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American Sociological Association

Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansisons of Resource Mobilization Theory

Author(s): Bert Klandermans
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Oct., 1984), pp. 583-600
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION:
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPANSIONS OF RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION THEORY*

BERT KLANDERMANS
Free University,Amsterdam

Resource mobilization theorists have nearly abandoned social-psychological

analysis of social movements. In this paper a fresh case is made for social
psychology. New insights in psychology are combined with resource mobilization
theory in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of traditional social-psychological
approaches to social movements. Expectancy-value theory is applied to movement
participation and mobilization. It is assumed that the willingness to participate in a
social movement is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of participation.
Collective and selective incentives are discussed. Expectations about the behavior of
others are introduced as an important expansion of expectancy-value theory to make
this framework applicable to movement participation. The theory is applied to
mobilization campaigns of the labor movement, and empirically tested in a
longitudinal study of a campaign during the 1979 collective negotiations in the
Netherlands. Outcomes support the theory. Theoretical and practical implications
are discussed.

Resourcemobilizationtheory was a reactionto pants in such divergentmovements as fascism

traditional social-psychological theories of
social movements (Zurcherand Snow, 1981).
Those theories focused on what attracted
people to participationin social movements.
Amongst the explanations were: personality
traits (cf. Kenniston, 1968;Kerpelman, 1969);
marginalityand alienation (cf. LeBon [1903]
1968;Freud, 1922;Hoffer, 1951; Kornhauser,
1959);and grievancesand ideology (cf. Davies,
1962; Toch, 1966; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr,
1970; Rothman, 1974; Landsberger, 1976).
These explanationstended to be based on the
assumption that participation in a social
movement, like other forms of collective be-
havior, is an unconventional,irrationaltype of
behavior (Schwartz, 1976).1 Thanks to re-
source mobilization theorists themselves,
these approaches became increasingly ques-
tionable. Attempts to show that movement
participants have characteristic personality
traitswere not very successful (Heberl6, 1968;
Roberts and Kloss, 1974; Klandermans,
1983b).Marginalityand alienation, for exam-
ple, were not the typical backgroundof partici-
*Directall correspondenceto: Bert Klandermans,
Departmentof Social Psychology, Free University,
Amsterdam,The Netherlands.
I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers who
provided many insightful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
I Schwartzcontrasts the social-psychological"ir-
rational"approachwith the structural"rational"ap-
proach. I hope to show here that such a charac-
terizationof social psychology is unjust.
American Sociological Review, 1984, Vol. 49 (October:583-600)
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in Germany (Oberschall, 1973), the student
movement (Kenniston, 1968), the civil rights
movement(Morris,1981),the unionmovement
(Moore, 1975), political protest movements
(Marsh, 1977; Barnes and Kaase, 1979), the
environmental, antiabortion, and antinuclear
movements (Leahy and Mazur, 1978),and the
unemployed movement (Klandermans,1979).
The importanceof grievances and ideology as
determinants of participation in a social
movement has been ambiguous(Gerlach and
Hine, 1970;McCarthyand Zald, 1976;Walsh,
1978;Leahy and Mazur, 1978;Tilly, 1979).
In contrast to traditional social-psycho-
logical interpretations, resource mobili-
zation theory emphasizes the importance of
structuralfactors, such as the availability of
resources to a collectivity and the position of
individualsin social networks, and stresses the
rationalityof participationin social movements
(Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Marx and
Wood, 1975; McCarthyand Zald, 1976; Zald
and McCarthy, 1979;Snow et al., 1980;Gam-
son et al., 1982). Participation in a social
movement is seen not as the consequence of
predisposingpsychologicaltraits or states, but
as the result of rational decision processes
wherebypeople weigh the costs and benefits of
participation.
Currently, resource mobilization theory is
the dominantapproachin the field. Paradoxi-
cally, a demand for new social-psychological
theories of mobilizationand participationhas
developed (Gamsonet al., 1982;Jenkins, 1983;
Walsh and Warland, 1983). Resource mobili-
583
584
zationtheorywent too far in nearlyabandoning
the social-psychological analyses of social
movements. In this papera fresh case is made
for a social-psychologicalanalysis of mobiliza-
tion and participationin a social movement.By
combiningnew insightsin psychology with re-
source mobilizationtheory, the weaknesses of
earlier social-psychologicalapproachesin the
field can be overcome.
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGYAND RESOURCE
MOBILIZATIONTHEORY
Social psychology can expand resource
mobilization theory in an importantway by
revealing processes of social-movement par-
ticipationon the individuallevel. To resource
mobilization theorists, participation results
from "weighing"costs againstbenefits. How-
ever, little attentionis given to weighingthese
at the individuallevel. Nor is much attention
given to the interaction between individuals
that generates mobilization.2
Identifyingthe interactionbetween individu-
als as the appropriatelevel of analysis has sig-
nificanttheoreticalconsequences. It takes into
account the psychological truism that people
behave in a perceived reality. Individualdeci-
sions to participatein a social movement are
based on perceived costs and benefits of par-
ticipation.That perceived reality is capable of
being influenced, and both social-movement
leaders and adversariestry to do so. Persua-
sion is an importantelementin every mobiliza-
tion campaign.The efficacy of a mobilization
campaignin persuadingthe individualis a key
determinantof participation.
Movement participationdenotes activities
rangingfromsigninga petitionto sabotage,and
frompart-timeor one-timeto full-timeactivity.
The perceived costs and benefits for different
activities can vary greatly (see also Tolbert,
1981).Moreover, there can be substantialdif-
ferences in perceived costs and benefits be-
tween individuals,across regions, and during
the life cycle of the movement. This has im-
portant implications for mobilization cam-
paigns. By timing,and by their choice of strat-
egy and arena, social-movementorganizations
can profoundlyinfluencethe costs andbenefits
of participation.
2 A number of students of social movements
whose approachesare cognatewith resourcemobili-
zation theory do pay attention to processes at the
individual level (Schwartz, 1976; Mitchell, 1979;
Oberschall,1980;Tolbert,1981;Gamsonet al., 1982).
Their analyses bear resemblances to the one pre-
sented here. They have in common, however, their
lack of a systematic,psychologicallybased theoreti-
cal framework.Moreover, they are not theoretical:
they provideno empiricaldataat the individuallevel.
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AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
A generalcriticismof resource mobilization
theory has been that it underestimates the
significanceof grievances and ideology as de-
terminantsof participationin a social move-
ment (Carden, 1978; Fireman and Gamson,
1979; Useem, 1980; Isaac et al., 1980). This
shortcomingresults from confusing the indi-
vidual and societal levels of analysis (see also
Geschwender, 1968). The fact that grievances
and ideology cannot explain the rise of social
movements does not mean that they. do not
play a role in the decisions of individualsto
participatein a social movement. One of the
aspirationsof this social-psychologicalexpan-
sion of resourcemobilizationtheory is to find a
more satisfying theoretical solution for the
problem of grievances and ideology as deter-
minantsof participationin a social movement.
PERSUASION AND ACTIVATION:A
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF
MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION
Participationin a social movement fluctuates.
Alternatingly,a movementhas its rankand file
in action and then it falls back on its cadre.
Mobilizationplays an importantpart in these
fluctuations.The remainderof this article will
focus on participationin a social movement
and on the way it changes as a result of mobili-
zation attempts.
The Willingness to Participate
A person will participatein a social movement
if s/he knows the opportunitiesto participate,if
s/he is capable of using one or more of these
opportunities,and if s/he is willing to do so.
This paper elaborates the third condition by
applying expectancy-value theory to move-
ment participation.In general this theory "at-
tempts to relate action to the perceived attrac-
tiveness or aversiveness of expected con-
sequences" (Feather, 1982:1).3The key ele-
3 Expectancy-valuemodels in psychology com-
prise such concepts as attitude, motivation, choice
and decision. The motivationfor a certainbehavior
is a function of the expectation that it will yield
certainoutcomes and the values of those outcomes
(Rotter, 1954, 1972; Mitchell, 1974; Campbelland
Pritchard,1977).The value of an outcome of behav-
ior is a functionof the instrumentalityof the primary
outcome for other, secondary outcomes and the
value they have. Expectancy-value theory is a
rational-choicetheory. It is one of the subjective
utility theories in psychology. As such, it is easily
compatiblewith resourcemobilizationtheory. How-
ever, I do not want to suggestthat social psychology
has nothingmoreto offerthatis usefulto the studyof
social movements(see Gamsonet al., 1982;Pinard,
1983;Ferree and Miller, 1984).
MOBILIZATIONAND PARTICIPATION
ments of the theory are expected outcomes
(expectations) and the value of these out-
comes. Theoretically,values and expectations
combine in a multiplicativeway. Even if the
