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RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS.

MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,


Petitioners,

vs

ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN


DOES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

PREFATORY:

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS:

Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,


learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia and Julienne, among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal


Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include:
(a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
(b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that showvirtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:

1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right
to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them,
lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a
right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at
the latter part)

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,


honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right
to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy


2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim
(proven by at least substantial evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or


information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and
of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about
the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business


endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control


information about themselves.Several commentators regarding privacy and
social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to
privacy protected in OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools


To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did
so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort
to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s
profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses,
and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what
extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right
to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving,
thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that
her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able
to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and
that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable
either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures
or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another
user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the
former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that
a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot
easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
G.R. No. 203254,
October 08,
2014,DR. JOY
MARGATE LEE,
PETITIONER, VS.
P/SUPT. NERIA.
ILAGAN,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Neri, a police officer,
filed a petition for the
issuance ofWrit of
Habeas Data against
Joy, her former
common lawpartner.
According to him,
sometime in July
2011, he visited
Joy’s
condominium and
rested for a while.
When he arrived
athis office, he
noticed his digital
camera missing. On
August 23,2011, Joy
confronted him about
a purported sex
video shediscovered
from the digital
camera showing him
and anotherwoman.
He denied the video
and demanded the
return of thecamera,
but she refused. The
had an altercation
where Neriallegedly
slammed
Joy’s
head against a wall
and then
walkedaway.Becaus
e of this, Joy filed
several cases
against him,
includinga case for
violation of
Republic Act 9262
and
administrativecases
before the
Napolcom, utilising
the said video.The
use of the same
violated his life to
liberty, security
andprivacy and that
of the other
woman, thus he had
no choice butto file
the petition for
issuance of the writ
of habeas
data. After finding th
e petition sufficient
in form and substanc
e, theRTC issued the
writ and directed Joy
to appear before the
RTCand produce
Neri’s
digital camera, as
well as the original
andcopies of the
video, and to make a
return within five
days fromreceipt. In
her return,. Joy
admitted keeping the
memory cardof the
digital camera and
reproducing the
video but only for
useas evidence in
the cases she filed
against Neri.
Neri’s
petitionsshould be
dismissed because
its filing was only
aimed atsuppressing
the evidence in the
cases she filed
against him;and she
is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting,
or storingof data
regarding the person
of Neri. The RTC
granted
Neri’s
petition and ordered
the turn-over of the
video to Neri
andenjoined Joy
from reproducing the
same. It disregarded
Joy’s
defense that she is
not engaged in the
collection,
gatheringand storage
of data, and that her
acts of reproducing
the sameand
showing it to other
persons (Napolcom)
violated
Neri’s
right to privacy and
humiliated him. It
clarified that it ruling
onlyon the return of
the video and not on
its admissibility
asevidence.
Dissatisfied, Joy filed
the instant petition
before theSupreme
Court.
ISSUE:
W/N the filing of the
petition for issuance
of the writ ofhabeas
data was proper
The
Court’s
ruling:
NO. A.M. No. 08-1-
16-SC, or the
Rule on the Writ
of Habeas
Data(Habeas Data
Rule), was
conceived as a
response, given
thelack of effective
and available
remedies, to address
theextraordinary rise
in the number of
killings and
enforceddisappearan
ces
[1]
. It was
conceptualized as a
judicial
remedyenforcing the
right to privacy, most
especially the right
toinformational
privacy of individuals
[2]
, which is defined as
“the
right to control the
collection,
maintenance, use,
anddissemination of
data about oneself
[3]
.”
As defined in Sectio
n 1 of the Habeas Da
ta Rule, the writ ofha
beas data now
stands as
“a
remedy available to
any personwhose
right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is
violated orthreatened
by an unlawful act or
omission of a public
official oremployee,
or of a private
individual or entity
engaged in
thegathering,
collecting or storing
of data or information
regardingthe person,
family, home, and
correspondence of
theaggrieved
party.”
Thus, in order
to support a petition
for theissuance of
such writ, Section 6
of the Habeas Data
Ruleessentially
requires that
the petition
sufficiently alleges,
amongothers,
“[t]he
manner the right to
privacy is violated
orthreatened and
how it affects the
right to life, liberty or
securityof the
aggrieved
party.”
In other words, the
petition
mustadequately
show that there
exists a nexus
between the right
toprivacy on the one
hand, and the right to
life, liberty or
securityon the other
[4]
. Corollarily, the
allegations in the
petition mustbe
supported by
substantial evidence
showing an actual
orthreatened
violation of the right
to privacy in life,
liberty orsecurity of
the victim
[5]
. In this relation, it
bears pointing
outthat the writ of
habeas data will not
issue to protect
purelyproperty or
commercial concerns
nor when the
groundsinvoked in
support of the
petitions therefor are
vague anddoubtful
[6]
. In this case, the
Court finds that
Ilagan was not able
tosufficiently allege
that his right to
privacy in life, liberty
orsecurity was or
would be violated
through the
supposedreproductio
n and threatened
dissemination of the
subject sexvideo.
While Ilagan purports
a privacy interest in
thesuppression of
this video

