Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Nazis' bid for a European empire was as much a conquest for raw materials as it was an
expansion of 'race and space.'1 Among the raw materials that the German leadership hoped to
plunder was oil, a resource that Germany lacked. Germany's shortage of oil and the Nazis' quest
to achieve oil security affected the course of the war and was a contributing factor in the ultimate
collapse of the Third Reich. Tracing and analyzing Nazi oil policy furthermore illustrates how
Nazi ideology, combined with hubris and wishful thinking, affected the way Nazi leadership
Few nations are blessed with sizable domestic oil reserves. Germany had coal, and it
was through hydrogenation, a process by which coal is converted to synthetic liquid fuel,
that the Third Reich hoped to reduce and eventually eliminate its reliance on foreign oil
imports.2 Hydrogenation was capital-intensive and expensive, but there were economic
reasons in favor of reducing oil imports, the most important being the unfavorable
supplies were vital to a functioning economy and military, and relying on imports to
1/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
meet fuel needs put Germany in a strategically precarious position. Nazi ideology,
which equated independence and its brand of German exceptionalism with economic
The basic technology for hydrogenation was developed before the First World
War, but the ability to produce usable fuel was elusive. German scientists were the most
as oil imports strained the German balance of trade. The Defense Ministry also
supported aid for a synthetic oil industry, calling the project “of utmost importance” to
The private sector, however, showed little enthusiasm for the risk of
commercializing hydrogenation. The start up costs were high, and capital was scarce.
Oil companies were dissuaded by the low cost of natural crude prices, compared with
companies formed during World War I, took the plunge and opened its first synthetic
fuel plant in 1927, with heavy support from the state. The military urged expansion of
the industry, viewing cost as no factor. The Reichwehr, the provisional defense force
allowed under the Treaty of Versailles, advocated in 1930 a large scale expansion of
synthetic fuel plants, along with plants to produce synthetic rubber and fibers. 4
2/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Even with Weimar's support for its nascent domestic hydrogenation industry,
Germany was hardly immune from the developments of the international oil market.
The Great Depression and the drop in demand for oil in the 1930s, combined with
massive new oil discoveries in Texas, made hydrogenation an even worse investment as
international oil prices plunged. Leunabenzin, the synthetic motor fuel produced at IG
Farben's Leuna plant, cost up to ten times as much as Rumanian or American imports. 5
crude equal to twenty-five times the 1933 sale price of Texas crude.6
The National Socialist Party vehemently criticized IG Farben for being the
governing board, and for the monopoly it held on the thus far unprofitable synthetic fuel
program.7 In 1932, two IG Farben officials met with Adolf Hitler, in hopes of convincing
him to call off the party's negative press campaign. The discussion was supposed to be a
half-hour presentation, but turned into a two-and-a-half hour speech, as Hitler grew
excited and assured the executives that synthetic oil, with its promise to end reliance on
foreign oil, fit perfectly into his vision for Germany: “Today, an economy without oil is
German motor fuel must become a reality, even if this entails sacrifices. Therefore, it is
urgently necessary that the hydrogenation of coal be continued.” Hitler promised to halt
the smear campaign against IG Farben and to keep the protective tariffs in place. IG
3/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Farben, in return, removed a few Jews from its top ranks and pledged a generous
IG Farben's synthetic fuel program benefited immediately from the Nazi Party's
and guaranteed markets by setting prices well above market value. In 1934, the
need.9
fuel production. Shortly before Germany remilitarized the Rhineland, Fascist Italy
including a total embargo on oil. Like Germany, Italy possessed no significant domestic
oil reserves. In the end, the economic sanctions did not include oil. Had the League
enforced an oil embargo on Italy, Mussolini complained, he would have had to withdraw
“in a week” for lack of fuel, and the invasion would have been “an incalculable disaster.”
The possibility of embargo was a real threat, and the Allied blockade of Germany was
engrained in the historical memory of the First World War. To many Germans, Hitler in
particular, the surrender of 1918 was caused not by battlefield defeat, but by lack of food
and fuel.10 As the Earl Curzon famously summed up in 1918, the Allied cause “floated to
8 Yergin, The Prize, 312; Goralski et al, Oil and War, 21.
9 Goralski et al, Oil and War, 22.
10 Goralski et al, Oil and War,15
4/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
In September 1936, Hitler unveiled the Four-Year Plan, demanding “to advance
Germany’s motor fuel production with all possible speed and achieve self-sufficiency
within eighteen months.”12 This plan included ten new hydrogenation plants, that could
triple production by 1938. For Hitler, the question of “production costs” of raw
materials was “of no importance.” Shortly thereafter, the Reich doubled the import tariff
on crude oil.13 The resignation of Dr.Hjalmar Schacht, who, as head of the Reichsbank
and acting Minister of Economics, opposed rearmament and Hitler's autarkic policies
because they were unjustifiably expensive, further established the position of the state-
domestic synthetic oil industry, suggests that Nazi support for autarky was based not
only on the grounds of economic necessity, but for political and rearmament purposes.
