they can tend only to ravage the country and
retire, or to facilitate the operations of some other army, acting on
another line, which was the case with the Russians, during this whole
war we are describing. They could not, and the Austrians would not
avail themselves of the victories the former had gained at Palrig and
Franckfurt on the Oder; so that the Russians, unable to fix them-
selves on or near that river, were always obliged to retire after a
short campaign, because their line of operations was too long.
We suppose the frontier before us to be three hundred miles in
length; yet the enemy can act against it from three points only,
where his depots are lodged, as in F.G.H. [Plate V ] and even from
these he can attack the two points C.E. on our frontier alone; when
he has taken either of them, he must proceed next to B. or D. and
from thence to the capital A. and not before. I have already shewn,
in treating of a defensive war, how you must counteract and check
his progress, so shall conclude the subject.
We can no way better explain our principles, than by applying
them to the different frontiers of Europe and America, accordingly,
in the following part, we shall give a military analysis of them, viz.
of that of France, Austria, the Prussian dominions, Turkey, Russia,
Poland, England, and North America.
PART THE FIFTH
THE APPLICATION OF THOSE PRINCIPLES TO THE

MILITARY CONSTITUTION OF THE DIFFERENT
POWERS OF EUROPE; WITH MAPS OF FRANCE,
HUNGARY, POLAND, TURKEY, GERMANY AND
RUSSIA, WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR DIFFERENT
FRONTIERS, WHEREIN WE EXAMINE WHETHER AND
HOW THEY MAY BE ATTACKED WITH ADVANTAGE
Chapter I. Of the Frontier of France
In describing this and other frontiers, we do not pretend to point

out the different positions and camps which may be taken on either
side, because it would require a more perfect knowledge of the coun-
tries than we are masters of; and moreover, would be useless, because
these must be determined by the motions of the enemy, and many
other occasional circumstances, by which a general must regulate his
operations: what we shall say will, however, enable the sovereigns,
ministers, and generals, to form their plans of war, offensive and
defensive; these last must know how to conduct them.
We have already said, that the absolute force of a frontier con-
sists in natural obstacles, which an enemy would find in approach-
ing and attacking it. These arise from numberless causes, as mountains,
rivers, woods, defiles, the greater of lesser fertility of the soil, the
direction of it, &c. &c.
The relative force of a frontier line depends on the distance of
the capitals and fortresses, where the depots are lodged, of those
who attack or defend it, from whence their different lines of oper-
ations must proceed; as these are long or short, the operations will
be more or less difficult; insomuch, that it may, I think, be estab-
lished as an axiom, that when the respective forces and abilities of
the commanders are nearly equal, those who act on the shortest
line, must from that circumstance alone prevail in the end, because
being nearer their depots, they can open the campaign sooner, act
with more vigour and activity, and for a longer time than those
whose line of operation is at a greater distance.
The frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basil, in

Switzerland, and runs in various directions from thence to Dunkirk,
in French Flanders. I shall divide this long line into three parts, and
consider each of them separately. The first part goes from Basil to
Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length. The sec-
ond part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moselle, covers Lorrain
on the side of the electorate of Treves, the dutchies of Deux-Ponts,
Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan
down the Meuse to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to
Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles; so that this
whole frontier is about 470 miles.
The first part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which are
placed Hunninghen, New Brisac, Strasburg, and Landau, all which
are very strong. Strasburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on the back
part of Alcase runs a chain of mountains, which separates it from
Franche Comté and Lorrain; the distance between these mountains
is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near Strasburg, cov-
ered by the Rhine and the fortresses above-mentioned, could with
ease prevent an enemy from passing that river, or at least from
besieging any of them, and without taking them all, he could not
possibly separate his army and take his winter quarters in Alsace,
while the French have any considerable force encamped or cantoned
in the mountains above-mentioned. I am therefore surprized the
Austrians ever made any attempt on that side, and much more so,
that the French were so very much alarmed at it. For my part, I
am confident, that an able general, at the head of thirty or forty
thousand men, so far from being terrified at the approach of an
enemy, or opposing his passing the Rhine, would wish to see him
shut up between the mountains, the river, and the fortresses; because
he would see the facility of preventing his repassing it at all, and of
cutting him off intirely. Look at the map and judge.
The second part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes
from Landau to Sedan, is very strong both by nature and art, hav-
ing several strong places on it; and the country before it is no less
difficult, being very mountainous, and consequently full of narrow
passes. The direction of this line is concave towards that part of
Germany; so that an enemy who advances on that side must have
his depots on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maestricht
and Namur on the Meuse; in both cases the army, which I suppose
encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the
part the fifth. the application of those principles 501
Rhine, by acting on his line of operation on that side, while another

of forty thousand men, placed on the Meuse near Sedan, will pre-
vent any army from advancing into Lorrain or Champaign on that
side, as is evident from the inspection of the map.
Whether we consider the strength of this line, the direction of it,
or finally, the obstacles which the country before it offers, it will
appear that no enemy can approach it, much less attack it with any
prospect of success: a small corps posted at Luxemburg, might indeed
advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in haste, but no
solid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on that side.
The third and last part of the French frontier runs from Sedan
down the Meuse to Charlemont, and from thence to Dunkirk, and
is 150 miles in length. It has been the scene of successive wars for
near two centuries, the most expensive, bloody, and durable of any
recorded in the annals of mankind, of which the author proposes
giving the history on the same plan this work is wrote.
This line is stronger by art than nature, having a prodigious num-
ber of strong fortresses and posts upon it; moreover, it projects in
many places, so that an enemy can enter it no where, without hav-
ing some of them in front and on his flanks, his depots must be at
Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thousand men placed
on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will so
bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a step without immi-
nent danger; for that, which we suppose on the Sambre, by mask-
ing Namur, penetrates into the country to Brussels, &c. which will
force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the pre-
sent state of Austrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland,
nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above-
mentioned countries in one campaign.
In the war for the succession of Spain, at the beginning of this
century, ten successful campaigns brought the Allies no farther than
Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Austrian frontiers, a very incon-
siderable defeat at Denain1 obliged prince Eugene to raise the siege
of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits
of many victories.
1
At the Battle of Denain (1712) the French marshal Claude Louis Hector, duc
de Villars (1653–1734) attacked and killed 8,000 allied soldiers with a vigorous bay-
onet attack. Eugene arrived late on the field and was forced to retreat across the
River Scheldt.
Map 10. Map of France.
I know most people suppose, that this was owing to the defection
of the English: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies might
in time have advanced to the Marne, and sent parties to the Seyne:
but will any officer suppose, that any army marching that line from
Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter quarters on the
above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in possession of
Picardy, Normandy, and Champagn? No, it is impossible: the great
fault of the French generals, when on the defensive, was to oppose
the enemy in front, whereas they should have operated against their
flanks.
The final event of this long and bloody war shews the strength
of this frontier, and the prodigious resources of the house of Bourbon.
From the description we have of the French frontier, towards Ger-
many and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears, that an
enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine, opposite
to Alsace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impossible, to
conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into
Lorrain, &c.
That the second part of the French frontier, from Landau to the
Meuse, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the
Moselle, between the Rhine and the Meuse, the event of the different
wars, waged in Flanders, prove the superiority of the French, I mean
the superior advantages they possess in acting on that frontier, which
are indeed so very great, that no forces can be collected and sup-
ported in Flanders by the house of Austria, the English, Dutch, and
the German princes, which can preserve that country against the
efforts of the French; most certainly the Austrians alone cannot do it.
So much for the absolute force of the French frontier: let us now
examine its relative force. This, we have said, depends on the length
of the enemy’s line of operation, direction of it, goodness and num-
ber of the roads, situation of his depots, &c.
Of all the powers in Germany, the house of Austria alone is in
any degree able to contend with France; we shall therefore confine
our observations to a war, which the first might undertake against
the latter. Vienna is the point, from whence the Austrians must part,
the distance between that place and the nearest part of the French
frontier, viz. Alsace on the Rhine, is above 300 miles, which alone
gives the French a decisive superiority. In acting on the Rhine they
have their depots on the spot; in a whole campaign their army need
not march twenty miles, insomuch, that the expences of maintain-

ing it in the field would be very little more than in time of peace,
because it would require no train, equipage, &c. which retard the
operations of an army, and are so very expensive to the state: whereas
an army acting on a line of 300 miles, requires such a prodigious
train of equipages as would exhaust the most powerful state. The
difficulty and expence of forming depots, as you advance, would
retard its motions, and finally put a stop to them altogether. Moreover,
such an army could not be brought to the scene of action till very
late in the season, and if by a decisive victory it does not acquire
a sufficient tract of country in and near the enemy’s frontier to take
up its winter quarters, it must soon retire; while the enemy, abun-
dantly supplied with provisions and stores on the spot, can pursue
you in the retreat, and render your future attempts still more difficult.
What we have said, regards the Austrian’s line of operation only,
as to its length and the obstacles which arise from thence alone; we
shall now consider those that proceed from the nature of the coun-
try, through that the different lines, on which it can march to act
on the Rhine.
Parallel to this river, on the German side, at the distance of ten
or fifteen miles, runs a chain of very high mountains, called the
Black Forest, from Switzerland to Heidelberg on the Neckar, and
from thence to the Main. Through the first of these mountains there
goes from the Rhine to the Danube only one capital road; it passes
over the Neckar, goes to Stutgard, the capital of the dutchy of Wir-
temberg, along the Neckar to Ulm: it is one continual pass or defile,
between fifty and sixty miles in length, and of course offers num-
berless positions, where a small army can stop the most numerous.
The country between the Rhine and the said mountains belongs
to the Elector of Palatine, several lesser princes, and free cities. The
mountains themselves comprehend the dutchy of Wirtemberg, some
other principalities and free cities. On the east side of these moun-
tains lies Bavaria, which now likewise belongs to the Elector Palatine,
and some free cities. This prince, by acquisition of Bavaria, is now
so very powerful, that in conjunction with the duke of Wirtemberg, or
even alone, he can hold the balance of Germany between the Austrians
and the French, and hinder them from approaching each other.
The second road goes from Francfort on the Main to Wurtzburg,
Nuremberg, and Ratisbon on the Danube, and is no less difficult
than the former. The Austrians can approach the Rhine only by the
one or the other; if they advance by the first, the French may pass
the Rhine, and by occupying some posts in the dutchy of Wirtemberg,
stop their progress and force them back into Bavaria; and if they
go on the other road, by occupying the heights on the left of the
Rhine, between Mentz and Offenburg, prevent their passing that
river, and force them down towards Coblentz and Cologne, or by
passing the Rhine, and marching to Wurtzburg, prevent their approach-
ing the Rhine at all; or finally, let them advance towards Coblentz
and the Lower Rhine, and then pass to the Main, and cut off all
communication between the Low Countries and the Austrian domin-
ions in Germany and Italy, which would prevent them from mak-
ing any considerable efforts in Flanders.
We have already shewn, that France has great advantages in attack-
ing Flanders, from the proximity of its depots, which are greatly
increased, by the Austrian’s line of operation, from Vienna to Brussels,
which makes it impossible for them to preserve that country. It was,
no doubt, owing to this circumstance chiefly, if not intirely, that the
house of Austria could not preserve Alsace, Franche Comté, and
Lorrain, which finally will bring on the loss of Flanders.
The French would find nearly the same difficulties in passing from
the Rhine to the frontiers of Austria and Bohemia, and in all prob-
ability would lose their army, as they have always done, whenever
they went as far as the Danube. The French have however some
very considerable advantages over the Austrians: they can invade
and over-run Flanders, before it is possible for the Austrians to col-
lect any forces there, capable of opposing their progress; and, more-
over, can form such alliances in Germany, as would greatly embarrass
the Austrians; whereas these can form none that could in any degree
affect the safety of the French monarchy.
It would therefore seem adviseable, and perhaps necessary, that
the house of Austria should exchange all its possessions from Luxem-
burg to Flanders for Bavaria, the present possessor of which might
find it very eligible, as he might draw a line from Manheim to Deux
Ponts, Luxemburg, and Namur, and establish an easy communication
between the whole: the Austrians no longer engaged in such distant
provinces, might turn their thoughts elsewhere with more advantage.
The French frontiers towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are
too strong to be invaded by those powers: the idea of passing the
Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deserve a seri-
ous discussion. We shall consider the coast of France on the British

channel and the ocean on another occasion.
Chapter II. Of the Austrian Frontiers
The frontiers of the house of Austria are of prodigious extent, hav-

ing many separate provinces, as those in Flanders and Italy. Here I
shall consider only that frontier line, which begins in the Tirol, goes
along the bishopric of Brixen, Carinthia, Stiria, Austria, round Bohe-
mia, Moravia, the new acquisitions in Poland, Transilvania, and pass-
ing the Danube near Belgrade, goes up the Save, along Sclavonia
and Croatia, which separates those provinces from Bosnia in Turkey.
For greater accuracy, we shall divide this immense line into sev-
eral parts, relative to the different point, on which it may be attacked
by the neighbouring power.
The first part is that which goes from the county of Tirol to Passau
on the Danube, and from thence to Egra in Bohemia. All this line,
as far as the Danube, runs along and through the Alps, and is there-
fore impervious to any army, even light troops could no act against
it with success. The remaining part, from the Danube to Egra, is
nearly as strong, being covered by very high mountains almost inac-
cessible. Over this line go three great roads, one from Inspruck into
Bavaria, towards Augsburg; another from Vienna up the Danube,
to Passau and Straubing, &c. The third from Egra into the Upper
Palatinate, towards Nuremberg in Franconia; from each of which
there runs a few cross roads that lead into the adjacent countries.
It is, however, on these three only that an army can act; though an
enemy cannot pretend to enter the first road, nor could any oper-
ation on that side be of use to him; yet the Austrians might assem-
ble a very considerable force at Inspruck, and behind the Inn, and
from thence penetrate into Bavaria as far as the Danube.
The second road, which goes along that river, is extremely difficult;
a small corps, posted on the left of the Inn, near Passau, would stop
an army, while the light troops would pass that river higher up, and
act on the enemy’s flank and rear. All this country is most particu-
larly adapted to light troops; moreover, the road runs close to the
Danube in many places, and as this river is there very narrow, and
contracted by high mountains, a few troops on the opposite shore
stops the march of an army as well as the navigation, so that while
the Austrians have any force at all, and particularly light troops on
the above-mentioned line, no enemy can, however numerous, attack
it with success; nor could he march down the left side of the Danube,
leaving Egra and that part of Bohemia behind him, and on his flank:
moreover the direction of this frontier line being concave towards
the enemy, is extremely favourable to he Austrians, for independent
of the prodigious strength of the country, which alone enables them
to oppose him in front with success, he cannot advance against any
given point of this circle without exposing one or both his flanks,
he would soon lose his communication with his depots, must retire
and change his line of operation.
From what we have said, it appears that Egra is the only point
of this line which can be attacked; this place neither is nor can be
made strong. It were adviseable to build a capital fortress on that
frontier so placed, that an army posted near it might advance and
take a central position between the source of the Maine and Ratisbon
on the Danube, so as to be on either river immediately, as cir-
cumstances might require. Whatever enemy approaches this frontier,
can have no other line of operation than one drawn from Nuremberg,
Ratisbon, or some other place on the Danube to Egra.
An army covered by such a fortress, as we propose, would undoubt-
edly render every attempt on that side fruitless, particularly if a body
of fifteen or twenty thousand men of light troops and Hussars would
enter Bavaria from the Inn.
At the death of Charles the Sixth, the French and Bavarians en-
tered Bohemia by Egra, which confirms our observation on this fron-
tier; had there been such a fortress as we propose, it is probable they
could not have taken it, nor could they have left it behind them.
The relative force of this line consists in this: the Austrians can
in very little time collect such forces as are able to defend it; whereas
the Bavarians and French (for the first alone cannot contend with
the Austrians) cannot be on that frontier in a year; these last can
draw nothing from France at such a great distance; the Bavarians
cannot supply them with subsistence and stores for any considerable
time, they must separate and will be beat in detail: the French will
lose their army, and Bavaria will be ravaged and ruined.
The history of the war of the succession, and of that begun in
1741, carried on in this country, shews, that any future attempts
against the house of Austria on this side will be equally unsuccessful.
From Egra to the Elbe there is but one line of operation, viz. that
which goes from Dresden to Prague, from the Elbe to the Queiss,
which separates Bohemia from Lusatia, no line can be drawn from
the one to the other. From Friedland to the road, which goes from
Olmuts in Moravia towards Neiss, there are two lines of operations,
one from Schweidnitz to Prague, the other from Neiss to Olmuts:
Glatz is a post rather than a fortress, from whence a line of oper-
ation might be drawn into Bohemia. However, if a considerable body
of troops were placed in the county of Glatz, they would greatly
facilitate the operations from Schweidnitz to Prague, and those from
Neiss to Olmuts; and on the contrary, very much retard and check
those which the Austrians might carry on those lines into Silesia.
This advantage arises from the situation of this province, which pro-
jects into Bohemia, and is the vertex of a triangle formed by lines
drawn from Glatz to Neiss and Schweidnitz, and another between
these two last places.
In the preceding part of this volume, which was printed in 1766,
I gave a military description of this frontier, pointed out the three
lines of operation above-mentioned, and indicated the camps which
the Austrians might occupy to frustrate the attempts of the Prussians:
I there said, by occupying the passes on the road, between Lowositz
and Dresden, no army coming from thence could enter Bohemia.
Secondly, that by camping behind the Elbe, between Königsgratz
and Königshoff, the Prussians coming from Schweidnitz would be
stopped there: and thirdly, that an enemy coming from Lusatia by
Rumburg and Gabel into Bohemia, would also be stopped by an
army posted behind the Iser.
The king of Prussia, in alliance with Saxony, resolved to enter
Bohemia, from Schweidnitz with one army, and from Dresden with
another. The first, very numerous, he commanded in person; the
second, composed of Prussians and Saxons, was no less so.
The Austrian forces were likewise divided into two armies, some-
thing inferior to the Prussians; the emperor commanded that opposed
to the king, and marshal Laudon that destined to act against prince
Henry. The result of all these dispositions was, that the king entered
Bohemia, and advanced to the Elbe, where he found the emperor
encamped behind that river, exactly as we proposed, in such a man-
ner, that the king could neither bring him to an action, nor by any
manœuvre force him to quit his position. Prince Henry advanced
Map 11. Map of Germany.
towards the passes above-mentioned, but the dispositions of marshal

Laudon were so just, that he could not attempt forcing them. Thus
these two mighty armies, conducted by such able generals, as the
king of Prussia and prince Henry, were stopped short in their careers
unable to advance a step.
The king naturally impatient, grew tired and ashamed of his sit-
uation; the only probable means to extricate himself, and proceed
in the execution of his plan, was to order prince Henry to leave
Saxony, and enter Bohemia from Lusatia by the passes of Rumburg
and Gabel, which would bring him on the emperor’s flanks, and of
course force him to abandon his strong camp, retire, and so leave
the king an opening to advance and pursue his plan. Accordingly
prince Henry entered Bohemia by the passes above-mentioned: in
the mean time marshal Laudon, informed of the prince’s motion,
likewise quitted his camp, passed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and advanced
to the Iser, behind which he encamped, with his right extended
towards Turnau, by which means he stopped once more prince
Henry, and effectually covered the Emperor’s left flank.
The king was again disappointed, but did not despair; he formed
another project, which he hoped would displace the emperor, the
object of all his manœuvres: higher up the Iser, in the mountains,
is a place called Arnau, which the emperor had occupied, because
it covered his left; this the king proposed attacking; accordingly he
ordered his army to march on his right, while that of prince Henry
marched on his left.
The emperor reinforced this post, and the Prussians were repulsed.
The season was far advanced, and every attempt of the Prussians
baffled, the king resolved to put an end to the campaign; accord-
ingly his army retired in several columns, that on his left, or rather
on the right in his retreat, was isolated. The emperor availed him-
self of the circumstance, and ordered general Wurmfer to attack it,
which he did with such success, that he defeated, killed, and made
prisoners above 2000 men.
It was natural to suppose, that prince Henry should have retreated
into Lusatia by the same roads he came; but to the astonishment of
every officer, a little acquainted with his profession, he chose another
route, long, difficult, and extremely dangerous; he marched by mar-
shal Laudon’s left flank, advanced to the Elbe, passed that river at
Leitmeritz, and from thence through the passes into Saxony, and
executed his retreat with success, because nobody offered to molest

him: why such a general as Laudon, at the head of a numerous
army, did not cut him off intirely at the passage of the Elbe, is a
mystery which cannot be explained, and the more so, as prince
Charles of Lichtenstein commanded a corps at Melnick, which could
have opposed this passage in front, while marshal Laudon with his
whole army attacked his rear.
Thus ended this campaign and the war, as glorious to the emperor
as it was shameful to the Prussians. Barren of events, it offers only
one observation, which is this; in Bohemia, and I believe in most
other countries, there are certain points, which being occupied, will
baffle the attempts of much superior forces. It is surprizing that in
the several great wars carried on in Bohemia, these points should
have escaped the eyes of so many able generals.
The Austrians, by their acquisitions in Poland, have formed a new
frontier on that side; it runs from Teschen in Silesia, close by Cracow
on the Vistula, and from thence almost in a right line to the Niester,
within a few miles of Chotzim in Moldavia, on the same river; its
length is about four hundred miles, its breadth various.
This country, like all Poland, is plain and open, has no fortress,
nor any enemy, which for the present can render it necessary: how-
ever, as Poland may probably hereafter become the field of battle
between those great powers, who divided a great part of it among
them. The Austrians, like the Prussians, who are building a capital
place on the Vistula, should likewise build one on their new frontiers.
This country is no otherwise useful to the Austrians, than by its
productions; we must examine, however, whether it may not furnish
means to carry on any future war against the Prussians with more
advantage than heretofore.
The wars between these two powers have been chiefly carried on
on the frontier which separates Bohemia from Silesia; and as things
then stood, could not be prosecuted on any other lines than those
above-mentioned. That frontier is more advantageous to the Prussians
than the Austrians, for the reasons we assigned in the description of
that country, to which we refer: the back part of Silesia towards
Poland, from the Oder to the Warta, as far as Custrin, is intirely
open, having no one place of strength on it, excepting Gros-Glogaw
on the Oder and Custrin: this line is near 300 miles in length. It is
well known that the king of Prussia draws infinite advantages from
Map 12. Hungary and Transilvania with Slavonia and Croatia.
Poland—horses, cattle, recruits, corn, &c. without which he could

not maintain his armies in Silesia, nor form such depots there as
enable him to wage war in Bohemia.
This being premised, it seems clear, that if the Austrians built a
place of arms on the line, between Teschen and Cracow, a little
further back, and opened a communication from thence to Hungary,
through the passes of Tablunka, and some other roads through the
mountains, which separate that country from Poland, a powerful
army might be assembled near the fortress, we suppose, to act on
the back part of Silesia along the Oder or Francfort, a very inter-
esting point to the Prussians.
It is needless to point out all the advantages which the Austrians
would reap from the operations of such an army; I will therefore
only say, that unless they find out a new line of operation, their
attempts on Silesia will be fruitless; and I see not how it is possible
for them to establish any other, but that which we propose.
The next part of the Austrian frontier runs from the Niester to
the Danube, and separates Transilvania from the Bannat of Temeswaer,
from Moldavia and Walachia: it is a chain of prodigious high moun-
tains almost impenetrable, insomuch, that there is but one pass,
through which wheel carriages can go; it leads to the Pruth. The
Austrians have acquired here a tract of land, and have built a bridge
over that river, a few miles behind Chotzim, and of course will open
a good communication into Moldavia. They should open two more
roads through these mountains, the one from Hermanstadt, the cap-
ital of Transilvania, close by the river Alut, which runs into Walachia;
and a third from the Bannat of Temeswaer, through the pass of
Meadia into Walachia, close to the Danube, opposite Widin.
This being done, nothing can hinder the Austrians from con-
quering Moldavia and Walachia in one campaign. The Turks have
in those countries only Giurgewa and Ibrailow on the Danube,
Chotzim and Bender on the Niester, neither of which can resist a
fortnight’s regular siege. As things now are, Austria holds the bal-
ance between the Turks and Russians; for neither can pass the Niester
without her consent.
The last part of the Austrian frontier runs from the Danube up
the Save, and separates from Slavonia from Bosnia. The country
on both sides of this river, particularly Bosnia, is extremely moun-
tainous, insomuch, that a regular army cannot move without great
difficulty. The direction of this line is very favourable to the Turks.

It is, I think, impossible to advance beyond Belgrade towards Con-
stantinople, while they are masters of Bosnia: whereas they may pass
into Sclavonia, and by forcing a passage over the Drave, open a
communication into Lower Hungary, the Bennat of Temeswaer and
Transilvania; with such fruitful countries behind them, they might
proceed into Upper Hungary and Austria, as formerly.
In the present state of the two empires, nothing of this can hap-
pen; on the contrary, the Austrians are in every thing infinitely supe-
rior to the Turks: the line of operations of the first goes from Vienna
down the Danube to Peterwaradin, where, and at Temeswaer, depots
may be formed without trouble, and with very little expence, because
they would require scarce any horses, carriages, &c. whereas the
Turkish line must come from Constantinople, is 450 miles long, in
many places very difficult; so that this distance may make an essen-
tial difference in the operations of the two armies.
In case such a war should happen, I would propose placing one
army on the Save, with the left towards the Danube, and a strong body
of cavalry on the other side of that river; another, consisting of
30,000 men, chiefly light troops, two regiments of hussars, some how-
itzers and field-pieces, should assemble in Croatia, and enter Bosnia
on that side: this would oblige the Turks to abandon the Save, and
fall back towards Servia, which will give the army, we suppose placed
on the other side of the Save, room to pass it; and by thus acting
in front and flank of the enemy, you will force him to abandon
every province successively, or fight you on your own terms.
In a war with the Turks, I beg leave to recommend the use of
the pikes, the order of battle proposed in the preceding part of this
work, with a numerous artillery and howitzers. The Turks always
act in front with all their forces, and often with such impetuosity,
that it is no easy matter to resist their attacks; and if they succeed,
it is no less difficult to avoid a total overthrow, which makes the
order of battle we propose absolutely necessary as well as the mode
of acting on their flanks; more especially at the time they are occu-
pied in front: in this manner a column of near eight thousand Turks,
while engaged in attacking a redoubt, where there were seven hun-
dred men, were totally dispersed in five minutes time by three hun-
dred horse, who attacked them in flank in a loose manner à la
debandade.
Chapter III. Of the Turkish Frontier
We have already described that part of this line towards the Austrian
dominions, it remains we now examine, that which confines on
Poland and Russia. If the Poles, like their ancestors, the tartars, made
war with 100,000 horsemen, far from being a prey to their ambi-
tious neighbours, they would make them tremble: all Poland, and
the countries adjacent, from the Oder to the Dwina and Niester, on
the frontier of Russia, and even beyond the latter to the Wolga, are
intirely open and defenceless, and abundantly provided with corn,
horses, cattle, &c. 100,000 horse, divided into smaller bodies, would
over-run this immense space in a few months, and leave not a living
creature behind them to cultivate the ground, which would become
a desart, and these mighty monarchs shut up with a few subjects in
and about their fortresses. What would you do with your immense
armies of infantry, heavy squadrons, and your thousand cannons
against such an enemy? Nothing: their superior velocity gives them
every thing, and leaves you nothing but the ground on which you
encamp, which you must soon abandon, if you can, or perish.
Remember Peter the Great on the Pruth! By following this method,
the Tartars under Gensis Chan and his successors made greater con-
quests than any people in the world; but all this is a vision, the
Poles are nothing: a bad government destroys the resources of the
most powerful kingdoms; we shall therefore consider the Turkish
frontier so far as it relates to a war with Russia.
This frontier runs from Chotzim to the Niester to the Black Sea,
and from thence to Oczakow on the Nieper, along the Crimea
towards the Don. It is true, that the tartars, who inhabit the coun-
try from the Niester to the Don, along the Black sea, are not sub-
ject to the Grand Seignior, but they are so far dependent on him,
that they have always acted with him, and always will. On this fron-
tier the Turks possess Chotzim, Bender, Oczakow, and Precop on
the Isthmus, which separates the Crim from Little Tartary; in all
which he can form his magazines with ease from Asia and Europe.
The Russian frontier runs, on this side, from Kiow on the right
of the Nieper as far as Kinsburn, opposite Oczakow, on the mouth
of that river. On this frontier the Russians have only one fortress,
Pultawa, where Charles the Twelfth found the term of his victories
and glory. This line is above five hundred miles in length.
The Turkish and Russian’s principal line of operation must go

from Chotzim to Kiow, which is two hundred and fifty miles: if
either did not occupy Poland, and draw their subsistence from thence,
it would be impossible for either to act on this line, and of course
their wars would be confined to Little Tartary and the Crim, in
which the Russians have the advantage, as well from the position
and direction of their frontier, which enables them to attack that
country in different parts, as from the proximity of their resources,
the course of the rivers, &c. &c.
But as Poland has, and ever will be the property of those who
occupy it, both powers will act on the principal line from the Nies-
ter to Kiow. From the direction of the Turkish frontier, it is evi-
dent, that the Russians cannot approach the Niester, if the Turks
order thirty or forty thousand Tartars to advance into Poland, be-
tween the Bog and the Nieper, and between this river and the Don,
even the tartars of Cuban might be made to act between the Don
and the Wolga. If such a disposition was made and executed, the
Russians, far from advancing into Moldavia, would find it difficult
to preserve their own country, which is plain and open, and there-
fore cannot be defended by any armies whatever, constituted as ours
are, against the incursions of a hundred thousand horsemen. We saw
lately a miserable vagabond [Pugachev], at the head of a few thou-
sand rabble, over-run a great part of the Russian empire: our armies,
I repeat it, are formed to act only on a very contracted line, and
in a close country they never can perform great things, or make
extensive conquests.
Chapter IV. Of the Russian Frontier towards Europe
This line begins at a small river called Kymen in Finland, and is

the limit between the Russians and the Swedes; it runs along the
gulph of Finland, and part of the Baltic as far as the mouth of the
Dwina, on which Riga, a very strong place, and considerable for its
trade: from hence it goes up the above said river to its springs, and
then to Smolensko on those of the Nieper, from whence finally it
follows the course of that river to the Black Sea, opposite Oczakow;
the Russians have appropriated some provinces on the right of it.
We shall divide this line into three parts. First, that in Finland
Map 13. Turkey in Europe.

opposite the Swedes. Secondly, that from the mouth of the Dwina
to Smolensko. And thirdly, that from the last place to the Black Sea.
Russian Finland is quite a savage country, having nothing in it
but forests, marshes, lakes, rocks, and mountains, is extremely poor,
and does not furnish wherewith to feed the inhabitants, though few
in number, and do not exceed a hundred thousand persons. This
country is so very strong, that three or four regiments, which gen-
erally are quartered here, are sufficient to defend it against four times
that number; and the more so, as the Russians can from Cronstadt
send any number they think proper over the gulph, and land them
behind the Swedish army, that would advance towards the Kymen:
in whatever position the Swedes place themselves, the Russians may
act against them in front and on either flank, and force them into
the sea, as in the last war in this country, or to abandon it and
retire up the gulph of Bothnia towards Torneo, where they must
perish for want of subsistence.
The Russian’s line of operations goes from Petersburg through
Wyburg; the capital of Finland to David’s Stadt, a new fortress, and
thence to Fredericksham near the Kymen; all which places are well
fortified: the Swedish line goes from the same Kymen to Abo, and
from thence over the gulph of Bothnia to Stockholm on the Baltic:
the first line is about 150 miles in length, and the second near 400.
The first is a good road by which the army may be supplied, as
also by water from Cronstadt, Nerva, Revel, &c. whereas the Swedes
must bring every thing from Stockholm and other places beyond the
gulph of Bothnia.
Whoever considers these circumstances, the great difference there
is in the length of the respective lines of operations, and finally, the
superiority of the Russian forces, will conclude that the Swedes, so
far from being able to attack the former with advantage, cannot pre-
serve their possessions on this frontier a month, if they are attacked:
it would therefore seem prudent to give them up rather than keep
them on such precarious conditions; such a measure would greatly
increase the power of the Swedes, who would have the Danes only
to contend with, to whom in every respect they are much superior.
It was to the circumstances above-mentioned only, we can attribute
the loss of the Swedish provinces, on that side of the Baltic, by
Charles the Twelfth: how could that prince suppose it was possible,
with any forces Sweden could raise and maintain, to preserve them
at such a distance, over a very difficult sea, frozen for six months
in the year, against the superior forces of the Russians, who were
limitrophes, and able to act continually, almost during the whole
year? The event of that, and I believe of most wars, carried on on
such an extensive line, confirms the doctrine we have established;
that is, they miscarry and ruin those who undertake them.
From Petersburg to Riga, on the Dwina, there are Narva and
Revel, which are stations for the Russian squadrons; the coast is
high, and by no means safe for great ships, which dare not shut
themselves in the upper part of the Gulph of Finland, where a west-
erly wind would keep them longer than they would wish; so that
the Russians have nothing to fear on that side, and the less so as
they have from Finland along the coast to Riga, at least fifty thou-
sand men always in quarters.
The country on the Russian side of the Dwina, from Riga, is
something better than Finland, though like it, for the most part cov-
ered with lakes, forests, marshes, &c. and of course is very thinly
inhabited. On all this frontier an enemy can only advance towards
Riga, and from thence to Petersburg, or towards Pleskow, which is
the key into Novogorod and Moscow; the loss of Pleskow, on the
lake Peipus, brought on that of the Swedish provinces. Had Charles
the Twelfth been able to keep it, he might have prevented the
Russians from supporting themselves on the Nieva in Ingria, and by
acting on their line from Moscow to Novogorod, have forced them
to Tweer behind the Wolga. This Pleskow is a very important post,
if they had a powerful enemy to contend with on that frontier, but
they have none: for the Prussians, however formidable, were they
totally disengaged on the side of Germany, can never advance to
the Dwina: their main forces are behind the Oder, and must be
supported from thence, and by land, because the Prussian monarch
has no fleet.
The Russians can, first, send a fleet to ravage the coast from
Memel to Stetin. Secondly, can advance in front into Prussia, and
occupy it before the Prussians can send a sufficient army to prevent
it. Thirdly, they can send a considerable body of troops, particularly
light troops, to act on the Prussian’s line, from Konigsberg to the
Vistula, and even pass this river and advance towards the Warta—
such troops want no magazines.
Smolenskow is fortified, but not so as to be able to make any
considerable resistance; this is the most important point on all the
Russian frontiers, it is only two hundred miles from Moscow, through
Map 14. The Russian Empire in Europe.
which the communication between Petersburg and the southern

provinces passes; by occupying Moscow, the empire is overturned.
It was through this pass the Poles always entered Russia, and for a
long series of years contended with success with the Russians, and
even set up an impostor on the throne of that empire.
If Charles the Twelfth, being master of Poland, instead of going
to Puttawa,2 had taken Smolenskow, and from thence advanced to
Moscow, a victory would have given him that important place, and
for some time the empire. He could not however have preserved it
while connected with Sweden, for the same reasons he could not
preserve his provinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which
must finally happen at such an immense distance, would necessar-
ily have ruined him.
In speaking of the Turkish frontiers, we have already described
that which goes from Smolenskow to Kiow, and from thence to the
Black sea. We shall conclude what we have to say on this subject,
by observing, that however desirous the Russians may be to inter-
fere in the affairs of Germany, they can only act an auxiliary part,
and that for a few months only in the year; they can never main-
tain any conquests beyond the Vistula, so far they may proceed,
because their fleet might co-operate with success, even this would
become difficult, since the Prussians have made acquisitions in Poland,
which unites Prussia with the other provinces of the house of Branden-
burg, and this communication is secured by a capital fortress now
building on the Vistula, near Marien Werder: when we consider the
map, we see that the Turks and Prussians are the only powers that
can approach the Russian frontier, and that Austria must be atten-
tive to their motions; it seems that an alliance between the two
empires would be useful to both.
The rest of the Russian frontier, from the Don to the Wolga,
along the provinces of Orenbourg, Siberia, and Irkutch, has for the
most part several hordes of Tartars in the neighbourhood, who now
and then make incursions into the Russian provinces to plunder,
2
Battle of Poltava (8 July 1709). The decisive battle of the Great Northern War
(1700–21) in that it checked the ambitions of King Charles XII of Sweden and
put Russia on the strategic offensive. Charles frontal attacks on prepared positions
cost him 7,000 killed out of an army of 22,000, while Peter the Great lost roughly
3,000 of his 40,000 soldiers.
which having accomplished, they retire with the utmost expedition.

The Chinese are on the limits of Irkutch, and separated from it
by a small river, which runs through a Town called Kiatcha, inhab-
ited by the subjects of both empires. They could by means of the
Tartars of Great Tartary be troublesome to the Russians, but are
afraid of them, averse to war in general, and do not wish to see the
Tartars armed.
On the north of Siberia, towards the Frozen Sea, the inhabitants
are savages, and live by hunting, pay a small tribute in skins, which
is all they have to pay.
The Persian monarchy has for many years been torn by civil dis-
sensions, which subsided during the reign of Gherim Khan, a very
able and just prince, who died lately; and the civil wars, as usual,
are broken out afresh, so that the Russians have nothing to fear on
that side: moreover, the mountains of Causacus, which run from the
sea of Asoph to the Caspian, present so many difficulties, that nei-
ther can make war beyond them.
Having described the frontiers of the principal European powers
on the Continent, we must now return to consider that of France
on the British channel. This frontier extends from Dunkirk to Ushant,
and round that point, along the Bay of Biscay, to Bayonne; on this
line, however, there is but one harbour, where a great fleet can be
built, equipped, and ride in safety, which is Brest; ships of the line
are also built at Rochfort, and equipped there, but few in number,
and only few can be kept there with safety; they soon perish, because
the water is sweet, though the tide runs very high and violent up
the Charante.
In speaking of the line of operation, on which an army acts, we
have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it is
of any considerable length, or intersected by mountains, passes, and
rivers, and of course, if it goes over a considerable branch of the
sea, no solid enterprize can be executed on such a line, though your
forces are much superior to those who oppose you. A pirate may
land twenty men on the coast of France, or any other, rob a hen-
roost, burn a few houses, and run away to their ship, in spite of
France and its two hundred thousand men, because such an expe-
dition is executed in a few hours.
In the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made several
attempts on the coast of France, the result was burning some fishing-
boats, and, by accident, I believe, some houses, and were happy to
Map 15. Map of Poland.
come off.3 Their last exploits at St. Cas, was, we know, very unfor-
tunate. Whose fault was it? No doubt it was the fault of those who
planned these fine expeditions. Could we have burnt the enemy’s
docks, stores, &c. at Brest and Rochfort, it would have been of great
importance and worth trying; but every other object was by no
means equal to the risk or the expence, and never ought to be
undertaken. No forces the English can bring on the coast will be
sufficient to take Brest, or any other capital place: but for a moment
I will suppose the French are asleep; that the English fleet and fifty
thousand men are at Brest. What then? Why, then they must in a
short time return home, if they can; for surely they cannot remain
at Brest, which in a short time will be surrounded by a French army,
who will besiege you in it, you must therefore abandon it, or advance
into the country: advance, in the name of God! You are at Rennes,
the capital of Britany; What then, I ask once more? Why, you will
be surrounded, your communication with Brest and your fleet cut
off, and your army perishes by the sword or by famine.
What I say of Brest, which indeed is the only place on the coast
where a fleet can for any considerable time ride with safety, is equally
applicable to every other point on this coast, or any other coast
whatever. If your army meets with any, though very inconsiderable
resistance; for while your enemy can keep the field, and act on your
flanks, you cannot remain on any given spot; and if you advance,
you only precipitate your ruin.
On the coast of England there are three harbours, where a great
fleet may ride with safety. The enemy must take one of them. Suppose
it done, and that the English have not a ship left. Suppose further,
that there is a French army of sixty thousand men encamped on
Black-Heath, and off London bridge.
I say, there are two hundred thousand men in England who have
bore arms; I will put half on horseback, and the other half remains
on foot; mix them as circumstances may require, then I place fifty
thousand men in Surry and Sussex, and as many in Essex, who act
on the enemy’s line, which on that supposition must go towards the
Downs, there being no other place where his fleet can anchor; such
a disposition being made, and only half the number of men we pro-
pose employed, I ask any officer, any man of sense, what will become
3
The expeditions to Rochefort (1757), St. Malo (1758), Cherbourg (1758), and
St. Cast Bay (1758) proved ill-conceived and ruined many army careers.
of the enemy’s army on Black-Heath, or in any other given point,

sixty or seventy miles from the coast? It must perish; for undoubt-
edly no army can subsist on a line of such length as is that, from
France to Black-Heath, over a branch of the sea, and penetrate into
the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty thousand men
only to oppose their supplies. No army can subsist in a country,
unless it draws all, or the greatest part of its subsistence from the
country itself, and of course possesses a great tract behind it, and
on every side to the right and left; for if you can act on the enemy’s
line, he must retire; and though he should be in possession of such
a tract of country as we suppose, he cannot keep it, unless he is
master of one or more strong places, to enable him to separate his
troops and put them into winter quarters.
When the combined fleet appeared on our coast, the nation unac-
customed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed, I then
thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion,
and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the
lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he landed, and the
different positions the English army must have occupied on such
lines to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping
the post he had taken on our coast. When I consider this subject
in a military light only, I wished almost that the enemy had made
such an attempt; because once for all they would have seen the
absurdity and danger of it, and we should for ever have been cured
of our fears.
Chapter V. Of America
I take it for granted, that every body has or may have a map of
the seat of war in this country, and therefore have not given it here.
Politics have not in the least contributed to bring this important war
to a happy conclusion, probably have retarded it. In general I have
observed, that when they interfere with military operations, they have
rather retarded than accelerated them: when an army is once in the
field, and the plan of the campaign settled, let the general go his
own way, he is on the spot, and with the assistance of his officers
alone, can determine what is to be done, and how it is to be done.
As I am totally unacquainted with the face of the country, it is
impossible for me, even supposing I was a competent judge, to form
any opinion of the different actions which have happened there, dur-
ing this long war; most, if not all of them, have been successful; it
is therefore just to conclude, they were conducted with wisdom and
valour: why, the result of them did not answer the expectations of
the public, will appear from what we shall say on the subject.
We must beg the reader will recollect what we have said in Chap.
III, on the line of operation, Chap. IV, on the nature and princi-
ples of an offensive war, and compare the doctrine therein estab-
lished with the manner in which the American war was conducted:
it will, we think, appear, that the want of success did not arise from
want of honour, valour, or of wisdom, in planning or executing the
various actions which happened; but from those difficulties which
arose from the nature of the country, and perhaps likewise from the
defects in the general plan of war, that was adopted and pursued
with so little success.
The country is open, that is, it has no fortress excepting Boston,
New-York, and Charles-Town; it is very extensive, and very thinly
inhabited in proportion to its extent; so that there is no one province,
I believe, which could maintain a fleet and an army for a month,
which of course must be supported from England, that is, on a line
of above three thousand miles. Whoever considers this circumstance
only, and calculates the infinite difficulties in transporting and main-
taining an army of forty thousand men, at such an immense dis-
tance, will find many reasons, which have concurred to retard and
frustrate the progress or our arms. Posterity will admire the activity
and vigour of our counsels, and be astonished at the resources of
our country. The ministry could do no more than place and main-
tain a prodigious army on the spot where it was destined to act: no
fault can justly be imputed to them; they are acquitted by every wise
and moderate man, who considers their conduct as to this point with
impartiality. Though the country has no fortress, it is however very
strong by nature, and has very few good roads; it is still in its infancy.
Let us now examine, what seems to me, the real causes of our
little success in this long and unhappy war.
New-York is the point from whence our army must advance into
the country; from this point, with a radius of a hundred miles, for
example; describe a semi-circle, whose diameter is the sea coast; as
there is not, within that circumference, any one fortress whose pos-
session will render you master of a certain tract of country between
it and the coast, it follows you cannot establish a certain line of
operation; the enemy is encamped on that portion of circle, and on

whatever direction you proceed, he meets you, and if you press him,
retires where he pleases, having an immense country behind him,
which furnishes him with provisions from every point of the compass;
whereas you are chained to New-York, you cannot follow the enemy
too far, because you have not a sufficient number of horses and car-
riages for that purpose; and moreover, the enemy may attack your
line behind you and cut off your army, or force you to retire. While
he has an army in the field, you cannot separate yours, without the
greatest danger, twenty miles from New-York. If within the supposed
circle, or any other circle, there was a capital fortress, your line of
operation is of course determined between New-York and such a
fortress, in which case you march and act on that line, the enemy
must follow you or anticipate you, he must fight you or let you take
the place: whereas, as things now are, you are reduced to march-
ing and counter-marching, advancing and retiring within a circle the
whole campaign, even for twenty campaigns, without a possibility of
bringing the enemy to a decisive action, which the principles of an
offensive war require, or of fixing yourselves on any one point. After
much trouble and loss you must necessarily return to New-York, and
so on for twenty campaigns, unless you or the enemy, totally exhausted,
give up the quarrel for want of means to keep it up.
What I have said of New-York, is equally applicable to any other
point from Boston to Georgia, and, indeed, to every other coast in
the world. If your enemy can keep the field, if the country is open,
extensive, and destitute of fortresses, within reach of the shore and
the harbour you occupy, you can never carry on a war with success.
The history of all wars, and of all expeditions, the six fruitless cam-
paigns we have made in America, confirm the truth of our principles.
Yet by the singular position of this country, the possession of
Canada, the superiority of our fleet, and the activity of his majesty’s
ministers, I think, that notwithstanding the difficulties which arise
from the distance, the face of the country, and the nature of the
war, it might with the forces, which have been sent into that coun-
try, have been concluded in one campaign with glory and success.
Let us therefore examine, whether with an army of thirty or forty
thousand men, supported by a powerful fleet, we could or can con-
quer these provinces? I say we could, and always can; if we can be
masters of Boston; from that harbour draw a line to Albany, or some
given point on Hudson’s River, not far from it, which is 150 miles,
a corps of six or eight thousand men advance from Canada towards

Albany, leaving Hudson’s River always on the right; take possession
of Rhode-Island and of Newport on the Continent, with as many
men; chiefly light troops, with very few field-pieces, and some how-
itzers, and as few carriages as possible; the more light horse the bet-
ter, because they can forage at a great distance, and act with vigour
and celerity. The main army, twenty thousand men, at Boston. If
this army advances to Hudson’s River; I say, that another of equal
goodness and force cannot prevent it, if the enemy leaves that river,
and goes to meet you towards Boston, one or both of he above-
mentioned corps from taking possession of Albany, and of some other
posts upon it, and by moving about and avoiding a general action,
he is surrounded and must perish. If he beats your main army, or
quits his line of operation, to pursue either of the above-mentioned
corps, he cannot avoid his fate. It is evident, that the more he
advances on the line, from Hudson’s River towards Boston, the more
certain is his ruin, for this reason; an army acting upon one line
must relinquish it, if the enemy can oppose it in front, and at the
same time on its flank and rear.
In short, to conquer America, you must draw a line from Boston
to Albany, and act on that line in the manner we have proposed:
all operations on lines, drawn from the coast into the country, from
Boston to Charles-Town, will prove hereafter, as they have already
done, unsuccessful.
VI
THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR IN GERMANY, BETWEEN

THE KING OF PRUSSIA, AND THE EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND
HER ALLIES: CONTAINING THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1758 AND 1759,
VOL. II (1790)
CONTENTS

Editor’s [Colin Lindsay] Dedication ........................................ 541
Editor’s [Colin Lindsay] Preface .............................................. 543
Campaign of 1758 ...................................................................... 544
Chapter I. Of the Operations of the Prussians,
till the Taking of Schweidnitz .......................................... 544
Chapter II. Of the Operations of the Prussians and
Austrians after the Taking of Schweidnitz, till the
Retreat of the Former from Olmutz to Silesia,
with Reflections .................................................................. 546
Journal of the Siege of Olmutz ........................................ 555
Reflections on the Siege of Olmutz, and the
Different Operations which were Executed on
that Occasion .................................................................. 595
Chapter III. Of the Operations of the Russian Army
Commanded by General Fermor ...................................... 604
Of the Operations of the Army of the Empire
Commanded by the Prince of Deuxponts .................. 625
Campaign of 1759 ...................................................................... 650
Chapter I [untitled] ................................................................ 650
Reflections on these Transactions .................................... 661
Reflections .......................................................................... 671
Chapter II. Of the Operations of the Austrian Army,
Commanded by Marshal Daun in 1759 .......................... 677
Reflections .......................................................................... 684
Chapter III. Of the Operations of the Imperial Army ...... 685
Reflections .......................................................................... 693
Note A ........................................................................................ 704
Note B ........................................................................................ 706
Note C ........................................................................................ 708
Note D ........................................................................................ 711
Note E ........................................................................................ 715
Note F ........................................................................................ 718
Note G ........................................................................................ 725
Note H ........................................................................................ 728
After Henry Lloyd died suddenly in June 1783, British agents descended
on his residence at Huy and absconded with his papers and effects.
Colin Lindsay of the 46th Regiment of Foot, edited and published
in 1790 the newly-discovered second volume of the history of the
Seven Years’ War. It covers the campaigns of 1758 and 1759, espe-
cially the cataclysmic Prusso-Russian battles of Zorndorf and Kuners-
dorf. Less polished than its predecessors, it nonetheless continues the
development of Lloyd’s principles of war-making and earlier themes.
Lloyd’s first-hand experience, especially at the battles of Hochkirch
and Maxen, informs the cogent analysis.
Lloyd’s scrutinized and amplified his criticism of Frederick’s meth-
ods and tactics; deeming them predictable and therefore ineffective
by 1758. The tactics of Leuthen could not be repeated, he con-
cluded, because the enemy expected him to attempt them at every
turn. Thus, posthumously he swum against the prevailing tide, espe-
cially in Prussia, that Frederick’s methods were near-flawless and
approached the ideal. But one implicit question permeates the nar-
rative: why did the Russians and Austrians fail to win the war after
inflicting several devastating defeats upon Frederick the Great’s army?
For their part the Russians did not act upon proper ‘lines of oper-
ation’ and therefore had great difficulty translating battlefield suc-
cess into operational or strategic advantage. The Austrians under
Daun suffered from inaction and a lack of strategic vision. As Lloyd
observed, they had no fixed plans and no sense of what they wanted
to achieve with their victories.
This volume was a postscript on a colorful career. The history
itself is unfinished; personifying Lloyd’s own incomplete career. By
1790, the age of the Enlightenment had ended and a new age of
revolution took its place. Lloyd and his times were soon overshad-
owed and in part forgotten by the tumult of the French Revolution
and the wars of Napoleon Bonaparte. But his concepts and ideas
would inform and influence the thought of future thinkers up to the
present day.
Colin Lindsay added several notes as an appendix in the original
volume, mostly to add other accounts that countered Lloyd’s narration
540 vi. the history of the late war in germany, vol. ii (1790)
or analysis, especially accounts by Tempelhof. I have included these

notes as they were part of the original volume.
Publishing History
History of the Late War in Germany, Between the King of Prussia, and the
Empress of Germany and her Allies: Containing the Campaigns of 1758,
and 1759. Volume 2. With a correct Military Map of the Seat of
War; and Plans of the Siege of Olmütz, and the Battles of Zornsdorf,
Hochkirchen, Paltzig, Cunnersdorf, or Frankfurt, and Maxen.
Published from the General’s Manuscripts, under the Inspection
of an English Officer, and Illustrated with Notes Critical, Historical,
and Explanatory. London: Printed for T. and J. Egerton, 1790.
en partie de l’anglais de Lloyd, et en partie redigee sur la corres-
pondance originale de plusieurs officers francais et principalement
History of the Late War in Germany, Between the King of Prussia, and the
Empress of Germany and her Allies: Containing the Campaigns of 1758,
and 1759. Volume 2. (Cambridge: Ken Trotman, 2003). This is
a facsimile reprint of the 1790 edition.
To His Royal Highness Frederic, duke of York and Albany,1 &c.
&c. &c.
Sir,
The last Sheets our Author lived to publish, were dedicated to Your
Royal Brother the Prince of Wales; to whose Patronage then could
the Remainder of the Work be with so much Propriety addressed
as to that of Your Royal Highness? But You have a still better Title,
Sir, to this Homage; it is to Your Royal Highness that the British
Army looks up as the future Restorer of that uniform System of
Miliatry Discipline, which distinguished it under Your Great Uncle
of glorious Memory; without which, in spite of its native Valour, it
will always fall far short of Perfection, and which, Experience has
proved, can in this Country never be long maintained but under
the Auspices of a Prince of the Royal Family. Deign then, Sir, to
read, and to protect this posthumous Work of the almost only orig-
inal Military Writer of our Country; his Precepts were written for
Princes, and are worthy of them.
That Your Royal Highness may one Day have an Opportunity
of applying them to the solid Advantage of the Nation, the increased
Lustre of its Arms, and Your own immortal Glory and Renown, is
the sincere and ardent Wish of him, who has the Honor to sub-
scribe himself, with the warmest Attachment, and the most profound
Respect,
Your Royal Highness’s

Most obedient, and devoted Servant,
The Editor [Colin Lindsay, 46th Regiment of Foot]2
1
Prince Frederick, Duke of York and Earl of Ulster (1763–1827). Second son
of King George III, he sought a military career and initiated many military reforms
as Commander-in-Chief (1798–1808).
2
Brig. Gen. Colin Lindsay (1755–95) also published, Extracts from Colonel
Tempelhoffe’s History of the Seven Years’ War: His Remarks on General Lloyd, On the
Subsistance of Armies, and On the March of Convoys, 2 vols. (London: Printed for T. Cadell,
1793).
THE EDITOR’S PREFACE
The following Sheets are printed from a Manuscript in General

