Review Airspace Within 50nm Perth Wa

Airspace Review within
50 nautical miles of Perth Airport

March 2017
Office of Airspace Regulation Page 2 of 35
DOCUMENT SPONSOR: OFFICE OF AIRSPACE REGULATION
TRIM REFERENCE: D17/77122
FILE REF: OP16/501
Document control:
Version Issue/Nature of Revision Date

0.1 Initial draft October 2016
0.2 Peer review feedback December 2016
0.3 Incorporates management feedback December 2016
0.4 Incorporates ANSP feedback January 2017
0.5 Incorporates new format February 2017
Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0.1 The Airspace Act 2007 (Act) 1 provides the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) with
the authority to administer and regulate Australian-administered airspace and obligates
CASA to conduct regular reviews of the existing classifications of Australian–administered
airspace. The Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) conducted a review of the airspace
arrangements and classifications within a 50 nautical mile (nm) radius of Perth International
Airport (Perth) to determine if the airspace remains “fit for purpose”. This review did not
assess the implications of a proposed new runway at Perth or the impact of new military
training aircraft at the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Pearce.
1.0.2 This review applies CASAs’ regulatory philosophy which considers the primacy of air
safety but also takes account of all relevant considerations including cost.
1.0.3 An assessment of airspace incidents and feedback from stakeholders concluded
there were no risks that required changes to the existing airspace. However, the review has
noted areas where improvements could be made.
1.0.4 The OAR has determined that the current airspace architecture is fit for purpose but
the airspace architecture will need to be reviewed when planning operations of the proposed
new runway at Perth.
1.0.5 Stakeholder feedback focussed on the need to improve efficiency and shared access
to airspace. The OAR will pass this feedback to the relevant agencies and CASA staff.
Recommendations:
The following recommendations have been made:
1. CASA and Airservices Australia (Airservices) provide additional education to local
operators at Jandakot in relation to airspace infringements. This information should
also include advice on the CASA confidential reporting system and the general
process for reporting airspace infringements.
2. CASA Flying Operations Inspectors and Aviation Safety Advisors conduct specific
consultation with Airservices and Jandakot Airport operators to determine the cause
of airspace infringements and possible mitigation options.
3. Bindoon operators submit their concerns about frequency congestion to the South
Western Australia Regional Airspace Proceedures Advisory Committee (SWA
RAPAC).
4. CASA Operations staff and the Safety Adviser for Perth region should raise the option
of amending the “South Six” visual reporting point (VRP) to align with Thomas Road
and the “Alkimos Wreck” VRP to align with the adjacent settling ponds at the SWA
RAPAC.
5. Operators seeking greater access to Pearce airspace should raise these issues
through RAPAC or directly with the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer at RAAF Base
Pearce.
1
A full list of acronyms and abbreviations used within this report can be found at Annex A.

CONTENTS
1 Executive summary................................................................................ 3
2 Introduction .......................................................................................... 5
3 Background .......................................................................................... 5
4 Aviation incidents ................................................................................ 10
5 Detailed feedback from stakeholders ....................................................... 12
6 Key issues and findings ........................................................................ 13
7 Overview of changes since 2011 Perth Aeronautical Study .......................... 15
8 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 16
ANNEX A – Acronyms and abbreviations ....................................................... 17
ANNEX B – Australian airspace structure ...................................................... 19
ANNEX C – Restricted and Danger areas within 50 nm of Perth ......................... 20
ANNEX D – Air traffic control tower hours ...................................................... 21
ANNEX E – Controlled area steps ................................................................ 22
ANNEX F – Detailed charts of restricted and danger areas within 50nm of Perth ... 23
ANNEX G – Stakeholder consultation list ....................................................... 32
ANNEX H – Detailed information about comments provided during the review ...... 33
ANNEX I – References............................................................................... 35

2 INTRODUCTION
2.0.1 Under Section 11 and 12 of the Airspace Act 2007 (Act), the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA) has responsibility for the administration and regulation of Australian-
administered airspace. In carrying out these responsibilities CASA must give primacy to
aviation safety and must:
 foster efficient use of Australian-administered airspace,
 foster equitable access to that airspace for all users of that airspace,
 take into account national security, and
 take into account protection of the environment.
2.0.2 CASA last conducted a review of airspace around Perth International Airport (Perth)
in 20112.
2.1. Purpose
2.1.1 The purpose of this review is to assess the airspace architecture within 50 nm of
Perth between the surface and 18,000 feet (ft) above mean sea level (AMSL) to determine if
the airspace complies with the requirements of the Act for safe operations, efficiency and
equitable access. The review provides findings and recommendations about matters that
impact aviation safety, efficiency or equitable access for airspace users.
2.2. Process
2.2.1 The review process included:
 Analysis of aircraft movement data;
 Analysis of the mix of aircraft operations in the area;
 Assessment of current aircraft movement levels and mix of aircraft operations to
determine the suitability of existing airspace;
 Assessment of the appropriateness of the current airspace classifications and
architecture;
 Assessment of any issues related to aircraft operators seeking equitable access;
 Assessments of the appropriateness of the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided in
each class of airspace;
 Identification of any threats or risks to the safety of aircraft operations; and
 Consultation with airspace users.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1. Overview of Australian airspace classifications
3.1.1 Australian airspace classifications accord with Annex 11 of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and include Class A, C, D, E, and G depending on the level of
service required to safely and effectively manage aviation activity. Class B and Class F
airspace is not currently used in Australia. Each class of airspace determines the type and
nature of aviation operations permitted in that airspace. Class G airspace is predominantly
used by visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft that do not require surveillance, separation or
navigation assistance. VFR aircraft generally fly in good weather and during daylight hours
so they can navigate using visual references on the ground. Aircraft operating in Class A
airspace are primarily larger passenger aircraft operating under instrument flight rules (IFR)
that are provided with separation from all other aircraft. Aircraft operating in Class C, D and E
airspace are provided with a control and surveillance service and comprise a mix of VFR and
IFR operations. Annex B provides details of the classes of airspace used in Australia.
3.1.2 The airspace within 50 nm of Perth is dominated by Class C and D controlled
airspace (CTA) with ATS provided by Airservices Australia (Airservices) or the Department of
Defence (Defence).
2 The report is available on the CASA website https://www.casa.gov.au/files/perth-aero-studypdf

3.1.3 Uncontrolled airspace (Class G) exists below and around the Perth CTA. Refer to
Figure 1 (extract from the Perth Visual Navigation Chart (VNC)) indicating the 50 nm
boundary.
Figure 1: Extract of Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
3.1.4 The review is focused on terminal area airspace around Perth. Therefore, Class E
airspace to the south of Jandakot between Flight Level (FL) 180 and FL 240 was excluded
from this review.
3.1.5 There are 24 Restricted Areas (RAs) within the Perth area and all of these are
controlled by Defence. There are seven Danger Areas (DAs) within the Perth area and the
nominated contact for these areas includes Defence (three areas), CASA (three areas) and
Skydive Express (one area). Refer to Annex C for a list of RAs and DAs.
3.2. Aerodromes
3.2.1 There are two major federally leased aerodromes (Perth and Jandakot), one major
Defence aerodrome (Pearce) and 13 other aerodromes within 50 nm of Perth. Most of the 13
other aerodromes are privately owned and operated. The aerodromes support a mix of
passenger transport (PT3) operators, Defence, emergency services, flying training
organisations, charter companies, private pilots, skydiving operators, gliding clubs, balloon
operators, hang gliders and recreational (ultralight and microlight) activity.
3.3. Air Navigation Service Providers in the Perth area

3.3.1 Airservices provides aerodrome control (tower) services at Jandakot and Perth while
Defence provides tower services at Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Bases Pearce and
Gingin. The tower hours of operation are described in Annex D.
3
For the purposes of this study, PT services can be defined as activities involving regular public transport and all non-freight-
only charter operations.

