GRI-00/0246

Draft Interim Report

Implementation Plan for Periodic Re-Verification Intervals

for High-Consequence Areas

Prepared by:

B. N. Leis
T. A. Bubenik
Battelle
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

for

Gas Research Institute

1700 S Mount Prospect Ave
Des Plaines, Illinois 60018-1804

Contract No. 5000-270-8194

January 2001
 Legal Notice

This report was prepared by Battelle as an account of contracted work sponsored by the Gas
Research Institute (GRI). Neither GRI, members of GRI, Battelle, officers, trustees, or staff of
Battelle, nor any person acting on their behalf:

• Makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the

accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report, or
that the use of any apparatus, methods, or process disclosed in this report may not
infringe upon privately owned rights; or
• Assumes any liability with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use
of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report.

ii
 Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data
needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information including suggestions for reducing this burden to
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget,
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, D.C. 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

January 2001 draft interim

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

Implementation Plan for Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for High- GRI contract no.
Consequence Areas 5000-270-8194
6. AUTHOR(S)

B. N. Leis and T. A. Bubenik

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Battelle REPORT NUMBER

505 King Avenue

Columbus, Ohio 43201-2693
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING

Gas Research Institute AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

1700 S Mount Prospect Ave GRI-00/0246

DesPlaines, Illinois 60018-1804
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This reports presents an implementation plan for re-verification intervals that are developed to control
integrity threats to gas-transmission pipeline integrity and ensure safe operations in high consequence areas.
These intervals were evaluated using “worst case analyses” in a “one size fits all” framework for use in a
prescriptive integrity management plan. Flow charts are presented to assist in determining whether a
pipeline fits into the suggested “one size fits all” framework. Situations which don’t fit the framework need
a case by case integrity assessment. Codes and standards are being developed by ASME, NACE, and other
standards development organizations to support the associated regulations and integrity management
standard.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

pipelines, safety, integrity, pigging, hydrotesting, direct assessment

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
REPORT THIS PAGE ABSTRACT

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev.2-89)
 Executive Summary
This report presents an implementation plan for periodic re-verification intervals that are
developed to control integrity threats to gas-transmission pipeline integrity and ensure safe
operation in high-consequence areas (HCAs). These intervals were evaluated using “worst-case
analyses” in a “one-size-fits-all” framework for use in a prescriptive integrity-management plan.
This implementation plan was developed to ensure that pipeline operations fit this “one-size”
approach, and thus can be safely operated based on periodic prescriptive re-verification intervals.
Flow charts are presented to assist in determining whether pipeline operation is within the
provisions of the “one-size-fits-all” framework. Where the provisions do not apply directly,
either the pipeline is excluded or the one-size interval is shortened accordingly. Integrity
management for pipeline segments in HCAs for excluded situations will require case-by-case
integrity assessment. It is anticipated that portions of a pipeline through an HCA that are
excluded because of unique field situations will be identified and evaluated through practices
like direct assessment. Company records can be used to identify and evaluate exceptions
involving as-constructed or rehabilitated situations.
Technical committees associated with NACE and ASME are developing standards to support the
implementation plan, and the needs for personnel training and minimum qualifications,
independent of this report.
Finally, an example based on consideration of results for an inspection of two hypothetical
pipelines suffering different degrees of in-service degradation was used to illustrate the many
factors that impact how the age of available information bears on the current condition of a
pipeline. While there is merit in setting a single age beyond which data are excluded, this
example demonstrates that such an approach would not ensure a conservative outcome, nor is it
relevant or justified for well maintained pipelines.

v
 Research Summary
Title: Implementation Plan for Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for High-
Consequence Areas
Contractor: Battelle
Principal B. N. Leis and T. A. Bubenik
Investigators:
Report Period: March 2000 to January 2001
Objectives: Provide an engineering and scientific approach to determine the baseline
safety and integrity of pipelines in high consequence areas. A variety of
inspection technologies such as hydrostatic testing, pigging, and Direct
Assessment, are used for this assessment. The same technologies in
various combinations will be used to re-verify the safety of the pipeline
segment at periodic intervals.
Technical
Perspective:
Results: There is a considerable body of pipeline performance, damage detection,
and mitigation experience that need to be integrated into a common
integrity assurance process. The flow diagrams in this report provide this
framework. The flow diagrams provide the plan for an operator to
periodically confirm the safety of pipelines running through high
consequence areas. This is a common approach for the majority of gas
transmission pipelines, however it is not appropriate for all pipelines.
Exclusions are discussed and these will require separate case-by-case
assessments. The methodologies presented here are expected to become
the foundation of an Integrity Management Plan, which will be written by
the standards development organizations. Examples are given.
Technical
Approach:
Project This report provides a foundation for ANSI standards. Periodic
Implications: reassessment of pipeline safety in populated areas is non trivial. Both the
initial and periodic evaluations demand a standard methodology in order to
support informed discussion when there may be conflicting viewpoints.
Project K. G. Leewis
Manager:

vi
 Table of Contents
Page
Objective ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Elements of the Implementation Plan ............................................................................................. 3
Benchmarking Pipeline Condition.............................................................................................. 5
The Baseline Inspection.............................................................................................................. 7
Hydrotesting............................................................................................................................ 7
In-Line Inspection................................................................................................................... 7
Direct Assessment................................................................................................................... 8
Assumptions and Exclusions Related to Class-Design-Based Re-Verification Intervals ............. 9
Standards....................................................................................................................................... 12
Personnel Training and Qualifications.......................................................................................... 14
Example: Integrity Condition Assessment................................................................................... 17
ILI Results and the Pipelines Inspected .................................................................................... 17
ILI Implications ........................................................................................................................ 20
Data Utility in Benchmarking and Assessing “Current” Baseline Condition........................... 22
Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 24
References..................................................................................................................................... 25

vii
 Objective
Pending legislation and changes in federal pipeline design, construction, operation, and
maintenance regulations have focused attention on pipeline integrity in high consequence areas
(HCAs). Because operation and the passage of time can reduce the margin of safety provided by
the design and related regulations in CFR Title 49, Part 192, there is a perceived need to
periodically reestablish that margin. The objective of this is to report present the implementation
plan for prescriptive re-verification intervals needed to determine that the condition of a pipeline
is consistent with the margin of safety provided by Part 192. The re-verification intervals
themselves have been developed in a companion effort.