value of an outcome is very high it will not
motivate individuals as long as they do not
believe that the outcome can be producedby
their efforts. Usually differentoutcomes (ma-
terial and nonmaterial)are distinguished.For
each outcome a value-expectancyproductcan
be calculated.Motivationis definedas the sum
of these differentvalue-expectancyproducts.4
A rational-choiceframeworkdoes not imply
thatfeelings, emotions or sentimentsare unim-
portantin relation to movement participation.
Nor does it arguethat potentialparticipantsare
consciously multiplyingand addingvalues and
expectations.The usefulness of the framework
is that it provides a device for the systematic
analysis of the variety of beliefs, expectations
and attitudesthat are relatedto participationin
a social movement (see Schwartz [1976] and
Oberschall[1980]for defenses of the rational
view of humanaction).
However, before this general theoretical
frameworkcan be applied to movement par-
ticipation,it has to be modifiedin an important
way. The goals of social movements are "col-
lective goods." Obtaininga collective good is
not directly contingent on the decision of an
individual to participate (Olson, 1977). Ra-
tional individuals will not participate in the
productionof a collective good unless selective
incentives motivatethem to do so. ThoughOl-
son's argumenthas been criticized (Schwartz,
1976; Mitchell, 1979; Fireman and Gamson,
1979;Oliver, 1980), it clarified the distinction
between collective benefits and selective ben-
efits. If one finds it untenable that only the
latter motivates movement participation,one
must acknowledge that the relationship be-
tween participationand collective benefits is
differentfromthe relationshipbetween partici-
pation and selective benefits.
Collective benefits and participation. Both
Gamson(1975)and Schwartz(1976)arguethat
people participate in activities to produce a
collective goal precisely because they are
aware that the good would never be produced
if everyone sat back and waited for someone
else to do something. Oberschall (1980) re-
markedthat this was especially true for people
who are strongly in favor of the collective
good. Fireman and Gamson (1979) and
4 Thereis considerablediscussionin the literature the free-riderdilemmaalong this line. Oliver et al.
concerningthe mathematicalpartof the theory (see, (1983) propose a similarlimitationof the free-rider
e.g., Kuhl, 1982). Leaving aside the theoretical problem.
argument,in practicemost researchersuse multiple
regression analysis to combine the different vari- for behavior-outcomerelations and instrumentality
ables.
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585
Fleishman (1980) stressed the importance of
feelings of responsibilityand solidarityin this
connection. Schwartz (1976) and Oberschall
(1980)addedthe probabilityof success as very
important.In their analysis the probabilityof
success is related to the number of partici-
pants. Oberschall (1980) pointed out that the
importantquestion for the individualis what
his/her participation will contribute to the
probabilityof success. From a hypothesized
relationship between the number of partici-
pants and the probabilityof success, the indi-
vidualcontributionas a functionof the number
of participantscan be derived. Oliver et al.
(1983)madeclear that there is a varietyof such
productionfunctions.
These arguments do not touch the funda-
mentalissue, namely, that persons have to de-
cide to participateat a point when they do not
know whetherothers will participate. There is
a social-psychologicalsolutionto this problem.
Althoughpeople do not know what others will
do, they have expectations. Based on their ex-
pectationsaboutthe behaviorof others, people
assess the probabilityof success and their own
contributionto it. The expectationthat partici-
pationhelps to producethe collective good can
therefore be categorized as follows:
a. expectationsabout the numberof partici-
pants;
b. expectations about one's own contribu-
tion to the probabilityof success;
c. expectationsaboutthe probabilityof suc-
cess if many people participate.
These expectationscombinein a multiplicative
way with the value of the collective good to
producethe expected collective benefitsof par-
ticipation.
Applying expectancy theory yields the hy-
pothesis that the value of a collective good is a
function of its instrumentality6 for social
changes which the movementhopes to achieve
and of the value of changes. To form an opin-
ion about this instrumentality,an individual
must have knowledgeaboutthe collective good
and its implications.
Participationand selective costs and bene-
5On the basis of the expectations distinguished,
we can definethe free-riderproblemmoreclosely. A
free rideris someone who believes that his/herown
contributionto the probabilityof success will be very
small, but who believes that the numberof partici-
pantsandthe probabilityof success are largeenough
to expect that the collective good will be produced.
See Klandermans(1983a) for a reconsiderationof
6 In expectancy-valuetheory expectation is used
for outcome-outcome relations.
 586
fits. Selective costs and benefits are by defini-
tion contingenton participation.Expectations
about, and values of, these incentives directly
influence the willingnessto participate.In the
literaturethere are different classifications of
selective costs andbenefits(cf. Freeman,1979;
Tolbert, 1981).An importantdistinctionis that
between expected reactions of significant
others7and expected materialcosts and bene-
fits like money, time, injury, entertainment.8
Motives. The willingnessto participatein a
social movement can be defined as a function
of the perceivedattractivenessor aversiveness
of the expected consequencesof participation.
This signifiesthat willingnessto participateis a
function of:
(a) the expectation that participation will
help to produce the collective good and the
value of the collective good-the collective
motive; (b) the expected selective costs and
benefits and the value of these costs and bene-
fits. As distinguishedin the reactionsof signifi-
cant others, these comprise the social motive.
As they relate to nonsocial costs and benefits,
they comprise the reward motive.
Expectationsor instrumentalitiesand values
combine in a multiplicativeway and the three
motives in an additive way. The value of a
collective good will be zero if it is not believed
to be instrumentalfor valued societal changes,
or if the changesit is saidto be instrumentalfor
are not valued. The value of a collective good'
will be negativeif it is believedto hindervalued
societal changes, or if changes are valued
negatively.
If the value of the collective good is zero, the
collective motive will be zero. If this value is
negativethe motivewill be negative, unless the
expectation componentis zero.
The collective motive will also be zero if the
expectation that participationwill help to pro-
duce the collective good is zero: persons will
not be motivatedby the collective good if they
do not feel that their participationcontributes
to the probabilityof success, or do not believe
that enoughother people will participate,or do
not feel there is any chance of success even if
many people participate.
Since the different motives combine in an
additive way, they can compensate one an-
other. If the collective motive is weak, zero or
7To avoid circularity,it is importantto point out participate. Ideally, social movement organi-
who in a person's environmentwill be significant. zations will take a variety of approaches, ap-
Althoughit is difficultto give exhaustive enumera- pealing both to collective and to social and
tions, certainlyfriends, colleagues and family mem-
bers are among them.
8 These costs and benefits can vary greatly de-
pendingon the situation and the kind of participa- the spread of generalized beliefs (Smelser, 1971).
tion. However, often the maincosts andbenefitsof a Consensus mobilization, however, is a purposeful
particularform of participationcan be specified.
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
negative, the other motives can be so strong
that a person is willing to participate. If the
collective motive is strong, the social motives
and/orrewardmotives can be negativewithout
making a person unwilling to participate. Of
course there are also situations in which the
collective motive does not outweigh negative
social and/or reward motives, either because
the collective motive is too weak, or because
the social and rewardmotives are too negative.
Figure 1 summarizesthe theory on the willing-
ness to participate.
Mobilization
Mobilizationattempts by a movement organi-
zation have the aim of winning participants,
that is, persuading people to support the
movement organizationby material and non-
materialmeans. Mobilizationattempts always
containtwo components.These are called con-
sensus mobilizationand action mobilization.
Consensus mobilization is a process through
which a social movement tries to obtain sup-
port for its viewpoints.9It involves (a) a col-
lective good, (b) a movement strategy, (c)
confrontation with the opponent, (d) results
achieved. Neithercollective goods nor types of
action are fixed quantities. They change, and
this requiresrenewed consensus mobilization.
Consensus mobilizationdoes not take place in
a vacuum. Collective goods and actions are
often controversial. Opponents, counter-
movements, rival organizations counter the
arguments of a social movement. A social
movement will have to go into these
arguments.In short, a "paperwar"is waged to
promote or to discourage the mobilizationof
consensus. The degree of success with which
consensus is mobilized around the collective
goods can be measuredby the extent to which
these goods are known and valued. Whether
people value a collective good depends on the
extent to which consensus mobilization suc-
ceeded in makingthem believe that this good is
instrumentalfor valued social changes.
Action mobilization is the process by which
an organizationin a social movement calls up
people to participate.Consensus mobilization
does not necessarily go together with action
mobilization,but actionmobilizationcannotdo
without consensus mobilization. Action
mobilization involves motivating people to
9 Consensus mobilizationbears resemblances to
effort of a social-movementorganization.