3.3.2 Airservices provides radar control services from the Perth Terminal Control Unit
(TCU) for airspace within 36 nm of Perth and the Air Traffic Services Centre in Melbourne
provides radar control services outside 36 nm of Perth. The TCU manages aircraft arriving,
departing and transiting the Perth area and coordinates aircraft movements with the enroute
controllers in Melbourne. Defence and Airservices controllers are co-located within the Perth
TCU to enhance co-ordination of military and civilian aircraft activity.
3.3.3 Airservices and Defence provide directed traffic information (DTI) to aircraft operating
under IFR inside Class G airspace. A flight following service may also be provided to aircraft
operating under VFR in Class G airspace where surveillance is available and controller
workload permits.
3.4. Surveillance
3.4.1 Surveillance information within the Perth area is provided by a combination of three
radar systems. The Perth terminal area radar (TAR) is located at Perth whilst the enroute
radar is located near Kalamunda. A Defence operated radar is located at Eclipse Hill.
3.4.2 Perth TAR delivers both primary surveillance radar (PSR) and secondary surveillance
radar (SSR) services. The PSR has a range of 50 nm, whilst the SSR has a nominal range of
250 nm. The Kalamunda site has a SSR facility with a range of 250 nm. Radar coverage in
the review area is considered reliable above 5,000 ft AMSL. Radar coverage within the Perth
Control Zone (CTR) and to the south of Perth is available to the surface. Radar coverage to
the east of Perth is limited due to terrain and does not provide surveillance coverage below
1,000 ft AMSL. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is a radar-like
surveillance system that provides coverage throughout the review area above 5,000 ft AMSL.
The SSR at Kalamunda is scheduled to be decommissioned within the next two years.
3.5. Perth Airport

3.5.1 Perth Airport is a certified aerodrome operated by Westralia Airports Corporation Pty
Ltd under a 99-year lease from the Federal Government. The airport processes more than 14
million passengers (International and Domestic) and approximately 145,000 PT flights a
year.
3.6. Perth aircraft movements

3.6.1 Total aircraft movements at Perth have been declining since 2013 (refer to Figure 2
Perth Statistics 2012 - 2016). The growth in passenger and aircraft movements at Perth was
significant up to that point. The annual movements for the year ending December 2015 show
a 5% decrease compared to the previous year. This decline is largely the result of a
slowdown in the resource sector that reduced the demand for Fly in – Fly Out (FIFO)
operations. The decline in movements has continued with a further 2% decrease between
2015 and 2016 resulting in a total reduction of 9% between 2013 and 2016. Total passenger
numbers remained steady at around 14 million passengers per annum between December
2013 and 2015.
3.6.2 The current Perth Airport Masterplan4 forecasts steady growth of approximately 3.4%
in aircraft movements from 2016 to 2019. Passenger numbers are forecast to increase at
4.0% over the same forecast period.
4
Aircraft movement forecasts for Perth Airport contained within Perth Airport Master Plan 2014

Perth Airport
155,000 14.5
150,000 14.0
145,000 13.5
140,000 13.0
135,000 12.5
130,000 12.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Annual Movements Perth Annual Passengers Perth (M's)
Figure 2: Perth Statistics 2012-2016.
3.7. Details of Perth airspace

3.7.1 The airspace is a mix of Class C (Perth CTR and Class C steps), Class D (Jandakot
CTR), Class G and a number of RAs and DAs. Above the Perth CTR and in the vicinity of
Jandakot are six Class C airspace steps with differing lower limits. (See Annex E controlled
airspace steps within the review area).
3.7.2 The Perth CTR is a circle of 11 nm radius from the Perth distance measuring
equipment (DME) truncated to the south and west. The CTR extends from the surface to
1,500 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 3.
Figure 3: Perth CTR, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
3.8. Jandakot Airport

3.8.1 Jandakot Airport (Jandakot) is a certified aerodrome that has been operated by
Jandakot Airport Holdings Pty Ltd under a long-term lease from the Federal Government
since June 1998. Jandakot is the main general aviation (GA) aerodrome servicing Perth and
its operations are dominated by flying schools. Jandakot is one of the busiest GA
aerodromes in Australia and ranks in the top three locations for aviation incidents.

3.9. Analysis of Jandakot aircraft movements

3.9.1 Total aircraft movements at Jandakot have been steadily declining since 2012 (refer
to Figure 4 annual movements Jandakot 2012 - 2016). The December 2015 annual
movement total was 3% lower than the previous year with the 2016 year continuing to
decline by apprximately 2% . This reduction is not directly related to a reduction of FIFO
activity but includes changes in student flying training.
Figure 4: Annual movements Jandakot 2012-2016.
3.10. Details of Jandakot airspace

3.10.1 The Jandakot CTR is a circle of 3 nm radius from the Jandakot Aerodrome Reference
Point. The CTR extends from the surface to 1,500 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 5.
Figure 5: Jandakot CTR, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
3.11. Pearce Aerodrome

3.11.1 Pearce aerodrome (Pearce) is a military aerodrome operated by the RAAF and is
considered one of the busiest military training bases in Australia. Pearce supports three
operational squadrons (SQNs):
 Number 2 Flight Training School (2FTS) operating the Pilatus PC-9 turbo-prop
aircraft.
 79 SQN operate the Hawk 127 jet to conduct advanced flight training for pilots
who have recently graduated from 2FTS and refresher training on the Hawk
aircraft for experienced fighter pilots.
 A SQN from the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) operate Pilatus PC-21
turbo-prop aircraft.

3.12. Analysis of Pearce aircraft movements

3.12.1 Pearce has reported in excess of 120,000 movements per annum. There are no
indications that this level of activity will change significantly in the near future.
3.13. Gingin Aerodrome

3.13.1 Gingin aerodrome (Gingin) is a military aerodrome operated by the RAAF for pilot
training. Gingin is also used by the Pearce Aero Club, which keep a number of aircraft at the
aerodrome.
3.14. Pearce and Gingin airspace

3.14.1 Pearce and Gingin do not have a CTR. The aerodromes are surrounded by RAs
which are activated via a notice to airmen (NOTAM).
3.15. Military restricted areas

3.15.1 See Annex F for detailed information about all military restricted areas in the Perth
area.
3.16. Restricted Area (RA) access

