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Tan vs COMELEC G.R. No.

73155 July 11, 1986

NOTA BENE: This case is relevant to the current buzz regarding the "Sugbuak." The
issue in this case, however, is a bit on the technical side.

- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily more than
one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was created as a result of the
alteration

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for
January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that
the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government
Code because:

(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within
the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute

The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely considered.
Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January 4, 1986, after the
plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day, January 3.

ISSUE:

W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites under
Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that --

"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,


abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a province is
created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, "the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" must first be
obtained.

The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in
the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental.

"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The
first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would
be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros
del Norte."

The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the
Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984
(128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support their case, should not be taken
as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, it held that the dissenting view of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos in the aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable
ruling, quoting that:

"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people
of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the
people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision."

It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the creation of the
new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it recited therein that "the
plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and
twenty days from the approval of this Act." However, when the bill was enacted into B.P.
885, tehre was an unexplained change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new
province, which are the areas affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-
serving phrase to state that the new province constitutes the area affected.

"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading,
erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much
an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not
to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points
raised by the petitioners."

Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on January 3,
1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the
officials thereof are also declared null and void.

SO ORDERED."

Sardea vs COMELEC G.R. No. 106164 August 17, 1993

The petitioners who are allegedly bona-fide residents and voters of Mauban, Quezon, and who are
"so numerous it is impractical to bring them all before the Honorable Court" (p. 2, Rollo), assail the
Resolution promulgated on June 19, 1992, by the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, entitled: "In the Matter of the Petition to
Declare a Failure of Election in Mauban, Quezon," denying their petition against the COMELEC, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, and the private respondents who were
proclaimed the duly elected Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban,
Quezon.

The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads as follows:

Irregularities such as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an


election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and
to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds,
precisely, of only a relatively few. . . . . (Grand Alliance for Democracy, GAD, et al.
vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. 78302, 27 May 87, En Banc, Resolution.)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . it is very clear that as early as May 14, 1992 petitioners were already not in
consonance with the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers. Yet, from petitioner
EDWIN SARDEA'S own admission, he only formally filed on May 18, 1992, his
petition assailing the legality of the canvassing being held, contrary to the provisions
of Sec. 17 and 19 of R.A. 7166.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to DENY


as it hereby DENIES this petition. (pp. 36-37, Rollo.)

Petitioner allege that respondent COMELEC "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution, considering that it blatantly disregarded
its own Rules of Procedure and, more importantly, it perpetuated (sic) a clear violation of election
laws"
(p. 85, Rollo).
The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 12, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, convened at
the Municipal Hall and canvassed the first batch of election returns for the just concluded May 11,
1992 elections in that municipality.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while the canvassing of the election returns
was going on, some sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea, a defeated mayoralty candidate of
LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building" and "destroyed . . . all election materials and
paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election returns furnished to respondent Board
. . ." (p. 86, Rollo).

On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and assessed the
extent of the damage wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered that the election returns in the
possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban were intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said election
returns for use in the canvass. However, due to the absence of certain forms needed for the
canvass, the same was suspended and moved to May 17, 1992. Still, on said date, the canvassing
was not resumed because the Board had to determine first the number of returns to be used in the
canvass.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the parties that it would
continue the canvassing of the election returns based on the copies from the MTC of Mauban. Atty.
Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-NUCD, objected. Later, he filed a petition in behalf of petitioner
Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers on the ground that it had no
authority from the COMELEC to use the copies of the election returns obtained from the MTC of
Mauban. The Municipal Board of Canvassers overruled Attorney Devera's objection and denied
Sardea's petition to stop the proceedings, citing the directive dated May 15, 1992 of the Provincial
Election Supervisor, Atty. Adolfo Ilagan. The directive was based on the authority given by Acting
Executive Director Resurreccion Bora of the COMELEC, "to order the Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Mauban, Quezon to make available the copy of election returns, etc., in his possession for the use of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers" (p. 86, Rollo). As Sardea manifested that he would appeal the
ruling, the Board of Canvassers suspended the proceedings in order that he may formalize his
appeal. On May 19, 1992, he filed a notice of appeal.