1
 Background
A companion report has evaluated factors controlling the various threats to gas-transmission
pipeline integrity and determined the interval at which pipeline integrity must be re-verified to
ensure safe operation(1). Because this time interval depends on wall thickness and stress, it also
depends on Class Location, which for natural gas pipelines operating in the U.S. is defined in
CFR Title 49, §192.5 of Subpart A. Specifically, the time interval due to the reduction in wall
stress and increase in wall thickness in Class 3 and Class 4 designs as compared to Class 1
designs was determined for a prescriptive integrity management plan. Subpart C of the U.S.
regulations sets the highest permissible working stress at 72 percent of the specified minimum
yield strength (stress)1 for Class 1 designs. Design factors introduced in Subpart C reduce this
working stress as building density increases within a corridor that surrounds a pipeline, with the
intent to reduce risks associated with failure for Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4 designs. As the
regulations are structured, these provisions apply to pipelines operated at pressures creating
maximum allowable wall stresses equal to or greater than 40 percent of the specified minimum
yield stress (SMYS).
On the assumption that high-consequence areas will overlay Class 3 and 4 designs, Reference 1
expressed the re-verification interval in HCAs relative to that for Class 1 designs. This report
presents an implementation plan for the re-verification interval, which was developed in terms of
regulatory-based provisions that reflect the as-constructed pipeline. Because the re-verification
interval was referenced to the as-constructed state, it is necessary to establish that the current or
BASELINE condition of an existing pipeline2 is “functionally equivalent” to the design state of a
new pipeline – or fit-for-service (FFS) – before this interval can be applied.
The BASELINE condition of a pipeline can be established by BENCHMARKING the pipeline – a
process that integrates available data to characterize the pipeline’s condition in terms of its
operation, maintenance, and prior inspection history, and that of similar pipelines. The
benchmark data are evaluated to determine if they adequately characterize the pipeline’s current
condition. Where the available data fall short, they are supplemented by a BASELINE
INSPECTION, using a hydrostatic re-test (HRT), in-line inspection (ILI), direct assessment
(DA), or other equivalent test, as appropriate3. This report discusses the interplay between the
benchmark and baseline activities, and then defines the scope and procedures involved in
subsequent periodic inspections.

1
Excluding lines operated at 80 percent under a grandfather clause.
2
Where the pipeline condition is not found functionally equivalent to the design state of a new pipeline,
rehabilitation is indicated. Such rehabilitation would be implemented on a timeline consistent with the severity of
the degradation, as is currently required by §192.703 (b) of the regulations. Deferred maintenance requires pro-
rated reduction in the verification interval.
3
As discussed in Reference 2, which tool is appropriate depends on the pipeline situation and the integrity threats
involved. Reference 2 also notes that direct assessment is the subject of independent development designed to
move this technology to a level comparable to ILI and hydrotesting.

2
 Elements of the Implementation Plan
The implementation plan is shown in flow-chart format in Figure 1, which illustrates the
elements of the implementation plan and the interaction between them. As the focus is HCAs,
the implementation plan begins with benchmarking the pipeline system in these areas. This
benchmarking activity characterizes the current condition of the pipeline and its prior history, as
well as that of similar pipelines. The benchmarking process first defines the as-designed and
constructed pipeline system, which was the condition assumed in Reference 1 as the basis to
determine the re-verification interval. The current condition of the pipeline must be
“functionally equivalent” to this baseline. As can be inferred from Figure 1, functional
equivalence includes both the operability of the pipeline system and the integrity of the pipeline.
Both aspects are considered because the risk of failure in an HCA involves both the integrity of
the line pipe and the potential for an upset in operation of related systems that might affect
increased risk in the HCA. For this reason, Figure 1 includes provision for benchmarking both
the pipeline through the HCA, and non-pipeline portions of the system either upstream or
downstream from the HCA that can affect increased risk in the HCA.
The current regulations provide for extensive and frequent periodic maintenance of valves and

Figure 1. Elements of the implementation plan and their interplay.

other portions of the non-pipeline system, which makes such data widely available for this initial
benchmarking task. The benchmarking task also addresses the historical information gained in
previous inspections of the pipeline to assess its integrity. These data could include information
from an ILI, DA, HRT, or the pre-service hydrostatic test (PSHT). Finally, the benchmarking
task incorporates information that is unique to the pipeline’s operation. This information would
be supported by information developed through a like-similar (root-cause) analysis of other
pipelines or pipeline segments.
The benchmark data are then evaluated to determine if they adequately characterize the
pipeline’s current condition, to determine that the pipeline’s integrity is comparable to that when
it went into service. For pipelines where the integrated available data fail to characterize the
pipeline’s current condition, the flow chart presented in Figure 1 identifies additional activities to
adequately define it. As can be seen from the flow chart in Figure 1, the additional activities

3
include HRT, ILI, DA, or other equivalent activities, as appropriate3. These activities comprise
the baseline inspection, and where required, define the baseline condition for the pipeline.
Standards, personnel training, and qualification requirements are being developed independently
to ensure this process demonstrates functional equivalence of the non-pipeline aspects, and the
integrity of the pipeline segments in HCA’s, as discussed later in this report.
Once the baseline is established, the flow chart in Figure 1 points to a second level of flow charts
that define exclusions to the prescriptive “one-size-fits-all” re-verification interval determined in
Reference 1. These second level charts, which are presented and discussed later in this report,
determine whether the prescriptive re-verification interval of Reference 1 applies to the pipeline
under consideration. If the pipeline qualifies, the flow chart in Figure 2 points to use of the
prescriptive re-verification interval to determine when the next inspection is required. If the
pipeline does not qualify, Figure 2 points to a case-specific determination of the re-verification
interval.
In contrast to cases requiring baseline inspection, for pipelines where the integrated, available
data adequately characterize the pipeline’s current condition, the flow chart points directly to the
second level exclusion charts. In these cases, the benchmark data comprise the “baseline” for the
pipeline, and the baseline inspection is bypassed. As expected, the flow chart in Figure 1 points
directly to the second level charts and exclusions to the prescriptive “one-size-fits-all” re-
verification interval.
Standards, personnel training, and qualification requirements are being developed to support the
baseline process, which is to be implemented as shown in Figure 2. The function of Figure 2 is
to establish that the pipeline under consideration is a candidate for evaluation in a prescriptive
framework. Many of the concerns in this initial screening are re-visited in more detail later
during the benchmark process, where information may indicate the pipeline or segments of the
pipeline cannot be dealt with in a prescriptive manner.

Figure 2. Pipeline integrity and system functionality considerations for HCAs.

4
The flow chart in Figure 2 screens system operation and pipeline condition for portions of the
pipeline that impact HCA’s. Gas operations and quality are dealt with first, to limit the
likelihood of internal corrosion problems and upsets in system control. Where the standards,
personnel training, and qualification requirements cannot be met, a case-specific re-verification
interval must be developed that is shorter that the prescriptive maximum. Alternatively,
retroaction is required. System functionality that adversely affects risk in HCA’s is considered
next. Again, standards, personnel training, and qualification requirements are being developed,
as discussed later, and where these are not met a case-specific re-verification interval must be
developed that is shorter that the prescriptive maximum. Alternatively, retroaction is required.
Similar work is under way to deal with pipeline condition and cathodic protection for the
pipeline.

