G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 7.
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo)
filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of
divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch
43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the
court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a
petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December
6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in
fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the
event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to
leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et
al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent
of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article
26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to
her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van
Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a foreigner
and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the
latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.15
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family
Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code,
a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was
originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),
but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres.
Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee,
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married
to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to
a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband
or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to
be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement
for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband,
who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement,
which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect.
There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen,
against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that
was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied
the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy;
that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the
case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the
foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the
Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court, which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.
In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently,
she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven.
Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine
and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without
dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the
Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition
until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. "
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound
by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths
of the lawmakers.37 "The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in
the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband
or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected to
judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial
scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel,
and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest,
public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the
same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President, which
have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the
court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one
of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or
her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary.
There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien
spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the
bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed
in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically
apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If
the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts
will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data
whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to prove. Second,
We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts,58 that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that
the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact,60 that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or
immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take
judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or
at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner
Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But
now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry
the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective
March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on
the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the
part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred
upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an
E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the
Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various
sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116,711062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled
"An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in
the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted
by the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on
February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the
bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as
follows:
The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code,
modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being
a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family
Code, restated as follows:
The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-one (21),
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party,
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband or wife;
either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;
Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and
Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection found
to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at
the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36
of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery
or transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in
the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest
and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish
a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country.77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A.
No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No.
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"),
as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court
must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity
of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under
the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution
is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is
that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage.
Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of
rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that
the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import
a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law.87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce
the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the
divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign
court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not
denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the
ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on
persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN,
JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of
86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3
million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just
as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to
prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against
Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed
by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by
women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March
27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts
of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission
of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities
of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
social workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed,
for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil
Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262.
She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years
old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3)
children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural
child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie
Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife,
whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand,
petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately
isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when
she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized
her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was
often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a
bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the
godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted
to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank
manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just
using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private
respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their
quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and
shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At
another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips
that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on
their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-
Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private
respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to
stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up.
Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings.
Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up
his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent
to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son
bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of
taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for
about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit,
nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent
has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-
depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's
Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager,
petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He
then packed his things and told private respondent that he was
leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who
lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just
accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she
is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she
goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the
construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations –
326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said
corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the
use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation
together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00
from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash
advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from
the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the
affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has
not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the
value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective
for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal
dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be
removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein)
to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police
officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent
will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila
and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all
her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and
shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may
be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through
other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother
and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the
like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO
in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms
and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel
all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to
surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children,
including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and
other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006
up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later
than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall
be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support
pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a
single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court
issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the
continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are
using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the
house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the
peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the
sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per
month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00)
per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the
denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of
hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing
one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more
manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but
subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other
personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus
Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and
equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling
within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order
by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make
an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in
the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00
for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic)
children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed
firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the
children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial
support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new
acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She
alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros
Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president,
with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van
used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen
with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone
and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two
men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized
the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another
occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the
arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police,
and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father
for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by
the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said
home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her
things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room,
private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30)
days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and
her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva
Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona
and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the
three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber
firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a
month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to
September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to
August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the
amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate
No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should
the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in
the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located
in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-
2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-
168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B.
Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to
any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of
petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner
Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the
encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a
period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed
in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August
23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally
terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23,
2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each
expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's
motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-
SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2)
the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary
Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil
case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly,
the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the
protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral
attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been
denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now
before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT,
THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of
the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-
G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily
it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will
not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family
Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369,
otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with
said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several
key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned
law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or
any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City
remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization,
admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity
to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but
in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that,
"plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or
law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as
follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before
the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the
same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against
Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure
requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not
an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since
a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be
excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of
a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that
a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a
counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is
not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of
the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection
order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is
being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature
should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is
one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be
that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless
allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the
need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the
following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been
marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which
shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day
period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued.
(Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the
conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-
10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due
to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a
period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It
may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection
order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the
private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed
to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul
of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a
superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However,
Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of
a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO
issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was
improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal
course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before
judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more
reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or
invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their
entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are
not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune
from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the
trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing,
however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from
our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression,
with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged
our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to
the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and
criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be
committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor,
Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized
measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special
attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied
protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and
relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this
would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the
main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the
spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to
place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women
who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do
not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men
are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here
members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-
in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion
whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue
of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be
having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during
the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the
measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a
need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women
who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses,
their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If
we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at
all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not
equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs
with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love
their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or
not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given
equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the
macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee
came up with this bill because the family members have been
included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While
women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally
why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children
are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that
there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic
Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs
of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for
one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the
same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify
their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our
courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations
and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I
recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights
and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include
other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups
and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other
senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the
Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment
of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the
net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito
Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the
proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she
is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the
amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale
used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter
of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong
babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na
talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we
remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much
abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is
not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-
old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And
it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully
prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the
aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into
the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may
be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and
it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to
seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It
is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis
supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be
discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences
... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National
Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment),
violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions
dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society.