Lloyd’s own Hand Writing, which he left nearly ready for the Press.
Little else was wanting than supplying some Minutiæ of Detail, such
as orders of Battle, et cætera, and the necessary Topographical
Illustrations; these the Editor has furnished from the best Materials
he could procure, and further than this he has nothing to boast.
The Author’s Stile he has left as he found it, referring the Reader
to the general’s own Excuse for it, contained in his Preface to the
first Volume. With respect to the Observations the Editor has haz-
arded in the Notes, he had rather detailed the Author’s Ideas than
obtruded any of his own; nor should he have ventured to do even
that, but under the Conviction, that Truth and Knowledge are to
be produced only by Discussion, like Fire by Collision; and that by
inspiring a Taste for Military Criticism into his Brother Soldiers, he
might render an essential Service to his Country, since in correcting
his Ideas, they must almost necessarily purify and enlarge their own.
CAMPAIGN OF 1758
Chapter I. Of the Operations of the Prussians, till the

Taking of Schweidnitz
The king of Prussia commanded at Breslau during the months of

December, January, and February: the fifteenth of March he left
that city, accompanied by his brother, prince Ferdinand, Prince
Maurice of Anhalt Dessau, prince Eugene of Würtemberg, and sev-
eral other generals, to contract his quarters, and assemble his troops
in the neighbourhood of Landshut, in order to cover the siege of
Schweidnitz, with which he proposed beginning the operations of
this campaign, which would enable him to undertake some other
expedition of greater consequence in Bohemia or Moravia, before
the enemy could approach his frontiers. His majesty’s head-quarters
were at Creysau, with six regiments of infantry, and some batallions
of guards. His light troops, supported by some regular infantry and
cavalry as circumstances required, were continually employed in har-
rassing the Austrian posts in the mountains, and driving them back,
in order to prevent them from approaching Schweidnitz. Several
expeditions were undertaken and executed with various success, of
little or no advantage to either party, and always attended with great
loss of men, particularly in winter: generals are too lavish of the
blood of light troops, which are counted for nothing; they harrass
them continually in marches, and counter-marches, in attacking posts,
&c. I am of opinion, that no operation whatever should be attempted,
or post attacked, unless the possession of it be absolutely necessary
to facilitate some capital enterprise. I would also recommend that
the new recruits, on coming to the army at the beginning of the
campaign, should be employed in the advanced posts with the light
troops, to accustom them to see the enemy often. This in a short
time would insure them to labour, and inspire them with courage
and coolness equal to the veterans.
The necessary preparations being made for the siege of Schweidnitz,
which had been blocked up during the winter, lieutenant general
Treskow, with five thousand men infantry, two companies of min-
ers, and thirty-five squadrons of cavalry (in all about nine thousand
six hundred men) opened the trenches before that place in the night
between the first and second of April. In a few days nine batteries
were erected, four of four cannon, and four howitzers, three of five
mortars, each placed behind the former, one of five mortars, and
one of eight twenty-four pounders. The thirteenth and fourteenth a
new bomb battery opposite the Wassar fort, and on the fifteenth at
night took the Galgen fort by assault, which reduced the governor
lieutenant general Count Thierhaimb [Franz Ludwig Thürheim] to
surrender the sixteenth. The garrison consisting of two generals, one
hundred and seventy-three officers, three thousand four hundred and
thirty-six soldiers, one thousand three hundred invalids, were made
prisoners of war. Besides the cannon which the Austrians had found
in the place, when they took it the preceding year, there was found
belonging to the Austrians twenty twelve pounders, three twenty-four
pounders, three of ten, eight mortars, ten pounders, one of thirty,
ten of sixty, all brass, and six iron of sixty, in all fifty-one pieces,
cannon and mortars. The loss of the Prussians was two officers, three
under officers, one bombardier, ninety-one soldiers, and five com-
mon men killed; fourteen officers, ten under officers, two bombardiers,
two hundred and thirty-one soldiers, and four men belonging to the
army wounded.
This place is by no means strong; it was taken the preceding year
by the Austrians in nearly the same space of time. In one thousand
seven hundred and sixty-one Laudohn took it in a few hours sword
in hand, without opening the trenches; and it was finally retaken in
one thousand seven hundred and sixty-two, after a defence of ten
weeks. Whence proceeded this very great difference? From the
difference of characters, and abilities of the different persons, who
conducted the siege and defence, in the different periods. The last
siege was remarkable for the noble defence the place made owing
chiefly to the superior abilities of M. Gribauval,1 now a lieutenant
general, and I believe at the head of the department of artillery in
France. We shall therefore in the sequel give an exact plan of the
place, and its environs, with the positions of the respective armies
during the siege, and a journal of it, with some remarks of our own,
1
Jean-Baptiste Gribeauval (1715–89). French engineer and artillery colonel,
Gribeauval served as a volunteer in the Austrian army and later instituted impor-
tant reforms that modernized the French artillery.
on that event, which concluded the war, for no other enterprise of

consequence was afterwards undertaken or executed.
The retaking of Schweidnitz reduced the state of the war to what
it was at the breaking out of it; the fatal battle of Leuthen was the
cause. Had the Austrians avoided it, being in possession of Glatz
and Schweidnitz, and their powerful, this campaign might and ought
to have begun with the siege of Glogau, which the approach of the
Russians would have facilitated. Neiss must have fallen of course.
The war was finished; Silesia conquered: the Prussians could not
pretend to defend Brandeburg and Pomerania after the taking Glogau,
when attacked and surrounded by the Austrians, Russians, and
Swedes.
Chapter II. Of the Operations of the Prussians and Austrians after

the Taking of Schweidnitz, till the Retreat of the Former from
Olmutz into Silesia, with Reflections
After the taking of Schweidnitz, the king of Prussia intending to pen-

etrate into Moravia, and besiege Olmutz, ordered the troops which
were to compose that army, to assemble near Reichenbach, and
from thence to proceed towards Neiss. General Ziethen, with a corps
of about eight thousand men, was detached towards Upper Lusatia.*
General Fouquet, with about an equal number, was left in the coun-
try of Glatz, from whence he sent troops to occupy the mountains
on his right towards Friedland, which effectually covered the march
of the former. In the mean time the king visited the county of Glatz,
and ordered the roads leading to Landscron and Habelschwerd to
be repaired.
The Austrians quitted their quarters on the nineteenth of April,
and went to occupy the camp, which had been traced for them at
Skalitz (on the frontier of the county of Glatz) where the head quar-
ters was established. General Boscow with a considerable corps, was
placed at Trautenau on the road which leads from Bohemia to
Landshut and Schweidnitz in Silesia. The duke of Aremberg, with
the corps of reserve was posted at Nachod, and general Laudohn
* The king says, he was sent to Landshut, and rejoined his army before Olmutz,
about the 10th of June.
with his light troops at Lewin. Before we proceed further in relat-

ing the operations of this campaign, it will be right to give a state
of the Prussian forces, and how and where they were employed.
The Prussian army destined to besiege Olmutz being assembled
at Neiss, marched in two columns, and in three days that led by
the king arrived at Troppau, and the other led by Marshal Keith,
who was to command the siege at Jagerndorff, these two columns
entered the plains of Olmutz the third of May, one by Sternberg,
and the other by Gibau. Part of these troops passed the Morave at
Littau, and went to encamp near Marisch Neustadt; General [Charles,
marquis] de Ville who had commanded the troops in Moravia dur-
ing the winter, threw the greatest part of his infantry into Olmutz,
and with his cavalry retired to Prosnitz. The king ordered a detach-
ment of two regiments of hussars under Colonel [ Johann Paul]
Werner2 to march to Olschan, where the Austrians had some mag-
azines covered by a small detachment which retired without loss.
The Prussians supported by his majesty in person, with a corps of
infantry and dragoons, advanced towards Prosnitz, from whence
General de Ville retired with his cavalry, and occupied a strong post
at Predlitz, on which prince Eugene of Würtemberg, with four reg-
iments of dragoons, one of hussars, and some batallions of infantry
occupied Prosnitz.
General Fouquet observing by Marshal Daun’s motions, that he
proposed marching towards Moravia, having reinforced the garrison
of Glatz, went with the remainder of his corps to Neiss, and from
thence convoyed the ammunition and artillery designed for the siege
of Olmutz towards that place, and on the twelfth of May arrived at
Gibau, upon which the king, then at Littau at the head of about
ten thousand men, went to join the prince of Würtemberg, who
commanded about eight thousand men at Czetkowitz. These two
corps were formed in two lines, the artillery of reserve was placed
on a high ground between them, general Fouquet with the heavy
artillery, ammunition, &c. replaced the troops which had been drawn
from Littau by prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau.
The king, with a great body of troops, chiefly cavalry, left Czet-
kowitz, passed by Prosnitz, advanced to attack General de Ville at
2
In 1762, Frederick sent Werner’s hussars to raid Hungary along with a group
of Crimean Tartars.
Illustration 17
Illustration 18
Predlitz. This last retired towards Wischau: there was a smart action
at the village of Drissitz, in which, after some loss on both sides,
the Prussians were repulsed by Count St. Ignon,3 who commanded
the Austrians. The day following the king retired to his former camp
near Prosnitz.* Soon after the Prussians began to contract their
different posts, in order to besiege Olmutz; Markgrave Charles4 occu-
pied Neustadt; prince Maurice, Littau; general Wedel,5 Namiest; the
king, the heights between Prosnitz and the Morave. The trenches
were opened before Olmutz the twenty-seventh of this month, on
the side of Tobitschau, beyond the river; a regiment of dragoons,
five hundred hussars, and two batallions were sent to invest the place
on that side.
General Laudohn, who conducted the avantgarde of Marshal
Daun’s army with about five thousand men, chiefly light troops, quit-
ted his post at Lewin the second of May, and marched to Reichenau.
The main army on the third likewise left the camp of Skalitz, and
went to Wodierad. A considerable body of troops commanded by
general Harsch,6 was posted at Nachod, to cover Bohemia on that
side; while Marshal Daun advanced to Chotzen on the fourth, and
the day following encamped at Leitomischel. In the mean time gen-
eral Laudohn advanced to Landscron, and being informed that
General de Ville had retired towards Prosnitz, advanced to Hohenstadt,
where he arrived on the sixth, and immediately occupied the posts
of Aussee and Muglitz, from whence strong parties were continually
detached to observe and restrain those of the enemy. In the mean
time general Jahnus, with a considerable body of light troops, took
post at Schildberg the sixth, and sent detachments to Schomberg
and Grunberg, from whence he would observe the motions of the
Prussians, and interrupt their communication with Troppau and
Upper Silesia. On the nineteenth this general took post at Aller
Heiligen, near Muglitz, and from thence sent detachments on the
enemy’s communciations towards Bährn and Hoff, which alarmed
their posts, attacked several with success, and destroyed and took
several of the transports sent into the country to collect forage, &c.
3
Maj. Gen. Count Joseph Saint-Ignon.
* See Note A.
4
Markgrave Karl von Brandenburg-Schwedt.
5
Maj. Gen. Johann von Wedell.
6
Maj. Gen. Ferdinand Philipp Harsch, commander of Austrian engineers.
in all which skirmishes the Austrians obtained great advantages. The

progress of the siege was greatly interrupted by these continual attacks;
for which reason the king, at the head of ten battallions, fifteen
squadrons of cavalry, and two of hussars, with some artillery, marched
at eleven o’clock in the night, between the twenty-first and twenty-
second of May, and at break of day began a terrible fire of artillery
against the posts, which general Laudohn had at Namiest and Belvedir,
which lasted till six in the evening; when general Laudohn advanced
with two regiments of hussars to support his posts, on whose appear-
ance those of the Prussians halted, and soon after returned to their
camp, having lost some men in their retreat; a batallion of their
grenadiers was attacked by the Austrians sword in hand, and suffered
very considerably; the Austrians lost two captains, a lieutenant, and
thirty men on this occasion.*
On the twenty-third of May: the army under Marshal Daun, left
Leitomischel, and encamped at Zwittaw, and the next day marched
to Gewitsch, where it occupied a very strong camp, the right flank
being posted at the town stretching from thence to a village called
Kornitz, on the road which runs between Drosnitz and Tyrnau; it
turned off there in a potence formed by the cavalry belonging to
the left wing. The corps of grenadiers and carabiniers occupied the
height in front of the town between Jarmeritz and Biskupitz, the
reserve encamped on the right of the army with its left to Gewitsch,
and its right to Oppatowitz; a small rivulet with marshy banks cov-
ered the front, and some dykes the left flank. Here the Marshal
remained till the sixteenth of June. Meanwhile the corps commanded
by General Harsch marched to Marisch Tribau: the country between
these posts and those of the Prussians was filled by the troops under
Generals Laudohn, Jahnus, and de Ville, so that not a day passed
without many skirmishes; and though in some of them the Austrians
were forced to retire, upon the whole they always reaped the advan-
tage, by interrupting the operations of the enemy, and forcing him
to contract his posts, so that he could draw little or no forage or
other succours from the country itself; every thing must come from
Troppau, about forty miles off, which road was continually infested
by the several detachments posted in the neighbouring mountains.
* See Note B.
One of these attacked a considerable convoy on the twenty-eighth

near Heidenpiltsch, dispersed the escorte, took about three hundred
waggons with most of the horses, and carried them off. Laudohn
attacked the Prussians at Laskow with success. Möhring’s hussars
were totally dispersed, and lost many men and horses. Colonel le
Noble, at the head of eight hundred men and some cannon, was
attacked by Lieutenant Colonel Lanius near Sternberg, and totally
routed, having lost four hundred men taken prisoners with three
pieces of cannon, the convoy destroyed, himself wounded with about
two hundred men only escaped. On the fifteenth of June Marshal
Daun ordered General St. Ignon with a strong detachment of cav-
alry to advance towards Prerau on the left of the Morave to restrain
the enemy’s parties from plundering the country. The same day the
Marshal having made his dispositions for the march of the army on
the day following, went off in the evening, though late, to examine
the camp he proposed occupying; accordingly the army broke up
before day break, and proceeded in five columns to the camp marked
out, near a village called Prodivanow, where it arrived at six in the
evening, the march having been retarded by heavy rains which broke
the roads, which were otherwise very bad, as they passed through
great and difficult mountains, passes, &c. The heavy baggage was
left behind. The seventeenth the march was resumed in the most
secret manner, and the army proceeded in three columns, the Marshal
at the head of the van composed of the grenadiers and carabiniers,
that he might form his dispositions according to the circumstances
which might occur during the march, being near the enemy (a
method which all Generals should imitate in such cases). This march,
like that of the preceding day, was difficult, on account of the moun-
tains, ravins, &c. through which it passed. The army halted in com-
ing out of the last passes that the whole might come up, which being
done, it proceeded to occupy the camp traced between Prödlitz and
Evanowitz, and there joined by the corps under General de Ville.
These fine and decisive marches were planned with such wisdom,
and conducted with such secrecy, that the enemy had not the least
intelligence of them, insomuch that their troops were then foraging
in that neighbourhood, when the army arrived.
On the eighteenth General St. Ignon attacked a Prussian post at
Hollitz, consisting of two batallions and two squadrons of Bareuth’s
dragoons, and three of Putkammer’s, and forced them to abandon
it with great loss. Count Stainville,7 brother to the duke of Choiseul,
who attacked the enemy’s left, took a pair of silver kettle drums,
killed near two hundred men, and made one hundred and five pris-
oners; those on the other wing had equal success. This affair being
happily concluded, Count St. Ignon was returning with his detach-
ment to his former post, and was about a league from Hollitz, when
a dragoon came from Olmutz to inform him, that the garrison made
a sally, and that they had shut up the enemy at the village of Wister-
nitz, whom they desired the Count to attack. On which, though the
troops under his command were extremely fatigued, the Count, with-
out hesitating a moment, wheeled about, on approaching Wisternitz
he perceived seven squadrons of the enemy which seemed disposed
to attack him in his rear; he ordered his detachment to wheel right
about, and instantly charged them, and though supported by a batal-
lion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, they were totally destroyed,
having lost near eight hundred men killed and wounded; among the
latter was general Meyer, who commanded them.
The regiment of light horse had been raised during the winter,
and greatly distinguished itself on this occasion, like our Elliot’s,
though it was the first action of consequence in which it had been
engaged.
It is observable that new raised infantry do not in general behave
so well as new raised cavalry; the reason I believe is, that the for-
mer being placed in a line, and moving slowly has too much time
to reflect on the danger of its situation; when cavalry being instantly
brought to action, moreover incited by emulation, goes on with more
vigour than the old regiments. If there is not in the troops a sense
of honour, fear then prompts them to act with the utmost vigour,
which is regarded as the only means to finish the danger.
This action does much honour to the zeal, valour and wisdom of
Count St. Ignon and his officers. It is an example worthy to be imi-
tated, and we therefore recommend it to our brethren.
The new position taken by Marshal Daun so near the Prussians,
obliged his Majesty to contract his posts that he might be in sufficient
force, either to attack him or defend himself in case he was attacked;
he therefore recalled the corps posted at Neustadt and Littau, and
7
Léopold Charles, comte de Stainville (1724–81). Brother of French Foreign
Minister Etienne-François, duc de Choiseul (1719–82), and later Bishop of Evreux
and Archbishop of Albi and Cambrai.
placed them in the camp near Prostnitz and Czetcowitz. On the

twentieth his Majesty at the head of ten or twelve thousand men,
advanced on the hills beyond Prædlitz in order to reconnitre Marshal
Daun’s camp, and at the same time to cover a foraging made in
the village on his right; these two objects being fulfilled, he returned
to his camp at Prostnitz.
On the twenty-first Marshal Daun detached General Baron Bülow8
with twelve thousand men, with orders to march by Prerau into
Olmutz, which he executed the day following without losing a man.
The Prussians made a great foraging on the twenty-third, aban-
doned the mountains of Rumback near Littau, retired to Klein Senitz
and reinforced their posts at Laskow, with two regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry drawn from the corps at Prosnitz, and from that
which made the siege of Olmutz. They also withdrew the rest of
their troops from Littau, and concentered their forces near Olmutz;
and to prevent the Austrians from passing the Morava, broke up
their bridges on that river at Nenakowitz, and Dub. The twenty-
sixth the corps which carried on the siege were reinforced by about
eight thousand men chiefly cavalry, which occupied Wisternitz, Teinitz,
Hollitz, etcætera, on the left of the Morava to prevent the Austrians
from throwing any more succours into the place on that side, while
the king with the main army did the same on the other side.
On the twenty-seventh after dinner, Marshal Daun unexpectedly
ordered his army to march to Dobromielitz, his right came towards
Klenowitz, and his left at the former place, both covered by two
small rivers. His motives for taking up this new position were prob-
ably as follows; in the first place, to draw the king’s whole attention
to his own safety, under the persuasion that he was on the point of
being attacked, and consequently preventing his Majesty from mak-
ing any considerable detachments. In the next place, to cover the
march of a corps that he sent across the Morava, under the com-
mand of General Ziskowitz;9 for the Marshal being informed that a
great convoy consisting of several thousand waggons, loaded with
stores, money and provisions, escorted by twelve or fourteen thou-
sand men commanded by general Ziethen, was advancing from Neiss
8
Maj. Gen. Ferdinand Friedrich Bülow.
9
Maj. Gen. Josef, Graf von Siskovíc. Lacy’s successor as Quartermeistergeneral and
Lloyd’s arch-rival who played a considerable role in his decision to resign his com-
mission in 1761.
by Troppau, to the camp at Olmutz, determined to attack it, accord-

ingly he detached general Laudohn, who was posted at Willinow
with about six thousand men, to fall upon it on that side, and General
Ziskowitz with the same force to do the like on the other. These
two generals came up with the convoy between Bautsch and Domstättle
and instantly attacked, dispersed and defeated the escorte, which lost
about three thousand men. General Laudohn made prisoners, gen-
eral Putkammer, two majors, twenty officers, two hundred soldiers,
and six pieces of cannon, and near one thousand waggons, while
general Ziskowitz took over thirty officers, two batallions of eight
hundred men each compleat, six pieces of cannon, and near one
thousand waggons; General Ziethen was forced back to Troppau, a
very small and trifling part of the convoy arrived in the camp before
Olmutz. This remarkable action deserves to be transmitted to pos-
terity, with all the particulars of it, as it will furnish an useful les-
son to such officers as may be employed on similar occasions. We
shall therefore give here a translation of the different accounts pub-
lished of it, by both parties.
Though the siege was conducted as all others, which I believe
differ only in a greater or lesser degree of vigour shewn on both
sides, the mode of carrying it on must be the same, the points of
attack also must be regulated by the position of the place, and the
greater or lesser facility of approaching it, on one side rather than
on the other, all places being constructed on the same principle, the
method of attacking them is determined by rules analagous to the
trenches, parallels, saps, mines, galleries, batteries, &c. and their con-
structions; contrary to custom, the besieged shewed more vigour than
the besiegers. We shall therefore give the journal of the siege, and
the more so as it will serve to explain some other transactions.*
Journal of the Siege of Olmutz
After general Fouquet’s corps had joined the camp at Krenau, Field
Marshal Keith took upon himself the command of it and the con-
* The Journal alluded to, as well as the accounts of the destruction of the con-
voy, as published by the respective parties, not having been found among the
Author’s papers, the Editor has supplied that deficiency by an Extract from Colonel
Templehoff ’s very accurate work.
duct of the siege; he had under his orders lieutenant general Fouquet,
and Major generals Schenkendorf,10 prince Francis of Brunswick11
and [ Johann Karl] Rebentisch. The king came to the camp from
Prosnitz, and after he had reviewed the army of the siege, and the
train of artillery, he rode out accompanied by the general officers
and engineers, to reconnoitre the fortress and its environs, and gave
out the necessary orders respecting the siege. The corps appointed
to carry it on, was ordered immediately to invest the town on the
side of Drosnitz, and to form a chain of posts in such a manner, as
that whole extensive space might be occupied. The right wing was
on the Morava and had Neustadt before its front, and Nimlau in
the rear; the left extended itself beyond Krenau, and had this vil-
lage in its rear; the Field Marshal’s head quarters was in Schnabellin,
and was occupied by the batallion of Lattorf, and the two compa-
nies of miners. Near this village was placed the artillery, and the
depot of all the other necessary stores for carrying on the siege in
Horcke, a village on the left. Near a forest, was placed the bakery,
to which were attached two hundred and fifty waggons of the Proviant-
train, and here also was a depot of meal and forage, and the field
hospital belonging to this corps; two companies of the batallion of
Naumeister were posted to protect these, and the two others on the
bridge of Chometau. On the right wing, near the regiment of Pan-
nerwitz, was a bridge thrown over the Morava, to facilitate the com-
munication with the country on the other side of that river; this was
occupied by a corps under the command of general Meier of the
dragoons, which was posted as follows: the batallion of Naimchefsky
in Lodenitz, two hundred jagers in Drussowitz, ten squadrons of
Bareuth dragoons, and two squadrons of Seydlitz’s hussars in the
neighbourhood of Starnau, and Bauniowitz; this little corps was so
distributed, in order to maintain the communication with Silesia,
with which view also the free batallions, Le Noble and Salenmon
occupied Sternberg, in order to cover the siege; his Majesty posted
himself at Prosnitz, with a corps consisting of the following regiments.
10
Maj. Gen. Friedrich August von Schenckendorff
11
Prince Friedrich Franz, Prince von Brunswick-Lüneburg. General and brother-
in-law of Frederick the Great, who was decapitated by a cannonball at the battle
of Hochkirch (1759).
Infantry Cavalry
1 gren. bat. Haake 5 Sq. Gardes du corps
1 gren. bat. Kremzow 5 Sq. Gens d’Armes
2 M.B. Charles 5 Sq. Carabiniers
2 M.B. Kannaker 5 Sq. Krokow
2 M.B. Itzenplitz 5 Sq. Schmettau
2 M.B. Wedel 5 Sq. Ziethen’s Hussars
2 M.B. Lattorf 5 Sq. Putkammer
2 batallions, Old Brunswick 5 Sq. Seidlitz
2 batallions of guards 5 Sq. Norman Dragoons
1 batallion Retzow 5 Sq. Czettritz
1 gren. bat. Carlowitz 5 Sq. Young Krokow
1 gren. bat. Wedel 5 Sq. Young Plathen
1 gren. bat Diringshofen 10 Sq. Werner’s Hussars
1 gren. bat. Benkendorf 10 Sq. Möhring
21 batallions 88 squadrons
The generals attached to this corps were to the infantry; lieutenant

general Prince Ferdinand, major generals Geist, [ Johann Albrecht
von] Bülow, H.A. Kahlden, Wedel—to the cavalry, lieutenant gen-
erals Prince of Würtemberg, Ziethen, and Seydlitz, and major gen-
erals [Robert Scipio von] Lentulus, Bredow, [Karl Christoph von]
Schmettau, the Younger Krokow, [E.F.] Czetteritz, and Putkammer.
The bakery, with two hundred and fifty waggons of the proviant-
train, was in Drehowitz.
In the camp near Littau, or Aschmeritz, were posted the follow-
ing corps under the orders of Prince Maurice, who succeeded in this
command to Field Marshal Keith.
2 batallions Prince of Prussia 2 bat. Assebourg

2 bat. Forcade 2 Bat. Munchau in Littau
2 bat. Manteufel
1 gren. bat. Schenkendorf 1 gren. bat. Rath
1 gren. bat. Rohr 1 gren. bat. Heyden
5 sq. Schöneich 5 sq. Kyau
5 sq. Bredow 200 Ziethen’s hussars
Total 15 batallions and 15 Squadrons
The generals attached to this corps were, lieutenant generals [F.W.]

Forcade and Neuwied, and major generals Prince Charles of Bevern,
Lattorf, [Friedrich Christoph von] Saldern, and Kreutz, to the infantry;

[Prince Johann von] Schöneich and [Hans von] Krokow, to the cav-
alry. The bakery of these troops was in Littau, together with the
field commissariat, the military chest, the magazine of meal, and
other provisions, the hospital, and four hundred and fifty waggons
of the proviant-train.
In the camp of Neustadt, under the Markgrave Charles, were
1 gren. bat. Beverling

1 gren. bat. Manteufel
1 gren. bat. Unruh
2 M.B. Geist
2 M.B. Kalkstein
7 batallions
And 3 squadrons of Seydlitz’s hussars.
The generals with these were, lieutenant generals the prince of Hesse
Cassel12 and [Wolf Friedrich von] Retzow, and major generals Kan-
naker, Bornstädt, and [Georg Conrad von der] Goltz. This corps
drew its subsistence from Littau.
The Austrians on their side were also separated into several corps;
Marshal Daun, with the grand army, encamped near Leutomischel,
and general Harsch having quitted his post at Nachod on the seven-
teenth, was advanced as far as Nikel; general Laudohn, with his light
troops, was stationed near Konitz, and extended his posts to Willinow,
Namiest, Laskow, Ptin, and so on, to keep up his communication
with De Ville, who with a strong corps of cavalry, was posted on
the road to Brinn; general Janus occupied the heights of Allerheligen,
near Muglitz, with his light troops, who possessed themselves also of
Seren, Lostitz, the castle of Busow, and Aussee. Colonel Lanius, with
about a thousand light troops, was at Friedland and Lobnick, to
observe and molest the road of communication with Silesia.
The numbers of their light troops (the greater part of whom are
composed of men who are to be depended on, and who are accus-
tomed to a very hardy course of life), gave the Austrian generals a
considerable advantage; and they are obliged to them for the suc-
cess of many of their enterprizes, which otherwise they perhaps never
12
Hereditary Prince Friedrich von Hessen-Kassel.
would have risked. They profit by this superiority in light troops, to

draw round their encampments a chain of a prodigious extent, con-
sisting not merely of single posts, but of small corps, so that the
grand army is not only perfectly secured from surprizes, but is enabled
behind this curtain to make various movements, without their oppo-
nents receiving the least intelligence of their motions, till they are
drawn up and ready to attack him; all their marches are by this
means covered, and it is absolutely impossible to attack them on the
move, since it commonly happens that a chain of these troops is
drawn quite from the camp they quit to that which they are to take
up; desertion for the same reason can never be very great among
them, although an Austrian army contains as many foreigners, or
perhaps more, than any other. Their opponents on the contrary are
exposed to various little accidents, which though they decide noth-
ing on the whole, are nevertheless very troublesome to the troops.
They must pay the strictest attention to render secure the commu-
nications with their detached corps and magazines, the enemy’s light
troops infesting the whole country, and watching every opportunity
to snap up something, wherein they are very often successful.
Between the king’s army and the corps under prince Maurice at
Littau, there was a considerable space left entirely open; and this
circumstance gave general Laudohn an opportunity through his
detachments posted at Willinow and Namiest, to render the com-
munication between the two extremely insecure; this was the more
troublesome inasmuch as the consumption of the bakery in Drehowitz
was to be supplied from the magazine in Littau, and to this end
transports were constantly passing to and fro. The king determined
hereupon to drive Laudohn away. With this view, in the night of
the twenty-first and twenty-second of May, he put himself in motion
with a strong corps of troops in three columns; the first under the
command of the prince of Würtemberg, consisted of the grenadier
batallion of Diringshofen, five hundred dragoons, and five hundred
hussars, of Werner; they moved forward to Blumenau, and there
remained to cover the march of the others against the corps under
De Ville. The second under Ziethen, which consisted of the second
batallion of Lattorf, and five hundred dragoons, was destined to take
the enemy in the right flank; and with this view marched by Rostelitz,
Starechowitz, and Czech, to Premeslowitz: in the third column, under
generals Geist and Putkammer, was the grenadier batallion Carlowitz,
the second batallion of Markgrave Charles, the second of Kannaker,
and the second of old Brunswick; they took their march by Czech,
and from thence over the mountains strait to Namiest. At the same
time prince Maurice had received orders to detach prince Charles
of Bevern with the grenadier batallion, Schenkendorf, the second
batallion of Manteufel, and the second of Asseburg, with fifty hussars,
strait to Willinow and Namiest, to come on the left flank and the
rear of the enemy; all these columns marched off in such a manner
as to arrive at the same moment at day-break at their several posts;
the success meanwhile did not answer these excellent dispositions.
General Laudohn had received timely intelligence of the king’s
approach, as well from his advanced posts as from his spies, among
whom you might reckon almost every peasant in the country round
about; besides this, the detachment under the prince of Bevern,
arrived earlier than the other columns, and put the enemy in motion.
The small advanced detachments did not lose a moment in falling
back on their main body, leaving the greater part of their baggage
behind them; and the mountainous and woody nature of the coun-
try (of which the light troops knew every foot path) gave general
Laudohn the means of gaining the heights behind Konitz; without
any considerable loss. Indeed Ziethen’s hussars found an opportu-
nity to take prisoners one captain and one lieutenant of Croats, and
one captain and one lieutenant of hussars, with forty-eight Croats,
and to cut several more in pieces. There was on both sides a good
deal of cannonading, but without effect; the enemy keeping con-
stantly at a distance, where there was no getting at them. The king
followed them as far as Konitz, but when he saw that no essential
advantage was to be obtained from pursuing them any further, he
sent back his troops to their posts again.
As soon as Marshal Daun received advice that the army of the
siege, with the necessary ammunition, and other stores, was come
before Olmutz, he thought it was then time to approach the king,
and to devise some means of relieving the fortress. With this design
he broke up his camp at Leitomischel, on the twenty-third marched
to Zwittau, and on the twenty-fourth to Gewiez; at the same time
general Harsch advanced from Nikel, and the same day encamped
near Müglitz, on the heights of Allerheiligen: General Jahnus on the
other hand posted himself near Lostitz, and compelled the out-posts
of prince Maurice’s corps, which occupied Remnitz and Neuschloss
to retire nearer to the camp. General de Ville advanced once more
with his corps as far as Wischau, and general Esterhazi was sent
with some light troops to Ptin, to preserve the communication between

him and the grand army; the vanguard of this, under the prince of
Lowenstein, took post near Konitz to sustain General Laudohn, who,
notwithstanding the little check he had received, still continued his
expeditions.
In Olmutz General Marshal was indefatigable in carrying on his
preparations for the defence of the place, on the capture of which
the destiny of the campaign seemed to depend. So soon as he was
assured that the siege was seriously undertaken, he caused part of
the suburbs to be burnt, part to be demolished; the works to be
repaired in many places, new ones to be constructed, and all holes,
ditches, and hollow ways in front of them to be filled up, however
small the advantage might be, which the besiegers could derive from
them. He caused likewise some thousand fascines and gabions to be
prepared in the neighbouring forest to serve for the reparation of
the damaged works during the siege; and lastly, he laid under water
the greatest part of environs on the side of the convent called Kloster
Hradisch. Within the city he gave the necessary orders to the burghers
for the preservation of the police, and for their conduct in various
accidents which they must be exposed during the siege; the useless
mouths were likewise sent away, and all the cattle and other provi-
sions collected together from the neighbouring villages, in order to
guard against famine, an evil far more dreadful to a besieged town,
than all the cannon shot of the besiegers. In short, he provided for
every thing, and displayed so much prudence and skill in his con-
duct, that in any event he was assured of the approbation of his
masters, and the esteem of his enemy; whether through his steady
and courageous opposition he preserved the place, or were in the
end compelled to give it up with honour, after a brave defence. The
besiegers on their part were not less active; and by the twenty-fifth
every thing, whether fascines, gabions, or whatever other prepara-
tions are necessary, either for the engineers or artillery, were col-
lected together in the depot at Schnabellin, and a line of circumvallation
drawn about their camp from the Morava as far as the wood of
Horka.
The engineers diligently examined the ground round the town to
determine upon the fittest point of attack; they found that the greater
part might be laid under water, excepting what lies between Hatschin
and Neustift, which rises continually as you leave the town. It was
therefore immediately determined that the attack must be made on
this side; but against which part of the works it might be directed
with the greatest advantage, this remained still to be determined on.
About fifteen hundred paces from the fortress goes the road to
Prosnitz, called the Imperial road, over a small height which is named
the Tafelberg, and loses itself in the plain by degrees as it approaches
the town; over this height ran a hollow way, some hundred paces
in length, parallel with the works of the town, and afterwards turned
and wound about in such a manner as to form natural approaches
to the town. Colonel Balby,13 of the engineers, to whom the conduct
of the siege was entrusted, promised himself great advantages from
the situation of this hill, a man being able distinctly to overlook from
it every part of the enemy’s works; besides, he thought the artillery
could not easily find a more commodious spot to place the ricochet
batteries in the first parallel; and as he was looked upon as a man
of more than ordinary skill in his profession, and having been pre-
sent at various sieges, as Bergen op Zoom for instance, had joined
practice to his theory; his opinion was listened to, and it was deter-
mined to employ this post to the best advantage. After this point
was settled, there still remained the question, whether it were bet-
ter to go with the first parallel to the right of the hill down to the
Povalka, a small branch of the Morava, over against Neustift, or to
the left, till it met the river not far from Hatschin; if the latter were
chosen, nothing was to be feared from the works enfilading the
trenches; but on the other hand, it was apprehended that they might
be flooded by the time the sap was brought to the foot of the Glacis:
of this there was truly no danger in the former case; but then one
exposed the trenches and parallels during the continuation of the
work, to the danger of being taken in flank and enfiladed along their
whole extent by the works which the enemy had constructed in the
islands near the place called Salzergut, and which from hence were
known to the besiegers by the name of the Water-Fort.
These works could during the continuance of the siege be still fur-
ther augmented, and they were by so much the more dangerous, as
they lay very low; made a feu rasant, the most dangerous of all, and
were scarcely exposed to be injured, or their fire silenced, by the
artillery of the besiegers.
13
Giovanni Balbi. Favorite of Frederick the Great who was the scapegoat for
the failed siege of Olmütz.
This circumstance appeared however to Colonel Balby to be of

no importance. He thought to be able to cover himself from them
to the rear, and even hoped to ruin the works themselves by his
bombs and grenades. It was therefore determined to conduct the
attack on this side, and the night of the twenty-seventh and twenty-
eighth of May was appointed for opening the trenches.
At five o’clock in the afternoon, the batallions appointed to cover
this operation assembled, as did also one thousand three hundred
and twenty-five working men from the regiments, who being pro-
vided with the necessary instruments, waited for the time of break-
ing ground; it was proposed not only to draw the first parallel, and
the communications leading thither, but also to compleat in the first
night, a battery of twelve cannons, and two mortar batteries, one of
twelve and the other of four pieces. The working men were divided
into four parties; the first was commanded by Colonel Balby, it con-
sisted of one major, two captains, and four lieutenants of engineers,
fifteen miners, and two hundred working men of Markgrave Henry’s
regiment, these were appointed to prepare one half of the parallel,
from the middle of the Tafelberg, about four hundred paces on the
right hand, as also an epaulement for the cavalry.
Colonel Wredel14 of the engineers commanded the second divi-
sion, which consisted of two captains, four lieutenants, fifteen min-
ers, and two hundred working men from prince Henry’s regiment,
these were ordered to compleat the remainder of the parallel.
Lieutenant colonel Embers with the third division, consisting of
three captains, three lieutenants, thirty miners, two hundred men of
prince Francis’s regiment, as many of Fouquets, with three hundred
peasants, was appointed to draw the communications, and extend
them to their opening into the approaches; the remaining five hun-
dred and twenty-five men, were attached to the artillery for the con-
struction of the batteries.
As soon as it was dark, the covering batallions marched out in
two columns, observing the greatest silence; they were followed by
the different divisions of working men. As soon as the former were
come to the spot appointed, they formed themselves in a line, with
considerable intervals, in front of the parallel, to be opened; and
each batallion detached two platoons, two hundred paces forwards,
14
Friedrich Christian von Wrede.
which laid themselves on the ground, and sent out their out posts
about eighty paces further, who also lay down. Behind each flank
of the parallel were placed eighty dragoons, to be at hand to repel
any attempt of the enemy’s cavalry; the engineers traced the paral-
lel and approaches, the artillery their batteries; and the work advanced
so briskly, that in the course of this night, the greater part was so
far compleated, that the troops who at day break, drew back to wait
for the relief, remained in them under cover. Notwithstanding the
enemy’s cavalry encamped in front of the Theresian gate, and strong
picquets of infantry were posted all round the town, and the field
posts also of the cavalry were advanced quite to the foot of the
Tafelberg; yet the commandant was not informed of the opening of
the trenches, sooner than four o’clock in the morning, he fired then
some few cannon shot; but which hurt nobody.
In order to draw off the enemy’s attention to another side, gen-
eral Rebentisch received orders to attack the village of Repschin, at
two o’clock in the morning; which the commandant had occupied
with two hundred croats, as also Hatschin, Kowalkowitz and the
convent of Hradisch, with other troops. To this end the batallion of
Nimschefsky had detached two companies to Horka, while the batal-
lion of Naumeister, which was posted there, made this attack; after
that some cannon shot had been fired at the village, the volunteers
advanced and marched strait up to it; the enemy quitted it without
making the slightest resistance, left their field equipage, knapsacks,
and a great quantity of arms, and retired into the town; the villages
was set on fire, and then it was perceived that the cavalry in front
of the Theresian gate, continued perfectly quiet in their camp, on
which prince Francis ordered a howitzer, and two six pounders to
be brought into the parallel, whose fire soon drove them from that
post, and compelled them to retire into the town. The commandant
who perceived very plainly, that from the distance at which the par-
allel was traced, he could do little damage to it with his fire, thought
it not prudent to waste his powder, which he intended to employ
hereafter to more advantage, and therefore on that day made very
little firing. The besiegers in consequence of this lost no more than
one single man, from the opening the trenches to the hour of relief
on the twenty-eighth in the afternoon.
On the thirtieth the first parallel was entirely completed, and the
artillery ready with six batteries. In the crochet on the right flank
stood three twelve-pounders, then followed a mortar battery of twelve
Map 17. Plan of the Siege of Ollmutz by the Prussian Army, Commanded by F.M. Keith, from 20th May to 1st July, 1758.
pieces, then a battery of nine twelve-pounders, and after that one

of three mortars. All these began to play on the thirty-first in the
morning, but it was soon apparent that it was without effect, and
served only to waste the ammunition which was already by no means
superabundant; the distance in a direct line to the Theresian gate
was reckoned at fifteen hundred paces, but the works against which
the attack was directed, lying to the right of that near the Povalka,
it might fairly be called eighteen or nineteen hundred paces from
the batteries to them. The greater part of the bombs scarce fell on
the Glacis at furthest, and the cannon shot being fired at an eleva-
tion, either went away clear over the works, or struck first and so
flew over, or buried themselves so deep, that they never after rose,
and consequently did not in the least damage the artillery on the
ramparts. For the same reasons the fire from the fortress had not
the smallest effect, notwithstanding that the besieged enjoyed an
advantage, which had the distance been less considerable, would
have been of the greatest importance.
The small extent of the parallel which did not exceed seven hun-
dred paces, crowded the batteries very near each other, and the
front of attack extending nearly in a strait line, with bastions of a
very obtuse angle, enabled the enemy to employ almost the whole
of his artillery against our works, on which all his fire was united
as in a central point, which must naturally give him a great advan-
tage over the besiegers. On this day one thousand two hundred and
twenty cannon shot were fired, and three hundred and eight bombs
and twenty-six grenades thrown, without dismounting one single can-
non from the ramparts. At least as many shot were fired from the
town, and the whole loss sustained by the besiegers consisted in four
killed and as many wounded, without a single battery being dam-
aged, a single platform broken, or a single gun dismounted. But on
the other hand the mortars and howitzers suffered uncommonly on
account of the great distance they fired from; the beds of four mor-
tars were so much damaged in the great battery, that they were
forced to be repaired, and one was rendered wholly useless; in the
others three were rendered unserviceable, and one mortar split; all
the platforms, without exception, stood in need of repair. The reason
of this was, that the mortars were forced to be charged with three
pounds of powder. Now whoever is acquainted with the effects of
powder, will easily perceive that in this case at the ordinary elevation
of forty-five degrees, the stress upon the mortar beds and platforms
is too great for them long to resist. It would have been better not
to have fired at all; experience, the best instructress, now taught us
to our cost, that the approaches were commenced at too great a
distance from the works.
Field Marshal Keith insisted therefore with colonel Balby, that he
should no longer lose time in finishing the first parallel, but go on
forwards with his approaches, that the batteries might be brought
nearer to the town, and might be employed with more effect. The
first parallel was upon this lengthened about seven hundred paces
to the right hand out from the crochet, and another battery con-
structed of eight pieces of cannon, to damp the fire from the water
fort, which took this parallel in flank; but as this battery must nec-
essarily expose its own flank to the other works, it was constructed
en cremailliere. On the fourth of June we were ready with our second
parallel; notwithstanding that, it being almost entirely enfiladed by
the water fort, we were obliged to fill it with traverses. The artillery
did not lose a moment in forwarding the construction of new bat-
teries, under whose protection the approaches might be carried on
with more safety and expedition, for we had now got within eight
hundred paces of the works.
Colonel Balby however was not of this opinion; he conceived the
batteries on the Tafelberg to be much better calculated to protect
the advancement of the work, than all those which, were proposed
to be constructed in the second parallel, and this for no other reason
than that from the former one might discover near two thirds of the
height of the works; whereas on the contrary, in the second paral-
lel the fall of the ground scarce permitted you to see the embra-
sures; and as to the small progress we had hitherto made in destroying
the defences and artillery of the besieged, this he imputed merely to
an ill-judged parsimony in confining the charge of our twenty-four
pounders to ten, and of our twelve pounders to five pounds of pow-
der, whereas he maintained they ought to have been considerably
augmented, and that we should carry the first to fifteen, and the
second to seven pounds, if we wished to produce the effect intended.
He would not have maintained these opinions if he had been bet-
ter acquainted with the effects of artillery, nor have fallen into the
error, that the range of a shot increases always in proportion to the
charge of powder. This principle was held as long as artillery was
treated rather as handy-craft than as science, but men soon learnt
from experience that three-eighths of the weight of the shot was at
all times the properest charge, and generally speaking, far from being
too weak. Besides, the range of a cannon shot does not depend upon
the charge alone, but on the angle of elevation, the length of the
piece, the resistance of the air, and various other small circumstances,
which a man must take into his calculation, if he would avoid falling
into considerable errors on the subject of gunnery.
As the progress of the works advanced, we were more and more
convinced that what had been considered as a mere trifle, would be
attended with the most serious consequences. The fire from the water
fort became every hour more destructive, and as it enfiladed a part
of the second parallel, we were obliged there also to construct tra-
verses for the protection of the men, and a battery on the right flank
to check the vivacity of its fire. Many difficulties attended the exe-
cution of this latter work. The water fort lay so far detached from
the other works of the town, that being able to flank the whole front
of attack, it was consequently impossible to attack it without expos-
ing one’s flank to the town; this rendered the progress of the work
very tedious, and cost us very many men. I myself have been often
present whilst superintending the working men, when a shot from
the water-fort has gone through them, and has crossed another from
the town, which has taken off a whole rank of workers. Nothing is
more capable of destroying all courage and good-will in the troops,
either for working or fighting, than a flanking enfilading fire, though
the imagination perhaps represents the danger as being greater than
it really is. It is therefore with reason established as one of the first
principles of our profession to avoid this fire, and it will ever be
considered as a capital fault in the conduct of this siege, that we
should have exposed ourselves to it, when we might have avoided
it by giving another direction to our parallel.
At length on the eighth of June the batteries on the left, and on
the twelfth the great battery on the right, were so far advanced as
to admit of several pieces being brought into them. Till this was
done the fire had been very much interrupted, as it was determined
for the abovementioned reasons to fire no more from the batteries
on the Tafelberg, which had been found to be an unnecessary waste
of ammunition; by this means the engineers were hindered in the
advancement of their works, which the very heavy and destructive
fire from the town absolutely stopped, and so found themselves
obliged to employ several days in remedying the original errors com-
mitted in the choice of our attack. On the ninth the king himself
came from Kleinlaten, to which place he had removed his head

quarters from Schmirsitz, and reviewed the state of the siege; he
soon discovered where the fault lay, and was extremely displeased
with the small advancement of the approaches. This drew a very
sharp reprimand upon colonel Balby; the colonel however would by
no means admit that it was to be imputed to the excessive distance
at which the parallel had been traced, nor yet to the direction cho-
sen for the approaches, but solely to the batteries having been removed
from the Tafelberg.
In the letter which he wrote on the tenth to Field Marshal Keith
and General Fouquet, he says, among other things,
They took away all the artillery from the Tafelberg. In all that part
therefore of their works which were within reach of the left flank of
our approaches, the enemy were at liberty to do whatever they pleased,
and to bring the whole of their artillery to bear upon that point; hav-
ing nothing to hinder them or divert their attention. If only six or
eight guns had been left me there! but no, they took every one away.
His majesty is much displeased that the works do not advance more
rapidly. On the contrary, any man who is acquainted with the prin-
ciples on which a siege ought to be conducted, would rather impute
it to me as a great fault, that I should have advanced my approaches
so imprudently, without having the protection of the batteries, and
without having in any degree damped the fire from the enemy’s ram-
parts. I proceed to-night still further with my approaches; and your
Excellency knows that on the right flank there is but one battery yet
in readiness, and probably will not be for some days to come; how-
ever, I shall carry on the sap under a most dreadful fire, but I will
not be answerable for the consequences if the enemy should profit by
this advantage. A man must have cannon, mortars, and howitzers; a
man must have powder, shells, and cannon shot; a man must keep
up an uninterrupted fire, and superior to that of the fortress, if he
expects a siege should be carried on with vigour. Nothing of this is
the case; I therefore will answer for nothing.
So much for colonel Balby’s ideas on gunnery.
After the batteries in the second parallel were in readiness, the
sap went on rapidly, notwithstanding the heavy fire from the town;
and on the twenty-second it was carried as far as the foot of the
Glacis, and we should have reached it sooner had we not been com-
pelled by the fire from the water fort, (which took the workmen in
flank), to make a double sap instead of a single one, which consid-
erably delayed the work. This parallel then became the first, and
what was the first served only as a communication; from hence one
may judge how considerably the works would have been advanced,
if on the first night we had approached to within eight hundred
paces of the town; we should then have been ready on the twelfth,
or at latest on the sixteenth of June, to begin working on the third
parallel, and this would have had a very considerable influence on
the success of the undertaking. I have already said that the advan-
tages expected to have been derived from the situation of the Tafelberg,
determined colonel Balby to depart from principles which he sufficiently
understood, and had himself employed at the siege of Schweidnitz.
But this alone was not all his reasons, the enemy had several pic-
quets of infantry before the town, and parties of his cavalry were
posted at the foot of the Tafelberg; now it was apprehended that
we might have been discovered by them, and so prevented from
finishing our parallel on the first night by the fire that discovery
would have drawn upon us; but even had we been so discovered,
that consequence does not necessarily follow; it scarce ever happens
that a parallel is drawn about a fortress without discovery, and yet
it is always pretty considerably advanced; at three sieges of Schweidnitz
this was the case, and particularly at he last; nevertheless the work
was so far advanced during the first night, and that too without any
considerable loss, that on the following day the men were completely
under cover from the enemy’s cannon shot; indeed this parallel was
traced at a thousand paces distance, and consequently further off
than was necessary; and it is plain from hence, that in the present
instance we might have advanced without danger, at least within
this distance of the town. Then I may add how watchful soever gen-
eral Marshall might be, however prudently he may have taken his
measures, it would all find a parallel in the conduct of General
Guasco’s15 defence of Schweidnitz.
But the great error was in carrying the approaches to the right
towards the Povalka; for every one knew that we must have the fire
of the works raised in the islands there, otherwise called the Water-
Fort in our flank. This openly broke through all the rules of art:
but admitting that the attack could not be carried on, on the side
of Hatschin and Repschin, on account of the inundation to which
the third parallel might be exposed, still it did not necessarily follow
that it must therefore be undertaken on the opposite side; besides,
15
Lt Gen. Franz Guasco. A Piedmontese who had preceded Lacy as General-
quartermeister.
this object of our apprehension deserved a somewhat stricter enquiry

than was given to it, to discover whether in fact it were as well
grounded as it appeared to be. It was by no means probable from
the elevation of the ground in that quarter, that the inundation could
reach the Theresian gate; but suppose it even could have reached
it, the enemy would scarcely have had recourse to this expedient for
his protection, since having countermines under his Glacis, which in
that case would have been also overflowed and rendered useless, he
would have thereby lost one of his best means of defence.
It will immediately strike any engineer who examines the plan of
this town, that the attack ought to have been carried on upon the
ravelin on the left of the Theresian gate, looking from the fields,
and on both the bastions which defend this ravelin. Thereby we
should not even have lost the imaginary advantage of the Tafelberg,
we should have received no fire in our flank, and we might have
advanced directly on the capital of the ravelin; instead of which by
turning to the right hand, we lost five days in altering the direction
of our approaches. Indeed the Povalka seemed to cover the right
flank of the parallels, but that in this instance is no very important
advantage, as great as it is in the situation of camps and other posts,
a redoubt on either flank, and a few field pieces in it, would have
answered the purpose full as well.
I shall now proceed no further with the journal of the siege, which
any man may find in the publications of that time. Except two great
sallies and various small ones made upon the workmen at the head
of the sap, (which like all others ended in spiking up a few cannon,
and a trifling loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners on either side),
there happened nothing worthy our notice. Whoever is in any degree
acquainted with the theory of sieges, will very easily supply this gap
in our narrative. The besiegers completed their third parallel in spite
of all chicanes the enemy could oppose to them, and kept still advanc-
ing, though with tedious steps, till at length other circumstances ren-
dered it necessary to raise the siege. But as these belong to the
operations of the two armies who continued observing each other,
I shall now return once more back to them.
Both armies were in a position which seemed to promise some-
thing decisive every day, but Marshal Daun did not find it prudent
to commit himself with the king, and determined to remain a quiet
spectator of the siege, till he had drawn together all his reinforce-
ments, and till circumstances afforded him a fair opportunity of haz-
arding somewhat, notwithstanding that the weakness of the Prussian

army, and their repartition into various separate corps, between
whom the communications were at no time perfectly secure, seemed
to invite him to more activity. The king made no essential alteration
in the disposition of his troops, on the approach of the enemy’s
grand army; he fought only to procure more security against the
incursions of their light troops, for his communications with the corps
under Prince Maurice, near Littau. To this end, General Wedel was
detached on the twenty-fifth of May, with the grenadier batallions
Benkendorf and Bieverling, the second batallion of Münchow,
Putkammer’s Hussars, and two hundred men of Le Noble and
Salenmon’s free batallions; and he pitched a camp on the hill named
Hrad, between Namiest and Laskow. By this disposition General
Laudohn was more restrained, but not absolutely prevented from
molesting this little corps, though without any advantage obtained;
so that it was forced, during the whole time it remained in that
camp, to stand under arms nearly the whole night through. Now as
the great distance of four German* miles between the army at
Schmirsitz, and the corps under the Princes, might tempt Marshal
Daun to attack the one or the other, while in the mean time another
body of troops marched strait upon the army employed in the siege;
his majesty ordered them to join him instantly, if he himself should
be attacked; and in case the enemy marched against them, then the
king was in like manner to march to their support. But if timely
advice was received of the enemy’s intentions, then in that case, both
corps should march towards each other, and united at Gross Sehnitz.
But the one case happened no more than the other; for except some
small skirmishes with the out posts, and the usual nightly visits of
the Croats, from which they often carried back broken plates, noth-
ing went forwards worth relating. Notwithstanding the opportunities
General Harsch had of disturbing the road leading out of Silesia,
the convoys passed as regularly, as if he had not been there. The
batallions of Kleist which was stationed in Troppau, escorted on the
twenty-sixth of May, some hundred Winspels of meal into the camp,
and returned back without seeing one single enemy.
Again, on the eighth of June, General Putkammer arrived in camp,
with a considerable convoy of waggons laden with meal, ammunition,
* About eighteen or twenty English.