Benchmarking Pipeline Condition

Pipeline failures due to in-service degradation occur as a result of the localized effects of service
that lead to wall thinning or cracking. Wall thinning occurs at breaks in the coating, where the
cathodic protection (CP) system has been ineffective, and where the right-of-way (RoW)
provides environmental conditions that support metal-loss corrosion. Environmentally assisted
cracking (EAC), such as stress-corrosion cracking (SCC), is associated with the coating disbonds
and occurs selectively where the right-of-way (RoW) provides environmental conditions that
support these processes. Thus, it follows that determining where (1) the right-of-way (RoW)
provides environmental conditions that support degradation and (2) coating failure or disbonding
have occurred are two keys to determining the current condition of the pipeline. Much is known
about RoW conditions and problem locations from past operation and maintenance of existing
pipelines. And, through like-similar analysis of other pipeline situations, much can be inferred
concerning where and when certain degradation processes have the potential to be problematic.
The process of using like-similar analysis of other pipelines and knowledge of RoW conditions
along a given pipeline serves to benchmark where the localized effects of service leading to wall
thinning or cracking are most likely, and when.
Benchmarking serves to define potential problems and assists in prioritizing which pipeline
segments merit attention first. Superimposed on prioritization based on pipeline condition is
prioritization based on consequences of failure. Recognizing that this report focuses on HCAs,
the benchmarking task is centered first on condition, and then on consequences.
Figure 3 shows the scope of the benchmarking task. This task begins by defining the as-
designed and constructed pipeline system, which in turn defines the “functional equivalence”
that must be demonstrated in the baseline inspection. The benchmarking task then adds
information gained in prior inspections, which embrace data from DA, ILI, and hydrotesting, or
other equivalent. Finally, the benchmarking task adds information that is unique to the pipeline’s
operation, which is supported by information developed through a like-similar analysis of other
pipelines or pipeline segments.
All of the information involved in the benchmarking task summarized in Figure 3 lies on a
timeline. For example, some of the direct-assessment data might reflect years of field-work
gathered over the time the pipeline has been in operation. Likewise, a hydrotest or ILI may have
been done at some time in the “recent” past. The extent to which this information comprises data

5
Figure 3 Scope of benchmarking tasks

relevant to the pipeline’s “current” condition depends on the rate of degradation along the
pipeline. This is because the current condition of a pipeline suffering a high degradation rate
changes more quickly and significantly than does one that is degrading more slowly. It follows
that the setback time4 over which data are relevant is case specific.
Based on Reference 1, neither SCC nor fatigue comprise threats to integrity in Class 3 and Class
4 designs, which leaves dissolution (metal-loss corrosion) as the threat mechanism to determine
the setback time to identify data relevant to current condition. One way to estimate the setback
time lies in use of a corrosion rate typical of such incidents as compiled in the U.S. Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS) incident database5. For wall thickness typical of transmission pipelines,
this leads to about a 6-year setback time for regulatory-accepted levels of metal loss. The
relatively short setback time based on worst-case kinetics could be significantly longer where
hard data exist to support such actions. For example, ILI data6 can be used to identify and locate
metal-loss features present at the time of the inspection whose continued development should be
evident at present. Where these areas were not dug or otherwise disturbed after the ILI, such
sites could be dug today, and the defect depths compared to that in the ILI log to establish a
distribution of case-specific corrosion rates. In turn, that distribution of rates, coupled with the
sizes of the deepest remaining features, defines an alternative route to estimate the relevance of
the historical records. Regardless of the route taken to test and demonstrate their relevance to the
pipeline’s current condition, only data passing that test are considered further in benchmarking
pipeline condition.

4
Setback time is the time shift between the date the pipeline condition is to be determined and the date of the prior
inspection for which the data can be used for benchmarking current condition.
5
Incidents compiled in this database are predominantly first-time occurrences on a given pipeline, as incidents
prompt systemic changes to counter underlying factors. Accordingly, setback time is evaluated using an average
rate for these worst-case scenarios.
6
To be of practical significance, sufficient field digs had to be made to verify the statistical validity of the pig calls
when the ILI was done. Moreover, sufficient digs would have to be made to prove the significance of the digs
made to demonstrate that the ILI is relevant today. In both cases, the number of digs is case specific – there is no
one-size-fits-all result.

6
Once the setback time is established, data relevant to the current condition can be identified, and
the benchmark process completed based on the scope outlined in Figure 3. Thereafter, the need
for a baseline inspection can be established, and the baseline condition for the pipeline
determined.

The Baseline Inspection

If the benchmark data fail to adequately characterize the pipeline’s current condition from an
integrity perspective, the flow chart in Figure 1 points to a baseline inspection. This baseline
inspection can use HRT, ILI, DA, or other equivalent process, as appropriate3.

Hydrotesting
The practice of hydrotesting7 has been discussed broadly by several authors over the years since
pressure-based proof testing was shown appropriate for pipelines(e.g., 3-6). A hydrotest can be
useful in establishing the current condition of a pipeline, but has some drawbacks aside from the
usual concerns involving disposing of the water, cost, and time-out-of service. While recognized
by OPS as a proof test for pipelines for more than 30 years, the hydrotest is selective as to the
types and sizes of flaws it exposes. Axial crack-like defects that rupture at the test pressure are
easily exposed by this proof test. However, because such features grow to failure by stable
tearing during the course of the test, it is also possible to grow near-critical defects during the
test, but not to their critical size. For this reason, hydrotesting has been viewed by some as
deleterious to the pipeline’s subsequent utility. Growth during the pressure test can leave a small
portion of the remaining anomalies on the verge of failure, or can initiate failures upon return to
service, or in extreme cases cause a pressure reversal leading to failure at a pressure less than
achieved in the hydrotest.
In addition to problems associated with defect growth during the testing, pressure-proof tests are
limited in their ability to expose small-diameter blunt defects, such as those formed by metal-loss
corrosion. Such blunt defects with depths nearly through-wall have not been exposed in full-
scale experiments and in actual field hydrotests, and large axial flaws can survive even high-
pressure testing in higher-toughness line-pipe steels.(7) Fortunately, the sizes and types of such
defects can be predicted as a function of the test pressure and line-pipe properties, which makes
it possible to estimate the effectiveness of pressure-proof testing in practice.
Analysis, as well as a wealth of field experience, indicates that hydrotesting can be very effective
in controlling in-service degradation leading to axially oriented cracking. For this reason, and
because ILI and DA have yet to be developed to the same level of effectiveness, HRT remains
the preferred means to control near-critical SCC in gas-transmission pipelines.

In-Line Inspection
In-line inspection technology has significantly advanced over the last 30 years, with early tools
evolving into “second-generation” tools to deal with metal-loss defects, and tools currently being

7
Pressure-proof testing could be done with any fluid. Liquid-phase media, such as water, are preferred to gas-
phase media to avoid compressibility of the pressurizing media, which can confound interpreting test results, but
more importantly could promote dangerous running fractures in the event a defect is exposed.