which he
fears would
somehow findits way
to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the
internet for
publicconsumption

he failed to explain
the connection
betweensuch interest
and any violation of
his right to life, liberty
orsecurity. Indeed,
courts cannot
speculate or contrive
versionsof possible
transgressions. As
the rules and
existing jurisprudenc
e on the matter evok
e, alleging and event
uallyproving the
nexus between
one’s
privacy right to the
cogentrights to life,
liberty or security are
crucial in habeas
datacases, so much
so that a failure on
either account
certainlyrenders a
habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this
case. In fact, even
discounting the
insufficiency of
the allegations,
thepetition would
equally be
dismissible due to
the inadequacy ofthe
evidence presented.
As the records show,
all that
Ilagansubmitted in
support of his
petition was his self-
servingtestimony
which hardly meets
the substantial
evidencerequirement
as prescribed by the
Habeas Data Rule.
This isbecause
nothing therein
would indicate that
Lee
actuallyproceeded to
commit any overt act
towards the end
of violating
Ilagan’s
right to privacy in
life, liberty or
security. Nor
wouldanything on
record even lead a
reasonable mind
toconclude
[7]
that Lee was going
to use the subject
video inorder to
achieve unlawful
ends

say for instance, to
spread itto the public
so as to ruin
Ilagan’s
reputation. Contrasti
ngly,Lee even made
it clear in her
testimony that the
only reasonwhy she
reproduced the
subject video was to
legitimatelyutilize the
same as evidence in
the criminal and
administrativecases
that she filed against
Ilagan
[8]
. Hence, due to thein
sufficiency of the
allegations as well as
the glaring
absenceof
substantial evidence,
the Court finds it
proper to reverse
theRTC Decision
and dismiss the
habeas data petition.
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014, DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, PETITIONER, VS. P/SUPT. NERI A.
ILAGAN, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former
common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited

Joy’s

condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera
missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex video she discovered from
the digital camera showing him and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the return
of the camera, but she refused. The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed

Joy’s

head against a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him,
including a case for violation of

Republic Act 9262

and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video. The use of the same violated
his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file
the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data. After finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, the RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce

Neri’s

digital camera, as well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days
from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and
reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri.

Neri’s
petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the
cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted

Neri’s

petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the
same. It disregarded

Joy’s

defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of
reproducing the same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated

Neri’s

right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the video and not
on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data was proper

The

Court’s

ruling:

NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances

[1]

. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals

[2]

, which is defined as

“the

right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself

[3]

.”

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as

“a

remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.”

Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others,

“[t]he

manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved

party.”

In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other

[4]

. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim

[5]

. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are vague and doubtful

[6]

. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of
this video

which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption

he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the
nexus between

one’s

privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much
so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this
case. In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing
therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
violating
Ilagan’s

right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable
mind to conclude

[7]

that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends

say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin

Ilagan’s

reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan

[8]

. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,

vs.

Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B.


CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama, Jr.