On May 22, 1992, the COMELEC held a special meeting and resolved "to authorize the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon to reconvene and use the copies of the election returns of
the Municipal Trial Court Judge" (p. 87, Rollo).

On May 24, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened and dismissed Sardea's appeal.
The letter of Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and the minutes of the special meeting of the
COMELEC on May 22, 1992, were deemed sufficient authority for it to use the MTC Judge's copies
of the election returns. A copy of the excerpts of the minutes contained a written notation of a certain
Cesario Perez addressed to the chairman of the respondent Board commanding him to "implement
this resolution" and that "this is tantamount to denying the appeal to (sic) your ruling, which appeal
was not received by this Commission" (p. 62, Rollo). The canvassing continued thereafter.

On May 26, 1992, Sardea filed a petition in the Office of the Election Registrar in Mauban, Quezon,
assailing the composition of the Board of Canvassers and its proceedings. He also filed an Amended
Notice of Appeal.

On May 27, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the private respondents as the
duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon.
On June 10, 1992, petitioners filed Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, seeking to declare a failure
of election in Mauban, Quezon, based on the grounds that:

I. The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to declare a


failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.

II. Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without prior authority from
the Honorable Commission. (p. 14, Rollo.)

On June 19, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated the challenged resolution, whereupon Sardea filed
this petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion:

1. in not annulling the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban,


Quezon, despite the failure of election in that municipality;

2. in considering the grounds raised by petitioners as proper for an election contest


despite the nullity of the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Mauban, Quezon; and

3. in ruling that petitioner did not appeal on time the resolution of the Municipal Board
of canvassers of Mauban, Quezon.

The respondents asked for the outright dismissal of the petition based on Section 3, Rule 39 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that decisions in special action cases "shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless retrained by the
Supreme Court" (p. 90, Rollo).

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the finality of COMELEC decisions or resolutions is
indicated in Sec. 257 of B.P. 881, as amended (Omnibus Election Code) which provides that the
decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall become final thirty (30) days after its promulgation.

Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 257. Decision in the Commission. — The Commission shall decide all election
cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision. The decision of the Commission shall become final thirty days after receipt
of judgment. (Art. XII, C, Sec. 3, Const.; Art. XVIII, Sec. 193, 1978 EC). (Underlining
supplied.)

A perusal of our election laws shows that they do not explicitly provide for an appeal from the
COMELEC to the Supreme Court. Section 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each
[Constitutional] Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty [30] days from receipt of a copy thereof." The petition for certiorari shall be filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rivera vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 178; Galido vs. COMELEC,
193 SCRA 79; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84; Pedalizo vs. Mariano, UDK-9819, March 15, 1990).

Since no constitutional provision or law fixes a shorter period, the reglementary period within which a
petition forcertiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court against the COMELEC is thirty (30) days
from receipt of a copy of the COMELEC's order, decision, or ruling.
Respondents did not correctly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure because
this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, hence, it falls under Sec. 1, Rule
39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Sec. 257 of the Omnibus Election Code. This petition
was therefore seasonably filed on July 23, 1992, within thirty (30) days after the petitioner received
the COMELEC resolution on June 23, 1992.

Nevertheless, it must fail because we find the grounds of the petition to be without merit.

The facts show that Sardea's two (2) complaints/petitions involved pre-proclamation controversies
which are defined as:

Sec. 241. Definition. — A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question


pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Art. XX Omnibus Election Code:
emphasis supplied.)

Sardea's first May 18, 1992 complain questioned the use of the Municipal Trial Court Judge's copies
of the election returns as basis for the canvass.

His second complaint on May 27, 1992, filed with the Election Registrar, assailed the composition
and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Both complaints definitely raised pre-
proclamation controversies.