7
developed to detect and size cracks and other types of defects.(8-11) The capabilities of these tools
can be judged with respect to either detecting defects, or sizing defects, with detection being
much easier than sizing, but sizing being necessary to assess integrity. Experience and the
science underlying the technology the tools are based on indicate that tools designed to detect
and size one type of feature, such as localized metal loss, are not equally successful in other
applications, such as detecting long axially-oriented metal loss. Likewise, tools that are capable
of detecting and sizing localized metal loss may miss significant wall thinning due to general
corrosion. Finally, it is easier to detect and size localized metal loss than detect and size cracks.
For applications involving metal loss, ILI vendors currently claim detection and ±10 percent
sizing at an 80 percent confidence level, which means that one in five features is miss called.
Claims for detecting and sizing cracks tend to fall below that for metal loss. Thus, as for
hydrotesting, the possibility exists that ILI will miss features that ultimately could compromise
the integrity of a pipeline. This weakness is partially offset by ILI’s ability to find some defects
smaller than a near-critical size.

Direct Assessment
Direct assessment is another approach to characterize the condition of a pipeline for purposes of
demonstrating its integrity and establishing a baseline for FFS evaluation to set the re-
verification interval. Some of the technologies that underlie direct assessment have been in use
in various ways to focus maintenance along the RoW for many years.(e.g., 2, 12) As with ILI tools,
these capabilities have been evolving to enhance defect detection and related decision making,
and new tools are emerging.(e.g., 2, 13, 14) Perhaps the most significant development is the ability to
integrate the indications and implications of this data. Currently a major effort is under way to
develop these capabilities and integrate their results, with a view to DA emerging as a statistical
equal to HRT and ILI.(2) However, until this work is completed the DA tools being developed
must be viewed as developing technology.
Once fully developed and demonstrated, DA will point to defects associated with breaks in the
coating that expose the line-pipe steel to the effects of the environment along the RoW. These
features will be exposed by bell-holing and physically sized with the same measurement
practices used to validate the detection and sizing capability of an ILI. Indications from DA
would be mapped and dealt with in the same way that indications from an ILI would. Features
whose size requires immediate repair would be dealt with accordingly, while those whose size
permits continued operation would be repaired as time permits. Where defects remain following
a baseline inspection, their presence reduces the re-verification interval determined in Reference
1 on a pro-rated basis.2
However, as for hydrotesting and ILI, DA will have weaknesses, including the likely inability to
differentiate severe metal-loss defects from less severe defects.

8
 Assumptions and Exclusions Related to
Class-Design-Based Re-Verification Intervals
Because Reference 1 dealt with a prescriptive integrity plan in a “one-size-fits-all” framework,
an essential part of the implementation flow chart in Figure 1 excludes applications outside the
“one-size” provisions that underlie Reference 1. The next section identifies exclusions that result
from the assumptions made in Reference 1, leading to the second-level flow charts discussed
earlier, to ensure all applications are within the provisions of the one-size approach.
The first general assumption underlying the re-verification interval in Reference 1 is that pipe
wall thickness is increased in Class 3 and Class 4 designs in accordance with the regulatory
provisions and use of the same grade of line pipe. The first two checks in the flow chart in
Figure 4 exclude pipelines where the provisions of the regulations are implemented with other
than the same grade of line pipe used in adjacent Class 1 line pipe. Because higher-strength
grades were not commonly available through the late 1960s, early pipeline construction was
largely with the same grade of line pipe, so that this check is not anticipated to exclude much
early construction. However, as higher strength grades have become available, it is possible that
this check will exclude rehabilitation work done with higher-strength line pipe, as well as class
changes that have been met through use of higher-strength grades.
The second general assumption is that re-verification intervals for HCA’s for gas-transmission
pipelines can be based on that for Class 3 and Class 4 designs relative to that for Class 1. This is
tantamount to assuming that the definition of an HCA overlays exactly that for Class 3 and 4
designs. Thus, the second check in the flow chart in Figure 4 excludes HCAs other than those
that overlay Class 3 and 4 designs.
The third general assumption is that the line-pipe steel, the pipeline coating, and the cathodic-
protection (CP) system are consistent with the properties and degradation rates used in
Reference 1. In that reference, evaluation of leak versus rupture and control of fracture arrest
involved use of 20 ft-lb as representative of the lower-bound full-size equivalent (FSE) Charpy-
vee notch (CVN) plateau (CVP) energy for the line-pipe steel toughness. Pipelines made of line
pipe known to have CVN energies below this level at the service temperature are excluded
through the flow chart in Figure 4. Likewise, steels whose fracture-appearance-transition
temperature (FATT) is known to be below the service temperature are excluded through the flow
chart in Figure 4. Heat of compression significantly warms the pipe wall in high-volume cross-
country transmission operations, and helps such pipelines avoid this exclusion. A FATT above
the service temperature leads to longer fractures if fracture initiation occurs. For this reason, the
flow chart in Figure 4 includes a second filter related to FATT involved with pipeline operation –
excluding pipelines where significant heat of compression is absent if the FATT is anticipated to
be high. Examples of such include pipelines fed from LNG, low-pressure pipelines, and some
intrastate lines.
Although the external metal-loss corrosion kinetics used in Reference 1 reflect an upper-bound
for protected pipelines based on the OPS incident database, periodic upsets in CP conditions can
accelerate corrosion. Accordingly, segments of a line where upsets such as stray currents or
shielding occur are excluded by the flow chart in Figure 4. Likewise, segments of pipeline

9
Figure 4 Exclusions based on the general assumptions in Reference 1

where microbiologically-influenced corrosion (MIC) is known to be active in areas of failed

coating are excluded.
In addition to the design and RoW issues addressed in Figure 4, the prescriptive re-verification
interval developed in Reference 1 also reflects assumptions concerning pipeline operation. First,
it is assumed that the gas is sweet and dry pure methane, which excludes rich or sour-gas service,
as well as transport of acid-forming gases. The first check in Figure 5 addresses this exclusion.
Second, it is assumed implicitly in Reference 1 that the loading is predominantly pressure only,
the exclusion for which is covered in Figure 5 by the second check. The third and fourth checks
in Figure 5 reflect the fact that the prescriptive re-verification interval of Reference 1 is free of
concern for SCC and fatigue, which reflects the reduced stress in Class 3 and 4 designs, and
assumptions concerning the amplitude and frequency of pressure cycles and gas temperature.
Associated with these checks are back-up checks to ensure that the prescriptive re-verification
interval is applied within the constraints of the thresholds and other assumptions made in
Reference 1. Finally, because the re-verification interval in Reference 1 relates specifically to
cracking in the high pH environment, and related data to characterize the near-neutral
environment are still being generated, pipelines known to suffer near-neutral pH SCC are
excluded8.