3.16.1 Requests for a clearance to fly through an active RA are generally declined if
activities within the RA are considered hazardous or incompatible with civil aircraft operations
or when military activities require absolute priority. In order to support the need for equitable
access, efficiency and flexible use of airspace, all RAs have been allocated a “Restricted
Area Conditional Status”. This status will give an indication to aircraft operators of the
likelihood of obtaining a clearance to fly through restricted airspace. The RA status
categories are listed below:
Conditional Status RA 1: Pilots may flight plan through the RA and under normal
circumstances they can expect a clearance from ATC.
Conditional Status RA 2: Pilots must not flight plan through the RA unless they designate
a route specified in ERSA GEN FPR or by agreement with Defence. Clearance from ATC is
not assured. Other tracking may be offered through the RA.
Conditional Status RA 3: Pilots must not flight plan through the RA and clearances will not
be available.
3.16.2 NOTAMs are issued to indicate changes to the RA conditional status. Defence has
advised that if an aircraft declares an emergency, every effort will be made to approve transit
of an active RA, irrespective of its conditional status. However, there may be occasions
where Defence is unable to suspend or limit military activity in a RA to provide safe transit to
an emergency aircraft.
4 AVIATION INCIDENTS
4.1. Aviation safety incident reports
4.1.1 Any accident or incident involving Australian registered aircraft or foreign registered
aircraft in Australian airspace must be reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB). Every aviation safety incident report (ASIR) is entered into the ATSB database and
is available to the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR). Defence incidents are also included
within these reports. Information from the ATSB confidential reporting system (REPCON) is
also available.
4.1.2 Records indicate there were 310 accidents or incidents in the review area between 1
January 2010 and 31 January 2017 (refer to Table 1 for Perth and 2 for Jandakot). There
have been no reported accidents at Jandakot or Perth since 2010.
4.1.3 A review of all reported incidents determined that most incidents could be categorised
as follows:

 Errors in pilot procedures,

 Failures in see and avoid procedures, and
 Communication failures.
4.1.4 There were a number of runway related incidents and issues involving non-
compliance with ATC procedures. This review will identify these issues to other CASA staff
and the service providers for further anlaysis and action where necessary.
4.1.5 Analysis of reported airspace incidents and feedback received during consultation
indicated that most incidents were caused by pilot error. There was no indication of issues
with airspace architecture that would justify changes to the airspace or changes to airspace
procedures. The number of incidents involving the failure by a pilot to follow ATC instructions
has reduced at Perth from 10 in 2014 to one in 2015 and zero in 2016. However, the number
of these incidents at Jandakot increased from five in 2014 to 10 in 2015 but reduced to zero
in 2016. Further education and training programs focussed on the flying training
organisations and GA pilots is expected to reduce the number of these airspace incidents.
Aerodrome
Accident and Incident Numbers Causal Factors
Location
Perth, WA No of Total See Pilot Radio ATC Airspace
No of No of
Occurrence Serious Accidents & and Procedures Communication Procedures Related
Accidents Incidents
Year Incidents Incidents Avoid Lapses Lapses Lapses incidents
2010 0 1 10 11 1 4 0 4 0
2011 0 1 14 15 0 3 0 8 0
2012 0 0 24 24 1 4 0 10 0
2013 0 0 20 20 3 6 0 7 0
2014 0 1 27 28 5 8 0 10 0
2015 0 0 6 6 1 1 0 1 0
2016 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 0 3 103 106 11 26 0 40 0
Table 1: Perth reported incidents.
Table 2: Jandakot reported incidents.

4.1.6 From 2010 to2016 there were 13 instances where a military aircraft was involved in a
reported incident. There has been just one civilian controlled airspace infringement by
military aircraft and one civilian aircraft infringing military restricted airspace reported to the
ATSB during the same period.
4.1.7 The OAR identified that Jandakot had a disproportionate rate (three times higher) of
aircraft near collisions between 2013 and 2015 when compared to other similar metropolitan
Class D airports in Australia. Consequently, the OAR initiated an education program through
the Safety Education Group (SEG) within CASA designed to raise awareness of the risks.
Airservices is also very proactive in engaging with local operators and encourages site visits
by flying schools and student pilots to the ATS facilities and hosts regular meetings at
Jandakot, to enhance cooperation, collaboration and information sharing. In addition, the
ATSB has commenced an investigation to identify factors that contribute to the aircraft
collision risk at Jandakot. The outcome of the ATSB review will be made available to CASA.
4.1.8 There has been an average of four runway incursions per year at Jandakot since
2010 where aircraft entered an active runway without a clearance from ATC. This number
reduced to one in 2016. There have been no reported runway incursions at Perth.
Airservices, CASA and airports are actively engaged in runway safety promotion programs
and will continue to target airports where there is a risk that these incidents will occur.

4.2. Summary of incidents

4.2.1 This review has assessed the incident data for an area within 50 nm of Perth and has
determined that there are no incidents that justify changes to the airspace architecture.
CASA through the SEG and the OAR has initiated strategies to mitigate risk through safety
promotion intended to reduce the causal factors for aircraft incidents. CASA will continue to
monitor incident reports for the Perth area to determine and undertake further regulatory
action or review as required.
5 DETAILED FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS

5.01 The OAR conducted consultation with internal and external stakeholders and other
interested parties. Stakeholders that provided feedback are listed in Annex G.
5.02 OAR representatives sought input through stakeholder meetings which were
conducted at Perth, Jandakot, Pearce and other outlying locations. Interviews with charter
operators, emergency service providers, flying schools among many others were held in
September and October 2016. Detailed information about comments received during this
review is at Annex H.
5.1. Air navigation procedures

5.1.1 Airservices processes IFR aircraft to and from Perth and Jandakot using instrument
procedures that are separated from military RAs. These procedures provide a safe solution
for the segregation of aircraft where there is minimal distance between airspace boundaries.
The co-location of military and civilian controllers in the Perth TCU enhances opportunities to
provide greater flexibility in processing aircraft into and out of the Perth area and also
provides for more flexible use of airspace when airspace is not required for military
operations or training. When Defence de-activates the RAs this airspace becomes Class C
and there is greater flexibility for ATC to process IFR aircraft through the deactivated areas.
5.1.2 Standard instrument departures (SIDs) are used by Airservices as a means of
managing northbound IFR aircraft and keeping them clear of the RAs, when active. The SIDs
are used by both turbo prop and jet aircraft. Standard terminal arrival routes (STARs) are
established to manage arriving IFR aircraft and keep them clear of the RAs when active. No
issues or concerns about the current SIDs and STARs were raised by Defence or Airservices
controllers. CASA understands that the airspace architecture and associated flight paths and
procedures may change in the future as operational concepts, flight procedures and airspace
requirements are considered for the proposed new runway at Perth Airport. CASA will seek
to be closely involved in the development of future airspace architecture and procedures
associated with the new runway development at Perth.
5.1.3 The southern boundary of Pearce airspace is located approximately 11 nm north of
Perth Airport. Military aircraft, particularly the Hawk, require tracking close to the Perth CTR
boundary. Therefore, Defence and Airservices apply a buffer to keep aircraft under their
control at least 1.5 nm from either side of the airspace boundary. Local airspace
management procedures have also been agreed between Defence and Airservices to
facilitate VFR and IFR approaches to runway 36 at Pearce. This includes the Gnangara and
Merlo airspace releases where military and civilian traffic may operate in close proximity.
Military aircraft contain their operations within the Gnangara release airspace by remaining
north of Gnangara Road at or below 1000 ft AMSL. Defence will return the airspace to the
Perth TCU when it is not required. Similarly the Merlo release enables Pearce ATC to
operate up to a 7NM arc from Pearce runway 36. In this fashion the airspace is actively
managed by both ANSPs to provide separation. The Merlo release is only available during
specific runway configurations at Perth whilst the Gnangara release is activated upon
request by Defence.
5.1.4 There are occasions when aircraft arriving or departing Pearce and Perth must be
sequenced to ensure separation. This sequencing often results in aircraft holding or being
delayed.

