Facts:

In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public

Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the
resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal
drawn vehicles in certainstreets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?

Ruling:
There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548
does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The
authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines”
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest.”

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the
law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances
upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to

determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in
view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of
public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the making of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held:
Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor

anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and
of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."

Azarcon vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving
business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP.
Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla
whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by

BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels
or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was
issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the
truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while
he had made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he
thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property
since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the
BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the
warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan
with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994,
the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its
maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner
filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual

designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was

specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have
jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private
individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer
or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal,

accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public
officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the
petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the
BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he
appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had
authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a
depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

PIMENTEL VS COMELEC
Facts : The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12
senatorial posts. At the time of filing of the Petition, around two months after
the said elections, the 11 candidates with the highest number of votes had
already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of office as
Senators. With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for
the twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent
Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC),
continued to conduct canvass proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and
last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.

Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special
Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in
which the Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and
MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were respectively canvassed. The
SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass proceedings held
before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao
(PBOC-Maguindanao)

Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S.

Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21
MCOCs from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the copy
intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the consistent denial by the
SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by
Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons
of the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and authenticity of
the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing
objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs.

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second

PCOC for Maguindanao. In the proceedings before the NBC, Pimentel’s
counsel reiterated her request to propound questions to PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the SPBOC-Maguindanao.
The NBC, however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel thereafter
moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass

Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC
and SPBOC-Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive
and procedural due process and equal protection of the laws, and in obvious
partiality to Zubiri

In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the
Court, the canvass proceedings before the NBC continued, and by 14 July
2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807 votes)
were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth Senatorial candidates
with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.
After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented
by all the parties before this Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present
Petition

ISSUE

HELD : A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines,
as follows:

SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy is any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local
elections, pre-proclamation controversies refer to matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of election returns
and certificates of canvass

Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for
Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, when it denied Pimentel’s request to question PES
Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and
SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to exclude the second
Maguindanao PCOC.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass proceedings,
properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest the Maguindanao MCOCs at that
stage by questioning PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the alleged
manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such would be tantamount to a
pre-proclamation case still prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166,
even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.

According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic

Act No. 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President and Senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to them by the local boards of canvassers. For the province of
Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the PCOC to the NBC.

Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentel’s request before the
NBC to still question PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOC-Maguindanao regarding the Maguindanao
MCOCs. There is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC
from the national canvass of votes for Senators after its authenticity and due
execution had been determined by the NBC in accordance with the criteria
provided by the law.

This Court finds Pimentel’s argument of deprivation of due process

problematic since he has not established what he is being deprived of: life,
liberty, or property. He was a candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time
he filed the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the canvassing of
votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still ongoing, and no winner for the
twelfth and last senatorial post had been proclaimed. May he already claim a
right to the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass proceedings
and his proclamation as winner, and may such a right be considered a property
right which he cannot be deprived of without due process? These were clearly
substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did not address. Unfortunately,
this Court cannot argue and settle them for him.

Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, did introduce an additional exception to
the prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in elections for
President, Vice-President, and Senators, this Court has already established in
the preceding discussion that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition.
The provisions in question did not materially change the nature of canvass
proceedings before the boards of canvassers, which still remain summary and
administrative in nature for the purpose of canvassing the votes and
determining the elected official with as little delay as possible and in time for
the commencement of the new term of office

GARMENTS AND TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD VS CA

Lorenzo Tañada vs Mariano Cuenco

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado
Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the
SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices
of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from
the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP.
Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the
NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The
issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET
is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of
the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the
Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in
the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This
is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
FACTS:

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected
respondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two seats,
originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the
Constitutional mandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen
Party Senator Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed
the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner
alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ETare
reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party
representatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral
Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tañada's right
as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body
that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made
permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents
contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET
members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the
petition is without cause of action since Tañada exhausted his right to
nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present
action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.