8
It is likely that the verification interval developed for high pH SCC will be relevant to near-neutral cracking as
both cracking mechanisms show a similar dependence on microplastic strain and so should exhibit a similar
dependence on maximum stress.

10
Figure 5 Exclusions involving operational assumptions made in Reference 1

In addition to RoW and operations exclusions, there are several assumptions related to the line
pipe implicit in the prescriptive re-verification interval introduced in Reference 1, which are
dealt with in Figure 6. The first two exclusions are vintage- and supplier-specific defects
introduced during line-pipe production. The third check excludes line pipe shipped by rail, and
purchased prior to changes in rail-shipment practices introduced to avoid seam cracking, which
also is vintage and supplier specific. References 15 and 16 are useful in identifying these
defects. The threat associated with these defects is limited, as defects that have caused
reportable incidents reflect line pipe supplied by specific mills, and made over a limited time
interval. This knowledge is a key to managing the integrity treat posed by such features.

Figure 6. Exclusions related to the line-pipe vintage and supplier.

11
 Standards
Earlier sections of this report outlined the process of benchmarking to characterize the condition
of a pipeline system based on the prior experience with the pipeline of concern. Like-similar
analysis of other pipelines and knowledge of RoW conditions along a given pipeline also were
discussed as a way to benchmark where problems might be anticipated. The significant role of
the CP system was noted as the means to control metal loss corrosion, as was control of that
system to avoid damage to the coating, or possible hydrogen-related cracking. When the
benchmark data fail to adequately characterize the pipeline’s current condition from an integrity
perspective, the discussion indicated that a baseline inspection was required using HRT, ILI, DA,
or other equivalent, as appropriate3. However, that discussion did not identify how to benchmark
or inspect a pipeline system, make decisions concerning its integrity or functionality, or mitigate
the problems identified. The purpose of this section is to indicate the scope of such actions, and
outline the standards9 needed to consistently implement those actions. The section following this
one addresses the related personnel training and minimum qualification requirements.
Key aspects of system integrity and functionality were outlined in Figure 2 in regard to a
preliminary evaluation of the exclusions associated with use of the prescriptive re-verification
intervals of Reference 1. They are re-visited here in reference to the detailed information
gathering and evaluation that is involved with benchmarking.
The first check in Figure 2 involved gas quality, which in a prescriptive framework is dealt with
on a pass / fail basis. Evaluation on a pass / fail basis requires a gas-quality standard be met that
effectively eliminates the likelihood of gas-quality-related incidents. There are three elements
being considered in the development of such a standard. The first element addresses the effects
of past gas quality on integrity or functionality. A standard is required to establish that the
pipeline system in the HCA has not been degraded by past service. This performance-based
standard focuses on low points and other facets of the system where internal corrosion or other
forms of degradation may have occurred. The remaining two elements deal with the future: one
sets gas-content requirements that effectively limit future internal degradation associated with
gas-borne constituents; the second sets measurement methods and frequency requirements that
ensure the content requirements achieve their intended purpose. Recognizing that these
standards will serve a regulatory function, the requirements and practices must be auditable.
In addition to gas quality, standards must be developed as the basis to determine the current
condition and functionality of the pipeline system. These standards must deal with the integrity
of the pipeline and the functionality of the compressor stations and other above ground
installations, as well as the system controls. The elements that comprise these standards are the
same. The first element deals with inspection to characterize condition in terms of integrity or
functionality; a second deals with criteria to assess if the condition is consistent with the
provisions of the pipeline or system design when the line was commissioned; while a third
addresses retroaction taken as required, and demonstrates the adequacy of these actions once
implemented. These elements are listed down the left side of each of Figures 7, 8, and 9, which
outline the scope of standards to establish system functionality and integrity.

9
The scope of standards is discussed herein. These standards are the subject of committees active within
organizations such as NACE and ASME.

12
The scope outlined in each of Figures 7 – 9 identifies where current regulatory requirements
have to be met as a part of the standards to be developed. These figures also outline interfaces to
personnel training, and identify where at present it is clear that minimum qualifications must be
in place for the staff involved to ensure the adequacy of the functionality and integrity developed
by these standards. It is anticipated that other such areas will continue to be identified as this
process moves forward. Some of these issues are discussed in the next section.
Standards to support the implementation plan and needs for personnel training and minimum
qualifications are being dealt with independent of this report through technical committees
associated with NACE and ASME.

13
 Personnel Training and Qualifications
Figures 7 and 8 outline elements of standards associated with system functionality and protection
as it impacts HCA’s. Personnel training and minimum qualifications supporting these elements
are in many ways an extension or continuation of existing practices. Because companies have
been dealing with these practices since the inception of the regulations, there is little new to add.
Suffice it to note that current regulatory coverage of system protection relates to metal-loss
corrosion, whereas in future system protection might incorporate other forms of “protection”.
For example, as technology develops, “protection” might incorporate technology that limits
immediate or delayed mechanical-damage incidents through practices that detect encroachment
to the RoW, or the presence of the pipeline in the RoW. Alternatively, technology that protects
against future sources of delayed mechanical-damage incidents through practices that detect
contact with the pipeline might be involved. For this reason, standards need to be written
recognizing that protection technology continues to develop.
While Figures 7 and 8 address practices that have a long history, Figure 9 addresses what may be
recent technology for some operators. This technology also is continuing to evolve quickly. For
this reason, both training and minimum qualifications are important considerations in regard to
pipeline system inspection and assessment to demonstrate functionality and integrity. In regard
to the inspection aspects, training should involve both the inspection company personnel as well
as operator personnel.

Valve & Station System

Function and Controls
Data and Emergency
Response Plans

Functionality
Demonstrated
???

RetroAction
Demonstrated
???

Figure 7. Elements and scope of valve, station, and controls condition

assessment, addressed by related standard(s) and personnel training.

14
Figure 8. Elements and scope of condition assessment for control and protection
systems, addressed by related standard(s) and personnel training.

Figure 9. Elements and scope of pipeline condition assessment, addressed by

related standard(s) and personnel training.

15
The focus of training for inspection staff should reflect typical operator needs and performance
requirements for demonstrating functionality and integrity. Flow of information should be
directed at avoiding gaps in the inspection that could lead to incidents. For example, current ILI
for pipeline integrity that uses MFL-based inspection for metal loss defects deals with localized
metal loss features, but can miss gradually developing significant general wall loss(17). This gap
will close as the interchange between pipeline integrity engineers and the ILI personnel makes
clear the need for tools that address localized metal loss, and the general wall thinning that also
can cause a leak or rupture. Gap analysis of the functionality and protection aspects should be
done to identify where additional training will enhance the value of the inspection and reduce
incident risk in HCAs.
Training and qualifications also should address statistically valid calibration and verification of
ILI calls and the level of certainty in the resulting integrity analysis. This should include dig-site
selection, in addition to the number of digs required as a function of the accuracy and precision
of the calls.
Training of operator personnel associated with inspection and condition assessment should
develop the required competency or the skills needed to select and interface with consultants
with an established competency in the areas required. As indicated in Figure 9, skills are
required to establish the conditions for each of the potential threats to integrity. It is important
that the training and the minimum qualifications established for operator personnel provide the
tools needed to identify any gaps in the inspection methods. This will enhance the value of the
inspection and reduce incident risk in HCAs.