5.1.5 To improve efficiency and traffic management in the Perth area, Defence pilots are
required to submit a flight plan 30 minutes prior to their scheduled flight.
5.1.6 The number of aircraft planning to depart during the peak has reduced considerably
since Perth implemented a “slot” management system and Airservices implemented a traffic
management flow system (Metron). These systems are established to manage capacity.
However, factors such as weather may reduce capacity and create congestion at Perth or in
the surrounding airspace.
5.1.7 The existing airspace procedures and architecture are appropriate for the volume and
nature of aircraft movements. Forecast growth in the domestic and international market and
a possible resurgence in FIFO operations may result in future changes to airspace or
airspace procedures but these will be subject to further review by CASA.
5.1.8 Feedback from some airspace users raised concern over constraints generated by
Defence RAs. CASA reviewed these comments and is satisfied that the current RAs are fit
for purpose to protect military operations/training and to protect civil aviation from
incompatible military activity (such as high energy jet training and military firing). Defence
acknowledges the impact that restricted areas can pose on civilian operators and has been
active in applying the principles of flexible use of airspace and equitable access where
possible. Defence is regularly reviewing the status of the RAs and will seek to make changes
to these areas when safe to do so and without impacting military requirements. CASA and
the OAR will continue to work closely with Defence on reviewing the future of each RA.
5.1.9 There are many aircraft landing areas (ALAs) within the Defence managed airspace
around Perth. The relationship between the ALA operators and Defence is described as
amicable.
5.1.10 Urban growth in the greater Perth metropolitan area is driving the need for Defence to
regularly review and amend their airspace procedures and tracking to ensure a ‘fly
neighbourly’ and ‘harmonious’ community approach.
6 KEY ISSUES AND FINDINGS

 Issue: Aircraft operators raised concern about delays in obtaining access into controlled
airspace.
o Finding: Changes to current airspace classifications would not resolve this issue
given the delays are created by the need to provide separation and sequencing to
large numbers of aircraft within CTA.
o Improvement Opportunity: ATC and airspace users should explore the possible
benefits of alternative air traffic management procedures such as visual departures
for IFR flights departing Jandakot. This would provide a means of departing without
IFR-IFR separation but still provide some level of alerting service.
o Improvement Opportunity: ATC and airspace users should consider the options and
benefits of new instrument flight procedures and flight paths to and from Jandakot.
o Improvement Opportunity: Airservices and airspace users should seek greater
collaboration and issue management through the South Western Australian Regional
Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC).
 Issue: The justification for establishing RAs may have changed since they were first
established.
o Finding: The changing nature of military operations and training activity justifies the
need for the RAs and DAs to be reviewed by Defence and the OAR to determine if
they are still fit for purpose or whether they should be modified or disestablished.
 Issue: The Class C step to the south of Jandakot is being regularly infringed.
o Finding: There are no incident reports supporting concerns about airspace
infringements to the South of Jandakot. Feedback during consultation indicated that
infringements are not being reported.

o Finding: The Class C step provides protection for the Perth 03 ILS procedure. Any
changes to the Class C step would remove this protection. The option of changing the
ILS procedure is not being considered by Airservices.
o Recommendation : CASA and Airservices provide additional education and
information material to local operators at Jandakot in relation to airspace
infringements. This information should include advice on the safety incident reporting
process and the confidential reporting system that can be used to report airspace
infringements.
o Recommendation: CASA Flying Operations Inspectors and Aviation Safety Advisors
conduct specific consultation with Airservices and Jandakot aircraft operators to
determine the cause of airspace infringements and develop mitigation options.
 Issue: There is reluctance by some operators to interact with and share information with
the ANSPs to better understand the operating environment and discuss local issues.
o Improvement Opportunity: All stakeholders should participate in cross-industry
forums such as RAPAC to raise matters such as navaid congestion or to develop a
collbaorative relationship between training organisations and the sport and recreation
operators.
 Issue: The operators of the Bindoon ALA are unable to access R155 when active which
prevents access to the airfield. The operators are equally unable to access the R155 area
to the north from the 36 DME boundary. They also raised concerns regarding frequency
congestion.
o Finding: Access to the Bindoon ALA could be resolved if a portion of R155 was
modified. Defence understands the issues raised by Bindoon operators and will
review the airspace architecture when considering airspace to support new training
aircraft.
o Recommendation: Bindoon aircraft operators engage with Defence to discuss the
development of a letter of agreement (LOA) that clearly articulates procedures that
may facilitate sport and GA access through R155 without impeding Defence
operations.
o Recommendation : Bindoon operators raise their concerns about frequency
congestion at the SWA RAPAC.
 Issue: Information and annotations on the visual terminal chart (VTC) are not adequate
for VFR operators.
o Improvement Opportunity: The benefits of including parachuting symbols and the
location of visual reporting points (VRPs) on the VTC should be considered by
members of the SWA RAPAC.
 Issue: Some VRPs are difficult to locate.
o Recommendation : SWA RAPAC considers amendment of the “South six” VRP to
align with Thomas Road and the “Alkimos Wreck” VRP to align with the adjacent
settling ponds.
 Issue: IFR arrivals at Jandakot via Canning Bridge can bring arriving aircraft into conflict
with aircraft using the Perth 03 ILS. In addition, operators consider some of the
procedures add unnecessary complexity to their arrival.
o Finding: Altering some of the inbound waypoints to permit faster and less complex
access, particularly for rotary wing aircraft, rather than being held and sequenced by
ATC may alleviate this issue..
o Improvement Opportunity: Aircraft operators should discuss the option of additional
tracks or instrument flight procedures into Jandakot at the SWA RAPAC or directly
with Airservices.
 Issue: Access by civil aircraft into the Pearce airspace for instrument training is difficult to
obtain.

o Finding: Defence has limited opportunity to provide civil access to the Pearce area for
training due to the nature and volume of military traffic.
o Recommendation: Operators seeking greater access to Pearce airspace should seek
to raise these issues through RAPAC or directly with the Senior ATC Officer at RAAF
Base Pearce.
 Issue: Access to Pearce RAs is complicated by the proximity of the controlled airspace
boundary and the military airspace procedures.
o Finding: The airspace architecture around Perth is designed to maximise safety for all
aviation activity while also considering efficiency. The mix of operations in a small
area combined with military requirements for airspace result in an airspace design
that can produce boundaries that are in close proximity. This design is unavoidable
but offers maximum protection to aircraft operators.
 Issue: Landholder restrictions are imposed at some remote navaid sites.
o Finding: This issue is best raised by aircraft operators with the respective landowner.
 Issue: Some operators expressed a view that the separation standards being applied in
civilian airspace are overly conservative and unnecessarily restrictive at times.
o Finding: Airservices and Defence are applying separation standards as detailed in the
Manual of Air Traffic Services. These standards are applied to ensure the safety of
all aircraft operating in controlled airspace and to manage the flow/sequencing of
traffic in and out of airports in the Perth area.
 Issue: A number of training organisations raised concerns with the location of
parachuting operations and landing sites within the review area.
o Finding: The Review did not identify any risks or safety issues relating to parachuting
operations within the Perth Area. These operations are promulgated on the charts.
 Issue: Practice IFR approaches into Jandakot are not permitted.
o Finding: Practice IFR approaches are prohibited due to a number of factors most
notably the inability to separate an IFR arrival with Jandakot circuit traffic.
 Issue: The airspace around some of the navaids is becoming congested potentially
elevating risk due to the concentration of traffic using the navaids that remain after
Airservices navaid rationalisation project.
o Finding: There are limited IFR training navaids in the Perth region following the
removal of 20 navaids in Western Australia including 6 within the review area as an
outcome of Airservices’ Navaid Rationalisation Program (NRP). The NRP was
extensively consulted with industry in the Perth region and no objections were
received during consultation. CASA initiated changes to the training syllabus to
address the training and testing requirements focusing on skills and training and
dealing with potential airspace congestions around the remaining navaids. Alternative
navaid training options and coordination of training schedules may reduce
congestion.
7 OVERVIEW OF CHANGES SINCE 2011 PERTH

