Olja Čokorilo, Gianluca Dell'Acqua

AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)

TECHNIQUES
AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) TECHNIQUES
Olja Čokorilo, Assistant Professor
Department of Air Transport, Faculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering, University of
Belgrade, Vojvode Stepe 305, Belgrade, Serbia, e-mail: oljav@sf.bg.ac.rs
Gianluca Dell'Acqua, Assistant Professor
Department of Civil, Construction and Environmental Engineering, University of Napoli
Federico II, Via Claudio 21, I-80125 Naples, Italy, e-mail: gianluca.dellacqua@unina.it

ABSTRACT
Hazard identification is very important for safety management system (SMS) implementation process.
In aviation industry practice, hazards may be identified through a data-driven (quantitative)
methodology or qualitative process such as discussions, interviews and brainstorming and can be
grouped into three generic families: natural hazards, technical hazards and economic hazards. Since
the scope of hazards in aviation is wide, this paper develops a quantitative methodology for assessing
aviation hazards during the aircraft usual daily operations. The methodology is developed by
estimating all related hazardous factors by their occurrence placement, nature and specific components
related to timing, sequencing and mutual dependency. The use of the proposed methodology allows
investigation of aviation safety factors and flexible assessment of aviation hazards. The results
demonstrate that the proposed methodology has the potential of becoming very useful in practice
facing further generalization of hazard identification process.
Keywords: Safety; Risk; Hazard, Aircraft

1 INTRODUCTION

Aviation industry defines hazard identification and safety risk management as the core
processes involved in the management of safety. Traditional system safety is based on the
consequences and the safety implications of technical aspects and particular components of
the system under considerations whilst contemporary safety management recognizes system
safety based on hazard identification and safety risk management as a key driver in aviation
system design and operation issues which also includes the role of human factor.
The concept of safety in aviation may have different connotations like freedom from
hazards or no accident (Waikar and Nichols, 1997). Therefore it is important to understand
and identify those factors which cause or are likely to cause harm. Contemporary methods
vary from statistical and trend analysis to cost analysis. The paper describes brainstorm
methodology for conducting organizational factors which could cause serious incident or
accident. Described case study which is based on everyday aircraft operations, demonstrated
the methodology process. Nowadays, researches related to hazards in aviation or hazard
methodologies implementation widely consider risk assessment as a part of safety
management system process (Čokorilo et al., 2011a; Hurst et al. 1996; Lee, 2006; Shyur,
2008; Lawrence and Gill, 2007; Oztekin and Luxhoj, 2010). Decades of psychological and
social scientific research have shown that the everyday processes of risk perception and risk
evaluation rely on entirely different models to subjectively assess risks (Plattner et al., 2006;
Paternòand and Santoro, 2002).

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AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
TECHNIQUES

2 HAZARDS IN AVIATION

The scope of hazards existing in aviation activities is very wide since aviation
environment is bounded by man-machine relationship. There are several most used hazard
definitions in aviation. According to (FAA, 2006), a hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite
to an accident or incident. According to (EUROCONTROL, 2001) a hazard is any condition,
event, or circumstance which could induce an accident. Hazards can be grouped into three
generic families: natural hazards, technical hazards and economic hazards.
Aviation industry recognized hazard identification as the process used to determine all
possible situations, events and circumstances that may expose people to injury, illness, disease
or death or may cause damage or loss of equipment and property, or damage to the
environment. For example, well-known SHEL model generally describes relationship
between software (S), hardware (H), environment (E) and liveware (L) include into all
aviation activities. Therefore, hazard identification is necessary for understanding hazard
treats from human actions, procedures, system design factors, regulatory and organizational
factors, defences, etc. Hazard identification and safety risk management, are the core
processes involved in the management of safety (ICAO, 2009). The complete elimination of
risk in aviation operations obviously is an unachievable and impractical goal (being perfectly
safe means to stop all aviation activities and to ground all aircraft). As not all risks can be
removed, nor are all possible risk mitigation measures economically practical. In other words,
it is accepted that there will be some residual risk of harm to people, property or environment,
but this is considered to be acceptable or tolerable by the responsible authority and the society
(Čokorilo et al., 2010; Čavka and Čokorilo, 2012).