We have already ruled in Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468, that pre-proclamation controversies my no
longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed and
assumed office. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is an election contest in the Regional Trial
Court as provided in Sec. 250 of B.P. 881 and Sec. 2(2),
Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

In this case, since the authenticity and completeness of the returns were never questioned and the
winning candidates had been proclaimed on May 27, 1992, Sardea's pre-proclamation complaint in
the COMELEC ceased to be viable.

The COMELEC correctly dismissed Sardea's petition on the ground that it was proper for an election
contest.

But its holding that petitioners' appeal from the resolution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers was
late, is erroneous.

Section 17, R.A. 7166 deals with the commencement of pre-proclamation controversies while Sec.
19 provides that "parties adversely affected by a ruling of the Board of Canvassers on questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission
within three (3) days from a ruling thereon."

The petitioners properly filed their objection to the use of the election returns from the MTC during
the canvassing on May 18, 1992, based on Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166. Said section provides that persons
objecting to the inclusion in the canvass of any election returns "shall submit their oral objection to
the chairman of the Board of Canvassers at the time questioned return is presented for inclusion in
the canvass." (Emphasis ours.)

By presenting his verbal objection, and subsequently filing a formal objection, on May 18, 1992,
Sardea acted in accordance with Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166. His notice of appeal was verbally denied on
May 24, 1992 by the Board of Canvassers. He filed a notice of appeal to the Commission on May
26, 1992, or within three (3) days after the denial of his notice of appeal by the Board of Canvassers.

This issue on the timeliness of the petitioners' appeal to the Commission is actually moot and
academic because said appeal could not survive after the winning candidates were proclaimed.

The lone remaining issue is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the
petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon province.

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is identical to Section 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, reads as follows:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,


fruad, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
(Sec. 7, 1978 EC).

In Usman vs. COMELEC (42 SCRA 667, 690), we held that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure
of election are: "(1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force
mejeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of
the elections. The language of the law clearly requires the concurrence of the[se] two circumstances
to justify the calling of a special election."

The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the Municipal Board of
Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is not one of the causes that would
warrant the declaration of a failure of election because voting actually took place as scheduled on
May 11, 1992 and other valid election returns still existed. Moreover, the incident did not affect the
result of the election.

The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only under
circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had been so
fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish and what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of
the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise
(20 C.J., pars. 179-181; Capalla vs. Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95).

The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within reach, to ascertain the
true result - when neither from the returns nor from other proof, nor from all together can the truth be
determined (Law on Public Officers and Election Law by Hector S. De Leon, p. 381, 1990 Ed., citing
A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, by F. MECHEM, note 1 at p. 143).

There is a failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be
ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as far as possible be respected.

Since in this case copies of the election returns submitted to the MTC of Mauban, Quezon were
extant, and their authenticity was not questioned, they were properly used as basis for the canvass.
This is expressly authorized by Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) which provides
that "if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the
Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said
election returns issued by the Commission . . . ." (Emphasis ours.)

Thus did we rule in an earlier case:

"While it is true that in local elections, the original copy of the election returns is to be delivered to the
city or municipal board of canvassers as a body for its use in the city or municipal canvass, there is
no provision in the Omnibus Election Code stating that the canvass should be based only on the
original copy of the election returns. Besides, the duplicate copy of election returns that were used in
the canvass of votes were not only authentic copies or certified copies but duplicate originals.
Moreover, petitioner failed to show or even make an allegation that the use of the duplicate originals
of the returns had in some definite manner caused him prejudice, like uncounted votes in his favor or
alteration of an election result otherwise in his favor." (G.R. No. 82674, In Re: Protest of Atty. Alberto
de la Rosa, etc. vs. Comelec and City Board of Canvassers of Zamboanga City, Resolution en
banc dated November 3, 1988.)

There is no merit in the argument of the petitioners that inasmuch as B.P. 881 has been
amended/modified by R.A. 7166, 1 the copies of the election returns in the possession of the MTC
may not be used for the canvass but merely for comparison purposes to determine the authenticity
of other copies of said election returns as provided in Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166. 2 The
repealing clause of R.A. 7166 enumerates the sections of the Omnibus Election Code which it
specifically repeals. Sec. 233 is not among them.