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MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 587

Attitude theory
Motivation theory
value of social
change advocated
Il value of collective
x 0 good

familiarity instrumentality of x
with collec- 0. collective good for II
tive good social change advo- expectation that
cated participation will
help to achieve the
collective good*

- participation contributes to probabi-i value of reaction

lity of success of significant
- expected numberof participants i
i
others
- expected success. if many people
participate
+ willingness
x +-
+ to parti-
cipate

expected reaction
of significant
others to partici-
pation and to
non-partici pation

value of costs
and benefits

expected costs and

benefits of parti-
cipation and non-
partici pation

means a multiplicativerelationship.
a X
+ means an additive relationship.
Figure 1. A Theory of the Willingnessto Participatea

rewardmotives (Gamson, 1975;Carden, 1978; of free-riderbehavior. Since free riderstake a

Snow et al., 1980).They have every reason to
do so. Participationbecause of collective mo-
tives means that both the collective good and
the type of participationare attractive. But it
will seldom be the case that each and every
member of a collectivity is won over to the
collective good and the form of participationin
the time available. Particularly if nearly
unanimousparticipationis demanded,there is
always a certainpercentagewho, lackingcom-
plete consensus, will have to be mobilized
using social and/or reward motives. Another
factor to be contended with is the occurrence
positive standon the collective good but do not
believe that its production depends on their
participation,it is not of much use to appealto
collective motives. What remains is to try to
mobilize them using social and/or rewardmo-
tives. Here, again, the chance that a social
movementdecides to do this will be greaterif a
higher degree of participationis required.'0
"I Not all types of action are equallyvulnerableto
nonparticipation(cf. Fireman and Gamson, 1979;
Klandermans,1983a;Oliver et al., 1983). This will
differ for differenttypes of action.

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 588
A mobilizingorganizationwill try to make
the benefits of participationand the costs of
nonparticipationas high as possible, and the
costs of participationand the benefits of non-
participationas low as possible. Apart from
influencing the three motives directly, a
movement also has indirect means of control-
ling the costs and benefits of participation.
Two importantones are (a) the choice of the
type of action and (b) the choice of the scene.
A movement can choose amongseveral types
of action, from moderateto militant. With its
choice of the type of action, a movement can
determineto a large extent the costs and bene-
fits of participation. A movement can fight
where it is strongest,that is, in sectors of soci-
ety with strong movement networks where it
can organizemany people. Resource mobiliza-
tion literaturehas shown that people are more
easily mobilized in such sectors (cf. Ragin et
al., 1982).The premisehere is that this is prob-
ably because a more favorable cost-benefit
ratio can be created in such sectors.
Psychologically speaking, there will be an
elementof projectionin estimatesof the number
of participantsin a movement. A person who
does not wish to participatewill make a lower
estimate of the numberof participantsthan a
person who does wish to take part."IIn a col-
lectivity this has all the look of a self-fulfilling
prophecy:if manypeople thinkthatfew people
will participate,many people will have doubts
about the efficacy of their own participation.
Thus a downwardspiral ensues which is fatal
to the willingness to participate.Mobilization
efforts attempt to reinforce the view that
"many people will participate."If this is -not
successful, the prophecy fulfills itself.
METHOD
The theory of mobilization and participation
has been applied in research on mobilization
campaigns of the union movement, the
women's movementand the peace movement.
This paper presents data from a study of the
effects of a mobilizationcampaignby the In-
dustrial Workers'Union of the Dutch Union
Federation, the largest union of industrial
workers in the Netherlands.
The Campaign
In 1979, the Industrial Workers' Union (IB
FNV) tried to mobilize its members for a
shorter work week. It was argued that
shorteningthe work week would reduce unem-
I See Granbergand Holmberg(1983) for an in-
terestingelaborationof a similarassumptionregard- had shown significantdifferencesas covariates. Not
ing voting behavior.
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
ployment. The campaign started in August
1978 when the chairman of the IB FNV
launched the 35-hourwork week as the chief
demandin the 1979negotiations.The campaign
included numerous publications in the press
andappearanceson radioandtelevision, issues
of the union'smagazine,posters, bulletins,and
pamphlets, work by union officials and by
members. The union, however, quickly went
on the defensive. Not just their opponent, but
public opinion and even many "friendly"
economists or politicians turned against it. In
an effort to break this massive resistance, the
union twice changedits goals: first, by replac-
ing the 35-hourweek with a 39-hourweek, later
by dropping the shorter work week and de-
mandingextra days off.
Collective bargainingis a series of events.
Our study was devoted to some of them. One
did have a greatdeal of influence:the failureof
a 6-week strike againstthe West Germansteel
industryin which the 35-hourwork week was
at stake. This failure made the union keenly
aware of its small chances of success, even if
militantaction were taken. Thus no action was
taken in the Netherlandsthat year. Ultimately,
however, an agreementwas reached giving a
few extra days off. Although the members
were not markedlydissatisfiedwith this result,
many regretted the meager results. Few be-
lieved it would have a favorableeffect on em-
ployment.
Research Design
Mobilization campaigns often last several
months. In this case the campaign started in
August 1978, and the negotiations were not
completeduntil June 1979. In such a situation,
longitudinalresearch is to be preferred.From
the end of November 1978 throughJuly 1979
we interviewed a group of union members
about once a month. We chose the timing so
that the interviews fell shortly before or-after
an importantevent. Althougha total of seven
waves were held, for methodologicalreasons a
design was developed which ensured that no
respondent would be interviewed more than
three times. Seven groups of members were
selected, and they were interviewedaccording
to the schedulein Figure2. Whenthe similarity
of the seven groups was controlled on a
number of variables, the differences found
were so few that the groups can be used for
comparison with no difficulty.'2 In addition,
12 To
check whetherthe differencesfoundaffected
the outcomes, analyses of covariance were carried
out on all effect variables,with the variableswhich
once did they lead to differentconclusions.
MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 589