It was in the spring and summer of 1938,with the prospect of war looming, that
experts in the Four Year Plan Office revised the overoptimistic targets for fuel self-
sufficiency set in 1936. Göring approved in July 1938 the New War Economy Production
Plan, which called for concentrating efforts on items vital for the war effort: synthetic
rubber (Buna), light metals and gunpowder, explosives, poison gas, and petroleum.
Mobilization fuel requirements were also recalculated based on the conflicts that
preceded War War II in Ethiopia, Spain, and the Far East. Specialists in the New War
11 “Floated to Victory on a Wave of Oil” in The New York Times, November 23,1918.
12 Hitler quoted in Eichholtz, Oil and War, 2.
13 Goralski et al, Oil and War, 25.
5/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Economy Production Plan office drastically increased the Wehrmacht's 1936 estimate of
fuel needs from 5-6 million tons annually to nearly 14 million tons, increasing yearly to
By the final years of the interwar period, Germany was less dependent than ever
before on oil imports. In 1940, synthetic fuel was meeting nearly half of German
consumption needs, producing 72 thousand barrels of oil per day. 15 IG Farben officials
assured the Reich, without qualification, that German fuel supplies could eventually be
met wholly through hydrogenation of coal. Investment in synthetic oil was beginning to
pay off, as the cost of synthetic liquid fuel narrowed to a more manageable level of 1.5 to
2 times that of imported refined oil products.16 A year before Germany's invasion of
Poland and the start of the Second World War, Hitler announced that the policy of
autarky, pursued without concern for short-term cost, had overturned the possibility of
[The] German economy is being so constructed that at any time it can be completely independent
from other countries and stand on its own feet. And this is succeeding. The idea of blockading
Germany can even now be buried as an entirely ineffective weapon. The National Socialist State,
with the energy that is peculiar to it, has drawn conclusions from the lessons of the World War.
And now, as before, we hold to the fundamental principle that we would rather limit ourselves in
this or that field should it become necessary in order to make ourselves independent from foreign
countries. Above all, the following decision always will stand at the top of our economic actions:
security of the nation goes ahead of everything else. Its economic existence is, therefore, to be
secured materially in its fullest measure with our own standard of life and our own living space.
For only then can the German army be in a position at all times to take freedom and interests of
the Reich under its protection.17
While Germany was by fall 1938 less dependent on foreign imports than it was during
World War I, it was still vulnerable to foreign attacks on its fuel sources. First, during
14 Eichholtz, Oil and War, 3-4.
15 Yergin, The Prize, 316.
16 Eichholtz, Oil and War, 24.
17 Adolf Hitler, September 1938, quoted in Eichholtz, Oil and War, 15.
6/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
peacetime, Germany still imported over half of its fuel. Mobilization of a navy and
mechanized army—particularly the combined motor and air power necessary to carry
exponential rate. Fuel self-sufficiency may have been possible with more time and
greater investment, but at the start of World War II, it had not been achieved. Second,
imports came not only from Rumania and the Soviet Union, but also the United States,
Venezuela, the Dutch East Indies, and Mexico. These New World trade routes were
especially vulnerable to disruption. Third, the synthetic fuel plants themselves were
conspicuous, easy targets for air raids in the event of war. The Allies specifically
targeted synthetic fuel plants for strategic aerial bombing later in the war. Even with
Nazi politics of expansion to accommodated both its ideological belief that the “tightly
packed racial core” of Germany was unfairly corralled into too little space, and that
participation in the world economy would weaken the German state. Concluding that
March 1938 added the newly-discovered Austrian oil fields in the Vienna Basin, which
7/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
was particularly welcome because of the field's physical proximity to Germany. The
Germans quickly increased production, from 57 thousand tons of crude in 1938 to 1.1
million tons in 1943.20 Also, the seizure of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia later
that year provided the Reich with a rich deposit of lignite, a coal that was particularly
When Nazi Germany attacked Poland in September 1939, following behind the
front lines was the 'Galicia Petroleum Commission,' which made a rapid dash to the
divided the field, and Germany took only the westernmost part, which produced a half
million tons of crude per year, or just over a quarter of the field's total production. The
seizure of the field was quick enough that facilities survived mostly intact. Nonetheless,
inefficient extraction methods by the 350 separate industries operating in West Galicia
meant that the Germans could only maintain prewar production capacity. It was not
until the failure of the 1942-1943 assault on the oil-producing regions in the South
Caucasus that the Germans replaced the inefficient extraction methods with a more
long-term strategy.22
On the Western Front, the Germans captured the oil field in Alsace, but its
controlled sector of Galicia. Of far greater importance, though, were the stockpiles of oil
