Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Latin America

World Affairs Institute
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

Author(s): RONALD R. POPE
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 135, No. 2 (Fall 1972), pp. 139-170
Published by: World Affairs Institute
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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA
By RONALD R. POPE*
T raditionally Russia has shown no great interest in the affairs of

Latin America. Prior to 1917 the Russian government was
preoccupied with Europe and Asia and for the most part ignored
the Western Hemisphere. Lenin is reported to have observed that Latin
America was too close to the United States to be ripe for revolution.1
It is only recently that Russian interest in the Western Hemisphere has
become more apparent.2 The impetus for the current widely discussed
Soviet involvement in the region was provided by Castro's rise to power
in 1959. The USSR's Latin American Institute, for example, was
established in 1961, and one of its departments is devoted to Cuba.3 As
further testimony to recent Soviet interest, the Soviet-Cuban Friend
ship Society was established in 1964, the USSR-Chile Society and the
USSR-Mexico Society were founded in 1966, and the USSR-Uruguay
Society was founded in 1968.4
The historical absence of a Russian presence in Latin America has
been in part due to the nature of Soviet priorities and preoccupation
elsewhere, and in part to the workings of the Monroe doctrine. These
factors, though, are changing. In what can be taken as an oblique
reference to the Monroe Doctrine, for example, a major Soviet text on
international affairs states that "the artificial barriers [with] which
imperialism and reactionary bourgeoise landowning circles are attempt
ing to isolate the Latin American republics from socialism" are falling.5
But even so, Soviet influence is still comparatively limited.
Current Soviet policy can be divided into her interests in "progres
sive" governments, diplomatic relations, local communist parties, trade
and aid, cultural exchange, "showing the flag" (Soviet naval visits), and
the content of her propaganda on Latin America. Information on
diplomatic representation, trade statistics, and data on the relative
*This essay is based on a research report written by the author for the Foreign Policy
Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
139
140 RONALD R. POPE
amount of attention paid to Latin America by the Soviet Union, all

utilized in this essay, represent the most reliable evidence currently
available. But this information tells only a part of the story. For the
rest one must rely on statements in the Soviet press and journals and on
the fragmentary reports on actual Soviet activities in the Western
Hemisphere.
The Third World does not generally receive a great deal of attention
from top Soviet decisionmakers. The people who write on this subject
are usually at a low level in the bureaucracy. Therefore, to the extent
that these writers are in fact removed from the ultimate seat of Soviet
power and are not directed by it, their comments and observations
cannot be taken as totally accurate reflections of the leadership's
opinions and intentions.' While public statements are frequently the
best evidence available, their limitations must be kept in mind.
Progressive Governments
Soviet ideology requires the "progressive evolution" of politics in

Latin America. As Victor Vol'skii states:
Studies by Soviet Latin Americanists ... have led us to the

conclusion . . . that the laws of social economic development
discovered by Marxist-Leninist science operate in Latin America
with the same force as they operate in other parts of the world.'
As noted above, Castro presented the Russians with their first

foothold in Latin America. The radical turn of the revolution in Cuba,
however, evidently took Moscow by surprise. The Kremlin seems
initially to have been reluctant to accept Castro's assertion that Cuba
was in fact a full-fledged member of the socialist bloc. But in the end
the combination of the temptation of having a state friendly to the
Soviet Union and hostile to the United States so close to North
America and the pressure of Castro's demands for socialist support led
the Soviet leadership to opt for the opportunities presented by a
socialist Cuba.8
Cuba's "contributions" to the Soviet Union have indeed been mixed.
She can be counted as a victory for socialism, an irritant and distraction
for the United States, and a base for Soviet operations in the Western
Hemisphere. At the same time, however, Cuba represents a considerable
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 141
economic burden and some risk to the Soviets. She is effectively

outside the "protective" umbrella of Soviet conventional power-unlike
Czechoslovakia and Hungary-and well within the reach of U.S.
conventional power. The Bay of Pigs landing could theoretically be
repeated with more success in the future. At least until 1968 Castro
took a stand independent of Moscow. Hans Morgenthau, for example,
counts him as a rival, at least on a regional level, with Moscow and
Peking for the mantle of communist legitimacy.'
After an initial period of considerable open disagreement with
Moscow, Castro appears to be willing to concentrate on internal
economic problems and at least to scale down his attempts to export
revolution. Undoubtedly he has been influenced in this choice not only
by the mounting pressures of internal problems and Soviet insistence on
the "peaceful transition" thesis, but also by Che's death in Bolivia and
Allede's electoral victory in Chile.
The electoral victory of a Marxist government in Chile, albeit by a
very small margin, in the fall of 1970 is certainly an event of interest to
the Soviets and one that is bound to influence their policy in Latin
America. Most important, Chile represents a victory for the "peaceful
road" method in contrast to China's (and Castro's) call for armed
insurrection. Radio Moscow pointed out that "it has not been the gun
but the actions of the revolutionary class which enabled the people to
take over political power there.""4 As early as 1964 Russian writers
were forecasting that the unity of leftist groups in Chile presented an
opportunity for "the victory of progressive forces, the establishment of
a people's progressive government, and the implementation of radical
social change."" In the middle 1960s the Soviet government was in
fact already rapidly improving its diplomatic, economic, political, and
cultural relations with Eduardo Frei's leftist-leaning Christian Demo
cratic government.
The General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid
Brezhnev, confirmed Moscow's interest in Chile by devoting a relatively
significant number of words to events there in his address to the 24th
Party Congress. He stated that "for the first time in the entire history
of the continent" a "popular" government has been installed by the
people "by constitutional means." Although Yankee imperialism is out
"to deprive [them] of what they have won . .., the people of Chile are
filled with resolve to continue along their chosen path." They are being
aided, according to Brezhnev, by "the working people of other
142 RONALD R. POPE
countries of Latin America [who] are coming out in support of Chile's

progressive course." No mention was made in these remarks of Soviet
support for Chile."
The Russians are almost certainly hopeful that events in Chile will
prove the correctness of their thesis of "peaceful revolution" and that
they will be able to claim Chile as another victory for socialism. They
are also aware, however, that the path is not free of obstacles and that
"setbacks" are possible. An important article that appeared in a recent
issue of Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn' on the general subject of "the 24th
Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and
problems of contemporary international relations" noted that while "it
is still difficult to fully estimate the meaning of last year's victory of
the Popular Unity bloc in the presidential election, . . . one can say with
assurance that Chile is experiencing the beginning stage of a socialist
revolution." The writer goes on to say, however, that the revolution is
in its "initial state" and that "the possibility of a return to the worst"
cannot be excluded.13
Two other Latin American governments were also referred to as
"progressive." They received a one-sentence mention in Brezhnev's
report: "The governments of Peru and Bolivia are struggling against the
bondage of U.S. monopolies.""
Until the recent ouster of the Torres government in Bolivia, both of
these countries had military governments headed by reform-minded
officers. As a Latin American communist put it, the armies in Bolivia
and Peru had changed from instruments of oppression to "the
standard-bearers of a national patriotic revolution."" Another com
munist observer argued that "the emergence of progressive trends in the
armed forces of Peru and other countries of the continent is part of the
general upsurge of the Latin American peoples' anti-imperialist and
democratic struggle led by the proletariat and its vanguard-the
communist parties."16
The progressive role of the army in the politics of developing
countries has been explained by the fact that the military represents a
powerful, organized force which is capable of being either progressive
or reactionary depending on its class make-up and local conditions."1
The "progressive" nature of the military in Latin America is explained
by the mixed social origins of its members and the generally low pay of
the officers which eliminates them from membership in the privileged
class."8
Local communist enthusiasm for the "progressive" military govern

ments is not without its limits. Commenting on the situation in Peru,
Jorge del Prado, the head of the Peruvian communist party, observes
that a progressive military government is a "rare circumstance" that
"lends special might to all the government's actions against imperialism
and the oligarchy but at the same time impedes and delays the process
of the government's realization of the importance of the participation
of the masses."9 Del Prado goes on to argue, however, that the struggle
for progress in Peru presently requires cooperation with the government
and not opposition to it: It is "necessary to act with sufficient
prudence, bearing in mind that the government in qyestion is
ideologically heterogeneous and needs to preserve the unity of the
armed forces."20
The problem with military governments according to the communists
is that none of them has yet "set the objective of a socialist revolution.
This is understandable, because the movement is led by the petty
bourgeoisie, not by the proletariat."21 Because of the control sup
posedly exercised by the Pentagon, the communists argue that popular
pressure will have to be applied by the workers on these governments in
order to insure that society will continue down the proper path of
development to its end.22
The same article that gave what is probably the current authoritative
public evaluation of the situation in Chile argues that the revolution in
Peru "is closer to the Afro-Asian type of noncapitalist transformation"
and therefore is "different [in] character from that in Chile." Although
"the oligarchy and corrupt bourgeoise have been dismissed from
control by the government [and] the landowning class is being
liquidated," according to this article, "this is not yet a bourgeoise
democratic, and further still, not a socialist revolution." The reason for
the revolution's limited "progressive" character is that "the government
is not controlled by the working class in union with the peasantry, but
by the armed forces, the leaders of which . . . would like to build
'something midway between capitalism and socialism. '"2"
Diplomatic Ties
As would be expected, Moscow has diplomatic ties with the