group I 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group II 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group III 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group IV 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group V 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group VI 1st 2nd

interview interview

group VII 1st

interview

Nov. 20-29 Jan. 29- Feb. 19- Apr. 3-18 May 18- June 11-
|an. 4-18 Fe15. 9 Mar-. 2 June 1 July 11

Figure2. Design

this design13has many advantages.We can get The Interviews

a picture of the course of the campaign by
comparing the outcomes of the successive
interviews. We can also study the effect of a
single event by comparingthe outcomes of the
interviews before and after that event while
controllingfor repeated measurement.
Respondents
Membersof the IB FNV were interviewedat
three plants belongingto the AKZO concern:
Enka in Emmen; Enka in Ede; and AKZO
Pharmain Oss. A sample of 746 persons was
taken from the membershiplists of the union.
The data set includes 490 complete series of
interviews (66%), well distributedover plants
and interview waves. The first interview had
the highest nonresponse rate. This interview
was completed with 565 members (76%).
Slightly less than half the dropouts refused to
take partin this interview.The others were not
at home, were no longer members, no longer
worked for the company, were sick, or had
moved. The refusals(1/8 of the originalsample)
may have damaged the representativeness.
Small percentagesagain fell off at the second
(4%) and third interviews (6%). Half of the
dropoutsat the thirdinterview were members
who had already left for vacation.
II The design is one of the variantsof the separate unionaction always distinguishedbetween two
sample-pretest-posttestdesign (Campbelland Stan- types of action: militant action, such as a
ley, 1963):
R 0, x 02
R x 02
The interviews were held at the participants'
homes andwere carriedout by the Netherlands
Instituteof OpinionPolls. Each questionnaire
consisted of one part that was the same each
time and another that changed. The initial
interview included a general list of personal
data.
The Questionnaire
The variablesfrom the theory of willingnessto
take action were operationalizedas follows. (I)
The familiaritywith the collective good was
measuredby the following questions: Are the
unionsdemandingshorterworkinghours?(yes,
no, don't know). In what way do they want to
shorten working hours? (open question). (II)
The instrumentalityof the collective good for
the social change advocated:We asked the re-
spondents if they felt that a "shorterworking
week would make a contributionto reducing
unemployment"(definitely, I think so, I don't
think so, definitely not). (III) The value of the
social change advocated: From the responses
to variousquestions we were able to infer that
the interviewees almost without exception at-
tached much value to reducingunemployment.
Theoretically,this means that the value of the
social change advocated equals 1 for each re-
spondent.
The questionon the motives to participatein
strike; and moderate action, such as holding
meetings on work time, a slowdown, a short
work stoppage, etc.
Collective motives. (IV) The value of the

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 590 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
collective good: Union members were asked Willingness to take action. (IX) We mea-
how they stood on a shorterwork week. They sured the willingnessto take part in action by
could reply on a 5-point scale from very posi- asking, "If it comes to action for the negotia-
tive to very negative. tions, will you take part in moderate/militant
(V) The expectation that participationhelps action?"(definitely,I thinkso, I don't thinkso,
to achieve the collective good: (a) The expec- definitely not).14
tation about one's own contribution to the
probabilityof success was operationalizedin RESULTS
the followingtwo statements:"It reallydoesn't
make much difference whether or not I take The Theory of the Willingness to Participate
partin action.""It is importantthat I take part Tables I and 2 summarizethe overall evalua-
in action, because in doing this I supportthe tion of the theory. Table 1 concentrateson the
union" (agree entirely, agree, disagree, dis- attitudetowardsthe collective goal andTable2
agree entirely). (b) The expectation about the on the willingness to participate.
numberof participantswas establishedas fol- Table 1 presents the correlations between
lows: "In your estimate, how many people at beliefs about the instrumentalityof shorter
your plantwill participatein moderate/militant workingtime for unemploymentreductionand
action in connection with the negotiations?" the attitudetowardshorterworkingtime in five
(very few, not so many, quite a few, very successive interviews.The data show a signifi-
many). (c) The expectation about success if cant relationshipbetween these two variables
many people participatewas measuredby the at all five points in time. It could be that people
question:"Imaginethat very manypeople take- believe that shorterworkinghours reduce un-
part in moderate/militant-action. Do you think employmentas a rationalizationfor theirdesire
that this will induce the employersto take into to have a shorterwork week. Thatis, it may be
account the union standpointin the negotia- that the attitudesproduce the beliefs about in-
tions?" (definitely, I think so, I don't think so, strumentalityratherthan the reverse. The sec-
definitely not). ond part of Table 1 examines this issue. This
Social motives. (VI) Three categories of partof the table presentsthe correlationsof the
people seemed significant:members of one's changes in the variables.15The argumentthat
family, colleagues, and direct superiors. A instrumentalityproducesattitudesis confirmed
variableindicativeof social motivationto par- if changesin one are correlatedwith changesin
ticipatewas calculated.Basic data were (a) the the other, for it is unlikely that other possible
value a person attaches to reactions of family determinantsof the attitude (for instance, the
members,colleagues, anddirect superiors,and need for more leisure time) change in the same
(b) the expected reactions of these persons to way. As Table I shows, changes in the vari-
participationand to nonparticipation.The so- ables are significantlycorrelated.
cial motivationscore is the sum of the products Table 2 is derived from six hierarchicalre-
of values and expectations. If persons expect gression analyses with stepwise inclusion
favorablereactions if they participateand un- (three for moderateand three for militantac-
favorableones if they do not, then the score is tion).16 Following a procedure suggested by
positive. If they expect unfavorablereactionsif
they participateand favorableones if they do
not, then the score is negative. 14 To overcome the drawbackthat an important