that German plunder units captured from storage tanks and refineries, including 1
8/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
million tons in France and and half million tons in the Netherlands. Plundered oil from
France and the Netherlands more than replaced the oil spent in the Western Europe
campaign.23
Aside from the Soviet Union, Rumania was a critical source of petroleum for
Germany, but Germany's position there was precarious because German investment
accounted for only .2% of total oil-invested capital. Between 1938 and 1941, new
developments allowed the Germany to pull Rumania, and its crucial oil industry, closer
into its orbit. German economic power, its aggressive annexation of Austria and division
of Czechoslovakia, and its victory over Poland certainly added pressure to cooperate. In
May 1940, Germany reached an agreement with Rumania to swap German arms for
Rumanian oil at a significant discount. By 1941, Rumania was exporting over half its oil
to Germany, about 3.6 million tons per year.24 Nazi leaders were convinced that, with
encouragement, Rumania could double its oil output. However, it was no secret to those
who were better informed that Rumanian fields were on the decline after 1936. As it
turned out, refinery yields failed to live up to Nazi standards, as refinery output steadily
declined between 1939 and 1943, in which year output achieved only 45% of fulfillment
of Nazi plans.25
The decision in late 1940 to invade the Soviet Union was made amidst vacillation
among policymakers about how to proceed. Some scholars suggest that securing the
Soviet Union's extensive oil reservoirs was a decisive factor in Hitler's determination to
9/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
invade.26 In fact, fuel was probably among the strongest arguments not to invade. Even
after Directive 21 was issued in December 1940, which called for preparations to be
made to invade the U.S.S.R. by no later than May 1941, economic and military experts
were still unclear on how the Wehrmacht was going to be able to fight its way to the
When, in November 1940, Herman Göring told head of War Economy and
Thomas was unambiguous in pointing out the risks to Germany's fuel supply posed by
Aviation fuel sufficient until fall 1941, assuming a maximum consumption of 150,000 tons
during the main months of combat. Motor fuel assured only for the march-up and a maximum of
two months' combat, after August supplies exhausted; supplies then only from own production
and imports (Romania, possibly Baku [!]). . . same situation in the diesel fuel sector where
supplies exhausted after mid-August. Heating oil until fall.27
Two weeks later, Thomas reported to Göring that the eastern front “could only be
supplied with fuel for only two months.” Göring replied to Thomas in agreement, but
rather than questioning the sanity of invading the U.S.S.R. with such perilously low fuel
supplies, Göring assured Thomas that the “Baku oil-producing region, too, had to be
seized at all costs.” Göring further argued that once the German forces launched their
attack, the “entire Bolshevik state will collapse,” so there should be no reason to suspect
26 Daniel Yergin, for example, considers the issue of oil a major factor in Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet
Union (Yergin, The Prize, 317). Indeed, there are some suggestions from high-level sources that Hitler did
consider oil as a factor. Albert Speer told interrogators that “the need for oil certainly was a prime motive” in
deciding to invade the Soviet Union (USSBS, “Oil Division Final Report,” 36-39). Given Hitler's apparent
ignorance of the severe risk that Germany faced in opening a second front with no greater than a four-month
supply of petroleum products stockpiled, it would seem odd that the logistical consideration of oil played
anything more than a secondary role in the initial decision.
27 Georg Thomas on February 8, 1941, quoted in Eichholtz, War for Oil, 36.
10/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
the Soviets would destroy of oil facilities. Finally, Göring informed Thomas that he
planned to “meet with Antonescu” to convince him “to have our Romanian [oil] resource
Hitler read Thomas' reports with rage, calling his insufficiently optimistic
appraisals “defeatist reports” and “pure fantasy.”29 Initially, Hitler and Göring's
assumption that the war would end in a matter of weeks seemed justified, as the
Germans quickly drove back the disorganized Soviet forces. 30 However, there were early
signs that Nazi leadership had fatally miscalculated supply needs, as vehicles burned
twice as much fuel as expected on tough Russian terrain and large vehicles sank into
unpaved roads. Warnings of fuel shortages went ignored amidst more welcome news of
early victories.31
Bogged down in mud and snow, the Wehrmacht only reached the outskirts of
Moscow in fall 1941, and by then, critical time had been lost. The Luftwaffe was
increasingly being grounded for lack of fuel, leaving infantry and panzer divisions
exposed. Not only quartermasters, but commanders also complained of the “wretched
state of our fuel supplies.”32 As winter set in, engines seized, gasoline froze, and
lubricating oil turned into a thick tar. By then, both German soldiers and Nazi
28 Georg Thomas and Herman Göring quoted in War for Oil, 36. The assumption that the Soviet state would not
survive the initial assault was widespread. Of the eastern war, Hitler boasted that “we'll kick the door in and the
house will fall down” (Yergin, The Prize, 318).