Since B.P. 881 and R.A. 7166 are statutes in pari materia, they should be so construed as to
harmonize with each other and with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system (Valera vs. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823). Prior statutes relating to the same
subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions, and if possible by reasonable
construction, both to be construed that effect may be given to every provision of each (C&C
Commercial Corp. vs. NWSA, 21 SCRA 984, citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. 2 pp.
530-532).

Section 233 of B.P. 881 ought to be harmonized with Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166. Section 27,
par. b(5) of R.A. 7166 presupposes that other copies of the election returns are existent and may be
compared with the copies of the MTC. It does not preclude the use of such authentic copies in the
canvass when the copies submitted to the Board of Canvassers have been lost or destroyed. The
letter of Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and the minutes of the
special meeting of respondent COMELEC held on May 22, 1992 constitute sufficient authority for the
use of such returns in the canvass.

In light of all the foregoing, the use by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon of the
election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban, was not contrary to law, and was in
fact the best possible recourse under the circumstances in order to give life to the will of the
electorate. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion when it issued the assailed resolution
denying the petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Mitmug vs COMELEC G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

FAILURE OF ELECTIONS
Mitmug vs. Commission on Election
G.R. Nos. 106270-73. February 10, 1994.*
Ponente: Digest Author: FABI

DOCTRINE: —Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare failure of election, two (2) conditions must
concur:first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election..

FACTS:

 Sultan Mitmug and Datu Dagalangit were among the candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao during the
11 May 1992 election. Other candidates for the said position also included Datu Elias Abdusalam and Datu Bagtao Khalid.

 There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the said municipality.

 Voter turnout was rather low, particularly in forty-nine (49) precincts. Five (5) of these precincts did not conduct actual
voting at all.

 COMELEC ordered the holding of a special election in the five (5) precincts which failed to function during election day.

 Mitmug filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election alleging various irregularities such as the alteration,
tampering and substitution of ballots.

 COMELEC considered the petition moot since the votes in the subject precincts were already counted.

 Other petitions seeking the declaration of failure of election in some or all precincts of Lumba-Bayabao were also filed
with COMELEC by other mayoralty candidates.

 Mitmug filed a motion to intervene in these four (4) petitions.

 But COMELEC treated the same as a motion for reconsideration and promptly denied it considering that under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure such motion was a prohibited pleading.

 Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election.

 Sultan Mitmug impugned the creation of this Board.

 Nevertheless, new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes.


 Datu Dagalangit was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor.

 Mitmug filed this petition for certiorari seeking the declaration of failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts where
less than a quarter of the electorate were able to cast their votes.

 He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin Datu Dagalangit from assuming office.

 Mitmug lodged an election protest with the RTC disputing the result not only of some but all the precincts of Lumba-
Bayabao, del Sur.

 COMELEC et al. assert that with the filing of an election protest, petitioner is already deemed to have abandoned the
instant petition.

ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying motu proprio and
without due notice and hearing the petitions seeking to declare a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-
Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

RULING+RATIO: NO.

Petition to annul an election is not a pre-proclamation controversy. Consequently, the proclamation of a winning candidate together
with his subsequent assumption of office is not an impediment to the prosecution of the case to its logical conclusion.

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing of a verified petition to declare a failure to
elect, notices to all interested parties indicating therein the date of hearing should be served through the fastest means available. The
hearing of the case will also be summary in nature.

Based on the foregoing, the clear intent of the law is that a petition of this nature must be acted upon with dispatch only after hearing
thereon shall have been conducted.
o Since COMELEC denied the other petitions which sought to include forty-three (43) more precincts in a special
election without conducting any hearing, it would appear then that there indeed might have been grave abuse of
discretion in denying the petitions.