currently "progressive" governments. In fact, she has diplomatic
relations with all the South American governments except Paraguay, as
144 RONALD R. POPE
well as with the Central American countries of Costa Rica, Mexico, and,
of course, Cuba. More than half of the current ties have been made
since 1969." There are at least four possible motives for Soviet
attempts to expand diplomatic relations in Latin America: (1) the
desire to offset U.S. influence; (2) the desire to encourage a "favorable"
direction for both the internal and external policies of Latin American
governments through (more or less) diplomatic channels; (3) the desire
to increase trade; and (4) the hope of increasing the stature and
therefore the effectiveness of local Moscow-oriented communist
parties.2s That the last possibility is not always uppermost in the
Russians' minds is clearly indicated by the fact that Moscow often
carries on negotiations and establishes ties with governments (e.g., Peru)
that actively suppress the local communists.26 It has also been
suggested that aid for left-wing military governments could serve to
draw away support from the communist parties.27
The available biographical data on the Soviet diplomats accredited to
Latin American countries suggest that they have respectable
backgrounds and are well prepared for their jobs. It is particularly
interesting to note that among the past ambassadors to Cuba were
Maxim Litvinov (1942-1943) and A. A. Gromyko (1943-1946)."
An article in the New York Times,29 based on information supplied
by American intelligence specialists, indicates that the caliber of Soviet
intelligence agents assigned to Latin America is now quite good.
According to the article, a typical Soviet agent is now "personable,
gregarious, cosmopolitan, and fluent in Spanish and often in English."
It is estimated that one-half of the accredited Soviet personnel in Latin
America are intelligence agents, with a range of from 70 percent in
Mexico (where activities center on the United States) to 25 percent in
Uruguay. While the U.S. intelligence analysts see the Soviet Union as
willing to "quietly back both rural and urban revolutionary movements
in Latin America, depending on time and place," they also believe that
Soviet policy is now "aimed at convincing Latin Americans that its
diplomatic personnel are personable, professional, responsible
people-always correct. .. .
Here the Russians face a dilemma. Moscow's involvement with
revolutionaries can be both embarrassing and threatening to Soviet
gains in influence and prestige in Latin America. This was illustrated by
the recent flurry in Mexico centering on the arrest of 19 young
revolutionaries whose leaders, it was charged, had studied in Moscow at
Lumumba University.30 The problem for Moscow (to be discussed in

detail below) is how to be at the same time both respectable and
revolutionary.
Local Communist Parties
An important key to Moscow's aims in Latin America lies in the

direction of Soviet influence on the local communist parties. Is the
Soviet Union encouraging a bid for power-through elections? or by
revolution? Or is Moscow basically ignoring local parties and seeking to
bring about favorable changes by "revolution from above" (i.e.,
through diplomatic ties)? The problem for analysis is that there is
evidence for all three possibilities: election, insurrection, and
"revolution from above." There is a fourth complicating dimension to
the problem: how fast and how far does Moscow want changes to go?
Discussion of this last question will be deferred until the- section on
"The Pattern of Soviet Policy" below. For now we will look at the
evidence associated with the first three points.
In general terms, Moscow has been arguing with the Chinese that the
cost of a nuclear war would exceed any possible benefits to socialism
and that the possibility of escalation from local revolution to all-out
war is generally too great to risk trying to gain power by violence. And
besides, the Kremlin argues, it is perfectly possible for socialists to
achieve success peacefully.31
Russian writers have agrued that trying to "speed up" the revolution
leads to a "split in the national forces and a weakening of the
anti-imperialist movement." More specifically, with regard to Brazil in
1964, so the argument goes, the Moscow-oriented party supported
Goulart (whose "progressive" programs were supported by the people
and attacked by the American monopolists and reactionary circles).
The Chinese-supported faction, however, called for immediate armed
rebellion, calling the local communist party "traitors to the Brazilian
people." This split served to weaken leftist forces and thereby made
possible the victory of the reactionary groups. The authors flatly state
that the Chinese attempt to persuade the communist parties to "push
the revolution" despite "modern world development" has failed.3"
In another example, a Uruguayan communist has stated that "the
Communist Party [of Uruguay] is becoming a mass party, a real
political force, which is what Lenin always called for."33 (Emphasis in
146 RONALD R. POPE
the original.) Of course Lenin argued that such a mass party would
never be able to win power by violent revolution.
Young Latin American radicals have evidently been attracted to the
possibility of an early rise to power by utilizing Chinese (and Cuban)
supported tactics. Moscow does not like to lose influence with such
elements, nor see the Chinese gain in influence. Complaints can be
heard that "sundry elements, using a welter of pseudo-revolutionary
phrases, are trying to arrogate authorship of a policy [anti-imperialism]
the Communists have been faithfully operating for decades.""
Beginning with the Bolshevik takeover in Russia in 1917, all of the
current communist governments have seized power primarily through
the use of force-with the hopeful (for a communist) exception of
Chile. It must be difficult for the Russians to live down this
tradition-assuming that all the leadership might wish to live it down.
Besides, as noted above, they do not seem to want to leave the realm of
revolutionary violence to the exclusive influence of Mao (or Castro).
A Latin American communist who is apparently in favor with
Moscow-he writes a great deal on Latin America in Soviet-controlled
journals, particularly New Times and World Marzist Review-has noted
the balance that currently seems to be sought:
Strikes, demonstrations, parliamentry activity, seizure of

latifundia or enterprises, ideological struggle, agitation and, to
some extent, armed action, are all elements of -the revolutionary
struggle on the Latin American continent.3s (Emphasis added.)
For reasons that have already been discussed, and possibly others,
the Russians have not eliminated violence as a possible means in the
struggle for socialism in Latin America. The same article referred to
above that condemned the Chinese for trying artifically to "speed up"
social change in Latin America also argues that the concrete choice of
violent or peaceful means depends on "objective conditions." Writing in
1964, the authors quote the communist party of Chile as believing that
conditions there could change, requiring a turn to armed rebellion. In
Argentina the choice of methods would also depend on "concrete
circumstances." In the Caribbean the existence of reactionary
dictatorships might possibly make violence necessary.
The dictatorships in the Caribbean countries give the

Communists of these countries grounds to believe that a peaceful
path to democratic revolution has been closed to them and that

armed struggle is the only possible form of change.36 (Emphasis
added.)
The above comments and similar rhetoric seem to be aimed at trying

to limit the influence of the Chinese and others more radical than the
Soviets, as well as at keeping Moscow's options open. In practice,
however, the Kremlin's emphasis has been on peaceful change and, for
the most part, the Moscow-oriented communists have cooperated.
Robert Alexander, a specialist on Latin American communism, has
argued that these "orthodox" communists have tended to stick with
Moscow for three basic reasons: (1) the majority of the leaders were
trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and look to Moscow as
the "workers' fatherland," (2) these same men are now middle-aged and
not particularly attracted to the rigors and risks of revolutionary
activity, and (3) adopting a revolutionary strategy would cause them to
lose their existing influence and positions." As an example supporting
the last point, Alexander refers to the Venezuelan experience. In the
early 1960s the local communists, influenced by Castro's success in
Cuba, turned for a time to armed insurrection. As a result, in 1962 the
Party was declared illegal, lost its seats in the legislature, lost its
influence in the labor movement (at one time it controlled
approximately one-quarter of the union membership), was generally
shunned, and suffered a rapid decline in membership.3"
This reasoning provides an explanation for the relative conservatism
of the old-line parties in the past. However, even the orthodox
leadership, if it gets close enough to power, as in Chile, may be tempted
to seek to "fulfill its dreams in its own lifetime," regardless of the
actual chances for success, the consequences of failure, or Moscow's
desires.
A comment by Luis Corvalin, General Secretary of the communist
party of Chile, can be read as a hint that an attempt might be made to
restrict political freedom in that country. Contrary to the communist
ideal, political opposition continues to exist in Chile, but, according to
Corvalin, "as long as its material and ideological basis survives, it is
preferable . . . to recognize that oppsition, provided it acts within the
law."39 (Emphasis added.) This wording suggests that restrictions could
be imposed after asserting that the "material and ideological basis of
the opposition no longer survives" and/or that it has been "acting
148 RONALD R. POPE
illegally." In the past, as one Soviet writer notes, the other left-wing
groups had refused to cooperate with the communist parties because
they considered them "dictatorial."4" A move on the part of the
Chilean communists to insure their grip on power by declaring the
opposition no longer legitimate would be bound to have an adverse
effect on the acceptability of all the Latin American parties as coalition
partners. Further, any attempt by the Russians .to intervene would
revive and strengthen the charge that the local parties are merely a
"tool for penetration by 'Soviet imperialsim.' "41 In short, it seems
logical to assume that any attempts to build socialism "without internal
opposition" and to strengthen the ties of the "socialist community"
(i.e., increase Soviet influence by way of the local parties) are likely to
affect adversely the general acceptability of the communists within
Latin America. Any such attempts would also probably bring into
question the respectability and trustworthiness of the Soviet Union as
their alleged sponsor.
Trade and Aid
Although Soviet trade has been growing fairly steadily since the end
of World War II, it is still not very large, particularly outside the Soviet
bloc, and especially with the Third World. This is shown by the data in
Table 1 which were taken directly from a Soviet source.42
TABLE 1
RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
(billions of rubles, in current prices)
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1969 as %