and other necessities and provisions, under the escorte of three thou-
sand Convalescents, Kleist’s grenadier batallion, and the free batal-
lion of Rapin, which was raised for the most part from the French
prisoners, at Magdebourg, and deserters, without the loss of one sin-
gle waggon. Kleist’s batallion returned back immediately to Troppau,
but that of Rapin was quartered in Holitz, on this side of Olmütz.
The two free batallions, Le Noble and Salenmon, suffered somewhat
in this.
In order to cover this convoy, General Meyer was ordered to
occupy a place called Sauberg, near Döllein, with the grenadier
batallion of Nimschefsky; and to draw a chain of posts from Chometau
to Gibau, with a detachment of Bayreuth’s dragoons; the grenadier
batallions of Unruh belonging to the Markgrave Charles’s corps,
occupied Sternberg; and the free batallions posted there were advanced
as far as Bährn. Here Colonel Le Noble received intelligence, that
the convoy was already passed through Gibau; and without more
enquiry whether this really had any foundation, he immediately
recommenced his march back to Sternberg. In the mean time Colonel
Lanius, who was posted in the mountains, had possessed himself of
the woods and heights by Deutch Lodnitz, and attacked the free
batallions in the defilé, near Siebenhufen; and as they had been com-
pleated by a considerable number of Austrian deserters and prison-
ers, so the greatest part of them went over immediately to the enemy,
who obtained such an advantage from the superiority of numbers
they derived from these traitors, that it was no difficult matter for
them to take from us three pieces of cannon, and three hundred
prisoners, the rest cut their way through.
All these trifling advantages however could have very little real
influence on the destiny of Olmutz; this would have been easily
decided if Marshal Daun had determined to attack the king with all
his forces; but this the Marshal’s wary character did not permit; he
would not be induced to hazard a chance which it was at any time
in his power to recur to, till he had tried every other means that
appeared conducive to the accomplishment of his object; of these,
one was to open his communication with the fortress without expos-
ing himself to the danger of being forced into a battle by the king
while on his march; the other was to compel his adversary to relin-
quish his enterprize by cutting off the convoys of whatever was nec-
essary for carrying on the siege, which he was still obliged to draw
out of Silesia.
Now a communication with Olmutz was to be obtained by these

two ways; in the first place, if whilst general Harsch marched round
the corps of Markgrave Charles at Neustadt, taking his route by
Sternberg, the Marshal in the mean while had followed with the
main army by way of Müglitz, and so the two corps might unite
between Sternberg and Olmutz; this the corps of prince Maurice at
Littau in conjunction with that of the Markgrave was still too weak
to prevent; the king himself must have fallen back from Prosnitz
with the greatest part of the corps he had there, and united him-
self with them both before he could make head against the enemy
on that side; now Daun by this very movement became master of
all the roads which lead into Silesia, it is probable therefore that the
king would have attacked him, and besides also his communication
with the magazines in Leutomischel and further on into Bohemia
would thereby have been, if not utterly lost, at least rendered very
difficult, he therefore determined to try the other mode and post
himself opposite the king, waiting till he found an opportunity of
effecting the designs he had formed upon Kremsir and Prerau. He
hazarded nothing by this measure. I have already observed that he
had drawn an impenetrable chain of different corps of light troops
from Müglitz to Wischau; these occupied all the defilés and passes
in the mountains between Gewicz and Wischau, so that the grand
army could make any kind of movement behind them with the great-
est conveniency, without being under the least apprehension of being
attacked on the march, or even in any shape disturbed or inter-
rupted by the king. The Field Marshal had thereby the advantage
of the ground constantly on his side, he found withal positions, which
secured him from any attack, even though the king had been as well
acquainted with his plans as he himself were, but above all his move-
ments were concealed by the woods and hills from the discovery of
the eye the most practised in reconnoitring. The difficulties which
are inseparable from every march over mountains and through hol-
low ways, were the only hindrance he was exposed to; on the six-
teenth of June the army broke up from its camp at Gewicz with all
possible secrecy, and marched in five columns to Prodowanow.
General Harsch left his camp near Müglitz on the same day, and
marched to Konitz; on the seventeenth the Austrian army put itself
again in motion by break of day, and took up its camp between
Ewannowitz and Predlitz, the right flank was posted at the first
named place, and was covered by a marshy rivulet, the left stood
on the steep sandy hills which lie on the right of Predlitz; this and
all the villages lying before the front were occupied by infantry and
the corps of general de Ville, here joined the grand army.
This general had a few days before detached general St. Ignon
with the Saxon regiment of dragoons, called Prince Charles’s, the
two Austrian regiments, imperial Würtemberg and Löwenstein,
Deschosisches Hussars, a Pulk of Houlans, and some hundred Croats
towards Prerau, to observe the Prussian disposition on that side.
There St. Ignon heard that the Bayreuth dragoons were quartered
at Bistrowan, and two squadrons of Seidlitz’s Hussars at Wisternitz,
which could only be sustained by the grenadier batallion Nimschefsky,
which was in Drozdin, and Rapin’s free batallion posted at Hollitz,
he resolved therefore to fall on them; with this view he broke up
from Prerau on the sixteenth, and approached the dragoons just at
the entrance of the night. Field Marshal Keith had in the mean
while received intelligence of this march, and had apprized general
Meyer of it, who commanded on that side; this general therefore
kept his people under arms the whole night through, and drew to
his support the batallion of Nimschefsky, which was ordered to occupy
Wisternitz. At day break, nor till half past five in the morning could
any enemy be discovered; the patrolles which had been sent out dur-
ing the night, were not yet returned: all this time not a shot had
been heard, but a perfect silence reigned all around. This general
Meyer, contrary to all the rules of prudence took for a good sign;
he thought that the patrolles having met with no enemy, advanced
too far to be back so soon, and it never once occurred to him that
the enemy might have surprized and carried them off in silence. He
held the intelligence therefore as unfounded, and although several
officers thought they had discovered cavalry in the woods which lay
before their front, still he was so positive in his opinion, that he
thought it unnecessary to send out one single man to ascertain
whether this observation were well founded or not; he rather gave
orders to the grenadiers to return back to their quarters, and to the
dragoons to unsaddle and prepare for foraging, and thus fell into
the snare with his eyes open. The grenadiers were scarcely returned
into their quarters, before the enemy fell on the dragoons with his
whole force, penetrated into the whole camp, cut to pieces many
men, wounded and made prisoners many more, and compelled the
remainder to retire to Drozdin to the protection of their infantry.
The two squadrons of Seidlitz’s hussars had not been so precipitate;
they remained still saddled, and though they were forced indeed to
give way before superior numbers, yet they lost not a man, but on
the contrary made some prisoners. In the mean while, the batallion
of grenadiers got once more under arms, marched with all possible
expedition against the enemy, stopped him by some cannon shot
from pursuing any further his advantage, and chased him again from
the camp of the dragoons quite back to Gross Teinitz. At the same
time the free batallion of Rapin quartered in Hollitz, and two other
squadrons of the Bayreuth dragoons, who were posted near that vil-
lage, were attacked. But these withdrew themselves in time over the
Dam which leads to the Morava, and the enemy made only one
officer and thirty men prisoners, who were posted in the church
yard. General Meyer on this received orders from Marshal Keith to
draw back to Holitz, with his batallion of grenadiers. These formed
themselves into a square, took their baggage in the center, and
although they were attacked by the enemy, as well on the side of
the Heiligen Berg, as by some hussars who sallied from Olmutz,
they made good their way to Holitz without the loss of one single
man; general Meyer on the contrary, who had gone forward with
the remaining part of the regiment, was once more attacked by the
enemy, and compelled to pass the Dam near this village on the full
gallop. On this the dragoons fell into confusion and came in pell
mell with the enemy, who pursued them very hotly indeed; the loss
would here have been very considerable, if the free batallion which
had posted itself behind the Dams, had not by a heavy well directed
fire, stopped the enemy’s pursuit. The regiment lost in this unfor-
tunate affair into which they had been drawn by the imprudent secu-
rity of the commander, about fifty killed; general Meyer himself, four
other officers, and one hundred non-commissioned and privates
wounded, and about three hundred prisoners. Field marshal Keith
on the very first alarm passed the Morava without delay, with two
batallions and five squadrons of Würtemberg’s; he came however
too late to ward off this blow, for general St. Ignon on his approach
retired back to Prerau. Holitz was once more occupied by Nimschefsky’s
grenadiers, and the free batallion of Rapin, and those of the Bayreuth
dragoons, who were still mounted together with Seidlitz’s Hussars,
encamped near the village. As for the Field Marshal, he returned
with his troops back to the camp before Olmütz.
The march of then enemy’s army was immediately reported to
Prince Maurice and the Markgrave Charles, by their out posts of
Hussars; they both kept their troops all the night through dressed
and accoutred, to be ready to turn out in a moment, in case of an
alarm; but every thing remained quiet. Next morning the Prince
detached general Saldern and Schenkendorf ’s grenadiers, and Möhr-
ing’s Hussars, to reconnoitre the enemy. He found the camp on the
heights of Müglitz abandoned, and all the accounts he could pro-
cure, agreed in this, that the enemy’s grand army had turned to the
right towards Wischau. The Markgrave Charles also had now no
longer any enemy before him at Neustadt; and as much could be
reported to the king, and to the Bayreuth dragoons, at the same
time, he gave orders to that corps to break up its camp immedi-
ately, and go and post itself on the other side of Olmütz, to cut off
the communication between Prerau and that town. This was the
more necessary, as the handful of troops who were posted there
could not prevent the enemy from being from time to time supplied
with provisions, several waggons with powder being secretly con-
veyed into the town; nor the commandant from keeping up con-
stant correspondence with Marshal Daun’s army. General St. Ignon
also posted near Prerau, with no other intention than to sustain the
reinforcement which was intended to be thrown into the town. On
the seventeenth the Markgrave’s corps also left its camp near Neustadt,
and went to Bauniowitz. But on the eighteenth, after that the Mark-
grave and the Prince of Hesse Cassel had marched with the king
to Prosnitz, it moved into the neighbourhood of Bistrowan, and
was posted in the following manner by general Retzow, who at this
time commanded it. The regiment of Kalkstein, and one squadron
of Seidlitz Hussars were placed at Lodenitz, and were ordered to
break up and ruin all the roads which lead to Chometau. The sec-
ond batallion of Geist, and two more squadrons of Hussars were
sent under the command of general Goltz, to Wisternitz. The first
batallion of Geist, together with the second batallions of grenadiers,
Unruh and Manteufel, eight squadrons of Bayreuth’s dragoons, and
two squadrons of general Seidlitz’s hussars went to Bistrowan. Sternberg
at the same time was abandoned, and the two free batallions, Le
Noble and Salenmon, who had been posted there, went to Holitz;
which town was already occupied by Nimschefsky’s grenadiers, the
free batallion of Rapin, and two squadrons of Bayreuth. Prince
Maurice likewise changed his disposition, drew himself more to the
left, and took a new camp on the heights by Choelein, in such a
manner, that his right wing came on the hill where his left had
stood, and the left streched out over this village, in which he placed
his head quarters, Littau remained in the rear. But when the king
had reconnoitred the enemy, and found that he had a force greatly
superior to himself before him; he on the twenty-first called in Prince
Maurice with ten batallions, fifteen squadrons, and the two hundred
hussars who were attacked to this corps, and made these troops
encamp in the second line of his left wing. The grenadier batallions
Bohr, Wangenheim and Heyden, under the command of general
Kreutz, occupied the posts near Klein Sehnitz, where Möhring’s reg-
iment of hussars was already posted. This little corps was destined
in conjunction with that under general Wedel at Namiest, to keep
up our communication with the army of the siege, and to hinder
general Laudohn, who was still near Konitz, with four regiments of
regular infantry, a regiment of dragoons, and several thousand Croats
and Hussars from disturbing the progress of the siege by his expe-
ditions. The first batallion of Münchow, with two hundred men
detached from the regiment of Manteufel, remained at Littau, under
the command of Major [Moritz Franz von] Wobersnow for the pro-
tection of the hospital, in which about a thousand soldiers danger-
ously ill or wounded were left behind. The military chest, the field
commissariat, the proviant-train, and the less seriously affected sick
and hurt, went to Krenau. The Bakeries however were removed to
Horka, and were covered by the free batallion of Rapin, which came
from Holitz and encamped in front of that village. On the twenty-
third, Littau was summoned by a detachment of Austrian light troops
under colonel Zobel; who having received the usual answer, and
learning the approach of general Kreutz, drew off again.
In the mean while Marshal Daun, who had received positive orders
from his court to succour the place, fought to approach more an
more to his object; but as he well knew the vigilance and activity
of the king, he would not venture to make a single step by which
he might run the hazard of coming to action with him. The usual
measure of strengthning the garrison with a reinforcement of fresh
troops, appeared to him to be by so much safer, as the Prussian
quarters on the left bank of the Morava, were very much dispersed,
and moreover very slightly occupied. He entrusted therefore General
Bülow with the conduct of this expedition, and detached him on the
nineteenth with one thousand two hundred infantry, and about thirty
men of the artillery; this officer arrived without difficulty at Prerau,
the next morning General St. Ignon sent out strong patroles towards
Olmutz, whose business was to contain those of the Prussians, and

to cover the march of General Bülow; the general took a consider-
able detour through thickets, wilds and a very covered country, and
as he was furnished with guides who knew every nook and footpath,
and as all necessary measures were already taken before hand with
the commandant, he succeeded in getting behind general Retzow
notwithstanding all his vigilance, and on the twenty-second at day
break, fortunately entered the fortress by the way of Dölein, between
Lodenitz, and the Heilige Berge with his whole detachment. But as
general St. Ignon was apprehensive that this enterprize would be
attended with more difficulty, and that perhaps general Bülow might
not be able to reach the town during the night, but might be com-
pelled to cut his way through by day light; he himself advanced with
his corps, and shewed himself at five in the morning on the heights
of Gross Teinitz, to draw upon himself the attention of General
Retzow, and to sustain the detachment in case it were attacked. At
the same time the light troops which the besieged still had in
Kowalkowitz, moved out, and being reinforced by a part of the gar-
rison, drew up in order of battle before the village in the rear of
the Prussia camp at Bistrowan; Field Marshal Keith being informed
of this, detached instantly the regiment of Pannewitz, and the
Wurtemberg dragoons to General Retzow. The enemy however
undertook nothing further, but after General St. Ignon had waited
till ten o’clock, and from the stillness which reigned all around, could
easily judge that the stroke must have succeeded, he began his retreat
back again to Prerau.
The king had no sooner learnt what had happened, than he
ordered Lieutenant General Ziethen to advance against General St.
Ignon, to reconnoitre his position and if possible drive him from his
post, before he should have time to receive such reinforcements as
might enable him to attack General Retzow with superior numbers,
and thus open a communication with the town. Ziethen therefore
at one in the afternoon broke up from the camp at Prosnitz, with
the grenadier batallions of Carlowitz, Schenkendorf and Rath, under
General Putkammer of the infantry, and five squadrons of Ryau,
five of Schmettau cuirassiers, three hundred hussars of Ziethen, three
hundred of Werner, and three hundred of Putkammer under General
Krokow the younger; with these troops he passed the Morava by
the bridge which the army of the siege had thrown over that river
and joined General Retzow: On the twentieth, this corps advanced
as far as the heights of Prerau; General St. Ignon had occupied this
town with some hundred croats, his cavalry was posted behind it in
a camp, whose front was covered by the Beczwa, a river with marshy
banks, and by several ditches. Notwithstanding the strength of this
post, he sent away his baggage to Kropin, drew back with his corps
to the heights of Bicknow, and left only a hundred croats in the
town; it would not have been difficult for General Ziethen to drive
out the croats, and open the road to pursue the enemy, they would
probably not have held out a moment, and the affair would have
ended with a very trifling loss of men; but in the mean time came
intelligence, that the enemy had occupied the castle of Tobitschau
with some hundred croats under the command of colonel Vehla.
These General Ziethen must have left behind him had he advanced
any further, and as still more troops of the enemy from Kropin and
Kremsir, might fall upon the flanks, he might have met with some
difficulty in effecting his retreat, he therefore marched back to Lomutz,
and General St. Ignon returned to his old position. This was not
the only destination of General Ziethen’s detachment, a great con-
voy was expected out of Silesia, which had set out on the twenty-
first from Neisse and Kosel, under the escorte of two batallions of
Treskow, two of young Kreutz, two of Mitschefahl, one grenadier
batallion Bahr, one old Billerbeck, between two and three thousand
recruits and convalescents of the infantry divided into four batal-
lions, and one thousand one hundred men of the cavalry. The con-
voy consisted of between three and four thousand waggons, of which
only eight hundred and eighteen were laden with ammunition, and
other necessaries for carrying on the siege, the rest contained meal,
various other provisions, and the small mountings for the troops; in
proportion as the safe arrival of this convoy was of importance to
us, in like manner it was of the utmost consequence to the enemy
to intercept it. Therefore although the escorte was sufficiently strong
to protect it against any enemy, not excessively superior in force,
and the best measures might be reasonably looked for from colonel
Mosel, who had the command of it (a man of tried resolution and
experience) still circumstances might happen which would make some
succour absolutely necessary. Genral Ziethen therefore received orders
to meet the convoy with his corps, and to reinforce himself if he
thought proper with some batallions from that under General Retzow;
in the mean time he disposed his troops in and about the villages,
on the side of the Heilige Berge in such a manner, as that the town
was compleatly invested; Rath’s grenadiers were posted in Drozdin,

and three hundred of Werner’s hussars near them; the batallion of
Carlowitz occupied Samotiska, and five squadrons of Schmettau’s
encamped between these two villages; Schenkendorf ’s batallion occu-
pied Towerz, and five squadrons of Ryau, with three hundred of
Putkammer’s hussars were posted between that place and Samotiska,
beyond Towerz towards Glassowitz, were three hundred of Ziethen’s
hussars; by means of this position of colonel Lanius in the neigh-
bourhood of Sternberg, and of General St. Ignon in Prerau, who
could without danger send on their patroles as far as Troppau, and
through the readiness of the country people, to take upon them-
selves the employ of a spy; the enemy were enabled without difficulty,
to learn whatever was going forward on this side, while on the con-
trary the king’s intelligence was rare, uncertain, and very often
absolutely contradictory. As soon as Marshal Daun heard of the
approach by the convoy, he had no other choice left, he must of
necessity think of contriving the means of either cutting it off or
destroying it, and these he found as well in his great superiority over
the king, as in the natural circumstances of the country, and the
inclinations of its inhabitants, by whom he run no risk of being
betrayed. General Laudohn therefore received orders to approach
the road to Hof, taking a great circuit round by Müglitz, and so
over the hills; to join the detachment under Colonel Lanius with his
whole corps, and wait the arrival of the convoy. On the other side,
General Ziskowitz had orders to pass the Morava, to call in General
St. Ignon’s corps from Prerau, and then to conceal himself in the
woody mountains near Alte Liebe, till he found an opportunity of
falling upon the convoy.
In the mean time the Austrian general sought by all possible means
to lead the king into the belief that he intended to give him battle;
and these demonstrations appeared the more probable, because the
fate of the siege depended on that circumstance alone, if the enter-
prize upon the convoy should fail. It was therefore contrived that
the king should receive advice that an attack was intended upon
Prosnitz, which would oblige him to direct his attention that way.
The light troops made some attempts upon Ziethen’s hussars, but
without success however. Marshal Daun frequently reconnoitred the
Prussian camp, and at length on the twenty-seventh unexpectedly
took up a new position with his right wing at Klenowitz, and his
left over Dobromielitz, whereby he not only approached nearer to
the king, but also threatened his majesty’s left flank; at the same
time general Buccow was detached with a corps of some thousand
men to Ptin against his right, and the posts near Tobitschau were
considerably reinforced. All these movements were made with the
following view, partly to conceal the march of general Ziskowitz,
who in the mean while had passed the Morava, and was gone away
to his destination, and partly also by the apprehension of an attack
to prevent the king from detaching any more troops to meet his
convoy.
As soon as this was assembled near Troppau, colonel Mosel, who
commanded it, put himself in motion on the twenty-sixth, and arrived
with the head of the column on the Heights near Bautsch. The line
of march of this great train was very tedious and full of impedi-
ments; from the constant arrival of convoys to the army the roads
were extremely broken up, and now from the rains which had lately
fallen were so completely spoiled, that the carriages were every
moment stuck fast, and the line thereby stopped and interrupted; so
that on this day the convoy could make but a very small progress
indeed on its route. It was prevented also the following morning
from proceeding at all, for colonel Mosel perceived it was absolutely
necessary to halt where he was on the twenty-seventh, to draw
together the remainder of the convoy, and even then it would not
be possible for him to carry in more than about two thirds of the
whole safe into camp. The rear which was by good fortune com-
posed only of suttlers waggons and such like, which in case of neces-
sity the army might do without, remained behind in confusion,
dispersed on the road to Troppau. This circumstance had a great
influence on the fate of the convoy.
In the mean time general Laudohn had reached Sternberg on the
same day, and occupied various posts so as to hinder the king from
receiving the smallest intelligence of the fate of this great convoy.
From hence it arose that colonel Werner, who had been detached
by general Ziethen on the same day to meet colonel Mosel, with a
batallion of grenadiers, two hundred dragoons, and three hundred
hussars, was able to proceed no further than Gibau; from this cir-
cumstance the Austrian general was convinced that succours must
be approaching, and that he had no time to lose, unless he would
abandon the enterprize entirely. He therefore, without delay, moved
forwards, and on the twenty-eighth, in the morning, entered the
environs of Guntersdorf; he immediately occupied all the Heights,
from whence he could command the Defilé running between Bautch

and Alte Liebe, through which the convoy must absolutely pass, and
threw his croats and Hungarian infantry into the adjoining thickets,
while his hussars and cavalry formed themselves right in the plain,
in order to fall on the line of march on every side. Colonel Mosel
in the mean while had in like manner put himself in motion by day-
break, without waiting for the rear of his convoy. It was not long
before he discovered the enemy with his avantgarde, and directly
came to the resolution of attacking him. The first batallion of Young
Kreutz marched quickly through the Defilé, formed in front of it,
notwithstanding a very vigorous fire of artillery which the enemy
directed upon the Debouché, and maintained its post till more batal-
lions came up, and colonel Mosel conceived them to be sufficiently
strong to clear the road before them by force. The second batallion
of Young Kreutz, the grenadier batallion of Old Billerbeck, and one
half of the batallions composed of the convalescents and recruits
belonging to prince Ferdinand’s regiment, commanded by captain
Pirch, were the first who passed the Defilé, and formed next to the
first batallion of Young Kreutz, and were followed by the remain-
der, excepting those who remained behind for the protection of the
train of waggons. The enemy had placed a strong battery upon a
height which played upon the left flank. The batallion of Billerbeck’s
grenadiers who covered this flank, and were consequently most
exposed to this fire, did not hesitate a moment, but rushed into the
wood, drove the croats and Hungarians, and pushed on pell mell
to the battery, where the enemy made so obstinate a defence, that
they could only be driven from it by the bayonet; at length how-
ever the grenadiers beat them from this post, took from them one
piece of cannon, and made two hundred prisoners. A moment after
the regiment of Kreutz, and the batallion of prince Ferdinand’s
recruits advanced, and with so much vigour and intrepidity attacked
the enemy, that after a very warm engagement, and with all the
exertions that general Laudohn could make so sustain his post, in
the end he was beat with the loss of above five hundred men killed,
wounded, and made prisoners. Colonel Mosel could not let himself
be drawn into any pursuit, being obliged to employ himself in reduc-
ing to order the line of march of his convoy, which the foregoing
affair had thrown into the greatest confusion. The peasants being
panic struck at the very first cannon shot, fled back, scattered them-
selves all over the field, and the greater part made the best of their
way at one stretch back to Troppau. This circumstance was very

favourable to the enemy’s hussars and croats, who broke in here
and there, and plundered every waggon, till they were chased away.
When every thing was quiet, and the order of march for the most
part re-established, colonel Mosel sent off immediately adjutant Beville
to the king at Prosnitz, to acquaint him of this affair, and of the
progress he had made with his convoy, and then making good his
way further on, came the same day as far as Neudörfel, without the
enemy’s having been able to take any thing more from him. General
Ziethen had on the same day, marched from Olmutz with his corps,
which had been reinforced in the night between the twenty-eighth
and twenty-ninth, by both the grenadier batallions of Unruh and
Manteufel, which had been sent after him; and after he had reunited
to his own corps, the detachment of colonel Werner whom he found
at Gibau, he joined colonel Mosel on the same evening. Here he
found not the half of the waggons, the greater part could not pro-
ceed through the badness of the relays, other were deserted by their
drivers, and indeed every one of them had turned about to go back.
From these circumstances he saw himself compelled to halt all the
following day, till by detached parties from his hussars, he had col-
lected the greater part together, and resettled the order of the march;
all this greatly favoured the enemy’s designs, General Ziskowitz had
from hence time to come up, and to post his corps in the thickets
between Stadt Liebe and Domstädtl, where they were compleatly
concealed. On the thirtieth the convoy resumed its march by break
of day on the road to Domstädtl; the cavalry of General Ziethen’s
corps marched on the right of the waggons, and in squadrons with
great intervals; so long as the ground was for the most part even,
the infantry marched on the left hand. The head of the column
reached the defilé near Domstädtl, without any enemy having shewn
himself, but when scarcely about one hundred and twenty waggons
had passed through the defilé, the enemy appeared upon the heights
on the left hand, began immediately a most severe fire from his
artillery on the entrance, shot almost every horse dead, and thus
brought the line of march absolutely to a stand still; General Ziethen
hereupon left the waggons, as they arrived by little and little to draw
up before the defilé, took both the grenadier batallions, Rath and
Carlowitz under General Putkammer, with about two hundred hus-
sars, and moved against the enemy; the attack had at first a very
prosperous success, every batallion of the enemy was broken, every
one of his cannon taken; but the Saxon dragoons rushing from the
thickets where they had been concealed, charged the grenadiers in
flank and rear, cut in pieces a great part, took many more and drove
the rest quite to the waggon bourg, where they fled for refuge; on
this General Ziskowitz turned the whole of his force on the center
of the convoy, recovered again the artillery he had lost, and kept
up a constant unceasing fire upon the waggon bourg, and the wag-
gons that had already past the defilé. In a very short time General
Laudohn also appeared, coming back again from Bahrn and attacked
the convoy on the other side; the combat was very obstinate, and
lasted above two hours with various success: but the troops com-
posing the escorte being broken and subdivided by the waggons, and
the enemy on the other hand keeping their lines always united, they
at length broke in, in several places, overpowered the escorte, and
dispersed the whole convoy. Each batallion drew off to the defilé of
Domstädtl, but General Ziethen with his party was cut off from it
and obliged to retreat, continually fighting his way back to Troppau;
General Krokow who commanded the avantgarde, and who from
the smoke of the powder waggons, set on fire by the enemy, the
silence which followed the explosion, and the retreat of the scattered
fugitives, readily concluded that the enemy must have effected their
design, came to the resolution of collecting all he could get through
the defilé, and setting forward on his march strait to Olmutz.
Before he could accomplish this, he had the mortification to see
the enemy renew his attack on the waggon bourg, formed on the
other side the defilé, cut in pieces a great part, and make prisoners
of the remainder of the escorte before his face, without having it in
his power to afford them any assistance. He marched off therefore
with what remained of the batallions of Manteufel, Unruh, Schen-
kendorf, Billerbeck, Rath, Carlowitz, the regiment of your Kreutz,
five squadrons of Ryau, one Schmettau, and about five hundred hus-
sars; together with near two hundred and fifty waggons, and with-
out making any more halts, arrived in the evening between Bistrowan
and the bridge of boats. Near Heiligen Berg he was again attacked
by the hussars and croats, who plundered one waggon; by good luck
General Ziethen had placed all the money waggons at the head of
the convoy, which from this circumstance were saved. The recruits
of Prince Ferdinand’s regiment who had never before once seen an
enemy, distinguished themselves on both these actions by the most
remarkable firmness; never did Spartan and Roman veterans, fight
for their country with more undaunted valour, than these raw lads
from seventeen to twenty years of age. They determined to defend
themselves to the last gasp, but the greater part of them together
with their commander captain [ Johann Ernst] Pirch,16 carried their
laurels with them to the grave; out of nine hundred there were scarce
sixty-five men taken, some who were but slightly wounded got back
to Troppau, the remainder all lay dead in their ranks. They might
have answered with a certain Spaniard, after the battle of Rocroi
to one who asked how strong they had been; as many as you find killed
or wounded. Upon the whole no fault can be imputed either to the
Prussian troops or their commanders; they did every thing that a
man can expect in such circumstances, from brave men and skilful
officers. But the enemy was so vastly superior to them, he had all
the advantage of the ground so intirely on his side, and fortune
favoured his whole enterprize in such a manner, that the escorte
might wholly perish, but could not possibly come off victorious.
Nothing moreover is easier than to dispose a convoy, and even to
destroy it, either in whole or in part, if the assailants only know how
to profit in any degree by their advantages, even though they should
not be commanded by a Laudohn or a Ziskowitz; a train of three
thousand four wheeled waggons, even if no stop or accident hap-
pens but all keep close together, takes up at least the space of four
German miles, if as commonly happens in a mountainous country,
they cannot proceed but in a single file. But suppose we allow ten
thousand men for the escorte, and admit that the commanding officer
is able to make the waggons drive four a breast, which reduces the
line of march to one mile, his troops also will be disposed of along
this space; I will take it for granted they are divided into three parts,
three thousand for the advanced guard, three thousand in the cen-
ter, and three thousand to cover the rear, the remaining one thou-
sand shall be dispersed in platoons all along the convoy, by this
disposition the three divisions will still be half a mile distant from
each other. Suppose now the enemy has only six thousand men, he
will still be considerably superior to each division, and if he only
attacks one of them with vigour, he must in all probability cut it in
pieces before the others can come to its assistance, (which would
16
Tactician who joined the French army and helped introduce the Frederician
methods.
take up a full hour) or else his troops must be good for nothing.
Without letting myself go here into an enumeration of all the advan-
tages he may draw from the nature of the ground, from making
various false attacks, from ambuscades, &c. in short to describe the
case in one word, he always is the assailant, and his oponent must
confine himself to a mere defensive, and that without daring to haz-
ard himself in the least from his convoy, which he must always be
at hand to succour. While this successful enterprize was carrying on,
Marshal Daun was not without apprehensions left the whole project
should miscarry. For as his reputation and the confidence he had
hitherto acquired with his sovereign. Depended upon his relieving
Olmutz, he came to the resolution of drawing as near as possible
to this town with his army. The better to conceal his views, he
shewed himself about nine o’clock in the morning of the twenty-
ninth, with a strong corps on the other side Prosnitz, and made as
if he would attack that town; during this time General Buccow gave
an alarm to Ziethen’s hussars near Kosteletz; the king immediately
took Lattorf ’s regiment and marched that way, leaving orders with
several batallions t the left wing, to hold themselves in readiness to
follow him in case the enemy should penetrate further. Werner’s
hussars, who were supported by the dragoons, Young Platen and
Czettritz as soon as they came in sight of the enemy, rushed upon
him, broke into his ranks sword in hand, and made about sixty pris-
oners. But the Field Marshal intending merely to reconnoitre, would
not suffer himself to be drawn into any thing serious, and withdrew
into his camp. On hearing that a very strong body of the enemy
was posted near Tebitschau, the king detached lieutenant general
Seidlitz with some hundred dragoons and hussars, to acquaint him-
self of the truth of this intelligence. He found, however, nothing but
hussars, of whom he brought back a few prisoners. Towards evening
came the flugel adjutant Beville, detached by colonel Mosel to head-
quarters, who informed the king that this convoy, after that the
escorte had repulsed the enemy, had reached the half way between
Bautsch and Domstädtl, and that general Ziethen was on his march,
with intention to join colonel Mosel. This intelligence was the more
agreeable to the king, as he might now with greater probability hope
that the convoy would arrive without any further molestation; for
the march of general Ziskowitz was totally unknown to him, so per-
fectly did mere accident by a most singular caprice of fortune, favour
the project of the Austrian general, and give to all his false demon-
strations the appearance of reality. And now Daun being observed

on the following day wholly employed in strengthening his camp
with redoubts, and various other field works; it was conjectured that
having without doubt learnt the check general Laudohn had received,
he sought by these precautions to put his troops in a situation to
give the king a warm reception in the excepted attack; and indeed
this conjecture had such a degree of probability in it, that it would
have been difficult to have any otherwise accounted for the Marshal’s
views. He however had in the mean time caused several bridges to
be thrown over the Morava, between Kremsir and Kogetin; and in
the night of the thirtieth of June to the first of July broke up his
camp at Drobomielitz in the most profound silence, passed the river
with his army, and accelerated his march to such a degree, that he
arrived towards the evening on the heights between Gross Teinitz
and Checkowitz, about half a mile from Olmütz, having made that
day of march of more than five miles. Moreover, left the king hav-
ing any intelligence of these movements, should take measures to
interrupt them, the Marshal had drawn his chain of trusty light
troops very close together, so that it was impossible for any deserter
to penetrate it, and general Buccow, who with a corps of four or
five thousand light troops had been left behind at Ptin to keep up
the communication with general Jahnus, who was posted at Konitz,
had orders to fall on Ziethen’s hussars near Kosteletz, at two in the
morning on the first of July, to draw the king’s attention on that
side; he was however driven back with loss by some infantry, who
had occupied a hollow way which he must pass. The out posts sent
in word that the Austrian army had left their camp, and soon after
the fatal news arrived that the convoy had at last, after a bloody
engagement, been for the greater part cut off. Marshal Keith, who
heard this sooner than the king, but supposed that general Ziethen
might still hold out, detached that same morning general Retzow
with seven batallions and fifteen squadrons to Gibau to extricate
him, but the blow was already struck; general Retzow could pene-
trate no farther than Dolein, where he was informed of all the cir-
cumstances of the affair; he marched back therefore without having
accomplished his object; and as he arrived in his old camp near
Bistrowan, discovered the whole of the enemy’s army on the heights
of Gros Teinitz, on which he passed the bridge of boats near Holitz
that same evening, and joined Marshal Keith, who had already
received the batallions that came back with general Krokow, and
the miserable remnant of the convoy. As soon as all had passed, the
bridge was broken down.
Marshal Daun not having been able to force the king to change
his strong camp, nor effectually to interrupt the progress of the siege,
and desirous to avoid a battle, determined to pass the Morava and
approach Olmutz, so near as to open a communication between it
and the army, which of course would force the enemy to raise the
siege without running the risk of a general action; accordingly on
the thirtieth of June at night, the army began its march which lasted
all that night, and almost the whole day following, being forty miles,
very near the enemy, and through a difficult country, a river, and
several bridges to pass, and late on the first of July, took its camp
near a village called Gros-Teinitz. The Prussians were informed of
this march so late, that they could not prevent, nor even interrupt
it. This very extraordinary march, the position of the Austrians and
the scarcity of stores and provisions, occasioned by the loss of the
great convoy, forced the king to raise the siege immediately, to pre-
vent further misfortunes, which very probably might ensue if his
Majesty persisted in his enterprize now rendered impossible, as the
Marshal, if he lost time, would concert such measures as would make
his retreat very difficult. Accordingly the same night the siege was
raised without loss, excepting a cannon or two, whose carriages were
broke, the whole army marched off before day break in two divi-
sions; the main army under the king directed its course by Gewitsch
to Marisch Tribau, the corps which besieged Olmutz under Marshal
Keith went by Littau, and Muglitz to Tribau. People ignorant of
the circumstances in which the king was, wondered he had chosen
this route rather than that which leads to Troppau, only forty miles
off;* he was forced to choose the former preferable to the latter,
because the Austrians under generals Laudohn, Ziskowitz, Jahnus
and St. Ignon, were masters of this, with about sixteen thousand
men, who in a country extremely favourable for the operations of
corps, and light troops in particular, could effectually interrupt his
march, and give Marshal Daun an opportunity to attack him in his
retreat, with every possible advantage.
Secondly, the forage on that road, as well as in upper Silesia, was
intirely exhausted, and little or nothing in the camp, whereas by
* The author speaks of English miles sixty-nine to a degree.

marching through Bohemia towards Königingratz, he avoided the

former difficulties, and moreover took several magazines which the
Austrians had collected in that country, and left unguarded, not sus-
pecting the king would march that way, though on the least reflection
they would have seen he could not take any other for the above
mentioned reasons.
A body of Austrians marched on the right of Marshal Keith’s col-
umn, and took some horses and waggons. The other column under
the king, who had marched by Konitz and Tyrnau, and from thence
by Krenau and Zwittau to Leitomischel, where the Van under prince
Maurice arrived the fifth, and the main army the day following; gen-
eral baron Buccow with a considerable corps, marched on the left
of the king’s column, he took post at Oppatowitz, from whence he
sent detachments towards Zwittau, to break up the roads and by
that means interrupt, and retard the march of the enemy; which
obliged him to deviate a little from the main road, but did not at
least prevent him from accomplishing his march to Zwittau as he
had projected.
The Austrian generals Buscow, Laudohn, St. Ignon and Ziskowitz,
with a very considerable corps, accompanied the enemy in his march,
some between the right column and the frontiers of Glatz, some on
the left to cover Bohemia, others followed; nothing however was
done to interrupt it, much less to stop it effectually.
Marshall Daun having visited Olmutz on the fourth, passed the
Morava and encamped on the hills near Drahanowitz; on the sixth,
the Van consisting of grenadiers and carabiniers under count Lacy
then quarter master general, advanced to Konitz to mark a camp
for the army, which arrived there the day following, and on the next
morning continued its march to Gewitsch. General Lacy with his
corps always preceded the army a day’s march to mark the camp
for it, and then proceeded to reconnoitre the country and procure
intelligence further on, so as to be able to proceed next day to mark
a new camp; which method is excellent, it secures the march of the
army, and gives time for any disposition which circumstances may
require. In this course he discovered Marshal Keith’s rear, march-
ing from Tribau through Krenau, resolved to attack it, and drove
the Prussians out of the village, and brought up some cannon; the
action (if it deserve that name) lasted from eleven o’clock, till night,
what the loss on either side may have been, is not material. The
Prussians by stopping the enemy the whole day, got time to arrive
in safety to Zwittau, and thereby accomplished the end which they

had in view, whereas the Austrians acquired no advantage at all.
On the ninth, Marshal Daun marched in two columns to Polit-
schka, where the army arrived very late, the road being mountain-
ous, and near fifteen miles. The same day the king came towards
Hohemauth, but finding some passes occupied by general Laudohn,
he encamped short of that place, so let the baggage proceed and
followed the next day.
The tenth the Austrian main army remained at Politschka, while
the king proceeded to Hollitz, and on the eleventh, arrived at
Königsgratz. On this day Marshal Keith who commanded the
rear, left Leitomischel, passed by Hohemauth and encamped at
Hollitz, the Austrians advanced the same day towards Leitomischel,
hoping to find Marshal Keith there, but he was gone, so they
camped between that place and Politschka; the gross of the Prussian
army which had remained at Hollitz, marched to join the king at
Königsgratz.
General Retzow who commanded the rear of this corps, and
escorted the artillery and provisions, set out about twelve o’clock,
was attacked by general Laudohn near a village called Wlezkowitz,
and forced to return towards Hollitz, and occupy some high ground
near that village, and then parked his convoy, having put fire to
some houses at Wlezkowitz, probably for a signal that he was attacked.
When the Austrians had collected all the forces they had in the
neighbourhood, Count St. Ignon with several batallions of grenadiers,
and a regiment of dragoons, attacked the Prussian cavalry which he
beat, and followed beyond the enemy’s artillery and baggage, by
which means it was thrown into disorder, which might have been
fatal, as the Prussians were again in order, had not general Laudohn
advanced with the infantry and cannon, which gave St. Ignon time
to collect his men, and put them in order. The Austrians had taken
three standards, and several pieces of artillery, which they were forced
to abandon, because Marshal Keith appeared with the remainder of
the rear guard, and the king also with a considerable body of troops,
upon which the Austrians retired to their former stations, both par-
ties lost a considerable number of men; the Prussians resumed their
march without being interrupted, and consequently now as at the
affair of Krenau had the advantage.
The garrison of Troppau, and what escaped of the convoy which
was interrupted in going to Olmutz, quitted the former place and
Illustration 19
went to Neiss; on which general de Ville, who had been left in

Moravia, advanced towards upper Silesia. The king being arrived
on the eleventh, as we have said at Königsgratz, found general
Buccow endeavouring to transport the magazines which the Austrians
had there, who withdrew the small garrison, passed the Elbe, and
took post on the other side at Chlumetz, without being able to
accomplish their purpose, for a great part of the magazine fell into
the hands of the Prussians, part of their army soon after marched
to the frontiers of the county of Glatz, but the principal part of it
remained encamped in two lines near Königsgratz, from whence
detachments were sent out on every side to collect forage.
On the twelfth, Marshal Daun quitted his camp at Sebranitz, and
marched to Hohemauth, the fifteenth the army advanced to Krockow-
Teynetsch between the former place and Pardubitz.
General Jahnus who had made part of general Buccow’s corps,
was ordered to Konigshoff on the Elbe, to observe the road to
Trautenau on the Prussians right, whilst general Laudohn was posted
at Hopotschna on their left. He was afterwards attacked in that post,
and forced to abandon it. The king took up his head quarters there,
with part of his army, the rest remained still at Königsgratz, and
raised some works, which seemed to indicate an intention of stay-
ing there for some time.
Marshal Daun therefore thought it necessary to advance nearer
the enemy, and on the eighteenth his army passed the Elbe at
Pardubitz, and took an advantageous cmap beyond it, between
Libischan and Wossitz, the head quarters at Dobrezenitz in sight of
Königsgratz; general Buccow and his corps joined the army here;
some days afterwards the army marched on the left, so that it came
between Urbanitz and Chlom.
The Prussians occupied the road which goes to Glatz, with small
corps to protect the convoys which went to and from that place to
their army, which they did effectually, for general Laudohn never
could intercept the smallest part of them, though he often attempted
it; the king returned to Königsgratz, leaving however, two camps at
Lewin and Reinertz.
The twenty-fifth, the Prussians drew their equipages out of Königs-
gratz into their camp, and destroyed their ovens, which indicated
they proposed quitting the country; accordingly on the twenty-sixth,
they left Königsgratz and marched towards Neustadt, all the corps
on the right and left, under generals Laudohn, Jahnus, &c. followed,
and the Van of the main army under general Lacy, but could not
make no impression on the enemy. The corps under general Ziskowitz
and St. Ignon, joined the main army, which marched out the thir-
tieth, and took its camp behind the Elbe, with the right at Rodow
and the left at Ertina opposite Jaromitz, and the head quarters at
Hertzmanitz, the Van at Smirschitz, with some grenadiers beyond
the Elbe; on the thirty-first the king made a motion as if he intended
going by Trautenau into Silesia, which made Marshal Daun take
such a position as would interrupt him, and perhaps prevent it.
General Laudohn who was on and behind the enemy’s left, was
ordered to quit that station, pass the Elbe, repass it above Jaromitz,
and post himself at Welsdorf near the road which leads from Konigshoff
to Trautenau; the same day the army made a motion on its left, so
that the right came to Ertina, and the left on the hills by Kaschow
to the wood near Kukus, the head quarters continued at Hertzmanitz.
On the third of August the Prussians left Neustadt, and camped
at Klein Skalitz; General Laudohn passed the road to Trautenau,
and took post at Horzitzka, from whence he advanced to attack a
Prussian post on a hill which covered their right, and after much
blood spilt on both sides, retired; it being so near the enemy, it
could not be forced entirely, nor indeed could Laudohn have occu-
pied it long if he had succeeded.
On the fourth the Prussians marched to Nachod, and the fifth in
two columns, the one to Starckstadt, and the other to Politz, on the
road to Braunau.
On the seventh, the first went by Friedland into Silesia, and the
other camped at Wiese, and the corps under general Fouquet took
post at Wünschelburg. These different motions were performed (though
in a very close and mountainous country), without any loss; notwith-
standing several thousand light troops attempted to interrupt them.
General Laudohn, whose corps consisted of above ten thousand men,
was ordered to Arnau, and from thence to precede the army, and
make the van of it, and on the eighth, advanced to Hohen Elbe.
Thus ended this memorable transaction, which deserves to be exam-
ined minutely, because it will furnish an example for such as may
be employed on similar occasions.
Reflections on the Siege of Olmutz, and the Different Operations which were
executed on that Occasion
It is evident that no operation, whether military or mechanical, can

be performed, unless the men employed are provided with he instru-
ments and materials necessary for the work intended; have their sub-
sistence secured; and perfect safety, that they may prosecute their
work without danger or interruption. In treating of a siege, we have
said in the preceding part of this work, that previous to opening the
trenches, a general should have in his camp, if possible, the artillery
stores and provisions ready prepared, and particularly if his line of
operation is of any considerable length, and the enemy has an army
in the field, otherwise bad weather, and the attacks he must expect
continually from the enemy, will render the arrival of his convoys
precarious, slow, and uncertain. The greatest part of his army must
be employed in escortes, patroles, &c. whereas it should be employed
either in carrying on the siege, or in protecting those who do; so
that the work may proceed regularly, and as quick as possible, for
all delays are dangerous, and always turn to the advantage of the
enemy or course: too many men, and too great a quantity of artillery,
can never be employed.
In order to protect as much as possible those employed in the
siege, experience has taught the necessity of lines of contravallation
and circumvallation, which ought never to be omitted, if the garri-
son is strong and moreover the enemy has any army in the field.
This enables you to carry on you operation without interruption,
and greatly diminishes the labour of your troops. I do not mean
that you should wait for the enemy within your lines, by no means;
the army which covers the siege, must meet the enemy in the field,
always at such a distance that in case you are beat, you have time
to withdraw your troops, and artillery, as the king at Kollin, which
could not have been done, had the battle been fought within a league
or two of Prague. At the siege of Olmutz, the king neglected every
precaution; insomuch, that the place was never properly invested,
and of course the besieged several times received succours of vari-
ous kinds unperceived, which besides its real use gives great encour-
agement to the garrison, and diminishes the hopes and confidence
of the besiegers. When we consider that the enemy’s light troops,
very numerous, got immediately between Olmutz and Troppau, from
whence every thing came to the army, and Monsieur de Ville was
Illustration 20
with a strong body of horse between the first place and Brinn, from
whence detachments were continually sent beyond the Morava, which
often defeated his majesty’s posts, and always interrupted the progress
of the siege, while Laudohn and his light troops acted day and night
on his line of operation, and attacked his convoys. Thus the two
capital points (I mean his subsistence and the safety of those who
conducted the siege) being totally neglected, he was forced to raise
it, which would have happened even had Marshal Daun had no
army in the field, for I am convinced that Marshal Laudohn alone
at the head of twenty thousand light troops, acting upon the king’s
line near forty miles long, in a country peculiarly adapted to the
operations of such troops, would have forced his majesty to aban-
don it, and indeed this General and Ziskowitz, with two detach-
ments of about twelve thousand men, did perform this work; for
Marshal Daun did not act himself, but only placed himself so, that
he might protect and support those who did. Moreover the king had
by no means a sufficient quantity of artillery, seventy pieces is noth-
ing against a good place and a good garrison, he should have had
three times as much; despatch is every thing on such occasions. The
post the king occupied at Prosnitz, was of all others the most improper,
as it left his rear and his line with Troppau, quite naked and defence-
less, and exposed to be continually insulted; whereas if he had camped
with his main army at Mahrisch Tribau, with two corps, one at
Landscron and the other at Zittau, Marshal Daun could not have
sent his light troops on the roads towards Troppau, and must have
changed his position, and by a round-about march, to avoid fighting,
endeavoured to place himself between Olmutz and Brinn; then the
post of Prosnitz would have been good, whereas it was no use, while
Marshal Daun was at Leitomischel; on the contrary it enabled that
General to employ his light troops with every advantage possible,
and at last brought on the loss of the convoy, which was a decisive
event, and alone would have forced his majesty to raise the siege.
Posted as the Prussians were, they were surrounded by the enemy’s
parties, who penetrated wherever they pleased, and of course inter-
rupted the operations of the siege; no army however numerous posted
in detachments round a place, can invest it effectually; it must occupy
nine or ten miles of ground, and if it formed a chain, which can-
not be done, the enemy by making some false attacks, will get through
it in twenty different places, and even by day force any part in spite
of you; the circular form of such a chain, makes it every where
weak, and no part can be abandoned to support those which are

attacked. If therefore the enemy has any force at all in the field, a
siege cannot be carried on unless the place is surrounded by good
lines, and though this is a truth demonstrated by experience, and
the examples of all great men, we find the king of Prussia always
neglected this necessary precaution; we also find that he is not suc-
cessful, for whenever any real attempt was made to raise a siege
formed by him, it succeeded, and always will; even lines are often
forced, because the communication between the different parts of
them, is intersected by the cannon of the place, to a great distance,
and very often by rivers, and other obstacles, so that the troops
which guard them, must remain where they are; whereas the enemy’s
motions are free, so that he cam bring a greater number to act in
different points, than those who are confined within the lines. Hence
it is that if they are accessible in many parts, and the enemy is pro-
vided with fascines, he will penetrate somewhere; you are too near
the town to fall back and form again, on some advantageous ground,
the troops to the right and left are taken in flank, and you must fly
as you can. For which reasons no attempt should ever be made to
defend lines, if they are at all accessible in many or all their parts,
yet they are absolutely necessary if you besiege a place, and the
enemy has an army in the field.
I suppose prince Henry’s army was weak, otherwise it would seem,
that if instead of going to Franconia, to raise contributions he had
entered Bohemia, such an enterprize would have facilitated the king’s
operations before Olmutz; this is only a surmise, it is possible he
was afraid of leaving Saxony, lest the army of the empire should
force the passes behind them; his army was small no doubt, for we
find he could not prevent the army of the empire taking Pirna and
Sonnenstein in his presence.
The situation in which the king was, at the beginning of the cam-
paign, made it necessary to take Schweidnitz, to prevent the enemy
from entering Silesia on that side, and advance as in the foregoing
year to Breslaw; but the siege of Olmutz was a rash and inconsid-
erate operation, which if successful would have proved disadvanta-
geous to him, because he could not preserve it, unless he left there
an army, and then only till winter, when the Austrians would have
retaken it; no place isolated which you cannot preserve ought to be
besieged unless to destroy it, because you will lose your garrison;
moreover the king having many and powerful enemies in the field,
and no men to spare in garrison, he ought to have collected all his

forces for the field, and wait the moment it was necessary to act,
and not act till then; more than two thirds of his army were new
levies; he should have brought them into the field only when nec-
essary, taken time to form them, and not expose them raw, as they
were, to the hard labours which necessarily attends a siege; by doing
otherwise an epidemical distemper seized them, and destroyed a
prodigious number, insomuch, that the corps under Marshal Keith,
which should have sixteen thousand men compleat, was reduced to
less than half that number, which accounts for his very slow progress;
he had not a sufficient number of men, nor half artillery enough;
he had but one attack, and that so weak, that during the whole
siege, the fire of the place was superior to his, and after near forty
days work, he was as far from taking the place as the first day; the
nearer he approached it, the more certain his loss, while the enemy’s
fire was superior, and in my opinion, he must in the end have fallen
back, until his fire was stronger, and perhaps abandoned the enter-
prise totally. People grow tired in a long siege, grow impatient, right
or wrong will advance, this brings on heavy calamities, because you
cannot advance with safety, but step by step, and in proportion as
your fire increases; and that of the place diminishes. This is reason
why you must raise your first batteries at a distance, though perhaps
favoured by the ground, it might be done much nearer, but it must
not be done, for if the enemy’s fire is strong, he will kill you many
men, and in an hour destroy what you have been forty in doing.
The event of this enterprize, and the cause which produced it, (I
mean the taking of the convoy) confirms the doctrine we established
in the preceding volume, which is, that a fortress, constructed with
a view to cover the country, should be placed at a considerable dis-
tance from the frontier, and not close to it, because in the first case
it enables you to act on the enemy’s line of operation, which is the
only method you have to retard the enemy’s progress, with safety
and success, for it is by no means adviseable to risk a general action.
Whereas if it is placed close to the frontier, and of course the enemy’s
line is short and easily defended, you cannot act upon it; you must
fight or let the place be taken in your presence; we shall conclude
our observation, by saying that the king did no one thing, which
should have been done. He abandoned his line of operation to the
mercy of the enemy; he never invested the place, so that it received
succours of different kinds during the whole siege; he had not artillery
or stores, provisions, &c. sufficient; his army was not strong enough
to carry on the siege, and to occupy a hundred different posts, which
was done ineffectually, and harassed his men so much that they
became extremely sickly, and he lost many men. He neglected every
precaution, as if the enemy had no army in the field, and that the
garrison consisted only of a few hundred men, and the place a
bicoque; for which reason he deservedly failed in his enterprize,
which cost him many men, and much time and treasure.
When we compare his conduct with that of Marshal Daun, we
shall find such rules for the conduct of generals, in similar occasions,
as may serve hereafter for guides, certain and infallible.
The result of the king’s conduct shews what is to be done by a
general who undertakes a siege, for by neglecting it he miscarried.
That of Marshal Daun will furnish no less certain rules for a gen-
eral who dares not risk a battle, and indeed ought not, but where
every other means to stop the progress of the enemy fail, and is
however commanded to do it.
Marshal Daun’s army was almost composed of recruits; the few
veterans dismayed by the unfortunate conclusion of last campaign.
It was dangerous to approach the enemy, moreover, he expected
considerable reinforcements from Flanders, Italy, &c. For which rea-
son he wished to be forgot and neglected by the enemy; he was so,
and therefore he continued a long time at Leitomischel. This posi-
tion was strong, and so far off, that the king could not leave the
neighbourhood of Olmutz, and go after Daun. The position of the
Austrian forces while the king was at Olmutz, was as follows: The
main army under Daun at Leitomischel, fifty English miles from
Olmutz; General de Ville, with a strong corps, had been left in
Moravia; upon the approach of the Prussians he retired into that
place, and retired with his cavalry, step by step, towards Brinn, from
whence he sent detachments over the Morava, which under Count
St. Ignon did much and important services, as we have seen. On
the left of the main army, and advanced before it, on the side of
Glatz, was placed general Harsch, with a strong corps, and beyond
this all the light troops which advanced occasionally to the road
which leads from Troppau to Olmutz, and consequently covered the
country on that side against the enemy’s parties, and moreover
alarmed his posts continually, and often intercepted and always inter-
rupted his convoys; to which was finally raised by their taking and
destroying the great convoy, which must have happened though
Marshal Daun had not interfered. This illustrious general who left
nothing to chance, nor did a wrong thing when permitted to follow
his own judgment, resolved to come nearer the enemy, when his
own army was in a condition to meet him, and when his adver-
sary’s forces were greatly diminished, and scattered about the coun-
try to defend posts which he could not defend; accordingly he quitted
his post at Zwittau, and in four days march through a most difficult
country, arrived the seventeenth of June at Evannowitz, within ten
miles of the enemy, without his having the least knowledge of it.
This fine and vigorous operation, performed with wonderful wisdom
and activity, was in itself decisive; for though the enemy had been
provided with stores, provisions, &c. he could not possibly have car-
ried on the siege with an army in front, a strong place in the rear,
and his communication with Silesia cut off, insomuch that a cart
could not come from thence, unless escorted by a strong body of
troops; and even this precaution was not sufficient, the place was
not invested, or rather was absolutely open on the left of the Morava,
so that nothing hindered the Marshal from throwing what succours
he pleased into it. The proximity of the Marshal drew the king’s
attention that way, which enabled the Austrians to destroy the con-
voy, as we have seen. The Marshal not content with this decisive
success, resolved to put a end to the business, and in two more
marches performed in the presence, and within reach of the king,
passed the Morava, and encamped within cannon shot of the town;
and if in that very night the king had not raised the siege and
decamped, it is probable the Marshal would have taken such measures
as to render the king’s retreat difficult, and perhaps impracticable,
which I suppose determined him to go off as soon as possible.
The column under Marshal Keith, where the artillery and equipage
were, was conducted with uncommon wisdom, and defended, when
attacked, with great vigour. On his coming to Zwittau he was forced
to take the same road the king had done. It seems strange and con-
trary to all rules that Marshal Keith’s column should march last.
The king the second day should have taken some very strong camp,
and ordered Marshal Keith’s division to make the van of the whole,
while his majesty, with the greatest part of his army, should have
made the rear; and as on all such occasions, distributed his troops
in echellons, so that they might support each other when attacked,
and march thus separated, with the more celerity, which is the point
to be aimed at in a retreat.
Illustration 21
Illustration 22
This retreat, like all others we here of, was executed with success,
for this simple reason. It was not interrupted by any serious and
powerful attack, which is now the common practice. For my part,
I should upon such an occasion pursue the enemy with my whole
army, and attack one or other of his columns with my principal
force, while the remainder should be employed in harassing the oth-
ers. This nonchalance is the more reprehensible, as in acting with
vigour you risk nothing. The enemy cannot remain on the spot, he
must retire, he must fight if you please, or abandon his equipage,
and part of his army, and run away. Whereas you may bring on a
general action, or not, as you like, he cannot force you. It will be
said that Marshal Daun ought not to risk an action, because he
knew the enemy must soon be obliged to retire, and be called else-
where. I grant all this, but it is nothing to the purpose; for he might
have fought him as long as he pleased, without being forced to fight
a battle, which in such cases is by no means necessary; you may by
partial, though vigorous attacks, ruin an enemy, or force him to
abandon his artillery, equipage, &c. I beg leave to recommend to
the Reader’s perusal, what I have wrote on this subject in my pre-
ceding volume.
Chapter III. Of the Operations of the Russian Army

