Sangco, Klaire Ciarra G.

Special Proceedings (Th 7:30-9:30)

February 28, 2019

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

MR. ALEXANDER “LEX’’ ADONIS, represented by the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
(CMFR), through its Executive Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS; and the NATIONAL UNION OF
JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., vs.
SUPERINTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO, DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM

G.R. No. 182855 June 05, 2013

FACTS:

Adonis, the petitioner filed for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus praying that the Court directs
respondent Superintendent Venancio Tesoro (respondent) to have the body of the former brought before this
Court and in the alternative, praying for the application of the Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
08-2008, which imposes the penalty of a fine instead of imprisonment in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001.

Adonis was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City (RTC), Branch 17 for Libel, filed against
him by then Representative Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of five (5)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as maximum penalty. He began serving his sentence at the Davao
Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.

A second libel case, was likewise filed against Adonis by Jeanette L. Leuterio.

On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on
Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the country, which included Adonis. On January 25, 2008, Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule
of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases." In view of these developments, Adonis, filed with
the RTC a Motion to Reopen Case (With Leave of Court), praying for his immediate release from detention and
for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant to the said Circular.

Adonis moved for his provisional release from detention. The motion was granted by Presiding Judge
George Omelio in open court and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,000. Subsequently on even
date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an undertaking, the trial court issued an Order directing the Chief
of Davao Penal Colony "to release the accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for some other crimes or
offenses." On the same date, the said order was served to the respondent, but the release of Adonis was not
effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no valid reason. On February 11, 2009, the Court received
the letter from the respondent, informing the Court that Adonis had been released from confinement on
December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth in his parole and with the advise to report to the
City Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Adonis is entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

RULING:

No.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The
writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective
defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally
confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of
a judicial process or a valid judgment.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or
discharge authorized, to wit:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.― If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel. Since his detention was by virtue of a final
judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted
him parole, along with six (6) others. While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole
when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a
ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was
granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant
petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at
that time.

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 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN BEHALF OF LETICIA
LOURDES A. CAMARA, ASST. VICE PRESIDENT OF LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY HER
SON, MARK DARWIN CAMARA, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE

G.R. No. 176563 April 02, 2007

FACTS:

Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest which detained the petitioner Assistant Vice-President
and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) issued from a contempt
citation against the petitioner for LBP’s failure to deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-
1390 as provided under the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in
cash and bonds, in the total amount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this
order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period.

LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in cash under its
account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk of court. However the respondent judge
found LBP’s compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as
payee, in the form that is readily withdrawable.

Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order. Hence,
petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction
on the part of the respondent when he refused to release Camara from detention despite LBP’s compliance.

RULING:

Yes.

A writ of habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge x x x and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process.

Camara was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued on 9 February 2007 arising
from a contempt citation against Camara (and Tengco) for LBP’s failure to deposit the preliminary
compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial court’s Order dated 4 March 2007.

Under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not lie “[i]f it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge x x x, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process x x x.”

Petitioner does not question the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue the Order of 9 February 2007 citing
Camara and Tengco in contempt of court. What petitioner assails is respondent judge’s refusal to release

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Camara from detention despite LBP’s deposit with its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of
the preliminary compensation provided in respondent judge’s 4 March 2005 Order.

RUBEN E. TIU vs. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Acting Chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Parole, HON.
FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, Director of the Bureau of Corrections, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA of the
Department of Justice, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., the Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 211269 June 15, 2016

FACTS:

Tiu was found guilty of drug trafficking (shabu) in 2000. He was detained at the Sablayan Prison and
Penal Farm in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. His conviction became final in 2004. On March 24, 2009, the
Board of Pardons and Parole issued a resolution recommending the grant of executive clemency to petitioner.
On June 3, 2010, acting on said recommendation, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) granted
him conditional pardon without parole conditions but was, nonetheless, still subject to the conditions
indicated in the individual pardon papers. No such papers were issued in petitioner’s favor. Petitioner
requested for issuance of pardon certificate in his favor but denied. It turned out that PGMA did not sign his
Pardon certificate, and that the related documents were returned to BPP, and the latter decided to defer
actions pertaining to the pardon pending compliance with all the basic requirements for executive clemency.
During the regime of President Aquino, RA No. 10592 was passed which would substantially increase the Good
Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) of qualified inmates.

His contentions:

--Pursuant to RA No. 10592, he is entitled to 19 years and 7 months of GCTA, which when tacked with
his actual time served of 14 years and 9 months would add up to 34 years and 4 months. Such is in excess of
his allegedly reduced sentence of 30 years.