3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS

Hazard identification (FAA, 2000): the hazard analyses and assessments required in the
plan shall identify the safety risks associated with the system or operations under evaluation.
Nowadays, different methods and tools are used in safety analysis: statistical analysis, trend
analysis, normative comparisons, simulation and testing, expert panel, cost-benefit analysis.
All mentioned methods for hazard identification generally could be selected into two possible
groups: 1) Reactive hazard identification methods where hazards are recognized through
investigation of safety occurrences and trend monitoring; 2) Proactive hazard identification
methods where hazards are identified analyzing systems’ performance and functions for
intrinsic threats and potential failures. The most commonly applied proactive methods are the
safety assessments, operational safety audits, safety monitoring, etc. In order to obtain
different techniques toolbox (FAA/EUROCONTROL, 2007) defined inventory of over 500
techniques. More popular techniques are: Air-MIDAS; Air Safety Database; ASRS (Aviation
Safety Reporting System); Bias & Uncertainty Assessment; Bow-Tie Analysis; CCA
(Common Cause Analysis); Collision Risk Models; ETA (Event Tree Analysis); External
Events Analysis; FAST (Future Aviation Safety Team) Method; FMECA (Failure Modes
Effects and Criticality Analysis); FTA (Fault Tree Analysis); Future Flight Central; HAZOP
(Hazard and Operability study); HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction
Technique); HERA (Human Error in ATM); HTA (Hierarchical Task Analysis); HTRR
(Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution); Human Error Database; Human Factors Case;
PDARS (Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System); SADT (Structured Analysis and
Design Technique); SAFSIM (Safety in Simulations); SIMMOD Pro; TOPAZ accident risk
assessment methodology; TRACER-Lite; Use of Expert Judgment.

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Olja Čokorilo, Gianluca Dell'Acqua
AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
TECHNIQUES
Generally, hazard identification methods are used for safety factors identification. These
factors are measured against more subjective standards and might be more difficult to
quantify. Theoretically, safety factors are those most closely correlated with accidents and
include casual factors such as (Wells et al., 2003): personnel capabilities (pilots, controllers,
etc.); air traffic environment; aircraft capabilities (Čokorilo, 2011b); weather; unpredictable
acts. The following case study presents mixture of all mentioned factors and could be used as
a good practice for hazard identification process.

4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION CASE STUDY

The presented case study considers problem of runway incursion. The problem describes
proactive tool related not only to mentioned case study but to every similar aircraft operations.
A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle,
person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard, or results in a loss of required
separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or intending to land
(Krause, 2003). The FAA four year study between 1997 and 2000 which included the over
450 towered airports in the U.S. National Airspace System resulted by the number of airport
operations neared 266 million with a reported 1 369 runway incursions.
The scenario presented below is based on international airport three-phase construction
project. This is a construction project to repave one of the two crossing runways at an
international airport with approximate 100 000 movements a year (Fig. 1).

Figure 1: International Airport Layout

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Olja Čokorilo, Gianluca Dell'Acqua
AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
TECHNIQUES
Based on initial airport layout, scope of construction works are defined into three phases
as it is shown on Fig. 2. Assumptions for the runway utilization during the construction work
are: 1) Continuous utilization of RWY 18-36 during the three-phase construction project; 2)
RWY 18-36 length is 3 850 m and the distance available from threshold RWY 18 to
intersection RWY 09-27 is 2 600 m; 3) Information must be provided to airport users.
Phase 1 includes: 1) Extend the length of RWY 09-27 by 900 meters westward and width
from 30 to 45 meters from a point 100 m from the intersection with RWY 18-36, and
strengthen the runway extension (from asphalt to concrete) to increase its Pavement
Classification Number (PCN); 2) Extend the length of TWY Delta by 900 meters westward;
3) Estimated time to complete the work: seven months.
Phase 2 includes: 1) Construct and enlarge new threshold entrance and holding zone at
TWY Charlie; 2) Extend the width of RWY 09-27 from 30 to 45 meters and strengthen (from
asphalt to concrete) this part of the runway up to a point 200 m before intersection TWY A-B
to increase its PCN; 3) Estimated time to complete the work: five months.
Phase 3 includes: 1) Complete the construction work of RWY 09-27 for the central area
of the last 350 m at the intersection of RWY 09-27 and RWY 18-36 (from asphalt to
concrete), increase its width from 30 to 45 meters and its PCN; 2) Estimated time to complete
the work: two months.