Commanded by General Fermor 17
In the preceding volume, we gave an account of the retreat of the

Russians into Poland, which gave General Lewald an opportunity
to march with his army to Pomerania to oppose the Swedes, and
having beat them, to assist the king in Saxony, leaving Prussia only
two batallions and fifty hussars, who retired also into Pomerania, on
the approach of the Russians, who with about thirty thousand men
in the month of January, took possession of all Prussia, which the
king found it impossible to defend as so very great a distance against
a powerful enemy almost on the frontier of it, and so very properly
abandoned it. By thus concentring his forces, he could with more
ease and facility oppose the various armies, with which he was sur-
rounded, and upon any particular occasion collect a sufficient force
17
Mistakenly numbered Chapter II in the original publication with the previous
section left unnumbered.
to stop their progress, whereas if he persisted in defending Prussia,

a powerful army would be necessary, and this he could not spare.
The Russians remained quiet during the months of January and
February. In March a considerable corps advanced into Poland and
took possession of Elbing and Thorn, on the Vistula, a necessary
measure, in order to secure a passage over that river, and also to
form magazines, which might easily be collected in such a corn coun-
try as Poland, and brought there by water carriage, a thing of the
utmost importance, and particularly where the roads on the falling
of a shower of rain become impassable. In order to accelerate what
might be thought necessary, the General, Count Fermor took up his
head quarters at Marienwerder on the ninth of March; the army
remained in quarters till May: about the end of this month the troops
approached the Vistula and passed the river near Dirschau; the divi-
sion commanded by Count Romanzow,18 encamped near Conitz,
who sent a strong detachment under Major General Demiscow19
towards the New March and Pomerania in order to raise contribu-
tions, which orders he executed without mercy, carrying off what he
could, and destroying the rest, if credit may be given to what has
been wrote on the subject. The tenth of June, the army marched
to Conitz, where the whole assembled and General Demiscow was
again detached with three thousand hussars and two thousand
grenadiers on horseback towards a town called Kazimirsberg in
Pomerania, which was taken and plundered as well as the whole
country, where the Cossacks could penetrate and then retired again
into Poland. The twenty-eighth of June, the army left Conitz, and
on the first of July arrived at Posen on the Wartha, while Count
Romanzow marched into Pomerania and the New March. The
approach of such a powerful army, whose detachments run along
the right of the Oder from the frontiers through Brandenburg and
Pomerania and spread terror and desolation wherever they came,
made it necessary to oppose an army to curb, and if possible stop
their progress; accordingly the king ordered that which the year
before had been in Prussia under Marshal Lewald, and was now in
Swedish Pomerania commanded by Count [Christoph von] Dohna
to march against the Russian main army. Lieutenant General Canitz20
18
Count Petr Aleksandrovich Rumiantsev (1725–96).
19
Thomas von Demiku.
20
Lt. Gen. Hans Wilhelm von Kanitz.
campaign of 1758
607
Map 18, Part 1. The Battle of Zornsdorf, on the 25th of August 1758.
campaign of 1758
609
Map 18, Part 2. The Battle of Zornsdorf, on the 25th of August 1758.
preceded with a strong vanguard, a body of Russians under General

Demiscow made an attempt against Driesen but was repulsed by
Colonel Count Huerd.21 The same day (tenth of July) the Russian
army advanced to Miedzyrycz, and immediately sent a strong corps
provided with artillery, &c. to attack Driesen again, while a detach-
ment was placed at Neübruck to intercept the garrison to Friedberg
where they attacked them, the greatest part of the garrison was com-
posed of Austrians, who on seeing the Russians cried Vivat Maria
Theresa, and joined them; the remainder composed of militia defended
themselves extremely well and made good their retreat to Landsberg
on the Wartha.
In the mean time Count Romanzow was advanced to Stargard
and General Resanow to Stolpe, with a view to secure the com-
munication with the Oder.
The chief object the Russians had, was the taking of Custrin,
which they hoped might be done before the arrival of the king, who
they knew was coming from Silesia with considerable succours to
join Count Dohna’s army which lay encamped near Frankfort. Custrin
is small but very strong from its situation on the Oder, which joins
the Wartha there, this river is very deep, and rapid in its course,
being narrow; it is surrounded by a morass, through which is raised
a wad or a dam by which alone you can approach it on that side.
It communicates with the country beyond the Oder, by a bridge of
timber, at the head of which is a fauxbourg, but no outwork I believe
at all, which is a great fault, for had their been a good one, the
Russians could not have come near enough to bombard the town,
which laid it in ashes. It had at this time a strong garrison com-
manded by a brave man, Colonel Schach de Wittenau.
On the fifteenth of August a detachment of Russians followed by
the whole army approached the town, and immediately without open-
ing the trenches, or raising any breastwork or regular batteries to
cover the cannon, or men that serve them, in open field began to
throw bombs, which in a few hours laid it in ashes, but neither did
nor could in the least hurt the ramparts, and produced no other
effect than the ruin of many thousand people, and wounded three
soldiers. The third day only General Fermor thought it necessary to
summons the town to surrender, which should have been done before
21
Count Johann Judwig Hordt.
he bombarded it, threatening to take it by storm, if they did not

give up the place; this message was in the highest degree ridiculous,
the Oder was to be got over without a bridge or even a boat. Not
one single shot had been directed against the works, consequently
no breach made, nor one cannon dismounted. How this Excellency
proposed taking the place by storm, we leave it to his friends to
explain.
On the twenty-second of August, the king with very considerable
reinforcements from Silesia, and two regiments of horse from Saxony,
arrived at Count Dohna’s army, and on the day following passed
the Oder below Custrin at Gustebiese; this obliged the Russians to
raise the siege and take another position. The corps brought from
Russia under General Broome, and that which had lain before Custrin
joined the army; on the twenty-fifth a general action ensued, the
most bloody of any which happened during this very active war;
which goes by the name of the battle of Zorndorff, a village on the
field of battle. We shall give the different accounts.
Account published by the Prussians
In obedience to the king’s command I left Custrin, and on the twenty-
fourth, found our army encamped at Darmutzel, that of the enemy
was formed with the right at Zicker, and the left at Quartschen, and
Zorndorff behind it, between two and three in the morning we advanced
over the Mikel a small river, and proceeded through the wood called
Massin, and the village Batzlow into a plain, where the columns opened
and extended as far as Zorndorff, by which means we were exactly
behind the enemy. We expected that this manœuvre would have thrown
them into confusion, but we were mistaken, as the ground on which
they stood was not sufficiently extensive, they formed in four lines,
making front every way which was protected by a numerous artillery,
and chevaux de frize, their right flank was covered by the village of
Zicker, behind which was their cavalry posted in the plain; prince
Maurice under the king commanded our first line, General Manteufel22
the left of the infantry, and General Seidlitz the cavalry of the same
wing; the infantry supported by the artillery attacked the villages, these
were followed by two thousand two hundred grenadiers; but about
eleven o’clock, when we saw the enemy preparing to withdraw the
artillery, these grenadiers from whence much was expected, without
any visible cause, run away, at least one thousand paces before they
could be stopped. This made a great opening in the line, which left
22
Lt. Gen. Gerd Heinrich von Manteuffel.
the flanks of both infantry and cavalry quite unprotected, of which the
enemy’s cavalry tried to avail themselves, but without success; first, by
doing it too late, and secondly, that General Seidlitz, notwithstanding
the ground was close and difficult, advanced at the head of the cav-
alry, which checked that of the enemy, and gave our infantry time to
rally behind it; the king informed of the flight of the grenadiers, ordered
three regiments of infantry, two batallions of grenadiers, five squadrons
of dragoons, five of gens d’armes, and three of garde de corps to
advance and assist them. At twelve o’clock the attack was renewed,
and General Seidlitz having thrown the enemy cavalry’s into confu-
sion, took their infantry in flank, and our infantry at the same time
supported by forty pieces of cannon, advanced and drove the enemy
out of the village of Zorndorff, where they found the baggage and
military chest, in which was about eighty thousand rubles, (about one
hundred and sixty thousand pounds); notwithstanding the disorder
which prevailed in the enemy’s right, they would not abandon their
ground, which occasioned a great slaughter among them. While we
thought ourselves sure of the victory, we observed the remainder of
their right wing, and their reserve form again at Quartschen. We
advanced and attacked the enemy again, and after a vigorous onset,
forced him to retire and quit his ground, and at sun-set the battle was
finished; his defeat would have been compleat and total, had not one
of the enemy’s Generals (Demiscow) towards the evening, with a body
of chosen men, advanced against our right, and though he lost the
greatest part of his men, he got however time for their infantry to
retire towards our left, and during the night to take another position,
where the whole army was collected and united; we remained under
arms during that night. The next morning, the twenty-sixth, we can-
nonaded each other; the twenty-seventh the enemy seemed inclined to
fight another battle, but instead of advancing they marched towards
the road which leads to Landsberg. As it was impossible for them to
reach the city in our presence, so they turned towards Wietz, and
camped between that village and the river Wartha, which was very
wrong, as they had no bridge to pass it, nor could they subsist long
there. Our loss, considering so great a victory, is very moderate, and
consists of about thirty officers killed, eighty wounded, seven hundred
and sixty men killed, one thousand three hundred and seventy-two
wounded, and three hundred and fifty missing. Whereas the enemy’s
loss is about twenty thousand men; we took above twelve thousand
prisoners, among which are five generals, and sixty officers of different
ranks. The reason of our small loss compared with that of the enemy
is, that their artillery was ill served, and the men not expert in the
use of their arms. The men are however strong and brave, a shot
through the body does not hinder them from continuing the fight; we
have moreover taken one hundred and four cannons, twelve mortars,
twenty-seven pair of colours, five standards, &c.
From this account nothing more can be collected, than that the
Prussians left wing attacked the enemy’s right, was repulsed, but at
length drove it out of the field, after an action which lasted from
near ten in the morning till six in the evening, and not till sun-set
as the Writer says. The victory, such as it was, was entirely owing to
the cavalry, under whose protection the repulsed infantry rallied, and
at length after the cavalry had driven that of the enemy back, and
attacked his infantry in flank, they advanced, renewed the attack,
and drove him out of the field.
As I have the greatest veneration for the king of Prussia’s abili-
ties, it is with diffidence I presume to offer my opinion on his con-
duct; however I must ask, why, after the enemy’s right was totally
beat as it is said, and forced to abandon the field, he did not send
some troops after them to prevent their rallying, and with the remain-
der of his army attack their center in flank and rear, while his right
attacked their left? This would in all probability have produced their
total defeat, or rather destruction. Why the day following, when the
enemy formed a line in front, he did not attack them? When the
twenty-seventh they retired, as this account says, between Wietz and
the Wartha, with their rear to it, he did not place himself across
their right wing? This would have rendered their retreat to Landsberg
impossible, and having neither boats to cross the river, nor subsis-
tence for many days, they must have fought their way through his
army, or surrendered. Why camp at Tamsel, and so leave the road
to Landsberg open? and in the six days they continued at Gross
Camin, nor in their retreat, ever attempt to attack them? If the
Russians after the battle formed on the left, as it is marked in all
the plans I have seen of this battle, how could they march unin-
terrupted close before the Prussians front, if they were at Tamsel,
or behind their army, and between it and Custrin, if it was on the
field of battle, to Gros Camin? all this is inconceivable. We there-
fore think that the action did not pass as represented in the plan;
or that the Russians, after the battle, did not form across the enemy’s
left flank, as in y.y. but on the contrary, across his right flank, from
whence they could easily retire to Gros Camin, which in the other
case seems impossible. It is wonderful that the six different accounts
of this battle which I have now before me, none tells us precisely
what was the position of the Russians the twenty-sixth in the morn-
ing; nor when the king marched to Tamsel, though it should seem
it was on the twenty seventh, when the former went to Gros Camin.
Upon the whole I think it certain that the Russians marched thither
by their left to avoid another action, and not by their right, which
would inevitably have engaged them in one, if the king thought
proper. The king’s army was formed in three lines; two of infantry,
and one of cavalry, behind it, whose orders were to advance only
when the enemy was thrown into confusion, or to protect the retreat
of the infantry, and favour its rallying, in case it was repulsed, which
happened. To this disposition alone his majesty owed his victory, as
he avowed himself. We are happy to find our doctrine on this sub-
ject (proposed in the first volume) confirmed by such an example,
and by so great a man as the king of Prussia.
The loss of the Prussians was not so small as the author of this
account makes it. It consists of
Killed Wounded Missing

Off. und.off. sol. Off. und.off. sol. Off. und.off. sol.
Cavalry 16 30 496 60 56 584 2 4 80

Infantry 45 98 2959 186 202 5015 15 38 1303
There are two more accounts of the battle given by the Prussians,
but neither gives us any circumstances which may lead to the knowl-
edge of the ground, or explain the manner in which it passed; they
say nothing more than that their left wing having been repulsed sev-
eral times, rallied under the protection of the cavalry, and by the
help of this, after a bloody action from ten in the morning till night,
drove at length the enemy’s right out of the field, as we have seen.
They do not say that their right or center acted at all, at least that
they gained any advantage; on the contrary it seems clear by their
own account, that General Demiscow’s attack restrained them, and
prevented their prosecuting the advantage gained over the enemy’s
right.
On the Russian side several accounts were published, two by the
commander in chief, and one by general [Petr Ivanovich] Panin,
neither contains any thing which gives much insight into the affair.
The first assures the Empress he got the battle, and that his army
was encamped on the field of action, while the very same day he
wrote to Count Dohna, the Prussian general, to desire leave to bury
the dead, and carry off the wounded; what impudent lies! If he was
master of the field, why ask leave to return there to bury the dead?
Count Panin was wounded, with a contusion, very early in the action,
the important part of which he was unacquainted with, and he
recounts even what he saw in a manner, which proves that the
smoak or other circumstances prevented him from seeing clear, which
too often happens; we are therefore obliged to recur to the account
given by one Arnfeld,23 a Swedish officer, volunteer in the Russian
army, as the only one which has some likeness to truth.
Count Fermor being informed the king had passed the Oder, raised
the blockade of Custrin, and marched with his whole army into the
plain, and formed with the right, consisting of the new corps which
arrived this day towards Zicker, and the left towards Zorndorff; this
position enabled him to oppose the enemy, whether he advanced by
Neüdamm or New Mill; he stopped at Neüdamm, and seemed dis-
posed to attack our left flank; however, the twenty-fifth in the morn-
ing he marched round our right wing, and behind us as far as Zorndorff,
which obliged us to change our front, and consequently our right
became the left, and the left the right; this was executed in the pres-
ence of the enemy, without confusion or loss of time; we drew back
our right from Zorndorff to Quartschen, that we might have more
room to extend our line, to prevent the enemy from attacking us in
the flank; Zorndorff was burnt that he might not cover his motions;
as the smoak was not dissipated soon enough, the enemy advanced,
supported by a heavy cannonade, and attacked our right, which they
endeavoured to take in flank. They were however repulsed, and ran
off behind their third line composed entirely of cavalry, by which they
were enabled to form again, and renew the attack. Our cavalry sup-
ported our infantry, but that of the enemy being much more numer-
ous, it was obliged to give way, otherwise the affair in this wing would
have been instantly determined in our favour. Our infantry obliged to
oppose that of the enemy, was, after having repulsed it several times,
compelled also to give way, while the enemy was continually rein-
forced by fresh troops. In the mean time our left attacked, but repulsed
the enemy, and with fixed bayonets drove him back in the greatest
confusion, and even attacked the right of his center and left wing, and
threw it into disorder; our right wing availed itself of these favourable
circumstances, attacked the enemy, and drove him quite back; but his
fine cavalry which had saved his left in the beginning of the action,
again stopped our progress, hindered our grenadiers from prosecuting
their advantage, and gave his infantry time to rally. Our cavalry on
the left, commanded by general Demiscow, did great service on this
occasion. As soon as the enemy’s infantry was formed behind the cav-
23
Fromhold Armfeldt.
alry, which had suffered much, they advanced and renewed the attack,
which was likewise done soon after by their left, with more vigour
than ever, and at last the enemy’s corps de reserve penetrated into
our center; and though he did not instantly derive any advantage from
this circumstance, however our right and left were totally separated,
and the first forced to retire, keeping up a continual fire towards the
little river, the Mitzel, and the wood; our left remaining on the spot.
Though general [George von] Brown, who commanded it, had been
dangerously wounded, and colonel Soltikow, were taken prisoners by
some hussars who came behind them, and a great number of other
officers of all ranks; our good countenance, the disorder into which
we had thrown the enemy’s army, and his loss, and the continual fire
our right, prevented him from renewing the attack against our left,
and at last compelled him to retire by his right behind Zicker, leav-
ing several pieces of cannon, and wounded men behind him, which
the enemy could not carry off that night. The same night our right
joined the left, which had always remained on the field of battle; the
confusion which prevailed every where, and the position the enemy
took behind Zicker, obliged us to change ours, and we camped exactly
opposite the place on which we stood the preceding day, where we
remained two days, and then marched unmolested to Gros Camin,
where our baggage was; we took twenty-six cannon, and several pris-
oners. The enemy camped between Zicker and Wilkerdorff, and drew
a line before his front.
This account of the Russian manœuvres seems clear, the right wing
joined the left, where it had remained during and after the battle,
from whence I conclude, that on the twenty-sixth the Russians formed
some where on that side; but if, as he says, the enemy was posted
between Zicker and Wilkersdorff, and not at Tamsel, how could they
march about his left to Gros and Klein Camin? There must be
something wrong and unintelligible in all these accounts.*
The loss of the Russians killed, wounded, and missing, nine hun-
dred and thirty-nine officers; non-commission and private killed and
wounded, eighteen thousand five hundred; ditto taken prisoners, three
thousand. The same officer, in another letter to Count Hamilton,24
a general in the Swedish service, says, that when the first line was
forced back, and the second advanced to support it, they fired upon
them, and killed a great number, which brought the whole into the
utmost confusion; the consequence of which was, they fell upon their
* See Note C.
24
Lt. Gen. David Gustav Hamilton. Commander of the Swedish forces in Pome-
rania (1758–59).
own baggage, plundered it, and got so drunk with brandy they found
there, that they could no longer be brought to obey, or even hear
their officers; and had the enemy advanced at that time, they would
have been all cut to pieces.
After the battle the Russians marched on the heights between
Camin and Vietz in a very advantageous position; both armies were
formed in battle on the twenty-sixth, however nothin happened,
except a heavy cannonade, which being far off, had little or no
effect. On the twenty-seventh it changed its position, and camped
further back, beyond these two villages, and the Prussians followed
them about three miles. The king intended attacking some redoubts
which the Russians had raised, in order to cover the road which
leads through the wood towards Landsberg, on the Wartha, and
advanced without any escorte to reconnoitre them within gun-shot
of them; being observed, they fired a great number of shot from
cannons and howitzers, which endangered his person. So he retired
in haste; but as it was necessary to observe nearly the motions of
the enemy, he ordered prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau, with an
avantgarde of forty squadrons of dragoons, two regiments of hus-
sars, and seven batallions, to camp out of reach of the cannon, while
the army remained at Tamsel.
At length on the thirty-first of August the Russians quitted their
camp behind Gros Camin, and marched by Blomberg, through the
woods and village of Massin to Landsberg. The Prussians advanced
to Blomberg the first of September, about four miles off Tamsel. On
the second the king with part of his army returned towards Saxony,
where the situation of prince Henry was critical, on the point of
being attacked by the Imperial army under Marshal Daun, and that
of the empire under the prince of Deuxponts.25 What remained of
the Prussian army was much weaker than that of the Russians, which
had been joined here by Count Romanzow’s division, and the corps
which general Risanow had in Pomerania, near Stolpe. Though the
Russian army was by these reinforcements as strong as ever, yet it
undertook nothing at all. The Prussians van was camped within four
miles of Landsberg, which the Russians attempted to bring to action
by surprise, but in vain; the Prussian general always found means
25
Field Marshal Friedrich Michael, Prince Pfalz-Zweibrücken. Commander of
the Reichsarmee (February 1758–March 1761).
to baffle their attempts. On the twenty-first of September the Russians

left Landsberg, and marched into Pomerania, leaving a strong gar-
rison at Landsberg. General Wobersnow was sent to attack that post,
which the Russians avoided by leaving the town, and passing over
the Wartha into Poland. The Prussian van under general Manteufel
followed the enemy’s main army, which encamped by Stargard, the
Prussians at Pyritz. The Russian general Pulmbach [Palmenbach],
with a considerable corps, was sent to besiege Colberg, a small place
not strong, and a sea-port in the Baltic, which would have been of
the utmost advantage to the Russians could they have taken it; who
having a fleet might have formed magazines there, and co-operated
with their army on land, and even have been enabled to place a
great part of their army in winter quarters in Pomerania, where are
many towns surrounded with walls in the old fashion, which by mak-
ing a good ditch pallisaded, and raising a few redoubts before the
gates, might be rendered capable of a good defence, at least until
their forces could be collected, and brought to succour the place
attacked. In short, with very little pains and industry such towns,
even when they have no walls, may be rendered inattackable to any
corps unprovided with cannon. There is no passing a good fossé pal-
lisaded with cannon, if men will defend themselves. For these rea-
sons this siege was determined on; accordingly General Pulmbach
approached the place on the third of October, and in a few days
raised several batteries, chiefly of mortars and howitzers, which fired
continually until the thirty-first of the same month, when the Russians
retired, not having been able to make a breach. Major Heyde, who
commanded in the place a small but vigorous garrison, acquired
immortal honour by his very brave and skilful conduct in the defence
of this place; his loss killed and wounded did not exceed five or
six men.
During the siege the Russian army remained at Stargard, till the
eighteenth, when they marched to Dramburg, where they remained
till the third of November. The Russians had occupied Greiffenberg.
Count Dohna ordered General Platten,26 with a detachment of hus-
sars and a regiment of dragoons to attack it; upon his approach the
Russians retired, but the Prussians came up with them not far off
and intirely defeated them; colonel Cubendorf and captain Lochstedt,
26
Lt. Gen. Dubislav von Platen.
distinguished themselves very much on this occasion. This event

though in itself of small consequence contributed to raise the siege
of Colberg; as it opened a communication with that city. After this
action General Fermor recalled General Pulmbach and his corps,
and on the third of November returned by Templeberg into Poland;
General Ohlitz who commanded the Russians at Driesen, after he
had ruined all the works old and new, abandoned that place, and
retired also into Poland, where the Russians took up their winter
quarters partly on the Vistula, and partly in the kingdom of Prussia.
The head quarters, heavy artillery, &c. were fixed at Marienwerden,
so the Russians with a mighty army concluded this campaign, with-
out executing any one thing worthy to be transmitted to posterity;
they wanted neither force nor valour, why then, will it be asked, did
they nothing? the reasons are obvious, and will shew, why, during
the war in which they gained some very important victories, they
never executed any solid enterprize.
In the preceding volume we have said, that the final success of a
war must chiefly depend on the length and nature of the line of
operation; if this is well chosen and directed to some capital object,
success will in general attend it; but if ill chosen, victory itself will
lead to nothing.
The line on which the Russians acted has its source, and origin
like all others at the capital, unless the sovereign commands in per-
son; from thence generally stores of different kinds are brought, as
well as the orders by which the operations of the army are regu-
lated; for sovereigns, and their ministers, are too jealous of their
power to confide it entirely to the General, however necessary; the
circumstances in war are transitory and almost instantaneous, a
General should therefore be invested with every power, that he may
avail himself of them, but that is not the case, and therefore we
must consider the court as the first point of the line of operations;
the second is, that where your depots are lodged; and the third,
finally that point or place you intend attacking. It is evident, first,
that you cannot reckon on any subsistence, which may be collected
between these two last points, because the enemy will, or ought to
employ every means to carry it off, or destroy it, which is easily
done if he can take the field before you, and that your line is long,
which of course makes your marches slow and tardy, and the more
so, if his places of arms enable him to canton a great number of
troops in a small circumference especially, and your cantonments
are extensive; but should the enemy leave the country unmolested,
the whole resources you can draw from it, will be only green for-
age, some cattle, &c. until August, when you may get corn, and
moreover horses to supply the wants of the army, transport provi-
sions, &c. but this supposes the most exact discipline, and no less
exact probity, in paying abundantly for whatever the peasants fur-
nish, which circumstance is too much neglected in all armies, and
much retards their operations, and very often forces them to quit
the field without even attempting any thing. The Russian army so
far from endeavouring to preserve a country, on the contrary seem
to make it their only study how to destroy it, which they do so
effectually, that wherever they can penetrate, they leave it a perfect
desert, their steps are marked with blood and desolation. Hence it
is that they cannot act for any time on a given line, or remain on
any one spot for a fortnight; when they advance a hundred miles
from their depots, the transports become so difficult, particularly
when Autumn is set in, and no intermediate depots are formed by
what they might collect in the country as they advanced, they are
of course obliged to return home, and always by a different road,
from that by which they advanced.
It is a certain rule, from which a General ought never to depart,
to shorten continually as he advances his line of operations, by form-
ing new depots behind him on that very line, and no where else, oth-
erwise he cannot move at all, for if he do form such depots, if they
are not placed on his line, the enemy will destroy them, and put an
end to his operations. When the line of operation is determined,
(and it always is, or may be so), why are depots formed any where
else? why dispersed all round the country, as if intended to be given
up to the enemy? unless to enable the commissary and contractors
to make up a good account. The Austrians always lost many of their
great depots. In every campaign Prince Ferdinand lost more than
he ought to have done, which not only wasted immense sums, but
what is more essential, retarded the operations of the army, and very
often defeated some well laid project, or enabled the enemy to exe-
cute what otherwise he would not have attempted. Time is every
thing in war, and nothing makes you lose it so much as delays, in
receiving the necessary supplies; the reader will forgive this digres-
sion on account of its very great importance. Secondly, the extreme
length of the Russian line, makes it impossible for them to carry
with them artillery, stores, and provisions for an army destined to
execute a capital enterprise, which reduces all their operations to

meer excursions, and they are stopped by the most inconsiderable
fortress: every attempt they made miscarried in Turkey, excepting
Bender, an old insignificant place, defended without knowledge, and
without valour. Chotzim, Ibrahilou, and Georgewa, were attempted,
but in vain; the Russians were repulsed with great loss by the Turks,
and afterwards abandoned them for want of heavy artillery, stores,
and provisions; they like the Tartars are forced to stop, changed
their route, or recur to violent and desperate means in attempting
places; without any breach or force to make any, they attempt to
storm walled towns; to facilitate which they begin with putting them
on fire if they can, which sometimes succeeds; when they meet men
void of honour, ignorant, or timorous, but nine times out of ten they
fail, which exasperates them, and renders them more cruel and
unmerciful towards those unhappy people who fall into their hands.
The Russian army had many of the customs and manners of the
Tartars without their velocity; they are massive like the Europeans,
but much slower, and undoubtedly less scientific. Though I must
confess that the men are excellent, and among the generals there
are many who would do honour to any army in Europe. Marshal
Romanzow is a man of great merit, and among his many good qual-
ities as a general, he studies and knows the genius and character of
his enemy. Prince [Nikolai Vasilevich] Repnin will acquire honour
if ever he commands an army; so will Kamenskoi and Soworow,27
and many more I could mention, for the reasons above stated.
It is I think impossible for a Russian army, to act effectually on
a line of such length. And we see in fact that during this whole war
every campaign was begun and ended as the preceding one had
done. They marched from the Vistula to Franckfurt on the Oder,
and returned from the Oder to the Vistula, without performing any
thing, though in the year fifty-nine they had gained two great bat-
tles in a few days.
They and their confederates committed a most capital fault in the
choice of their line of operations. The king of Prussia had wisely
abandoned Pomerania, which he could not defend against an enemy
who was so near that province, and of course had so much more
facility in attacking it, than the king in defending it; this he did with
27
Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov (1725–1800).
a view to concenter his forces, that he might occasionally and suc-

cessively employ the same troops against different enemies, as they
approached, and by this means, be in some measure on a par with
them, or at least sufficiently strong to stop their progress. The Russians
by coming to Franckfurt perfectly answered his purpose, for he was
thereby enabled to employ the very same troops, in Moravia, on the
Oder, and in Saxony. It is we think owing to this circumstance prin-
cipally, aided by his powerful genius and activity, that he did not
sink under the weight of such power as was brought against him.
Though the event of every campaign proved to a demonstration the
insufficiency of the plan of operation, yet did the confederates per-
severe in it to the last, by which the king of Prussia extricated him-
self with great glory from the greatest danger that ever threatened
any sovereign. This perseverance in a system which every campaign
shewed to be ill formed and false, is the more surprising, when we
can make it appear, that they might have chosen another line of
operation, not only free from all the difficulties they met with, but
on which they would have found every facility possible; and more-
over, by its direction would have forced the enemy to divide and
separate his forces in such a manner, that he must have abandoned
in a great measure the defence of one or other of his provinces.
When I consider the King of Prussia’s dominions, and observe the
figure of them, I find that the Oder is the great object he must ever
have in view. He has many strong places on it, though there is none
in the center about Franckfurt, which I think a great fault, because
was there a capital fortress in that part, his dominions on that side
would be invulnerable; but even as things now are, no enemy can
fix himself there, though he gained twenty battles. He cannot sepa-
rate his army there, and had the Russians taken Custrin, they must
have abandoned it, or lost their garrison, had they left one there,
for this reason—the king can from Silesia, Brandenburg, and Pome-
rania, bring one hundred thousand men to Franckfurt in a fortnight,
even in winter; the proximity of his strong places, and the number
of good towns, enable him to quarter many troops in a small extent
of country. For these reasons the Russians and Austrians in the year
sixty, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy after
two days stay, to get away, the one to Poland, and the other to
Saxony, though undoubtedly they had together near fifty thousand
men. This must always be the case if you attack an enemy in the
center of his dominions; whence it follows, that you must begin at
one or other of the extreme provinces. In the case before us every

attempt from Lusatia or Silesia failed, and always will; wherefore the
Russians should have advanced from the Vistula along the sea coast
to Colberg, and having taken it, which was a work of fifteen days,
made a place of arms of it, and a general depot, which they could
supply from Poland by land, and from Russia by water. This oper-
ation being finished, they should have proceeded to the Oder, and
possessed all the country on the right of that from Landsberg on
the Wartha to the sea, where half their army, and even all, being
supplied from Poland directly behind, and Colberg, might have taken
their winter quarters. The next campaign supported by their fleet,
in conjunction with the Swedes, or alone, they might have taken
Stettin, and the war was at an end, for Pomerania lost, and Branden-
burg open, the king could not pretend to defend Silesia, with a
Russian army immediately at his back, and in possession of his cap-
ital, which in such a supposition they might have taken and kept.
The Lower Oder, I mean from Franckfurt to the sea, is the weak
part of the Prussian dominions; happily for his majesty such another
confederacy may probably never happen again. The Russians alone
can never hurt him, and particularly now. The king of Prussia is
raising a considerable fortress near Graudentz, on the right of the
Vistula, which commands it.
Though we highly approve the abandoning Prussia for the rea-
sons above alleged, yet we can by no means think it was necessary
to have also abandoned all the country between the Vistula and the
Oder. Poland is an open and fruitful country, without any fortress
at all, excepting Kaminieck in Podolia, about six miles from Chotzim
on the Dneister, and consequently in all that tract through which
the Russian line went, they could not form any magazines, except-
ing behind the Vistula; consequently, any body of troops, lightly
equipped, might, and always may, secure the provisions between
those two rivers and the Wartha, &c. If Count Dohna, with twenty
thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, consisting of dragoons and
hussars, had in the end of April, or beginning of May, advanced to
the Vistula, and secured every thing behind him, which undoubt-
edly he might have done, the Russians would have found it difficult
to pass the Vistula, and much more so to advance towards Franckfurt;
they could not leave Count Dohna behind them, if he posted him-
self, when pushed, in or near the road which leads to Posen; because,
finding the country before them entirely naked, and their line attacked
by Count Dohna, they must have turned towards him and followed
him, which would have been so much time lost for them, and in
the end would have answered no purpose, for the same difficulties
would have always recurred, and at length forced them to retire to
the Vistula. The direction of the Prussian frontier on this, is exactly
on the flank of the march from the Vistula to Posen, and therefore
Count Dohna, by placing himself on that frontier, would be con-
tinually on their communications, which most certainly would have
forced them to change the direction of their march, and prevented
their approaching the Oder; which proves also that the choice was
bad, and that no other line here, or any where else, can be good,
unless its direction be in front, and so that the enemy has no province,
on the left or right, because in such case, by destroying the provinces
before you, and acting on your communications, particularly if long,
he will most certainly baffle all your attempts. In Poland I am per-
suaded that an army of thirty or thirty or thirty-five thousand men,
composed as we have mentioned, and possessed of superior veloc-
ity, will act successfully against three times the number, composed
as the Russian army is. The one will find every thing on the spot;
a heavy army nothing any where. Velocity is every thing in war,
particularly if the country be open and fruitful like Poland. Such an
army as we suppose with two hundred carpenters, and ropes to make
rafts, would ruin any European army in a month. The Tartars have
overcome and conquered a great part of the world by their veloc-
ity alone, whereas our European armies have not in two centuries
conquered any one province of considerable extent, because they are
too heavy.
The last thing I have to observe is, that the Prussians in their
operations against the Russians, have been too fond of fighting.
When you act offensively you must fight, and force those who
oppose your march to give way, that you may proceed on your jour-
ney; but when on the defensive never run the hazard of a battle,
because if the enemy acts on a long line, you may undoubtedly, by
placing yourself on his flanks, force him to retire. The Prussians got
the battle of Zorndorff; in ten days after, the Russians were as strong
as ever, and the first I am sure did not exceed twenty thousand
men. Yet could the latter undertake nothing; they even failed before
Colberg; Why? because they had no provisions, and were forced to
return to the Vistula before the bad weather set in. The following
campaign the Russians gained two great battles on the banks of the
Oder, assisted in the last by the Asutrians under general Laudohn,

from which neither they nor the Russians reaped any advantage;
and having just passed the Oder, made a tour through Lusatia and
Silesia into Poland, and having ruined the poor people, concluded
this campaign; which proves that it was wrong to fight them. These
examples confirm our doctrine on the subject we have treated in
the first volume, viz. that when you are on the defensive you must
never oppose the enemy in front, unless (which sometimes may hap-
pen) you can take a capital position across his line of operations,
which he can neither attack in front, nor by any motions on your
flanks, force you to abandon, which was the case with the Emperor
in the last short war in Bohemia.
Of the Operations of the Army of the Empire Commanded by the

Prince of Deuxponts
At the end of the preceding campaign this army took up its winter
quarters in the circle of Franconia. The head quarters were at
Nurenberg, but in the beginning of April they were transferred to
Bamberg, and part of the troops encamped near Bayreuth; the cav-
alry however for the most part lay in the neighbouring villages. In
the mean time the Prussians appeared on the frontiers of Franconia;
and colonel Meyer, supported by general Grabow, advanced as far
as Hoff, which the enemy abandoned; however, the Prussians over-
took some of them, and took some prisoners, and a considerable
magazine, and afterwards retired to Reichenbach. Some time after-
wards the same officer marched as far as Kahla, to destroy some
arms which were making there for the army of the empire, which
he fortunately accomplished, and retired without loss to Reichenbach,
protected in his retreat by several detachments, sent to occupy different
posts by general Grabow. It is surprising that any general should
disperse his magazines in such a manner, that any adventurer may
take them away.
During this time the army of the empire remained in its camp
between Cronach and Culmback till the fifteenth of May, when it
marched towards Bohemia, by Weydenberg, Wunsiedl, Artzberg, and
Schirnding; and on the nineteenth encamped near Egra in Bohemia;
prince Stolberg and general Lusinski advanced towards Asch and
Adorft, in order to cover the march of the army. They had left a
corps consisting of some few batallions and squadrons under gen-

eral Bosenfeld at Bayreuth, and a good garrison in Culmbach and
Cronach, to oppose the incursions of the Prussian light troops, for
they expected no other; in which they were deceived: For prince
Henry, who had collected the greatest part of his army at Zwickau,
resolved to make an expedition into Franconia to destroy the enemy’s
magazines and raise contributions. For this purpose, being informed
that the enemy’s main army had entered Bohemia, he left a body
of troops in the mountains to cover Dresden and that part of Saxony;
and on the twentieth of May advanced from Zwickau, and on the
twenty-third encamped at Taltitz, a village near Ælsnitz on the Elster,
between Plauen and Hoff. The van of this army consisting of four
or five thousand men, and commanded by Lieutenant General [Wil-
helm von] Driesen advanced towards Bamberg, where they arrived
the thirty-first, and took the place by capitulation; and having raised
very considerable contributions, and destroyed several small maga-
zines, this corps retired, and on the fourteenth of June, joined the
main army which was advanced as far as Hoff, which they quitted
the day following and marched to Ælsnitz, and from thence to
Zschoppau.
The Prussians speak of this notable expedition in more lofty terms,
than Xenophon of the retreat of the ten thousand, and even pub-
lished the plans of the different camps occupied by prince Henry,
though in fact it was an insignificant enterprize, in an open coun-
try totally defenceless, excepting Bamberg, which is surrounded by
an old wall, in many places broke down, which however the impe-
rialists defended so well, as to obtain leave to depart where they
pleased.
While the Prussians made this incursion into Franconia, the impe-
rial army remained in the camp near Egra, till the twenty-third of
May, when it came to Saaz where it was joined by a strong corps
of Austrians, consisting of three regiments of horse, one of dragoons,
a regiment of foot, and a batallion of Wurtzburg, and some time
after was also joined by the Austrians, who had been with the French
the preceding campaign, and the rest of the imperial troops left in
the circle of Franconia, who assembled at Wurtzburg, and from
thence were conducted by General Dombash28 to the army. Many
28
Maj. Gen. Charles-François, comte de Dombasle.
skirmishes as usual happened on the frontier, between the detach-

ments of the respective armies, and as usual without any real advan-
tage to either; the Prussians say that a corps of the Imperialists
entered into Saxony, with a view to surprise Dresden and Pirna,
which failed. The Austrians say nothing about it, and as nothing
really happened, nor even was there a man killed, the whole story
seems a mere invention.
At length the imperial army left Saaz the twenty-fifth of July, and
marched in four columns to a camp between Brix and Bilin, General
Dombash with his corps, consisting of the Austrians who had been
with the French last campaign, and what remained of the troops of
the empire at Wurtzburg, advanced into Saxony, along the frontiers
of Bohemia as far as Schleitz. On the twenty-eighth, the imperial
army marched to Toplitz.
The Prussians on these motions of the Imperialists approached the
Elbe, and a considerable corps took post at Dippoldiswalda, which
made it necessary for General Haddich to advance to Schonwald,
a village in the mountains on the left of the great road which leads
from Aussig to Dresden, and General Mitrouskito Altenberg, who
in going to reconnoitre was made prisoner by a party of hussars.
There was a considerable skirmish passed at the defilé called Pasberg,
which the army were obliged to abandon for a time, but had no
other effect; for being reinforced they advanced in their turn, but
had no other effect; for being reinforced they advanced in their turn,
and drove the Prussians back with very considerable loss; General
Dombash made excursions to Halle in Saxony, and raised contri-
butions: he took post at Zwickau in the beginning of August. The
twentieth of this month, Prince Henry quitted the camps he occu-
pied by Dippoldiswalda and Freiberg, and marched to Gros Seidlitz,
by which means the two places above mentioned were abandoned.
General Haddich marched by Gieshubel to the heights of Pirna, and
ordered General Dombash to take possession of Dippoldiswalda and
Freiberg, abandoned by the Prussians and with his corps advanced
to Frauenstein, on the twenty-seventh of August the army of the
Empire camped also by Pirna, the head quarters at Struppen.
The Prussian army marched from the Kohlberg towards Dresden,
and fortified itself: the two armies were extremely near, so that the
Prince of Deuxponts could not well undertake the siege of Sonnenstein,
he therefore ordered several batteries to be raised on some heights
from whence he could fire on the enemy’s camp; this and the
approach of the Austrian army under Marshal Daun to the Elbe,

forced Prince Henry to abandon his camp, which he accordingly
did, and on the first of September occupied one between Maxen
and Gamig, where he proposed remaining until the arrival of a con-
siderable reinforcement, which the king was bringing from the Oder,
after the battle of Zorndorff.
This retreat enabled the Imperialists to besiege Sonnenstein, which
capitulated in three days; the attack was conducted by General
Macguire, the garrison commanded by colonel Grape, consisting of
one thousand, four hundred and forty-two men were made prisoners
of War, twenty-nine brass and some iron cannon were found in the
place: as the operations of this army are hereafter connected with
that under Marshal Daun, we must resume our account of the move-
mens of this latter.
After the final retreat of the Prussians into Silesia, Marshal Daun
having provided for the defence of Moravia and Bohemia, on the
tenth of August, broke up his camp at Hertzmanitz and marched
by Horlitz, Gitschin, and Turnau to Reichenberg, where he arrived
the fifteenth.
The court of Vienna had resolved to drive if possible, the enemy
out of Saxony, and at the same to enter Upper Silesia and besiege
Neiss, for which enterprise General Harsch was making the neces-
sary preparations, and Marshal Daun was ordered to march through
Lusatia towards Dresden, and in conjunction with the army of the
Empire to attack that place.
Accordingly on the sixteenth, the Austrian army decamped from
Reichenberg, and marched in six columns to Ullensdorf, in Lower
Lusatia; the seventeenth to Zittau, the nineteenth to Schöna, and
the twentieth to Gorlitz, on the little river Neiss; the day following
General Laudohn with a strong corps, was detached to take Peitz
in Upper Lusatia, and extend his contributions as far as he could
in the Prussian territory; this he effected on the twenty-fifth, when
the commander surrendered the place, but had leave to retire; a
great quantity of ammunition and forage was found in it, the Austrians
raised every where great contributions.
Marshal Daun remained at Gorlitz, till the twenty-seventh of
August, having a few days before detached the Prince of Baden,29
29
Prince Christoph von Baden-Durlach.
with a very strong corps to Schönberg, from whence he could observe

the enemy in that part of Silesia, and cover Bohemia and Lusatia.
On the twenty-sixth, the main army decamped from Gorlitz, and
marched by Reichenbach, Weissenberg, Bautzen, Marien-Stein,
Konigsbruck, and on the first of September, encamped between
Nieder-Ebersbach, and the village of Beerwalde, where the army
remained till the fourth, in order to know the result of a conference
which General Lacy had with the prince of Deuxponts on the other
side the Elbe; on his return the army marched the fourth in three
columns to Radeberg, and the fifth to Stolpe. General Lacy for fear
of being cut off from the army by a strong Prussian corps which
advanced from Sagan towards Lower Lusatia, recalled his detach-
ment and abandoned Peitz, and marched to Hoyerswedra. The Prince
of Baden Durlach who had been all this time at Schönberg, on the
approach of the Prussians retired, and marched to Lobau, not far
from Hochkirchen. This was the position of the Austrians and
Imperialists in the beginning of September; the latter were about
Pirna, the Marshal Daun at Stolpe, Laudohn at Hoyerswerda, and
the prince of Baden at Lobau; we have been thus particular, that
the reader may see how and where, the new scene we are going to
describe opened; we must now return to the king of Prussia: This
monarch had ordered Markgrave Charles with about ten thousand
men, to march from Silesia to Saxony, by Priebus, Spremberg and
Sensenberg, while he himself with a considerable part of the army
which had fought the Russians, directed his march thither also, and
both joined on the ninth of September at Grosenhayn, as also part
of prince Henry’s army.
The Austrian army in conjunction with that of the Empire, rein-
forced by some more Austrians under General Serbelloni, had planned
the attacking of Dresden; the first was to pass the Elbe above the
town, so as to prevent prince Henry’s approaching it, and both
armies were to attack on different sides. This plan was to have been
executed on the eleventh, which the arrival of the king prevented,
who on the thirteenth encamped at Schönfeld, over against the
Austrians at Stolpe, upon which Marshal Daun recalled prince Baden’s
corps, which encamped at Wilten in Lusatia; a few days after he
was ordered to Putzl, and General Vehla to Bautzen. The Prussians
wanted to drive the Austrians out of their strong hold, these on the
contrary took every measure to stay there, and prepare for a vig-
orous resistance if they were attacked.
On the thirteenth general Retzow, with a strong corps, took post

at Badenberg, where general Laudohn, with twelve thousand men,
was advantageously posted on the hills, which however on the
approach of the enemy he quitted, and occupied some other heights
near Arnsdorf.
Colonel Riese was posted at Weissen Hirsch; attacked by a con-
siderable body of Prussians, he fell back in good order towards gen-
eral Emerick Esterhazi, who with his hussars covered his retreat to
Dittersbach, near the left of the army. Upon this all the Prussian
army on the right of the Elbe advanced on the fourteenth to Eschdorff
and Schulwitz, on which Reise retired to Porschendorf, and Laudohn
to Arnsdorf. The king resolved to attack general Laudohn, and either
force him back on the army at Stolpe, or rather as it would seem
from the disposition, to cut him off entirely; accordingly on the
fifteenth Major general Prince of Bevern, with a detachment, was to
march that night, so as to come in the morning on Laudohn’s right
flank; General Retzow marched to Wolmsdorff, very near general
Laudohn; and the king himself, with several batallions and squadrons,
marched directly towards Fischback, a village behind Laudohn;
between him and the main army at Stolpe. On seeing this disposi-
tion Laudohn retired towards Stolpe, so that Retzow’s van only was
engaged, which, according to the Prussian account, killed above six
hundred men, and made three hundred and twenty prisoners. Retzow’s
corps encamped on the ground Laudohn had quitted. The Austrian
account does not differ from this. General Laudohn retired towards
Dürre Fuchs, and from thence to Bischoffswerda, being reinforced
to sixteen thousand men, and Count Colloredo30 occupied the heights
of Dürre Fuchs before the army, with several batallions.
The king being always determined to drive Laudohn back, and if
possible bring the Marshal to a general action, ordered General
Retzow to advance to Bischoffswerda, while his majesty marched to
Radeberg. But Laudohn, though attacked by three different corps,
made his retreat good to Nieder Putzka, where Marshal Daun had
posted the Marquis d’Ainse with a strong corps to support him in
case he was pushed; both acted upon this occasion with much pru-
dence: D’Ainse advanced, Laudohn instantly sent the greatest part
of his corps to meet him, and secured the communications between
them, and then followed with the rest without any loss. We mention
30
Rudolph Joseph, Graf von Colloredo (1706–88).
this manœuvre only to shew how a man must act in similar cir-
cumstances. After this transaction the king advanced to Bischoffswerda,
from whence he sent a considerable detachment to Bautzen, which
they took possession of the thirtieth of September, making there some
few prisoners. By this means the Austrians were cut off from Lusatia
and Silesia.
Though the two armies were very near, the king did not think it
advisable to attack Marshal Daun in his strong position. This General
recalled five batallions, and Portugal’s regiment of horse, from the
Imperial army, the second of October, and sent Prince Baden Durlach
towards Löbau, to secure the march he had projected through the
mountains to Lusatia, that he might regain what he had lost, and
once more oppose in front the enemy’s march to Silesia.
Accordingly the fifth of October, at twelve o’clock, part of the left
wing struck their tents and marched; and at night the whole army
formed in two columns followed, and marched by the Ottendorf
forest, Putzka and Neükirken, to Crusta, where it arrived the sixth.
On the seventh the army resumed its march to Köttlitz. To cover
this very difficult march, the rear, consisting of Laudohn’s corps,
Colloredo’s, the reserve, and several batallions of grenadiers, that is
half the army, was conducted by the duke of Aremberg, with great
skill and prudence, and one skirmish only happened. Of which the
Austrians say:
That the sixth, in the morning, a Prussian detachment, consisting of
several batallions and two regiments of dragoons, attempted to trou-
ble the march, but they were instantly driven back by Arberg’s regi-
ment of foot, commanded by Colonel Count Merode; the hussars took
three cannon, and about one hundred prisoners; a Prussian batallion
was totally destroyed; our loss in all amounts to three hundred men.
The Prussians say nothing of this affair.
On the eighth the Prussian army marched to Bautzen, and on
the ninth to Radewitz, and encamped opposite the Austrians, with
the right at Hochkirchen, and the left at Gudiz or Graditz, and
General Retzow took post at Weissenberg, on the other side the
small river Löbauer Wassar. On the eleventh Marshal Keith, with
a convoy from Dresden, arrived in the camp.
Upon the arrival of he Prussians Marshal Daun made some new
dispositions in his camp; General Laudohn was ordered to take post
on the enemy’s right flank, the infantry at Wuischke, and the cav-
alry at Rackel; Count Emerick Esterhazi, with some infantry, lay at
Nostitz; General Ziskowitz, with five batallions of grenadiers on the

hill Stromberg, and Colonel Count Browne, with four batallions, at
Clossen, by which the right of the army was covered, as the left was
by Laudohn’s corps.
The Prussian account of this battle runs thus:
The corps under the king left Blumberg the third of September, and
on the ninth of the same month joined the army which the Markgrave
Charles brought from Silesia, at Grossenhayn near Dresden; the tenth
we marched between Moritzberg and Dresden, and encamped near
Schönfeld. The enemy was at Stolpe, and General Laudohn at Fisch-
bach, before his front; from whence he was driven by General Retzow,
who made about three hundred prisoners. General Retzow camped
at Fischbach, and our army marched by its left to Ramenau, which
motion obliged the Prince of Baden to march towards Bautzen; two
days afterwards we drove General Laudohn from Bischoffswerda, where
we encamped. Marshal Daun found it advisable to march by his right
to Witten; General Retzow had already taken possession of Bautzen,
where we also marched, and General Retzow took post at Weissenberg.
The Prince of Baden stood at Arensdorff, across the road which goes
by Reichenbach and Gorlitz into Silesia, and Marshal Daun was on
the heights near Kettlitz. The king’s army advanced to Hochkirchen,
from whence the Austrians were driven, and encamped on the heights,
with his right beyond that village, and the left towards Gröditz. In the
night between the thirteenth and fourteenth, Marshal Daun attacked
our right wing, and as the night was dark and foggy, the Pandours
having drove the light troops posted at the end of our right flank, got
into the village, and set it on fire, which obliged the infantry which
covered our flank, to quit their post, and abandon the village. The
Austrians attempted several times to pass through the village, but were
repulsed by our cavalry and infantry; at the same time General Retzow
was attacked by the Prince of Baden, whom he repulsed, took nine
hundred prisoners, and joined the army, whose left wing was likewise
attacked, it was ordered to support the right wing, which was done,
and there remained behind only a grenadier batallion (Kleist), which
having advanced too far was made prisoner. The post of Hochkirchen
was defended from half an hour past four in the morning till ten,
when the army received orders to retire. General Retzow joined it,
and occupied the villages of Beerlitz and Doberschutz. We have lost
Marshal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswick, whose death we greatly
lament. Field Marshal Prince Maurice was wounded and taken pris-
oner. Generals Geist and Krockow were wounded. The king and most
of the Generals received contusions, or had their horses killed under
them; our loss amounts to about three thousand men; the night pre-
vented our men on the right from taking down their tents, and so
they were lost; we have taken five hundred prisoners, among whom
is General Vieteleschi.
The Austrians account is as follows.