AERONAUTICAL STUDY
7.01 Aircraft movements associated with FIFO operations have declined. This has reduced
the level of congestion during peak periods at Perth. This reduction also reduces congestion
in the airspace around Perth.
7.02 The number of runway incursions at Jandakot has reduced from eight in 2010 to one
in 2016. However, there was an average of four each year between 2011 and 2015, which
justified the need for further education and training focussed on runway safety.
7.03 Delays to IFR departures from Jandakot continue to generate comment from
stakeholders. Radar surveillance over Jandakot is not reliable at ground level. Therefore,

aircraft must be procedurally separated until they can be identified on radar once airborne.
Future surveillance capabilities or the use of ADS-B by IFR aircraft operating at Jandakot
may improve efficiency for IFR operators at Jandakot.
7.04 Access to the Perth ILS for instrument training continues to concern local operators
and training organisations. This situation is managed by Perth ATC using a booking system
that allocates around 10 slots per week day for navaid/ILS training. Note: the booking system
provides priority over other training traffic but not the arriving sequence. These slots are
limited due to the number of aircraft movements at Perth and reliant upon situations such as
weather and unexpected aircraft movements (such as emergency aircraft operations).
Airservices report that approximately 20% of those that book fail to “show up” and 20%
cannot be cleared due to higher priority traffic. A further two or three do not book but still
request an ILS approach. The booking system is reportedly working well and is rarely full.
7.05 An airspace change proposal (ACP) to provide access to the Swan River is being
developed by a group of local stakeholders. The proposal seeks to modify a portion of the
Perth CTR increasing the base from the surface to 500 ft AMSL. This will benefit VFR
operations along the river without affecting operations at Perth.
7.06 Perth Airport is preparing a major development plan that includes a concept of
operations for a proposed new parallel runway. This project will require new airspace designs
in the future. Therefore, the OAR will engage with Perth Airport during development of the
master development plan and provide advice on any changes to existing airspace
architecture.
8 CONCLUSION
8.01 CASA has conducted an analysis of aircraft movements and incidents in the Perth
area and concluded that the existing airspace architecture is fit for purpose. There were a
number of incidents recorded in 2015-16 around the Perth area but the general trend has
been a reduction in the overall number of incidents over the last five years. Most issues
raised by aircraft operators related to airspace access and delays with ATC clearances.
These are not considered a risk to aviation safety and should be addressed through locally
established consultation forums such as RAPAC. A number of training incidents at Jandakot
relate to runway incursions and failure to comply with ATC instructions. These issues should
be addressed through targeted education and safety promotion activity by Airservices, CASA
and local operators at the Runway Safety Group meetings.
8.02 Feedback from some operators indicates that there have been more airspace
infringement incidents than reported. The CASA Safety Seminars and targeted educational
material will provide an opportunity to promote and educate aircraft operators on the
requirement and benefits that result from incident reporting.
8.03 There has been a reduction in the number of aircraft movements at Perth following a
decline in FIFO activity. However, this trend is expected to reverse in the near future.
Predicted growth in aviation activity, construction of a new runway at Perth and the arrival of
new aircraft types for Defence flying training will trigger further reviews of the Perth airspace
and possible changes to airspace architecture to accommodate these changes.

ANNEX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym/abbreviation Explanation
ACP Airspace Change Proposal
Act Airspace Act 2007
Airservices Airservices Australia
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication
ALA Aircraft landing area
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AMSL Above Mean Sea Level
ANSP Air navigation service provider
ASA Aviation Safety Advisor
ASIR Aviation Safety Incident Report
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATS Air Traffic Services
ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CTA Control Area
CTR Control Zone
DA Danger Area
DAH Designated Airspace Handbook
Defence Department of Defence
DOTAM Director of Training Area Management
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
ERSA En Route Supplement Australia
EPBC Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
FIFO Fly in – Fly Out
ft Feet
FL Flight Level
GA general aviation
Gingin Gingin aerodrome
H24 24 Hours per day
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFP Instrument Flight Procedure
IFR instrument flight rules
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
ILS Instrument Landing System (navigation aid)
Jandakot Jandakot Airport
kt Knots
LOA Letter or Agreement
MATS Manual of Air Traffic Services
MATS SUPP Manual of Air Traffic Services Supplement
MOS Manual of Standards
NDB Non Directional Beacon
nm nautical miles
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
OAR Office of Airspace Regulation
PT Passenger Transport
Pearce Royal Australian Air Force Base Pearce
Perth Perth International Airport
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RA Restricted Area
RAPAC Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee
RSAF Republic of Singapore Air Force
SEG Safety Education Group
SID Standard Instrument Departure
SVFR Special Visual Flight Rules
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route

Acronym/abbreviation Explanation
TAR Terminal Area Radar
TCU Terminal Control Unit
VFR visual flight rules
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VNC Visual Navigation Chart
VTC Visual Terminal Chart

ANNEX B – AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE STRUCTURE

Class Description Summary of Services/Procedures/Rules
All airspace above
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) only. All aircraft require a clearance
A Flight Level (FL) 180
from Air Traffic Control (ATC) and are separated by ATC. Continuous
(east coast) or FL 245
two-way radio and transponder required. No speed limitation.
Not currently used in Australia.

B
In control zones
All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. All aircraft require
(CTRs) of defined
dimensions and continuous two-way radio and transponder. IFR separated from IFR, VFR and
C control area steps Special VFR (SVFR) by ATC with no speed limitation for IFR operations. VFR
generally associated receives traffic information on other VFR but is not separated from each other by
with controlled
ATC. SVFR are separated from SVFR when visibility (VIS) is less than visual
aerodromes
meteorological conditions (VMC). VFR and SVFR speed limited to 250 knots (kt)
indicated air speed (IAS) below 10,000 feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL)*.
All aircraft require a clearance from ATC to enter airspace. For VFR flights this
Towered locations
such as Bankstown, may be in an abbreviated form. As in Class C airspace all aircraft are separated
D Parafield, Archerfield, on take-off and landing. All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and are
Parafield and Alice speed limited to 200 kt IAS at or below 2,500 ft within 4 NM of the primary Class
Springs. D aerodrome and 250 kt IAS in the remaining Class D airspace**.IFR are
separated from IFR, SVFR, and are provided with traffic information on all VFR.
VFR receives traffic on all other aircraft but are not separated by ATC. SVFR are
separated from SVFR when VIS is less than VMC.
All aircraft require continuous two-way radio and transponder. All aircraft are
Controlled airspace
not covered in speed limited to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*, IFR require a clearance from
E classifications above ATC to enter airspace and are separated from IFR by ATC, and provided with
traffic information as far as practicable on VFR. VFR does not require a
clearance from ATC to enter airspace and are provided with a Flight Information
Service (FIS). On request and ATC workload permitting, a Surveillance
Information Service (SIS) is available within surveillance coverage.
F Not currently used in Australia.
Clearance from ATC to enter airspace not required. All aircraft are speed limited
G Non-controlled
to 250 kt IAS below 10,000 ft AMSL*. IFR require continuous two-way radio and
receive a FIS, including traffic information on other IFR. VFR receive a FIS. On
request and ATC workload permitting, a SIS is available within surveillance
coverage. VHF radio required above 5,000 ft AMSL and at aerodromes where
carriage and use of radio is required.
* Not applicable to military aircraft.