29 Hitler quoted in Goralski et al, Oil and War, 53.
30 Adolf Hitler believed the war would be over in three weeks; Field Marshall Walther von Brauchitsch predicted
that major operations would be over within four weeks. Georg Thomas himself believed a quick war was
possible and in fact necessary to prevent the destruction of Soviet fuel stores and infrastructure and to solve the
issue of transporting oil and supplies to and from the South Caucasus (Goralski et al, Oil and War, 55).
31 Yergin, The Prize, 318.
32 Goralski et al, Oil and War, 81-82.
11/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
policymakers alike had awakened to the reality that a quick victory was beyond reach.
If the Russo-German war was not a war for oil in 1941, it was by 1942. The issue
of oil supplies had become a pressing enough that it was the oil-rich Caucasus, and not
Moscow,33 that became the Nazis' priority in the Soviet Union. In an attempt to “seize
the initiative again,” Hitler ordered that the northern front be extended to meet the
Finns, the central front to stand ground outside Moscow, while the southern flank broke
The thrust towards the Caucasian oil fields began in late July 1942. The line was
to move over 200 miles to reach Maikop, and 750 miles to reach Baku, a city literally
swimming in oil. Panzer units reached the nearest installations in Maikop in the second
week of August. For Nazi leadership, it was critical that the oil fields be captured with
minimal damage so that oil could quickly be extracted. Hitler even entertained the idea
of using a local coup to capture the oil facilities, employing insurgents disguised in
Soviet uniforms. Paratroops were supposed to land in order to keep the element of
surprise.35 But when the technicians from the 'Oil Brigade' examined the fields, they
reported back that the Maikop fields were “as thoroughly scorched as an oil field can
be.” The Soviets had demolished everything, pouring concrete into the wells and
destroying even the small hand tools in workshops. Restoration of the fields to
producing condition was difficult enough, but the task of the Oil Brigade was toughened
33 In August, Hitler briefly shifted the war strategy from attacking Moscow to seizing the Crimea (which Hitler
believed could be used as a staging ground for air assaults on Ploesti) and the industrial region on the Donets,
and to sever the Soviet oil supply from the Caucasus (there seems to be no indication that Hitler intended on co-
opting Caucasian oil). The führer later changed his mind.
34 Directive No. 41, April 5, 1942.
35 Eichholtz, War for Oil, 95-96.
12/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
by heavy resistance from Russian partisans, who repeatedly infiltrated and blew up
installations. Logistical problems also hampered repairs, as the roads and bridges into
On November 21, oil production in Maikop resumed under Nazi control, just as
the Red Army completed its encirclement of Stalingrad. Production was pathetic.
Experts believed that Maikop could perhaps produce 6 to 10 thousand barrels per
month, and that production could expect to reach 50 to 70 thousand tons per month
only by the end of 1943. In reality, the Germans probably produced no more than a
thousand tons of oil, because already by late December 1941, the Wehrmacht was
pushed back from Maikop. In January, the oil fields were evacuated of personnel, and
marked the greatest extent of German imperialism and the turning point of Nazi
Germany's quest to exploit foreign oil. Like Japan, Germany had gambled on its ability
to achieve oil security by conquering a foreign source of oil before its stockpiles
depleted. Unlike Japan, Germany failed. The Germans did not conquer the ultimate
prize of the oil fields at Baku, nor were they able to bring the field that it did conquer—
Maikop, a field that was already in terminal decline—to a level of production that would
justify the cost. Furthermore, with an overextended front and an overextended baggage
train, the Nazis could only defend their unproductive field for a matter of weeks before
13/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
losing it to the Red Army. With the prospects of exploiting foreign oil dissipating, the
At first glance, petroleum shipments to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease appear
paltry. Of all refined petroleum products shipped through Lend-Lease (including fuel,
lubricants, and additives), only 5% went to the Soviet Union—compared with the 74%
that went to Great Britain.38 However, comparing such broad statistics downplays the
importance of the aid that was delivered. Much of American Lend-Lease aid was highly
specialized materiel and equipment that was more important to the Soviet war effort
Unlike the Axis powers, the Soviet Union never experienced a major fuel crisis,
with the exception of an anxious moment in late 1942 when the German Army took the
decaying Maikop fields and threatened the more productive Baku fields. Operational
and regional shortages of fuel were more a result of logistical problems, not supply
problems. The issue for the Soviet Union was not quantity, but quality of oil. Although
the entire refining capacity of the Soviet Union immediately before and during the
Second World War was imported from the West or designed using Western
technology,39 Soviet refineries were dated and in poor repair, and could not produce
14/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
delivered to the Soviet Union, nearly half was high-octane aviation fuel and over a
quarter was specialized blending agents.40 Throughout the entire course of the war, the
U.S.S.R. imported approximately a quarter of its aviation fuel through Lend-Lease, 41 but
at the peak of Lend-Lease deliveries, aviation fuel shipments was equal to one-and-a-
The petroleum data also does not show the extent of equipment transferred to the
aviation lubricant plant, and two desalting and dehydration plants. 43 Deliveries of