The king of Prussia marched from Bautzen the tenth, and encamped
with his right on the heights of Hochkirchen, and his left at Kottiz;
he took this position to secure the corps posted at Weissenberg, con-
sisting of eight thousand men, which we proposed attacking the eleventh,
and cut off from the king, had he remained at Bautzen, and hinder
him from going by Gorlitz to Silesia. This obliged Marshal Daun to
place five batallions on the hill Stromberg, which lies some hundred
yards before the right wing, and four batallions in the village Clossen,
by which means, the way to Gorlitz was shut, so that the king could
not march that road, without attacking and beating our army. These
measures were the more necessary, as on the arrival of the king, the
corps at Weissenberg advanced, with a view to occupy Stromberg; but
perceiving we had taken post there, it returned to Weissenberg. On
the eleventh, Marshal Daun reconnoitred the enemy’s position, and
found, that if he could drive them from Hochkirchen, a certain and
compleat victory would follow. As the king had raised several works
on the heights of Hochkirchen and placed there a great number of
cannon, it was determined to make a corps march through the woods,
which should come on the enemy’s flank and rear, while another
attacked him in front. Though the strong camp occupied by the Marshal
made us easy as to the event, if we were attacked in it, he resolved
to attack the enemy, who little expected it; and to add to his secu-
rity, abbatis were made, and works raised in the wood. The thirteenth
was fixed upon for the attack; as the necessary preparations could not
be made in time, it was postponed to the day following. The disposi-
tion to be observed in the different attacks, was given to the general
officers in writing; the artillery proceeded through the woods, and at
four in the morning was within musquet shot of the enemy. A little
before day the van of the columns, and the troops under General
Laudohn, who came behind the enemy’s camp, were masters of the
village of Hochkirchen, and the enemy’s works, and at break of day
our infantry was formed in his camp.
Immediately after the Duke of Aremberg attacked the enemy’s left,
and took the redoubts which protected it, and notwithstanding the
enemy made a most vigorous resistance on every side, he was forced
to give way to the superior valour of our infantry. He was driven out
of Hochkirchen, and pursued by our vanguard, which, contrary to
orders, advanced too far; the enemy had time to rally, and in his turn
attacked the van and corps of grenadiers, which he drove back with
great slaughter, and retook part of the village Hochkirchen, after he
had been repulsed three times. As the final success depended on hav-
ing this village, the Marshal ordered seven regiments of infantry, and
sixteen squadrons of carabineers and horse grenadiers to advance and
support them, which they did bravely; an Italian regiment suffered
extremely; Bathianis took three hundred prisoners. During the attack
Map 19. Plan of the Battle of Hochkirchen, October 14th, 1758.

of Hochkirchen the rest of our left wing was engaged with the right
of the enemy, but could not advance with safety until we were mas-
ters of Hochkirchen. At length the bravery of our troops, after an
obstinate resistance, forced the enemy to abandon this important post,
who retired under a continual fire of his artillery. Marshal Keith and
Prince Francis of Brunswick were killed in this action, the former com-
manded the right wing, and was buried with all the honours of war.
While this passed in and about Hochkirchen, the cavalry of the left
under Count O’Donnel, was beat back, on which the Marshal ordered
Count Lacy with five companies of horse grenadiers and carabineers,
to attack the enemy’s infantry, which advanced against our left; this
they did effectually, and re-established the affair, which in fact decided
the victory. This is my opinion, and therefore Count Lacy deserves
the greatest praise; it was a critical moment, of which he availed him-
self with skill and valour. The Marshal’s chief attention very properly
was, to keep the line in good order as it advanced on the right. General
Buccow (who commanded the cavalry) and the Duke of Aremberg,
notwithstanding the obstacles they met with, from the ground and from
the obstinate resistance of the enemy, at length made their way, and
obliged him to retire. Prince Lowenstein, with a small corps, was
ordered to attack that of Retzow at Weissenberg, to prevent his going
to assist the king. This general, with part of his men, went thither,
but was prevented by two regiments of horse, which attacked the head
of his column. The enemy being driven back on all sides, retired on
some hills behind him; about nine o’clock the battle was over, and
the enemy retired into the plain near Predlitz, followed by Gen.
Laudohn with three regiments of dragoons: we have taken above one
hundred pieces of cannon, with the camp and baggage of the enemy.
The Austrians lost in this battle something more than one thousand
men killed, and four thousand wounded. The Prussians lost, killed,
wounded, taken, and deserted, about seven thousand men, of this how-
ever I am not certain; never having seen an exact list of their loss.
Though the Austrian army was far superior in numbers to that of
the enemy, in the action however they were nearly on a par, for
excepting a few batallions sent to support the Duke of Aremberg,
the Prince of Baden’s corps did not come into action, nor any of
the troops placed in the center, between the Marshal’s attack and
that of the Duke of Aremberg; nor the corps on the left under
General O’Donnel, which consisted of forty squadrons, and all
Laudohn’s corps then under O’Donnel’s orders; Prince Lowenstein
did what he was ordered to do, but he could not hinder Retzow
from joining the king’s left wing; so that in fact Marshal Daun’s,
and the Duke of Aremberg’s corps or divisions only, were truly
engaged, and the weight of the whole action fell on them alone. As
I was present at this very important battle, and very often since on
the ground, I think it will be agreable to the reader to give my

account of it and opinion, which will enable him to form a more
exact judgment than from what these two accounts can afford. All
accounts of battles, from malice or ignorance, are generally imper-
fect, and very often false. Moreover, no plan, though ever so well
executed, can give an adequate idea of a field of battle; to remedy
this, engineers will put every thing into them which makes them per-
fectly unintelligible, by the confusion and proximity of places and
things. The only mode to pursue is, to leave out every thing that is
not connected with the operations of the troops, and to give an exact
description of the ground; both together will enable the reader to
form a competent judgment of the different manœuvres executed in
a battle.
The camp occupied by the Austrians was strong in all its parts,
and moreover, by the oblique direction of the line, still stronger, the
left being close to the wood occupied by Laudohn’s corps, could not
be attacked; neither could the right, or center, without presenting
the flank to the left, and to Laudohn’s corps; and besides, the Austrians
could in a very short time pass the Löbauer Wasser, and place them-
selves where Durlach’s corps was, across the road which leads towards
Silesia, and always arrive before the king at Neiss, which was then
the only object he could have in view. The hills on the left all cov-
ered with a very thick wood, fall gradually to a narrow valley, through
which runs a rivulet; this, according to the custom of this country,
is stopped by Damms, in order to form fish ponds; on the other
side, the ground rises to Hochkirchen, and from thence falls by an
easy declivity for about three miles into a plain, beyond which runs
the Spree, and on the other side are some heights. On the ridge of
the heights by Hochkirchen was posted the right of the Prussian army,
where it made an angle with the center, which went in a right line
to Radewitz, where the left made an angle, and ran near Kolitz, so
that the line represented the letter Z in this manner . The ground
before and behind the Prussians had no woods or trees at all, but
many bushes and small inequalities and ravins, which might check
a line of cavalry, but not stop it, particularly if it advanced by
squadrons and small troops, and supported as in this case by infantry
under General Laudohn; by what we have said, and a view of the
plan, it appears that the strength of the Prussians lay in the post of
Hochkirchen and the neighbouring heights; this being lost, all was
lost. It was also the only point which the Austrians could attack, for
the center and left ran away in an oblique direction, and could not
be approached without exposing the flank to the enemy’s right, and

as he then stood, the right wing of the Austrians might have been
taken in flank and rear by the enemy’s corps at Weissenberg. If to
this we add, that the right was effectually covered by the rivulet and
fish ponds, that it could not be approached but by passing the Damms
in columns, within two hundred yards of the camp, and forming the
lines under the fire of the infantry, and a great many cannons, which
every one knows is impossible, the cannon alone would have pre-
vented any one’s passing the Damm; in which case general O’Donnel
and Laudohn’s corps could not advance, particularly the cavalry; the
success of this attack (supposing every body did his duty) depended
on the most improbable circumstance in the world; namely, that the
Prussians who knew it was impossible to approach their right, but
by passing these Damms about two hundred yards off; did not in
the night, (by day, it was unnecessary), place a corporal with ten
men on each Damm, and a detachment of hussars, and parties of
infantry beyond their right, towards Meschowitz and Soritz, merely
to give notice of the enemy’s approach; the cannon directed towards
the Damm, would have forced the columns back in an instant into
the wood, and no battle would have ensued. This obvious precau-
tion however was so totally neglected, that the officers who con-
ducted the columns, crept before to discover where the centinels of
the camp (for there were no out posts) were, and brought the columns
into the enemy’s tents unperceived, nor was there a gun fired, till
long after the Austrians were in possession of that part of the camp.
From this fact I would infer one maxim, viz. that whatever is pos-
sible, a general should think probable, and take his measures accord-
ingly, that like old women he may not say; who would have thought
it? Marshal Daun reasoned justly; “If I surprise the enemy, the dis-
position I have made will insure me a compleat and decisive vic-
tory; if I find him on his guard, I will not attempt any thing, and
the few which may have passed the Damms, and General O’Donnel,
may retire before it is quite day.” When you look at the plan, and
consider the position of both armies during the whole action, when
the Prussians to support Hochkirchen formed their line across their
camp, one is inclined to ask why O’Donnel’s corps did not turn
their right flank and rear? Why all these troops placed between the
Marshal’s attack, and the duke of Aremberg’s, did not attack his left
flank? This would have put an end to the battle in five minutes.
Why finally, the corps under the duke was not supported by all that
under the prince of Baden? which would have enabled the former
to take the grand battery before the enemy’s left in half an hour;
why the duke of Aremberg did not advance to Badewitz, after he
had taken the battery? which was the more easy, as the Prussians
had very few troops on their left; the whole line having marched to
the right, to support Hochkirchen, by this means the enemy would
have been intirely surrounded, and must have perished, which shews
the goodness of Marshal Daun’s plan, had it been tollerably exe-
cuted; but alas, he and the Duke of Aremberg only sought; the corps
under O’Donnel, that between the left and the right, and finally that
which remained under the Prince of Baden, did not; though they
consisted of at least half the army; this corps lost sixteen killed, and
fifty wounded; that under Laudohn sixty-six killed, and about two
hundred wounded. The cavalry under O’Donnel lost nothing that
is mentioned; the whole cavalry lost about one hundred killed, and
three hundred wounded, which proves they did not come to action.
Those on the right had not an opportunity, those on the left on
receiving a few scattered shots from some men hid behind the bushes,
retired, and never advanced afterwards. Laudohn’s corps occupied
some heights behind the enemy, from whence they could fire a few
cannon shot, but never engaged, as the reader may observe by the
plan. They who know this general, will not suspect him of being
backward in fighting. No man sees and seizes a favourable moment
better than he does, or executes with more vigour. He has the eye
of an eagle, the heart of a lion, the meekness and innocence of a
lamb; but great and capital faults were committed undoubtedly, which
prevented the total ruin of the Prussian army.
If we consider the state of the Prussian army thus separated, and
surrounded by superior forces, it will appear incredible they could
make any resistance at all. They did however resist, and in a man-
ner that rendered the victory for five hours doubtful. In my opin-
ion this battle does the king, his generals, and his army more honour
than any victory he ever gained. In his retreat he was not pursued,
but followed at a distance by General Laudohn, who now and then
fired a shot after him. General Retzow behaved with great prudence
on this occasion. He took post near an old Swedish redoubt, where
the king’s army assembled, and for about an hour was in great con-
fusion, like a swarm of bees about a hive: about eleven o’clock this
batallion began to unfold: a line of cavalry was formed on the left
fronting the hills, where Laudohn stood; another of infantry behind
this, and a third of what remained of their equipage and artillery.

This being done, they marched off in as good order as if nothing
had happened, passed the Sprée, and posted themselves on the height
beyond it. This crowned the Prussians with glory; I do not remem-
ber to have read, or heard of any thing like it, nor do I ever expect
to see such another transaction. Thus ended this celebrated surprize
and battle which followed; the wisdom of Marshal Daun is no less
conspicuous, than the extraordinary vigour and presence of mind of
the king, and his officers; courage was great and equal in both, noth-
ing more could be required or expected from a Roman soldier.
The king’s army consisted of ten or eleven thousand men he
brought with him from Count Dohna’s army; as many under the
Markgrave Charles from Silesia, and ten thousand under prince
Francis of Brunswick, of which he had left some batallions and
squadrons, with his brother in Saxony, so that at Hochkirchen it did
not amount to thirty thousand men, whereas that of the Austrians,
was at least fifty thousand, but not half was brought into action, so
that upon the whole, those who really fought on each side, were
nearly equal in numbers. One cannot help lamenting the propen-
sity the king has for fighting when by no means necessary, as in this
case; by skilful manœuvres he had opened his road to Bautzen and
Silesia, where his presence was necessary to raise the siege of Neiss.
Why not go thither? or if he chose to keep the Austrians some time
longer in Lusatia, to hinder their returning to Dresden, why not
march from Bautzen to Weissenberg, and send Retzow to Reichenbach,
on the road to Gorlitz, and camp with his right at Weissenberg, and
his left on the heights, where the Prince of Baden was posted? which
would have much embarrassed Marshal Daun, and might have offered
a more favourable opportunity to attack him, which in no case was
necessary. By marching to Hochkirchen he was under the necessity
of beating the Marshal, or falling back, to resume another road to
Silesia. All this was done, because his majesty loves fighting; he will
never comprehend that being on the defensive a general should never
fight, if he can avoid it. Had he beat Marshal Daun he could derive
no other advantage, but raise the siege of Neiss, which he could
accomplish without fighting, which appears from this, that though
he lost the battle at Hochkirchen, he went into Silesia, and forced
General Harsch to raise the siege and retire. A general should scarce
ever fight when on the defensive, but to preserve some important
place, and hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his coun-
try, or force him to abandon it, if he is in possession, which was

the case in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven at Lissa; and
even here if the Austrians had not lost their heads, a victory would
have availed the king nothing. They had Breslaw and Schweidnitz,
who could drive them from thence in the winter, had they chose to
remain there? Nobody. Let us return to our narration.
After the battle Marshal Daun having left a brigade on the field
to bury the dead, and take care of the wounded, returned with his
army to Kitlitz, where he remained till the seventeenth, whence he
advanced to Belgern, and camped over against the enemy; by this
unmeaning and false step he left the road to Silesia open, as the
reader may see by the plan. Of which the king availed himself, for
having been reinforced by about six thousand men brought him by
Prince Henry from Saxony, and furnished with tents and artillery,
stores, &c. on the twenty-fourth, he broke up his camp, and taking
a little to the left to avoid any obstacles, marched the whole night;
and on the twenty-fifth encamped at Ullersdorf, on the way between
Muscha and Gorlitz, and on the twenty-sixth arrived at Gorlitz. On
the twenty-fifth in the morning, Laudohn’s corps, and in the evening
the corps de reserve, were sent by Reichenbach towards Gorlitz,
and the whole army followed the next day. The van of the two
armies met unexpectedly, a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the
Austrians had the advantage at first, but that of the enemy being
supported by all their cavalry, they retired, but with some loss,
towards the Landscron, (a high mountain, which rises like a sugar
loaf, about which the armies often encamped during this war), and
on the twenty-eighth the Prussians passed the Neiss, and marched
towards Lauban; and on the thirtieth encamped at Litchtenau, on
this side Lauban. Marshal Daun, finding it now impossible to hinder
the enemy’s going to Silesia, sent General Wied with nine batallions,
ten companies of grenadiers, and four regiments of cavalry, through
Bohemia, to reinforce the army which was then besieging Neiss. This
was an idle scheme, for undoubtedly they would arrive too late; and
should they arrive, it was by no means advisable for the Austrians
to wait the coming of the king, whose army was superior to theirs;
Laudohn’s corps pursued the enemy’s rear guard, and of course
attacked it whenever an opportunity offered, in which several actions,
it is said, the king lost, killed, and wounded, two or three hundred
men, which if true, is nothing to the purpose, for the Prussians pros-
ecuted their march, and on the thirty-first came to Lowenberg; the
third of November to Schweidnitz, and the sixth to Nossen, beyond

Munsterberg. Laudohn followed the enemy as far as Javer, and
camped at Löhn, not far from Lowenberg; and General [Connor]
O’Kelly, who followed him, took post at Lauban. Marshal Daun
resolved to return to Saxony, and attempt the taking of Dresden,
where we shall follow him. In the mean time we will take a view
of what passed in Bohemia and Moravia, after Marshal Daun and
the king had left the country.
General Harsch was ordered to prepare what was necessary to
besiege Neiss, which was then left to its garrison alone, for General
Fouquet posted at Landshut, had enough to do to restrain the
Austrians, and prevent them from entering Silesia on that side.
Accordingly the Marquis de Ville, with a considerable corps advanced
towards Neiss in August, he endeavoured to block up the place, and
raised contributions. This General attempted to surprize Brieg and
Schweidnitz, in which he failed and returned to Neiss. In October
General Harsch, with a considerable corps arrived in camp, and
took the command of the whole; the greatest part of October, the
Austrians were employed in preparing fascines, and other materials
for the siege, which however they deferred till they received the news
of the victory from at Hochkircen, which they imagined would pre-
vent the king from coming to interrupt their operations; accordingly
they camped near the town, and indeed so near, that the artillery
of the place obliged them to fall back one thousand paces; on the
twenty-sixth, they raised two batteries, and a mortar bed, from which
they played against the town, and the sluice to cut off the water, in
that however they did not succeed. The siege was continued in the
usual manner till the fourth of November, when on receiving intel-
ligence of the king’s approach, they raised the siege and retired partly
into Moravia, and partly into Bohemia; Kosel which had been blocked
up by some Croats, for near four months, was also on the king’s
arrival abandoned. Thus ended the siege of Neiss, which no doubt
might have been taken, had Marshal Daun after the king’s retreat
out of Bohemia, turned his thoughts that way, instead of losing his
time idly and unprofitably during the whole months of August and
September, in Lusatia and Saxony; moreover by transferring the seat
of war into Upper Silesia, the Austrians so near their depots at
Olmutz, would have been enabled to act with vigour and without
danger; the country about Neiss, Glatz, &c. is extremely strong, an
army of forty thousand men might one every spot find a camp,
which the king could not by any attack in front, force them from,
nor could any diversion made in Bohemia or Moravia from Glatz,
interrupt them a moment, twenty thousand men placed on that fron-
tier, would have been sufficient to cover the country effectually;
another advantage would from this measure have occurred, that the
king could not arrive from the Oder to Neiss in the same length of
time, as from thence to the Elbe and Dresden, so that the Austrians
would have had more than sufficient time to take the place. In all
this war, an infatuation to take Dresden prevailed in the courts of
France and Vienna, to which Marshal Daun in spite of his better
judgment, was forced to give way, and sacrifice the interests of the
state to a groundless and chimerical opinion; by endeavouring to
reconcile as much as possible the interest of his sovereign, with the
orders he received to attack Dresden, he undertook two operations
at once, viz. the siege of Neiss, and the delivery of Saxony, and of
course failed in both, whereas had he carried his whole force against
one or other point, he would have succeeded.
But to resume our narration. Marshal Daun, having left Generals
Laudohn and O’Kelly to follow the king, returned to resume his
enterprize against Dresden; on the sixth of November, he passed the
Elbe at Pirna with sixty thousand men, and summoned that town
which he expected would surrender on his appearance. Prince Henry
finding it impossible to maintain his communication with Leipswic,
had passed the Elbe and left general Schmettau with twelve thou-
sand men to defend Dresden, a city of considerable extent but ill
fortified. The Austrian General on the seventh (the very day the king
had raised the siege of Neiss) approached so near to Dresden, as to
leave no room to doubt of his intentions of attacking it, he hoped,
perhaps to carry it by a coup de main under cover of the suburbs;
the houses of which (particularly from the Pirna gate to that of
Wildsruf ) are so high as to overlook the ramparts, and are close to
the edge of the ditch; this circumstance compelled the Governor in
common prudence, to provide for the safety of the fortress, and gar-
rison intrusted to him, by depriving the enemy of so commodious
an approach to his walls; this could only be done by burning the
suburbs, a necessary measure in his circumstances, but a most dis-
agreeable and invidious one; he endeavoured therefore by repeated
representations, both to the court of Dresden and the Marshal, to
avoid coming to that extremity; but finding no disposition in Daun
to attend to any thing, he or the Saxon minister could say to him
on the subject, and that on the contrary his out posts were driven
in, and the redoubts that covered the suburbs, attacked and carried
by the Austrians, whose batteries began to annoy the town, and who
threatened every hour to carry the suburbs, and through them the
fortress itself by assault, he at length executed what he had long
threatened, and set fire to the combustibles which had already been
prepared, and placed in several of the houses for that melancholy
occasion; this however was not done till the very last extremity, (as
by the written certificates of the magistrates and other authentic
papers sufficiently appears) nay so loth was count Schmettau to
employ this dreadful expedient, that he perhaps risked the event
more than in strict prudence he ought to have done, the enemy
having penetrated, in the attack of the redoubts (though afterwards
obliged to retire) so far, as to have left an Austrian soldier killed on
the very draw bridge of the Pirna gate.
It was at three in the morning of the tenth, the signal was given
for firing the suburbs; the six batallions who occupied them and the
redoubts, retired into the town by the three gates, which were imme-
diately barricaded, and after six o’clock not a single Prussian appeared
in the suburbs, notwithstanding all that has been published to the
contrary.
After the burning of the suburbs the Austrians remained quiet.
Itzenplitz’s corps was strongly placed close to Dresden, and colonel
[ Johann Jakob] Wunsch, with some batallions, was on the heights
of Weissenhirsch where O’Donnel should have been, if they pro-
posed doing any thing on that side of the Elbe.
In this state things remained till the sixteenth, when Marshal Daun
broke up his camp, and retired to Pirna, and from thence by Gieshubel
into Bohemia.
Much was wrote on the subject of burning the suburbs of Dresden,
which did not deserve a moment’s attention; but men, when unsuc-
cessful in their measures, will complain of every thing. Near three
hundred houses were burnt or damaged.
While this was doing in Saxony, the king, whose arrival at Nossen
had raised the siege of Neiss, and obliged the Austrians to retire as
we have seen; on hearing that Marshal Daun was before Dresden,
quitted his camp on the ninth of November, and taking his march
towards Saxony, on the fifteenth arrived at Lichtena, near Lauban,
and the eighteenth at Bautzen, which obliged Marshal Daun to quit
Saxony, and abandon Pirna and Sonnenstein, which put an end to
the campaign.
Generals Laudohn and O’Kelly who were in Lusatia, on the

approach of the king, retired to Zittau, and from thence into Bohemia;
on the twenty-first of November, the king and his army arrived at
Dresden, and soon after put his troops into winter quarters, having
finished a very fatiguing but a glorious campaign; his numerous ene-
mies had gained no advantage over him, whereas he had regained
the very important fortress of Schweidnitz. We must return to the
Imperial army and follow it to its quarters, and conclude our account
of the campaign, with some reflexions on the whole.
As the operations of the Swedes were not of any great impor-
tance in themselves, and totally unconnected with those of the
Austrians and Imperialists; we shall at the end of this volume, put
altogether their operations during the several campaigns.
After the surrender of Pirna, the army of the empire was prepar-
ing in conjunction with Marshal Daun to besiege Dresden; as this
event was prevented by the king’s arrival, this army remained near
Pirna, and Prince Henry’s, which had been reinforced by some troops
sent him by the king, at Gamig near Dohna. The Imperial army
which drew its subsistence from Voigtland, was soon streightened,
the convoys being intercepted by parties sent from Gamig, quitted
the camp near Pirna, after Marshal Daun had left Stolpe, and gone
from the Elbe, and on the fourteenth of October marched to Gieshubel,
and General Haddick with a considerable corps, was posted at
Freiberg and occupied Zwickau and Chemnitz, to secure the arrival
of the transports; General Haddick was attacked in his post by
General Hulsen, who marched from Dippoldiswalda thither with a
strong corps, and forced him to retire; this last encamped on the
heights about the place.
Soon after this affair a considerable change was made in both
armies, occasioned by the battle of Hochkirchen; on the eighteenth
Prince Henry with several regiments, left Gamig, and marched by
Dresden, to join the king at Doberschau, near Bautzen; at the same
time General Dombasch, with two regiments of foot, and one of
horse, was recalled from the Imperial army to that of Marshal Daun.
General Itzenplitz took the command of the Prussian army after
Prince Henry had quitted it. General Hulsen having abandoned
Freiberg, the Imperialists took the post there again. Both armies con-
tinued in the same position the remaining part of October; the weak-
ness of the Prussian army, and the distance of the king, brought as
we have seen Marshal Daun back to Dresden in the beginning of
November. The army of the empire was ordered to advance farther
into Saxony, and if possible to take Torgau, Wittenberg, and Leipswic;

accordingly the Imperialists quitted Gieshubel the third of November,
and on the sixth arrived at Freiberg; this movement, and the approach
of Marshal Daun, determined General Itzenplitz to quit Gamig, and
march to Kesselsdorf. The Imperialists remained at Freiberg till the
twelfth. In the mean time General Haddick was sent to attack Torgau,
where he was met by General Wedel, on which he retired to Eilenberg,
where the Prussians, under Count Dohna, who was come from
Pomerania, followed him, and forced him, with some loss, to retire
to Freiberg. On the twelfth the Imperial army had advanced towards
Leipswic; but on Haddick’s retreat they retired also towards Zwickau,
when the dispositions for winter quarters were made; and on the
twenty-fourth the army separated and marched towards those assigned
them in Franconia.
Having occasionally as circumstances offered, given my opinions
on the occurrences of this campaign, it remains for me to conclude
my account of it by one reflection only, and this arises from observ-
ing the nature and direction of the line of communication between
Silesia and Saxony; this goes from Dresden by Bautzen, Gorlitz, and
Lauban, into Silesia, and is of a curvilinear direction. It is evident
that the Austrians can take no position on this line or beyond it, so
as to prevent effectually the Prussians from going from the one into
the other; for if they are on the line the Prussians may leave them
there, and pass beyond their right or left as they may be posted:
and if to prevent this they advance a considerable way beyond it,
then the Prussians may march along this line behind them, or by
acting on their line of operations intercept their convoys, or even
enter Bohemia and destroy their magazines, and thus force them
back. It was owing to this circumstance that the king was enabled
to support both countries during the whole war, by marching from
the one to the other as occasion required, and also when necessary
into Brandenburg; for it is impossible to take any position in Lusatia,
which will entirely prevent him. But Marshal Daun instead of going
to Stolpe, should have marched to Hoyerswerda, this would have
obliged the two corps which came from Silesia to join the king to
have marched higher up, as far as Cotbus at least, and they and
the king must have gone down to Torgau if he wanted to pass the
Elbe; if not, the Marshal might always have fallen back to Bautzen,
and by skilful manœuvres gained time enough to have enabled
General Harsch to take Neiss, which was then the only object in
view. I know very well the Marshal could not absolutely hinder the
king from marching into Silesia; but he might by these movements
have gained time, which was every thing; or by forcing him to pass
the Bober at Sagan, or lower down, he might have marched him-
self by the road the king actually took, which is by much the shorter;
and consequently the Marshal would have been at Nossen before
him. A few days provisions would have been sufficient.
Upon the whole it appears, that the Austrians cannot absolutely
hinder a Prussian army from marching from Silesia into Saxony at
all, or from this last into the former, unless it is on the left side of
the Elbe; then I think they may, particularly if they are masters of
Dresden. The great fault of the Austrians during the whole war was
this, they had not, it should seem, any fixed plan of operations; they
wandered from one place to another, waiting events, and when these
turned out even more favourable than could reasonably have been
expected, they were at a loss how to avail themselves of them, and
in such a situation that they reaped no advantage from them; new
schemes, new projects were made and none executed; such a vague
and undetermined mode of making war, renders it everlasting, and
finally it ends in doing nothing at all.
In war all the data are clearly given and known, the respective
forces are easily calculated, from whence a probable opinion may
be formed, and some certain object fixed and determined on, which
must be invariably pursued without any the least deviation; in the
case we have before us, the Austrians should have said—The enemy
must employ a certain number of men in Saxony, and an army
against the Russians on the lower Oder, these whether they gain or
lose a battle, cannot remain long in that country. Our forces are
entire and in great numbers, we have a powerful army, what shall
we undertake? what can we execute? let us do that without loss of
time, for the enemy will be soon back. We must not, cannot expect
any decisive event from the Russians; they come from far, and cannot
execute any solid enterprize; they make a powerful but not a durable
diversion in our favor, that is all they can do; let us avail ourselves
of it, be prepared for any event and lose not a moment in execut-
ing what has or ought to have been determined on before the cam-
paign: this the Austrians neglected doing, which might have been
fatal to them, had not the present Empress of Russia [Catherine II,
the Great] mounted the throne, and recommended peace.
CAMPAIGN OF 1759
Chapter I
The plan of operations for this campaign, was exactly similar to that
of the last; the Russians with a powerful army, were to advance
towards Franckfurt on the Oder, where they were to be reinforced
by a corps of fifteen or twenty thousand Austrians; what they were
to do afterwards, I do not know, nor do I believe it was settled.
They were in all probability to be guided by events; the Austrian
army was to cover Bohemia and Moravia, and wait till the approach
of the Russians drew the enemy’s attention that way, and gave by
that means, the Austrians some favourable opportunity to act and
execute some solid enterprize.
The army of the empire was to approach the Elbe, and attack
Dresden.
The Prussian forces were posted chiefly in Silesia under the king,
another army under prince Henry was in Saxony, to oppose that of
the empire; a third finally in Pomerania, destined to act against the
Russians; all these forces put together did not exceed one hundred
thousand men, viz. sixty thousand in Silesia, twenty in Saxony, and
as many in Pomerania; whereas those of the Austrians alone exceeded
that number, those of the Russians, amounted to near eighty thou-
sand men, and the Imperial army with the Austrians who were with
it, to at least forty thousand.*
The king of Prussia resolved to remain on the defensive, until the
approach of the enemy made it necessary for him to act.
As the Russians first mounted the stage, and opened the scene of
action, the order of things requires we should begin our narration
with them; we shall therefore relate the march and operations of
that army, from the beginning, to the end of the campaign, and add
our reflections on the principal events only, and such as really con-
tributed to the good or bad success of them, which with the map
annexed, will, we trust, suffice to give the reader a pretty clear idea
of the conduct of the war.
* See Note D.
The Russian army consisted of twenty squadrons cuirassiers, at

three hundred men each, six thousand; fifteen squadrons horse
grenadiers, at three hundred men each, four thousand five hundred;
eight squadrons horse grenadiers, at one hundred and ninety-six men
each, one thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight; thirty-six men
squadrons hussars, at two hundred and twelve men each, seven thou-
sand, six hundred and thirty-two; cavalry nineteen thousand, seven
hundred; cossacks five thousand: twenty-four thousand, seven hun-
dred; infantry seventy-six batallions, at seven hundred and five each,
fifty-three thousand, five hundred and eighty; in all, seventy-eight
thousand, two hundred and eighty men, with two hundred and thirty-
two pieces of artillery: this army was divided as usual into three divi-
sions, the first was commanded by Froloff Bagrey; the second, by
Lieutenant General Ransanow; the third, by Count Romanzow; all
these troops had bee in quarters behind the Vistula, and extended
throughout the kingdom of Prussia; the light troops even during the
winter, often advanced to the frontiers of Pomerania, with a view
to plunder, and raise contributions, in which they generally suc-
ceeded more or less, notwithstanding the vigilance of the Prussians
cantoned in that country, who were commanded by General [Ernst
von] Schlabendorff. In the end of February, General Platten took
the command, and had his head quarters at Stolpe; it was resolved
by the king of Prussia to send a corps into Poland, to destroy the
enemy’s magazines, which lay scattered over the country, before the
front of the Russians, in small defenceless towns and villages, guarded
only by parties of twenty or thirty men, contrary to all rules of pru-
dence, which require, that no depot whatever should be placed be-
fore the front, or in defenceless towns; they must always be behind
the army, or on the flank, in towns, and well defended; for an
army cannot like a traveller, find inns on the road, to refresh and
nourish it.
To put this project in execution, Major General Wobersnow was
ordered to assemble a corps, near Gross Glogau in Silesia, which
consisted of six batallions, and twenty-five squadrons, and on the
twenty-fourth, he marched towards Poland. In their way the Prussians
took prince Salkowski in his place, and carried him and his guard
(about two hundred men) into Silesia, on pretence that he was con-
nected with the Russians. From Lissa in Poland the Prussians marched
to Posen, where they found a magazine, which they destroyed; at
the same time General Platten sent a detachment of cavalry under
Colonel Platten, along the Wartha towards Meseritz, where they

destroyed a considerable magazine; after which the Prussians who
began to want provisions, on the fourth of March quitted Poland,
and having accomplished in a great measure their object, returned
to Silesia.
The Russian account of this transaction says, that Colonel Dalcke
who had been sent, with a detachment on the road towards Posen
was informed, the Prussians had entered Poland in several columns,
one under the king in person, another under Count Dohna, &c. and
were advancing towards the Vistula, all which, however false, was
believed, upon which Colonel Dalcke was reinforced, and ordered
to follow and observe the enemy in his retreat, but nothing hap-
pened worth mentioning. This alarm obliged the Russians to take
precautions, in case the enemy did really approach the Vistula, and
the better to observe the enemy, a considerable corps under Krama-
chokow who commanded the Cossacks, was sent towards New Stettin
in Pomerania, where a very sharp encounter happened, in which
captain Hohendorff, who had three hundred men infantry, and some
cannon, and captain Wussow with one hundred dragoons, had the
advantage, having forced the Russians to retire with loss. Wussow
was killed, and much regretted. The disposition made by these two
captains, would do honour to any general officers; one does not find
many such captains. I mention this affair, in itself of no great con-
sequence, to shew there are men of genius in the lower rank of
officers, whom a General should know, protect and employ.
Immediately after this skirmish, the Russian army was ordered to
prepare for its march, about the sixteenth of April. Count Fermor
who commanded it, passed the Vistula on the twentieth, and took
up his quarters at Munsterwalde, where the army assembled, and
on the seventh of May encamped by Swetz, and from thence advanced
gradually towards Posen, on which Count Dohna likewise assembled
his army near Landsberg in Brandenburg, and recalled all the detached
corps, even that which lay at Stolpe to cover Pomerania; on which
the Russian Colonel Tokelli took possession of Stolpe, and the Russian
light troops plundered without mercy every place they could get into,
particularly in Pomerania, which was almost defenceless.
The king resolved to oppose the progress of the Russians in Poland,
rather than permit them to advance unmolested as last year to the
Oder; for this purpose General Hulsen, with a considerable corps
was ordered from Saxony to go and join Count Dohna at Landsberg,
whose army consisted of twenty-six batallions; and sixty squadrons,

about twenty-five thousand men in all; the Russians, according to
their account, had at Posen forty thousand. On the twenty-third of
June the Prussians left Landsberg, and marched by Schwerin (or
Swierszina), Birnbaum (or Mienzychod), &c. to Wroncki, where they
camped the twenty-ninth; and on the first of July resumed their
march towards Poznan (or Posen), where the enemy lay strongly
encamped with this town, and the Wartha behind them. Being arrived
at Rogozno, General Wobersnow, with five batallions and three reg-
iments of cavalry, marched on the second by Lwowek to Poznan,
with a view to reconnoitre the enemy’s position. General Panin had
ordered Lwowek to be occupied by four regiments of foot, two of
cavalry, and two thousand cossacks, who on perceiving the Prussians,
instantly retired to the army, which immediately run to arms, and
remained perfectly quiet without firing a shot, and gave General
Wobersnow several hours to look about him; which having done, he
retired to Muravanna Gotzlina, where the first line of the army was
arrived. The enemy’s right being thought too strongly posted to be
attacked with advantage, the Prussians passed the Wartha by Obernich,
and camped by Objieczrze and Prezlavia, and give the following
account of their subsequent movements:
Being informed that the Russians were in motion, and were going to
camp at Casimierz. On the fifth of July, in the morning, we marched
and arrived at this place before the enemy, which obliged him to stop
between Tarnowa and Jancovitz,* where we proposed marching the
same night, and attack him in the morning of the tenth; but he had
moved off in the night, and marched to Wilczyno with a view to seize
the heights on our right flank, but we anticipated him; and on the
eleventh, in the morning, took possession of them in presence of the
enemy, whose front was covered by marshes, ravins, &c. The twelfth
the enemy moved on his left, and endeavouring to come on our flank,
we made front, and wished to bring him to battle, but in vain. On
the thirteenth we observed some movements on the enemy’s right, his
front however remained in its full length. Being informed that the
enemy directed his march towards Pniew, we marched in the night
towards Neustadt, that he might not get a march before us. Here pro-
visions began to fail us, there was nothing to be found in the villages,
not even a brick to build our ovens. On the fourteenth we found the
enemy camped between Pinne and Conin; we marched that day to
Peter, and the fifteenth to Meseritz.
* Colonel Tempelhof calls this place Wienkowitza, I imagine it may be Woynowice.

The Russians account of these operations says,

Brigadier Thrasnachokow reported that fourteen regiments of Prussians
were in march from Schwerin to Birnbaum; the twenty-fifth a strong
corps arrived at Franstadt. On the twenty-ninth the first division of
our army arrived in their camp, and on the same day the new com-
mander in chief Count Soltikow.1 On the third of July General Wober-
snow, with nine thousand men, came to reconnoitre our position. On
the eighth of July the army having the heavy artillery and baggage
behind, marched in six columns to Jankovitz; the Prussians army was
posted between Morowinow and Babinkow, covered by marches and
fish-ponds: the ninth Count [Gottlob] Totleben passed the Damms,
and attacked a Prussian post of two regiments of hussars with success,
on which the Prussians took arms, and not thinking themselves secure
in this post marched by Kazimierz to the village Bittin, where they
camped. On the eleventh our army marched directly towards the
enemy’s camp, which, on our approach, they broke up, and happened
to occupy another very strong one between the villages Perske and
Senkowe; we followed, and camped with our left at Bittin, and our
right at Molodosko, four miles from Jankovitz. The Prussians fired at
our posts; but our howitzers, which three bombs, made them cease.
On the twelfth we approached the enemy in order of battle, who was
formed on the heights; and we cannonaded each other. The strong
position the enemy occupied, prevented our attacking his line.
In the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth the enemy marched
to Pniew, where we instantly followed him, We observed by all his
motions he was afraid of being cut off from Silesia; wherefore we
marched always on his flank, by which means we came behind him.
The sixteenth we marched from Sumerschka to Borowki; the seven-
teenth to Ibonschino; the nineteenth to Babimost; the twentieth of
Kelschen, and the twenty-second to Palzig: which brought on a bat-
tle the day following, between Zullichau and the village Kay.
During this time Colonel Hordt with a detachment of cavalry, made
an expedition towards the Vistula behind the Russian army, and
with great success, having destroyed several magazines which con-
tained above sixty thousand bushels of corn, of various species, and
made some prisoners, which proves, that a corps of some strength
might have done so much, as would have checked and perhaps
stopped the Russian army intirely; at least we think that if the Prussian
General, instead of opposing them in front, (which at last brought
on a general Action) had, with his whole army posted himself on
1
General Petr Semenovich Saltykov (1698–1772).
their left flank, and from thence sent a corps behind them, the
Russians could not have proceeded and left him there; so that by
falling back gradually, as they advanced against him he could have
prevented their approaching the Oder at all. An enemy so superior
as the Russians were must not be opposed in front unless some
uncommonly strong camp offers, which he cannot by an attack in
front, or manœuvres on your flanks force you to abandon: we have
often said this; but when the conduct of the general requires it, we
must repeat it, and it cannot be too often repeated. It is the foun-
dation, and principle of a defensive war.
We have been very particular in our account of the manœuvres
of the respective armies; because nothing is more entertaining than
the motions of two armies in sight of each other, where the least
oversight leads very often to fatal consequences, and where a few
hundred yards gained or lost decide the final event of the whole.
What passed on this occasion bears a strong resemblance to the
operation of the two armies commanded by those great Generals,
Turenne and Montecuculi.
The Prussians having fallen back to Zullichau, and encamped
behind it, on the twenty-second at night Count Dohna received per-
mission to retire being ill, and General Wedel came from the king’s
army in Silesia to take upon him the command of the army. The
day following, (the twenty-third of July), was fought the battle which
goes by the name of Paltzig, Zullichau, and Kay, which are near
the ground on which it was fought. The account which Count
Soltikow gives of it, is distinct, and appears clear and exact. While
he praises his own people, he does the enemy that justice, which
their dispositions and singular bravery deserves. The Count says—
Perceiving by the enemy’s manœuvres, and learning by deserters, which
came in to us in great numbers, that far from meaning to cut us off
from the Vistula, his chief view was to hinder us from cutting off his
communication with Silesia, that he might be at liberty to join the
king against Marshal Daun, or be soon reinforced and enabled to act
against us. To increase his fears on this head, we always marched on
his right flank, and at last unobserved, we came before him. On the
sixteenth we marched from the village Sumercha, to the Hill Bokrowka;
the seventeenth to Ibonschino; the eighteenth the army halted. On the
nineteenth General Merdvinow reported he was arrived with his corps
at Folitsche, twenty miles from Posen; the nineteenth we marched to
Babimost; the twentieth we marched four miles to Holzen. Here we
had accounts from Count Tokeli that our light troops were advanced
campaign of 1759
657
Map 20. Battle of Palzig, July 23rd, 1759.

towards Zullichau. The twenty-first we halted to wait for General

Merdvinow. The enemy’s cavalry attacked our piquets, who were forced
to retire. One of their squadrons being advanced too far, and sepa-
rated from the rest, was cut to pieces. The twenty-second we recon-
noitred the enemy’s position, and our own army leaving the heavy
baggage at Holzen, marched to the village Guelrig, or rather Paltzig.
The twenty-third (on which your Majesty’s army gained a compleat
victory over the enemy) we marched at break of day on our right, in
order to come before the enemy on the road, which leads to Crossen,
and Frankfurt on the Oder. In the mean time, it was reported from
all parts that the enemy intended to attack our baggage. Though I
would advance nothing without some foundation, I think however, that
these reports were propagated by the enemy themselves, in order to
stop our march. So I continued my march to the road, without for-
getting the baggage, accordingly I sent a considerable corps to guard
it, and the main army continued its march; and being arrived at the
village Nicken, halted to take some rest. Some squadrons of the enemy’s
cavalry appeared before the first division, but were soon driven back
by our cannon, and disappeared. We did not imagine we should come
to action that day, as the enemy had always avoided it, and on our
approach quitted their camps, however strong, and generally in the
night. As it was of the greatest consequence to him to regain the road
to the Oder: so he had sent the cavalry above mentioned, seemingly
to reconnoitre us, but in fact, to cover the march of his army behind
them, I therefore ordered mine to resume the march; and being arrived
with my right wing on the road, I ordered it to extend itself quite to
the wood, which goes to the Oder, and my left leaned on another
wood by Paltzig, which was behind the center of the army; while we
were occupied in taking this position, our light troops skirmished with
the enemy; who on his side, was advancing in columns. While they
were passing the defilés and forming the line on our side of them, our
artillery made a prodigious havock among them; and had they not
continually relieved those in front with fresh troops, and the pass not
been of such great importance to them, they must have immediately
fled. After the cannonade had continued an hour, the enemy approached
us, sustaining his troops continually by fresh ones within musket shot,
and the fire of the musketry began; his attack was so desperate that
it seemed he was determined to gain the victory, or lose the last man
in his army. However his despair (or rather vigour and bravery as I
call it) availed him nothing against the great valour and dauntless
firmness of your majesty’s troops; having received reinforcements through
the wood, he attacked our right wing with uncommon vigour, three
times, and was repulsed with great slaughter. When we consider the
loss he had already sustained, it is surprising he should have renewed
the attack, but without doubt he flattered himself thereby to gain the
victory. He had ordered four regiments to pass through the woods to
attack our right flank, which was covered by two of our regiments,
that of Siberia, and that of Permia, which repulsed the enemy three
times, but had suffered much so that there were great openings in
their line, on which the enemy’s cavalry leaped among them (this is
the expression Soltikow uses, which shews the vigour with which they
attacked), but owing to the help of God, and your majesty’s good for-
tune, our artillery prevented these four regiments from coming well
out of the woods, and drove them back; the were pursued by General
Demiscow, with two regiments of horse, so that few escaped. In the
mean time, three regiments of infantry entered into the lines on the
right, and filled the opening; in this manner the enemy’s right, was
driven out of the field. However he did not give up the affair, he sent
the rest of his cavalry through the village Nicken to attack our left
flank, but General Totleben who was returned from the baggage, put
it on fire, so that the enemy could advance no farther; he made also
two attacks on our left, and was repulsed, so that he was forced at
length to retreat on all sides, followed by our cavalry and light troops,
and the Schuwallows.* We have lost the brave General Demiscow,
several officers, and about eight hundred and seventy-eight men, of
which and the wounded I here send the list. The enemy’s loss is very
considerable, General Wobersnow killed, General [ Johan Friedrich]
Stutterheim, Manteufel, and Canitz wounded, above four thousand
men killed, and two thousand prisoners, besides a great many desert-
ers. We have taken fourteen pieces of cannon, and many standards,
colours, &c. and lost no trophies.
The enemy made his way through the woods to the Oder, while
the infantry passed over bridges, and the cavalry through the fords
higher up towards Glogau. On the twenty-sixth, we marched towards
Crossen, where we arrived the twenty-eighth; General [Nikita Petrovich]
Villebois was sent with a strong corps to Frankfurt, and being informed
that the enemy was encamped about eight miles off, prince Gallitzen2
was sent to reconnoitre him, but on approaching, they quitted their
camp, and retired towards Glogau; a small party I sent to Marshal
Daun, through Silesia, met in the way a captain of horse, with twenty-
five men, sent to me by General Laudohn, who are since arrived here.
The General says, that he, with twenty thousand men is on the march
to join me, and that in four days he will reach the Oder; and I have
therefore resolved after to morrow, to march to Franckfurt, of which
I have given General Laudohn notice, that he may direct his march
thither, to draw prince Henry another way, and prevent him coming
from Saxony and joining the king. Our army is only sixty miles from
Berlin.
* These are constructed like the howitzers, with this difference, that instead of
being cylindric within, they are eliptic, with the greatest diameter horizontal, and
the lesser perpendicular, by which their shot are supposed to spread more in the
enemy’s line; I prefer the howitzer, for its simplicity.
2
Prince Aleksandr Mikhailovich Golitsyn.
The Prussian account of this battle, is as follows.

On the twentieth of July, part of the Russian army came to Zullichau,
and the remainder the day following; their object was to come to
Crossen before us, and so cut us off from Franckfurt. The twenty-third
in the morning, General Wedel reconnoitred the enemy’s camp at
Langen Meil, and finding it in motion, the Prussian army in order to
come before them, marched off in two lines, the one by Kay, and the
other by Mose, upon which the Russians occupied all the heights
beyond Kay, as well as the ravins, &c. Scarce were the Prussian columns
come out of the hollow way by Kay, when they fell in with the enemy’s
light troops, which they dispersed, but these were continually rein-
forced, and the action became more general. The Russians had placed
a great quantity of artillery on the heights opposite to the ground we
advanced upon. I was necessary to attack these batteries; accordingly
General Manteufel with six batallions, attacked them, and took forty
pieces of cannon, but was wounded, and carried out of the field. The
Russians made preparation for a retreat, in which they were protected
by the remaining artillery, on the heights behind those we had taken;
whereas ours not being able to advance through the marshy ground,
we were obliged to do every thing with the musket alone, which it
was hardly possible could be successful; moreover, this ground did not
permit us to advance regularly and form a line, so that our attacks
were insulated, and with the batallions separated, and not sufficiently
supported; General Wedel here ordered four regiments of cavalry to
advance through the woods, and attack the enemy’s right flank; and
though these drove all before them at first and made their way through
the woods, yet partly by the superior force of the Russians, and our
troops wanting timely support from the second column, and partly
from the ground not permitting us to form a greater line; we were
obliged to give way and retire: the attack began a little before four in
the evening, and finished at seven; so that the action did not last above
three hours; our left was posted on the heights by Kay, where it began,
and then extended to Paltzig. The enemy occupied all the heights
before us, where he remained. General Wobersnow was killed in the
attack of the cavalry, and much lamented for his good qualities, as a
gentleman, and a soldier; we have lost some cannon. The enemy dur-
ing the action burnt five villages without any necessity.
The loss of the Russians, officers and men, was near nine hundred
killed, and above four thousand wounded. That of the Prussians,
above two thousand killed, above four thousand wounded, and two
thousand missing, by the infantry; and by the cavalry, four hundred
killed, as many wounded, sixty missing, and one thousand three hun-
dred horses killed and wounded—in the whole above nine thousand,
that is more than a third of their army, which proves, that they
fought with vigour and firmness.
Reflections on these Transactions
In general it is highly necessary to oppose an enemy beyond your

frontier, and advance as far as possible to meet him, because many
advantages arise from this method. For in the first place, you gain
time, which is every thing in a defensive war: secondly, by con-
suming all subsistence behind you, the progress of the enemy is
retarded so much, that when finally you are driven back by supe-
rior forces; if you can find some strong camp on your frontier, from
whence you cover it, he will find it difficult, or perhaps impossible
to collect provisions, sufficient to undertake a siege, or execute any
capital enterprise, which of course will force him to retire (and this
is particularly true, with regard to the Russians, for the reasons
alledged already). However this rule has its exceptions, and the case
before us is one. The Prussians knew that the enemy was to be rein-
forced by a considerable corps of Austrians, that the junction could
be made only above Franckfurt, and that it must be executed almost
instantaneously, because the Austrians could not pretend to remain
above one day in that country: as the king from Silesia might come
behind them, and cut them off from Bohemia, and Saxony. From
whence it follows that the Prussian army, should never have lost
sight of Franckfurt, which would have prevented the projected junc-
tion, and probably the calamities which arose from it: any position
about Guben behind the Oder, would have effected this object;
whereas by losing the communication with Franckfurt, they suffered
Laudohn to arrive there unmolested at the very moment it was nec-
essary. Having once lost his communication with that place, the
Prussian general instead of giving battle should instantly have retired,
and endeavoured by forced marches to have regained it, which he
might still have done; for Laudohn arrived on the eighth or ninth
day after the battle: this was a capital fault, to have suffered himself
to be pushed, I may say, out of the road to Franckfurt, and still a
greater, not to have regained it, as he might have done, and prevented
the junction till the king arrived, which would have forced Laudohn
into Saxony; and the Russians of course, to avoid another useless
battle, would on their part also, have retired without loss of time.
The Prussians having lost the road to Franckfurt and Crossen,
were obliged to fight on improper ground, where they could not
form a line, or make their cavalry act, which was remarkably good.
They were brought on bad ground, and destroyed by the artillery
alone, which no cavalry can resist for a moment. It must not there-
fore be exposed to it, nor ever appear on any ground where it can-
not advance full gallop. The partial attacks which the Prussian account
blamed, are however in my opinion the best; whenever the enemy
cannot avail himself of the intervals between them, which was the
case here, and is so generally against the Russians, who manœuvre
slowly, and stand on the ground which they occupy, and seldom or
ever break their line to advance against any particular point, how-
ever advantageous it might be; partial attacks are more vigorous,
and if properly supported, generally succeed: you can bring the main
part of your line to act against particular points: whereas the other
parts of the enemy’s line must remain inactive, if the ground per-
mits you to hide you disposition, and make several false attacks to
prevent him from breaking his line to support the points really
attacked. When the ground is open, and you cannot cover your
motions, or course all your attacks must be linked together, and no
openings left between them, for if the enemy is able, and his troops
manœuvre well, instead of bringing his forces entirely to oppose your
attacks, and breaking his line for that purpose, he will instantly order
his second line, and his reserve (which should always be divided into
three parts, behind the right, the center and the left) to support the
points attacked; and with his best troops attack those places between
your attacks, which seem the weakest, his second line always advanc-
ing to support these detachments, so that you cannot come on his
flanks of such corps as advance before the front to attack you.
Whether this succeeds entirely or not, you cannot push on your
attacks, though successful. Whereas if your enemy remain on the
ground (as the Russians always, and indeed most other troops too
generally do) without attempting by such detachments, as I have
described, to create a diversion on that part of your army unem-
ployed in your attacks, he will probably be forced in one point or
other, because his motions necessarily depending on yours; if his
attention is drawn to more points than one at the same moment,
he will not dare to reinforce any part of his line, till one of your
attacks shall have become decisively serious, and then it is often too
late to do it with effect; his line is pierced, his reinforcements arriv-

ing successively, are successively beaten, and his army being broken,
brigade after brigade, the day concludes with a compleat and bloody
route, in which he probably loses most of his artillery, and perhaps
his camp and baggage, and thus becomes unable to resist whatever
operation you may be disposed to undertake in consequence of your
victory. The Russians hold this conduct, because they do not, as I
said, move with celerity, and confide much in their artillery; others
perhaps trusting too entirely in the strength of their position; but
besides, few generals and few armies are equal to the system of
defence I propose. Few generals have genius to discern what points
may, or may not be attacked, or defended with advantage, or catch
the moment it is to be done. Few armies are so constituted that
they can, if I may so say, execute the general’s orders with the same
rapidity he has conceived the propriety of them. The prodigious
quantity of artillery which they drag after them (in which, like the
Russians, most troops place too much confidence) chains them to
the ground on which they stand, or renders their motions too slow.
They cannot follow their general; he must follow them, and his tal-
ents when most required (in battle) are lost.
The Russians during this part of the campaign conducted them-
selves with great wisdom, and in the action behaved with a firmness
peculiar to themselves. The object was Franckfurt, because it was
there alone they could be joined by Laudohn, and therefore from
their first march from Posen they moved uniformly on their right,
and close to the enemy’s left flank, which wise manœuvre, united
to his fears of losing the communication with Silesia, at last brought
them on the road which leads to Franckfurt, forced the enemy to
engage in an unequal combat, where he was defeated, and accom-
plished their end with great glory.
After the battle of Paltzig, the Russians marched on the twenty-
sixth to Crossen, and there remained till the thirty-first; and on the
third of August arrived at Franckfurt, in whose neighbourhood General
Laudohn, with above eighteen thousand men, and forty-eight pieces
of artillery, besides those belonging to the regiments, arrived the
same day; the bridge over the Oder was re-established, and another
of Pontoons thrown over that river higher up, to maintain the com-
munication between the Austrians and Russians.
In the mean while General Wedel passed the Oder after the bat-
tle, and camped within a few miles of Crossen, between that place
and Glogau. The king ordered Prince Henry, who commanded in