16
 Example: Integrity Condition Assessment
To provide background for how this implementation plan and the related documents will affect
functionality and integrity, this section illustrates benchmarking and baseline inspection in
support of condition assessment by way of two example assessments. These examples focus on
condition assessment for integrity, as opposed to functionality. Within the concern for integrity,
which would address potential threats to integrity, these examples address only one of the
potential threats – metal-loss defects. Of the three current sources of inspection information for
pipeline integrity, these examples focus on data from a recent ILI of the entire pipeline. Finally,
to emphasize differences between situations requiring no immediate action versus that where
rehabilitation is needed, condition assessment is illustrated for two hypothetical pipelines, which,
as becomes evident, are assumed to be experiencing significantly different levels of in-service
degradation. Figure 10a presents the elements of the ILI, whereas the results of the inspections
are shown in Figure 10b–10e.

ILI Results and the Pipelines Inspected

The ILI results considered in both cases reflect the application of second-generation high-
resolution MFL- based technology. The hypothetical pipelines are buried at the required depth
in moist, sandy soil, which is consistently present over their roughly comparable lengths of about
1000 km. Both pipelines are otherwise identical single diameter lines that are independently
owned and operated. Both are older lines of comparable age with asphalt coatings representing
practices typical of the late 50s. Both are constructed of domestic X52 line pipe made by the
UOE process, with a double-submerged-arc weld long seam. The skelp for pipe making for both
lines came from a steel mill that does not have a history of material and construction defects.
The line pipe was field welded with practices proven over time to be free of in-service girth-weld
problems.
Operation at rated capacity was provided in design by compressor stations nominally separated
by about 75 miles. As constructed, the spacing was longer because both lines ran well below
capacity over their first years of operation. This practice led to a significant compression ratio
for both lines, and quite high discharge temperatures over their early years in service. Both
pipelines make use of full-bore mainline gate valves that are nominally located at 25-mile
intervals. Both pipelines were subjected to a pre-service hydrotest to 100 percent of SMYS.
Cathodic protection was installed on both pipelines within a year of their being commissioned.
The functionality of both pipeline systems is demonstrated periodically in accordance with
current regulatory requirements.
Early in their service, while demand was rather low and the wall-hoop-stress proportionally low,
both pipelines transported sweet, dry gas at discharge temperatures in excess of 150 F, which
resulted in aging of the coating and some disbondment. Compressor stations were added along
each line to match the design spacing as demand grew and required increased horsepower. After
the role of temperature in promoting SCC became apparent, both operators installed gas coolers
and took advantage of the added horsepower by balancing the load between the stations, which
reduced compression ratio and so also reduced discharge temperature. Both lines now discharge

17
sweet, dry gas at between 100 F and 110 F. As operation at higher temperatures occurred early
in their service while demand was low, SCC has not been a problem, a fact confirmed by
selective digs.
Gas content and quality are checked periodically by both operators. Neither line has gas
injection within its length: the closest upstream injection being more than 100 miles upstream in
either case. Both pipelines operate now at close to their as-designed maximum allowable
operating pressure (MAOP). Because of their supply and demand situations, there are few
pressure cycles more than three percent of MAOP on either pipeline. Class 3 areas are
distributed regularly along the RoW of both lines, with regulations required reduced design stress
achieved in those areas by increased wall thickness.
The essential difference between these hypothetical pipelines lies in the ability to affect constant,
controlled CP, with periodic upsets occurring throughout the life of one of these pipelines
because of hypothetical intermittent power problems. As yet, this has not caused a problem, as
neither line has suffered an incident due to any of the potential integrity threats. Hereafter, the
pipeline with good CP control is termed Pipeline A, while that experiencing intermittent control
is termed Pipeline B.
Both operators utilize aggressive direct assessment (DA) programs, which are facilitated by the
consistent moist environment of their pipelines. The pipeline characterized in Figures 10b and c
has required limited field re-coating based on the results of this DA work, as little degradation
has been identified in follow-up digs. No defects over a few percent of the wall thickness have
been found for Pipeline A, which were dealt with by grinding to smooth the features, followed
by re-coating. In contrast, the absence of incidents for Pipeline B, which is suffering severe
corrosion as shown in Figures 10d and e, may be due to periodic rework driven by defects
identified over the years through the DA program.
Both operators maintain good records of where and how the rehabilitation was done. Company
files identified these sites in terms of mileposts, chainage, weld-seams, and clock positions. This
information was used to locate this rework relative to the pig log, and such features were culled
from the cumulative defect records presented in Figures 10b through 10e.
Although not designed initially to launch and receive ILI tools, the simple design of these
systems meant that these pipelines were among the gas-transmission pipelines that could be
modified to pass such tools. Modifications on both pipelines were completed about five years
ago to make these lines piggable. Just over four years ago, ILIs were scheduled with the same
inspection company and completed for both operators using the same tool. The raw data created
by those inspections was read and interpreted in the same manner, by the same personnel.
Both lines were inspected with the expectation that external corrosion would be found, because
both lines are sited through moist soil. Internal corrosion was not expected, because their
operation involves sweet, dry gas confirmed by frequent, periodic gas sampling. The ensuing
discussion assumes that by running the same tool in both pipelines, and analyzing the data in a
comparable way, metal loss in both pipelines is equally characterized. It also assumes that a
statistically significant number of verification digs was made to both demonstrate that the tool
adequately and consistently characterized these defects. Dig sites needed to validate the
adequacy and consistency of the ILI included sites where the ILI identified large anomalies, as
well as at sites where the tool indicated small anomalies. Sites where corrosion was anticipated
but not indicated also were dug.

18
 ILI Validated With Condition RetroAction
Statisitically-Based Demonstrated Demonstrated
Confirming Dig Data ??? ???

a) elements of this ILI-based condition assessment

green<20% wall
Clock position

distance from reference girth weld

b) planar location of metal-loss features along and around Pipeline A

B31G

c) severity assessment for Pipeline A (based on B31G)

19
 green<20% wall, 20%<yellow<40%, 40%<red<60%

Clock position

distance from reference girth weld

d) view like part b), but indicating extensive corrosion on Pipeline B

B31G

e) severity assessment, but B31G indicates action is required for Pipeline B

Figure 10. Examples of baseline inspection and use of assessment criteria, for metal
loss defects identified by in-line inspection.