petroleum cracking equipment was estimated to be able to increase the output of high
octane aviation fuel from 110,000 metric tons in 1941 to a maximum of 1.67 million
metric tons in 1944 (the U.S. Office of Strategic Services estimated this to have
believed to have been made operational too late for the war.45
Another important aspect of Lend-Lease that the statistics do not elicit is the
technology transferred to the Soviet Union beyond equipment deliveries. Early in the
war, Standard Oil of New Jersey pioneered the development of new aviation lubricants
suitable for cold weather. The Soviet Union both imported and manufactured aviation
lubricants. At the request of the U.S. Petroleum Administration for War (P.A.W.),
15/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
available to the Soviet Union.46 Unlike the Allies, Germany did not possess such
lubricants to make cold weather operation possible. The Wehrmacht's motor equipment
therefore sat mostly immobile during the winter.47 At the request of the State
Department and P.A.W., Jersey Standard also agreed to share its research on addressing
the Soviet Union with technical data, refinery and plant designs, and pilot
manufacturing plants for the production of high-octane aviation fuel, lubricants, alcohol
Some scholars verge on arguing that the Soviet war machine (and potentially the
entire war) was dependent on Lend-Lease aid, while others, especially Soviet scholars,
have argued that Lend-Lease played an insignificant role in the Soviet victory. At least
with regards to meeting the Red Army's fuel needs, the actual contribution of Lend-
Lease lies somewhere in between, but probably closer to the former than to the latter.
By the outbreak of Russo-German war, the Soviet Union could barely meet its
own fuel needs, and indeed had considerable trouble providing the oil it was contracted
sell to Nazi Germany before the invasion.50 Its transportation network was
overburdened and its refineries were inadequate—a problem worsened by the U.S.
embargo on the Soviet Union of plants, plans, licenses, and technical data following the
16/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Soviet attack on Finland in the 1939-1940 Winter War.51 The German advance in 1941
also forced the mass evacuation of refinery equipment and staff from cracking plants
along the western borders of the Soviet Union. As a result, oil production fell
The turning point of the war on the eastern front was in 1943 at Stalingrad and
Kursk. The Red Army enjoyed numerical superiority, but the increasing size of the Red
Army that allowed the Soviet Union to repulse the Germans back to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop line by the end of 1943 created new logistical demands. Ammunition
consumption by the Red Army doubled between 1942 and 1943, and total fuel needs
increased by a quarter.53 The Soviet Union rebuilt refineries and diversified drilling, but
at the same time relied on steadily increasing imports of refined petroleum products. To
maximize its war effort, the Soviet Union needed refined petroleum products,
equipment and plants, and improvements in technology. Lend-Lease provided all three,
and helped alleviate the Soviet Union's tight production capacity and manpower
shortage.54
The United States furnished $12.5 billion in material assistance through Lend-
Lease, of which over $43 million was petroleum refining equipment and $111 million in
petroleum products.55 The U.S. used its strong economy, relative invulnerability, and
incomparably productive oil industry to aid the Soviet war machine. While it is difficult
17/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
to say exactly how these shipments affected the Soviet war effort, it is clear that Lend-
Lease was a crucial part of the Soviet war economy. The typical Soviet-era argument,
that the shipments were insignificant at the most critical times, is undermined by the
specificity of Soviet aid requests and the animosity among Soviet policymakers towards
any proposals that could have reduced Lend-Lease aid.56 American petroleum products
and refining technology was directed specifically toward fueling Soviet air power, and
without that material and technical petroleum aid, Soviet air power would have been
Germany's Retreat
Air raids on German oil refineries and synthetic oil plants in May 1944 caused a serious loss of
production, especially for high octane aviation fuel, which could only be produced
synthetically.57 Heavy bombing was destroying these facilities faster than they could be rebuilt,
and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit.58 Drastic measures were required. The loss of
56 A telling example of this occurred on June 1, 1942, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Soviet Foreign
Minister Vyacheslov Molotov of an impending reduction in Lend-Lease shipments from 4.1 to 2.5 million tons
over the course of the fiscal year in order to make shipping available for the opening of the second front in
Western Europe. Roosevelt may have expected Molotov to respond positively to the opening of the second front,
but Molotov fumed at the prospect of reduced shipping to accommodate a second front. The Soviet minister
feared cuts to “such non-military supplies as metals and railroad materiels, which have a direct bearing on the
solidarity of the present front” and cuts that would “impose restrictions on the Russian rear, e.g. on electric
plants, railroads, and machinery production,” which were “comparatively vital.” Roosevelt in turn suggested
that a strong second front (which the Soviets had been persistent in requesting) would help bring the second front
closer to Berlin. Molotov responded that the second front would be stronger if the first front still stood (Tuyll,
Feeding the Bear, 32). There are also numerous contemporary accounts of Josef Stalin expressing gratitude for
Lend-Lease shipments and technological and industrial support from the U.S.