This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a
form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human
rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on
Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993
stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social
context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to
eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching
of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence
against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to
use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in
patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in
virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave,
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were
treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat,
or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the
patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over
women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his
commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one
was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire
1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to
chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no
thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States
followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court
of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a
stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the
floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by
our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the
law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became
more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues
had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the
root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon,
however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the
feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming
the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United
States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two
million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male
partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude
the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who
are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double
the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per
year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all
women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during
their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly
11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many
of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife
beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence
is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps
because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women
who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in
large part because they have no other source of income... Returning
to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims
in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of
female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence
Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no
less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly
held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps
of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II
of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of
women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the
CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted
Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."
(Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official
statistics on violence against women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in
2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the
first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354
cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417
physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases.
xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471
cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised
more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
 Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight- recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases
9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its against our women.
implementation in 2004,74 thus: In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
2004 - 2011* derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in
a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a
*2011 report covers only from January to August live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011National Police – Women and Children Protection
Source: Philippine "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called
Center (WCPC) her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender
incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men sensitivity.
997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination
32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not
incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that
spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination
physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625 years of physical or emotional abuse.76
the result of many on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
R.A. 9262 invalid. domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in prosecution and the judges."85
receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle- II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women
equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
53 37 38 46 18 54 83drivers of vehicle-drawing
63 animals and not to those animals, although SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State
not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets. values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse family and its members particularly women and children, from
the city roads,9,021
"but their number must be negligible and their violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974
appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the committed against women and children in keeping with the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
result in actual213inequality is not violative of the right to equal provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
319 223 199 182 220 208 374
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
rendered invalid.78 human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
62 19 29 30 19 19 25C. Gender bias 15and prejudices In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall
121 102 93 109 109 99 States Senator128
158 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief accord to women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the
17 11 16 24 34 152 stressed that the
190 62 widespread gender bias in the U.S. has Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is,
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands III. The classification is not limited to existing
of the offender and then of the legal system.79 conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
16 34 23 28 18 25 22for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well,
family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case threatened by violence and abuse.
to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited
to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman
or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live
in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or
threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or
likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but
not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation
of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a
woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from
engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on
valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family
Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the
right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property
owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted
provision are attributable to research that has exposed the
dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that
the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are
worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not
guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner
insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing
mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out
the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may
likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case
of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L.
Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the
issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that
the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard
the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator
and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time
is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after
raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of
the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis
to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits
to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death,
if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities
of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from
service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days
from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him
and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of
petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on
May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO
to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its
Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which
to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet,
he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be
an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he
can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner
may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of
law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the
respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim,
regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of
the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection
order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent
must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall
direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things
and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may
be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then
can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it
for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments,
instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done
violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not
refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind
this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of
the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to
mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a
process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for
an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom
the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of
judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the
"Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads,
as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of
filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad
that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by
the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto
in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact
that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise
of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a
preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to
recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required
to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be
very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that
the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent
with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an
unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In
the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of
the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the
women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its
most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself.
If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it
should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA,
CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN,
JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed
KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE
LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO,
JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity
as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora
and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured
and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that
in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's
land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such
as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion
therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e)
the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings
of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing
and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature
and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares
per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident
and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this
rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached
as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing
TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the
TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of
the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources
(sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-
preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2)
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain
that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again,
the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children,
but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied
in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's
right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition,
the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world
in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe
that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are
seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore,
the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail
to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-
equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would
be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President
Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access
of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of
the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social
and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system
that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law
and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation
of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.
No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to
the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting
such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a
blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or
partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar
as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to
implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive
or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly
the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand
or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint
is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution.
The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how
we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in
the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession
area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually
been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing
the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-
impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 8, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as
to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is
that others may make different choices choices we would not make for
ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or
offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely
because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important
questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed,
our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and
difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions
are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an
insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications
about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to
create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are
preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than
intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of
diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots
in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act.[4]
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17,
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims
of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating
that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different
gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did
change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the
men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a
shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin
and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do
mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October
2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the
Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition
which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in
the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history
of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship,
or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised
Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance
as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x
xx
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed
upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any
form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the
establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether
live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which:
(1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy
the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4)
tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees
and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture
or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating
immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any of
its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one
article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency
of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section 13, Article
II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted
to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T.
Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman,
breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.
Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-
list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention
of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate
tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their
under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just
that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine
jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and
bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x xSignificantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to
protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the
case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is
elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups
moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters
and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-
based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by
said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted
moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the
land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications
and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these
legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act,
omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul
the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlads application for accreditation.Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex
parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May
2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file
its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11,
2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support
of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to
fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.[14] The
COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2,
2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed
a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto
its Comment-in-Intervention.[17]The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19,
2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis
for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their
own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the
COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported
violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these
rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members
and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its
field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the country,
petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed
that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for
denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of
petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior
to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory,
and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory
perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community
in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it
had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in
its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a
national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around
the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)
Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
 Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)
Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be
believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered
as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed
by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a
result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-
class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That
is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress
of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of
one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on
religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public
deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus
have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them;
the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of
society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a
law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots,
but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification
to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of
the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the
Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty
to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality
and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted
into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially
the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that
there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same
gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in
our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of
losing its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation,
even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived
lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted
public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a
finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are
committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not
translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and
action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority
to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we
recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior
considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance
advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on
one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all
value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from
our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion
that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because
of any particular morally reprehensible act.It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which
provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts
have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of similar
persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.[35] In Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared
that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x
x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes
sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral
disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the
nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for
a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply
that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals
under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs
position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the
equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not
received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make
such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified
by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled
in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice,
every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square
where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers
of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative
democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and
moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority
rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public
deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a
constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom
"not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but
for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It
promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed
in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its
views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct
is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports
LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public
morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on
both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection
provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to
learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here,
such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not
formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive
influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to
expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it
uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent
with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that
challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful
means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the
exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.[44]A political
group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward
policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection
of the freedom of association guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one
part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion,
even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay
rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions
of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly
denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not
be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends
that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of
limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the
extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of
COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a
transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in
its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals
and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support,
international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of
non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated
in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as
follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as
a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be
construed to include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United
Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
to be prohibited under various international agreements.[49]
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its
General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote)
as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and
the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative
and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of
democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity
with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable
or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by
reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties
should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group
or category of persons from elective office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We
refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of
the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their
true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of
society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an
arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is
unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader
context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further
claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This
has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if
wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of
a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de
lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized
by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the
support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is
not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16,
2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,
vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS
CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ,
ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner
petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in
this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of
said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit,
filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their
respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later
withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again
their positions as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of
Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and
dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations
and traditional leaders on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would
hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as
envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook
Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to
Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our
presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting
Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the
following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM
FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of
petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore
was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the
seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in
the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker
vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the
House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend
the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in
order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare
the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also
that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding
Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session
last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two
motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are
approved. ...
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat
of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their
session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings
held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null
and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative
Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987
valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and
equitable. 2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988,
received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook,
"EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION
XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had
caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries
and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after
filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First
District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing
in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for
reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action
of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments
without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of
the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused
withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to
the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
[sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which
the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the
petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and
academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For,
if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition
moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it
academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we
hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first
place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an
investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given
the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents)
that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not
set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private
respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture,
wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled." 11Certainly, that
avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and
hearing contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in
administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party
need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he
had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues.
It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to
rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act
of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising
from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter.
Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by
the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman
act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails
their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act
that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is
guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts
to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking
redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the
past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly
is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of
due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of
the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event
that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang
Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene
in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore,
to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of
the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX
and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in
Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated
on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established
"internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18specified
therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to
"act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of
the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-
banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of
all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that
event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim
Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now,
in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at
the proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy
in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook
(of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments
of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services,
thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang
Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs
within the framework of national development plans, policies and
goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in
this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established
by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and
other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages
and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the
enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to
assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and
the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang
Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on
the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2
and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the
Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang
Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming
that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region
XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it
provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion,
declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the
recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987
is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it
is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was
an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers
to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a
debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic]
and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard,
since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the
Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a
recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the
date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no
recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while
this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate
the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do
so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on
Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid
recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents
called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act
of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to
the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing
about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us.
We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken
as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be
validly declared without a session having been first opened. In
upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte
blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from
reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can
do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate
obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough
coercive remedies to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE
the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and
(2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves
and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC.
[ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche,
Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas &
Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez,
Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista &
Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F
emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette
C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C.
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z.
Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul
C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara
Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves
and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas
and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian
Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R .
Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken,
THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and
VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr.
Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M.
Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal
capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA,
LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY
C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE
APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE
H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein
represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in
his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo
C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido
C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero
Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General,
Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,
CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA
COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos
For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD
& ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of
Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma
Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity,
JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON
PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY
VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN
CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's
emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered
in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of
the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be
a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of
society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the
Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government,
endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement
these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within
the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts
its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds
Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues
of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every
democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and
their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From
television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of
the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a
deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys.
James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their
minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several
others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a
citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer
and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine
Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several
others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco
and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn.
Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member
of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life
Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are
members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B.
Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for
Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in their capacities as
citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and
Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in
his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B
UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious
objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest
test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion
and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under
the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered
by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no
longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is
claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define
the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates
the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right
to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility
they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores
the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers
to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person
to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail
his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning.
The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family
protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their
beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will
undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses
to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of
legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is
non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local
Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality
of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of
the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and
Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to
intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of
the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore,
the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of
the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments
raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for
a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17,
2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the
counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues
were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013,
and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until
further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed
the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No.
4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be
sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained
provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it
was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food
and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN
Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male
vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among
these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16,
1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. "
The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity
rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E .
Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December
8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a
broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a
part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable
methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to
be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A.
No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the
country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million
in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the
measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law
was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem
family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide
for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to
provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of
the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI
prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder
and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family
planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the
parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG
asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the
RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to
review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since
the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional
policies and positive norms with the political departments, in
particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the
Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the
petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it
cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It
claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not
a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of
the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that
the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the
doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the
policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social
disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch
done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court
may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial
power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be
it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple
and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to
make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any
sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases
supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally
declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation
of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through
the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the
judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does
not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet
to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the
petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is
no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review
of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible
and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no
authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete
act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of
the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate
ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by
the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component
rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on
the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file
their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the
rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held
that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and
a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although
they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not
be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated
as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not
only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this
time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is
at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to
them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is
not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the
Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus
of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As
stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal
and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole
idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the
central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions
such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one
bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections
and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title
is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life
and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting
abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-
abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the
fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human
good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive
use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it
shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion.
They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall
be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting
the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to
various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the
Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass
judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined
as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional
protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys
the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent
upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends
any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample
protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices
"on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need
to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the
years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting
women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles:
"principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will
be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on
this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made
on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it
is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second,
because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever
be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the
word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of
becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that
results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception"
as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal
personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest
in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the
fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the
intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the
ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the
beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner.
The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly,
as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question
that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally
categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the
ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from
the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total
of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must
conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of
conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want
to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample
protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the
purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from
the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we
should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on
that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already.
The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean
when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision
as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what
is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to
Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers
of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is
a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior
to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I
am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of
the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the
legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not
"maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would
be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more
about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking
route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987
Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy,
even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have
porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your
Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor,
yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to
be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to
form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that
dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that:
"Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum)
and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a
new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same
position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came
out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same
time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life,
begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and
that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and
after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a
human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This
conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view
of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two
distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are
not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he
wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any
legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to
the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the
utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of
the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was
to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of
the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion
laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed
by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH
Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel
to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under
Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-
related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which
is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against
abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to
or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act
No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in
prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation,
but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds
that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),
which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second,
prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all
that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It
also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes
that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already
has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it
becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the
mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted
in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And
as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9
of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as
an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its
expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used
as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal
and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative
intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that
provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or
acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the
RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined
as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined,
viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically
proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives"
and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del
Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be
struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There
is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR,
it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as
an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent
here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit
the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the
FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and
the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion,
and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a
manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives
that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"
embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in
the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit
that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the
definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections
4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the
assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory,
the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In
this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and
promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution
provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty
to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food
and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled
person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices
and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are
self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases
supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives
per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No.
5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is
to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention
at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are
still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure
the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to
the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the
same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such
sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion
which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of
the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or
agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA
No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices.