ILI Implications

Figure 10a indicates the elements of condition assessment, starting with the just-noted in-line
inspection, which could be done using one or more of the three available pipeline technologies.
Once the inspection is done and validated, Figure 10 a indicates that a criterion is used to judge

20
their severity, and decisions are made in terms of what features require action, and when in time
this must occur.
Figures 10b and 10d present the cumulative results of the inspection along the entire length of
the pipeline, with the location of features identified along the length pipeline axially compressed
to fit the width of the page. Figures 10c and 10e present the severity assessment for the pipelines
based solely on the ILI data. Figure 10b is paired with Figure 10c and Figure 10d is paired with
Figure 10e.
As is evident from Figure 10b, Pipeline A suffers only limited incidence of corrosion, and those
features are both widespread and small in area and depth. In contrast, the results shown in
Figure 10d indicate Pipeline B experiences problematic metal loss, for which more detailed
views show the presence of features that are occasionally closely clustered, and large in area as
well as deep compared to the wall thickness.
For both pipelines the severity of the defects identified by the ILI has been assessed using
B31G(18) ; however, any relevant and established criterion for metal-loss defects could have been
used(e.g., see 19-21). It is clear from Figure 10c that the defects present in this hypothetical pipeline
have a nominally acceptable size based on B31G. However, there is one feature that is more
than 20 percent of the wall-thickness, whose presence would be addressed in the near term.
In contrast, the results presented in Figure 10e would have generated a near-term response over
segments of this hypothetical pipeline, as the integrity assessment indicates defect severity
requiring immediate action. Other areas are indicated on this pipeline where typical metal-loss
corrosion rates motivate intermediate- to long-term action. Accordingly, a rehabilitation
program would be developed for this pipeline to address these features. This program would
specify rehabilitation ranging from pressure-containing sleeves to reinforcement, but might also
involve cutouts or selective replacement depending on company- and pipeline-specific issues.
Still other areas exist where re-coating alone might be viable – depending on the possible
presence of adjacent, deeper features and how they are rehabilitated.
With reference to the one-size-fits-all inspection interval reported in Reference 1, the presence of
any defect identified while benchmarking the pipeline leads to a degraded baseline condition
compared to the as-commissioned state of the pipeline. In such situations, either the pipeline is
rehabilitated to the as-designed state or the prescriptive re-verification interval must be
reduced10. For the examples considered, the effect of the metal-loss defects could be offset, for
example, by use of a pressure-retaining reinforcing sleeve11. If this repair is made using full-
scale-test-proven practices, the integrity is demonstrated equal to the as-commissioned state by
virtue of technical literature documenting such data(e.g., see 22). Such documentation presents full-
scale test results indicating structural adequacy, which coupled with the seal provided by the
girth welds, demonstrates pressure-boundary integrity equal to that of the pipeline as designed
and constructed.

10
Situations exist between the limits cited here, where the level of degradation can be tolerated without
reinforcement in accordance with regulations, or other immediate action. For example, shallow defects can be
ground smooth and inspected to ensure they are crack free, and if so the area can be re-coated and otherwise
rehabilitated as required, without penalty in terms of prorated wall loss.
11
The choice of this rehabilitation is threat-specific, and may be defect-size specific – issues that are beyond the
scope of this report.

21
In cases where the baseline condition includes defects that can be left in the pipeline consistent
with prescriptive regulatory provisions, the re-verification interval of Reference 1 must be
reduced. For corrosion defects, this reduction is in proportion to wall loss, based on the current
defect depth12. If the baseline condition involves use of recent data, care must be taken to
account for the elapsed calendar time between the recent inspection and the current date, which
is used as the benchmark date for the pipeline.

Data Utility in Benchmarking and Assessing “Current”

Baseline Condition

Whether “recent” data are viable as the basis to benchmark a pipeline and establish its current
condition as a baseline for application of the re-verification interval depends on several factors.
The results for the examples discussed in Figure 10 are useful in illustrating some of the factors
important in establishing how recent the inspection must be to serve as a measure of current
condition. As indicated above, this assumes that the metal loss in both pipelines is equally
characterized by the ILI, and that verification digs validate use of the ILI data.
Consider first the pipeline situation represented by Figures 10b and c, which indicate very
limited degradation has occurred from the as-commissioned state. Given the fact that the
environment is nearly constant and coating disbondment occurred early in this pipeline’s life, the
few shallow defects identified by the in-line inspection developed slowly over a period of
decades. This observation, coupled with the large axial spacing between these defects, indicates
that protection against metal-loss corrosion is excellent along the full length of this pipeline. In
light of the limited pressure cycling and absence of drivers for other threats, such trends build
confidence that the overall condition of this pipeline is good – in spite of the fact that these data
reflect metal-loss corrosion defects. Because the corrosion rate is low, the extent of corrosion
limited, and the data only four years old, the results in Figure 10b and c can be confidently
projected forward to the benchmarking date for this pipeline. Given the condition for this
pipeline, its operation and maintenance history, and the absence of significant defects based on
information integrated from ILI and DA inspection, results from an even older ILI could prove
viable to set the baseline condition. Such is particularly the case when integrated data from two
inspection sources are mutually consistent, and where current data gathered for example through
DA with confirmatory digs indicated the condition was unchanged.
In contrast to the trends in Figures 10b and c, the extent and size of the metal loss defects
presented in Figures 10d and e conveys the impression that the integrity of this pipeline is
questionable – even after the deeper features are repaired. Corrosion rates at some locations are,
based on these boxed indications, at least three times greater on average as compared to the just-
discussed pipeline. Integration of the ILI results and recent DA results indicates that hot spots
for corrosion are distributed along the pipeline and have been found within HCA’s. It follows
that hot spots for such corrosion may not have been adequately identified by the ILI, as the
consistency claimed by the vendors leaves open the possibility that many features deeper than 10
to 20 percent of the wall thickness could be missed given the number of features found.
Likewise still deeper features could exist.

12
As with the rehabilitation practice, this linear offset is specific to metal loss due to corrosion.

22
Because of the higher corrosion rates in the hot-spot areas, there is significant uncertainty in
projecting even four-year old data to establish the baseline condition for this pipeline. Thus,
once the hot spots are fully mitigated, and the deeper defects put on a fast track for mitigation,
consideration should be given to scheduling a baseline inspection. Alternatively, a very
aggressive DA program could be considered, along with like-similar analysis based on the defect
and mitigation history of this pipeline. High-pressure hydrotesting also could be considered,
although it is possible that the smaller-diameter pit-like metal loss defects will not be effectively
exposed by this approach.