Total turnover 14.6 15.1 16.4 18.0 19.8 109.7
With socialist countries 10.1 10.0 11.1 12.1 12.9 106.5
With CMEA countries 8.5 8.4 9.3 10.3 11.2 108.1
With developing countries 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.5 123.3
With developed capitalist
countries 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.4 112.5
With the exception of Cuba, which is of course a special case, Soviet

trade with Latin America, official protestations to the contrary,43 is
notable both for its irregular pattern and for its relative insignificance.
TABLE 2
TRADE OF INDIVIDUAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Argentina
Exports: USSRa 18.4 19.9 72.0 107.3 23.1
Totalb 1,365 1,411 1,493 1,593 1,465
Imports: USSR 0.9 4.4 20.3 7.4 4.8
Total 981 1,077 1,199 1,124 1,096
Brazil
Exports: USSR 43.4 37.1 32.8 30.5 34.7
Total 1,407 1,430 1,596 1,741 1,654
Imports: USSR 29.4 24.0 27.7 27.7 12.0
Total 1,487 1,264 1,096 1,496 1,667
Cuba
Exports: USSR 164.4 288.0 342.2 285.9 372.7
Total 544 714 686 593 ...
Imports: USSR 399.7 366.0 375.4 479.8 562.7
Total 867 1,019 866 926 ...
Uruguay
Exports: USSR 5.2 1.0 3.0 9.2 4.0
Total 165 179 191 186 159
Imports: USSR 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4
Total 177 198 150 164 170
aDerived from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Table 6 (p. 868), United Nations, Year
book of International Trade Statistics, Vol. 18 (1967). Rubles were converted to U.S. dollars
by multiplying by a conversion factor of 1.111.
bSource: Table A, Ibid.
This is illustrated by the data in Table 2. The irregular pattern is in large

part a result of the Soviet practice of buying large quantities of a
particular export item (e.g., coffee) on a one-time basis-primarily for
political effect.44 The low volume can be explained partly by the fact
that the Russians generally have an adequate supply of the products
most available for export from Latin America (i.e., raw materials)
within their own borders and in fact are themselves exporters of many
of these items, particularly to the West,45 or they have closer and less
expensive sources.
In their general study of Soviet foreign policy Professors Jan Triska
and David Finley found that a positive trade index number (i.e.,
significant trade relations) was not associated with diplomatic support
150 RONALD R. POPE
by the underdeveloped country of the communist trade partner in the

United Nations but that there was a "strong relationship between a
positive index number for economic aid and a procommunist voting
record."4' So why are the Russians not providing substantial aid, either
outright or disguised as trade? In some cases they are doing this (e.g.,
Egypt), but with regard to Latin America (and most of the rest of the
Third World) either Moscow cannot provide such "aid," or does not
find it worthwhile.
The Soviets regularly emphasize their own economic needs-which
clearly are not for more raw materials. The major part of their trade is
currently with the other socialist countries (see Table 1). The next
five-year plan calls for a 30-35 percent increase in trade turnover and,
according to Vladimir Alkhimov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade, "this growth will be effected primarily through further
expansion of trade with the socialist countries."4
As for trade turnover outside the Soviet bloc, traditionally the
greatest increases have been with the developed West. For example, the
Russians admit that, while trade with 51 developing countries increased
by 23 percent in 1969, it increased by more than 30 percent with
Sweden, by more than 50 percent with Holland, by 25 percent with
West Germany, and by almost 25 percent with Italy (a long-time Soviet
trade partner).48 It is true that for this one year, as noted in Table 1,
total Soviet trade with the Third World increased by a greater
percentage than it did with the developed countries as a whole. This
could conceivably signal a change in the growth pattern for Soviet
trade. Such a change, however, would be a definite and dramatic break
with the past, as can be seen from Table 1. Further, the Russians make
it clear that in the future they want to continue to increase their import
of manufactured goods and their acquisition of patent rights for new
technological processes.49 The developing countries, including Latin
America, can provide neither of these.
The Soviets place considerable emphasis on the mutual profitability
of all trade arrangements with developing countries. As one official puts
it, "Soviet economic and technical aid to the developing countries .. .
benefits both sides; in no sense is it a matter of charity.''50 And
according to another writer, one of the effects of socialist aid is the
creation in the developing countries of "reliable sources [of] income to
ensure the timely repayment of [the] socialist countries' credits and
other outlays."5'
The Russians justify their attitude by arguing that they do not

"owe"l economic aid to the Third World. It is the capitalist countries
that have done the exploiting and therefore the obligation to give aid is
theirs." One writer protests that "socialism strives to give all possible
assistance to developing states and expends for these aims resources
urgently needed for its own economic development." He goes on to
note that "the resources of the socialist states are further strained by
the fact that . . . the chief military might of imperialism [is] aimed at
them." This forces the socialist states "to make significant expenditures
on defense."3 In an earlier article this same author even argued that "as
long as there are numerous channels through which the West extracts
profits from the developing countries," the channeling of substantial
socialist aid to them "would merely in effect result in repumping part
of the national income of the Socialist countries to the safes of the
Western monopolies."54 Somewhat contradicting the argument that
"socialism strives to give all possible assistance to developing states,"
another writer, in answer to the assertion that "the socialist countries
. . . must increase their material assistance, 'even if this were in some
measure to affect the living standard of their own population,'"
bluntly replies that the "supreme internationalist duty [of]
Communists in power" is "to strengthen the economic might of their
country and raise the welfare of the working people." Aid to the Third
World, according to this author, must not be allowed to "impede the
progress of the socialist community." He attempts to make this stand
more palatable by arguing that socialist aid, "among other things,"
serves to induce "the capitalist countries to adopt fairer policy in
economic relations with the newly emerged states. "
Cultural Exchange
One of the few available Soviet articles touching on the subject of

cultural exchange argues that the United States uses cultural
cooperation with the USSR as a means for persuading Soviet citizens to
"go astray." The author evidently is complaining about Soviet citizens
coming away from cultural contacts disagreeing with their own
government and more in agreement with the United States.56 The
Russians would obviously like to have Latin Americans who participate
in exchange programs come away from them at least more favorably
disposed toward the Soviet Union. As one Soviet writer argues,
152 RONALD R. POPE
increased cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Latin America
"promotes rapproachement between the Latin American and the Soviet
peoples," demonstrates the desire of both sides to know each other
better, and helps to end the imperialist-imposed isolation of Latin
America.57
In 1969, out of 12,075 foreign students from noncommunist countries
studying in the USSR, approximately 1,450 were Latin Americans." At
the same time dramatically demonstrating the lack of Soviet economic
penetration of the area, excluding those in Cuba, there were 20 economic
technicans from the Soviet Union working in Latin America out of a total
of 9,870 Soviet specialists in the noncommunist Third World (over 3,000
of this total were in Africa and almost 6,000 were in the Near East and
South Asia).59 In 1970 the largest group of foreign students at Lumumba
University in Moscow was from Latin America (964), with the largest
single contingent being from Mexico (109). The next largest group was
from Africa (864), with 81 of the group coming from Kenya.60
The Russians do not always obtain the favorable results that they
desire from cultural exchange. The confrontation with the realities of the
Soviet system and Soviet society is sometimes disillusioning for the
foreign student,61 and Soviet technicians and advisers do not always leave
the best impression when working abroad. (These problems are of course
not limited to the Soviets.) However, the Russians are certainly making
their existence and accomplishments known, and overall they may well be
enhancing their prestige in Latin America through these exchanges.
"Showing the Flag"

The Soviet navy has been showing the Russian flag throughout the
world recently. In the latest edition of Jane's Fighting Ships the editor,
Raymond V. B. Blackman, rates the Soviet navy as a "supernavy" and a
distinct challenge to Western fleets.62 Among their other stops, Soviet
surface vessels and submarines have made several visits to the
Caribbean.63 It is generally acknowledged that the presence of the
Soviet navy in the Caribbean is significant from both the military and
political points of view. For one thing, now that the Soviets are there,
the handling of a crisis situation, such as was felt to exist in the
Dominican Republic in 1965, will certainly be more complicated.64
Besides circumscribing U.S. options in the area, the presence of the
Russian flag presumably serves to enhance Soviet prestige among Latin
American countries.
Soviet military and commercial vessels will undoubtedly continue to

call on Latin American ports. Much more significant though would be
the establishment of permanent military bases. American press reports
that the Russians were building a naval base in Cuba and were planning
to create another base in a fishing port in Chile were labeled a "lie" in a
recent article in Pravda. The article argued that this was another
attempt on the part of the United States to use the "myth" of a Soviet
threat to maintain American control over Latin America.65
Successful bids for increased influence on the part of local
communist parties might not always lead to increased Soviet power in
the Western Hemisphere, as some would argue has been the case with
Cuba. On the other hand, a significant and permanent Soviet naval
presence in the Caribbean would be a different matter. While this would
not necessarily lead to increased communist influence, it would
certainly bolster Soviet state power.
The development of a permanent naval presence could be taken as
evidence that Moscow wishes to have the capability to physically
intervene in the area. On the other hand, it is also possible that
increased Russian activity would be aimed more at hampering U.S.
capabilities (e.g., to "deal" with Chile) than at providing the Kremlin
with a realistic option of intervention on its own part. In either case,
Soviet actions in this realm will be of interest and should provide clues
as to their overall intentions toward Latin America.
Propaganda
Direct Soviet propaganda attacks have been leveled against the