57 Cooke et al, Target: Hitler's Oil, 140-141.
58 USSBS “Summary Report (European War),” 9. The report also notes the frequency with which oil plants were
attacked, and the speed with which they were rebuilt: “The story of Leuna [hydrogenation plant] is illustrative.
Leuna was the largest of the synthetic plants and protected by a highly effective smoke screen and the heaviest
flak concentration in Europe. Air crews viewed a mission to Leuna as the most dangerous and difficult
assignment of the air war. Leuna was hit on May 12 and put out of production. However, investigation of plant
18/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
the Rumanian Ploesti oil fields to the advancing Red Army in August added further impetus. On
May 31, 1944, Adolf Hitler created the aptly-named position of General Commissioner for
Immediate Measures under Albert Speer's Armaments Ministry to solve the fuel crisis. Hitler
granted the appointee, Edmund Geilenberg, expansive powers: “He is responsible for tackling
the work turned over to him with a generous supply of manpower and material and reckless
energy. The speed of his work is not to be impaired either with formal or regional obstacles.”59
Geilenberg was given unlimited authority to requisition labor and materials, and commanded at a
petroleum products production to underground and dispersed facilities. Ideally, these facilities
would have eventually produced 82% of Germany's aviation gas, 25% of motor gas, 67% of
aviation lubricants, and 88% of diesel fuel, based on January 1944 consumption levels. Several
records and interrogation of Leuna's officials established that a force of several thousand men had it in partial
operation in about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28 but resumed partial production on June 3 and reached 75
percent of capacity in early July. It was hit again on July 7 and again shut down but production started 2 days
later and reached 53 percent of capacity on July 19. An attack on July 20 shut the plant down again but only for
three days; by July 27 production was back to 35 percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29 closed the plant
and further attacks on August 24, September 11, September 13, September 28 and October 7 kept it closed down.
However, Leuna got started again on October 14 and although production was interrupted by a small raid on
November 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity by November 20. Although there were 6 more heavy attacks in
November and December (largely ineffective because of adverse weather), production was brought up to 15
percent of capacity in January and was maintained at that level until nearly the end of the war. From the first
attack to the end, production at Leuna averaged 9 percent of capacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the
Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF. Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out of production, many of these
missions mere dispatched in difficult bombing weather. Consequently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leuna
was not high as compared with other targets. To win the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were
flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.” (USSBS
“Summary Report [European War],” 42)
59 USSBS “Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany,” 1. There is no recent, complete technical
overview of the German domestic oil industry, but the United States Strategic Bombing Survey provides the best
and probably most reliable overview. The study is based on the close examination of German industrial plants,
cities, and other targets, and includes statistical data as well as information from interviews and interrogations of
“virtually all” surviving political and military leaders.
19/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
German technocrats stated after the war that they had proposed a similar measure as early as
1940. They reported that they were told that the war would have ended by the time these hidden
plants could have been constructed, and moreover were threatened with detention in labor camps
The entire program called for 140 separate facilities at a cost of 1.4 billion Reichsmarks
and a year's worth of labor from 200,000 men. Scarcity of manpower and materials, and the
advance of the Allies, required Germany to cut the program in half in the final months of the war.