**If traffic conditions permit, ATC may approve a pilot's request to exceed the 200 kt speed limit to a maximum limit of 250 kt
unless the pilot informs ATC a higher minimum speed is required.

ANNEX C – RESTRICTED AND DANGER AREAS WITHIN 50 NM OF

PERTH
RESTRICTED AND DANGER AREAS WITHIN THE REVIEW AREA

PURPOSE AS STATED IN THE
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY OR RA MILITARY AIRSPACE
RA/DA NUMBER LOCATION DESIGNATED AIRSPACE HANDBOOK
CONTACT STATUS Y/N
(DAH) 26 MAY 2016
R129 BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y
R134A BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y
R134B BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y
R134C BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y
R134D BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y
R140A GARDEN ISLAND MILITARY NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA3 Y
R140B GARDEN ISLAND MILITARY NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA3 Y
R153A PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R153B PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R153C PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R153D PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R155 PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R167A PEARCE MILITARY FLYING / NON FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R167B PEARCE MILITARY FLYING / NON FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y
R178 PEARCE MILITARY FLYING / NON FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA3 Y
R189 STIRLING FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
R190 STIRLING FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
R192B STIRLING FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
R192D STIRLING FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
R192F STIRLING FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
R192G STIRLING MILITARY FLYING / NON FLYING NAVY HMAS STIRLING RA2 Y
D104A JANDAKOT FLYING TRAINING CASA OAR N/A N
D104B JANDAKOT FLYING TRAINING CASA OAR N/A N
D104C JANDAKOT FLYING TRAINING CASA OAR N/A N
D169 SWANBOURNE FIRING ARMY DOTAM WA N/A Y
D186 BROOKLANDS PARACHUTING SKYDIVE EXPRESS N/A N
D197 MUCHEA RANGE FIRING FLT CDR 453SQN PEARCE N/A Y
D198 PEARCE MILITARY FLYING TRAINING FLT CDR 453SQN PEARCE N/A Y

ANNEX D – AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER HOURS
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER HOURS WITHIN THE REVIEW AREA
LOCATION HOURS OF OPERATION OUTSIDE TOWER HOURS

PERTH
24 hours a day (H24), 7 days a week. N/A
JANDAKOT 0700–2000 (Local) Monday–Friday and

0800–1800 (Local) on weekends from June to Outside tower hours non-controlled aerodrome
August. procedures
0700–2100 (Local) Monday–Friday and apply.
0800–1800 (Local) on weekends from September
to May.
PEARCE 0800–0000 (Local) Monday–Thursday, and Outside tower hours non-controlled aerodrome
0800–1500 (Local) Friday. The tower may be procedures
unmanned during promulgated hours apply.
GINGIN Outside tower hours non-controlled aerodrome

0900–1630 (Local) Monday–Thursday, and
procedures
0900–1430 (Local) Friday.
apply.
Air Traffic Control tower hours (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

ANNEX E – CONTROLLED AREA STEPS
CONTROLLED AIRSPACE STEPS WITHIN THE REVIEW AREA

AIRSPACE STEP LOWER
STEP DME DISTANCE PURPOSE
DESCRIPTION LEVEL
From the Aerodrome Reference Point
Perth Class C Surface to 1500 ft (ARP) to approximately 11 DME excluding
Protect arrivals and departures into Perth.
CTR AMSL the area to the west abeam the coast and
the Jandakot CTR.
The Class C step has been designed to protect the runway

From the Aerodrome Reference Point
03 Area Navigation (RNAV) / Global Navigation Satellite
(ARP) to approximately 11 DME including
System (GNSS) and VHF Omni- Directional Radio Range
Class C Step LL 1500 ft AMSL overhead Jandakot and the area along the
(VOR) approaches. The step also encompasses the
coast that was excluded from the Perth
airspace above the Jandakot aerodrome which is used for
CTR.
the runway 03 Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach.
Class C step protects arrivals and departures to Perth. The

From the Aerodrome Reference Point cut-out to the south allows VFR aircraft to gain sufficient
Class C Step LL 2000 ft AMSL
(ARP) to approximately 18 DME. altitude to permit flight over the hills to the east of Jandakot.
From the Aerodrome Reference Point The Class C step protects aircraft manoeuvring for the
(ARP) to approximately 18 DME and Perth runway 03 ILS. The step allows VFR aircraft
includes a wedge to the south of departing south from Jandakot to gain altitude before over
Jandakot. flying the township of Kwinana.
Class C step was designed in accordance with the

From the Aerodrome Reference Point applicable airspace design rules. The southern “cut-out”
(ARP) to approximately 22 DME. allows VFR aircraft departing south from Jandakot to gain
altitude before over flying the township of Kwinana.
The 4,500 ft AMSL Class C step was designed in

From the Aerodrome Reference Point accordance with the applicable CASA airspace design rules
(ARP) to approximately 36 DME. to enable Perth and Jandakot arriving and departing IFR
traffic to be contained in Class C airspace.
The 8,500 ft AMSL Class C step was designed in

accordance with the applicable CASA airspace design rules
From the Aerodrome Reference Point to enable Perth and Jandakot arriving and departing IFR
(ARP) to approximately 50 DME. traffic to be contained in Class C airspace. The “cut-out” to
the south is due to that airspace not being required for that
purpose.
The CTR is approximately 3NM centred

Jandakot Class D Surface to 1500 ft upon the Jandakot ARP. The Jandakot Segregate the Jandakot circuit area and traffic operating to
CTR AMSL CTR is approximately 11 DME from the and from Jandakots' three runways.
Perth ARP.
Description of controlled airspace steps (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

ANNEX F – DETAILED CHARTS OF RESTRICTED AND DANGER

AREAS WITHIN 50NM OF PERTH
R129 and R134A-D
The Bindoon RAs (R129 and R134A-D) lay within the Bindoon Army Field. R129, which is
entirely contained within the surrounding RA, R134, is established from the surface to
5,000 ft AMSL activated by NOTAM. Refer to Figure 5. The RA was established to protect
aircraft from explosive demolition activities.
R134A-D which surrounds R129 is established between 36 and 50 DME from Perth at
various levels from the surface to 10,000 ft AMSL, and are activated by NOTAM. The areas
are declared to protect aircraft from firing activities. The controlling authority for all the
Bindoon RAs is the Army, Director of Training Area Management (DOTAM) WA.
Figure 5: R129 and R134A-D, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
R140A
The Garden Island RA (R140A) is a circle of 1.00 nm radius centred on the Garden Island
Naval base, refer to Figure 6. The RA extends from the surface to 1,500 ft AMSL, is active 24
hours per day (H24) and was declared to protect the explosive storage facility. The
controlling authority is the Navy, HMAS Stirling.
Figure 6: R140A-B, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