United States with regard to U.S. military, political, and economic
involvement in Latin America. The Russians have accused the United
States of supporting reactionary military circles with training and
equipment designed to suppress the national independence and
liberation movements in the area. A recent article in Pravda asserted
that Secretary of State Rogers justified an administration request for
increased military aid to Latin America by stating that it "reduces the
possibility of the rise of a power which is hostile to the United States,
will lead to the growth of influence of the United States, and will
promote the achievement of its aims in Latin America."66 Moscowh has
also accused the United States of favoring an inter-American military
force to be used for this same role of suppresion.'7 In a Radio Moscow
154 RONALD R. POPE
broadcast in Creole to Haiti, the curious claim was made that the
United States planned to replace its military bases in Panama with bases
in Haiti, since the continued existence of bases in Panama, according to
the broadcast, was now in danger.68
The Russians regularly attack the OAS as the main instrument of
American political control in Latin America. One recent article quotes
John J. Johnson, a "former State Department official [and] noted
expert on Latin American affairs," to the effect that the Latin
Americans "have known full well that the OAS is first of all a means to
give the appearance of collective action to what is actually the will and
policy of the United States."69
Moscow is particularly sensitive about U.S. anticommunist
propaganda, arguing that its aim is to isolate the Latin Americans from
the socialist countries and thus perpetuate U.S. control and the power
of reactionary Latin American governments. As one writer puts it, "The
people who take their stand against imperialism today are becoming
increasingly aware that anticommunism is an integral part of U.S.
expansionist policy in Latin America and the bulwark of the local
ruling exploiter classes of the continent."* He further says that "the
logic of anticommunism is perfectly clear: social transformations are
out of the question in Latin America because they are what the
communists stand for."
The United States government is also accused of using aid and other
means to pave the way for, and then protect, private American
investment. Once in the door, the American firms supposedly acquire
monopoly control of the market and then proceed to reap excess
profits."'
The aim of all this propaganda is clearly to support and encourage
the already existent anti-American feelings and thereby to further
weaken U.S. influence in Latin America. By this means, and at little
cost and risk to themselves, the Russians obviously hope to enhance
their relative position in power and prestige vis--vis the United States.
Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Haiti have been attacking the
government there as terrorist and despotic. Jean-Claude Duvalier is
labeled a fool and a tool of U.S. imperialist and monopoly control."7
The local communist party is of course singled out as the leader in the
struggle for freedom and democracy,7" but interestingly enough the
Haitian army has been called upon to overthrow the "corrupt"
government.74 Haiti would appear to be the one country in Latin
America where the Soviet Union feels that revolutionary change is

currently most likely, and where they would like to have some
influence in the future, possibly by being able to point their past
support of radical change. Exactly how seriously the Russians are
themselves involved in Haiti-beyond propaganda broadcasts-is not
possible to determine from the available sources.
Latin America's Share of Soviet Attention
Just how important a place does Latin America hold in the hierarchy
of Soviet foreign policy interests? In an attempt to provide at least a
partial answer to this question a simple form of content analysis was
applied to a Soviet summary of significant foreign policy events. Table
3, then, can be taken as a rough measure of the relative degree of
TABLE 3
A MEASURE OF RELATIVE SOVIET INTEREST
IN LATIN AMERICA
1966a 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971b TOTALS
TOTAL REFERENCES 32 96 118 89 90 23 448
U.N. 1 2 8 5 4 0 20
COMMUNIST 10 (1) 29c (3) 47 (2) 44 (1) 29 9 (7) 168
China 0 4 0 13 2 0 19
Soviet Union 2 3 8 8 9 3 31
East Europe (1) 6 18 (6)27 (2)17 (3) 13 (1)5 (13)86
Other Communistd
(excluding Cuba) 2 3 9 6 4 1 25
NON-COMMUNIST 13 27 28 14 31 9 122
United States 5 7 7 3 13 5 40
West Europee 6 15 (2)19 8 17 3 (2)68
Other Non-Communist 2 5 2 3 1 1 14
THIRD WORLD 8 38 35 26 26 5 138
Africa 1 6 9 2 4 0 22
Middle East 4 (10)23 (3) 13 (5)16 (4)12 (2)5 (24)73
Asia 3 (1)5 (1)11 3 (1)6 0 (3)28
Latin America 0 4 2 5 4 0 15
Cuba 0 3 0 2 3 0 8
aEntries begin with 20 April 1966-after the 23rd Party Congress.

bEntries end with 15 March 1971-just before the 24th Party Congress.
CNumbers in parentheses represent general references to the category as a whole and are in
cluded in the total.
dMongolia, North Korea, North Vietnm and the National Liberation Front.
elncludes 2 references to NATO.
~Primarily Japan (a total of 5 references) and Turkey (6 references).
156 RONALD R. POPE
attention paid by the Russians to Latin America. The statements from

which the table was derived appeared in a series entitled "Chronicle of
Soviet Major Foreign Policy Acts Between the 23rd and 24th Party
Congresses" which appeared in International Affairs, numbers 2, 3, 4,
and 5 (Moscow, 1971). As for the completeness and significance of the
statements, the introduction to the first part states that "although it
does not claim to cover all events, the chronicle reflects the consistent
and multifarious activity of the Soviet state in implementing the foreign
policy decisions of the 23rd Party Congress.75 As noted below (see note
77), however, the chronicle is not consistent in reference to the
establishment of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, it does seem to be a
fair representation of Soviet concerns.
The entries in the chronicle cover TASS statements on international
events, official Soviet comuniques and notes, the speeches of Soviet
officials, a few comments from Pravda, official and unofficial state
visits, etc. The statements were classified as to individual country, an
area (e.g., the Middle East), or a category (e.g., communism). The
entries for the Soviet Union are comprised of statements on such things
as treaty signings by the Russians and internal matters (e.g., Party
Congresses) which make no references to other categories, areas, or
individual countries.
The entries ranged from positive (agreement was reached, the visit
was friendly, etc.) to noncommittal (a meeting was held, views were
exchanged) to negative (the actions of . . . were condemned). It is
interesting to note that slightly over half (22 out of 40) of the entires
for the United States were negative references to U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia. Also, there were no really positive entries for
China-with the possible exception of Soviet congratulations to the
Chinese people on the anniversary of their revolution.76
Among the references on Latin America, Cuba, as would be
expected, received the most attention (8 out of 15 entries).
Interestingly, none of the statements was truly positive. Five merely
noted the signing of trade or exchange agreements. One entry referred
to the visit of a Cuban delegation to the Soviet Union to discuss trade
(December 2-15, 1970), and another was a TASS statement to the
effect that the Russians were not going to establish a submarine base in
Cuba (October 14, 1970). Most significant, however, was the
announcement (the entry for June 26-30, 1967) that "A. N. Kosygin
visited Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban government. Alexei Kosygin
and Prime Minister Fidel Castro exchanged opinions on questions of

mutual interest." (Emphases added.) Visits to communist- countries
were generally described in the chronicle as "friendly." The phrase,
"exchanged opinions," seems to be a signal that full agreement on
important issues was not reached.
Seven other Latin American countries received mention-and they
were afforded only one entry each. The mentions, summarized below,
were all noncommital.
Chile: a trade agreement was signed (January 13, 1967).