Rewardmotives. Two types of costs seemed variablewould only be measuredby one question,
important: (a) financial sacrifices, and (b) other questions were asked at other points in the
worsening of a person's position in the com- interviewsabout the attitudetowardaction. The an-
pany. (VII) For the financial sacrifices, we swers to these questions correlatedreasonablywell
asked: "Suppose that it would cost money if with those to the directquestionon the willingnessto
take partin action(meanr = .50 for moderateaction,
you took part in any action in connection with and .67 for militantaction), and they did not show
the negotiations. Do you feel this is not too any differences in their relationshipsto other vari-
detractive,detractive,or very detractive?"By ablest
this formulationwe set the expectancy compo- 15 Residualscores were computedby substracting
nent at 1 and restrictedourselves to the value from the score on time 2 the score on time 1 multi-
component.(VIII)For the position in the com- plied by the correlationbetween the two scores.
16 Originally,expectancy-valuetheory prescribed
pany, we assumed that no one would be indif-
ferent about his/her position in the company simple addition of the separate motives. This un-
assumes that different motives are
worsening. We set the value of a worsened realistically
mutuallyindependentand have the same weight. A
position at -1 and restrictedourselves to this more realisticapproachis to accountfor intercorre-
expectationby askingwhethera person'sposi- lations and different weights by using regression
tion in the company would worsen by par- analysisratherthan simple summation(cf. Mitchell,
ticipatingin moderate/militantaction. 1974).

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MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 591

Table 1. The Attitudes Towards Shorter Working Time and the Instrumentality of Shorter Working Time for
Reducing Unemployment: Pearson Correlations of Single and Change Scores
Instrumentality
Nov. Jan. Early Feb. End of Feb. April
a) Single Scores
Attitude Towards
-shorter working hours .47*** .37** .44*** .38*** .48***
-shorter working week .35** .34** .33** .38*** .21*
Early Feb.! End of Feb.
Nov./Jan. Jan./Early Feb. End of Feb. April
b) Change Scores
Attitude Towards
-shorter working hours .35** .29* .39*** .44***
-shorter working week .19* .36** .25* .11
* p<.05.
** p<.o1.
p<.OO1.

Finn and Mattson (1978), in each regression
analysis the variables connected with one of
the three motives are included in the last step.
The data show that the contribution of each of
the three motives in this last step is significant;
each helps to account for the variance in the
willingness to participate in action. Together
the motives account for 43 percent of the vari-
ance in the willingness to participate in militant
action and 38 percent of the variance for mod-
erate action.
The contribution of reward motives is rela-
tively small, possibly because these costs only
really count when it actually comes to action,
and then especially if the action goes on a long
time. Alternatively, it may be that the kinds of
costs asked about (financial sacrifices, wors-
ening of the position in the company) are all in
the game for many people; only by becoming
too high might they dissuade these people from
participation. There is a wide difference in the
contribution of the social motives for the two
Table 2. Regressionof Motives on the Willingness
to Participate in Moderate and Militant
Action: R2 ChangesWhen a Motive is In-
troducedin the Last Stepa
Moderate Militant
Action Action
A R2 A R2
Collective Motives 13%*** 7%***
Social Motives 4%*** 10%***
RewardMotives 0.8%* 1%**
a
This table reflects the results of six stepwise
regression analyses; the percentage in the table
appliesto the motiveon the left when it is introduced
in the last step.
* p<.05.
** p<.Ol.
*** p<.oo1.
types of action(4 and 10percentin the last step
and 20 and 31 percentin the first step). Militant
actions are more controversialthan moderate
actions. Thus, reactions of significant others
will be more pronouncedand have more influ-
ence. Theoretically significant is the large
contribution of the collective motives even
when the othermotives are accountedfor. This
is in oppositionto Olson's (1977)argumentthat
persons are not motivated to participate in
collective behaviorby the collective good but
only by selective incentives. For a better
theoreticalunderstandingit is useful to break
down the collective motive again. Most of the
membershad a positive attitudetowardshorter
working time (see next paragraph);hence it
follows thatwhethera personwill be motivated
to participateby the collective good depends
upon the expectancy component. The expec-
tancy componentis madeup of three elements:
the expectation that participationcontributes
to the probability of success; -the expected
numberof participants;and the expected suc-
cess if many people participate.The correla-
tions between these elements were low, which
underlinesthe fact that each plays his/herown
role in the decision to participate.This is made
clear by the /3 coefficients in Table 3. The
prominence of two elements (a2 and b) de-
serves some comment. Feelings of solidarity
and responsibilityare reflected in the willing-
ness to supportthe union. Its weight validates
Fireman and Gamson's (1979) argumentthat
groupsolidarityis an importantdeterminantof
participation.The significanceof expectations
about the numberof participantsconfirms the
argumentthat the expected numberof partici-
pants is a self-fulfillingprophecy. Contraryto
Olson's logic, the willingnessto participatein
collective action appearsto be strengthenedby
the belief that many others will participate.

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 592 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Table 3. Regressionsof the Four Componentsof the Expectationthat ParticipationHelps to Achieve the
Collective Good on the Willingnessto Participate
ModerateAction MilitantAction
B /3 B la
al. My participationdoesn't matter .066 ** .052 .08*
(.027)a 11(.029)
a2. I participatebecause I want to supportthe union .296 39*** .282 35***
(.035) * (.038)
b. Numberof participants .236 .28*** .29 .33***
(.039) (.040)
c. Expected success if many people participate .654 11** .075 12**
(.027) (.029)
R2 .57 .56
a Standarderrors.
* .15<p<.10.
** p<.05.
*** p<.001.

