DEVORAH E. BARDILLON V.

BARANGAY MASILIOF CALAMBA, LAGUNA

GR No. 146886 APRIL 30, 2003

FACTS:
The root of this present petition is the controversy surrounding the two complaints for eminent domain filed by
respondent Barangay Masili to expropriate a144-square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot 4381-D, owned by
the petitioners. The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose
hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. The first complaint for eminent domain, entitled Barangay Masili, Calamba,
Laguna v. Emelita A.Reblara, Eugenia Almazan and Devorah E. Bardillon,was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.
However,the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the purchase price of Php 200,000 so it was dismissed
due to the lack of interest of the petitioner land owners. The second complaint for eminent domain, entitled Brgy. Masili,
Calamaba, Laguna v. Devorah E.Bardillon, was filed before the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner, by way of motion to
dismiss, opposed this complaint by alleging that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that respondent caused of action is
barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. However, the RTC ruled in favor of Barangay Masili
holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. This was also affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case

RULING:
No, the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case. An expropriation suit does not
involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to
take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial
courts. In the case of Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor explained that the subject of an expropriation suit
is the government exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, the value
of property to be expropriated, the just compensation that the court is duty bound to determine, is only incidental to the
expropriation suit. The amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. Verily,
the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano was decided during the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 which
provides that the Courts of first instance, forerunners of RTC, had the original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. To summarize, an expropriation suit is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is the governments exercise
of eminent domain--- a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC APRIL 24, 2012 Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011
FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI
and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative
facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual
land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after
which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE:

Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21,
1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has held in this motion to clarify that they maintain their November 22, 2011 decision
regarding the date of taking and reiterates their decision.
 [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands
in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice
of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the
date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian
court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GALLEGO

GR NO 173226 JULY 29, 2013
FACTS:

In this case, the court rule on the amount of just compensation due respondents Manuel O. Gallego, Jr., Joseph
L. Gallego, and Christopher L. Gallego for the 120-hectare portion, more or less, of their property situated in Barangays
Sta. Rita and Concepcion, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, placed under the government’s land reform program under
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).

Respondents Manuel O. Gallego, Jr., Joseph L. Gallego and Christopher L. Gallego are the co-owners of
several parcels of agricultural lands. Sometime in 1972, the DAR placed a portion of the property under the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). However, the DAR and respondents failed to agree on the amount of just
compensation, prompting respondents to file on 10 December 1998 a petition before the RTC of Cabanatuan City.

Petitioner LBP filed an answer, averring that only 76.8324 hectares and not 89.5259 hectares as was alleged in
the petition were placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 and that just compensation should be determined based on
an Average Gross Production of 65 cavans and/or 56.6 cavans per hectare which were the values at the time of taking
of the property. During the course of the hearing of the petition, the coverage of respondents’ lands had expanded to a
bigger area. In order to conform to the increase in the area placed under agrarian reform, respondents filed on 14
October 2002 an amended petition, stating that as certified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, 122.8464 hectares of the property had already been placed under the operation of P.D. No. 27.
After the pre-trial conference, the trial court issued an Order dated 08 November 2002, embodying the agreed
stipulation that the property placed under agrarian reform had an area of 120 hectares, more or less x x x. In a
Supplemental Pre-Trial Order dated 25 November 2002, the trial court stated that in view of the parties’ agreement that
the property was irrigated and had an area of 120 hectares, the only factual issue to be resolved would be the correct
Average Gross Production x x x on which just compensation would be fixed.

April 30, 2009 Report, the CA recommended alternative solutions for computing the disputed just compensation.

• LV = Land Value

• CNI = Capitalized Net Income

• CS = Comparable Sales

• MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.

Since DAR A.O. No. 05-98 provides for alternate formulae depending on the presence, relevance and
applicability of the indicated factors, the LBP and the respondents arrived at significantly divergent amounts for land
value when the presence, relevance and applicability of the indicated factors were differently appreciated.

ISSUE:

Which computation should be used in determining just compensation?

HELD:

The court held after considering both parties’ respective arguments, the court adopt the basic formula

"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)."

 In the present case, the court deem all three factors of CNI, CS and MV "relevant and applicable" for, as the
CA observed, has substantially complied with the prescribed formula. In disregarding the computation proposed by the
LBP, the CA found inapplicable the data necessary to compute the CNI because they pertained to different locations
and calendar years. Nevertheless, in offering the second alternative, which used the prescribed basic formula, the CA
essentially pointed out that the data necessary for determining the CS were equally inapplicable, as they did not
comply with the requirements. If we were to strictly apply the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 05-98 and disregard
both the CNI and CS factors to be equally flawed, then the only present, relevant and applicable factor left is MV,
which, when used following the third alternate formula "LV = MV x 2," will significantly reduce the just compensation to an
absurd amount. Clearly, we cannot support this, as our agrarian reform laws never intended to deprive landowners of
their property without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from the owner. In several cases, we emphasized that to be "just," the compensation must be real, substantial, full and
ample.