TOPIC: Writ of amparo

FACTS:

Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and


eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage.
After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital
and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby
Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby
Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was
“matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption,
wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent
a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on
November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby
Julian a ward of the State.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD:

The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper
as there was no enforceddisappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico


enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;


2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforceddisappearance because the


respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandumexplicitly stating that Baby
Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the
RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no
“enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and
fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from


her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with
the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that
she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child
and contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue
of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and
purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON v. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, GR No. 210759,
2015-06-23
Facts:
hree consolidated petition
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a
Notice[8] to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of
respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for... arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of
Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a
Letter-Request[9] to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), for the immediate... arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an
undesirable alien.
, Ku’s visa expired... charged Ku for being a risk to public interest... u was detained
Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.[17] On 24
January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance... of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO).[18] Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at 8:30
a.m.,[19] while he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on
29 January 2014 at
8:30 a.m.[20]
Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO,
entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO
Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and
Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family.
Petitioner... challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari[26]
docketed as G.R. No. 210759.
case cannot be categorized as one... of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance.[28]... petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo
petition.[29] On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the... third assailed
order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[
Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered
immediately released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the institution of the
proper remedy to extradition... whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was
properly granted in the case at bar.
Issues:
whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at
bar.
Ruling:
We rule in the negative.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory
definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by
agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to... acknowledge such
arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither
can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law
for a prolonged time.
they introduced themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of
Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of
his... visa.
was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Reconsideration before the BI,[52] thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply...
guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.
Ku was not able to present evidence that he... was exposed to “life-threatening
situations” while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show
that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed... and
ruled upon by the BI.
RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and
his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and
security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It... is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party.
When Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which
he had already... solicited from another tribunal.
here is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court,
which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other
tribunals.
A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums,
for it degrades and wreaks havoc... to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow
the sequence and hierarchical order in availing of such remedies and not resort to
shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with
This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo. And yet,... despite having knowledge of the
Court’s pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded to grant the said privilege.
It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a
mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to
comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect
for the Court’s... lawful order and directive
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
a)
GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14
March 2014 of the Regional Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo;... b)
DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
Principles:
It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people’s constitutional... rights, which made its maiden appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
elements constituting “enforced disappearances” a
(a)... that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b)... that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c)... that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition;
and
(d)... that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.[44
Gamboa vs Chan
July 14,2012
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa
Commission which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in
view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its
investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President.
Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the
Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides
and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP
forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media,
publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a
petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports
from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports against her. The RTC
ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC
dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the
source of the information.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD:
Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is
NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the
state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission
and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner
Gamboa.
This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in
the report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act that
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally
expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the
purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus
had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of report, but emphasized its confidential
nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.
But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that PNP was responsible for his unintended
disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to
her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary
and improper.
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. As public officials, they enjoy presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 183460, March 12, 2013

SPOUSES NERIO AND SOLEDAD PADOR AND REY PADOR, PETITIONERS, VS. BARANGAY CAPTAIN
BERNABE ARCAYAN, BARANGAY TANOD CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, BARANGAY TANODS ALBERTO
ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER ALIVIO &
BIENVENJDO ARCAYAN, ALL OF BARANGAY TABUNAN, CEBU CITY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The spouses Nerio and Soledad filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo against Barangay
Captain Bernabe Arcayan, Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Tanods Alberto, Carmelo, Roberto, Winelo,
Christopher and Bienvenido, all of Bgy. Tabunan, Cebu City. They allege that rumours circulated about
them cultivating a marijuana plantation, and because of this, the respondents raided their ampalaya
farm, but found none. After the raid, they received invitation letters for a conference from Bernabe.
They referred the letter to their counsel, who advised them to instead send a letter-reply. When
Bernabe read the letter, he took a copy but refused to receive it. The conduct of the raid, the invitation
letter, the refusal of the barangay captain to receive their reply, and the possibility of more
harassment cases threatened their life, liberty and security, thus a writ of amparo is necessitated.