By the end of the war, these facilities were operating far under capacity, having only produced
about 1 million barrels of motor gas and diesel fuel. Desperately needed aviation fuel was not
It would be nearly impossible to argue that the collapse of the German oil industry either
precipitated the collapse of the German economy as whole, or that it brought about the fall of the
Third Reich. It is however very probable that the failure of the oil industry was a contributing
factor in Germany's defeat. The U.S. Strategic Bombing, referring to the Kriegseilbericht (War
Express Report) produced by Nazi policy planners, noted that industrial capacity of Germany
The most striking result of this emergency industrial survey is its indication of well maintained
production almost to the end of 1944, in the face of the accumulated stresses of a long war and
intensive efforts at aerial destruction of the German industrial machine. The Kriegseilbericht
shows that industrial activity in November stood at approximately 95 percent of its second
60 Ibid. Interestingly, the USSBS report on the underground and dispersal plants suggests in its concluding remarks
that the program, had it started earlier in the war (and been more carefully planned), could have created a
synthetic industry “relatively safe” from bombing (USSBS “Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater
Germany,” 1). Some of the schemes verged on the absurd; one involved the covering of a mountain with a thick
layer of concrete, and then excavating the mountain, leaving behind a large mountain-shaped concrete shell
(USSBS “Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany,” 65.).
61 USSBS “Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany,” 2-4.
20/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
quarter level, and by December had lost another 10 percent of its April-June rate. Only in January
1945 did the further loss of industrial areas and the mounting effects of aerial attack cause a
pronounced recession of output, foreshadowing the almost complete breakdown of the next
months.62
By contrast, the German oil industry, which was a high priority target for the Allies, collapsed
very quickly. In December 1944, while the total production figures were around 85% of the
second-quarter 1944 level, refined petroleum production was below 40% of that of first-quarter
The synthetic oil sector was of higher priority for Allied bombing than was the crude oil
industry because of the greater range of products synthetic oil yielded. Synthetic oil made from
hydrogenation, unlike crude oil extracted from the ground, produced not only aviation fuel, but
also nitrogen, which was needed for explosives and for agricultural use, and methanol, used for
high explosives, and synthetic rubber. The attack on synthetic oil plants resulted in severe cuts in
production of all of those resources.64 The synthetic oil industry therefore collapsed much more
rapidly than the crude oil industry did, falling in December 1944 to 16% of its peak production
rate, and March 1945 falling to 3%. Crude oil production rates, by contrast, had fallen to 24% of
peak production by March 1945—a critical loss, but still less devastating than the losses dealt to
Ironically, the underground and dispersal plants that were ordered in response to
disruption. The plants were dispersed too widely, and, as a result, were especially
21/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
dependent on railroad networks, which were by fall 1944 targets for Allied bombing. 66
Attacks on sources of electrical power, fuel, and input coal also disrupted production. 67
The assault on the synthetic industry, which produced 95% of Germany's aviation
fuel, caught the Luftwaffe in a fatal trap. Operating at just one-tenth its minimum
required fuel in fall 1944, the German air force could no longer defend against bombing
raids, exposing the German oil industry to further bombardment. 68 The fighting
continued for several months, but the Wehrmacht paralyzing lack of fuel made major
Conclusion
Interwoven within the history of oil in the Second World War is a remarkable tension
priorities of the Nazi regime. The buildup of the synthetic oil industry is one instance
where the two coincide, as the domestic industry alleviated the burden on Germany's
foreign exchange, all the while isolating Germany from the world economy and
furthering the goal of achieving autarky. However, Hitler's calls for rearmament, along
with the wildly irresponsible targets for fuel self-sufficiency set by the Nazi regime and
even IG Farben executives, clearly shows priorities divorced from the realities faced by
the industry.