No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or
device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise
be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted
and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section
10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. -
The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of
family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall
coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and
budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels
and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to
space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and
devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is
still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must
not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by
all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or
incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has
yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure
that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public
consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the
constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that
ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after
they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they
are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal
ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are
evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim
that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is
gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it
harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the
transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to
address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless
violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health
services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide
for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses
to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to
refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the
option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law,
are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile,
contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health
care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those
objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling
them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too
secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory
sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to
indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom
they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious
objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services
to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces
the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a
serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's
belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH
Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions
no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does
not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health,
education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as
to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law
requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious
beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support
and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does
not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be
it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in
line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits
are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family
planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right
they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other
words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional,
the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same
does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it
being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is
required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and
23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is
minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 ,
the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information
received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that
natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous
society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -
the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus,
the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested
their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people,
shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in
the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the
influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions
of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as
tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public
schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that
the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-
versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on
mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the
"Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an
ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article
III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides
two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition
of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.
ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that
the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to
impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden
may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the
state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.
(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while
the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the
principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief.
The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome
power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This
has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same
case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What
is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or
the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these
limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to
be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is
whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano ,
German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test.
The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society.
Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form
or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on
freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano
was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible
Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as
speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and
German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent
with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest"
test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and
far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in
preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a
right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between
the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert
which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end,
the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which,
religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according
to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects
religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the
following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the
nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access,
without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific
and evidence-based medical research standards such as those
registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide
funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the
needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e),
Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and
couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of
family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) ,
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to
ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of
women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and
achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing
the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however,
the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent
with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon
by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes
simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive
health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached
with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened
by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest
test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds
in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so,
the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners
whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law
promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the
RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately
burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it
is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily
intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of
one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be
silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows
the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating
their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what
is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice
through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of
the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or
burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions
of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court
of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be
conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion
Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support
staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner
House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually
mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable
principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if
it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals
and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health
care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law
penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court
deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom
of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care
service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office
of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless
and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court
firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After
all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even
if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior
to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to
think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition,
and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such
exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative
of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent
Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law,
the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-
Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I
have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in
the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals
such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you
agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the
law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the
respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law
is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions
proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the
oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion.
The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is
the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure
free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would
limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however
few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It
also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective
is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of
referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to
achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by
other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a
person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna
Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health
Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services,
due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood,
and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and
health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections,
including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like
breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and
disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and
children victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive
health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities
are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth and the development of moral character and the right of
children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude
for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity;
and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied
that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by
concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization
reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at
that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such
number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of
social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right
to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service,
resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.
Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC,
manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal
author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle
of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In
a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed,
the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child
because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against
the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above,
whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case
would have been more than justified considering the life he would be
able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i)
thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the
family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control
population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family
as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over
their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in
case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like
tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the
wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State
shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-
making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating
in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife,
possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a
private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family
because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the
procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should
see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute
authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected
zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice
William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the
use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of
married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will
decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases
where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not
be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that
when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor
with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the
parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to
tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the
comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the
family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional
mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the
right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would
result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition
of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that
the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the
role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception
in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take
proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all,
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect
both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering
that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to
such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed.
In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their
parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has
already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be
put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized
that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for
the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused
child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the
parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental
authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24
thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and
statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock
births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion
and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society;
and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of
Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will
be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution
and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children
by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid
parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that
Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive
health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of
gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and
responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-
IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal
mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory
reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention
that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and,
thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to
them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover,
in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of
"private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service
provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a
nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery
of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and
NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by
the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section
7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should
not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications
and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods"
are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed
provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to
agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand,
the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care
service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health
care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on
reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the
RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the
occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of
the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from
all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the
class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire
to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that
the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as
elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children
only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look
into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section
14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between
public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as
it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude.
They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private
and non-government health care service providers to render forty-
eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned
in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers
of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare,
the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary
servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private
and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with
PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their
will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same
to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not
allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the
FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register
and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do
so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall
under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A.
No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby
created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall
be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of
health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation
of health products standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to
serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers,
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that
reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to
the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or
any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist
order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60)
days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties
of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency
that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public,
the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication,
the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
"service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that
the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said
Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x
x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive
orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.
[Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10
and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to
by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH
Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon
by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised
by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the
veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all
subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural
law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from
what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent
rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists
of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction,
rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve
as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the
very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is
not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural
law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the
poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional
insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State,
one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for
diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as
we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not
escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of
rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the
cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled,
poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the
hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in
the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on
such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances
from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if
the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the
State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless,
the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid
down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what
is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to
question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may
arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises.
But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court
must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by
the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere
compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the
Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still
be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A.
No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna
Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and
"non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which
is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added
the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives,
as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013
as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.