Figure 2: International Airport Construction Work Layout

4.1 Results
The presented case study was used for hazard identification. Author used brainstorming
techniques for listing possible hazards avoiding possible misunderstanding between hazard

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Olja Čokorilo, Gianluca Dell'Acqua
AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
TECHNIQUES
and risk differences (Table 1). Described case study presents overall methodology for hazard
identification which is based on following steps:
 list type of operation or activity;
 state the generic hazard (hazard statement);
 identify specific components of the hazard.
Analyzed sample was done based on conducting the analysis per phase of construction.
This principle allowed systematic approach which ensures hidden hazard identification.

Table 1: Hazard Identification

State the generic
N Type of operation or
hazard (hazard Identify specific components of the hazard
º activity
statement)
- Increased volume of traffic;
Air traffic - Separation issues;
considerations - Runway congestion;
1 Air Traffic Services
associated with single - Controller workload;
runway operation. - Changed departure and arrival flight
procedures;
- Vehicles crossing runway in use;
- Staff movements;
- Not removed construction materials and
2 Construction works Airport reconstruction
equipment;
- Access into prohibited airport areas;
- Failure to comply with the deadlines;
- Movements within construction works area;
Air traffic
- Exiting into closed runway;
considerations
- Use of closed taxiways;
associated with runway
3 Take off - Available take off distance reduction;
closure and available
- Changed procedures;
take off distance
- Take-off Weight – TOW limitations for
reduction
particular airliners;
Air traffic
- Use of closed runway;
considerations
- Available landing distance reduction;
associated with runway
4 Landing - Changed procedures;
closure and available
- Landing Weight – LW limitations for
landing distance
particular airliners;
reduction
- Airport equipment and vehicles movements
Movements of handling
within construction works area;
and landing vehicles
- Vehicle crossing runway in use;
- Inadequate marking of closed airport areas
(construction works areas);
Airport activities
5 Airport signalization - Inadequate marking of maneuvering areas;
- Inadequate marking of relocated threshold;
- Inadequate light signalization;
- Increased number and time delays due to the
Runway closure capacity reduction and weather conditions (crosswind);
- Rerouted flights into alternative airports;
- Not proceeded NOTAM and other relevant
Communication
Information on airport information about the changed conditions at the
6 issues associated with
duty plans airport;
ATC and airlines
- Navigation charts changes;
Increasing number of
Aircraft operations - Increased noise, emissions and complete
7 operations per single
departures/arrivals environmental impact;
runway

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Olja Čokorilo, Gianluca Dell'Acqua
AVIATION HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION USING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
TECHNIQUES
The importance of hazard identification lies in fact that well defined hazards are the basis
for safety risks measurement. Safety risk is defined as the assessment, expressed in terms of
predicted probability and severity, of the consequences of a hazard, taking as reference the
worst foreseeable situation. In reality one generic hazard could lead to variety of risks with
different probability and severity. For example “Not removed construction materials and
equipment” described in activity number 2 is a typical hazard, while possible risks are:
aircraft crash into equipment or facility; foreign objects ingestion into aircraft engine; FOD
(foreign object damage). All noted risks are critical. If one could evaluate hazard and its
circumstances (risks) then organization (airport, airline, ATM, etc.) would be able to make
priority measures to bring defined risks into green or yellow zones, instead of red one. It
means that good safety policy based on hazard identification could bring the organization
operating in safety zone which is based on risk elimination or mitigation within acceptable
limits.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this research was to establish an analytic methodology that uses data on
organizational processes to quantify the aviation hazards which are caused by aircraft
everyday operations during the airport construction works period. The use of the proposed
methodology allows investigation of aviation safety factors and flexible assessment of
aviation hazards. The results demonstrate that the proposed methodology has the potential of
becoming very useful in practice facing further generalization of hazard identification.

Acknowledgements
This paper is based on the project TR36027: „Software development and national
database for strategic management and development of transportation means and
infrastructure in road, rail, air and inland waterways transport using the European transport
network models“ which is supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the
Republic of Serbia (2011-2014).

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TECHNIQUES
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