R140B
The Garden Island RA (R140B) is a circle of 1.00 nm radius centred on the Garden Island
Naval base, refer to Figure 6 above. The RA extends from 1,500 – 4,000 ft AMSL, is active
via NOTAM and was declared to protect aircraft from explosives demolition. The controlling
authority is the Navy, HMAS Stirling.
R153A – Pearce
The Pearce RA (R153A) is established from 11–18 DME from Perth from the surface to
2,000 ft AMSL activated by NOTAM. Refer to Figure 7. The RA was declared for military
flying training. The controlling authority is FLTCDR 453SQN Pearce.
R153B – Pearce
The Pearce RA (R153B) is established from 18–22 DME from Perth from the surface to
R153C – Pearce
The Pearce RA (R153C) is established from 22–36 DME from Perth from the surface to
R153D – Pearce
The Pearce RA (R153D) is established from 36–65 DME from Perth from the surface to
Figure 7: R153A-D, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

R155 - Pearce
The Pearce RA (R155) is established from 11– 60 DME (approx.) of Perth from the surface
to FL160, activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 8. The RA was declared for military flying
training and the controlling authority is the FLTCDR 453SQN Pearce.
Figure 8: R155, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
R162 - Pearce
The Pearce RA (R162) is established to the south of Jandakot to approximately 70 DME
from Perth from 6,000 ft AMSL to NOTAM, activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 9. The RA
was declared for military flying training and the controlling authority is the FLTCDR 453SQN
Pearce.

R163 - Pearce
The Pearce RA (R163) is established to the west of the Perth coastline approximately 16-22
DME from Perth between 4,500 ft AMSL to NOTAM activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure
10. The RA was declared for military flying training and the controlling authority is the
FLTCDR 453SQN Pearce.
R165 - Pearce
The Pearce RA (R165) is established to the west of the Perth coastline approximately 16-22
DME from Perth from 2,000 ft AMSL to NOTAM activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 11.
The RA was declared for military flying training and the controlling authority is the FLTCDR
453SQN Pearce.

R167A-B - Pearce
The Pearce RAs (R167 A-B) are established to the west of the Perth coastline approximately
32-44 DME from Perth. The vertical limits are from NOTAM to NOTAM, the RA is activated
via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 12. The RAs were declared for military firing as well as military
flying training and the controlling authority is FLTCDR 453SQN Pearce.
Figure 12: R167A-B, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
R178 - Pearce
The Pearce RA (R178) is established adjacent to the Pearce CTA and is wholly contained
within R155. The vertical limits are from NOTAM to NOTAM, the RA is activated via
NOTAM. Refer to Figure 13. The RA was declared for military flying / non flying and the
controlling authority is FLTCDR 453SQN Pearce.

R189 - Stirling
The Stirling RA (R189) is established adjacent to Garden Island at HMAS Stirling from the
surface to 4,500 ft AMSL, activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 14. The RA was declared for
military firing as well as military flying with the controlling authority being HMAS Stirling.
Figure 14: R189, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016)
R190 - Stirling
The Stirling RA (R190) is established adjacent to Perth coastline North to North West of
Rottnest Island from the surface to 2,000 ft AMSL, activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 15.
The RA was declared for military firing as well as military flying with the controlling authority
being HMAS Stirling.

R192 B, D, F, G - Stirling
The Stirling RAs (R192B, D, F, G) are established adjacent to Perth coastline West to South
West of Rottnest Island. The vertical limits are from NOTAM to NOTAM and the RAs are
activated via NOTAM. Refer to Figure 16. The RAs were declared for military firing as well as
military flying with the controlling authority being HMAS Stirling.
Figure 16: R192 (B, D, F, G), Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
D104A, B and C
The Jandakot DAs D104A, B and C are situated to the south of Jandakot and extend from
the surface to the base of controlled airspace above each area. Refer to Figure 17. The
areas were established for flying training activities and are active H24. The contact
organisation is CASA, OAR.
Figure 17: D104 (A, B, C), Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

D169 – Swanbourne
The Swanbourne DA D169 extends from the surface to 1,500 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 18.
The area was established to protect aircraft from live firing activities and is active H24. The
contact organisation is the Army, DOTAM WA.
Figure 18: D169, Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).
D186 – Brooklands
The Brooklands DA D186 extends from the surface to the base of the overlying CTA step,
8,500 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 19. The area was established for parachute jumping
operations and is active during daylight hours. The contact organisation is Skydive Express.

D197 – Muchea Range

The Muchea Range DA D197 extends from the surface to 1,500 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 20.
The area was established for live firing activities and is active via NOTAM. The contact
organisation is FLTCDR 453SQN, Pearce.
D198 – Pearce
The Pearce DA D198 extends from the surface to 2,000 ft AMSL. Refer to Figure 21. The
area was established for military flying activities and is active via NOTAM. The contact
organisation is FLTCDR 453SQN, Pearce.

ANNEX G – STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION LIST

The following stakeholders contributed to this review.
Organisation Position
Air Australia International Commander in Chief and Head of Operations
Airservices Australia Regulatory Services and ATC Operations
WA Regional Office and Air Navigation

CASA
Airspace and Aerodromes Branch
China Southern Flying Training Operational Staff and Chief Instructor
Cobham Aviation Services Snr Base Pilot and Head of Flight Operations
Complete Aviation Operational Staff
Corsair Chief pilot and Operational Staff
Department of Defence FLTCDR Pearce and OAR Liaison Officers
Formula Aviation Operational Staff
Jandakot Flight Centre Operational Staff and Flying Instructors
Ozwest Operational Staff
Polytechnic West Operational Staff
Royal Aero Club WA Operations Staff
Singapore Flying Collage Chief Flying Instructor
Superlight Aircraft Club WA (Bindoon) Club President and Vice President
SWA RAPAC Members
Thunderbird Aero Services Operational Staff
Top Fun Aviation Chief Flying Instructor
Ultralight Flyers Club Calingari Club President
University Flying Club Club President
WA Police Air Wing Operational Staff and Flying Crew
Weststar Aviation Operational Staff