Saxony, to march with the greater part of his army into Silesia,
which accordingly arrived at Sagan on the Bober the twenty-eighth
of July, where it was joined by another under the Prince Frederick
of Wurtemberg,3 who with six batallions, and fifteen squadrons, had
been sent to observe General Haddick, but finding himself too weak,
had by the king’s orders returned to Sagan.
The king leaving his army in Silesia under Prince Henry’s com-
mand, on the twenty-eighth of July came to Sagan, and put him-
self at the head of the corps assembled there. When Marshal Daun
detached General Laudohn to join the Russians, he ordered General
Haddick, with a considerable body, to advance towards Pribus in
Lusatia to reinforce him, and cover his march towards Franckfurt,
which having done, Haddick himself with about twelve or fourteen
thousand men remained at Guben. The king who had directed his
march from Sagan to Somerfield, where he arrived the first of August
with one of his columns, was informed of his position, and fearing
he might make another expedition to Berlin, resolved to attack him,
which he did on the second, and drove him back with the loss of
the greatest part of his baggage; he seems to have been surprized,
otherwise such an event, could not have happened. On the third
the king resumed his march to Muhlrose, where he was joined by
Wedel’s army the fourth. Soon after happened the battle of Kunersdorff
near Franckfurt: the accounts published by both parties of this impor-
tant action, relate also all the manœuvres which preceded, and led
to it, we shall therefore give them as they are, that the reader may
judge for himself. The two first are given by the Prussians, and the
last by the Russians.*
The king having united his forces at Muhlrose the fourth, he marched
on the fifth to Wulkow on the Oder, the ninth the van camped at
Lebus, and the army at some distance behind; both armies, were now
separated by the Oder, and fronted each other; here General [August
von] Finck arrived from Saxony, with a strong corps of twenty-four
batallions and ten squadrons, upon which the king ordered bridges to
be thrown over the Oder, which was done lower down near Ritwein,
between Lebus and Custrin the ground before the army where it then
stood being improper, and moreover too near the enemy. On the tenth
3
Prince Friedrich Eugen von Württemberg (1732–97).
* See Note E.
the army received orders to march, and on the eleventh we passed

the Oder, the infantry over the bridges, and the cavalry through the
fords, and advanced about four miles further on, but the troops were
so fatigued with the heat and dust, that it was thought prudent to
postpone the attack till the next day; that night we remained in the
open field, without tents; the van was at Bischoffsee, about two miles
from the enemy, who remained very quiet in his camp well fortified.
The twelfth at three o’clock we marched towards Reppin, and formed
ourselves in order of battle in the wood, and then advanced against
the enemy’s right (it should be the left). This was likewise done by the
corps under General Finck. The fire from the batteries, began soon
after ten, and produced good effect; having continued near an hour,
eight batallions of the van advanced against the enemy’s entrench-
ments, and notwithstanding they were on high ground entered them,
without any loss, and took forty-two pieces of artillery: upon which
General Finck, with the rest of the van, marched against the great
entrenchment by Kunnersdorff. At first this did not succeed, because
it was not supported by any artillery; but when we had brought some
heavy cannon on the hill we had taken, which was the highest, General
Finck, protected and supported by them, attacked once more the
entrenchments, and succeeded; we had few men killed, but many
wounded; which done, the General advanced through the village of
Kunnersdorff: behind which lay an entire line of redoubts, the great-
est part of which were taken, and the enemy driven back on all sides.
They defended themselves however, with great bravery, and many of
them threw themselves on the ground, as if they had been dead; and
when we had passed them, got up, took their arms, and fired at our
backs: our cavalry was kept back by the prodigious fire of the enemy’s
artillery loaded with grape shot, (particularly the howitzers) and could
not advance to support the infantry as well as it could be wished. The
Russians however retired all together towards the last hill, and seemed
resolved to defend it. At the same time they seemed to despair, for
they began to plunder the baggage. We had taken above one hun-
dred pieces of cannon; and the Russians continually flying, till six
o’clock, we could flatter ourselves with hopes of a glorious victory: the
Russians had thrown themselves behind an abbatis by the Judenberg,
where they defended themselves, protected by fifty pieces of cannon;
and in this moment the Prussians fortune failed them, and turned her
back upon them, to which many circumstances contributed. The exces-
sive heat of the day, had very much fatigued the troops, and not a
drop of water being to be found was one, but not the only cause of
our bad fortune. After the taking of the third line of entrenchments,
the Prussians did not as before, advance in good order, but in bro-
ken troops, the disadvantage of which, any one may imagine. General
Laudohn saw this disorder, and with some regiments of grenadiers,
which as yet had not been engaged, knew how to avail himself of it;
while we were making our last attack in great confusion, he advanced,
campaign of 1759
667
Map 21. Plan of the Battle of Cunersdorf, August 12th, 1759.

and hindered the Prussians from taking the last entrenchment. The
cavalry is always victorious when the ground permits it to act freely
against tired infantry. The death of General Putkammer, and the
wounds of General Seidlitz were also the cause that our cavalry was
brought into disorder. It attempted to enter the entrenchments, but
did not succeed. The king did all that was possible to bring his troops
into order and exposed himself so much, that he had two horses killed
under him, but they were so tired, that they fell on the ground unable
to stand: so that nothing remained to be done, but retire as well as
they could. Had the Prussians remained in good order on the third
height they had taken, and postponed the last attack till next morn-
ing; when it might have been made with more advantage; it is prob-
able the flying enemy would have abandoned his posts in the night—but
when an event has happened, it is easy to judge how one might have
done better. It is said that General Finck proposed this to the king
who did not approve of it: we can however say for certain, that after
we had taken Kunnersdorff, if instead of advancing by our right, as
we did, we had advanced by our left, we should in great measure
have avoided the fire of the enemy’s great battery, and with much
more ease have taken the last hill. During the battle, about twelve
o’clock, General Wunsch had taken Franckfurt, which circumstance
likewise obliged the enemy to exert themselves. It is easy to imagine,
our retreat could not be made in good order; the Russians however
pursued us only a little way. The loss of the Prussians consists of about
three thousand killed, two thousand taken, and eleven thousand wounded,
above one hundred cannon, and near three thousand horses. The
fourth our army repassed the Oder, and camped near Retwein.
Every body says, and the Prussians believe, that nothing remained
to be done but take the Judenberg: a person who was on the ground
since the battle however assures, that before the Judenberg and close
to it, was a whole line of batteries, which appeared evidently long
after the battle, which the Prussians must have taken, before they
reached the Judenberg. Moreover this line was naturally so strong
that it could not be forced, which must have been done, after tak-
ing the abbatis on the side; where, into the bargain, the height is
so steep and craggy that it is as inaccessible as if it was pallisaded.
This circumstance in the heat of the battle, was overlooked by the
Prussians, at least, it does not appear in any place; which shews how
imperfectly men see and judge of ground.
The second account runs as follows.
Though the king’s army was not half so numerous as that of the
enemy, and they occupied a very strong camp, fortified and covered
with cannon, circumstances did not permit his majesty to defer the
attack any longer.
On the eleventh the army passed the Oder, four miles above Custrin;
the twelfth, at eleven o’clock, the attack was made with such success
that we took three batteries, in which were above eighty pieces of
artillery. The greatest part of the Russian army fled, and for six hours,
the victory was ours, which the enemy believed; but as part of their
troops collected in a great battery, which lay on the Judenberg. Stood
their ground; so at the same time, the Austrian cavalry then attacked
ours, and beat it; Seidlitz who commanded ours, was wounded and
carried out of the field. The enemy’s cavalry then attacked the infantry
and brought it into disorder. The king did all that was possible to re-
establish the affair, and brought on the troops three times again, and
exposed himself to the greatest danger; but in vain; the men were so
fatigued, they could not advance, which obliged his majesty to order
the retreat, and abandon the advantages he had obtained at first.
Count Soltikow’s account is as follows:
In my last I had the honour to inform your Imperial Majesty, that
the twelfth your army had gained a complete victory over the enemy,
commanded by the king in person. I now beg leave to add the par-
ticulars: on the eleventh we were informed the enemy had passed the
Oder. I did not think it necessary to change any thing in the position
we had taken, but to remain on the height we occupied near Franckfurt.
Our right came almost to the banks of the Oder, our left went to
Kunnersdorff as far as the woods. It would seem from hence that our
army had its back towards the enemy, but the nature of the ground,
required we should form as we did; when the enemy advanced to
Gerlitz, it was plain he would march about us, our right composed of
the first division, was commanded by Count Fermor, the van by General
Villebois; the second division under Count Romanzow, made the cen-
ter; and the new corps under Prince Gallitzen, made our left: for want
of room the Austrians could not enter into the line, and were there-
fore posted behind the right. I endeavoured to place the cavalry so as
not to expose it to the enemy’s artillery; from the nature of the ground,
the affair must be decided chiefly by the infantry.
On the enemy’s approach our light troops, commanded by Count
Totleben retired and took post before the front of our right; though
from the disposition of the enemy, it appeared he intended to sur-
round our left. I made no alteration in mine afterwards. On his nearer
approach he seemed to intend attacking also our right, probably to
cover his real intentions which was to attack our left: having erected
two batteries on that side against our flank; and at the same time
ordered some infantry and cavalry to advance through a valley, about
ten he extended his left; having raised some batteries against our right
which was covered by a marsh, over which is a bridge: this Count
Totleben put on fire, so that the enemy could not approach our right;
though by this I brought the enemy’s whole fire against my left. I
reaped however this advantage, that I could make my dispositions as
circumstances required; accordingly the enemy attacked our left, exactly

against the flank; where a regiment of grenadiers of the new corps
was posted; and after a vigorous resistance was obliged to retire, the
enemy having brought the greatest part of his fires against this point:
on which prince Gaillitzen, who commanded there, ordered two reg-
iments from the first and second line to advance, and form a line,
these were supported by two other regiments from the new corps, so
that they made front across the camp, where the flank was. During
this manœuvre, the enemy who were advanced to the ground left by
the regiment of grenadiers which retired, had an opportunity to take
our heights, and open his columns: so that these regiments were like-
wise driven back, and the enemy took two of our batteries, formed
his army in one column, which took all the ground about our new
line; and though he had suffered much in these attacks, his line extended
towards our right, against which he had likewise brought a great quan-
tity of artillery. To oppose these great forces, I ordered General Panin
to advance and support those regiments which retired; and as the nar-
rowness of the ground did not permit any more than two regiments
to form the line in flank, he did so with a regiment of grenadiers,
while Count Campitelli4 brought on the German grenadiers; behind
these he (General Panin) formed another line of two regiments, and
soon afterwards another of two more, and General Laudohn ordered
two German regiments to advance and support his grenadiers, so that
upon the whole there were six or seven lines, one behind the other,
the ground on which they stood, allowing no more than two regiments
in each line; of course the enemy was stopped by this mass of infantry,
and it was doubtful which side should prevail. The enemy ordered his
cavalry to advance, though the ground did not permit them to act
with vigour and advantage, on which Count Romanzow at the head
of ours, and General Laudohn with the Austrians attacked the enemy,
and forced him to give way; at the same time prince Lubomirsky with
three regiments of infantry, and prince Wolkonski5 with two more taken
out of the other lines wheeled about and brought the enemy’s infantry
into confusion: however he did not give it up, for he formed a new
column, with which he endeavoured to come behind our second line,
to put us between two fires, and prevent our right from marching to
support the left, but General Berg with two regiments taken out of
the second line of the right, advanced to meet him, and being sup-
ported by our cannon and howitzers drove him back, to which the
Austrian artillery contributed very much; we then concluded the bat-
tle was over, for though the enemy endeavoured to bring his troops
into order, he was forced to retire. About five o’clock two regiments
advanced from the van, while General Berg with two more attacked
4
Cavalry commander under Loudon.
5
General Prince Sergey Fedorovich Volkonskii (d. 1784).
the enemy in flank, and forced him to run away; he was retiring
before; General Laudohn at the head of all the cavalry pursued him
on the left, and the light troops on the right, so ended this famous
action, having lasted from eleven in the morning to six in the evening.
The Russians had killed, wounded and missing, about fourteen
thousand men; the Austrians about two thousand; and the Prussians
lost eighteen thousand, near three thousand horses, and one hun-
dred and seventy two pieces of cannon, they lost also General
Putkammer who was killed, and eleven other generals wounded. The
plan which we give of the battle, and the different accounts of the
same, read with attention will enable the reader to form a proper
judgment of it.
Reflections
In the conduct of this action we must observe, that the Russians as

usual fought well, and manœuvred ill; when finally they saw that
the enemy brought his principal forces against their left wing and
that flank, they should instantly have done then what they after-
wards did, when it was almost too late. They should have brought
up their van, their reserve, and the greatest part of their second line,
together with the Austrians, and formed another left flank, eight or
ten lines deep, which they might have done, as the ground was nar-
row, and did not exceed seven hundred yards. These lines would
have extended their left towards the Oder, more or less as the ground
opened and permitted it. This they might have done with the more
confidence, as the front of their camp, particularly on their right,
was very strong, being covered intirely with impenetrable marshes;
and secondly, because they in fact saw that all the enemy’s forces
were directed against their left. Having neglected this precaution for
about five hours, they were on the point of losing the battle, and
their army. For the Prussian General Wunsch had during the action
taken Franckfurt, and their baggage in it, so that they had no retreat,
but over a bridge a little above that town, which broke down, and
had it not, an army totally routed, so near the river, and the enemy
close to their heels, or rather upon them with their bayonets in their
backs, must have been drowned, cut to pieces, or surrendered at
discretion. Happily for the Russians, General Laudohn advanced
with his Austrians, and stopped the enemy until a disposition could
be made, and supported successively by many regiments of Russians
and Austrians, who formed several lines across the camp, with great
mass the Prussians could not move, and immediately gave way on
all sides. The attack made by the enemy’s cavalry was repulsed, and
he attacked in his turn, and beat; the battle was then won.
As to the king and his troops, they behaved with wonderful vigour
and activity, and deserved to win the battle: why did they not? in
the first place, because the enemy was much stronger, having at least
seventy thousand men, and a prodigious quantity of artillery, par-
ticularly howitzers of different species, which are of great use in the
field, in a close country, and against cavalry, could not move, and
act with their accustomed vigour and celerity, which gave the enemy
time to make the last disposition on his flank, and this was decisive
as we have seen. The Prussians, greatly diminished by their various
attacks, and much fatigued with the uncommon heat, and moreover,
as it always happens after a long and obstinate engagement, being
thrown into disorder, and of course unable to resist the shock and
weight of so great a mass as was formed against them, were obliged
to give way, at first gradually, being sustained by the cavalry, but
this being beat, they fled precipitately, and abandoned every thing,
their own artillery, and that taken from the enemy: whether they
ought or could form on the ground they had taken already, and
were in possession of before the last attack they made against the
Judenberg, with their left on the heights, and their right towards
Franckfurt, of which they were masters, I do not know; though I
think they might, in which case the enemy must have retired in the
night over the Oder, and the battle was completely won. It was the
last attack which was fatal to the Prussians; had they avoided it, I
am strongly inclined to believe the enemy could never have driven
them from the ground they occupied, and the less so, as the king
might have sent a strong detachment towards Franckfurt to join that
under Wunsch, which must have come on the Russians left flank
and rear, had they advanced to drive him out of his ground. To
support the last attack the king sent a strong column along the high
road to come even behind the flank of the enemy’s second line, as
it is marked in the plan. Now I ask, why at first setting out he did
not send a strong, or rather his chief column that way, from whence
he would have reaped every advantage possible, particularly had he
ordered a great part of his artillery to be placed against eh enemy’s
front towards the right, and made some false attacks there, which
would have hindered them from drawing troops from thence to sup-
port their left. We think that neither the Russians, nor any army
upon earth, however strongly posted, if one or other wing is sur-
rounded, and vigorously attacked, while another strong corps sup-
ported by cavalry, acts upon and behind the flank, can resist a
moment; and I am convinced, that if the king had firmly adhered
to this disposition, advancing coolly and deliberately with his infantry
(for cavalry alone must act rapidly, infantry is instantly thrown into
confusion if you pretend to hurry it), he would have driven the whole
Russian army into the Oder, or obliged them to disperse and fly in
the night up that river on the right of it. The ground permitted him
to do this at the last attack, and consequently it might have been
done at first; would have saved a great number of men, and, we
think, insured a complete victory.
We must here again lament the king’s violent inclination for bat-
tles; which as we have often observed, are seldom necessary, and in
a defensive war must always be avoided.* In these two battles the
king lost thirty thousand men, and two hundred pieces of artillery,
though neither was necessary.
Had Wedel’s army been reinforced to thirty-five thousand men,
and retired successively before the Russians, passed the Oder, and
taken post behind the Neiss between Guben and Franckfurt, with a
strong detachment there and at Crossen; General Laudohn could
never have joined the Russians, and these would most certainly not
have passed the Oder; though they never decline fighting, they never
engage freely in action. They would have gone over the Wartha
towards Landsberg, and from thence through Pomerania home, as
they did the preceding year, or perhaps gone up the right of the
Oder a little way, plundered the country, and gone by Posen to the
Vistula. The king in the mean time might have posted himself with
an army behind the Bober to observe the Austrians, and Prince
Henry in Saxony to oppose the army of the empire; by suc a dis-
position his majesty would have spared his men, and most effectually
protected his country, and saved Dresden into the bargain. The posi-
tions we mention are so decisive, that I am convinced the king with
one hundred and thirty thousand men, will enable to protect his
country against double the number.
Fifty thousand on the frontiers of Bohemia, with their center at
Glatz, move to the right or left, as the motions of the Austrians
* See Note F.
require, and if these penetrated into Upper Lusatia, those move up

the Queiss and Bober towards Naumbourg, Sagan, and Christianstadt;
forty thousand near Frankfurt, which will protect Pomerania, and
all beyond the Oder; and forty thousand men in Saxony, which
nobody can drive out. If the king had posted himself with forty thou-
sand men only, on the heights behind Frankfurt, and left eight or
ten thousand more in Saxony to protect Dresden for the present,
and his brother at Sagan, to observe Marshal Daun who was advanced
to Pribus, I say the Russians would never have passed the Oder,
and exposed themselves to the hazard of an action, with that river
behind them; and if they did, the king might have had many oppor-
tunities to fight them with advantage, or by occupying a strong camp,
with Berlin behind him, and Custrin on his left flank, stop them
short, and force them to retire. The idea which then prevailed of
joining Marshal Daun, which his motions seemed to confirm, was
ridiculous in the highest degree. These two armies amounted to, I
suppose, near one hundred and forty thousand men; neither had a
strong place or any depots, they could not consequently keep together
twenty-four hours, nor even subsist separately a week. If such a pro-
ject ever was made, they would have been both ruined, the king on
one side, and Prince Henry between the Austrians and Bohemia.
There was no opening for them but to fly into Saxony, and from
thence probably for the same want of subsistence into Bohemia. The
truth is, the Russians felt they had nothing to do beyond the Oder;
that in passing it, they greatly exposed themselves, and finally that
they could not stay any where beyond it. These being the circum-
stances and position of the respective armies, they could not remain
ten days where they were, and of course must have left Laudohn to
seek his way through Poland, and retired through Pomerania home,
or march on the left up the Oder, bring him part of his way home,
and having plundered the country in their way, return to Posen, on
the Wartha. For my own part, I an thoroughly convinced of this
reasoning, but the reader will take the map in his hand, and judge.
When then, O King, fight? Indeed this reasoning is so well founded,
that the Russians, though they had got two great victories, were
checked by the king, who had not above twenty-five thousand men,
and obliged after they had passed the Oder, to skim (if I may so
say) Lusatia, and part of Silesia, repass the Oder, and having escorted
Laudohn on his way home, be content to return to Posen, which
proves there was necessity for fighting, and that they must have done
this, without ever being able to pass the Oder at all.
The king continued at Retwein for some days; but on the approach
of General Haddick, who was coming with a considerable corps to
join the Russians, his Majesty thought it prudent to take some advan-
tageous camp, to hinder their advancing into Brandenburg towards
Berlin; accordingly on the fifteenth he marched by Lebus to Madlitz,
between Frankfurt and Furstenwalde, and on the eighteenth to this
last place, that he might with greater convenience receive the artillery
and stores he expected from Berlin.
The Russian army having been joined by General Haddick on
the fourteenth, passed the Oder the sixteenth, and encamped near
the village Lossow. On the twenty-second Count Soltikow had an
interview with Marshal Daun at Guben, whose army camped at
Tribel in Lusatia, and consequently the two armies might have joined
had they chosen, which the Russians undoubtedly refused, for the
reasons above mentioned; they had nothing, and were only supplied
by the Austrians for some little time, while the communication was
open between them, as I was informed. On the twenty-eighth of
August, the Russians occupied a camp at Hohenwalde, and jointly
with the Austrians blew up the sluices of the canal by Muhlrose,
which joins the Spree and the Oder, a cruel and unnecessary work,
worthy Goths and Vandals. On the twenty-ninth they encamped at
Grahnau in Lower Lusatia; upon which Frankfurt after it had paid
fifty thousand dollars, (about eight thousand pounds) was evacuated.
The thirtieth the Russians camped at Liberose, Haddick covered the
march on the right and Laudohn the rear; here they remained till
the fifteenth of September. The king kept very close, and almost in
sight of them during the whole march. On the thirtieth of August
he camped at Waldau opposite the Russians; on the first of September,
and the day following at Lubben, separated from them by a small
morass, where he remained till the Russians resumed their march,
which they did on the fifteenth of September, not being able to con-
tinue there any longer for want of provisions; when they went to
Guben, from thence on the eighteenth to Starnzeddel, and on the
nineteenth to Sommerfield; Laudohn advanced to Christianstadt,
where he was reinforced with eight or ten thousand men, under
Count Campitelli. The king followed close to the enemy, on his
right; he had already sent a corps under General Finck to Saxony,
and being arrived at Cotbus sent four batallions more there. The
Russians seemed inclined to take Glogau, that they might have a
place of arms in Silesia, but as they were not in a condition to
besiege it in form, and it had a good garrison, and the king close
to them, they wisely abandoned this project (if ever they had seri-
ously formed it).* The twentyieth they came to Christianstadt, passed
the Bober the twenty-first; the twenty-second they camped at Langen-
Hermsdorff; the twenty-third at Freystadt; the twenty-fourth at Benthen;
the twenty-ninth passed the Oder below Benthen, having the king
always close to them on their right; he advanced with some batal-
lions in hopes of coming up with their rear in passing the Oder,
but found them all on the other side, upon which his Majesty marched
to Glogau, and ordered a strong detachment to take post at Rutzen,
where they fortified themselves. On the fourth of October the Russians
marched to Schwasen, Laudohn made the rear guard. The Russians
made several batteries against the Prussian corps above mentioned,
but could not drive them away. On the seventh they marched to
Gross Osten, by which it appeared they proposed going towards
Breslaw, and arrive there before the king. This obliged his Majesty
to return over the Oder the seventh, and march also towards Breslaw,
he therefore ordered a strong corps to advance to Ratschutz: a bridge
was thrown over the Oder, where this detachment passed, and had
a smart encounter with the enemy’s light troops, the whole army
passed in the night and camped by Sophienthal. The Russians by
this position were prevented from going to Breslaw, and so remained
at Gros Osten till the twenty-eighth, when they marched to Hernstadt
on the Bartsch river, which was the direct road to Breslaw, but the
king had occupied this pass, which was of great consequence, as the
enemy could no longer go to Breslaw, without a long and difficult
march through morasses, &c. The king on seeing the enemy advance
to Hernstadt, marched thither also to support that important pass:
both armies were near each other; General Laudohn burnt the town
with his artillery. The reasons he gives are by no means sufficient
to justify such unnecessary barbarities. He was led by passion, on
feeling himself and the Russians disappointed in their views against
* They never had it in their power to make an attempt, the king by the posi-
tion he took at Milkau barred their road to that place, and by his well placed
detachments rendered it impossible for them to come near enough even to bom-
bard it.
Breslaw, by taking which place it was hoped, the Russian army, or

at least a great part of it, might be prevailed upon to stay with the
Austrian. This was the last exploit of the Russians. On the twenty-
fourth they began their retreat towards Poland. The king continued
in his camp some days after the retreat of the enemy, to make some
dispositions. General Hulsen with the greatest part of the army was
ordered into Saxony; General Schmettau remained in Silesia, with
a corps. The king being ill with the gout went to Glogau, but finding
himself better, on the seventh of November he set out for Saxony.
General Laudohn took his march through Poland towards Upper
Silesia, and on the twenty-fourth of November arrived with his cav-
alry at Cracaw, and on the first of December marched to Teschen.
General Fouquet had left Landshut, and crossed the Oder at Breslaw,
from whence he advanced to the frontiers to observe Laudohn, and
keep him from making incursions in his way, into Silesia, and kept
close to him, which brought on several skirmishes but of no conse-
quence. Both parties being quite fatigued with such operations at
that season of the year, and having great need of rest agreed to a
sort of truce, on condition that neither should undertake any thing,
during the winter, and so went into quarters; I wish this was always
done. For expeditions undertaken during the winter can be of no
great service, and ruin the troops who want rest.*
I shall conclude my observation on the Russian campaign, by say-
ing it proved, that an army whose line of operation is considerably
too long can execute no solid enterprize, though it be ever so pow-
erful: and that a handful of men well conducted (as the Prussians
were, who certainly did not amount to a third of the Russian army)
will infallibly stop their progress, and finally force them to retire,
without doing any thing; these two campaigns and the following
prove these truths to a demonstration.
Chapter II. Of the Operations of the Austrian Army,

Commanded by Marshal Daun in 1759
This army took up its quarters during the winter in Bohemia; the
weather being very severe in the spring it did not assemble till the
* See Note G.
end of April. In the months of March and April several skirmishes

happened on the frontier, from Moravia to Landshut, but as usual
of no real importance. General Beck took and dispersed a post of
about four hundred men the Prussians had at Greiffenberg. This
blow however was not left unrevenged at Commottau, in the circle
of Saatz, and on the borders of Bohemia and Saxony. The Austrians
under General Gemmingen6 had a corps of near three thousand
men, which were intended to cover that country, and particularly
some magazines dispersed about in the usual careless manner; these
Prince Henry resolved to attack and destroy: accordingly the four-
teenth of April he left Dresden, and on his way divided the troops
into two columns, the one he led himself, and the other was com-
manded by General Hulsen. The former entered Bohemia by
Peterswald to Linnay, not far from Lowositz, where Prince Henry
remained while his light troops advanced further into the country
to raise contributions, and destroy the magazines, which they did
with great success; and having joined the main body at Linnay,
returned on the twentieth to Saxony. The other column met with
greater resistance, on the Passberg, where they found the Austrians
entrenched with two regiments of infantry and some cannon, whom
after a long action they dispersed, took fifty-one officers, and near
two thousand prisoners, (among whom General Rheinhard), three
pair of colours, two standards, and three cannons. In this expedi-
tion the Prince ruined all the magazines as far as Boden on Egra
River, in the circle of Leutmeritz, &c. to a very great amount. In
the middle of May the Prussian army assembled and camped near
Landshut. The Austrian army had occupied a strong camp behind
the Elbe, between Jaromitz and Königshoff; the head quarters were
at Schurtz. Here Marshal Daun resolved (according to the plan estab-
lished) to wait until the approach of the Russians, or of the Imperialists,
obliged to abandon his position. The Austrians made several attacks
on the enemy’s posts during the time the two armies remained in
their respective camps, but without any considerable success. The
Prussians had drawn a great part of their forces out of Saxony to
oppose the Russians who were advancing towards the Oder, so that
the Imperial army was at liberty to act almost unmolested on the
6
Lt. Gen. Reinhardt Baron Gemmingen auf Hornberg und Treschklingen (1710–
75).
Lower Elbe, about Dresden, which was the object. The motions of
this and the Russian army made it necessary for the Austrians under
Marshal Daun to march into Lusatia, in order to support the oper-
ations of the one and the other; accordingly on the twenty-eighth
of June they quitted the camp of Schurtz, and marched in two
columns to Neudorff; another corps composed chiefly of the troops
which General Harsch had commanded, made the third column,
and the same day arrived at Horzize, under the Duke of Aremberg,
so that the whole army was, for the conveniency of the march
through that mountainous country, divided into three corps. On the
twenty-ninth the first marched in two columns, the one arrived at
Gitschin, and the other at Lömnitz. The corps under General Laudohn
marched on the right between these columns and the enemy. The
first of July the two columns marched, the one to Turnau, the other
to Bredl, followed by that under the Duke of Aremberg, who came
that day to Gitschin; the second the army arrived at Riechenberg,
where the Duke of Aremberg also arrived, and the whole army was
brought together. General Laudohn advanced at the head of two
thousand horse to reconnoitre the frontiers of Silesia and Marcklissa.
On the fifth the country beginning to open, the army marched in
five columns to Friedland; and the sixth, in four columns to Marcklissa,
the head quarters at Gorlitzheim, where it remained till the twenty-
ninth of July.
The king being informed of the Austrians march towards Lusatia,
sent General Seidlitz with a considerable corps to Lahn, part of
which had an encounter with a detachment of Laudohn’s under
Count Caromeli; in which this last had some loss. On the fifth of
July the king, with his whole army, marched to Lahn, and after-
wards to Löwenberg. About the middle of July he sent a corps under
the Prince of Würtemberg to Sprottau, to observe the Duke of
Aremberg, who had been sent with the reserve to occupy Lauban.
Marshal Daun’s object was to send General Laudohn with a strong
corps to join the Russians at Frankfurt. To which end he made the
following disposition: he recalled General Haddick, who was on the
frontiers of Saxony, and ordered him to march through Bohemia,
into Lusatia, where he arrived the twenty-second of July, and General
Laudohn joined him, and both marched together to Pfœrten, where
they came the thirty-first of July, and Laudohn proceeded on his
way to Frankfurt, where he arrived happily the fourth of August,
and joined the Russians some days after, as we have already related.
Illustration 23
Another corps under General Macquire was sent towards Saxony,

which took post the twenty-seventh at Bischoffswerda, to observe the
motions of General Finck, who had left Dresden, and was march-
ing towards Torgau. This was the position of the respective armies
till the end of July, when Marshal Daun, on receiving the news of
the battle of Paltzig, where the Prussians were beat, thought it nec-
essary to proceed further into Lusatia, and come nearer the Russians,
which it was thought would facilitate the operations of both armies.
General Beck, who was in the neighbourhood of Lauban, marched
to Naumberg on the Bober. The left wing of the army went to
Lauban, and the right remained at Marcklissa.
The loss of the battle of Paltzig made it necessary for the king to
reinforce Wedel’s army in such a manner, as would stop the progress
of the enemy on that side; accordingly the king resolved to march
thither in person, and Prince Henry was ordered with the greatest
part of the army in Saxony to march to Sagan, on the Bober, where
he arrived the twenty-ninth of August. The day following the king
began his march to the Oder, and Prince Henry was left to com-
mand the army in Silesia.
On the eleventh of August Marshal Daun having left a consider-
able corps under General Boccow at Marcklissa, to cover Bohemia,
and observe the enemy on that side, the Marquis d’Ainse at Lauban,
and General Macguire at Görlitz; marched to Pentzig, the twelfth
to Rothenburg, and the thirteenth to Pribus. General Beck occupied
Serau, and sent detachments to Christianstadt and Crossen. The
Prussians had a post at Grunberg, which General Beck attacked and
made prisoners.
On the nineteenth the army marched to Triebel, where it remained
till the thirtieth. From which Marshal Daun made several consider-
able detachments; General Macguire, with about twelve thousand
men, was ordered into Saxony to join the Imperialists under the
Prince of Deuxponts; General Haddick was ordered to take Peitz,
which he did. Various other corps were left on the Queiss and Bober,
to keep up the communication with Bohemia.
During this time Prince Henry continued in his camp near
Löwenberg, not knowing well what the object of the Austrians was,
and having no communication with the king, he could receive no
orders from him; he detached General Ziethen along the Bober
towards Sprottau, from whom he received information that the
Austrian army was at Triebel, upon which he ordered General
Fouquet to join him at Lownberg, where he left him, and with the
main army advanced to Sagan, at which place he arrived the twenty-
ninth of August, and General Ziethen passed the Bober, and took
post on the hills behind Sorau, with a great wood behind him, which
goes quite to Sagan. On the thirtieth the Austrian army marched
to Kuska; on the thirty-first to Forst, and the day following back to
Triebel. The second of September the vanguard went to Sorau with
an intention to attack General Ziethen, who on the approach of the
Austrians retired unmolested through the wood to Sagan, passed the
bridge and joined Prince Henry, who was encamped on the other
side of the town. On the third however the whole Austrian army
went to Sorau, with what intention it is impossible to judge, for he
could not think of bringing Prince Henry to battle, or of entering
Silesia on that side; I therefore think it was to prevent Prince Henry
joining the king, or going into Poland behind them, which the
Russians were afraid of, and so this motion was made merely to
make them easy on that subject. Their fears were ill grounded, for
as the armies then stood such a junction was impossible, and the
other movement not to be performed.
Prince Henry observing that the Austrian army was sixty miles
from the frontiers of Bohemia, from whence they drew their subsis-
tence, very naturally thought by marching back towards Lauban,
Marshal Daun would be obliged to return instantly towards Bohemia,
and take some post on the line of communication between Silesia
and Saxony, and by that means maintain his communication with
that country and his magazines in Bohemia: on the fifth of September
accordingly this Prince left Sagan, and marched behind the Bober
to Lauban, and on the ninth arrived at Neustadt not far from Lauban,
on which General de Ville, who had been left Marcklissa to cover
Bohemia, left that place, and the fifth came to Lauban, which gave
the Prussians an opening to send General Stutterheim over Marck-
lissa, to ruin the Austrians depots at Friedland and Gabel, which he
compleatly executed. On the approach of Prince Henry, de Ville left
Lauban, and retired to Görlitz, and the Prussians took possession of
Lauban. On the ninth de Ville’s corps had been considerably rein-
forced: however as Prince Henry made a motion towards his left
flank, de Ville quitted his camp near Görlitz, and retired to Bautzen.
The Prussians advanced and camped on the Landscron beyond that
town.
This manœuvre of Prince Henry of course obliged Marshal Daun

to leave Lusatia, and run back towards Bohemia; accordingly on the
ninth of September he left Sorau, and marched through a very close
and difficult country by Spremberg to Bautzen, where he arrived
the thirtieth. The rear of one of the columns was attacked by the
Prussians under General Krokow, who with one thousand horse
had been sent to observe their march; he took in this affair, about
two hundred prisoners and a great number of waggons. Both armies
continued for some time in their camps, the Prussians about
Görlitz, and the Austrians at Bautzen; Marshal Daun had resolved
to advance against Prince Henry, with what view I dont know, or
can even conjecture. Accordingly the army marched the twenty-third
to Riechenbech, and the day following the attack was to have been
made, but Prince Henry avoided it by retiring. At this time the few
Prussians which were in Saxony under General Finck, were hardly
pressed by the Imperialists, who had taken Dresden; wherefore Prince
Henry resolved to march into Saxony; to accomplish this design and
avoid fighting, on the twenty-third at night he left Görlitz, and
marched the whole night; in the morning he came to Rothenberg,
and having halted a few hours proceded to Klitten,* where he arrived
at midnight on the twenty-fourth; the next morning he proceeded
to Hoyerswerda, where General Vehla with about two thousand men
was encamped, never dreaming the enemy could come there, he was
surrounded, surprized in his camp, and taken with all his men, four
or five hundred only with one or two cannon however, I dont know
how, escaped and came to Bautzen; there Prince Henry remained
to let his troops recover themselves, till the twenty-eighth, when he
marched by Elsterwerda to Torgau, where he arrived the second of
October, and on the fourth joined General Finck at Strehlin.
Prince Henry in quitting Görlitz had begun his march towards
Hulbau, but soon turned off to the left. However Marshal Daun was
deceived by this, believing he was gone to Silesia, and so the Marshal
continued his march to Görlitz, where he was informed of the real
route Prince Henry had taken, upon which he returned the twenty-
fifth of September towards Dresden, and encamped at Kesselsdorff,
beyond that city. From this time to the end of the campaign, the
* A village on the Tahmer, between the Gros and Kleine Heyde.

operations of the Austrian army in Saxony; at the end of September,

and then conclude with their joint operations, till the end of this
campaign. But before we proceed to that part, we beg leave to make
some observations on what we have seen done by the respective
armies in Lusatia.
Reflections
Of all the follies that ever entered the head of any Minister or
General, that of bringing one hundred and forty thousand men, with
at least forty thousand horse of different species, into a country were
ten thousand could not subsist a fortnight, and where there was
nothing to do, is the greatest. This was now the case, and had nei-
ther Prince Henry nor the king interfered, these immense armies
could not have remained in Lusatia a week longer. The Russians
must have taken their march one way or other towards Poland; and
the Austrians must have returned towards Saxony and Bohemia,
because they could not subsist where they were, nor had they any
thing to do there at all; there was nothing to be done, I repeat it.
In justice to the memory of Marshal Daun, I must explain the motives
of this very absurd measure. The Court of Vienna during the whole
war, wanted to engage the Russians to pass the Oder, and leave
part at least of their army with them; because they saw the Russians
came late into the field, and for want of subsistence retired very
soon, to take their quarters behind the Vistula. The Russians for
very obvious reasons would and indeed could not, come into this
project. However having gained two great victories they consented
to pass the Oder, and advance a day or two’s march into Lusatia,
on condition, first that Marshal Daun should send them another
considerable reinforcement, (which was done, for general Haddick
joined them), secondly, that the Marshal should advance with his
whole army to hinder Prince Henry joining the king. This was the
motive which brought Marshal Daun into that country. We have
seen the effects of such preposterous measures.
Prince Henry has gained great reputation by his conduct on this
occasion, which is the only foundation, that is known to the world
of that glory which he enjoys. He has acquired the name of a con-
summate general. Many people place him above the king. Why I
cannot conceive; for, in the first place, the measure he pursued in
marching back to Lauban, and placing himself on Marshal Daun’s

line of communication, was so very obvious; that had he not done
it, he must have passed for ever for a blockhead; the operation itself
could meet with no obstacles, for there was nobody in his way; de
Ville had a corps, Prince Henry had an army. As to his going after-
wards to Saxony, I have already shewn, that the Austrians can take
no position in Lusatia, which will prevent the Prussians from going
out of Silesia into Saxony, and vice versa. The king when he saw
the Russians direct their march over Guben towards Silesia, might
have spared himself, and his troops, much unnecessary trouble, if
instead of following them himself, he had left it to the care of Prince
Henry (then behind the Bober); and marched to Bautzen, which
would have brought Marshal Daun thither, and moreover hindered
him from going into Saxony, which perhaps would have enabled his
Majesty to save or retake Dresden.
What happened on this occasion confirms the doctrine we laid
down in our first volume, concerning the line of operation, and a
defensive war. If the enemy’s line is considerably long, instead of
opposing his progress in front, and running the hazard of a battle,
you must act on his line, which will force him to fall back.
Chapter III. Of the Operations of the Imperial Army
The Imperial army had lain in Franconia during the winter, and
were making dispositions for opening the campaign as soon as pos-
sible, collecting magazines on every side; and had occupied Erfurth,
which they proposed making their place of arms, the ensuing cam-
paign. This Prince Henry resolved to hinder and concerted his mea-
sures with Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who on his side agreed
to send a small corps towards Fulda and Herschfeld, on the enemy’s
left flank, while the Prussians advanced in front. The project was
accordingly executed in the end of February and the beginning of
March. The posts of the Imperial army were every where drove
back; so that the Imperialists lost what magazines they had collected.
On the twentieth of March the prince returned to Saxony, and the
corps of the allies to their quarters.
In April Prince Henry made an incursion into Bohemia, as we
have seen, and retired into Saxony. In May he marched again against
the Imperialists, and drove them back beyond Nuremberg; and having
ruined a great number of their depots, retired again into Saxony.

Upon this the Imperial army assembled, and about the middle of
July advanced towards Leipzig, which was given to them, without a
siege, the fifth of August; from hence they proceeded to Wittenberg,
which they took in the same manner; from hence they went to
Dresden, already blocked up by General Brentano, and took it the
fourth of September without any opposition, by capitulation. While
they were occupied at Dresden, General Wunsch with nine batal-
lions and as many squadrons, from the garison of Leipzig, Wittenberg,
and Torgau, advanced to Wittenberg, which the Commandant gave
up, without firing a shot; upon which he advanced to Torgau, where
he arrived the thirtieth. In the night he stormed the place, and
General Kleefeld7 beat a parly at eleven o’clock, and capitulated.
Immediately after, he marched towards Dresden, which he found
had surrendered; upon this he retired to Torgau. During his absence
General [Friedrich Daniel] St. André8 who had been left at Leipzig,
came to Torgau, with a view of taking it; Wunsch attacked him,
beat him, and took his camp. This action did General Wunsch much
credit; his corps consisted of eight batallions and six squadrons,
whereas that of the enemy, was at least three times the number.
The Imperialists retired towards Dresden; General Wunsch marched
to Leipzig, and took it; the garrison was made prisoners of war. By
all this one sees, that a brave man, with few troops, who have
confidence in him, can do great things; and that numbers are noth-
ing in the hands of an ignorant General. Wunsch had not above
three thousand men; the Imperialists had thirty thousand at least.
We have thought it needless to trace particularly the marches and
encampments of the Imperial army, because they had no enemy
before them to make any disposition necessary. They could, and did
advance unmolested and unobserved; for even Wunsch did not arrive
in Saxony until they had overrun the country, and were any oppo-
sition. The Commandant, General Schmettau, who had about three
thousand men in that own, might have defended it some days, which
probably would have saved it.
This conquest seemed to lead to that of all Saxony, but from bad
conduct, or from the real difficulty of things, the Austrians during
the whole war could get no further; for though occasionally they
7
Wenzel Matthias, Baron von Kleefeld von Hnogek (1713–79).
8
Austrian attaché.
advanced towards Torgau, Leipzig, &c. yet at the end of every cam-
paign they were finally forced to fall back to Dresden. The only
advantage they reaped from the possession of this place was, that
they could canton a part of their army in Saxony about Dresden,
and in the Ertzgebürg during the winter, cover Bohemia on that
side, and take the field sooner than usual; they could also assemble
their army in Saxony without difficulty, being masters of the passes
which lead out of Bohemia into that country.
General Wunsch with his small corps was alone in Saxony, as we
have seen, till the middle of September, when General Finck with
twelve batallions, and eighteen squadrons, arrived there, and posted
himself by Eulenberg, where he was joined by General Wunsch. The
Imperial army had recalled all its detachments, and was encamped
about Dresden. The Prussians advanced to Rothschönberg, and
camped behind a great and deep ravin, and the Imperialists camped
on the other side. The Prussians retired to Meissen, and were fol-
lowed by the Imperialists, who harrassed their rear with advantage;
and on the twenty-first of September attacked them, of which action
we have the following account by the Imperialists.
The Prussian corps under General Finck, consisting of about eighteen
thousand men, had their left near Meissen; their right on the heights
of Korbitz; their front was covered by some villages and a deep ravin.
The Prince of Deux-Ponts resolved to attack them. The rain rendered
the march so difficult, that General Haddick, who was to have attacked
the enemy’s right flank, thought it necessary to halt, and let the troops
rest, and clean and load their musquets, which had been rendered
unfit for service; the rest of the army did the same. On the heights
about Neustadt the enemy perceiving our disposition, sent a consid-
erable corps to support the villages, and after a vigorous resistance
took them. In the mean time General Haddick advanced; Finck opposed
him, with the greatest part of his corps, and at first had some advantage;
but Prince Lobkovitz advancing with his cavalry, drove that of the
enemy back, and penetrated into their infantry, and after an obstinate
engagement forced them to fly on all sides, leaving their cannon behind
them. The night prevented our pursuing them. We remained on the
field of battle this night, and part of the following day. Haddick’s corps
retired to Taubenheim, that he might join the army. We have taken
several pieces of artillery, and three hundred prisoners. Our loss amounts
in killed, wounded, and missing, to about sixteen hundred men.
The Prussians on the contrary say, that they kept the field, which
seems true: for the Imperialists retired to their former camp after
the battle. The idea of sending General Haddick with a strong corps
against the enemy’s right flank, was just, and had it been well exe-
cuted, would have been decisive, which induced General Finck to
bring the greatest part of his force against it, well knowing that if
in this he succeeded, he had his retreat secured, and little to fear.
Upon the whole it appears, that the Prussians, though greatly infe-
rior in numbers, behaved on this occasion with much firmness, wis-
dom, and bravery.
The Imperial army remained in its camp at Wilsdruff, where it
retreated after the battle till the twenty-seventh, when on receiving
advice that the Prussians under Prince Henry were advancing, and
preparing to pass the Elbe at Meissen, it was thought advisable to
retire to Dresden, and cover that city.
Upon Prince Henry’s marching into Saxony Marshal Daun did
the same, and on the twenty-fourth of September took his camp at
Kesselsdorff. As General Finck remained at Meissen, Marshal Daun
made the necessary disposition to attack him on the second of
October, which did not take place, because this general very wisely
retired towards Torgau, and joined Prince Henry at Strehla; the
Austrian army however advanced, and on the sixth arrived at Oschatz,
about three miles from the enemy; who had placed General Rebentisch
with a corps on the heights of Eulenberg, to keep up the commu-
nication with Leipzig.
The Prussians could not well be attacked in front, and therefore
the Marshal ordered a corps towards Dahlen beyond their right,
which if they waited in their preent position, would come on their
flank, while the army attacked them in front; Prince Henry sent
General Wunsch to observe the corps above mentioned, and met
him at Dahlen, upon which he retired towards Eulenberg to sup-
port Rebentisch, if necessary. Both retired. The Austrian corps
advanced beyond Schilda; all these manœuvres of course obliged
Prince Henry to retire to Torgau, from whence General Finck was
sent to take possession of Eulenberg. The twenty-second of October
the Austrian general advanced to Schilda, he sent a strong corps to
Strehla under the duke of Aremberg to prevent the enemy receiv-
ing any thing down the Elbe;* another corps under General Gemingen
to Eulenberg, which the Prussians abandoned. Marshal Daun was
* Two batallions and two cannon, were enough, and too much, because the
country behind was in the hands of the Austrians, and consequently nothing could
go that way to the Prussians at Torgau. The Author.
very intent on driving Prince Henry from Torgau before he received

the reinforcements, which were on their march from Silesia, for
which purpose the duke of Aremberg was ordered to take post on
the Elbe, behind the Prussian army, which he accordingly did on
the twenty-fifth, when his corps arrived undiscovered at Domitsen.
Upon which Prince Henry marched with Finck’s corps that way,
and met General Brentano at the village Vogelgesang, where they
had a skirmish till night, but of no consequence: to keep up the
communication, between this corps and his, Marshal Daun sent a
very considerable one, under General O’Donel towards Eulenberg,
Prince Henry was alarmed at these dispositions which seemed to
portend a battle; which he could not sustain if attacked in front,
flank, and rear at the same time. Having observed that the duke of
Aremberg’s corps was quite insulated and could not be supported if
immediately attacked, before he or the other Austrian corps took
other positions; he resolved to send that very night General Wunsch
with his corps over the Elbe, with orders to march down that river,
repass it at Wittenberg, join the corps under Rebentisch who was
not far from thence; and together attack the duke, while Prince
Henry himself with part of his army did the same on his side, by
which means the duke being attacked in front, flank, and rear, and
having the Elbe behind him, must have laid down his arms. On the
twenty-ninth the two first met the duke at Pretzch, (happily he had
left Domitsch) attacked, beat him, and drove him back to Düben
on the Mulda, with loss of some cannon, many killed and wounded,
and about one thousand men prisoners, among whom was General
Gemingen. Of this strange transaction the Austrians give the fol-
lowing account.
It was resolved by Marshal Daun that the duke of Aremberg should
leave the Elbe, and march to Kemberg, and General O’Donel to
Düben, and having consulted together, proceed where they should
think most useful to the service. O’Donel took his post accordingly at
Düben, on the twenty-eighth; and the day following, the duke began
his march to the place assigned him; General Brentano conducted the
rear, and came to Pretzch, where they were met by Wunsch’s corps
and General Finck behind them, here a sharp action ensued; the duke
continued his march; but on coming to the heights by the village
Schnellin, he was met by Rebentisch’s corps, whose cavalry advanced
immediately, but was kept back by some infantry till the duke could
get with his corps on a height by Sackwitz, where he formed in order
of battle, and determined to attack the enemy before him; but observing
Illustration 24
Illustration 25
that General Brentano to avoid being hemmed in between Wunsch

and Finck’s corps, was returning to Güben, and that the three Prussian
corps were closing upon him on all sides, he thought it best to retire
also to Güben. General O’Donel advanced with his corps towards
Kemberg, to aid the duke, but having, as he said, heard late of the
affair, did not come in time, or even near enough to see the enemy;
and though the duke of Aremberg did all that could be done to secure
his retreat, with as little loss as possible; he could not prevent the
enemy taking some baggage and a cannon or two, and making many
prisoners: when we consider the proximity and position of the enemy,
it is wonderful the whole corps did not perish. The woods which cover
the country helped to make a tolerable retreat.
The Prussians account is as follows:
The enemy wanted to cut off our communications on the Elbe behind
us; for which purpose on the twenty-eighth of October Marshal Daun
sent the Duke of Aremberg with sixteen thousand men to Domitsch,
which is on the Elbe, upon which Prince Henry at the head of Finck’s
corps, marched that way. Our column was to pass through Vogelgesang,
which the enemy endeavoured to set on fire, but in vain, our cannon
drove them off; night coming on, we could not pursue them. The next
day the prince reconnoitered the enemy, whom he found encamped
very advantageously, and so it was not thought proper to attack him
in this post; upon which General Wunsch was detached the same night
to Wittenberg, and joined General Rebentisch, who was at Bitterfeld;
these two corps were to come by the road of Pretsch to attack the
enemy in the rear, Finck’s corps in front, and General Wedel with
another was to go through the woods, and cut off his retreat to Düben,
all which was to have been executed the twenty-ninth. But the enemy
having marched that morning at break of day towards Pretsch, where
he was going to encamp, met Wunsch and Rebentisch who were com-
ing that way. Prince Henry advanced to Pretsch, but could do noth-
ing. When the enemy saw himself between two corps, he retreated
towards Düben, one column went by Schoniedberg unpursued, the
other was followed with a continual cannonade by Rebentisch, by the
route of Graffenhayn. General Gemmingen who commanded the rear,
was attacked near Sackwitz by General Platen, with his own regiment
of dragoons and Gendorff’s hussars, and beat. He himself and above
a thousand men were taken prisoners, and one cannon; we found
much baggage in the woods.
After this action the Austrians under O’Donel retired to Eulenberg,
and the Duke of Aremberg to Kulen, on the left of the army, with
his advanced posts at Thalnitz.*
* Or perhaps Delitzsch.
Reflections
The absurdity of sending a considerable corps behind an enemy,

where a patrole of twenty men cannot go without danger, is so very
obvious, that one wonders it ever happened; yet this and a thou-
sand other ridiculous manœuvres are daily made. No corps can be
posted behind an enemy, within a good march at least, unless it is
supported by the whole army, because it cannot remain there an
hour without danger; and unless you propose attacking the enemy
instantly on one of his flanks, so that your right or left communi-
cates with that corps; and moreover, you also manœuvre against his
front, or part of it at least. Whether Marshal Daun intended attack-
ing the enemy or not, he should have brought his left to Eulenberg,
and posted General O’Donel’s detachment between it and the Duke
of Aremberg, which would have saved him and his corps. There
was no danger in this, because Prince Henry could not leave his
camp and pass between the Marshal’s right and the Elbe. What the
Marshal did was the more dangerous, as he knew the Prussians had
a corps behind the Duke of Aremberg, not a day’s march off, and
that Prince Henry covered with the woods, might bring any part of
his forces unmolested, (which really happened), to attack him in front,
while the other came behind him. General O’Donel, instead of going
fair and softly towards Kemberg, should have instantly marched
where the action was, which he knew very well from the firing,
which was loud enough, but he took quite another road. Besides the
danger of the plan pursued, it was foolish and useless; for Prince
Henry had his communication open on the right of the Elbe as far
as Berlin, and great depots at Torgau itself. So that no manœuvre
on the left of the river where both armies stood, could oblige him
to quit his position, unless you fought him and drove him by force
out of it.
The season being far advanced, and the weather very cold and
severe, Marshal Daun after this transaction determined to march
back to Dresden; accordingly on the fourth of November the army
left Schilda, and returned by the same road it came to Dresden,
where it arrived the seventeenth of November, followed close at heels
by the Prussians, who had sent a considerable corps beyond the
Mulda, which acted constantly on the Marshal’s flank, and some of
the parties sent by this corps were got to the neighbourhood of
Dresden before him; this made him hasten his march, which was so
well conducted that he did not suffer any loss worth mentioning,
though many skirmishes happened, which naturally are more advan-
tageous to the pursuers, than to the pursued.
During this retreat the king came to the army, which advanced
to the heights of Kesselsdorff, separated from the Austrians by a
brook, or rather a torrent, when it rains, called the Weistritz, which
falls into the Elbe below Dresden.
The king thought it dangerous to attack the Austrians in this strong
position, but determined to force them to quit Dresden, by cutting
off their communication with Bohemia. For which purpose, he sent
General Finck with a great corps by Freyberg to Dippoldiswalda,
and from thence to Maxen, exactly behind the Austrian army, from
whence he could send detachments into Bohemia, and had this gen-
eral been suffered to stay there, the Austrians must have abandoned
Dresden, passed the Elbe, and marched by the passes of Rumburg
and Gabel, into Bohemia. But Marshal Daun and those about him
in whom he confided, were not men to be frightened out of the
country. So far from it, that it was resolved instantly to attack this
corps, and in such a manner, as to leave it no issue whereby to
escape, and so open the communication with Bohemia. They were
resolved to repair the fault committed at Pretsch, and do the busi-
ness more effectually than the Prussians did theirs. As the country
about Dresden, has been the scene of many military transactions, I
think it will be useful to those who may be brought to act hereafter
in it, if I give a description of it; which I am the more inclined to
do, because I found on the present occasion, that the Austrians and
Prussians were equally unacquainted with it.
Dresden lies on the Elbe in a vale; on the left of the river the
ground rises gradually for about three miles, till you come to the
village of Rainchen, which stands on the highest spot. Immediately
at the foot of it runs a narrow vale, from the left towards the right
as you stand with your back towards Dresden; in this vale is the vil-
lage of Possendorff, through which the high road from Dresden to
Dippoldiswalda, and Freyberg goes; the vale runs to the right into
a hollow ground, where is the village of Potzschappel, from whence
you go up a steep hill to Kesselsdorff, where the Prussians van was
encamped and their army directly behind it. To Potzschappel come
many springs, which form the Weistritz; this runs through a very
narrow vale to Plauen, and cannot be passed any where but at
Plauen, and lower down under the cannon of Dresden, for which
reason the camps of Plauen and Kesselsdorff were thought extremely