ISSUES:

1.WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter

2.WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee

on Rules for the Senate

HELD:

1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action
against the Senate compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as
members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its
members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but
the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality).The
Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers.
2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of
6 Senate members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without
violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against
partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law
(modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed
mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention
that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When
interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent.
Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP
are valid. WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not
nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party elect more than 3
members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing to nominate, and
the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment
of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under
the discretion of the Chairman. PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or
manner of nomination cannot affect Consti mandate that the Senate is entitled
to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed, since the
Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority
party nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate,
and not the parties, elect on the ET members, brushing aside partisan
concerns. LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is unconstitutional
under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:1.9-member ET mandate violated2.right to elect of
Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate3.process of
nomination effectively superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power)4.SC
arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s proviso of <9 ET member
sunder certain circumstances The refusal of Tañada to nominate mustbe
considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order
to reconcile two applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.

carpio vs executive
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a
defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he
averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control”
over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under
whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the
president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP
and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control
the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large
part subsidized by the national government.

EXTENSIVE ENTERPRISES VS SARBRO

VILLALUZ VS ZALDIVAR
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office
in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an
ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the
removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar
suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After
investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president
then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz
averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be
removed considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The
President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him
since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a
presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and
removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under
the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President
may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential
appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified
under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified
service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line
with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by
law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
courts, or in heads of department”.
ISSUE:
0hether or not Villaluz is under the /urisdiction of the resident to be
remo'edconsiderin$ that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD:
2es.

he president has /urisdiction and not the #i'il ,er'ice.

he resident of
the hilippines has /urisdiction to in'esti$ate and remo'e him since he is a presi
dentialappointee who belon$s to the non3competiti'e or unclassified ser'ice
under ,ec 5
of Republic Act 4o. !6 bein$ a presidential appointee" Villaluz belon$s to
the non3competiti'e or unclassified ser'ice of the $o'ernment and as such he c
an onl) bein'esti$ated and remo'ed from office after due hearin$ b) the
resident of the hilippinesunder the principle that 7the power to remo'e is
inherent in the power to appoint . here is some point in the ar$ument that
the power of control of the resident ma) e+tendto the power to in'esti$ate"
suspend or remo'e officers and emplo)ees who belon$ to thee+ecuti'e
department if the) are presidential appointees or do not belon$ to
the classifiedser'ice for such can be /ustified under the principle that the power
to remo'e is inherent inthe power to appoint but not with re$ard to those
officers or emplo)ees who belon$ to theclassified ser'ice for as to them that
inherent power cannot be e+ercised. his is in line withthe pro'ision of our
#onstitution which sa)s that 7the #on$ress ma) b) law 'est theappointment of
the inferior officers" in the resident alone" in the courts" or in heads
of department .

TAULE VS SANTOS
Facts:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay

Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other
members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.

Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its

nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted.

Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing

respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan
affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in
Catanduanes.
Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the
election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be
presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.

Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest

involving the election of the officers of the FABC.

2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election
protest.

Decision:

Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989

resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers
of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules
and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any

protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the
power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision
over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in
the Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and
the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205
of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang
panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of
the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the
officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the
assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable
circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity
or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the
regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for
not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.

DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the
Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a
quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the
Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina,
Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore,
there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision.

• Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that

public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated
June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said
election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint
anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the
federation of barangay councils.

BORRES VS CANONOY

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTOIN

Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
Attempt to evade or defeat tax
Fraud by wire, radio, or television
False statement or entries
Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with

the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested
for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him
to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on
the following grounds:
He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the
evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna
Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a
local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local
state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark
Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution
Issue:
WON Jimenez was deprived of due process.

Held:
Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government.” Although the inquisitorial power exercised by
the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply
lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition
process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the
prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages:

1. The provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission

of the request &
2. The temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court.

Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as

early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the
evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal
since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for &
ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence,
therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. The Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation
of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a
preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings
which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can
possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the
extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according
to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records &
documents.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil &
administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein &
present their side.

In view of the foregoing premises, the petitioner is ordered to furnish private

respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.