Colombia: agreement was reached on resuming diplomatic relations
(January 19, 1968).
Ecuador: a trade agreement was signed (March 10, 1969).
Guyana: diplomatic relations were established (December 17,
1970).
Mexico: the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs paid an official
visit to the USSR (May 21-29, 1968).
Peru: Soviet Embassy established in Peru (February 1, 1969).
Uruguay: the Vice President of the Republic and the President of
the General Assembly visited USSR (February 27-March 4,
1969).
Not counting Cuba, references to Latin America (7) were only

one-fourth as many as those for Asia (28), less than one-tenth of those
for the Middle East (73-the 1967 war naturally had an inflating effect
here), and slightly less than one-third of those for Africa (22). In short,
Latin America received noticeably less attention in this chronicle than
did the other areas of the Third World." As would be expected, Latin
America received even less attention compared with areas of more
traditional Soviet interest, e.g., Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and
the United States.
Limits to Soviet Activity
The preceding sections dealt first with the various areas of Soviet
involvement in Latin America and then with the relative lack of
attention paid by the Soviets to this region. Utilizing the evidence
presented above, some of the major reasons for the general absence of
Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere will be presented.
158 RONALD R. POPE
There are also risks inherent in Soviet involvement in this region that
are (theoretically) independent of U.S. actions. For example, along
with the possibility that Soviet support could serve to maintain in
power a rival to Moscow's authority and influence (e.g., Castro), there
is also the possibility that, in spite of Soviet aid, failure could still
occur. The local communists might, for instance, lead or participate in
an attempt to overthrow a government by force, but fail. Moscow could
receive some of the blame for the actions of its "followers," resulting in
a rupture of diplomatic relations with the state involved and possibly
with other Latin American countries. In such event, all of Moscow's
previous gains in the area could well be lost. Further, this type of prob
lem might also lead to troubles for the Russians throughout the rest of
the Third World. (The Soviet Foreign Ministry, which has a large
organizational stake in maintaining stable ties with Third World
countries, would be particularly apt to lobby against Soviet policies
likely to promote revolutions or coups.)
Liabilities would also be incurred by Moscow should an initially
"successful revolution" fail and reaction set in. The Russssians are not
in the same position to militarily "restore order" as they were in
Czechoslovakia. They still lack required military capability and in any
case would run the serious risk of a direct confrontation with the
United States. The Kremlin might therefore simply have to stand by
and watch a socialist state such as Chile go under. That they would find
this difficult to do-both for ideological and political reasons-and, as a
result, would suffer serious losses is suggested by the numerous
comments made about the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. At the
24th Party Congress, Brezhnev seems to have summed up the Soviet
attitude toward "protecting the gains of socialism" when, in reference
to Czechoslovakia, he stated that "the peoples of the socialist countries
clearly demonstrate to the whole world that their revolutionary gains
will not be given up, that the frontiers of the socialist community are
inviolable and not to be encroached upon."82 ( Emphasis added.)
Finally there is also the possibility that a socialist regime might
manage to stay in power but with a noticeable lack of success in
handling the country's social and economic problems. Despite the
country's failure to build a "model socialist system" in an acceptable
time period (i.e., failing to confirm the Soviet claim that adopting
socialism insures rapid development), the Russians might still feel
compelled "to meet their internationalist obligations" and continue to
One of the obvious limitations to Soviet action in Latin America

involves geography. The geographical distance tends to limit physical
contacts between the Soviet Union and the countries in this area. Travel
is naturally less extensive than between contiguous areas, and the
possibilities for Soviet physical intervention are less than they are, for
example, in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. The proximity of Latin
America to the United States which has power capable of blocking
Soviet moves is also a deterrent to Soviet action.
A second limitation is the inadequacy of Soviet resources to devote
to the area. The previous discussions of trade and foreign policy interests
indicate that the Russians have higher priorities for their limited
financial and economic resources. Besides the existence of other
demands on Soviet assets, Moscow appears to be reluctant to invest
substantial resources in Latin America because of the uncertain value of
possible returns. In the past, even when significant resources have been
expended, the Soviets have discovered that they cannot always control
the course of events in their own favor.78 In short, it would seem that
the Soviet leadership feels that, at least for the present, it can gain a
better and more certain return by investing most of its scarce resources
at home and in Third World areas other than Latin America.
Moscow's lack of ability to control the course of events in Latin
America can be traced to three factors: (1) the inability of the Russians
to intervene physically as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, (2) Latin
American nationalism, and (3) the relative independence of local
"leftist" forces, including the communists. The role played by
nationalism, with the resultant extreme sensitivity to "outside
interference," was illustrated by the unprecedented ouster from Mexico
of five Soviet diplomats in unofficial but clear retaliation for Moscow's
supposed involvement in the training of some young Mexican
revolutionaries.79 At least until 1968 Fidel Castro represented the
forces of both nationalism and independent communism. He resented,
and attempted to limit, Russian "interference" in Cuban internal
affairs and generally felt that he knew better than Moscow what was
best for socialism in his area of the world.80
Probably the most important risk to involvement in Latin America
from Moscow's point of view is the possibility of a hostile U.S. response
to Soviet actions. The response could be in the immediate area, or in
retaliation elsewhere, and the result could well be detrimental to other
Soviet interests having higher priority than the Western Hemisphere. 81
160 RONALD R. POPE
support this "socialist" state at considerable cost and with little gain.
(This appears to be what has happened with Cuba.)
That the Russians seem to fear that this last possibility is quite real is
suggested by the numerous references to the thesis that the Third World
countries are not yet ready for a socialist revolution. For example, "the
developing countries constitute a reserve of world socialism, [but] most
of them are not ready to make a direct transition to socialism in the
immediate future."83 The Russians argue that Third World governments
must continue to make use of Western development capital and
aid-which will become less exploitive because of the pressures exerted
by the example of the socialist system (see note 54)-and improve the
utilization of their own resources if they are to develop economically.84
In his 1967 article on "Soviet Policy in Latin America," Herbert
Dinerstein notes that "in a sense, the Soviet Union has been forced into
the very position for which it criticized the Mensheviks in 1917. It
prefers that capital be accumulated before the socialist revolution so
that the new Communist states will have a better chance of success and
not make embarrassing demands upon the Soviet Union."85
The Pattern of Soviet Policy
To what extent does the evidence suggest a pattern to Soviet

involvement in Latin America? The answer to this admittedly rhetorical
question is that there does in fact seem to be a pattern. Portions of it
have already been discussed or implied. This section will bring these
parts together and present the complete picture.
Past Soviet foreign policies can be placed along a continuum going
from revisionist (in the Western as opposed to the communist sense of
this term) to status quo.6 For the purpose of this analysis five points
can be highlighted along this continuum:
1. Openly and militantly revisionist: direct physical pursuit of

change (e.g., the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1921, Trotsky's
thesis of "permanent revolution," and Stalin's subjugation of
Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948).
2. Unobtrusively revisionist: covert instigation of change (e.g.,
the Cuban missile crisis, covert support of "liberation move
ments").
3. Ambivalent: desire for both the success of revisionism and
the security of the status quo-willing to take advantage of change
but hesitant to initiate it (e.g., the policy toward Cuba in the early
1960s and possibly Chile in the 1970s).
4. Quietly status quo: maintenance of ideological front but
conservative actions (e.g., tacit U.S.-Soviet cooperation, dis
couragement of Castroites).
5. Openly and stubbornly status quo: open resistance to change
(e.g., Stalin's policy of "socialism in one country," the Non
proliferation Treaty, the refusal to support the Chinese, and the
Hungarian (1956) and Czech (1968) invasions).
Although Westerners might prefer to see Soviet policy moving in the

direction of at least quiet support of the status quo (number 4 above),
as is evident from the examples given, in the past Soviet policy has
moved left and right along the continuum. It is the thesis of this paper
that current Soviet policy toward Latin America is best explained by
reference to the third category-"ambivalent."
The evidence strongly suggests that Soviet interests in Latin America
are secondary to their interests elsewhere. It would appear that Moscow
wishes to maintain a limit on both Soviet costs and risks in the area. At
the same time, changes are occurring in the United States' "back yard"
that are serving to weaken U.S. influence, but which present
opportunities for increasing Soviet prestige and influence. Both
ideologically and politically the Russians must find these opportunities
tempting. But, particularly given Russia's limited capabilities for
directing the course of events in the area, the emphasis in Soviet policy
appears to be on encouraging anti-American attitudes and independence
from the United States, while attempting to increase Soviet influence
through fairly open and acceptable, and therefore less risky, ways.
Particularly with reference to the latter point, Moscow seems to prefer
diplomatic relations, "mutually profitable" trade agreements, cultural
exchange, and the legal participation of the communist parties in local
politics (even though this would seem to limit their chances of gaining
and keeping power in the foreseeable future-with the exception of
Chile).
To cause a decline in U.S. influence, Moscow appears .to prefer
"progressive"~ anti-American but nonsocialist governments-especially
until these governments can support themselves without substantial
Soviet aid. Reasons for this preference could be: (1) "Progressive"
anti-imperialist governments can be claimed as initial victories for
162 RONALD R. POPE
socialism. (2) They tend, in the Soviet view, to weaken the United
States' position and therefore to strengthen the relative Soviet position
(although not directly adding to Soviet power). (3) They do not require
the massive economic, political, and possible military commitment that
a pro-Soviet socialist government does (e.g., Cuba).17 (4) They do not
appear as a radical shift in the balance of forces (as did the Cuban
revolution) and therefore are less likely to elicit a strong U.S. response
that could be detrimental to Soviet interests (e.g., Soviet prestige as in
the Cuban missile crisis or the Vietnam conflict-in both of which cases
the Russians failed to act as firmly as some other communists,
especially Castro and the Chinese, thought they should). (5) They do
not represent the same potential for ideological and political challenge
as does a relatively independent socialist state such as China, Yugo
slavia, or Cuba.
To the degree that the Russians do believe that the future lies with
socialism they need not worry about the fact that not all the
"progressive" military governments are interested in socialism. (See
note 23.) It is obvious that the nationalism of these governments places
limits on Soviet influence. That their "half measures" and "failure to
involve the masses" (i.e., the communists) are frustrating to the local
communists is equally obvious. Herein may lie a problem for Moscow.
Will the local parties act in a restrained (a "legal") enough manner to
avoid the wrath of the military governments, or will they take actions
(with or without Moscow's consent) which will elicit that wrath (as
may have in part happened in Bolivia)-the end results being both their
own suppression and strained relations between Moscow and the
nationalist military governments?
Edward Gonzalez, a close observer of Cuba and an Assistant
Professor at the University of California (Berkeley), has suggested that
in Cuba the Russians initially desired the type of limited gains and
therefore limited commitment and risk on their part as discussed above.
He argues that the Cuban revolution was viewed as an asset to the
Soviet Union to the extent that it "disturbed inter-American solidar
ity," challenged U.S. dominance in the region, and "diverted Washing
ton's attention from other areas." But, according to Gonzalez, "the
Soviets evidently hoped to realize these limited cold-war objectives with
a minimum of direct involvement in Cuba and with the revolution
retaining its liberationist but noncommunist character. "88
Possibly in part because of its experience with Castro, the Kremlin
seems even more inclined to limit its commitment to revolutions in
Latin America today. In a review of several books on Soviet