23
 Summary and Conclusions
An implementation plan for periodic inspection intervals was developed to control integrity
threats to gas-transmission pipeline integrity and ensure safe operation in high-consequence
areas. Because these intervals were evaluated using “worst-case analyses” in a “one-size-fits-
all” framework for use in a prescriptive integrity-management plan, the implementation plan
provides filters to ensure pipelines managed on this basis fit within this framework. Where the
provisions do not apply directly, either the pipeline is excluded, or the one-size interval is
shortened accordingly.
Key one-size requirements are presented related to design and construction factors.
Requirements also are presented in terms of service-influenced and right-of-way influenced
factors. Integrity management for pipeline segments in HCA’s that do not meet these
requirements will require case-by-case integrity assessment. It is anticipated that portions of a
pipeline through an HCA that are excluded because of right-of-way-related requirements will be
identified and evaluated through direct-assessment practices. Exceptions involving as-
constructed issues or rehabilitation can be identified and evaluated through company records.
Standards to support the implementation plan and needs for personnel training and minimum
qualifications are being dealt with independent of this report through technical committees
associated with NACE and ASME.
Finally, an example based on consideration of results for an inspection of two hypothetical
pipelines suffering different degrees of in-service degradation was used to illustrate the many
factors that impact how the age of available information bears on the current condition of a
pipeline. While there is merit in setting a single age beyond which data are excluded, this
illustration showed this did not ensure a conservative outcome, nor is such an approach relevant
or justified for well-maintained pipelines.

24
 References
1. Leis, B. N., and Bubenik, T. A., “Periodic Re-Verification Intervals for High-Consequence
Areas,” Battelle Report to GTI, GRI Report-00/0230, January, 2001.
2. Bubenik, T. A., Leis, B. N., Burgoon, D. A., Rust, S. W., Clark, E. B., Garrity, K., Veith, P.
H., van Oostendorp, D., “Direct Assessment and Validation,” Battelle Report to GTI, GRI
Report-00/0231, December 2000.
3. Duffy, A. R., McClure, G. M., Maxey, W. A., and Atterbury, T.J., “Study of the Feasibility
of Basing Natural Gas Pipeline Operating Pressure on Hydrostatic Test Pressure,” Pipeline
Research Committee International, A.G.A. Catalog No. L30050, February, 1968.
4. Keifner, J. F., “GRI Guide for Locating and Using Pipeline Industry Research,” Draft
Report to GRI, 2001.
5. Keifner, J. F., and Maxey, W. A., “Hydrostatic Testing – Parts I and II,” Oil and Gas
Journal, July 31, 2000, pp. 54 – 61, and August 7, 2000, pp. 54 – 58.
6. Leis, B. N., and Brust, F. W., “Ductile Crack Growth Model and Its Implications With
Regard to Optimum Hydrotest Strategies,” Pipeline Technology Conference, Part B,
Oostende, pp. 13.11-19, 1990: see also Leis, B. N., and Rudland, D. L., “Toward
Alternatives to Hydrotesting to Ensure Safe Serviceability of Pipelines,” 11th PRCI/EPRG
Biennial Joint Technical Meeting on Line Pipe Research, pp 28.1-20, Arlington, 1997.
7. Leis, B. N., and Verley, R., “Quality Control and Non-Destructive Inspection Offer
Alternatives to Hydrotesting,” Oil and Gas Journal, July 31, 2000, pp. 54 – 61, and August
7, 2000, pp. 54 – 58.
8. Bubenik, T. A., and Nestleroth, J. B., “Multiple In-Line Inspection Technologies,” by T. A.
Bubenik and J. B. Nestleroth, Final Report to the PRCI, PR-3-9717, July, 2000.
9. Bubenik, T. A., Nestleroth, J. B., Davis, R. J., Leis, B. N., Francini, R. B., Crouch, A.,
Udpa, S., and Afzal, M. A. K., “In-Line Inspection Technologies for Mechanical Damage
and SCC in Pipelines,” Final Report from Battelle to the U. S. Department of
Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety, Report No. DTRS56-96-C-0010, June 2000.
10. Nestleroth, J. B., and Bubenik, T. A., “Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) Technology for
Natural Gas Pipeline Inspection,” GRI Report Number GRI-00/0180, September, 2000.
11. Bubenik, T. A., Nestleroth, J. B., and Leis, B. N., “Introduction to Smart Pigging,” Battelle
Draft Report to GTI, GRI Report-00/02xx, January, 2001.
12. Leeds, J. M., and Waterton, M., “Correlating Coating and Metal-Loss Data Can Save O&M
Money,” Pipeline and Gas Industry, March, 1999, pp. 27-35.
13. Leeds, J. M., and Grapilglia, J., “The DC Voltage Gradient Method for Accurate
Determination of Coating Faults on Buried Pipelines,” Proceedings of the 1990 UK
Corrosion Meeting, October, 1990.
14. Wyatt, B., “Advanced Overline Cathodic Protection and Coating Surveys,” 4th IBC
Conference on Onshore Pipeline Technology, International Business Conferences --
London, Paris, November 2000.

25
15. Kiefner, J. F., and Clarke, E. B., History of Line Pipe Manufacturing in North America,
ASME, CRTD-Volume 43, 1996.
16. Anon., Bulletin on Imperfection Technology, API Bulletin 5T1, 9th Edition, 1988.
17. Leis, B. N., Thomas, T. C., Quinones, A. G., and Ulloa-Ochoa, M. C., “In-Line Inspection
and Integrity Evaluation of PEP RMNE Line G-2,” Fifth Pipeline Congress and
International Exposition, PEMEX, Conference CD – Maintenance Section, Morelia,
Mexico, October, 2000.
18. Anon., ANSI/ASME B31G –1991, “Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of
Corroded Pipelines,” ASME, 1991.
19. Kiefner, J. F., and Vieth, P. H., “A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining
Strength of Corroded Pipe,” Pipeline Research Supervisory Committee, A.G.A. Catalog
No. L51609, 1989: see also Vieth, P. H., and Kiefner, J. F., “Database of Corroded Pipe
Tests,” Pipeline Research Supervisory Committee, A.G.A. Catalog No. L51689, 1994: see
also Vieth, P. H., and Kiefner, J. F., “RSTRENG2 Users Manual,” Pipeline Research
Supervisory Committee, A.G.A., 1993.
20. Leis, B. N., and Stephens, D. R., “An Alternative Approach to Assess the Integrity of
Corroded Line Pipe – Part One: Current Status and Part Two: Alternative Criterion,” 7th
International Conference on Offshore Pipelines and Polar Engineering, Vol. 3, pp 624 –
634 and pp 635 – 641, 1997.
21. Batte, A.D., Fu, B., Kirkwood, M.G., and Vu, D.; A New Method for Determining the
Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipelines, 16th International Conference on Offshore
Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, (OMAE 1997), American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Yokohama, Japan, 1997.
22. Kiefner, J. F., Bruce, W. A., Stephens, D. R., “Pipeline Repair Manual,” Pipeline Research
Supervisory Committee, A.G.A. Catalog Number L51716, December, 1994

26