However, a closer examination of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Sec. 2, Rule 26, thereof which was lifted from Sec.
6, B.P. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, indicates otherwise.
Sec. 2. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the
election in any precinct has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension
of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur:
1. no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the
election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and
2. the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

In this case, the votes not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But, the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual
voting took place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by
the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place, the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded.
o COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave, in denying the petitions outright.
o There was no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not constitute sufficient grounds to warrant
the relief sought. For, the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of these conditions to justify the
calling of a special election.
Indeed, the fact that a verified petition is filed does not automatically mean that a hearing on the case will be held before COMELEC
will act on it. The verified petition must still show on its face that the conditions to declare a failure to elect are present. In the
absence thereof, the petition must be denied outright.

There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes.

OTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Sultan Mitmug did not abandon this petition for certiorari when he filed an election protest
 When Sultan Mitmug filed his election protest with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, he informed the trial court
of the pendency of these proceedings. Paragraph 3 of his protest states "[T]hat on August 3, 1992, your protestant filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 106270 assailing the validity of the proclamation
of the herein protestee. . . ."

 Evidently, Sultan Mitmug did not intend to abandon his recourse with this Court. On the contrary, he intended to pursue
it.
 Where only an election protest ex abundante ad cautela is filed, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear the petition seeking
to annul an election

DISPOSITION: there being no grave abuse of discretion, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

Lucero vs COMELEC G.R. No. 113107 July 20, 1994

Petitioner: Wilmar Lucero (Lucero), Jose Ong, Jr. (Ong)

Respondent: COMELEC

Consolidated petition for certiorari seeking to annul the 7 Jan 1994 resolution of COMELEC

Related Provision/s:

Omnibus Election Code, Section 6. Requirements for holding a special election

1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law,
but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term

Facts:

• Lucero lost to Ong by 204 votes in the 1992 elections for the position of district representative of the
2nd legislative district of Northern Samar

• The tally, however, did not include the results of the following:

• Precinct No. 7 — Illegible


• Precinct No. 13 — Snatched ballots; no election held

• Precinct No. 16 — Missing election returns

• In light of this failure, Lucero moved for the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of Ong and to
hold a special election for Precinct No. 13

• Acting on Lucero’s urgent manifestation, COMELEC directed PBC to desist from reconvening until
further orders

• Ong moved to lift the suspension in which Lucero opposed

• COMELEC en banc issued a resolution ordering the Provincial Election Supervision (PES) of Northern
Samar to bring the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 to the Commission wherein the keys thereof shall
be turned over to the PES who shall in turn give the keys for each ballot boxes to the duly authorized
representatives of Lucero and Ong

• The Court issued a TRO against the implementation of the abovementioned resolution and eventually
ordered the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the same

Acting on motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by COMELEC and Lucero, the
Court modified its decision and instead ordered to re-raffle the case to COMELEC

In 1994, COMELEC en banc issued the assailed resolution ordering a re-tabulation of the votes including
the results of Precinct 16 and the ‘COMELEC-copy’ of the results for Precinct 7, a special election for
Precinct 13, and a recount of Precinct 7 conditioned upon the results of Precinct 13

• Both Lucero and Ong contested the said resolution

• Lucero — the count of ballots in Precinct 7 must be unconditional because the election returns
therefrom are invalid

• Ong — COMELEC has no authority to order the correction and to call for a special election almost two
(2) years after the regular election

• Hence, this petition

Issue/s:

W/N the count of Precinct 7 must come before the holding special election in Precinct 13 W/N a special
election could be held 1 year and 10 months after the regular election

Held:

• Yes. The count of Precinct 7 must be determined before holding a special election in Precinct 13

. • Requirement for holding a special election

• Failure of election
• Effect of failure of election in the results of the election

• It must therefore be necessary to know the total number of votes and the difference before it could be
determined if a special election is necessary

• If after including the count of Precinct 7, the difference in the votes are less than 213, which is the
total number of voters in Precinct 13, then a special election is deemed to be necessary because its
failure then would have an effect in the results of the election

• The ‘COMELEC copy’, which the authenticity is doubted, cannot be used, therefore, a count is in order
to determine the real results in Precinct 7

• Yes. A special election could still be held even after 1 year and 10 months after the regular election.