The remainderof this discussion concerns
the results over the course of the campaign.
Table- 4 gives a brief chronology of major
events in the campaignin relationto the seven
interview waves.
Consensus Mobilization
Knowledge. Adequate diffusion of knowledge
of the collective good is the cornerstone of
every mobilization campaign. Collective
goods.,however, are not invariablequantities.
They can change, influenced by circum-
stances, interaction with the opponent, etc.
For a social movement,two dangerscan arise:
(a) the collective good as it is defined initially
does not become widely enough known; (b)
changes in the definitionof the collective good
do not become widely enough known. As can
be seen from Table 4, there were two policy
changes in the 1979negotiations.
Figure 3 clearly shows that both policy
changesled to difficultiesaboutthe knowledge
of the goals. After a quite adequateinitiallevel
(70-80Woknew what the goals were), with the
first policy changethe numberof people aware 80
of the changedgoals was cut in half. A month 70
and a half later this number was once again 60
rising, but it did not reach the level of early
February.At the end of May the second policy
change took place, and again the number of
correct answers was cut in half.
knowledge is never more than a condition for
the spreadof a positive attitudetoward a col-
lective good. The key concept here is the in-
strumentalityof the collective good for social
changes felt to be worth fightingfor or for the
preservation of a desirable situation. Cam-
paignsfor the mobilizationof consensus strive
to make such instrumentalityplausible, often
in the face of counterargumentsby the oppo-
nent. The 1979 campaignfor a shorter work
week failed in this respect. The central ques-
tion was whether a shorter work week would
have a positive effect on employmentopportu-
nity.
As Figure 4 shows, after an initial increase
there is a dramaticdecrease in the extent to
which union membersbelieved that a shorter
work week would reduce unemployment.
90
1st policy
change
4
2nd policy
change
50
40
30

In general, the union "elite" (the members 20

with a highereducationand/orlevel of partici- 10

pation in the union)was better informedof the

goals of action after policy changes. Members end of mid- early end of mid- end of
outside these categories were less well in- Nov. Jan Febr. Febr. April May
Note Responses to first interview
formed and more vulnerablewhen it came to
disseminationof knowledge about changes in Figure 3. Percentages of Union Members Who
policy. Could CorrectlyFormulatethe Demands
Beliefs and attitudes. Dissemination of for a ShorterWork Week

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 MOBILIZATIONAND PARTICIPATION 593
Table 4. MajorEvents in the Campaign
August 1978 The chair of the IB FNV proposes the 35-hourwork week; mobilization
campaignstarts; discussion on shorterwork week begins.
November20-29, 1978 1st interview
November27, 1978 Governmentand employerorganizationsrefuse to negotiatea nation-wide
agreementon a shorterwork week.
December 1978 Steel strike in West Germanyfor a 35-hourwork week.
January4-18, 1979 2nd interview
End of January1979 Steel strike in West Germanylost.
January29-February9 3rd interview
Beginningof February1979 First policy change: 35 hours becomes 39 hours.
February19-March2 4th interview
March/April Negotiations with AKZO make no progress.
April3-18 5th interview
April 17 Negotiationswith AKZO break down.
April24 Second policy change: 39 hours becomes a few days off.
May 15 Negotiationswith AKZO start again.
May 18-26 6th interview
May 23 Agreementwith AKZO
June 5-18 Membershipmeetings:membershipagrees with contract.
June 11-July 11 7th interview

From the end of February onwards a majority instrumentality of the collective good for
no longer believed this. As expected, the de- valued social changes. Very often, as in the
velopments in the attitude toward a shorter case of reducing unemployment, the social
work week show the same picture, although change itself is above all discussion. The real
without becoming negative. These results problem is to make people believe that the
make clear the importance of beliefs about the collective good will advance this change.

Action Mobilization
definitely
instrumental
2.00 A mobilizingorganizationwill try to make the
.40 benefits of participationand the costs of non-
\30 participationas high as possible, and the costs
.20 . of participation and the benefits of non-
\

.10 participationas low as possible. There are

0?- various ways of doing this: (a) choosing the
-.10
type of action; (b) choosing the scene, and (c)
-.20 influencing the motives to participate. This
-.30
mustbe viewed in the context of maneuversby
\

-.40
the opponent and/or external events which
-2.00 A
may influencethe costs and benefits of partici-
definitely
not instru-
end of
Nov.
mid-
Jan.'
pation. The degree of success achieved in an
early
Febr.
end of
Febr.
mid-
April
mental
action-mobilizationcampaigncan be readfrom
Note to first
Responses
Significant
the willingness to take action.
interviews.
trend: F-lineair = 7.29, p <.01, df = 1.
Difference jan. Figure 5 presents the developments in the
- april: p<.01

willingnessto participatein moderateand mil-

Figure4. MeanPerceivedInstrumentalityof Shorter itant action. The figures for Ede and Oss did
WorkingHours for Reducing Unemploy- not differ significantly, so they are presented
ment together. In the establishmentsin Ede and Oss

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594 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Moderate action Militant action

Willing to Willing to
participate participate
1.00 1.00
.40 .40
.30 .30
.20 - .20 -

0?0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0~~~~~~~~~~~
- .20 -~~0~ .20 ?

- -~~~
.10 03 ~~ 0~~~~~~~~~~~
- .10 ?~~?
01 0

_O.,5 , -- ,-- - 00 0- -0
0-~~ - -O
- .30 - . 30--

- .40- - .40

Notwilling to late mid- early late mid- Notwilling to late mid- early late mid-
rarticipate Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April participate Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April

Ermen - -- Ec O-SS Dnen - F- Ede / Oss

Notes Ede and Oss, no significant differences between groups; no significant trend.
Emren, moderate action: linear trend; F-unique = 5.711, df = , p< .05; F-step = 5.554. df 1,
p < .05. Militant action: no significant trend; difference Nov. - April: p = .12.

Figure5. Mean Willingnessto Take Action

there was a weak willingness to participatein
moderateaction, and no willingness to partici-
pate in militant action throughout the entire
period. In Emmen,willingnessto participatein
both types of action was comparativelyhigh at
first, but it gradually melted away. Initially,
Emmen had the most potential participants,
but by April the opposite was true.
Fromthese results we can conclude that the
union did not succeed in mobilizing its mem-
bers. In two of the three establishmentsthere
was a willingness to participate in moderate
action, it is true, but it very soon became clear
that moderateaction would not be of any help,
and the initialwillingnessto participatein mil-
itant action in the third establishment disap-
peared.
Changes in the costs and beliefits of partici-
pation. Theoretically, the willingness to take
action is a function of collective, social and
rewardmotives. We have already shown that
the collective good lost in value. Over the same
periodthe expectationthat participationwould
help to achieve the collective good lost its
force, not because membersno longerbelieved
that theirparticipationwould contributeto the
probabilityof success, but because they grew
more and more pessimistic about the number
of participantsand the probabilityof success
even if many people were to participate.
Niuminber (f particip(lats. Estimates of the
number of participantscould vary from very
few to very many. Because membersestimated
the efficacy of an action based on the number
ot participants,the percentage that expected
very many colleagues to participate was of
interest.
Figure 6 concentrates on the outcomes for
one of the three establishments(Emmen) be-
cause of dramaticchanges there. In the other
two the percentageswere low throughoutthe
campaign.
As Figure6 shows, the percentagesof union
memberswho expected very manyparticipants
decline rapidly, indicating that the campaign
was losing its momentum.After an initial in-
crease (up to 58 percentin the case of moderate
action and 39 percent in the case of militant
action), startingin Januarythere was a sharp
decline which reached 4.5 percent in April, or
the level at Ede and Oss at the time.'7
'' If, instead of the percentage that expect very
many participants, we use changes in the mean esti-
mate of the number of participants, we find the same
pattern, except that the mean runs somewhat less
steeply. For moderate action, we found a significant
quadratic trend (F-unique = 7.074, df = 1, p = .01;
F-step = 6. 181, df = 1, p = .01). For militant action
we foUnd a marginally significant linear trend (F-
tunique - 3.33, df = 1, p = .08( F=step = 3.075, df =
I, p .0)X.