involvement in Latin America, Yale Ferguson, a member of Rutgers'
Latin American Institute, suggests that a "key theme" of these books
was that the experience with Castro had reinforced Moscow's policy of
"peaceful coexistence" which had in fact "begun to evolve before the
Cuban Revolution." According to Ferguson, Cuba demonstrated to the
Russians that the total conversion of a Latin American government to
Marxism-Leninism might not in fact serve the Soviet Union's best in
terests. "Such a development," he writes, "could necessitate the massive
diversion of scarce Soviet resources and possibly involve military risks,
without, at the same time, guaranteeing either unwavering political
ideological support or the establishment of a 'showcase' for the
USSR."89 (Emphasis in original.)
This desire to maintain limits on the Soviet commitment is also
suggested by the commentary on the recent events in Chile. Brezhnev's
remarks at the 24th Party Congress0 are notable for their lack of an
offer to help "protect the socialists gains" in Chile-as opposed to the
absolute requirement that they be protected in Czechoslovakia.
According to Brezhnev, the people of Chile and the working people in
the rest of Latin America are rallying to the support of the new regime
(but not the Soviet people?). The commentary appearing in
Mezbdunarodnia Zhizn"91 also fails to mention the USSR's "inter
nationalist obligation" to aid the socialists in Chile, and it does suggest
that the situation there could "return to the worst."
In an evaluation of the recent events in Chile very much along
these same lines, Leon Goure and Jaime Suchlicki, both of whom
are associated with the Center for Advanced International Studies
at the University of Miami, termed the Chilean situation a problem
for Moscow. They argue that, while Allende's victory can be viewed
as a vindication for the peaceful "united front" strategy that has
received Moscow's endorsement, at the same time "events in
Chile may have opened a Pandora's box for the USSR." The
possibility that Chile could become a "substantial economic
burden" for the USSR has been "greatly increased." Further, there
is the possibility that the substantial improvement in Soviet-Chilean
relations already made during the Frei administration could be
reversed if the United Front should fail and reaction set in. They
go on to argue that "since the success of the present Chilean regime
constitutes the strongest vindication of the USSR's Latin American
164 RONALD R. POPE
policy, [its] failure ... would seriously damage the Kremlin's policy
line and prestige in this area.""
This ambiguity that, it has been suggested, exists in Soviet foreign
policy toward Latin America is illustrated in more general terms by a
statement of overall Soviet goals made by Leonid Brezhnev at the 24th
Party Congress in March 1971. He stated that the aims of Soviet policy
were to provide "favorable international conditions for the construc
tion of socialism and communism," to strengthen "the unity and
cohesion of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood,"
to support "the national liberation movement," to defend consistently
"the principle of peaceful coexistence with states having differing social
systems," to rebuff resolutely "the aggressive imperialist forces," and to
save "mankind from a new world war."93
The Soviet Union is peace-loving and wants to strengthen the
socialist system. Yet it wants to support national liberation movements,
while cooperating with the new nations (whether liberated or not?).
Peaceful coexistence is to be defended, but imperialist "aggression" is
to be thwarted. In the end mankind is to be saved from nuclear war.
One might argue that in Soviet theory these statements do not
represent ambiguity or contradiction. In practice, however, it certainly
must be difficult for the Russians to reconcile promoting revolutionary
change with pursuing peaceful coexistence with the West and coopera
tion with the new nations, and combatting "aggression" with avoiding a
new war.
Conclusion: The Future of Soviet Policy in Latin America
Out of the five possible emphases for Soviet foreign policy discussed
earlier, it seems most likely that the "ambiguity model" should
continue to apply to Latin America for the foreseeable future.94 There
are at least five basic reasons for making this assumption: (1) The lack
of deeply established Soviet interests in the area (as opposed, for
example, to the Middle East), coupled with its remoteness from the
USSR and proximity to the United States, will tend to limit the direct
Russian pursuit of gains in the region. (2) This proximity to the United
States, however, will still make it tempting for the Russians to claim
victories for socialism when local groups take an anti-American stand
(e.g., in Peru and Chile). (3) On the other hand, these "progressive"
governments can probably expect little by way of substantial Soviet
aid-unless they can manage to get themselves accepted as true socialist