• Requirements in fixing the date of the special election

• Not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect

• Reasonably close to the date of the election held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect

• The delay was primarily caused by the legal skirmishes and maneuvers of the petitioners, therefore
the holding of the special election after almost two years may still be deemed to be reasonably close to
the date of the election not held

• Constitutional and statutory proscription are inapplicable to special elections which may be called
under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code

Ruling:

Ong’s petition denied.

Lucero’s petition granted — ordering the COMELEC to count the votes in Precinct 7, correct and add the
votes in Precinct 13, and hold a special election in Precinct 13 in not later than 30 days if found
necessary after the completion of the preceding orders

Dela Torre vs Comelec G.R. No. 121592 : July 5, 1996

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the COMELEC from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections on the ground that he was convicted
by the MTC of violation the Anti-Fencing Law, citing Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code of
1991 which provides as follows:

“Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after
serving sentence;”
Petitioner contended that the provision is not applicable to him because he was granted probation by
the MTC.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.


2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.

Held:

1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.

The elements of the crime of fencing which are:


1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article, item, object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property
received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and
the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain - thus deliberately
reneging in the process “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to xxx
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The duty not to appropriate,
or to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.

2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction
of fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment
of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although
it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996)

Hassan VS COMELEC G.R. No. 124089 : November13, 1996

Topic: Citizen Participation and Electoral Rights>Failure of Election

FACTS:

• petitioner Hassan and private respondent Buatan were candidates for the Office of the Vice Mayor
while the other private respondents were candidates for councilors in Madalum, Lanao del Sur in the 08
May 1995 regular local elections
• due to threats of violence and terrorism in the area, there was a failure of elections in 6 out of 24
precincts in Madalum

• the ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentified persons in Precinct No. 7-A

• in Precinct Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, elections did not take place because the members of the Board
of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed to report to their respective polling places

 thus, the Monitoring Supervising Team (COMELEC Team) recommended the COMELEC the holding of
special elections in said precincts on 27 May 1995 which was rescheduled for 29 May 1995 for the
reason that the members of the BEI failed to report for duty in their respective polling places
 the rescheduling of the elections in these precincts is to be held at Liangan Elementary School, which
is 15 kilometers away from the designated polling places

 on May 29, the members of the BEI did not again report for duty hence, the COMELEC was
constrained to appoint police/military personnel to act as substitute members so as to push through
with the elections

 thereafter the winners were announced and the results for the Office of the Mayor showed that
private respondent Buatan won

 on 10 June 1995, petitioner Hassan filed a petition with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the
May 29 rescheduled special elections on the grounds that:

 the voting which started at 10:00 a.m. was forcibly ended at around 2:00 p.m. because of exchanges
of rapid gunfiring and grenade launching between unknown elements and the Army or PNP soldiers;

 the voting was moves to Liangan E/S, located about 15 kilometers away from the respective polling
places;

 notices in the transfer of venue of the voting was sent only the “night” of 28 May 1995 and only to a
“few” but not to all concerned;

 only 328 out of the 1,645 registered voters of said precincts were able to vote constituting only
21.1%, and disenfranchising 78% of the registered voters thereof; and

 the regular members of the BEI did not report for duty and were substituted by military personnel

 COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the petition for a declaration of failure of elections
and to call special elections in subject precincts in Madalum, Lanao del Sur

ISSUE: W/N under the circumstances attendant in the case, a declaration of failure of elections is
proper.

HELD: Yes.
DECISION:

• the authority of the COMELEC to declare a failure of election is provided by Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code
 in several cases, the Court has ruled that the pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election
are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure,
violence, or terrorism, and (2) that the votes cast therein suffice to affect the results of the
elections
 the concurrence of these two (2) circumstances are required to justify the calling of a special
election
 mindful of these two (2) requirements, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner
 the COMELEC cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area,
sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually occurred on 29 May 1995 in the areas
concerned
 it must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time because no members of the
BEI reported for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area
 the peculiar situation of Madalum cannot be overstated notwithstanding the notice given on the
afternoon of May 28 resetting the special elections to May 29 and transferring the venue of the
elections 15 kilometers away from the farthest barangay/school was too short resulting to the
disenfranchisement of voters
 out of 1,546 registered voters in the five (5) precincts, only 328 actually voted
 further, the Court cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers, or the
constituents must be charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of the
failure of the two (2) previous elections for to require the voters to come to the polls on such
short notice was highly impracticable
 in a place marred by violence, it was necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time to be
notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the eventuality
 from the foregoing, it is not difficult for the Court to rule that there was insufficiency of notice
given as to the time and transfer of the polling places; the low turnout of voters is more than
sufficient proof that the elections conducted on that day was vitiated - a less than a day’s notice
of time and transfer of polling places 15 kilometers away from the original polls certainly
deprived the electors the opportunity to participate in the elections
 the rescheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon haste
and unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as to the date
but as to the designated polling place
 even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a problem; in the
absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number of
voters, the Court is constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid

Borja vs COMELEC G.R. No. 120140. August 21, 1996


Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. questions the authority of respondent
Commission on Elections en banc to hear and decide at the first instance a
petition seeking to declare a failure of election without the benefit of prior notice
and hearing.
During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T.
Capco vied for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros which was
won by Capco by a margin of 6,330 votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed
and has since been serving as Mayor of Pateros.
Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence,
terrorism and analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters,
presence of flying voters, and unqualified members of the Board of Election
Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of
election and to nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the Pateros Board
of Canvassers.
Concluding that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an
election contest, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition in its resolution
dated May 25, 1995. It declared that forced majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
and other analogous causes . . . are merely the causes which may give rise to
the grounds to declare failure of elections. These grounds, which include (a) no
election held on the designated election date; (b) suspension of election before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election in any polling
place resulted in a failure to elect, were not present in Borjas petition.
Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court,
arguing the same matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He
avers that the COMELEC en banc does not have the power to hear and decide
the merits of the petition he filed below because under Article IX-C, Section 3
of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
After a careful scrutiny of petitioners arguments, this Court finds the same
to be untenable. The petition must inevitably be dismissed.
In order to resolve the threshold issue formulated at the outset, there must
first be a determination as to whether a petition to declare a failure of election
qualifies as an election case or a pre-proclamation controversy. If it does, the
Constitution mandates that it be heard and adjudged by the COMELEC through
any of its Divisions. The COMELEC en banc is only empowered to resolve
motions for reconsideration of cases decided by a Division for Article IX-C,
Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides:

SEC 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

In the case at bar, no one, much less the COMELEC, is disputing the
mandate of the aforequoted Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution. As Borja
himself maintained, the soundness of this provision has already been affirmed
by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, albeit with some
dissent. In Ong, the Court declared that if a case raises pre-proclamation
[1]

issues, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has no original jurisdiction over the
same. Accordingly, said case should be remanded to the COMELEC which, in
turn, will refer the same to any of its Divisions for proper disposition.
A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation
controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the
Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case.
It must be remembered that Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as
Mayor of Pateros. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and
validity. To destroy the presumption, Borja must convincingly show that his
[2]

opponents victory was procured through extra-legal means. This he tried to do


by alleging matters in his petition which he thought constituted failure of
election, such as lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; fraud, violence,
terrorism and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of voters; presence of
flying voters; and unqualified members of the Board of Election
Inspectors. These grounds, however, as correctly pointed out by
the COMELEC, are proper only in an election contest but not in a petition to
declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code lays down the instances when a failure of election may
be declared. It states thus:

SEC. 6. Failure of Election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,


fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice, and hearing, call for the holding or continuation
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The same provisions are reiterated under Section 2, Rule 26 of the


Revised COMELEC Rules. In other words, the COMELEC can call for the
holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when the
election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter
phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is nobody was
elected. None of these circumstances is present in the case at bar. At best, the
grounds cited by Borja are simply events which give rise to the three
consequences just mentioned.
In reality, Borjas petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving
an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code,
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial
Court. Section 251 states:

Section 251. Election contests for municipal offices. A sworn petition contesting the
election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by
any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election. (Italics
supplied)

The COMELEC in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial courts decision pursuant to
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving


elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borjas petition, not
only for being deficient in form but also for having been filed before the wrong
tribunal. This reason need not even be stated in the body of the decision as the
same is patent on the face of the pleading itself. Nor can Borja claim that he
was denied due process because when the COMELEC en banc reviewed and
evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair hearing of his
case. The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein
certainly did not deprive him of his day in court. If anybody here was aggrieved
by the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco whose arguments were
never ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was because the COMELECs
actuation was favorable to him.
Certainly, the COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of
discretion, let alone grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borjas petition. For
having applied the clear provisions of the law, it deserves, not condemnation,
but commendation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution
of the Commission on Elections dated May 25, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

Canicosa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 120318. December 5, 1997

David vs Comelec G.R. No. 127116 : April 8, 1997


Typoco vs COMELEC G.R. No. 136191 : November 29, 1999
Sison vs COMELEC G.R. No. 134096. March 3, 1999
Loong vs COMELEC G.R. No. 133676. April 14, 1999
Carlos vs Angeles G.R. No. 142907. November 29, 2000
Benito vs COMELEC G.R. No. 134913. January 19, 2001
Pasandalan vs COMELEC G. R. No. 150312. July 18, 2002
Magno vs Comelec : 147904 G.R. No. October 4, 2002
Cawasa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 150469. July 3, 2002
Rulloda vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154198. January 20, 2003
Moreno vs COMELEC G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
Galo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 164225 April 19, 2006
Adap vs COMELEC G.R. No. 161984 February 21, 2007
Teves vs COMELEC G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009
Abella vs COMELEC G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991

Lonzanida vs COMELEC G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999

Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000

Ang Bagong Bayani G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

Pimentel vs HRET G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002

Adormeo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 147927 February 4, 2002

Socrates vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002

Latasa vs COMELEC G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003

Ang Bagong Bayani G.R. No. 147589. June 25, 2003

Tolentino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

Ong vs Alegre G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006

Rivera vs COMELEC G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007

CIBAC vs COMELEC G.R. No. 172103 April 13, 2007

BA-RA 7941 vs COMELEC G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007

Montebon vs COMELEC G.R. No. 180444 April 8, 2008

Aldovino vs COMELEC G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

Dizon vs COMELEC G.R. No. 182088 January 30, 2009

BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009

Philippine Guardians vs COMELEC G.R. No. 190529, March 22, 2011

Macalintal vs PET G.R. No. 191618 June7,2011

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC vs COMELEC G.R. No. 192803
December 10, 2013

Atong Paglaum, Inc vs COMELEC G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

Abundo vs COMELEC G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013

Section 124. Meeting to close the list of voters. - The board of election inspectors shall also meet on
the second Saturday immediately preceding the day of the regular election, or on the second day
immediately preceding the day of the special election, plebiscite or referendum whether it be Sunday
or a legal holiday, for the purpose of making such inclusions, exclusions, and corrections as may be
or may have been ordered by the courts, stating opposite every name so corrected, added, or
cancelled, the date of the order and the court which issued the same; and for the consecutive
numbering of the voters of the election precinct.

Should the board fail to include in the list of voters any person ordered by competent court to be so
included, said person shall, upon presentation of a certified copy of the order of inclusion and upon
proper identification, be allowed by the board to vote.

Should the board fail to exclude from the list of voters any person ordered by the court to be so
excluded, the board shall not permit said person to vote upon presentation to it by any interested
party of a certified copy of the order of exclusion.

Section 125. Re-registration. - A voter who is registered in the permanent list of voters need not
register anew for subsequent elections unless he transfer residence to another city or municipality,
or his registration has been cancelled on the ground of disqualification and such disqualification has
been lifted or removed. Likewise a voter whose registration has been cancelled due to failure to vote
in the preceding regular election may register anew in the city or municipality where he is qualified to
vote.

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