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MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION
60
50 . externalevents that made success unlikely,the
40 /
30 /
20
10
end of mid- early eind of
Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr.
- militant action -----
Figure6. Percentagesof Union Membersin Emmen
Who Expect that Very Many Colleagues
will Participate in Action, by Type of
Action
Probability of success. Perhaps more than
the other determinantsof the willingness to
participate,the probabilityof success is influ-
enced by external events. The 1979 negotia-
tions provide a good example.
In 1979,at the startof the negotiationsin the
Netherlands, a strike broke out in West Ger-
manyin which a shorterwork week was also at
stake. The strike lasted six weeks. Both sides
played hard. Ultimately the West German
unions lost the strike, and early in February
they concluded an agreementwhich made no
reference to a shorter work week. This out-
come also affected the negotiations in the
Netherlands, and this was expressed most
clearly in the expected success of actions
there. Figure 7 shows the changes in those
expectations. Since we found no significant
differencesbetween the establishments,the re-
sults are here combined.
Even before the disappointingend to the
West Germansteel strike,the adamantattitude
of the Dutch employers had already made it
clear that little could be gained by moderate
action. The numberof unionmemberswho felt
moderateaction would be effective showed an
immediate and rapid decrease. Members re-
mained optimistic longer about the effective-
ness of militantaction. But this optimismalso
suffereda setback when, around mid-January
and early February,the metal unions in West
Germanylost their strike. Of the union mem-
bers questioned in early February,60 percent
felt this would make the negotiations in the
Netherlandsa good deal more difficult. Figure
7 reflects this gloomy outlook; the percentage
of union members who were confident that
militantaction would change the minds of the
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employers went down to 25 percent, and for
moderateaction to 10 percent.
Due to failingconsensus mobilization,action
mobilization which lost its momentum, and
collective motive to participate vanished. It
was weak in two of the three establishments
fromthe outset, and it disappearedin the third.
Since the rewardmotives had been negativefor
manypeople fromthe beginnning,18 only social
motives might have compensatedfor this loss
in motivation.In Emmen, however, the social
motives diminished as well, although not in
the same dramaticway as the collective mo-
mid-
April tives. In Ede and Oss the social motives for
participationin militantaction were negative,
moderate action so they strengthenedthe aversion to militant
action. In the case of moderate action, how-
ever, the social motives were positive and did
compensate for the absence of collective mo-
tives. This explains why we found a weak
willingness to participatein moderate action
there.
Type of action. Differentcosts and benefits
are associated with participationin different
types of action. Table 5 summarizesevidence
on the interactionof motives and moderateor
militantaction in relationto willingnessto par-
ticipate. Persons who only wish to take partin
moderate action are compared with persons
who are also willing to take part in militant
actions.'9 The first groupis of interestbecause
they perceive such differencesin the costs and
benefits that they are not willingto participate
militant action is
40%1
definitely
effective
0
30%-
- - nmerate action is
definitely
effective
20%
10% - _ - -
late
Nov.
mid-
Jan.
early
Febr.
late
Febr.
mid-
April
Note derate
p 4.01;
action linear trerd, F-unque = 7.313, df = 1,
F-step = 7.71, df = 1, p < .01.
Militant
F-step =
action F-unique = 6.21, df = 1, p .05;
6.17, df = 1, p < .05.
Figure7. The Effectiveness of Trade Union Action
in Attainingthe Goal of a Shorter Work
Week
"I For instance, on the average, 50%feared wors-
ening of their position in the companyin the case of
participationin militantaction, and 32%in the case
of moderateaction.
'9 Seventy-threepersons were not willing to par-
ticipatein any kindof action. They are omittedfrom
this table because they are not relevantfor this dis-
cussion.
 596
Table 5. Mean Costs and Benefits of Participationin Moderateor MilitantAction by Willingnessto Take
Action
Wishes to Participatein
ModerateAction Only
Collective Motives
a. How many colleagues will partici-
pate in moderateaction?
same for militantaction
b. Is moderateaction effective?
same for militantaction
Social Motives
c. moderateaction
militantaction
RewardMotives
d. Will position in company grow
worse as a resultof participation
in moderateaction?
same for militantaction
in militantaction. The first column of Table 5
reveals these differences, especially in the so-
cial and reward motives. In the perceptionof
these persons, for militantaction the costs of
participationare considerablyhigher than for
moderate action. Such differences could be
balanced by collective motives. A look at
Table5, however, makes it clearthat this is not
the case. There are no differencesin perceived
efficacy, and regarding the number of col-
leagues, these persons are more pessimistic
about militant action. In their perception,
moderate action has a higher probability of
success because they expect more people to be
willingto participate.So why shouldthey take
the higher costs of militantaction?
A comparisonof this group with the group
that supportedmilitantaction shows important
differences in social and collective motives.
Whereasthe social motives of the "moderate"
group are negative, those of the "militant"
group are positive. Optimism about the effi-
cacy of militantaction and the numberof par-
ticipants results in strong collective motives
amongthe "militant"groupas comparedto the
"moderate"group.
It is of interest to note that the differences
between the two groupson the rewardmotives
are not very large. In both groups many per-
sons expect a worseningof theirposition in the
company. Nevertheless, all these people are
willing to participatebecause other motives
compensate for the costs.
The evidence in Table 5 warrantsa final re-
mark. The differences in perceived costs and
benefits of each type of action for the "mili-
tant"group suggest that for this group militant
action is more attractive. The social and re-
ward motives differ only slightly, whereas the
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
Wishes to Participatein
Both Moderateand
MilitantAction
(n = 79) (n = 200)
2.41 2.82
1.69 2.54
0.51 0.25
0.51 0.85
0.26 0.56
-0.68 0.44
-0.33 -0.25
-0.66 -0.40
collective motive is strongerfor militantaction
because such action is perceived to be more
efficacious. If one has to accept costs anyhow,
the more efficacious type of action is to be
preferredeven if the costs are higher.
Different plants. There were large dif-
ferences amongthe three plantsin the strength
of the union (Table 6). Of the three establish-
ments, the union was strongest in Emmen. In
accordance with resource mobilization lit-
erature, at the start of the negotiations the
willingness to take action was the highest in
Emmen; Table 6 shows why. To summarize
the evidence: the strongerthe position of the
union, the greateris the chance that colleagues
will motivate people to participate;the less
they fear for worsening their position in the
company, the more favorable can be the ex-
pected number of participants.The result is
that the membersare more easily mobilized.A
union can capitalize on this state of affairsby
fightinga conflict where it is strongest,that is,
in plants that are highly unionized and have a
strong union network. This does not imply,
however, that the union can be assured of
willingness to take action in such plants. This
only refers to the potential which may be
mobilized. A campaignthat does not go well,
counterpropaganda,and setbacks can also
crush willingnessto take action in such plants.
The negotiationsof 1979were a vivid example
of this.
DISCUSSION
The theory formulatedin this paper aims at a
break with both the traditional social-
psychologicalapproachesto social movements
and the neglect of social-psychological
MOBILIZATIONAND PARTICIPATION 597
Table 6. The Strengthof the TradeUnion, the Expected Reactionsof Colleagues,the Fear for a Worsened
Position, and the Expected Number of Participantsin the Three Plants
Trade Expects Positive Fears for a Expects
Level of Union Reactions of Worsened Very Many
Organization Network Colleaguesa Positiona Participantsb
Enka-Emmen 65% + 60% 32% 39%
Enka-Ede 30% - 23% 59% 5%
AKZO-Pharma-Oss 15% + 25% 59% 5%
a Expectanciesof participationin militantaction. Mean
percentagesfrom the series of interviews.
b
Expectanciesof participationin militantaction. Highest percentage.