states as did Cuba-a situation that Moscow is likely to try to avoid in
the foreseeable future. (4) In those areas in Latin America where local
unrest seems most probable (e.g., Haiti) the Russians will likely want to
avoid losing influence to the Chinese or Castro by appearing to be too
conservative themselves and therefore can be expected to at least
indulge in revolutionary rhetoric. (5) At the same time, Moscow will
want to avoid losing the recent gains reflected in her newly won
diplomatic ties and trade relations by having communism appear to be a
threat to the "national independence" of the Latin Americans. This last
problem might be particularly aggravated, as noted above, by an
attempt on the part of the Chilean communist party (quite possibly
disregarding Moscow's expressed wishes) to maintain itself in power in
the face of "reaction" or possible electoral defeat.
In summary, Soviet ideology demands a commitment to "progres
sive" social change in Latin America. (It should be noted that the
leaders' incentive to pay attention to this ideology is heightened by the
fact that it also serves to legitimize their regime and therefore to justify
their personal political and social positions.) The struggle with the
United States and China also prompts the Russians to seek gains in this
area where and when they can, or at least to try to prevent their
opponents from acquiring advantages. At the same time, Moscow has
other more important priorities, and is confronted by the fact that it
does not control events in Latin America. A wrong turn on the road to
socialism might lead to costs and risks for the Soviet Union that could
not be justified by the returns and that would divert attention and
resources from more productive and important tasks. Thus, the
Russians appear to desire a "low profile"95 in Latin America, and it is
probable that they will continue to assume this posture for the
foreseeable future-provided that events allow them this luxury.
NOTES
1. Stephen Clissold, ed., Soviet Relations with Latin America, 19IS?1968: A Documentary
Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 3.
2. Victor V. Vol'skii, the director of the USSR's Latin American Institute, takes a contrary
view, stating that Russia's interest in Latin America began with the "first word of the New
World" in 1530. See Victor V. Vol'skii, "The Study of Latin America in the USSR," in Robert
G. Carlton, ed., Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History,
1960-1968 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 13.
3. Vol'skii, Ibid., p. 20. The other departments are Economics, Foreign Policy and
International Relations, Workers' and National Liberation Movements, Agrarian Problems,
History, Culture, and Geography.
166 RONALD R. POPE
41. Ibid.
42. New Times, December 16, 1970, p. 21.
43. For a Soviet view of trade with Latin America see O. G. Klesmet, "The Significance of
the Socialist System for the Future Economic Development of Latin America," in Carlton, op.
cit., p. 307. For a contrasting western evaluation see Jan. F. Triska and David Finley, Soviet
Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 272.
44. See V. Borovsky's interview with President Figures of Costa Rica in Pravda, February
11, 1971, p. 4.
45. See "Soviet Foreign Trade," New Times, December 16, 1970, p. 22.
46. Triska and Finley, op. cit., pp. 273-280. The quotation is from page 276.
47. Interview with Vladimir Alkhimov, "Soviet Foreign Trade Today and Tomorrow," New
Times, April 7, 1971, p. 10. Also see the interview with N. S. Patolichev, "Soviet Foreign
Trade," New Times, April 14, 1970, p. 19. Mr. Patolichev is the USSR Minister of Foreign
Trade.
48. Patolichev, op. cit., p. 18.
49. Ibid., p. 19.
50. Interview with Vasily Sergeyev, Vice-Chairman, State Committee of the USSR Council
of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Developing
Countries," New Times, January 20, 1971, p. 18. Also see Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party
Congress, op. cit., pp. 13 and 22, and Kosygin's speech, "The 24th CPSU Congress Directives
for the 5-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy for 1971-1975," as
translated in FBIS Supplement, vol. 7 (April 7, 1971), p. 40.
51. V. Shelepin, "The Socialist World and the Developing Countries," New Times, March 3,
1970, p. 21.
52. M. Lavrichenko, "Speculation on the Needs of Developing Nations," International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 8, 1969, pp. 63-68.
53. Ibid., p. 68.
54. M. Lavrichenko, "Who is Responsible for Third World Economic Backwardness?"
International Affairs (Moscow), no. 8, 1968, p. 46.
55. Shelepin, op. cit., p. 23.
56. S. Romanovsky, "Misuse of Cultural Cooperation," International Affairs (Moscow), no.
4, 1967, pp. 56-61.
57. Z. I. Romanova, "The Development of Postwar Soviet Political and Cultural Ties with
Latin America," in Carlton, op. cit., pp. 304?305.
58. Research Study RECS-5 (July 9, 1970), "Communist States and the Developing
Countries: Aid and Trade in 1969," U.S. State Department, p. 11.
59. Ibid, p. 8.
60. Theodore Shabad, "Soviet Union: What Do they Do at Old Lumumba U.," New York
Times, April 18, 1971, section 4, p. 3. Also see Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "Lumumba University: An
Assessment," Problems of Communism, Nov.-Dec. 1971, pp. 64-69.
61. See Thomas Pauken, "A Look Inside Russia: Personal Report From A White House
Aide," U.S. News & World Report, August 2, 1971, p. 65.
62. "Jane's Says U.S. Fleet Declines While Soviet Has a 'Supemavy,' " New York Times,
July 29, 1971, p. 2.
63. See William R. Kinter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Soviet Military Trends:
Implications for U.S. Security, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Special Analysis No. 6, June 1971, pp. 47?49.
64. See Cuba and the Caribbean, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, August 20, 1970, p.
115.
65. R. Tuchnin, "Another Lie," Izvestia, February 28, 1971, p. 2 as translated in Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, March 30, 1971. For accounts of the Cuban incident see the New
York Times for November 15, 1970 (p. 1) and November 18, 1970 (p. 11).
66. Vitaliy Brovskiy, "In Whose Interests?" Pravda, June 2, 1971, as translated in FBIS,
June 4, 1971.
sons. This has opened up opportunities in the military for young men from working class
families. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Quality of Life in the Americas, Reprinted by the Agency for
International Development, pp. 17?19.
19. Jorge del Prado, "Novyi etap?novyee formy borby" (A New State?New Forms of
Struggle"), Pravda, June 25, 1971, p. 4.
20. Ibid. Also see by the same author, "Is There a Revolution in Peru?" World Marxist
Review, January 1971, pp. 17-27.
21. Padilla, et al, op. cit., p. 9.
22. Sec Ibid.
23. Mirskii, op. cit. A recent article in the New York Times describes the end sought by
President Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru as a "cooperative society," neither capitalist nor
communist. According to this article, in a recent speech the President attacked leftists while
hardly mentioning the rightists. He is reported to "believe Peru's small Communist Party is
potentially more dangerous to his nationalist reforming government than the country's
conservatives." Joseph Novitski, "Peru's President Details His Goals," New York Times, July
29, 1971, p. 4.
24. See Research Study RARS-11 (August 3, 1970), "Communist Diplomatic, Consular and
Trade Representation in Latin America," U.S. Department of State. Costa Rica's on-and-off
decision to exchange ambassadors with the USSR was off again as of September 1971. See The
Times of the Americas for May 26, 1971, p. 8; August 18, 1971, p. 5 and September 1, 1971,
p. 7. At the time of this writing no word was available on the status of Moscow's relations with
the new, and probably no longer "progressive," regime in Bolivia.
25. For an explanation by a Soviet official for this growth in diplomatic relations see S.
Gonionsky, "The Soviet Union and Latin America," New Times, February 17, 1971, p. 20.
Professor Gonionsky is identified as the First Vice-President of the Soviet Association for
Friendship and Cultural Co-operation with Latin American Countries. For western views see
John Keep, op. cit., and Tretiak, op. cit., p. 746.
26. See Aguilar, "Fragmentation of the Marxist Left," op. cit., p. 11.
27. See Robert J. Alexander, "Communist Parties of Latin America," Problems of
Communism, July-August 1970, p. 46.
28. For a catalogue of facts, without commentary, on this subject see Crowley, op. cit.
Litvinov of course was given this post on his way down, while Gromyko was on his way up.
29. Benjamin Welles, "Soviet Intelligence Role in Latin America Rises," New York Times,
December 7, 1970, p. 1.
30. See "Mexico Sees Plot by North Koreans," New York Times, March 16, 1970, p. 9.
Also see the newsletter Latin America, vol. v, no. 13 (March 26, 1971), pp. 100-101 and vol. v,
no. 14 (April 2, 1971), pp. 111-112.
31. Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that in their dispute with the Chinese the Russians have even
taken to labeling their own October Revolution as "almost peaceful." "They have also,"
according to Brzezinski, "cited the Hungarian revolution of 1918 and the Czechoslovak coup of
1948 as other examples of such peaceful transitions." The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict,
Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 508.
32. M. Kudachkin and N. Mostovets, "The Liberation Movement in Latin America," in
Carlton, op. cit., pp. 26?33.
33. Niko Schvarz, "Fighting for Popular Unity in Uruguay," World Marxist Review, March
1971, p. 52.
34. Athos Fava, "Victor Codovilla and the Argentine Communist Movement," World
Marxist Review, November 1970, p. 42.
35. Becerra, op. cit., p. 45.
36. Kudachkin and Mostovets, op. cit., p. 31.
37. Alexander, op. cit., p. 40.
38. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
39. Luis Corvalan, "Chile: The People Take Over," World Marxist Review, December 1970,
p. 11.
40. M. V. Danilevich, "Disruptive Socialist Activity in the National-Liberation Movement
and Possibilities for the Movement's Future Cooperation with the Communist Party," in
Carlton, op. cit., p. 57.
168 RONALD R. POPE
4. Edward L. Crowley, ed., The Soviet Diplomatie Corps, 1917-1967 (Metuchen, N.J.: The
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 218-219.
5. Akademiia Nauk SSSR: Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniikh,
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny [USSR Academy of Science: Institute
of World Economy and International Relations, International Relations Since the Second World
War] (Moscow, Politicheskaia literatura, 1965), vol. Ill, p. 604.
6. John Keep, "The Soviet Union and the Third World," Survey, no. 72 (Summer 1969), p.
29.
7. Vol'skii, op. cit., p. 18.
8. For useful and informative discussions of Moscow's initial reaction to Cuba and their
current relationship see Luis E. Aguilar, "Fragmentation of the Marxist Left," Problems of
Communism, July-August 1970, pp. 1-12; Clissold, op. cit., pp. 43-44; W. Raymond
Duncan, "Castro's New Approach Toward Latin America," World Affairs, March 1971, pp.
275?282; Edward Gonzalez, "Castro's Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals and the Soviet
Response," World Politics, October 1968, pp. 39-68; Daniel Tretiak, "Cuba and the
Communist System: The Politics of a Communist Independent, 1967-1969," Orbis, Fall 1970,
pp. 740?764; and especially Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959?1966
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967).
9. Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger,
1969), p. 55. President Allende of Chile is reportedly presenting Chile as the newest and
possibly the most relevant model of transition from capitalism to socialism. See Everett G.
Martin, "In Chile, Marxism is 'Very Special,' " The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 1971, p. 7.
For a detailed discussion of Castro's changing attitude toward his relations with Moscow see
K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1970), especially eh. vi.
10. Broadcast of 8 January 1971 as quoted in Leon Goure' and Jaime Suchlicki, "The
Allende Regime: Actions and Reactions," Problems of Communism, May?June 1971, p. 57.
11. M. Kudachkin and N. Mostovets, "The Liberation Movement in Latin America," in
Carlton, op. cit., p. 30.
12. Leonid Brezhnev, Report to the 24th CPSU Party Congress, Radio Moscow domestic
service (live), March 30, 1971 as translated in Daily Report (Soviet Union), Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, no. 62, supplement 17, vol. 2 (March 31, 1971), p. 14. (This source is
hereafter cited as FBIS.) This speech is also translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol.
xxiii, nos. 12 and 13.
13. G. Mirskii, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, ego tendentsii sovremennom
mire," Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn' ("The National Liberation Movement: Its Tendencies in
Today's World," International Life), no. 7, 1971, p. 26. International Life is the Russian
language version of International Affairs (Moscow). The articles in the Russian edition are
generally translated about one month later for the English edition. Therefore, this article should
appear in no. 8, 1971, of International Affairs.
14. Brezhnev, op. cit.
15. Longino Becerra, "Leninism and topical problems of revolutionary struggle in Latin
America," World Marxist Review, March 1970, p. 45.
16. Juan Cobo, "The Peruvian Phenomenon," New Times, March 17, 1970, p. 21. Also see
Y. Gavrikov, "Peruvian Example," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, 1971, p. 83.
17. See K. Maydanik, "Rol'armii razvivaushikh stranakh," Mirovaia Ekonomika i
Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia ("The Role of the Army in Developing Countries," World
Economy and International Relations), May 1970, pp. 140?141. This is a review of G. I.
Mirskii, Armiia i politika stranakh Azii i Afriki (The Army and Politics in the Countries of
Asia and Africa) (Moscow, Nauka, 1970).
18. See L. Padilla, J. Laborde and E. Sousa, "Latin America: Anti-Imperialist Fight and the
Armed Forces," World Marxist Review, March 1971, p. 87. In his report to the President on
Latin America, Nelson Rockefeller corroborates the first part of this Soviet analysis. According
to Rockefeller, the conservative Latin American landowners are shifting their interests to urban
industrial life, with a corresponding decline in the attractiveness of military service for their
67. Vitaliy Levin, "Dangerous Plans," Pravda, May 9, 1971, p. 5 as translated in FBIS, May
12, 1971.
68. Radio Moscow, May 14, 1971 as translated in FBIS, May 17, 1971.
69. S. Gonionsky, "Crisis in OAS," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 1, 1971, p. 22.
The Johnson quotation is taken from Current History, January 1969, p. 6. Also see L.
Kosichev, "OAS: Mounting Contradictions," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 9, 1970, p.
85; and Oleg Ignatyev, "A Dialog with a Mute," Pravda, April 27, 1971, p. 5 as translated
in FBIS, May 3, 1971.
70. K. Khachaturov, "Anti-Communism in the Latin American Policy of the USA,"
International Affairs (Moscow), no. 6, 1970, p. 50.
71. Theodosio V?rela, "Imperialism Continues to Plunder Latin American," World Marxist
Review, May 1971, pp. 96?103. Also see Radio Moscow broadcast in Portuguese to Brazil, May
7, 1971 as translated in FBIS, May 10, 1971.
72. See for example Radio Moscow broadcast in Creole to Haiti, May 11, 1971 as translated
in FBIS, May 13, 1971.
73. See Jaques Dorcilier, "Courage and Dedication of Haiti's Communists," World Marxist
Review, November 1970, pp. 95?97.
74. See for example Radio Moscow broadcast in Creole to Haiti, May 28, 1971 as translated
in FBIS, June 2, 1971.
75. International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, 1971, p. 91.
76. A separate article discussing these data in detail is planned and hopefully will be
published at a later date.
77. It should be noted that agreements to establish diplomatic relations made in 1969 with
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, and in 1970 with Venezuela were not mentioned in the chronicle.
78. See Uri Ra'anan, "Tactics in the Third World: Contradictions and Dangers," Survey,
October 1965, pp. 26-37 and, by the same author, The USSR Anns the Third World: Case
Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 7-8.
79. See note 30 above.
80. See for example, Edward Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 47-48, 57 and 67?68.
81. Adam Ulam writes that "there is no doubt that the masters of world Communism
would have viewed any ambitious Communist venture in Latin America prior to Castro's
take-over of Cuba with disfavor. Before 1933 recognition by, and after 1933 good relations
with, the United States were considered by the Russians to be of infinitely greater importance
than Communist successes in Mexico or Chile. Even in the most hopeful revolutionary
situations, such as in Mexico in the 1930s, the Russians gave local Communists no
encouragement to strike out for power on their own." Expansion and Coexistence: The History
of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67 (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 645.
82. Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 9. For similar comments also see O. Pavlov, "Proletarian
Internationalism and Defense of Socialist Gains," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 10, 1968,
p. 12; and P. Fedoseyev, "Marxism and Internationalism," International Affairs (Moscow), no.
3, 1969, p. 8.
83. Shelepin, op. cit., p. 20. Also see Kudachkin and Mostovets, op. cit., pp. 29-30; V.
Tkachenko, "Latin America in Search of a Future," International Affairs (Moscow), no. 4,
1971, p. 101; and Longino Becerra, "Latin America Looks to the Future," World Marxist
Review, January 1971, p. 113.
84. See O. G. Klesmet, "Capitalistic Sources for Financing Economic Development in Latin
America," in Carlton, op. cit., pp. 234-241. An article by R. Ul'ianovskii in Kommunist (no. 4,
1971) also emphasizes the need of developing countries to "gradually [break] with capitalism."
The article is translated under the title of "Some Questions of Noncapitalist Development" in
Soviet Law and Government, Fall 1971, pp. 124?140.
85. Herbert S. Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," American Political Science
Review, March 1967, p. 82.
86. William Welch developes a similar but much more complicated "classificatory
scheme"?he takes more than just the protectionist-interventionist factor into account?in his
excellent book, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals
170 RONALD R. POPE
from the Academic Community (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). See especially pages
37-43.
87. A large number of western observers can be found who would probably accept number
3 (Ambivalent) as an accurate description of current overall Soviet foreign policy. For example,
K. J. Holsti states that "there is almost constant conflict among Soviet policymakers who must
attempt to reconcile short-run political and diplomatic goals with an ideological commitment to
support the 'international proletarian movement.' " International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 128. Also see Adam Ulam, op.
cit., pp. 751-752; Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Cold War. . . and After (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 51?54; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexis
tence,' " The New Leader, December 16, 1968, p. 12; and Triska and Finley, op. cit., pp.
312-313.
It is interesting that William Welch's extensive analysis of American academic views of
Soviet foreign policy indicates a definite trend toward a view roughly corresponding to this
essay's "Ambivalent" label (see pp. 280?281). Welch feels that American views, as represented
by books of at least respectable scholarship published between 1958 and 1968, fall into three
distinct categories or images: (1) "ultra-hard": Soviet conduct is "utterly aggressive" and
unchanging (p. 267); (2) "hard": it was originally aggressive but is changing (p. 272); and (3)
"mixed": it is "driven by fear, posing moderate threat to mankind, and moderately changing."
(p. 270) The ultra-hard image clashes fairly directly with our thesis on current Soviet policy
toward Latin America, while the hard and mixed views do not. Welch's Tables 1 (pp. 6?7) and
5 (p. 44) indicate that no ultra-hard book (worthy of inclusion is his survey) has been written
since 1962?63. American Images . . ., op. cit. (The page numbers are for Welch's book.)
88. Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 48.
89. Yale H. Ferguson, "Moscow and Peking in Latin America," Problems of Communism,
May?June 1971, p. 74. The books he was reviewing were J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J.
Strover, eds., The Soviet Union and Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1970); Clissold, op.
cit.; Carlton, op. cit.-, and Cecil Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, 1957?1967
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
90. See note 12.
91. See note 13.
92. Gour? and Suchlicki, op. cit., p. 55.
93. Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 2. For a remarkably similar statement see V. Trukhanovsky,
"Proletarian Internationalism and Peaceful Co-existence," International Affairs (Moscow), no.
8, 1966, p. 54.
94. A similar conclusion is arrived at (from a different perspective) by Walter C. Clemens in
"Soviet Policy in the Third World in the 1970s: Five Alternative Futures," Orbis, Summer 1969,
p. 482.
95. Before it became politicized and popularized in the Nixon Doctrine, the "low profile"
image referred to radial ply tires that appear to need air even though fully inflated. The
question, then, is whether the Russians might not be seeking to remain unobtrusive in Latin
America while nevertheless pursuing in full measure their full range of foreign policy goals. But
the "air" in this case is not a "free good." Our analysis leads us to believe that the "tire" in
question is in fact relatively flat. (Dr. Harvey Sicherman brought this analogy to the author's
attention.)

Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Latin America

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Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Latin America

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World Affairs Institute

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

T raditionally Russia has shown no great interest in the affairs of

amount of attention paid to Latin America by the Soviet Union, all

Soviet ideology requires the "progressive evolution" of politics in

Studies by Soviet Latin Americanists ... have led us to the

As noted above, Castro presented the Russians with their first

economic burden and some risk to the Soviets. She is effectively

countries of Latin America [who] are coming out in support of Chile's

Local communist enthusiasm for the "progressive" military govern

As would be expected, Moscow has diplomatic ties with the

Lumumba University.30 The problem for Moscow (to be discussed in

Local Communist Parties

An important key to Moscow's aims in Latin America lies in the

Strikes, demonstrations, parliamentry activity, seizure of

The dictatorships in the Caribbean countries give the

path to democratic revolution has been closed to them and that

The above comments and similar rhetoric seem to be aimed at trying

Trade and Aid

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1969 as %

With the exception of Cuba, which is of course a special case, Soviet

This is illustrated by the data in Table 2. The irregular pattern is in large

by the underdeveloped country of the communist trade partner in the

The Russians justify their attitude by arguing that they do not

One of the few available Soviet articles touching on the subject of

"Showing the Flag"

Soviet military and commercial vessels will undoubtedly continue to

Direct Soviet propaganda attacks have been leveled against the

America where the Soviet Union feels that revolutionary change is

Latin America's Share of Soviet Attention

aEntries begin with 20 April 1966-after the 23rd Party Congress.

~Primarily Japan (a total of 5 references) and Turkey (6 references).

attention paid by the Russians to Latin America. The statements from

and Prime Minister Fidel Castro exchanged opinions on questions of

Chile: a trade agreement was signed (January 13, 1967).

Not counting Cuba, references to Latin America (7) were only

Limits to Soviet Activity

One of the obvious limitations to Soviet action in Latin America

The Pattern of Soviet Policy

To what extent does the evidence suggest a pattern to Soviet

1. Openly and militantly revisionist: direct physical pursuit of

Although Westerners might prefer to see Soviet policy moving in the

Latin America today. In a review of several books on Soviet

Conclusion: The Future of Soviet Policy in Latin America

aid-unless they can manage to get themselves accepted as true socialist

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