ANNEX H – DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT COMMENTS

PROVIDED DURING THE REVIEW
Access to the Perth CTA
Access to the Perth CTA is considered restrictive by the GA community. Many training
organisations shared a belief that ATC are reluctant to accept VFR aircraft within Perth CTA.
Commercial students however, are required to obtain CTA exposure as part of their training.
Whilst GA operators understand that they may present air traffic management challenges,
such as delays, all were resolute that this issue should be highlighted and addressed.
On a related issue, operators seeking to approach Jandakot IFR are at times required to
operate outside controlled airspace from the East, due to air traffic in the Perth CTA. Under
the circumstances described, ATC were unable to provide a clearance through the controlled
airspace. As a consequence aircraft descend outside controlled airspace in the vicinity of the
high ground. Some operators have expressed a preference that they be cleared through
Perth controlled airspace at levels permitting tracking toward the west and then descend over
the ocean for an arrival into Jandakot. Whilst this would require increased flight time it was
considered an improvement to passenger comfort and safety.
Access to the Perth ILS
Many training organisations raised concerns about the limited access to the Perth ILS which
is required for IFR training. Training slots are booked through Airservices. However, those
slots are, at times, cancelled by ATC prior to being used, despite the booking and
confirmation. Cancellation can occur whilst the aircraft is airborne at times and on some
occasions following a period of holding requested by ATC pending an anticipated clearance.
Jandakot IFR arrivals and departures
Aircraft seeking to depart Jandakot in Class D airspace, operating under the IFR, are often
delayed due to aircraft operating into Perth in the adjacent Class C airspace. This is
particularly the case when the runway 03 ILS is being used. IFR departures are often offered
a VFR clearance in lieu, as a means of departing Jandakot. This creates issues particularly
when operators are seeking a separation service for operational requirements. The matter
also creates issues regarding standard IFR procedures training.
IFR arrivals at Jandakot are via Canning Bridge to the north of the aerodrome. This can bring
arriving aircraft into conflict with aircraft using the Perth runway 03 ILS. Additionally,
operators can be required to undertake procedures that they describe as adding complexity
to the arrival unnecessarily. Altering some of the inbound waypoints to permit faster and less
complex access, particularly for rotary wing aircraft rather than being held and sequenced by
ATC, may provide a solution. Having additional IFR approaches into Jandakot was discussed
as also being desirable.
Emergency services operators remarked that delays with IFR arrivals and departures remain
an operational challenge from an airspace perspective. All agreed however, that ATC provide
great assistance under emergency circumstances.
Separation standards
Many operators expressed concern regarding the perceived conservative separation
standards being applied by ATC. Whilst anecdotal only, these standards are nevertheless
described by the operators as overly restrictive at times. GA aircraft operating along the
Swan River to the south of Perth and flying in the opposite direction to the PT aircraft
departing from Perth to the north were “reportedly” denied clearances. Under the
circumstances described, the likelihood of the aircraft being in proximity to each other is
minimal. The operators also raised concerns regarding the inconsistency of air traffic service
standards at times. In particular, instances where the same procedure flown by two operators
at the same time had differing and unexplained standards applied. Many operators are
seeking some measure of flexibility in regard to managing aircraft separation.
Bindoon ALA
The Bindoon ALA is wholly contained within R155, and therefore a clearance to operate is
required when the RA is active. Most sport pilots based at Bindoon, do not hold the
necessary qualification to operate aircraft in controlled airspace and therefore can only

operate when the area is deactivated. The ALA operators are seeking consideration to
excise a small portion of the RA to form a light aircraft lane along its boundary. This lane
would permit uncontrolled exit to the Class G airspace and re-entry to the field through
R155/R153D at low level, day light hours only. The lane should be oriented to avoid the
higher ground to the east enhancing safety. A Letter of Agreement (LOA) serves other
locations, in similar but not identical circumstances, permitting sport and GA operators to fly
within agreed airspace volumes and times without clearance. A LOA with Defence may serve
this purpose in the shorter term. The operators have also raised the notion of requesting
Defence alter a portion of R155 to become a DA from the current 36 DME boundary for
possible consideration.
The location of the ALA also brings about issues with frequency congestion on 126.7.
Members are reporting reading transmissions as far away as Bunbury due in part to the flat
terrain. The club will consider its options in that regard.
Skydiving Operations
A considerable number of training organisations and operators raised the matter of the
parachute operations within the review area. Many of the Jandakot operators consider that
some skydiving operations could be better located and may be less than compatible with the
flight training operations in D104 for example. Whilst it was acknowledged that approval for
their operations is in place, there were nevertheless concerns about the location of some of
the drop zones. Particular mention was made of the water ski park which is at the exit point
of the entry lane to the D104 training area. Similarly, parachuting operations in the vicinity of
Rockingham (CHIMNEY 341) were raised as a matter of concern, specifically in the
aerobatics areas where the two activities are potentially incompatible.
Class C wedge south of Jandakot

The Class C 2,500 ft AMSL step to the south of the Jandakot control zone boundary was
discussed as a concerning issue. Operators have reported that the step which is adjacent to
the control zone is regularly being infringed in error. Some operators would prefer the step
be altered, if possible, to avoid infringements and simplify operations in the area. The Class
C step provides protection for the Perth 03 ILS procedure.
Instrument Training
Issues relating to instrument training include:
 Access into the Pearce airspace to undertake instrument training was discussed as
being difficult to obtain at times. This is typically due to the volume of military traffic.
Whilst access to Pearce ILS is available out of hours the approaches either
commence or terminate within the Perth CTA which further complicates the matter.
Access to Gingin Non Directional Beacon (NDB) is available outside hours however
access to remote aids is restricted by agreement with the landholder(s) and some
airspace procedures used are not published.
 Practice IFR approaches into Jandakot are not permitted.
 The airspace around some of the navigation aids (Navaids) is becoming congested.
The airspace around Cunderdin non-directional beacon (NDB) is one example which
can be exacerbated when glider operations are being conducted. Access to those
NDBs that remain in service following the navaid rationalisation program was
discussed as potentially elevating risk due to the concentration of traffic using the
remaining aids.

ANNEX I – REFERENCES
 Aeronautical Information Publication – May 2016
 Airspace Act 2007
 Airspace Regulations 2007
 Australian Airspace Policy Statement – 2015
 DAP West – Effective 26 May 2016
 Designated Airspace Handbook – May 2016
 En route Supplement Australia – March 2016
 Manual of Air Traffic Services 3 March 2016 – 25 May 2016

Review Airspace Within 50nm Perth Wa

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Review Airspace Within 50nm Perth Wa

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Airspace Review within

50 nautical miles of Perth Airport

DOCUMENT SPONSOR: OFFICE OF AIRSPACE REGULATION

TRIM REFERENCE: D17/77122

FILE REF: OP16/501

Version Issue/Nature of Revision Date

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

2 The report is available on the CASA website https://www.casa.gov.au/files/perth-aero-studypdf

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Figure 1: Extract of Perth VNC (Airservices: Effective date 26 May 2016).

3.3. Air Navigation Service Providers in the Perth area

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

3.5. Perth Airport

3.6. Perth aircraft movements

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Annual Movements Perth Annual Passengers Perth (M's)

Figure 2: Perth Statistics 2012-2016.

3.7. Details of Perth airspace

3.8. Jandakot Airport

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

3.9. Analysis of Jandakot aircraft movements

Figure 4: Annual movements Jandakot 2012-2016.

3.10. Details of Jandakot airspace

3.11. Pearce Aerodrome

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

3.12. Analysis of Pearce aircraft movements

3.13. Gingin Aerodrome

3.14. Pearce and Gingin airspace

3.15. Military restricted areas

3.16. Restricted Area (RA) access

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

 Errors in pilot procedures,

Table 1: Perth reported incidents.

Table 2: Jandakot reported incidents.

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

4.2. Summary of incidents

5 DETAILED FEEDBACK FROM STAKEHOLDERS

5.1. Air navigation procedures

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

6 KEY ISSUES AND FINDINGS

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

7 OVERVIEW OF CHANGES SINCE 2011 PERTH

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

ANNEX A – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

ANNEX B – AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE STRUCTURE

Not currently used in Australia.

F Not currently used in Australia.

* Not applicable to military aircraft.

Airspace Review within 50 nm of Perth Airport – March 2017 Version: 0.5

ANNEX C – RESTRICTED AND DANGER AREAS WITHIN 50 NM OF

RESTRICTED AND DANGER AREAS WITHIN THE REVIEW AREA

R129 BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y

R134A BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y

R134B BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y

R134C BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y

R134D BINDOON MILITARY NON FLYING ARMY DOTAM WA RA2 Y

R153A PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y

R153B PEARCE MILITARY FLYING FLTCDR 453SQN PEARCE RA2 Y