analyses by resource mobilization theory. not participate in a social movement unless

Contraryto the traditionalsocial-psychological
approach,participationin a social movementis
assumedto be rational.The emphasisis not on
personality characteristics or psychological
states, but on the psychological process of
weighingcosts and benefits. One of the objec-
tions to the traditionalapproachis that it de-
fines participationas tension release, and thus
it does not matterin which movementa person
participates. In the theory presented in this
article it does. Participationis seen as a ra-
tionalchoice in the situationas the person per-
ceives it, and as a way to obtain desired out-
comes. In the eyes of the participant,partici-
pation is a means of reachingvalued goals.
These goals and theirrelationto factors such
as relative deprivation and frustration have
been the subject of much discussion in social-
movement literature. Resource mobilization
has ruled this discussion out of order without
solving the problem. The theory developed in
this articleattemptsto reconcilethe social psy-
chological and resource mobilization ap-
proaches in this respect. Feelings of relative
deprivationor frustrationdo not necessarily
evoke agreementwith the goals of a movement
which pretendsto remedy these feelings: goals
have to be perceived as instrumentalto the
eliminationof these feelings. The research re-
sults support the validity of this argument.
Theoreticalemphasismust thereforeshift from
relative deprivation to the perceived instru-
mentalityof the collective good for the elimi-
nation of relative deprivation. Such percep-
tions do not originatespontaneously.Consen-
sus mobilizationis needed for this. Campaigns
are needed which explain the situation and
make clear why the collective good will bring
relief (cf. Schwartz, 1976).Agreementwith the
goals of the movement does not necessarily
lead to participation:a person may doubt
whether participationwill help to achieve the
goals, social and/orrewardmotives may be too
negative.
Theoriesthat stress the rationalityof partici-
pation in a social movementhave to solve the
problemof the dilemmaof collective behavior.
As Olson (1977)stated it, rationalpersons will
selective incentives motivate them to do so.
Resource mobilizationtheory does not really
solve that problem. Concepts like ideological
incentives (Gamson, 1975; Carden, 1978),
feelings of solidarity (Gamson and Fireman,
1979) or responsibility(Fleishman, 1980), the
perceived indispensability of an individual's
contribution (Tolbert, 1981), differences be-
tween action forms in vulnerabilityto free rid-
ing (Gamsonand Fireman, 1979;Oliver, 1980),
different production functions (Oberschall,
1980; Oliver et al., 1983), or thresholds
(Granovetter, 1978) do not really touch the
heartof the matter,which is-that persons have
to decide at a point when they do not know
whether others will participate.20 This article
argues that the problem can be solved on a
social-psychologicallevel. Since people have
expectations about others' behavior, they can
formulate their "own" production functions.
As the evidence presented demonstrates,this
production function heavily influences the
willingnessto participate.On a collective level,
the expectation that others will participate
works as a self-fulfillingprophecy. Counterto
Olson's argument,a collective good can moti-
vate persons to participatein a social move-
ment if they expect that others will also par-
ticipate.
'Moreover,if the expectancy componentis a
little larger than zero, a collective motive to
participatecan exist if the collective good is
valuedhighly(cf. Oberschall,1980).If a person
comes from a supportive social background
(positive social motive) then there can be quite
a few nonsocialcosts of participation(negative
rewardmotive) before the balance turnsto the
negative. Oliver et al.'s (1983) theoretical no-
20 Pinard (1983) arrived at the same conclusion.
Using an expectancy-valueframework,Pinardtried
to solve the problem primarilyby expanding the
value componentwith moralobligationas a separate
force. He mentioned expectancy of success as a
factorbut did not elaborateit in detail. In contrastto
Pinard,the solutionhere is soughtin the expectancy
component by introducing "expectations about
others' behavior"as a separatefactor.

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 598
tions about the differentproductionfunctions
that characterizethe relationshipbetween in-
dividual contribution,the number of partici-
pantsand the productionof the collective good
are not invalidatedby this argument.In par-
ticular, their hypotheses concerning the dif-
ferentialmobilizabilityof people dependingon
the partof a functionthat is relevantfor them
still stand. We must keep in mind, however,
that individualsconstruct their own functions
based on their expectations; although these
expectationsneed not be real, they are real in
their consequences.
The evidence presented makes it clear that
such expectations, in combinationwith selec-
tive costs and benefits, are of greatimportance
for the choice a person makes among alterna-
tive forms of action. For instance, in the eyes
of some respondentsthe goal could be reached
by moderateaction. Why shouldthey take the
higherrisks of militantaction? For those who
did not believe moderateactionto be effective,
it did not make much sense to accept the costs
of such action. They preferredto participatein
militant action, even though the perceived
costs were higher.
People's expectations are based on past ex-
periences. In a mobilization campaign a
movementorganizationtries to influencethese
expectations. Resource mobilization theory
has used the mobilizationconcept in a rather
unspecific way. By makingthe distinctionbe-
tween consensus and action mobilizationwe
separatedthe processes of convincing and ac-
tivating. The researchresults on the spreadof
knowledge and the beliefs about the instru-
mentalityof shorterworkingtime showed the
importanceof consensus mobilizationas a sep-
arate process. Schwartz(1976)made a similar
distinctionbetween "ignorancereduction"and
"organizational disciplinization." The im-
portance of such distinctions is that they
specify convincing and activating as two dif-
ferent processes with different determinants.
In yet another way, research on mobilization
would do well,to specify mobilizationefforts.
Attemptsto influencedifferentmotives require
different efforts. Influencing the collective
motive demands consensus mobilization for
the collective good, but also attemptsto influ-
ence the expectations about the behavior of
others, the probabilityof success, and the indi-
vidual contributionto the probabilityof suc-
cess. For instance, by means of tryouts it can
be proved that others will participate.This is a
delicate affair, because one can make persons
believe that enough people will participateand
that their participationis not necessary. Inten-
sifying social motives requires influencing a
person's social environment. Social networks
(Snow et al., 1980) and mobilizationen bloc
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
(Oberschall, 1973) are important in this re-
spect. Influencing reward motives demands
manipulationof rewardsand punishments,for
instance, by creating organizations that can
help victims, decreaserisks or collect money in
supportof activists (cf. Morris, 1981).
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