After the RTC issued the Writ, the respondents filed their Verified Return/Comment. In it, they alleged
that Winelo received a report of an alleged existence of a marijuana plantation in Bgy. Gining; the
matter was referred to Bernabe and Romeo who organised a patrol; while Carmelo was taking his
breakfast, Nerio chanced upon him and accused him of uprooting the marijuana plants, which Carmelo
denied.

RTC issued the assailed Resolution denying the petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo. The
spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, to assail what they think is a
serious and grave error on the part of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of a writ of amparo is proper

RULING:

We uphold the RTC’s Resolution and deny the instant Petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a
petition therefor, as follows:

SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence that
their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first, that
respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the latter were
cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them invitation letters
without stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay captain refused to
receive petitioners’ letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the possibility of more
harassment cases, false accusations, and potential violence from respondents.

All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.

On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners’ ampalaya farm was sufficiently
controverted by respondents.

Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on the
ampalaya farm of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot
possessed by David Quintana.

Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador
himself admitted that they had done so with his permission, as stated in his affidavit:

5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning.
He told me that there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya farm and that
there is already a raid.

6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for
marijuana plants.

Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners’ permission, we cannot grant the
privilege of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the
intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners’ property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, we
ruled that the writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property
or commercial in nature, as follows:

[T]he writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under
the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous
and uncertain grounds.

x x x. (Emphasis in the original)

We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground
to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.

On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captain’s act of sending
invitation letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate
or threaten their constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show that Barangay
Captain Arcayan sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the records are
bereft of any evidence that petitioners were coerced to attend the conference through the use of
force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the conference, as
they have in fact done in this case.

The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following these events, they can anticipate more harassment
cases, false accusations and possible violence from respondents – is baseless, unfounded, and
grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation does not warrant the
consideration of this Court.

On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
“Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.”
NAVIA ET. AL. VS. PARDICO
(G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012)

Facts of the Case:

At 8:30 of March 31, 2008, a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies


Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) in Grand
Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle
awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked
Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw
Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office
of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires
and lamps in the subdivision.

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of
the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.

The version of Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office
because they received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale
Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said
subdivision. The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to
petitioners (Asian Land security guards) Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising
(Buising). Following their departments standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising
entered the report in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was
there where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus
repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the two
suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them. At the security
office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben who admitted that they took the
lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of
Lolita. Since complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation hence no
complainant will be filed, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed
a statement to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or
injury to him. His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states
that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and
Bong left the security office. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about
those who might be involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the
subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also
affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that
he was released unharmed and without any injury. Upon Navias instructions, Dio and
Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as witness that
they indeed released Ben from their custody. Subsequently, petitioners received an
invitation from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to appear thereat
relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband
Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City
Police Station. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and that they have no
information as to his present whereabouts. They assured Virginia though that they will
cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband.

Respondent’s version however stated otherwise. According to respondent, Bong


and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into
the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation and suffered
physical abuse from Navia, his threatening statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang
narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben,. Bong allegedly admitted that he and Ben attempted to
take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is located is very dark and
his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install
a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to
take a lamp from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their
house. However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on
the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. Later on, Lolita was
instructed to sign an entry in the guards logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben
to stay in her house anymore and that they released her son Bong unharmed but that
Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. The following
morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but
only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night
before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she
could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police.

Virginia then filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos
City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an
Order directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of
the body of Ben before it. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO.

RULING:
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to
arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

Here, Bens right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not
dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at petitioners security
office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted fact ipso facto established
Bens inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty and security. Article 6
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human
beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right
to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to
liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and
security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Bens disappearance as


alleged in Virginias petition and proved during the summary proceedings conducted
before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available


to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge


or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must
also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried
out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in
an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.

In the present case, we do not doubt Bongs testimony that Navia had a menacing
attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the
circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at that time, his threatening
statement, Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben, cannot be
taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is


not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the
evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated
Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded
or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents
had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence
in investigating his case, the Supreme Court will definitely not hold the government or
its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

The Supreme Court further ruled that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person
sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private
individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented
that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental
involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

Hence, the Decision of the RTC of Malolos City was reversed and the Petition
for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico was dismissed.

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