--RA No. 10592 shall be applied retroactively to being favorable to him. Section 5 thereof provides that
time allowances for good conduct once granted shall not be revoked.

--His claim that his sentence was automatically reduced to 30 years upon being granted a colonist
status pursuant to Section 7(b), Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the Bureau of Corrections Operating Manual
(BuCor-OM). And that such status does not require executive approval pursuant to Sections 5 and 7 of the
same Manual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus be granted to Tiu.

RULING:

No.
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 The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. In the present case, there is no showing
that his detention has become unlawful.

The grant of executive clemency to him is incomplete and ineffective given that no individual pardon
papers were issued in petitioner's favor. Pardon is essentially a contract between the convict and the
President. By virtue of which the convict agrees that he will be recommitted to prison should he violate the
terms of his pardon. The determination of whether there has been a violations lies with the President, the
Court cannot interfere. The terms and conditions of this contract were contained in the pardon papers, it is
thus essential to the grant.

This is not to say, however, that petitioner's pardon papers may not have been issued due to non-
compliance with the requirements, which is a matter that the Court shall not, and could not, resolve here. This
is because the grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

The conferment by the Director of Corrections of a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to
reduce the latter's sentence. The act of classification as a penal colonist or trustee is separate from and
necessarily precedes the act of approval by the Executive. Once classified as such, the prisoner must maintain
the classification, and such classification receives the President’s approval. Such approval is necessary.

The reduction of a prisoner's sentence is a partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the
President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend the same.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR
S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA
CRUZ, et al

G.R. No. 189155 September 07, 2010

FACTS:

Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, she enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-
USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and
towns of Central Luzon and she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health
survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily
armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.

When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her

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companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking
off and landing, and some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to
convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who
tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is
included in the “Order of Battle.” On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone
with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something
untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru
the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.

Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police
(PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.

SC issued the writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. CA granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the
respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and
torture of Roxas. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not substantial evidence is required to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended

RULING:

Yes.

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended. An
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.

In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of such right.
Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction
and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the
petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime,
strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

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 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM

G.R. No. 184769 October 05, 2010

FACTS:

A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative
clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under
the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:

“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending favor
to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment
thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to
meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a
violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the
confidentiality of the data.

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in
order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or
home

ISSUE:

Whether or not Habeas Data is the proper remedy for Lim.

RULING:

No.

Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession
of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
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 DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254 October 08, 2014

FACTS:

A petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data was filed by Neri, a police officer, against Joy, his
former common law partner. Allegedly, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a
while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted
him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He
denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Neri
allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases
against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom,
utilising the said video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the
other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.

After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to
appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to
make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the
digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s
petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the cases she
filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of
Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from
reproducing the same. It disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and
storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom)
violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and
not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper.

RULING:

No.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
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of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the
Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the
petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data
will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination
of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed
to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to
the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be dismissible
due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of
his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually
proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as
the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss
the habeas data petition.

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WRIT OF AMPARO

Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY PADOR, petitioners, vs. Barangay Captain BERNABE
ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, Barangay Tanods ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES,
ROBERTO ALIMORIN, et al

G.R. No. 183460 March 12, 2013

FACTS:

In February 2008, there were rumors circulating that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in
Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto
Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioner
Nerlo and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent barangay captain Arcayan.
They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advise them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-
reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan.

When the Arcayan received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused
to sign a receipt document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the reaid, the sending of the
invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply – as well as the
possibility of more harassment cases, false accusation, and possible violence from respondents – gravely
threatened their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After
examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits the RTC issued the writ and directed the respondent
to make a verified return.

Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July 2008. It issued the
assailed resolution finding that the petitioners’ claims ware based merely on hearsay, speculation, surmises
and conjectures and that respondents had sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of letter of
invitation. It thereafter proceeded to deny the petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of writ of Amparo

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioner must prove by
substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to extraordinary rise in the
numbers of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security. As an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing

10
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to those Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al

G.R. No. 191805 April 16, 2013

FACTS:

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was alleged to be forcibly taken by several men and was brought to a car where there were
men holding guns. The men tied his hands, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started
punching him. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There
were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word Bravo written on it. Rodriguez later on
learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on
the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.
In the morning, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him board a vehicle. While
they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to
confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head.
Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a papag, and
gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on
the papag while being tied to it at the waist. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper
stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed
the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media. The soldiers guarding him repeatedly
reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had
surrendered to the military.

Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas
Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj.
Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. He prayed the issuance of the writ of amparo ordering
respondents to desist from violating Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security.