In dealing with oil issues, the führer and top Party leadership repeatedly let
22/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
hubristic visions and hopeful thinking based on Nazi ideology overrule even the most
practical of considerations. Among the egregious offenses to reason in this regard was
the decision to invade the Soviet Union with only enough fuel to sustain operations for a
matter a weeks. Worse was that Nazi policymakers were quite aware of this problem,
but shrugged the issue off based on the assumptions that the Soviet bureaucracy and the
Soviet people would be unable to sustain a war against Germany, that Rumanian oil
fields in terminal decline could somehow double their production in a very short
amount of time, and that the oil fields at Baku deep into Soviet territory could be
reached and exploited in enough time to alleviate any potential fuel crisis. Even
Wehrmacht's push in 1942 to take the South Caucasian oil fields was based on
shockingly stupid logic—how could Hitler have believed that Maikop, a region located
well behind Soviet lines, could be captured intact and spared of sabotage without any
element of surprise, and when refineries on the western borders, for example, were fully
evacuated of equipment and personnel when the Wehrmacht did have the element of
surprise? The campaign to capture Soviet oil fields made practical sense, but the
apparent belief that the Wehrmacht, already overstretched in 1942, had the logistical
capacity and strength of force to reach the oil fields, capture them by surprise and to
prevent sabotage, and defend the installations can only be explained by hubris
The fate of Georg Thomas, the Nazi strategist who correctly predicted the
23/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
telling example of Hitler's attitudes towards views that did not follow in lockstep with
Nazi political correctness. Thomas was sacked in January 1943, just the Oil Technical
Brigade withdrew from the Maikop oil fields and the veracity of his warnings was
beyond questioning. General Wilhelm Keitel told Thomas that: “I must concede to you
today that your warning and economic judgments before and during the war were
correct. But you have made yourself intolerable to the Führer and the Party by
expressing those views loud and often. Hitler has made clear that he has no use for men
Paul Kennedy's argument, that the economic capacity of the Allied powers
overwhelmed the Axis powers in the long-run, rings true in the case of oil. 70 While
Germany was cut-off from the foreign imports that had supplied it during the 1930s, the
Allies possessed both crude oil sources in the United States, in Latin America, in the
Soviet Union, and in the Middle East, as well as the means to ship petroleum products
through pipelines and oceangoing tankers. When German air power was left grounded
with no fuel or immobilized by solidified engine lubricants, the Soviet Union could rely
on Lend-Lease shipments to fill the critical need for aviation fuel and cold-weather
lubricants, along with other specific oil products and refining equipment.
peacetime, but they were ultimately incapable of matching the production and logistical
capabilities of the Allies, and were insufficient and vulnerable in prolonged war.
69 General Wilhelm Keitel quoted in Goralski et al, Oil and War, 53-54.
70 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 347-357.
24/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
As the war shifted against Germany, Nazi policymakers held a persistent dream
that fortunes could be reversed at the final hour by a 'wonder weapon.' 71 The Third
Reich spent liberally on technologies that ultimately had at most a negligible effect on
the course of the war, or simply could not be used because the Reich lacked more basic
requirements. A particularly illustrative example can be found in the case of the Me-
262, the world's first operational jet-powered fighter, which was taxied to the runway by
oxen to save on fuel consumption. The hydrogenation plants were a technical feat
elude Allied bombers were similar to the 'wonder weapons' that turned out to be
unfeasible. For all its speed in the air, the Me-262 was highly vulnerable on the runway,
and for all trouble went through to bury hydrogenation plants, they proved just as
vulnerable as any other plant, as attacks on more exposed infrastructure like railways
Germany's shortage of oil, and its quest for new sources, played an important
factor in the collapse of the Third Reich. The qualitative question of exactly how
important oil was is a debatable matter. An Allied victory was hardly inevitable, so there
were certainly other factors that led to Germany's defeat, such as battlefield
effectiveness or more moral causes.72 Oil operated as an economic factor, and the
United States' and the Soviet Union's high production capacity and relative mastery of
71 Overy, Why the Allies Won, 240. Richard Overy disagrees with the 'overwhelming force' argument, that the
Allies defeated the Axis based on their superior economic power, but by analyzing the failure Germany to
produce any return on 'wonder weapons,' he also strengthens the argument that the weakness and disintegration
of the German economy was at least a major contributing factor to Germany's defeat.
72 Overy, Why the Allies Won, 325.
25/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
shortages and overstretched logistical capacities, helped the Allies win the war.
Furthermore, an examination of Nazi Germany's quest for oil also reveals Nazi
26/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Bibliography
Anonymous. “Floated to Victory on a Wave of Oil” in The New York Times, November
23, 1918.
Cook, Ronald. Target: Hitler's Oil: Allied Attack on German Oil Supplies, 1935-1945.
Eichholtz, Dietrich, trans. by John Broadwin. War for Oil: The Nazi Quest for Oil
Goralski, Robert and Russell W. Freeburg. Oil & War. New York: William Morrow and
Hayes, Peter. Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era. Cambridge:
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Larson, Henrietta M., Evelyn H. Knowlton, and Charles S. Popple. History of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey): New Horizons, 1927-1950. New York: Harpers &
Row, 1971.
Leeuw, Charles van der. Oil and Gas in the Caucasus and Caspian: A History. New
27/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Mazower, Mark. Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. New York: Penguin
Books, 2009.
Pearton, Maurice. Oil and the Romanian State, 1895-1948. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1971.
Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996.
Stokes, Raymond. “The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945” in The Business
Tuyll, Hubert P. van. Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945.
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. “1. Summary Report (European War).” United
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. “2. Over-all Report (European War).” United
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. “112. Underground and Dispersal Plants in
United States Strategic Bombing Survey. “134. Over-all Economic Effects Division
28/29
Jonathan Morales December 18, 2012
World War II on the Eastern Front
Weeks, Albert. Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Free
Press, 2009.
29/29