strong. Beyond Possendorff on the other side of the vale we first
mentioned, the ground is also very high, on which stand Rabenau,
Carsdorff, and other villages; about half a mile further on to the
right of the road, which goes to Dippoldiswalda, begins a great for-
est called the Tharandischerwalde, which goes for many miles towards
Freyberg, and beyond it. This forest is impenetrable for troops; which
obliged the king to order General Finck to go a great way about
by Freyberg, to Dippoldiswalda, and so on to Maxen.
The quarter master general Count Lacy, to whom the Author was
then attached by duty, as he is now by gratitude; having traced the
camp at Plauen went to follow some Prussian hussars, in hopes of
taking some of them, and get intelligence of Finck’s corps; coming
on the heights of Possendorff, he observes, that the enemy might
march down Kesselsdorff, to Potzschappel, and on either side to the
heights on which he then stood, or the other opposite by Rabenau;
both which posts would enable him to cut us off from Bohemia, and
the more, so as the distance from Kesselsdorff to the heights, is not
half an hour’s march. On coming to head quarters he informed the
Marshal of these circumstances, and the Marshal immediately ordered
General Sincere, with a very great corps of infantry and cavalry, to
take post on the heights this side the vale of Possendorff; this was
done on the nineteenth.* The Marshal being informed that General
Finck was at Dippoldiswalda, determined to attack him there; accord-
ingly having ordered General Sincere’s corps, to be reinforced by
some cavalry, on the nineteenth it marched to Dippoldiswalda; it
snowed very much. On coming there, we found Finck was gone that
very morning to Maxen; his baggage, escorted by a batallion of light
infantry, was then marching through a village called Rheinhartsgrimme,
and getting with all haste into a little wood beyond it, through which
goes the road to Maxen. This of course required a new disposition,
which was as follows.
* Tielke says General Sincere was detached on the eighteenth. See Note H. [See
Johann Gottlieb Tielke, An Account of Some of the Most Remarkable Events of the War
between the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians, from 1756 to 1763: and a Treatise on several
Branches of the Military Art, with Plans and Maps, 2 vols., trans. by Charles and Robert
Crauford (London: Printed for the Translators; and Sold by J. Walter, 1787–8);
originally published as Beyträge zur Kriegs-Kunst und Geschichte des krieges von 1756 bis
1763: mit Plans und Charten, 6 vols., (Freyberg: Gedrunckt mit Barthelischen Schriften,
1775–86)].
Map 22. Plan of the Affair near Maxen, 20th and 21st November, 1759.
A corps was to be left at Dippoldiswalda, to keep our rear secure;

that under Sincere was to march next morning to seek the enemy;
General Brentano was to advance from the neighbourhood of Dresden,
and come behind the enemy; and finally the Imperial army was to
proceed on the right of the ravine of Dohna, and come on the
enemy’s left flank, so that having the Elbe behind, all hopes of escap-
ing were cut off. The Marshal at the same time gave all the nec-
essary orders to the army, in case that of the enemy made any
motions.
On the twentieth at break of day the troops got under arms, and
formed, expecting the order to march. At length the Marshal accom-
panied by many generals and officers, came to the line, but no orders
for marching were given, because these gentlemen, who pretended
to know the country, raised many difficulties to dissuade the Marshal
from marching. They said the roads were impracticable; happily,
Major [Friedrich August von] Fabri (now a lieutenant general in the
Emperor’s service, a zealous and an excellent officer), had been
reconnoitring that way; he arrived and reported to the Marshal that
the roads were good, and that in less than two hours, the troops
might be formed on the hill behind the wood; upon which the
Marshal ordered him to conduct them, and they marched accord-
ingly. The country between Dippoldiswalda, and Maxen, is as fol-
lows. A little beyond the former place, is a village, Rheinhartsgrimme,
and beyond that a wood about half a mile in extent, (represented
as impassable, though the enemy had passed the preceding day),
upon coming out of it; to the right is a hill, which commands the
wood and the road, within one hundred yards, the road goes along
the side of it, close to a ravine on the left; from the top of the hill
runs a narrow plain, for about a mile, which is bounded by another
hill, much higher, which commands it. On this the Prussians were
placed with Maxen behind them; within one hundred yards of this
hill, which is steep, the plain which leads to it is broke by two small
ravines to the right and left, which leaves a passage only of about
forty yards, through which the Austrians must advance, within one
hundred yards of the enemy’s line, covered by many batteries. The
Austrians passed the wood unmolested, the grenadiers took posses-
sion of the hill before it, and halted there till the artillery was brought
upon it, and the rest of the troops arrived; then proceeded to the
enemy, with a very narrow front, a batallion or two. On the right
the artillery moved, and did the enemy much damage: on coming
to the narrow pass above mentioned, the front was still more con-
tracted, by which a moment’s time was lost, however in a few min-
utes they got over it, and with extraordinary rapidity entered the
enemy’s redoubts; here they halted, till the whole came up and
formed on the ground, where the enemy had stood, and which runs
in a slope quite to the Elbe about Pirna. While this was doing on
the side of the Austrians, the Prussians retired to Maxen, and formed
a new line on some heights behind it; the Austrian grenadiers
advanced, drove them out of Maxen; the rest followed, keeping to
the left to avoid breaking the line, and to come on the enemy’s right
flank; and after a faint resistance forced him to retire; the Austrians
pursued him, from hill to hill, till night put an end to the affair for
the present. In the night the Marshal was informed that the enemy
approached Dippoldiswalda, upon which he ordered a body of troops
to occupy the post at Rüppchen, where Sincere’s corps had been,
before it marched to Dippoldiswalda, with orders to advance if nec-
essary, to support the troops which had been placed there, and to
prevent the king from sending any succours to Maxen, through the
valley, which was found to run from Kesselsdorff by Possendorff, to
the last place; and another on the heights of Maxen, likewise to sup-
port Dippoldiswalda, in case the enemy advanced that way; these
dispositions being made, the Marshal was prevailed upon to go into
a house a Maxen to rest; in the morning before day break he came
to the troops, and ordered some cannon to advance, and fire towards
the place where the enemy was supposed to be; in a little time a
trumpet was heard to sound, the fire ceased, but nobody appearing,
it began again. A trumpet sounded a second time, and the fire ceased.
The day was breaking, and soon after came General Rebentisch,
and surrendered the troops prisoners of war. They were so entan-
gled, that it was near twelve o’clock before they could be brought
out of the hole, where they had lain pell mell the whole night. They
were carried to the great Garden, near Dresden. The corps con-
sisted of nine generals and about twelve thousand men, seventy pieces
of cannon, &c. Thus ended this extraordinary affair, with little loss
on either side during the battle. I was present, and therefore the
reader may rely on the veracity of this account. I have omitted sev-
eral particulars, as names of the regiments, &c. because I thought
them no ways necessary to explain the action itself; ground and
disposition are the only things to be considered, unless, as it some-
times happens, a particular manœuvre, on either side contributes to
the decision of the business, which was not here the case.
The Prussians did not upon the whole behave on this occasion as
they generally do, which is easily explained, if we consider the human
heart. From the first moment the Austrians appeared, General Finck
must perceive he was lost; he had before him a strong corps of
which he could not know the numbers, behind his right, at no great
distance, the Austrian army; and a corps under General Brentano
approaching him on that side; behind him was the Elbe, on his left
the ravine of Dohna, on the other side of which within musquet
shot, was a great part of the Imperial army, which fired on his flank
during almost the whole action, and annoyed him not a little. In
such a situation it is no wonder if he despaired; neither he nor any
general on earth, could have escaped the catastrophe which befell
him. If the reader will recollect we said, that close to the wood
through which the Austrians passed there was a hill, very high and
steep; and rendered uncommonly difficult to mount, by the great
quantity of snow which fell the nineteenth and twentieth, succeeded
by a severe frost; he will think as I do, that if General Finck had
posted four batallions and some cannon on this hill, with parties in
the wood, the Austrians would have found it difficult, or perhaps
impossible to advance that way, which would have protracted the
affair, and given time for the king to send reinforcements to disen-
gage him, or for him to march in the night on his right, through
the woods towards Rabenau, between Dippoldiswalda, and Dresden.
The situation of Marshal Daun could he have been stopped here,
was very critical, insomuch that any motion either Finck or the king,
made on that side, would have forced him to abandon the enter-
prize, and seek his own safety; but this not having been done, no
obstacles could possibly have prevented his success. Had the king
known the country; first, he would not have sent General Finck to
Maxen, without occupying the heights at Rabenau, not a mile from
his camp, and not much more from Maxen, by which neither one
or other could be attacked, but in front. Had he known the coun-
try, he would have sent a corps through the valley on the twenti-
eth towards Maxen, which would have greatly embarrassed Marshal
Daun, and cut off the troops he had left at Dippoldiswalda. It was
not known then by the Austrians, that the valley so often mentioned,
runs from Kesselsdorff to Maxen; and when it was known, General
Lacy trembled at the danger which might have happened, and
instantly ordered some works to be raised on the heights of Rabenau,
which commanded the vale towards Potzschappel and Kesselsdorff,

which the author of this work executed the two following days; so
that these works and the corps placed at Dippoldiswalda, made it
impossible for the enemy to make the least motion on that side,
which enabled the Marshal to extend his quarters in Saxony behind
these posts, as far as the mountains which separate that Electorate
from Bohemia. I have been very particular in the description of the
ground, because in a mountainous country, if it is not perfectly
known, every step an army takes may be attended with the most
fatal consequences, of which we have before our eyes, a very strik-
ing example.
In all this transaction, and those which lead to it from Torgau to
Maxen, two things are remarkable, and serve to confirm our prin-
ciples; first, that no army however strong, can keep its ground if you
advance against it in front, and at the same time send a powerful
corps to act on its flank and rear.
Secondly, that if you do not keep up the communication, between
the army and such corps, they will be lost, if the enemy is at all an
able officer. This last axiom having been neglected, the Austrians
narrowly escaped the fate of General Finck at Pretsch, under the
Duke of Aremberg; and the Prussian corps was entirely destroyed.
We cannot therefore but wonder that so great a captain as the King
of Prussia, having the example of Pretsch before his eyes, should
within a fortnight have repeated the fault: it is possible in war, as
in most other situations, to over-do a thing, and drive the nail fur-
ther than it can go. The King of Prussia has been guilty of this fault
more than once. He had won the battle of Franckfurt, had he known
when to stop; he did not, and the victory was torn out of his hands.
Let us resume our narration.
The king sent a small corps under General Dierke, up the right
of the Elbe towards Meissen, which Marshal Daun ordered General
Beck to attack, who executed his commission compleatly. On the
third of December, this general directed his march so that he came
on the Prussians left flank, attacked, and drove them to the Elbe,
where having no bridge, they were all taken with their general:
another proof that no corps or army should camp with a wing on
a river, morass, or precipice, because if they are attacked on the
flank, and beat, they are lost.
After the affair of Maxen, the king applied to Prince Ferdinand
for a reinforcement, which accordingly arrived under the Prince of
Brunswick at the end of December, and was posted on the right.

The king advanced to reconnoitre the Austrians, on the side of
Freyberg, and finding them well fortified made no attempt; and in
the month of February the Prussians returned to Meissen.
The Imperial army having left the greatest part of the Austrians,
who had joined them, with Marshal Daun, quitted the field the sev-
enth of December, and marched through Bohemia, and Voightland,
into winter quarters in Franconia; the head quarters were at Bamberg.
So the campaign ended on this side.
In the summer, General Harsch, with a very powerful corps, or
rather army, entered Silesia, twice, on the side of Landshut, where
the Prussian General Fouquet, with very considerable forces, was
encamped, who repulsed the former both times, and the last with
some loss, the Austrian General having embroiled himself among the
mountains, which he did not sufficiently know.
Having made my observations on the plan of operations, and on
the several transactions, which occurred during this campaign, I hope
the Reader will comprehend, why the Austrians and their allies, with
near two hundred thousand men, did not gain any considerable
advantage over the Prussians, who never had above half the num-
ber, and why the victories of Paltzig, Franckfurt, and Meissen, were
not followed by any solid success; it was certainly owing to the bad
plan, which the Austrians had formed for this campaign. Had the
governor of Dresden done his duty, he might have held out a few
days at least, and this would have been sufficient, to have saved that
important place. And so the campaign would have ended exactly
where it began.
NOTE A
Colonel Tempelhoff (an officer of distinction in the Prussian service,

and from that circumstance perhaps a better authority than General
Lloyd, for the detail of the Prussian operations), gives a very different,
and I think a more intelligible, and accurate account of these move-
ments; according to him, General Fouquet did not join the king’s
army at Gibau, but at Krenau, which happened not on the twelfth
of May, but on the sixteenth and the three following days; conse-
quently this junction was subsequent, to the second expedition the
king made against General De Ville’s corps, not previous to it: his
majesty had advanced from Littau to a camp near Prosnitz (not
Czetkowitz), situated between Studenitz and Stareckowitz, his head
quarters at Schmirsitz, where he arrived on the eleventh with nine-
teen batallions, and forty-eight squadrons, here he joined the Prince
of Würtemberg, whom he had left with two batallions of foot, ten
squadrons of dragoons, and as many of Werner’s hussars, and hav-
ing detached General Seidlitz on the evening of the twelfth, with
two regiments of dragoons, and three hundred hussars to Tobitschaw,
to collect forage and provision, which General Lentulus was to bring
to the army; for which purpose he followed Seidlitz, with a batal-
lion of grenadiers, and three hundred cuirassiers, escorting a num-
ber of bread wagons and pack horses; his majesty the better to secure
the object of this detachment, determined to drive back De Ville’s
corps, and on the thirteenth marched himself, with three batallions
of foot, twenty-three squadrons of cuirassiers and dragoons, and
fifteent of hussars directly to Prödlits; General De Ville being apprized
of the king’s approach, broke up his camp, and sent away his bag-
gage to Rausnitz, which he had time to do before the enemy’s
columns could get at him, through the Defilés, which lay before his
front; he himself (though at first he made a shew of maintaining his
post, probably the better to secure his tents and baggage), retired
on the king’s approach in good order, first to Wischau, and then to
Rausnitz, with the loss of only sixteen killed, and forty-one prison-
ers. The king’s cavalry advanced as far as Wischau, the infantry
occupied Prödlitz, the king himself returned to Schmirsitz, leaving
note a 705
the detachment to the Prince of Würtemberg, who, having seized a

magazine of meal and forage, which the enemy had left in Wischau,
and sent it under the escorte of his infantry to the camp by Schmirsitz,
retired himself, and went back to his old post near Prosnitz.
NOTE B
A close attention to dates, and an accurate detail of the series of

events are so absolutely necessary, to enable a reader to compre-
hend clearly, and reason justly upon military operations (but most
especially when as in the present instance, every position occupied,
every movement executed, was good or bad, according to the rela-
tive situation of the enemy), that I trust, I shall be excused if I add
another long note, containing a few more details, borrowed likewise
from Colonel Tempelhoff ’s work.
On the king’s first arrival in Moravia, the infantry of his own corps
was cantoned in Littau, and the villages lying beyond the Mora on
the side of Olmutz; that belonging to Marshal Keith’s division was
partly encamped near Starnau, partly in cantonments in the villages
between Neustadt, Littau, and Starnau, the whole cavalry encamped;
Marshal Keith’s ovens were in Sternberg, covered by the free batal-
lions of Le Noble, and Salenmon; those belonging to the king were
in Littau. On the fifth, the king drew ten batallions from Keith’s corps
to his own; it was with a part of this reinforcement, and six regiments
of cavalry and dragoons, that his majesty marched to support Werner’s
detachment, in the first expedition made against De Ville. The sixth
on learning the approach of Laudohn, the king drew twenty-three
batallions, and thirteen squadrons into the camp of Aschmeritz, near
Littau, while the Prince of Würtemberg’s corps posted at Prosnitz, kept
De Ville in check.
On the eighth of May, this was the disposition of the Prussian forces.
In the camp of Aschmeritz, twenty-five batallions, thrity-three squadrons
under the command of the king himself. In that near Newstadt under
Lieutenant General Forcade, eight batallions, twenty-four squadrons.
In the camp near Starnau, under the Markgrave Charles nine batal-
lions, sixteen squadrons. In Sternberg, two free batallions. In the camp
of Prösnitz under the Prince of Würtemberg, two grenadier batallions,
and thirty squadrons. On the nearer approach of the Austrians, the
king called in Lieutenant General Forcade, with six batallions, and five
squadrons, and the Markgrave Charles replaced him with seven batal-
lions from Starnau; on the eleventh the king marched as we have
already seen, with nineteen batallions, and forty-eight squadrons to
Prosnitz, leaving Marshal Keith with fifteen batallions, and as many
squadrons, in the camp of Aschmeritz; these alterations were made in
note b 707
consequence of intelligence received, that Marshal Daun was direct-

ing his march by Brinn.
The above disposition lasted with very little variation, till General
Fouquet arrived with the artillery, &c. when the siege began.
NOTE C
If our author had had an opportunity of referring to a most excel-

lent account of this battle, published by Captain Tielke, an officer
in the Saxon service, who was present at it, and had been assisted
by the inspection of the accurate and very detailed plans with which
his work is illustrated, he would, I think, have found himself at no
loss to conceive and to convey to his readers a very perfect idea of
all the movements subsequent to the action, as well as the circum-
stances of the action itself; he would have found that the king’s first
attack on the enemy’s right not having succeeded, he with his usual
quickness and ability immediately changed his plan, and leaving
General Seidlitz with the cavalry under his command, to protect the
retreat of the broken grenadiers, and favour their rallying, advanced
with his right wing to renew the attack on the other extremity of
the Russian square, where he was more successful; for though he
met with a vigorous resistance, he finally drove the enemy quite
beyond Zorndorff and the marshy rivulet, towards the sheepfold,
where they formed again in a square, as marked in the plan No.
III so that the two armies changed places, that of the Prussians mak-
ing a sort of wheel to the left, upon their own center. The ill suc-
cess of the king’s first attack was owing (as at Kolin the year before)
to his orders not having been obeyed with sufficient punctuality by
the general who commanded the first line of infantry, who by not
sufficiently inclining to his left as he advanced, lost (as the king him-
self observes in his memoirs) the protection of the marshy rivulet
which ran towards the enemy’s right flank; and what was worse,
found himself dressed with the eight batallions of grenadiers, behind
whom he ought to have been formed to sustain their attack.
The circumstance which most puzzles our author, viz. the move-
ment of the Russians on the twenty-seventh to Gross and Klein
Cammin, by which they marched along the greatest part of the
Prussian’s front, and turned their left wing, he would have found
accounted for by the nature of the ground, and a thick fog which
concealed their march. With respect to his majesty’s conduct subse-
quent to the action, perhaps the general’s criticisms may be better
founded: in the first place, if instead of throwing back his left wing
note c 709
towards Zicher, when he encamped in the afternoon of the twenty-

sixth, he had extended it to the heights between Wilkersdorf and
Tamsell, and employed his numerous and victorious cavalry in scow-
ering the plain between that and the Drewitz wood, encamping as
in s. s., he would have cut off General Fermor from his heavy bag-
gage, parked near Gross Cammin, and the four thousand grenadiers
which guarded it, must have fallen; or if the king thought such a
position would have too much extended his line, his majesty had
still another effectual way of cutting off the final retreat of the enemy,
even after he had retired under cover of the fogto Gross Cammin;
for it appears evident, that by marching form his left through the
intervals of that chain of ponds, which run from Wilkersdorff towards
the Massin wood, and so striking into the road by which his first
and second columns marched to the field of battle on the twenty-
fifth; the Prussian army might have taken up a very strong position
as in xx behind Batzlow and Blumenberg, the front covered by those
two villages, and left upon the Wartha, in which situation the Russians
would have found them encamped across the only roads by which
it was possible to retreat to Landsperg.
Buit a general’s operations are not always to be tried merely by
strict principles of tactics; other reasons of war, and powerful ones
too, totally independent of those, will often operate irresistibly; and
this seems to have been particularly the case with his Prussian Majesty,
in the present instance; the loss he had sustained in this terrible
action, was very considerable, and though much inferior in numbers
to that of the Russians, was (considering his circumstances) much
more severely felt by him, than by them; the most complete victory
over them, even though it should amount to a total destruction of
their army, was to him but a partial advantage, a temporary deliverance
from an enemy, that threatened to penetrate into his country on
one frontier, but he had already done enough, on the twenty-fifth
to check that; Marshal Daun on another side threatened, by wresting
Saxony out of his hands, to cut off at once all the sinews of the war;
to oppose him with success called for the exertion of all the strength
his majesty could muster: another action therefore with the Russians,
however it might terminate, would have been highly detrimental to
the general state of his affairs, if attended with any thing like the
loss he suffered in the first, and that was much to be apprehended
if he had driven them to despair; besides every man the king lost
was a soldier formed, a loss but ill supplied by the best recruit, and
yet even so to replace them was to him an object of difficulty. The

Russians on the other hand were little better than a vast band of
peasants, brave but ill disciplined, who if they had been destroyed
to a man, would by the opening of the next campaign have been
easily replaced, and till the next campaign he knew he had at any
rate nothing to fear from them. Custrin was succoured, they could
not subsist any longer upon the banks of the Oder, still less could
they attempt to pass it, they must therefore retire homewards; and
his majesty well knew they were not in a capacity to undertake any
solid operation in their retreat, with the smallest prospect of success,
particularly as they would have a Prussian corps to follow them con-
tinually, and wait upon all their motions; for these reasons probably
he did not push matters so far as he might, and perhaps would have
done, had he had no other enemy to contend with.
NOTE D
Colonel Tempelhoff ’s account differs from this both with respect to

the gross amount of the Prussian forces and the proportion in which
they were distributed; and as these are points on which the Prussian
officer, was more likely to obtain accurate information than our
author, and as the following distribution is very circumstantial, our
readers, I hope, will not be sorry to find it inserted in a note.
The army in Silesia under the king himself, consisted of the fol-
lowing regiments.
Infantry Cavalry
Grenadier Batallions Cuirassiers
1 Diringshofen 2 Markgrave Charles 3 Gardes du corps
1 Billerbeck 2 Linstädt 5 Gens d’Armes
1 Haack 2 Münchow 5 Carabineers
1 Kleist 2 Prince Henry 5 Schmettau
1 Rathenow 2 Prince Ferdinand 5 Bredow
1 Nimshefski 2 Bonstadt 5 Schoneich
1 Busch 2 Manteufel 5 Seidlitz
1 Bähr 2 Kalkstein
1 Benkendorf 2 Rebentisch Dragoons
1 Carlowitz 2 Old Brunswick 5 Norman
1 Manteufel 5 Czettritz
1 Unruh Free Corps 5 Young Plathen
1 Heyden 1 Leckolbe 5 Wirtemberg
1 Bieverling 1 Angenelly 5 Krockow
1 Salenmon
Musqetteer Batallions Du Verger Hussars
2 Itzenplitz 10 Ziethen
2 Prince of Prussia 10 Möhring
3 Guards 10 Seidlitz
2 Lattorf
1 Retzow Grenadiers Batallions 14
2 Wedel Musquetteers 36
2 Forcade Free Corps 4
2 Stutterheim Total: 54 Total: 88 Squadrons
A corps under the command of General Fouquet in Upper Silesia,
consisted of the following regiments.
Infantry
Grenadier Batallions Musquetteer Batallions
1 Naumeister 2 Mosel
1 Buddenbrock 2 Queis
1 Rath 2 Young Brunswick
1 Arnim 2 Markgrave Henry
2 Fouquet
2 Young Kreutz
1 Lattorf Garrison B.
Cavalry
10 squadrons Bareuth dragoons 10 squadrons Werner hussars
Total: 17 Batallions, 20 Squadrons
The army in Saxony, under Prince Henry, was composed as follows.
Infantry
Grenadier Batallions
1 Lubath 1 Schwartz
1 Oesterreich 1 Old Billerbeck
1 Bornstadt
Musquetteer Batallions
3 Bemburg 2 Putkammer
2 Goltz 2 Hoffmann
2 Brandeis 2 Neuwied
2 Lestwitz 2 Kursel
2 Bredow 2 Bulow
2 Hülsen 2 Kassel
2 Knoblock 2 Hausen
2 Grabow 1 Free Corps Monjow
2 Finck 1 Free Corps Wunsch
2 Salmuth 1 Free Corps Colignon
Cavalry
Cuirassiers Dragoons
5 sq. Life Regiment 5 sq. Meinicke
5 sq. Prince of Prussia
5 sq. Prince Frederick Hussars
5 sq. Horn 10 sq. Kleist
note d 713
5 sq. Krokow 5 sq. Belling

5 sq. Kyau 10 sq. Putkammer
The following regiments were under General Count Dohna in

Pomerania.
Infantry
Grenadier Batallions Musquetteer Batallions
1 Nesse 2 Bevern
1 Lossow 2 Prince Maurice
1 Petersdorf 2 Lehwald
1 Kleist 2 Dohna
1 Burgsdorf 2 Kleist
1 Kremzow 2 Kanitz
2 Dierke
Free Batallions 2 Old Kreutz
2 Hordt 2 Treskow
Cavalry
Dragoons Hussars
10 sq. Schorlemmer 7 sq. Ruesch
5 sq. Old Plathen 8 sq. Malakowsky
5 sq. Plettenberg
Recapitulation
Colonel Tempelhoff reckons seven hundred men to each Prussian

batallion, in this campaign; and one hundred and forty to each
squadron, so that the respective strength of the three armies would
be as follows.
The King’s (including General Fouqyet’s corps)

72 Batallions 50,400
108 Squadrons 15,120
Total 65,520
Prince Henry’s army in Saxony

60 Squadrons 8,400
Total 38,500
The army under Count Dohna, in Pomerania

35 Squadrons 4,900
Total 23,100
Total of the Prussian forces, employed as above mentioned.

203 Squadrons 28,420
Total 127,120
NOTE E
As there is much finesse, and much matter of instruction, as well as

curiosity in the king’s dispositions, for this important battle, our read-
ers we trust will not be sorry to see them conveyed in his majesty’s
own words, a literal translation of which is here subjoined.
If the enemy remains in his present position, the army will march
early to-morrow morning, in columns of lines by its left flank; but the
generals, Finck and Schorlemmer, will remain with the troops under
their command at their posts. At the break of day, General Finck will
make all the drums of his corps beat the reveille, and moreover cause
much noise to be made in his camp; as soon as the day-light appears,
all the general officers belonging to Finck’s corps with a great swarm
of attendants, led horses and hussars, must reconnoiter the heights
upon which the enemy’s left wing is posted; they must carry spying
glasses and assemble frequently together in a circle. This may last a
full hour, and is intended to draw the whole attention of the enemy
to this part of his position; Lieutenant General Finck must therefore
occupy likewise the heights before Treffen, both with infantry and cav-
alry, taking care however not to expose the troops to a heavy fire of
artillery. At six o’clock, Lieutenant General Finck will advance with
his corps, and occupy the heights before Bischoffsee (where at present
the grand guards of Kleist are posted) with a battery of heavy can-
non, and also a corps of infantry to support it. But General Finck
must not begin his attack before the king shall have engaged the enemy,
and he hears the fire of the small arms; then if the enemy should
change his front, or attempt any other movements, he must take advan-
tage of them. General Schorlemmer will support this infantry with his
cavalry, and repulse the enemy, should he attempt to pass the Defilé
of Crossen and Beckermill.
The army itself will march in two columns by its left; the grenadier
batallion Oesterreich, will be at the head of the first column, or first
line, and General Seidlitz will have the head of the second column,
or second line. The duke of Wurtemberg will follow with the cuirassier
regiments, under his command, and the hussars of Kleist upon the
right flank of the first line, namely, that of the Markgrave Charles’s
regiment. During the march across the heath, the right wing of the
army must be somewhat advanced, and the left kept back. When the
army shall have formed, the duke of Wurtemberg will post himself
with his cavalry behind the right wing of the second line; Kleist’s hus-
sars must extend beyond that flank; General Seidlitz with his cavalry,
will place himself behind the left wing of that line.
But should the enemy not remain in his present position, but should
march to Reppin in the course of the night; then the army will march
thither at three o’clock in the morning, in three columns. The king
imagines the enemy will in that case, place his right at Reppin, his
left at Nollendorf, and cover his front by a small rivulet, but which is
no ways a considerable obstacle. The infantry will march in two lines,
the cavalry will form the third, the whole marching by their left.
Lieutenant General Seidlitz, will be at the head of the column of cav-
alry, after him will follow the divisions of the duke of Wurtemberg,
and General Schorlemmer. The advanced guard will be formed by
Neuendorf, and the attack will be commenced by the right wing of
the army.
The following is a list of the Prussian forces on this memorable day.
note e 717
Illustration 26
NOTE F
Our author’s criticisms here seem perfectly just, at least as far as

they regard the king’s first dispositions. His majesty according to the
list contained in the foregoing note, had fifty-four batallions in the
field, exclusive of the brenadiers, and Bredow’s dragoons (who on
this occasion appear to have acted on foot), his cavalry consisted of
one hundred and four squadrons.
The ground between the Bäcker Mill and the Cunnersdorf Wood,
does not appear to be above three thousand six hundred paces wide:
from the Great Mill, across the Cunnersdorf meadows, to the little
rivulet which separates them from the Elsbrug belonging to Franckfurt,
is about one thousand two hundred: if the king therefore had increased
Finck’s corps to sixteen batallions, he would still have had thirty-
eight remaining to support his advanced guard, which should have
attacked the Mühlberg or Windmill Hill, in conjunction with the
sixteen batallions under Finck; these should have passed the Hüner
Brook, not only at the Great Mill, but wherever a bridge could be
thrown; and being supported by the thirty squadrons of hussars and
dragoons, which were attached to them, might perhaps from the
very first moment, have ensured the victory; for Colonel Tempelhoff
says, “that the want of cavalry, and light artillery, prevented the
Prussians from profiting by the first success of their grenadiers, and
gave the enemy time to rally, and make a new disposition.” Supposing
now the king’s thirty-eight batallions, had been formed twenty in the
first line, and eighteen in the second, which would have more than
sufficed to occupy the space mentioned. Sixty-nine squadrons of cav-
alry being in two lines behind them, and a regiment of hussars on
their left flank to patrole the woods, and keep a look out after the
Cossacks; in this order they might have followed the progress of their
grenadiers, sustaining them as they advanced, till stopped by the
chain of Ponds, which stretch from Cunnersdorf quite into the wood,
here the Prussians being once masters of the village, six batallions
would have been sufficient to havemasked the Pond heads, and pre-
vented the enemy from returning, particularly if sustained by fifteen
or twenty squadrons of dragoons and hussars, the remaining thirty-
two batallions then, and forty-nine squadrons, might by inclining
note f 719
constantly to the right, have effectually seconded the efforts of the

grenadiers and Finck’s corps, who by turning the Kub Grund or Cow
Bottom (the hollow way where Laudhon first effectually stopped
them), would have come on the flank and in the rear, even of that
formidable mass formed across the camp, which must therefore prob-
ably in the end have given way; the ground does not appear to have
been impracticable, for (as General Lloyd observes very justly) the
last attacks actually took place there. Could the king at the same
time have spared any part of his troops and artillery, to have marched
in the night through the wood, and made a false attack upon the
enemy’s right flank, as our author proposes, it would probably have
drawn Count Soltikow’s attention that way, and very much facili-
tated the above mentioned operations, but his majesty was so extremely
inferior in numbers, that, perhaps, he could not afford to spare such
a detachment.
It is not unlikely this would have been the very disposition the
king would have made, had he been acquainted with the ground,
but alas, he was not; and he was deceived, as Colonel Tempelhoff
assures us, by an officer, who having been constantly quartered dur-
ing the peace at Franckfurt, was supposed to know the ground, and
who had described it to his majesty as a perfect plain, between the
woods and the village, making no mention of the ponds; it is very
probable the king did not know of these till after the battle, for his
majesty was during the greatest part of the action, at the extremity
of his right wing, which he himself led into fire; and Tempelhoff
says, they are so situated as not to be distinguished till you come
close to the brink of them. Hence the circumstance of all the cav-
alry being thrown into the left wing, with which it is evident the
king thought to turn Cunnersdorf, and menace the front and right
wing of the enemy; hence the orders for that impracticable move-
ment of the cavalry, in which Seidlitz was wounded, it was obliged
to file off over pond heads, where the king thought they could
advance in line; his majesty was without doubt deceived in the idea
he had formed of the ground, and his dispositions having been made
upon false data, were consequently defective.
With respect to what our author, in common with many other
military critics, suggests of the propriety of his majesty contenting
himself with his first advantages, and halting on the ground he had
already gained from the Russsians, without driving them to desper-
ation by his last attack, I shall give the reader Colonel Tempelhoff ’s
arguments on that head, always chusing to give him better author-

ity than my own, whenever I find the subject has been treated of
before. He says in his observations on the battle of Cunnersdorf:
Many men are of opinion, that the king after having stormed the
enemy’s batteries on the Windmill Hill, and after he had cleared the
whole field of Russians quite down to Cunnersdorf, ought to have
halted, and been contented with the advantages he had already obtained.
The enemy, it is said, would have retreated in the night, and have
abandoned the whole camp to the king; this battle would then have
proved as decisive in its consequences, as that of Zornsdorf; and whilst
the enemy filled the gazettes of their party, with fruitless disputes about
maintaining the field of battle, his majesty would, as on the former
occasion, have reaped all the fruits of an undisputed victory.
This opinion is for the most part founded on the false supposition,
that the enemy was already driven back as far as the Judenberg, and
had there formed his last disposition. Had this really been the case, it
would indeed have been highly dangerous to hazard still another attack,
with troops who had been so long already in the severest fire that per-
haps was ever seen, and had exhausted their strength by their exer-
tions during the hottest day ever felt, having fought with prodigious
resolution, valour and steadiness, and that attack too, such as might
well have startled the freshest troops. According to these suppositions
the enemy would have stood on a perfect mountain, his left flank
would have been covered by the hollow, in which General Laudhon’s
corps had spent the night under arms, which is not only very deep
but extraordinary steep on both sides; his right flank also would have
been to the full as difficult of access; for the hills on which the enemy
would most probably have posted it, are also very steep, and those
too in the center are not to be climbed without much difficulty. But
these hills lie from three to four thousand paces behind Cunnersdorf;
and if the king had driven back the enemy as far as this, I doubt
much whether he ever would have been in a condition to make any
further resistance; it was upon these hills, that in the commencement
of the action his right wing was posted, so that to have driven him
as far back as here, would have been to drive his army up quite from
the left to right, that is to say, to drive it on a heap. But in fact, the
enemy was very far indeed from suffering such an overthrow; the left
wing, and the center of the Prussian army, had not advanced above
a few hundred paces beyond Cunnersdorf, the right wing stod in a
close disorderly heap behind the Cow Bottom, and Finck’s corps on
their right hand in the hollow, having the heights of Elsbruch before
them, which they were never able to surmount, though they ran up
to them with great intrepidity; on the other hand the enemy still main-
tained his ground on the Spitzberg, to which he entirely owed his
deliverance. Besides, where should the king make this halt? If it was
to be done at all, the moment chosen for doing it, was when the
note f 721
grenadiers had stormed the Windmill Hill, and had made themselves
masters of a considerable part of the enemy’s artillery; this in truth is
saying, the king ought to have halted in the very moment, when he
had every appearance on his side of attaining the most complete, the
most decisive victory, a victory which would have for ever delivered
him from the enemy, that of all others, the most severely pressed him
during the whole. Nothing is more unjust, than to judge the merits of
a general by the event of an action; how many battles have not been
lost by men, who had weighed their enterprise with the utmost atten-
tion, had formed it on the best principles, had made their dispositions
according to the most approved rules, and in the execution had neglected
nothing by which their success might be ensured; while the adversary,
who perhaps had done no more than draw out his troops in order of
battle, according to the Roster, gains in the same degree that the other
loses, and is indebted to some unforeseen circumstance, some accident,
which perhaps he was not even informed of, for the reputation of hav-
ing acted like a great and very able general. If a man would form a
just and impartial judgement, he must go upon the field of battle, he
must imagine himself in the situation of the generals and the troops,
on either side, both the assailants and those on the defensive part, and
combine all this according to the true principles of war.
After the grenadiers had stormed the Windmill Hill, there were but
eight batallions as yet in action, all the rest of the army had not lost
a single man; they saw victory before them, the most considerable
difficulties surmounted, and the enemy in the greatest disorder. And
was this a moment for the king to order a halt! Should he now forgo
at once all his prospects of a most complete victory! Should he stop
short in the midst of their career, his brave troops who with rapid
steps were moving up, and pressed forward to victory, and thus make
before their eyes an open avowal, that he feared his enemy? Would
not that have been to shew a mistrust of the courage of his troops,
nay, in plain words to declare them mere cowards? Then the enemy
had behaved himself so miserably in the defence of this very strong
post, that the king might with good reason expect his further resis-
tance to be no better, and therefore without difficulty to be surmounted,
by the zeal and bravery of fresh troops? Though I myself was present
at the action, yet I had not till last summer a competent knowledge
of the field of battle, and even now I find not the least reason, which
could prevent the king from pushing on his attacks, after the storm-
ing the first entrenchments of the Russians. The right wing of the
Prussian army stood on the heights, which command the whole field
quite to Cunnersdorf; nothing presents itself there to the eye, which
should prevent a further attack: the whole ground quite to the village
is a plain, no more intrenchments remained to be stormed, the vil-
lage itself was unoccupied and burnt; the enemy under the embar-
rassment of changing his front, cooped up in a narrow space, where
he could take no advantage of his superior numbers; the Prussian army
in a position by which it was enabled to attack him at once, in front,

in flank, and in rear; and would you have had the king by an absolute
inaction forego all these advantages, which were before his eyes? In
that case it would have been better, not to suffer himself to be engaged
to fight at all. The king was however so circumstanced, that he had
now more than ever, good reason to put somewhat to the risk, for
the sake of preventing the Russians, from undertaking any thing fur-
ther this campaign. A strong corps of Austrians encamped in Lower
Lusatia under General Haddick, threatened the Marches of Berlin itself,
and was in a posture to join the Russians, wherever it should be
thought adviseable. Saxony was totally unprotected, the army of the
Empire having it in their power to take Torgau and Wittenberg, cities
which could make no defence, but which if they should fall into the
enemy’s hands, would leave the road clear for him to Berlin. Dresden,
where the chief depots, were of all the stores necessary for maintain-
ing an army in Saxony, was in danger of sharing the same fate with
the other cities of this electorate; all communication with the army in
Silesia cut off, and it besieged as it were by the Austrian grand army
under Marshal Daun. Had the king now remained on the left of the
Oder, and confined himself to a strict defence to cover Berlin, and to
prevent the further progress of the Russian army in the march of
Brandenburg, he would have found himself compelled to retire by
degrees quite back to Berlin; especially if General Haddick had been
reinforced from the grand army, and had directed his march thither:
all this must evidently have happened, unless one can suppose it pos-
sible for the Austrian Generals, to have been so short-sighted as not
to have seen their own advantages. Had his majesty on the contrary,
continued on the other side of the Oder and fought to cut off the
supplies, which the Russians drew out of Poland, he could not how-
ever prevent them from passing the river, and detaching both Haddick’s
and Laudhon’s corps to Berlin, which they might have done without
too much weakening themselves, and the contributions this detach-
ment would have levied on their way back, would have ridden them
of all embarrassment arising from want of provisions; besides, such a
disposition would have totally dissabled him from securing Saxony,
and having no magazines along the Wartha, he could not long have
remained in that neighbourhood. He could not in these circumstances,
accomplish much by the skilful marches, or the best chosen positions,
whereas the gain of a decisive battle, would at once have delivered
him out of all his difficulties; hence it was not rashness to hazard it,
prudence absolutely required it. It may be said, the king would be
obliged after the loss of a battle, to do that with an army diminished
by one half and under much worse circumstances, which he might
have done before: certainly, but was not the situation of the enemy
also considerably changed? The Russian army, which, including the
corps of Austrians, might consist before the battle of about sixty thou-
sand, was now less by eighteen thousand, the men had expended all
note f 723
the ammunition which they carried in their pouches, and had been
obliged to take a considerable part of what they had with them in
their stores; it must be considered too, that if these were sufficient to
supply their army once, that was all, they could supply them no more.
The Prussians indeed were in the same case, but these wants might
be supplied in a few days, from their magazines in Custrin, in Stettin
and in Berlin. The Russians on the contrary, were too far distant from
their depots, for this to be done in so short a time; they must there-
fore of necessity remain sometime inactive, which the king might take
advantage of, to repair his shattered forces. One may from hence in
some measure, explain why the Russian Generals did not perform all
that the public expected from them, which has commonly little, or no
idea of the difficulties attending military operations. Had Field Marshal
Soltikow after the battle, ventured to move forward to hastily, he might
reckon upon being once more attacked by the king; and then had his
good fortune deserted him, but a small part probably of the Russian
army would have escaped; he had therefore the most urgent motives
to be wary in his conduct, and not totally to sacrifice the remnant of
his troops, who had so bravely fought at Kay and Cunnersdorf. He
might with great reason expect that his allies should also do some-
thing, and not leave him to bear alone the whole burthen of the war.
Besides, the whole Russian army was convinced that the Court of
Vienna, meant only to make a tool of them, and cared little how many
or how few of them returned home, provided they themselves reaped
the fruits of their labours. A natural consequence of this idea, was that
the enemy had no longer any great inclination to fight, and rather
longed for their return into winter quarters in Poland. One may assume
it as a fact, without doing any violence to probability, that the king
was well acquainted with the dispositions of the Russians; now these
had already existed before the battle, and Frederick’s penetration could
easily discover the future consequences, which must result from them.
Whilst therefore his enemies expected the march of the combined army
in Berlin, the irruption of Marshal Daun into Silesia, the recovery of
Saxony, the siege of Magdebourg, Steeten, and so on, and his friends
shuddered for him; his genius on the very morrow of the battle, shewed
him that nothing of all this would happen; hence also with his usual
serenity and temper, which never left him in the midst of danger, he
was enabled to send word to Duke Ferdinand by the same officer,
who had brought him the news of the victory of Minden. I am sorry
the return of so good a piece of news should not be more lucky. But if you get
safe back, and dont find Daun in Berlin, and Contades in Magdebourg, you may
assure Duke Ferdinand from me, that there is no very great loss sustained. Thus
a great man may always with safety risk more than another, being
sure that in the greatest calamities his resources will not fail him. This
accounts for the exploits of an Alexander, and a Cæsar, and explains
to us the principle upon which Gustavus Adolphus ventured into Ger-
many; and Condé hazarded the battles of Rocroy, Freyburg, Nordlingen,
and Senef, and how Frederick was enabled to extricate himself with
glory out of seven years war, carried on against the most powerful
forces of Europe.
Such are the arguments Colonel Tempelhoff uses, in support of the
king’s conduct on this occasion; and indeed, I think completely justifies
his majesty, from the imputation of having rashly attempted to push
his advantages too far, which our author in some measure lays to
his charge, though it must be observed, he does not venture to speak
very decisively on this point.
With respect to the difference of sentiments between the Colonel
and our author, on the necessity of the king’s fighting at all, I have
given the arguments on both sides of the question, and shall not
presume to deliver any opinion of my own, but leave it to the reader
to judge for himself.
NOTE G
These hardy, skilful, and rapid movements, by which, with a twice

beaten corps, not one third of the enemy’s army, the king of Prussia
contrived to prevent him reaping any advantages, from a most bloody
victory obtained in the midst of the summer, on the most exposed
part of his frontier; render this part of the campaign of one thou-
sand seven hundred and fifty-nine too interesting not to make it a
desirable thing for our readers to follow his majesty step by step
through all these marches; we shall therefore add to the journal of
the Russian movements, which our author gives us, a similar one of
each position taken up by his majesty, extracted from a military
magazine published at Berlin, a work of acknowledged merit and
authenticity.
On the enemy’s leaving his camp at Mühlrose, and occupying another
at Liebrose, the king on the thirteenth of August marched with the
army in three columns to a village called Borne, near Beeskow, from
which last the enemy was immediately dislodged; the town was then
occupied by a free batallion, a body of hussars were posted behind it,
and the army itself encamped by Borne, with this village between the
two lines.
On the thirty-first the army broke up once more and marched in
three columns to Waldow; in this camp the right wing was placed at
the village called Kannichen, facing the Spree Walde, and the left at
Waldow, before which last place Kleist’s and Putkammer’s hussars,
and the free batallion of Collingen were posted in a wood for the bet-
ter protection of the left flank of the army.
On the second of September the bakery was established at Lübben,
under the protection of two batallions and about one hundred and
fifty dragoons. The enemy having by his march on the fifteenth to
Guben discovered beyond a doubt his intention of going into Silesia,
the king broke up his camp on the sixteenth, and marched in two
columns by Lübben to Vetschow, and on the seventeenth to Cotbus,
where he encamped behind the town, having his front covered by the
Spree; here the Prussians took a Russian officer and twenty men pris-
oners. The eighteenth was a halting day, to give time for the second
line to join, which had been left behind in the camp of Waldow. On
this day his majesty detached Colonel Kleist with ten squadrons of
hussars, and the regiment of old Plathen, together with two batallions
of foot, under the command of Colonel Linden, to Spremberg; and
Major General Linstädt with two batallions and eight squadrons of

hussars to Forste. On the nineteenth the whole army marched to the
last mentioned place, and took up a camp with the front covered by
the Neisse. Colonel Kleist on the same day marched from Spremberg
to Mosqua, to cover the right flank of the army in case of necessity.
On the twentieth the army marched to Linderode, and Colonel Kleist
from Mosqua to Sorau, from whence he marched again that night,
and advanced with his cavalry to drive the enemy out of Sagan, which
he effected completely, cutting many of them to pieces, and making
the rest prisoners. On the twenty-first, at ten in the morning, the king
arrived at Sagan with the whole cavalry; the infantry followed soon
after, and encamped with the left wing at Eckersdorf, and the right
on the Galgenberg (or Gallows Hill) near the town. Many of the
enemy’s patroles (who was unapprized of our rapid march) were made
prisoners.
The king’s movements after the battle of Frankfurt, to cover Berlin
and afterwards Silesia, from the invasion of the Russian army, are
worthy the highest admiration, the conduct of his adversary on the
contrary, is subject to much just censure. The enemy’s generals ought
to have exerted all their efforts to occupy the post of Sagan, before
the king’s arrival, and to that end, they should have detached a corps
of ten thousand men thither, which from the natural strength of that
post, might have stopped the Prussian army long enough to give time
to the Russians, and General Laudhon to reach Glogau. Such a con-
duct in the enemy’s generals, would have obliged the Prussian army
to take a long detour, and if they had fought to turn this corps in the
neighbourhood of Sprottau, it need only march by its left, and place
itself behind the Sprottau river, in which case its communication with
the grand army, could not possibly be cut off.
On the twenty-third the king marched with the army in two columns
to Suckau, a village not far from Neustadt; the Cossacks which had
penetrated as far as here, were driven back. Both wings of the army
were posted on heights, the center was cut in two by the village. The
vanguard on their arrival in the new camp, saw the heads of the
enemy’s columns on the heights of Wendischborau, they halted as soon
as they perceived the Prussians, and pitched their camp on the above
named heights.
Several [risoners reported that the enemy’s intention was to have
encamped on the heights near Milkau, and that their generals had
received no intelligence of the king’s march. His majesty’s object in
taking the camp of Suckau seems to have been, to march by his flank
to the heights of Milkau, whenever the enemy should attempt to pass
the defile of Neustadt, to attack their army on its coming out, and
thus utterly destroy it.
On the twenty-fourth the enemy having put his troops under arms
at the head of his camp, the Prussians did the same, and upon patroles
being sent out to discover what his intentions were in this, they learnt
note g 727
that he was about to occupy a new camp, traced out between Nenkers-
dorf and Malschwitz.
It being by this time certain that the enemy would not pass the
defile of Neustadt, the king made the army advance to the heights of
Milkau, at which village their left flank was placed, while their right
came to Baune, by this advantageous position, the enemy was shut
out of the road to Glogau, and now took up a camp between Neu-
Tschoe, and Keltsch. In this position both armies remained some time
under arms, each expecting to be attacked, but at length the tents
were pitched, and both camps strongly fortified.
On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth the king was joined by
Generals Maier, and Queist, with three squadrons, and seven batal-
lions; this reinforcement enabled his majesty to extend his right wing
to Nenkersdorf, before which village an entrenchment was thrown up.
On the twenty-ninth several movements were observed in the enemy’s
camp, the object of which could not at first be discovered, but as we
discerned during the night, many fires on the other side the Oder near
Carolath, it was plain that he had passed that river with a part of his
forces. On the thirtieth the enemy continued in motion, and the king
determined to attack his rear guard; for this purpose on the following
morning (October the first) he marched with six batallions, fifteen
squadrons of dragoons, and ten of hussars, and marched by Neustädtel
as far as Keltsche, the enemy had however already passed the Oder,
and his majesty made prisoners only some trainers and a part of the
baggage train. Major General Plathen was detached that same day by
his majesty, with six batallions, two regiments of cuirassiers, two of
dragoons, together with the hussars of Kleist and Malachowski to
Glogau, to occupy a position at Klein Zaerbau, a village near that
town on the other side the river. This corps was reinforced the next
day by all the dragoons and hussars, a picket of one thousand cuirassiers,
and eleven batallions of foot, it formed in such a manner, that both
flanks were covered by the Oder; and in this situation protected that
town from a bombardment, and was at hand to cut off the enemy
from the Hund pass, and thus prevent him from penetrating any fur-
ther into Silesia.
NOTE H
As the reader will perhaps be desirous of comparing the narrative

and sentiments of our author, on this very remarkable transaction,
with those of Captain Tielke, and at the same time may possibly
not have that book to refer to; I shall trouble him with this one
more note, extracted from Lieutenant Christian’s translation, of that
very interesting author.
On the seventh of November the Austrian army under Marshal Daun,
was advantageously encamped upon the heights of Plauen, the ravin
and gorge of which were in its front.
This ravin is lined by very high and steep rocks, in some places per-
pendicular, in the midst of which runs the Weissritz; a few rugged roads,
scarcely passable, lead up to the heights, which are easily defended.
The gorge begins at Plauen, and continues almost without inter-
ruption to the village of Potzchappel; from thence it extends to a
mountain called the Windberg, that commands all this country, and
covers the flank of this valley. Though the rocks cease to line the ravin
at this part, the heights are notwithstanding rather steep, and the roads
and passages troublesome and difficult.
This extensive ravin opens towards Dresden, and terminates on the
left of the Weissritz, in a gentle slope at the Fauxbourg. On the right,
this height (at whose foot stands the village of Plauen) forms a ridge
resembling a parpet, which reaches from Plauen to the Fauxbourg,
and is called the Haneberg.
The whole of the Imperial cavalry encamped in the plain between
Plauen and the Fauxbourg, with its right flanked by the latter, and its
left covered by the village of Plauen.
This advantageous position of the Imperial army, rendering its attack
difficult, dangerous, and almost impracticable, his Prussian majesty, in
order to force it to retreat, endeavoured to cut off its forage, and com-
munication with Bohemia. For this purpose he sent Colonel Kleist,
with a light corps, into Bohemia, who destroyed some magazines, and
raised very heavy contributions. On the fifteenth General Finck was
detached by Freyberg to Dippoldiswalda; the king advanced in person
with the main army to Wilsdruff, and pushed his advanced guard,
commanded by General Ziethen, to Kesselsdorf. The sixteenth Major
General Wunsch had already advanced to Maxen, with half of Finck’s
corps as an advanced guard, and the eighteenth succeeded in driving
Major General Kleefeld of the army of the Empire from his advanced
posts, from Dohna to Cotta.
note h 729
To this corps of the enemy, posted at Maxen, Marshal Daun imme-