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ISSUES:

1. What is a Writ of Amparo?

2. Whether or not the privilege of Writ of Amparo should be granted.

RULING:

1. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves
both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading
to subsequent investigation and action.

2. Yes.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence
that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life,
liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September
2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to
issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN,
JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and
RANDY DAYAG vs. LEOMAR BUENO

G.R. No. 191416 February 07, 2017

FACTS:
On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita Mamba, (Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed.
Emelita is the mother of Mayor William Mamba (Mayor Mamba), then mayor of the Municipality of Tuao,
Cagayan, and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacanang official. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency
created by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police with the peace and order of the
municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery. On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force,
Malana, Anggana and Sagalon, together with Barangay Officials, Cinabre and Encollado, went to the house of

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the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement in the robbery.
The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno (Maritess), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the
respondent was brought to the Tuao police station. The parties gave different accounts of what happened
after the respondent was brought to the police station:
When they reached the police station, there were no police investigators or any representative from
the SWD office and so the investigation could not proceed. A certain Raymund Rodriguez was, at that time,
also at the police station. He claimed that he and his brother Robin were approached by the respondent to rob
the canteen. Robin, however, declined the offer. Later that night, Raymund saw the respondent and Lorenzo
Haber robbing the canteen. Robin reported the incident to the Task force. The petitioners further claim that at
the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba and Atty. Mamba were out of town for an official leave and a report to
work in Malacanang, respectively. The respondent’s custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber’s
custody was also referred to the Task Force as there was also no police investigators available when he was
invited to the police station.

Atty. Mamba arrived on June 17, 2009. On June 18, 2009, while on their way to the police station, they
were met by Police Supt. Joselito Buenaobra, of the PNP in Cagayan. The respondent’s custody was thereafter
transferred to the PNP.
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that: On June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and dayag, both members of the
Task Force, upon order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from the
police station and brought him to Mayor Mamba’s house. In the evening, the respondent was made to board a
white van driven by Anggangan, where he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he
would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba’s house. Heber, a minor, was likewise
brought to Mayor Mamba’s house. The respondent an Haber were then tortured. They were made to roll on
the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue stick by Malana; hot was poured over their bodies, to force
them to admit to their involvement of the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein.

Maritess went to the police station to look for her son; she was told that the respondent was brought
to Mayor Mamba’s house. Maritess was not permitted to see her son and she was able to talk to Mayor
Mamba. Maritess then sought the assistance of P/Supt Buenaobra regarding the respondent’s disappearance.
The PNP Cagayan regional Office was then preparing a case for Habeas Corpus when the respondent was
released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD office.
Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the CHR in Cagayan as regards the case of
the respondent. On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by the CHR, file a Petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Amparo with the CA. A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. The respondent presented in
evidence his own testimony and the testimonies of Dr. Tiangco, of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center,
provincial welfare officer, Elvira Layus, and Maritess. The petitioners, on the other hand, presented the
testimonies of Cinabre, Incollado, Baligod and Robin.
The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum and testificandum to and heard the testimony of P/Supt
Buenaobra. On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the decision granting petition for writ of amparo against
respondents.

The CA opined that the respondent’s rights to liberty and security were undeniably undermined when
he was invited by the members of the Task force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba’s house.

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 The CA further claimed that the invitation extended to the respondent by the Task Force members was
in the nature of an arrest. The same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since the circumstances of the
case do not fall within the purview of Section 2 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The CA ruled that, the refusal of the members of the Task Force and especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and
address the irregularities committed by its members is tantamount to continuing violation of the respondent’s
right to security. The petitioners sought for reconsideration but was denied. Hence the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the writ of amparo in favour of the respondent.

RULING:
Yes.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the factual findings of the CA,
which is largely based on respondent’s evidence. The totality of the evidence presented by the respondent
meets the requisite evidenciary threshold. His allegation were corroborated by the testimony of Haber who
further testified to their torture. He added that he and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where
they were suffocated by placing plastic bags on their heads, and that a wire was inserted to their penises.
The respondent’s claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who that she examined the
respondent and found that he suffered several injuries and multiple second degree burns. It also attested that
respondent had scars on his head, arms and back. What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by
substantial evidence that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally detained, and
tortured.
The fact that the respondent, after four days of detention, had been released, however, does not
negate the propriety of the grant of writ of amparo.
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still be issued in the respondents favour notwithstanding his
release. Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by them to effectively
investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and to prosecute those who are responsible therefor.
Worse, the illegal detention and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of the
Task Force themselves.
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that the
respondent’s right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the
CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favour of the respondent. The petition is denied and the decision and
resolution of the CA are affirmed.

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