diately opposed a body of light troops, commanded by Major General
Brentano; and as the Prussian forces near Dippoldiswalda and Maxen
amounted to thirty-five squadrons and eighteenth batallions (see the
order of battle), Marshal Daun was obliged to secure the rear of his
army, by posting another corps at Rüppchen, under the command of
Baron de Sincere, General of infantry.
The eighteenth Lieutenant General Finck followed General Wunsch
to Maxen with the remainder of his corps, and, to secure the road to
Freyberg, left four batallions and a regiment of cuirassiers at Dippol-
diswalda, under the command of Major Genera; Lindstaett: these troops
however rejoined the corps at Maxen the same night, in consequence
of an order from the king, sent to General Lindstaett by a chasseur.
General Finck afterwards detached Major General Wunsch, with five
batallions and five squadrons towards Dohna, and on the nineteenth
dispatched Major General Platen, with three batallions and a regiment
of dragoons towards Reinhardsgrimme, posting himself with the remain-
der of the troops near Maxen.
By this position the whole of the Imperial army was prevented from
entering into cantonments, its forages were also much straitened, and
the Prussians enabled to make incursions into Bohemia at pleasure.
This situation determined Marshal Daun to reinforce the corps under
the command of Sincere, in order to dislodge General Lindstaett from
Dippoldiswalda, that he might afterwards more easily dispossess the
Prussians of the posts of Maxen and Dohna. It was supposed General
Lindstaett would defend Dippoldiswalda, being judged stronger than
he really was.
Sincere’s corps consisted of:
Hussars: Scezeni
Dragoons: Staff and Young Modena
Cuirassiers: Serbelloni, Pretlach, Schmertzing, and Old Modena
Infantry: Anger, Marschall, Giulay, Clerici, Ligne, Wied, Hartsch,
Botta, and Young Colloredo
Which were reinforced by the regiments of Anhalt Zerbst Cuirassiers,
and those of Durlach, Haller and Tillier, infantry.
In consequence of the abovementioned plan, Sincere’s corps received
orders to quit Rüppchen the nineteenth, at seven o’clock in the morn-
ing, and advance to Dippoldoswalda, which was executed.
In the mean time the Marshal joined the army of Sincere, and occu-
pied a very advantageous camp, before Dippoldiswalda, its right being
flanked by the heights of Maltern, and its left by Haeselich; three
batallions were also posted in the town of Dippoldiswalda. If another
Prussian corps had occupied this town whilst General Finck marched
to Maxen, or the troops under the command of Linstaett had been
reinforced, Marshal Daun must have been greatly embarrassed: he
would have found the attack by Reinhardsgrimme impracticable, with-
out exposing his right flank to the Prussians, and putting himself between
two fires; and as the left flank of the position at Plauen was threat-
ened at the same time, had the Imperialists intended attacking Finck’s
corps by Roehrsdorf and Wittgendorf, they would not have ventured
to detach a sufficient body of troops to assure its success.
As it was to be feared that his Prussian Majesty would discover the
enterprize of the Imperialists, either by the cannonade, or by some
other means, and that he might in the interim attack the principal
army, at this time weakened by a considerable detachment, the Marshal
rejoined it, leaving orders with Sincere’s corps to march to Reinhards-
grimme the next day, November the twentieth, at seven o’clock in the
morning. The troops had began their march, and the heads of the
columns were arrived at Ringelshayn, when Marshal Daun (attended
by their Royal Highnesses Princes Albert and Clement of Saxony)
returned to take the command of this corps; having previously made
the necessary dispositions at the grand army, in case of an attack, and
observed that the enemy had not changed their position. The Marshal
placed Count O’Donell at the head of the cavalry, and Baron de
Sincere commanded the infantry. The order of March was in four
columns, viz. two of cavalry and two of infantry. The advanced guard,
commanded by Major General Baron de Siskowitz, consisted of Scezeni’s
regiment of hussars, some squadrons of carabiniers, a few croats, and
a brigade of grenadiers of five batallions. Lieutenant General Baron
de Seckendorf remained upon the height of Maltern, with the regiments
of Botta and Young Colloredo, infantry, one squadron of Stampach,
one of Anhalt Zerbst, and one hundred hussars and dragoons, detached
from the regiments of the Emperor, Esterhazi, and dragoons of the
Staff, to cover the rear of the Imperialists, in case a detachment of
Prussians should advance from Freyberg, to Dippoldiswald. Brentano’s
corps, posted near the Red-House and afterwards at Roehrsdorf, received
orders to approach Maxen, and endeavour to take Finck in flank and
rear, whilst the Marshal attacked him in front. It had been previously
concerted with the army of the Empire, part of which was posted at
Gieshubel, under the command of the Prince of Stolberg, that a corps
should be detached to Dohna, to inclose Finck’s army on this side.
Reinhardsgrimme was occupied by three squadrons of Prussian hus-
sars, commanded by Major de Hauschwitz; and General Platen was
posted in the rear of this village. Marshal Daun arrived near this spot,
formed his order of battle in two lines, and immmediately reconnoitred
Reinhardsgrimme, which he afterwards attacked with his advanced
guard.
The enemy’s troops posted within and in the rear of this village,
abandoned it at his approach, without defending the important gorge
in which it is situated, the passage of which must have been attended
with the greatest difficulty; they retired into the wood, and from thence
to Hausdorf, a retreat which permitted the Imperialists to reconnoitre
the roads through this village and the forest. The passages were found
note h 731
narrow, and the more inconvenient, as the sharp frost, attended with
little snow, had rendered the slope (which is naturally very steep) so
slippery, that it was thought impossible to ascend it with artillery and
cavalry, whose horses were not shod for that purpose; but M. de Fabri,
at that time Major of the Staff (or corps of Field Engineers) having
assured the Marshal that he had examined the roads, which, though
inconvenient and difficult, he had found practicable, the order to march
was immediately given; and, after having garnished the woods with
croats and hussars, who drove the Prussians from the nearest heights
on the other side, the corps continued to advance in four columns by
Reinhardsgrimme to Maxen.
General Finck had occupied the heights in front of Maxen with
three batallions, (c) four howitzers, and five twelve-pounders. (No. 27)
General Platen was posted in front near Hausdorf, with two batallions;
and the remainder of the troops faced General Brentano. A battery
of four six-pounders was established upon the steep hill on the right
of Maxen, (No. 28) and two others of two twelve-pounders each, oppo-
site Brentano’s corps. (No. 29 and 30)
General Finck’s not having occupied the two mountains, situated
between the wood of Reinhardsgrimme and Hausdorf, rendered his
position very defective, by favouring the debouché and deployment of
the Imperial troops from the abovementioned wood, which could neither
be seen nor prevented, on account of the two mountains I anf F, sit-
uated between the debouché of the wood of Reinhardsgrimme and
the mountains C and H, upon which he was posted.
It must be acknowledged, that after having detached M. de Wunsch,
he was not strong enough to occupy them; but with what view he
posted the General at so great a distance, or why the latter did not
afterwards support him, I cannot account for. I was informed by the
Prussian officers, that as soon as General Finck found himself attacked
by the Imperialists, he dispatched successively two or three officers to
General Wunsch, two demand the two batallions of Munchow as a
support, during the attack of the hill of Maxen, and that the General
refused to comply with this order, alledging that he could not spare
them. It would perhaps have been more prudent, if General Wunsch
had not only sent these two batallions, but followed with his whole
force to the assistance of General Finck; for supposing the army of
the Empire had passed the defilé of Müglitz, which the small force
under the command of M. de Wunsch could not have prevented, the
reunion of a numerous body of troops on a ground so narrow and
intersected as that near Maxen, far from being formidable, would
have been rather advantageous to the Prussians; but M. de Wunsch’s
corps remained at its post near Bloschwitz during the whole action,
satisified with cannonading the troops of the Empire, which had
advanced to Dohna, from the two batteries of four twelve-pounders,
No. 57 and 58.
As soon as the batallions of grenadiers of the advanced guard had

cleared the wood, they occupied the height on the right, which the
Marshal ascended in order to reconnoitre General Finck’s position,
and make the necessary disposition for the attack. He ordered the
batallions of grenadiers, as they came up, to halt at the foot of the
mountains, to prevent their being incommoded by the enemy’s fire till
the moment of attack. In spite of the very steep ascent, rendered still
more slippery by the sharp frost, snow and ice, Captain Schroeder of
the Imperial artillery, by his skill and exertions, in a short time estab-
lished a battery of eight twelve-pounders, upon the height, No. 23,
which enfiladed the left flank of the Prussians, and made considerable
havock. The cannonade became very brisk on both sides; but that of
the Imperialists, having the advantage of situation, did the most exe-
cution. As soon as this battery opened, General Platen retired with his
two batallions from d, and entered into the line f. The troops on the
other side of Maxen faced Brentano’s corps, which had advanced from
Roersdorf to F.
In the mean time the Imperial grenadiers, followed by the infantry,
advanced in columns, their cavalry on the left; being debouched entirely
from the wood G, they formed in order of battle, and brought eight
howitzers and six six-pounders upon the height, (No. 24) situated at
a small distance in front of their right, and upon that (No. 64) twenty-
six pieces of different calibres. The fire of these batteries, being extremely
well nourished, must have carried slaughter and confusion through the
Prussian ranks. Brentano’s corps, in the mean time, continued its
approaches, firing from eight eight-pounder culverins, placed at No.
26 and 65, upon that part of Finck’s corps which opposed him near
Wittgendorf. The shot from the two attacks having occasioned som
confusion amongst the baggage placed at (h), which communicated to
the batallions, the enemy were obliged to remove it to (i). The can-
nonade having continued three quarters of an hour, the Marshal ordered
the grenadiers commanded by General Siskowitz, and supported by
M. de Ainse with his brigade of infantry, to attack on the right, and
the brigade of Major Dombasle on the left. The cavalry marched in
the hollow, under cover from the enemy’s fire, and passed Hausdorf.
Whilst the Imperialists were descending the height to attack the
Prussians, two batallions of the latter descended the hill of Maxen to
take them in the flank, g; the firing between these troops hardly lasted
a quarter of an hour, the Marshal having left one batallion upon the
height, No. 24, to secure this flank; the battery likewise enfilading the
Prussian batallions, who being at the same time charged in front by
the grenadiers, were forced to retreat with precipitation into the vil-
lage of Maxen.
General Finck immediately supported them with a batallion of
grenadiers from the right, and two of infantry from the left of the line
opposite Brentano’s corps, No. 36, 37, and 38, with six squadrons of
dragoons, [No.] 54, who marched through the village of Maxen to
note h 733
the height; but the two batallions who had been repulsed, threw these
troops into disorder, and the greatest part of them were made pris-
oners. The Prussian Major Generals de Rebentisch and Mosel used
their utmost endeavours to prevent the disorder, and rally the flying
troops; but their efforts were useless against the distinguished bravery
of the Imperial grenadiers, which seemed to increase with the difficulty
they encountered in climbing the heights, particularly those occupied
by the enemies; in short, they carried every thing before them.
The enemy’s cannon could do but little execution, and the Prussian
cavalry was entirely useless, from the want of space on the steep height
on which it was posted, and from whence it must necessarily descend
to the charge, whereas that of the Imperialists attacked and charged
ascending.
There were some fleches* upon the heights of Maxen, constructed
entirely of stones, great quantities of which are found in these envi-
rons: far from assisting the Prussians in their defence, they were cer-
tainly hurtful.
The grenadiers and Imperial carabiniers carried the principal height
(k) with but little loss, and obliged the Prussians to abandon their can-
non. Flushed with success, they pursued them with too much ardour,
and were falling into confusion; which the Marshal perceiving, checked
the pursuit, and formed the infantry in order of battle upon the height
L, abandoned by the Prussians. The Imperial cavalry turned the left
of this height M, and pursued the advantage already gained with the
utmost intrepidity.
As the attack of Brentano’s corps became during this time more
serious, General Finck ordered fifteen squadrons of cuirassiers to advance,
commanded by Major Generals de Bredow and Vasold (m); but being
obliged to turn some ponds, and pass through marshy meadows and
thick furze, they could neither form nor attack with the necessary shock
and impetuosity; they were consequently repulsed, and obliged to retire
with precipitation to (n). The Imperial grenadiers pursued the victory
obtained on their side at Maxen, and continued pushing the Prussians
beyond the village.
General Finck collected the routed and scattered troops in the best
manner he could, and ordered General de Lindstaett to form them
again near Schmorsdorf (o); Brentano’s corps continued advancing, and
during this time arrived at N, and lastly at (O), where it joined Marshal
* These fleches were supposed by many to have been constructed by Finck’s

corps; but I can with truth assert, that they were thrown up the year before, by
the Prussian Major General de Knoblock: besides, I have too much respect for
Field Engineers in general (even were they Turks) to suppose they constructed them
to be defended; and I hope to do them justice by supposing they were only intended
as a mask. I am more inclined to be of this opinion, as I have entered a camp
abandoned by the Prussians, which at first glance appeared to be fortified; its para-
pet consisted of a few faggots, and the cannon were trunks of trees.
Daun’s. The new position, or rather halt of the Prussians, was but of
short duration; for the Imperialists, elated with success, advanced with
so much bravery, that nothing could resist their efforts: they charged
the Prussians; broke their ranks; and, without giving them time to
breathe, drove them from the height to height, and took the greatest
part of their artillery and some colours. The Prussian cavalry, which
threatened to fall upon the Imperial infantry, was repulsed by the cav-
alry of the Imperialists, particularly by the regiment of dragoons of
Young Modena, who afterwards charged and cut up the Prussian
infantry, took two batallions and their colours, together with some stan-
dards and cannon.
Coutn Palfy, Lieutenant General of the army of the Empire, had
advanced from Zehista towards Dohna with the two regiments of hus-
sars, Spleni and Haddick; and Major General Kleefeld was posted at
the same point of Zoschendorf with some batallions of croats and the
Sclavonian hussars. The prince of Stolberg, having under his com-
mand the Counts d’Effern and de Fugger, had advanced to Buckerswalda,
where he took post with the regiment of infantry of Mayence, one
batallion of Darmstadt, two batallions of Füstenberg, the regiment of
Imperial dragoons of Savoy, commanded by Major General de Voghera,
and some large field-pieces; he also cannonaded Wunsch’s corps from
the batteries established at 59, 60, 61, 62, and 63.
The light troops, commanded by Major Generals de Palfy and de
Kleefeld, afterwards passed the ravin, and advanced towards Sirsen,
to inclose General Finck on this side; the latter, who was pursued great
part of the night, took post in the plain between Falkenhayn and
Bloschwitz.
The Marshal detached two regiments of cavalry towards the Elbe,
to prevent the Prussians from escaping on this side by crossing the
river.
These dispositions threw General Finck, with the remainder of his
corps, into the most distressed situation possible; surrounded on all
sides by gorges and defiles, whose heights were occupied by the
Imperialists, there was not a single opening left him to retreat.
The night being too far advanced for the Imperialists to continue
their attacks, the troops were formed in order of battle upon the
heights, and passed the night under arms. (T ) The ammunition which
arrived from the camp at Plauen, was distributed to them, and every
preparation made for renewing the attack at day-break.
The same night General de Seckendorf, posted near Maltern, sent
word that his hussars and dragoons in front of Dippoldiswalda had
been drove in, and that they discovered the enemy’s infantry and cav-
alry.* He immediately received orders to defend his post and the
* Colonel Kleist returning from his expedition in Bohemia with his corps, con-
sisting of ten squadrons of green hussars, ten squadrons of dragoons of Schorlemmer,
and the free batallion of Corviere, received orders at Sayda to support General
note h 735
debouche to the last extremity, and in case he found himself absolutely

oliged to abandon it, to fall back upon Reinhardsgrimme and Hausdorf.
In the mean time the Marshal occupied the heights of the latter, with
six batallions and two regiments of cavalry, under the command of
General Plonquet, and sent orders to Count Buccow (General of
Cavalry, commanding the army near Plauen in his absence) to detach
General Baron Anger immediately with four batallions to Rüpchen,
and to reinforce this post, according as circumstances and the strength
of the enemy at Dippoldiswalda might require, without risking the
safety of the grand army. He was ordered likewise to keep up the
communication between the latter and the corps posted at Maxen and
Blochwitz, and to cover their left flank. The Generals Anger and
Plonquet were to consult on the proper steps to be taken to answer
these intentions.
I have been assured General Finck had formed the resolution of
cutting his way through the Imperialists with the remainder of his
corps towards Schmorsdorf,* and that he had issued orders to the
Generals under his command, to distribute cartridges amongst the
troops for that purpose; but upon their representation, that his forces
were too much weakened to attempt this enterprise with success, he
ordered them to be mustered in the night, and found the whole of
his infantry amounted but to two thousand eight hundred and thirty-
six men; the troops posted upon the height of Maxen having been
taken or deserted in great numbers.
Finding, therefore, that he could not risk such an attack with any
hopes of success with so small a force, and having only eight pieces
of cannon remaining, against ten times the number of troops, furnished
with a numerous artillery, and the position of the Prince of Stolberg
at Buckerswalde, rendering the passage at this place equally impracti-
cable, it was determined that the regiments of cavalry should file off
Finck, and had therefore immediately directed his march to Dippoldiswalda, where
he arrived very late at night on the twentieth. The town was not occupied by the
Imperialists, and there was only a picket of one hundred men posted in a house
contiguous to the bridge, without the town. The Sieur Kempel, Lieutenant of the
batallion of Corviere, with fifty men, approached under favour of the night with-
out being perceived, supported by Captain le Grange, with one hundred more and
a piece of cannon; he killed the two centinels posted at the foot of the bridge, sur-
prized the picket before it could get under arms, killed several and made a great
many prisoners, entering the town with those who fled, which he occupied.
General Hülsen, who had likewise received orders to assist and disengage Finck,
marched the twentieth from his cantonment at Sora, near Wildsdruff, to Collmitz,
and pushed his advanced guard on to Klingenberg; the twenty-first he arrived with
the latter at Dippoldiswalda, and seeing there was no possibility of saving Finck’s
corps, he retreated with colonel Kleist to Freyberg.
* Probably by Muhlbach and Cunnersdorf: it is true that he would have been
opposed only by the light troops of Colonel Reid, but at the same time would have
found impracticable roads.
by the gorge, under favour of the night, pass the corps of Imperial
light troops at break of day near Sirsen, and then pursue their March
by Lug and Lockwitz. M de Wunsch, though General of infantry, was
ordered by General Finck to execute this manœuvre, having the most
perfect knowledge of the country.*
An hour before day-light, the Marshal ordered the cannon to advance
as near as possible, and the grenadiers to hold themselves in readiness
to renew the attack at day-break.
A general officer of the Prussians arrived at the advanced post, and
desired to be admitted to the Commander in Chief. The Marshal
being informed of it, sent General Lascy to acquaint him they must
lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. The cannonade had
began before the Marshal could give orders to postpone the attack,
but was immediately silenced. General Lascy soon after returned, with
the answer that Finck’s corps would surrender prisoners, on condition
they might retain their baggage, which the Marshal granted.
In the mean time General Wunsch had endeavoured to escape with
the cavalry in the manner indicated, but had met with insurmount-
able obstacles in the attempt; being obliged to lead the horses one by
one across the ice, only a few squadrons of hussars had passed the
first gorge when the Imperialists perceived them. The Marshal insisted
that Wunsch’s corps, or rather the six regiments of cavalry which he
then commanded, should be included in the capitulation, upon which
General Finck observed, that he could not capitulate for M. de Wunsch,
who was commandant of a separate corps.
During this treaty, which Finck prolonged as much as possible, to
give M. de Wunsch time to execute the intended passage, he sent
different officers, in the presence of M. de Lascy, under pretence of
informing Wunsch of his capitulation, but in fact to see if he had
already passed the defile of Sirsen. M. de Lascy perceiving the strat-
agem, threatened to renew the cannonade, if M. de Wunsch contin-
ued his retreat.
The difficulty of penetrating through a ground so intersected, and
whose ravins were covered with brush-wood and occupied by croats,
augmented every instant; and the last officer whom General Finck sent,
returned witht the information, that scarce half a squadron had passed
Sirsen, and that General Wunsch found the passage impracticable.
Upon which General Finck, and the generals under his command,
signed the capitulation at Blochwitz, General Wunsch excepted, whose
corps was notwithstanding included; even those who had passed the
gorge were obliged to return, and lay down their arms with the rest:
* I have no doubt of this plan being thought of, as I had the information from
the Prussian officers themselves; but I cannot conceive how the passage of the cav-
alry could have been practicable on this side, still less which way it could have
joined the king’s army.
note h 737
but he being near Sirsen when the capitulation was signed, could after-
wards avail himself of this circumstance, and assert that he had no
share in it.
The whole corps having laid down their arms, the prisoners were
conducted to the great garden near Dresden, by the troops ordered
on this duty. The Marshal then posted the principal part of his corps
upon the heights of Maxen, sent Brentano’s division towards Dippol-
diswalda, and himself rejoined the grand army near Dresden.
The number of killed and wounded, was inconsiderable on both
sides.
The Imperialists took:
3 Pair of silver kettle drums
1 Pair of brass kettle drums
24 Standards
96 Pair of colours
Artillery
25 Three-pounders
2 Four-pounders
18 Six-pounders
17 Twelve-pounders
9 howitzers
71 pieces of cannon, and 44 ammunition wagons
Prisoners
1 Lieutenant General: Finck
8 Major Generals: Rebentisch, Linstaett, Mosel, Wunsch, Platen,
Vasold, Bredow, and Gersdorf
9 General officers
6 Colonels
3 Lieutenant Generals
6 Colonels
3 Lieutenant Colonels
32 Majors
88 Captains
168 First Lieutenants
85 Second Lieutenants
100 Ensigns
50 Officers of the Staff
8 Officers of the Artillery
549 Total of officers
According to the account published by the Imeprialists, the total
number of prisoners, including the non-commissioned officers, amounted
to fourteen thousand nine hundred and twenty two men.
Tielke concludes this account with observing,
Every witness of this affair must allow, that the Imperialists, indepen-
dent of their good andjudicious dispositions, and the advantages they
derived from the ground and their artillery, fought with the greatest
bavery. On the other hand, notwithstanding the position of the Prussians,
and the ground they occupied, rendered them incapable of using their
arms with success, they certainly displayed a great deal of firmness
and intrepidity.
Finis
Map 16. A Map of the Theatre of the King of Prussia’s Campaigns.
INDEX
absolute force of a nation 248, Austrian Succession, war of the 335

284–286, 341 and n6, 472, 508
Adolf Fredrik, King of Sweden 40
and n12 Baden-Durlach, Prince Christoph von
Ainse, marquis d’ 630, 681, 732 628–629, 631–632, 638, 641
Alberoni, Giulio 335 and n4 Bagrey, Froloff 651
Alexander the Great 344, 452, 458, Balbi, colonel Giovanni 562 and n13,
723 563, 567, 569–570
Algiers 350 banks 269–276
Altenberg, Mitrouskito 627 battle 27, 385, 394, 399, 662–663
America 238, 252, 281, 290, 298, Lloyd’s critique of contemporary
490 methods 406–410
American Revolution 327 Beck, Philipp Levin 136, 160, 678,
Lloyd’s military strategy for 344, 681, 702
531–534 Belle-Isle, Chares-Louis-Auguste
Amherst, Jeffrey 328, 361 Fouquet, comte de 49 and n7, 81,
Anabaptists 226 115, 209
Anhalt-Dessau, Moritz, Prinz von 81 Berg, general 670
and n9, 88, 140–141, 149, 173, 544, Bergen-op-Zoom, siege of 562
547, 550, 557, 560, 572, 576–578, blue-water strategy 190, 253, 346
590, 611, 617 Bohemia
Apraxin, Stepan Fedorovich 179 and description of 42–48
n29 Boscow, general 546, 590
Aranjuez, treaty of 327 Brandenburg-Schwedt, Karl, Markgrave
Arenberg, Charles-Marie-Raymond, von 550, 558, 574, 576–577, 629,
duc de 50 and n8, 88, 90, 546, 632, 642, 706, 715
631, 633, 638, 641, 679, 688–689, Brentano-Cimaroli, Josef Anton von
692–693, 702 159 and n24, 686, 689, 692, 699,
Arian 11 701, 729, 731
Aristotle 393 Breslau, battle of 156–162
Armfeldt, Fromhold 615 Austrian account of 157–160
armies 493–494 Prussian account of 160–162
and aristocracy 474–475 British East India Company 240
and despotism 460–464 Broglie, Victor-François, duc de 142
and monarchy 468–470 and n19
and republics 470–474 Broome, general 611
composition 387–389, 421–425 Brown, George von 616, 632
formations 399–401 Browne, Maximilian Ulysses, Reichsgraf
nature of 437–438, 443 von 50 and n9, 88
principles of 385–387 at Lobositz 66, 70–72, 74–76
artillery 22–23 Lloyd’s criticism of 84–86,
Asia 242, 289, 458, 460 110–111
Augustus III, King of Poland 35 and at Prague 115
n3, 65 Brühl, Heinrich 38 and n8
Austria 336 Brunswick-Bevern, August Wilhelm,
frontiers 507–517 duke of 64 and n2, 75, 88, 90–91,
motives for war in 1756 35–36 96, 117, 122–124, 136, 140–141,
relationship with France 251, 255 151 and n, 153, 155, 162
740 index
Lloyd’s criticism of at Reichenberg Choiseul, Étienne François, duc de

92–93; at Breslau 163–165 338 and n12, 552
Brunswick-Bevern, Karl, prince of Christian VII, King of Denmark 255
557, 560, 630 and n4
Brunswick-Lüneberg, Ferdinand, prince Cicero, Marcus Tullius 439 and n1
of 26 and n11, 64–65, 146, 149, civil wars 476–478
544, 557, 620, 685, 702, 723 Clerk, Robert 331 and n1, 413
Brunswick-Lüneberg, Friedrich Franz, Clinton, Henry 328
prince of 56 and n11, 564, 642 Colloredo, Rudolph Joseph, Graf von
death of at Hochkirch 632, 638 630 and n30
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Karl Wilhelm colonies 237–244
Ferdinand, Hereditary Prince of contractors 436
Lloyd’s dedication to 9 coup de main 350
biography 13 and n2 coup d’oeil, 20 43
Buckingham George Villiers, 1st Corsican revolt 189
Duke of 209 cossacks 605, 652, 718, 726
Burke, Edmund 246 Croats 496, 560, 572, 578, 583, 644
Bülow, Ferdinand Friedrich 554 and Cromwell, Oliver 203, 219, 222
n8 Cuba 242
Bülow, Johann Albrecht von 557,
578–579 Dalcke, colonel 652
Butler, Freiherr Louis 158 and n21 Daun 115, 119, 121 and n, 123, 125,
157–158, 168–169, 370n1, 547,
Caesar, Julius 11, 189n2, 203, 389, 550–554, 558, 560, 571–572, 574,
439n1, 474, 723 581, 587–589, 591, 593–594, 597,
Cambrai, League of 343 and n1 617, 628–633, 642–644, 646–648,
Campitelli, Count 670 and n4, 675 655, 659, 664, 674–675, 677–679,
Carleton, Thomas 428 and n25 681–683, 685, 688–689, 692, 694,
Carthage 285, 288, 458, 471, 474 701–703, 707, 709, 722–723,
Catherine II, Empress of Russia 282, 728–730
649 Lloyd’s criticism of 132, 539, 573,
Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Younder 576, 600–601, 604, 640–641, 645,
189n2 684, 693
cavalry 366–367, 387–388, 390, defensive war 491–495, 642–643
392–393, 399 Demiku, Thomas von 605 and n19,
Lloyd’s analysis of 401–403, 425 610, 612, 614–615, 659
Lloyd’s proposed reform of Denain, battle of 501 and n1
419–421 depots 348, 371, 491, 620
Charles I, King of England 192 and despotism 342, 449
n1, 201, 219 and military operations 459–464
Charles II, King of England 212 and Deuxponts, prince of, see
n15 Pfalz-Zweibrücken, Friedrich
Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor Michael, prince of
37 and n7, 335, 508 Diercke, general 134, 702
Charles XII, King of Sweden 39n9, Dohna, Count Christoph von 605,
284, 323, 518, 522, 526 610–611, 614, 618, 623–624, 642,
Charles Edward Stuart, the ‘Young 648, 652, 655, 730
Pretender’ 336 and n9 Dolgorukov-Krymskii, Prince Vasilii
Charles Emmanuel III, King of Mikhailovich 434 and n28
Sardinia-Piedmont 336 and n7 Dombasle, Charles-François, comte de
chasseurs 424 626–627, 647, 732
Chernyshev, Zachar Grigor’evich 122 Don Philip 336 and n8
and n dragoons 228
index 741
Draskovich, Joseph 90 and n3 Fouqué, Henri-Auguste, Baron de la

Driesen, Wilhelm von 175, 626 Motte 44 and n3, 100, 546–547,
Dutch 239–242, 251, 271, 279, 284, 555–556, 569, 594, 644, 677, 682,
292, 309, 314, 352, 454, 471–472 703–704, 707
France 279, 298
Eliot, George Augustus 228 and n2, frontier 499–507
419 and n23, 553 motives for war in 1756 32–35
Elizabeth, Empress of Russia 35 and power of 246–252, 254–255, 341
n2, 178, 614 plight of people in 224
Elizabeth I, Queen of England 201, Frederick II, King of Prussia 336,
208 400
Embers, colonel 563 debasement of coinage by 304
English constitution Lloyd’s criticism of 78–82, 113;
advantages of 222–228 at Kolin 127–131; 137–138;
criminal justice 225 at Olmutz 595, 597–600; at
disadvantages 229–233 Zorndorf 613; at Kunersdorf
effects of luxury upon 222–223 672–674; at Maxen 702
military in 226–227 Lloyd’s praise of at Leuthen
reform of 234–236 177–178
royal power in 199, 201, 206, military methods 386–387
210–211 Frederick William I, King of Prussia
principles of 192–195 36 and n6, 37
Erskine, Henry 228n2, 419 and n22 French East India Company 239, 249
Esterházy, Count Emerick 631
Esterházy, Nicolaus Joseph, Prince 36 Geist, major general 557, 632
n4, 121, 127, 158, 169, 560, 630 Gemmingen auf Hornberg und
d’Estrées, Louis-Charles-César Le Treschklingen, Reinhardt, Baron
Tellier de Louvois, comte, duc and 678, 688, 692
Maréchal 34 and n1 generalship 437–445
Eugene, Prince de Savoie-Carignan Genghis Khan 284, 518
24 and n9, 25, 501 geography 23–27
Austrian frontiers 507–517
Fabius [Quintus Fabius Maximus American frontier 531–534
Verrucosus] 399 and n11 British channel 527–531
Fabri, Friedrich August von 699, 731 French frontier 499–507
Family Compact 338 and n15 frontier lines 496–498
fear 448–449 Russian frontiers 519–527
Fermor, Villim Villimovich Fermor, Turkish frontier 518–519
Graf von 179 and n28, 605, 610, George II, King of England 36 and
615, 619, 652, 669, 709 n5, 245
feudalism 460, 466–467, 476 Germain, George 328
Finck, August von 664–665, 668, Gibraltar 327
675, 681, 683, 687–689, 692, Golitsyn, Prince Alexander
694–695, 701–702, 715, 728–736 Mikhailovich 659 and n2,
firearms 394, 396, 398 669–670
Lloyd’s critique of 16, 395, 397 Golz, Georg Conrad von der 558
Fleury, André-Hercule, Cardinal de Grabow, general 625
81 and n8, 209, 335–336 Gribeauval, Jean-Baptiste 545 and n1
Folard, Jean-Charles, chevalier de 390 Gros Jägersdorf 179–182
and n5, 425 Prussian account of 179–181
Forcade, gen. F.W. 557, 706 Apraxin’s account of 181–182
fortification (and camps) 21–22, 43, Guardacosta 241
156, 162–163, 479–480, 610 Guasco, Franz 570 and n15
742 index
Guibert, Jacque Antoine Hippolyte, Kamenskii, Mikhail 464 and n1,

comte de 484 and n1 621
Kanitz, Hans Wilhelm von 605
Hadik von Futak, Andreas, Graf von killed at Palzig 659
141 and n18, 627, 647–648, 664, Keith, James Francis Edward 65 and
675, 679, 681, 687, 722 n4, 112n, 125, 132–133, 135, 138,
Hamilton, David Gustav 616 and n24 141–142, 146–147, 175, 547, 555,
Hannibal 399 and n11, 472 557, 567, 569, 575–576, 588–591,
Hardy, Charles 327 599, 601, 631, 706
Harris, James 457 killed at Hochkirch 632, 638
Harsch, Ferdinand Philipp 550–551, Khevenhüller, Ludwig Andreas 48
558, 572, 574, 600, 628, 642, 644, and n5
648, 679, 703 Kinsky von Chinitz und Tettau, Franz
Havannah 338 and n16 de Paule Ulrich, Fürst 122 and
Helvetius, Claude Adrian 446 and n3 n12
Henry VIII, King of England 201 Kleefeld von Hnogek, Wenzel
Henry [Friedrich Heinrich Ludwig], Matthias, baron von 686 and n7,
Prince of Prussia 100 and n4, 124, 728, 734
509, 512, 598, 617, 626–629, 643, Kleist, Friedrich Wilhelm 76 and n
645, 647, 659, 664, 673–674, 678, Knox, William 246 and n1
681–685, 688–689, 692–693 Kolin [Chotzemitz], battle of 47, 595,
Hessen-Kassel, Friedrich, Hereditary 708
Prince of 558, 577 description of 118–127
Heyde, major 618 Austrian account of 119–122
Hochkirch, battle of 632–643 French account of 125–127
Austrian account of 633, 638 Prussian account of 122–125
Prussian account of 632 Königsegg-Rothenfels, Maximilian
Hochstadt battle of 132n Friedrich, Graf 88 and n1, 189
Hordt, Count Johann Judwig 610, and n1
654 Kunersdorf, battle of 46, 664–671
howitzers 364, 366, 416, 433, 517, Frederick the Great’s account of
659 715–717
Hubertusburg, treaty of 398 and n10 Prussian accounts of 664–665,
Hülsen, Major General 124 and n, 668–669
131, 647, 652, 677–678, 735 Saltykov’s account 669–671
Hume 273 and n3 Tempelhof ’s account of 720–724
hussars 401–402, 414, 422, 496, 577 Kyow, general 162
industry 280–283, 341 Lacy, Franz Moritz, Graf von 12 and

Ireland 245 n1, 350n2, 570n15, 629
Itzenplitz, general 647–648 at Breslau 158
at Hochkirchen 638
Jahnus von Eberstädt, Franz at Leuthen 174
Maximilian, Baron 135 and n14, at Lobositz 72
550–551, 558, 560, 588–589, at Maxen 695, 701, 736
593–594 at Olmutz 590, 594
James II, King of England 200 and at Reichenberg 92
n2, 219, 335 lance 414
Jews 304–305, 493 Lanius, colonel 552, 558, 573
Jomini, Henri 7 legion 391–394
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor 159 Lehwaldt, Hans von 178 and n27,
and n22 183–184, 604–605
Jugurtha 398 and n9 Lentulus, general 704
index 743
Leopold II, Holy Roman Emperor 630–632, 638–639, 644–645, 647,

159 and n23 659, 661, 663–665, 670–671,
Leuthen [Lissa], battle of 410, 643 673–677, 679, 706, 720, 726
Austrian account 168–169 Louis XIV, King of France 22 and
Prussian account 169–174 n7, 207 and n8, 248, 250–251, 270,
liberty 452–454, 467 276, 334–335, 472
Lichtenstein, Charles, Prince of 513 Louis XV, King of France 250, 335
Liegnitz, battle of 407 Louisa Ulrika, Queen of Sweden 40
light troops 228, 369, 379, 388, 403, and n11
409, 418, 422, 428–429, 495–496, Louvois, François Michel Le Tellier,
544, 553, 558–559, 578, 595 marquis de 209, 338
Lindsay, Colin 539, 541 and n2 Lowenstein-Wertheim, Christian
Lindstaett, general 729, 733 Philipp, Prinz von 76 and n6, 561,
line(s) of operation 347–348, 371, 638
374, 484–488, 492, 532, 619–620, Luchesi, general 158, 169, 174
622–623, 648 Luzinski, general 168, 625
Lloyd, Henry Humphrey Evans
and the Corsican revolt 189 Machiavelli, Niccolò 211, 292
and economic theory 261–262 Maguire von Iniskillen, Johann
and the invasion scare of 1779 Sigismund 134, 158–159, 169, 174
327–328 and n26, 628, 681
biography xiii–xvi Maillebois, Jean-Baptiste-François
criticism of Austrian war effort 649 Desmarets, marquis de 49 and n6
description of English geography Mailly, Augustin-Joseph, comte de
349–361 142 and n20, 148
experience at Hochkirchen 638–640 Mainz, Johann Friedrich Karl von
experience at Maxen under Lacy Ostein, Elector and Archbishop of
695 86 and n10
experience in the Russo Turkish Manteuffel, Gerd Heinrich von 611,
War (1768–1774) 428 and n24, 618
464 killed at Palzig 659–660
experience in the Seven Years’ War Marathon, battle of 389
5, 13, 423 marching 17–21, 178, 366,
New System 410–411, 415–419 480–484
order of battle 366–368, 403–406, Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria
425–433 27 and n13, 35, 86, 88
politics and war 458–459 Marius 288, 474
Lobkowitz, Joseph Maria Carl, Prince Marschall von Biberstein, Ernst
121 and n10, 174, 687 Dietrich, Graf 42 and n1, 141,
Lobositz, battle of 67–76 170, 175, 561, 570
Locke, John 310 Maxen, battle of 370 and n1,
London 200, 276, 299–300 695–702
Lorraine, Karl Alexander, Prince of Tielke’s account of 728–738
48 and n4, 87, 90, 97, 114, 133, Mazarin, Jules 334 and n3
135, 137–138, 141, 152–154, 156, Meissen, battle of 687–688
168 Merdvinow, general 655, 658
Lloyd’s criticism of at Breslau Meyer, Karl Friedrich von 115 and
166–167; at Leuthen 175–177 n7, 553, 556, 573, 575–576, 625,
Loudon, Gideon Ernst, Freiherr von 727
44 and n2, 407 and n15, 509, Minorca 327, 471
512–513, 545–546, 550–552, 555, missile weapons 387–388, 394
558–561, 572, 578, 581–583, 585, monarchy 342–343, 450
588–591, 594, 597, 625, 628, and military operations 464–470
744 index
Money Parliament 192–194, 213–221

circulation of 277, 278–279, passions 204–205, 445–448
287–293, 297–300, 311 Peloponnesian War 390–391, 398,
coinage 304–310 470
interest of 311–312 Persians 389, 458, 527
luxury and corruption are caused by Peter I, Emperor of Russia 38 and
294–295 n9, 39, 518
origins of 266 Pfalz-Zweibrücken, Friedrich Michael,
paper currency 275–276, 281 Prince of 617 and n25, 625, 627,
quantity theory of 261 629, 681, 687
universal merchandise 266–267 phalanx 389–392, 394
Montecuccoli, Raimondo 391 and n6, Pharamond 209
410, 655 Philip V, King of Spain 251, 335n4
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Philip of Macedon 247
Baron de la Brède et de 200 and Piccolomini, Ottavio Eneo Giuseppe
n1, 276, 316, 321, 380, 459, 475 66 and n5, 115
Moravia pikes 364, 366, 387, 415, 517
description of 48–52 Pirch, Johann Ernst 586 and n16
Mosel, colonel 582–584, 587 Platen, Dubislav von 618, 651, 692,
Muller, John 22 and n6, 23 727, 729, 731–732
music 457 Plato 393
Poland 466 and n5
Nabobs 248, 460 Polish Sucession, war of the 335n5
Nádasdy, Franz Leopold, Graf von Poltava, battle of 518, 522 and n2
118–119, 122 and n, 123, 126, 133, Polybius 11, 392 and n7
136–137, 155, 157, 160, 162, Pompone de Bellièvre 338 and n14
168–169, 173 Portugal 240, 252, 279, 293,
Naples, kingdom of 335 314–315, 350n2, 471
Noble, Col. le 552, 573, 706 Prague, battle of 97–106, 400 and
North, Frederick North, ‘Lord’ 261, n12, 401, 408, 431
263 and n1, 328, 331n1 Austrian account of 97–99
Prussian account of 99–100
O’Donell, Karl Claudius 76 and n, Schwerin’s account of 101–106
119, 174, 638, 640–641, 646, 689, Presbyterians 226
692–693, 730 prices 297–300
offensive war 488–491, 624 precious metals 301–303
Ohlitz, general 619 Principles of War 14–16
O’Kelly, Connor 644–645, 647 privy council 207
Oldenburg, Jürgen Friedrich von 115 Prussia
and n6 imitation of drill 15
Olmutz, siege of 550–594 motives for war in 1756 36–37
journal of 555–571 Pugachev Revolt 464 and n2, 519
O’Reilly, Alejandro O’Reilly, Conde Punic Wars 390
de 350 and n2 Putkammer, Georg 122, 134, 557,
572, 579, 584
Palmenbach, general 618–619 killed at Kunersdorf 668, 671
Palzig (the Kay/Zullichau) battle of, Puységur, Jacques-François Maximo
46, 654–661, 681 de Chastenet, marquis de 389
Saltykov’s account of 655, 658–659 and n3
Panin, Petr Ivanovich 614–615, 653,
670 Quakers 226
Paoli, Pasquale 189 quantity theory of money 261
Paris, Peace of 190, 242 and n1, Quebec 243
253
index 745
Ransanow, general 651 Saxe, Hermann Maurice, Comte de

Rebentisch, Johann Karl 556, 564, 16 and n3, 27
688–689, 692, 700, 733 Saxony
redoubts 370 and n description of 60–62
Reichenberg, battle of 91–92 motives for war in 1756 38
relative force of nations 320, 341 Schenkendorff, Friedrich August 556
religion 454–455 Schlabendorff, Ernst von 651
Repnin, Prince Nikolai Vasilevich 621 Schmettau, Karl Christoph von 557,
republics 343–344, 450–451 677, 686
and military operations 470–475 Schöneich, Johann, Prince von 558
Resanow, general 610, 617 Schorlemmer, general 715–716
Retzow, Wolf Friedrich von 558, 577, Schweidnitz, siege of 544–546, 570
579–580, 588, 591, 630–632, 638, Schwerin, Kurd Christoph, Graf von
641 65 and n3, 66, 88, 91, 96–97, 99
Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, duc biography 100n5
de 334 and n1, 338 killed at Prague 100
Richelieu, Louis-François-Armand Seignelay, Jean-Baptiste Colbert,
Vignerot du Plessis, Duc de 140 marquis de 338 and n13
and n17, 142, 146, 149–150 Serbelloni, Giambattista 88 and n2,
Riese, colonel 630 119, 121, 159, 629
Rocroi 586, 723 Sertorius, Quintus 398 and n9
Rome 473–474 Seydlitz, Friedrich Wilhelm von 418
Roman Catholicism 226 and n20, 557, 611–612, 679, 704,
Rossbach, battle of 143–149 708, 715–716
French account of 148–149 wounded at Kunersdorf 668–669
Prussian account of 146–148 siege warfare 433, 595
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 296 and n1, Silesia
472 and n7 description of 52–60
Rumiantsev, Petr Aleksandrovich 434 Silistria, siege of 428 and n24
and n27, 605, 610, 617, 621, 651 Sincere, Baron de 121, 695, 699,
at Kunersdorf 669–670 729
in the Russo-Turkish War sipahis 388, 420
(1768–1774) 463 Si“kovíc, Joseph, Graf von 407 and
Russia 280, 282, 285, 289 n16, 554 and n9, 555, 581–582,
frontiers 519–527 584–585, 587, 589–590, 594, 597,
motives for war in 1756 38–39 632, 730, 732
Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) 434, soldiers 28–29
463, 621 armament 413–415
Lloyd’s experience in 428 and n24 Austrian 30, 495
clothing 412–413
Sachsen-Hildburghausen, Joseph English 31, 227
Friedrich, Prince of 139 and n15, fear in 448–449
142, 146 French 29–30, 362
Saint-Germain, Claude Louis, comte honor of 449–451
de 140, 143, 146, 148, 150, Prussian 30–31
395–396, 404 rewards of 451–452
Saint-Ignon, Joseph, comte de 550, Russian 30, 183, 621
552–553, 575, 577–580, 589–591, Spanish 31
594, 600 Turkish 31, 461–462
Saldern, Friedrich Christoph von Soubise, Charles de Rohan, Prince de
558 139 and n16, 145–146, 148
Saltykov, Petr Semenovich 654 and Spain 238, 241–242, 251–252, 271,
n1, 655, 669–670, 675, 719, 723 279, 282, 293, 315, 341, 471
746 index
Spanish Succession, war of the 24 Uhlans 16, 86 and n

and n8, 270, 508
Stainville, Léopold Charles, comte de Vaux, Noël Jourde, comte de 327
552, 553n7 Vehla, general 629, 683
Stambach, count 121, 159 Vendôme, Louis-Joseph, duc de 24
Stamp Act 243n2 and n10, 25
Sternberg, Ungern 184 Verri, Pietro 6, 262, 267n1
St. André, Friedrich Daniel 686 and Vieteleschi, general 632
n8 Ville, Charles, marquis de 547,
St. Gotthard, battle of 391 and n6 550–551, 558–560, 593, 595, 600,
Stolberg-Gedern, Christian Karl, Prinz 644, 682, 685, 704, 706
von 174 and n25, 625, 730, Villebois, Nikita Petrovich 659, 669
734–735 Virgil 451
Stutterheim, Johan Friedrich 659, 682 vizier 205 and n6, 207, 462, 464
Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Volkonskii, Prince Sergey Fedorovich
208 670 and n5
Suvorov, Aleksandr Vasilevich 621 Voltaire 379
and n27
Sweden 279–280 Wackenitz, Dietrich-Wilhelm von 418
constitution 192, 195 and n21
motives for war in 1756 40–41 Walpole, Robert 205 and n7, 209
Switzerland 472 and n6 Wedell, Johann von 550, 557, 572,
648, 655, 660, 663, 673, 681, 692
tactics 385, 429–430 Werner, Col. Johann Paul 547 and
Tarquinius [Lucius Tarquinius n2, 559, 582, 584, 704, 706
Superbus] 453 and n4 Westphalia, treaty of ,334
Tartars 388, 452, 458, 484–485, 621, Whitefield, George 226 and n1
624 Wied, general 121, 158, 643
taxes 243, 252, 272, 316 Wilkes, John 189–190, 220
Tempelhof, George Friedrich von 5, William the Conqueror 349
540, 541n2, 555n, 653n Winterfeldt 101–103, 152–153
criticism of Lloyd’s narrative Wobersnow, Moritz Franz von 578,
704–707, 718–724 618, 651, 653–654
order of battle at beginning of 1759 killed at Palzig 659–660
campaign 711–714 Wöllwarth Gottfried Baron, 121 and
Teschen, treaty of, 337 and n11 n9, 158
Thucydides 391 women 435, 447, 455–457
Thürheim, Franz Ludwig 545 Wrede, colonel Friedrich Christian von
Tielke, captain 695n, 708, 728 563
Timariats 460 and n2 Wunsch, Johann Jakob 646, 668,
Tokelli, colonel 652, 655 671–672, 686–689, 692, 728–729,
toleration 225–226 731, 736
Totleben, Count Gottlob 654, 659, Württemburg, Friedrich Eugen,
669 Prince of 664, 705–706 prince
trade 313–315 1758
Tresckow, Joachim Christian von, 121 Württemburg, Karl Eugene, Duke von
and n8, 544 122 and n13, 544, 547, 557,
Turkey 285, 413, 428, 460, 463, 517, 715–716
621 Wurmser, general 512
frontier 518–519 Wurzburg, Adam Friedrich von
Turenne, Henri de la Tour Sensheim, Bishop of 86 and n11
d’Auvergne, vicomte de 410 and
n18, 655 Xenophon 11, 626
index 747
York, Prince Frederick, Duke of 541 Zobel, colonel 578

and n1 Zorndorf, battle of 56, 611–617, 624,
628, 720
Zieten, Hans Joachim von 103 and Armfeldt’s account of 615–616
n5, 122 and n, 162, 165, 174, 403, Prussian account of 611–612
546, 554–555, 557, 559, 579–580, Tielke’s account of 708–710
582, 584–585, 681–682, 728 Zullichau, battle of, see Palzig
HISTORY
OF WARFARE
History of Warfare presents the latest research on all aspects of military history. Publications in the series
will examine technology, strategy, logistics, and economic and social developments related to warfare in
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East from ancient times until the early nineteenth century. The series will
accept monographs, collections of essays, conference proceedings, and translation of military texts.
1. HOEVEN, M. VAN DER (ed.). Exercise of Arms. Warfare in the Netherlands,

1568-1648. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10727 4
2. RAUDZENS, G. (ed.). Technology, Disease and Colonial Conquests, Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Centuries. Essays Reappraising the Guns and Germs Theories.
2001. ISBN 90 04 11745 8
3. LENIHAN P. (ed.). Conquest and Resistance. War in Seventeenth-Century
Ireland. 2001. ISBN 90 04 11743 1
4. NICHOLSON, H. Love, War and the Grail. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12014 9
5. BIRKENMEIER, J.W. The Development of the Komnenian Army: 1081-1180.
2002. ISBN 90 04 11710 5
6. MURDOCH, S. (ed.). Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648. 2001.
ISBN 90 04 12086 6
7. TUYLL VAN SEROOSKERKEN, H.P. VAN. The Netherlands and World War
I. Espionage, Diplomacy and Survival. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12243 5
8. DEVRIES, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Tech-
nology. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12227 3
9. CUNEO, P. (ed.). Artful Armies, Beautiful Battles. Art and Warfare in Early
Modern Europe. 2002. ISBN 90 04 11588 9
10. KUNZLE, D. From Criminal to Courtier. The Soldier in Netherlandish Art 1550-
1672. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12369 5
11. TRIM, D.J.B. (ed.). The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Profes-
sionalism. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12095 5
12. WILLIAMS, A. The Knight and the Blast Furnace. A History of the Metal-
lurgy of Armour in the Middle Ages & the Early Modern Period. 2003.
ISBN 90 04 12498 5
13. KAGAY, D.J. & L.J.A. VILLALON (eds.). Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon.
Medieval Warfare in Societies Around the Mediterranean. 2002.
ISBN 90 04 12553 1
14. LOHR, E. & M. POE (eds.). The Military and Society in Russia: 1450-1917.
2002. ISBN 90 04 12273 7
15. MURDOCH, S. & A. MACKILLOP (eds.). Fighting for Identity. Scottish
Military Experience c. 1550-1900. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12823 9
16. HACKER, B.C. World Military History Bibliography. Premodern and Non-
western Military Institutions and Warfare. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12997 9
17. MACKILLOP, A. & S. MURDOCH (eds.). Military Governors and Imperial
Frontiers c. 1600-1800. A Study of Scotland and Empires. 2003.
ISBN 90 04 12970 7
ISSN 1385–7827
18. SATTERFIELD, G. Princes, Posts and Partisans. The Army of Louis XVI and
Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands (1673-1678). 2003.
ISBN 90 04 13176 0
20. MACLEOD, J. & P. PURSEIGLE (eds.). Uncovered Fields. Perspectives in
First World War Studies. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13264 3
21. WORTHINGTON, D. Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 13575 8
22. GRIFFIN, M. Regulating Religion and Morality in the King’s Armies, 1639-1646.
2004. ISBN 90 04 13170 1
23. SICKING, L. Neptune and the Netherlands. State, Economy, and War at Sea in
the Renaissance. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13850 1
24. GLOZIER, M. Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King. Nursery for
Men of Honour. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13865 X
25. VILLALON, L.J.A. & D.J. KAGAY (eds.). The Hundred Years War. A Wider
Focus. 2005. ISBN 90 04 13969 9
26. DEVRIES, K. A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Tech-
nology, Update 2004. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14040 9
27. HACKER, B.C. World Military History Annotated Bibliography. Premodern and
Nonwestern Military Institutions (Works Published before 1967). 2005.
ISBN 90 04 14071 9
28. WALTON, S.A. (ed.). Instrumental in War. Science, Research, and Instru-
ments. Between Knowledge and the World. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14281 9
29. STEINBERG, J.W., B.W. MENNING, D. SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN
DER OYE, D. WOLFF & S. YOKOTE (eds.). The Russo-Japanese War in
Global Perspective. World War Zero, Volume I. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14284 3
30. PURSEIGLE, P. (ed.). Warfare and Belligerence. Perspectives in First World
War Studies. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14352 1
31. WALDMAN, J. Hafted Weapons in Medieval and Renaissance Europe. The Evolu-
tion of European Staff Weapons between 1200 and 1650. 2005.
ISBN 90 04 14409 9
32. SPEELMAN, P.J. (ed.). War, Society and Enlightenment. The Works of General
Lloyd. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14410 2
33. WRIGHT, D.C. From War to Diplomatic Parity in Eleventh-Century China. Sung’s
Foreign Relations with Kitan Liao. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14456 0

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WAR, SOCIETY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Major General Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (c. 1729-1783). Reproduction

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

© Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal

printed in the netherlands

for her patience, support and exuberance

List of Illustrations and Maps .................................................. ix

I. The History of the Late War in Germany,

Index ............................................................................................ 739

1. Order of Battle of the Prussian Army,

20. A List of the Austrian Forces under Marshal Daun,

1. A Map of Part of the Seat of War in Germany

11. Map of Germany ...................................................... 510–511

Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (c. 1729–83) is arguably the most

at a Jesuit school. In this capacity he may have remained unknown

In 1772 Lloyd accepted the commission of Major General from

The following compilation is a direct outgrowth of my earlier work

THE HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR

Editor’s Introduction .................................................................. 5

The narrative itself is an analysis of the operations that culminated

foundation for Henri Jomini’s inﬂuential Traité des Grandes Operations

l’Impératrice reine avec ses Alliés. 2 vols. Traduits et augmentes de

are generally omitted, as well as the plan of operations; and the

Austrian army, while quarter master general of it, by which means

Reﬂections on the General Principles of War; and on the Composition

It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more diﬃcult,

on certain and ﬁxed principles, which are by their nature invariable;

propositions, particularly those whose whole study has been applied

of their country, which is connected with these things much more

should most immediately engage the attention of those who pro-

Portuguese army, with great precision, be once taught, so that sev-

The ﬁrst thing to be considered, in order to reduce all evolutions

reigned as Holy Roman Emperor Francis I (1745–65). See C. A. Macartney, Maria

The French convinced from experience, nothing could more eﬀectually

The Austrian minister at Petersburg4 had contributed all he could

Avarice, an impotent ambition, a spirit of intrigue combined with

No country has in so short a time changed the principles of its con-

without vigour, and they therefore embraced the ﬁrst opportunity of

Of Bohemia and Moravia

These two great provinces belong to the empress of Germany. They

one continual deﬁle, particularly, when it enters the Prussian domin-

enemies, drove them intirely out of that country, and Bohemia,

garrison, that it seems doubtful whether any attempt should be made

This country, like most others in Europe, was formerly governed

the Moldau, to cover Prague. In the interior part of the country,

Of Silesia and the County of Glatz

This country lies from the south to south-east of Bohemia. It extends

Prussia to invade Bohemia with facility and success: whereas any

which covers Schweidnitz. There is another on the heights of Wûrben,

of supporting them during the winter. They must necessarily fall

to penetrate into Brandeburg, without having previously taken Custrin

The frontiers of Pomerania, towards the Swedes and Mecklenburgers,

Of Saxony and Lusace

In speaking of Bohemia and Silesia, we have already said, that the

running from Pirna to Freidland. From this place, Lusace is sepa-

The interior of this country is intersected by many small rivers,

Having explained the views of the diﬀerent powers at war, and

The king of Prussia attempted to enter into a negotiation with the

of Dresden, on the 6th of September. His majesty’s intention seems

Bohemia. Marshal Schwerin was ordered to keep his position at

sume to recommend, for reasons too obvious, in our opinion, to