G.R. No.
L-30887 December 24, 1971
FELIPE RAYMUNDO, CESAR OBLIGACION, and PEDRO GARCIA, who
died during the pendency of their appeal in the Honorable Court of Appeals,
succeeded by his widow, TRINIDAD ALTESA and his children AMBROCIO,
ENGRACIA, RUFINA, AMPARO, DOMINADOR and PABLO, all surnamed
GARCIA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
FELICIANO FELIPE, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29754 December 24, 1971
FELIPE RAYMUNDO, PEDRO GARCIA and CRISPULO FELIPE, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
FELICIANO FELIPE, FAUSTINA CONTRERAS, ANA SALONGA,
ERNESTO SALONGA, GABRIEL DIONISIO, ARTURO S. FELIPE,
MATIAS SANTOS, AMBROCIO R. CRUZ, CONRADO FAUSTINO,
ALFREDO C. VILLANUEVA, SIMEON B. SAMSON, BRIGIDA V.
SAMSON, and SAN FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, INC., defendants-appellees.
L-30887
A. D. Dasalla for petitioners-appellants.
C. de los Santos for respondent-appellee.
L-29754
A. D. Dasalla for plaintiffs-appellants.
C. de los Santos for defendants-appellees Feliciano Felipe et al.
Feria, Feria, Lugtu & La'O for defendant-appellee San Francisco del Monte, Inc.
MAKASIAR, J.:
In their brief which is partly quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. No. 35640-R, (pp. 39-43, rec. of L-30887), petitioners-appellants in L-30887,
who are also plaintiffs-appellants in L-29754, claim that the factual background of
these two cases now before US, is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Lot 3 is owned possessed, and occupied by the defendant Felipe
Raymundo who is paying taxes thereon while Lot 2, same block,
belongs to the defendant Pedro Garcia. Both defendants have their
respective houses thereon and have been living and residing
therein for more than thirty (30) years each.
xxx xxx xxx
Before the last World War, the Filipino employees of the San
Francisco del Monte, Inc. organized fromexclusively among
themselves a mutual aid association which they named "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid." The plaintiff and the two defendants abovenamed were
among the members of that association.
xxx xxx xxx
With its funds, the association purchased lots from the San
Francisco del Monte, Inc. for resale to its members on the
installment plan. Among the lots acquired by the said association
are the two now in question. In turn, Lot 3 was purchased from the
association by the herein defendant Felipe Raymundo while Lot 2
was bought by the defendant Pedro Garcia. Both were able to
complete paying their respective lots before the aforesaid World
War broke out. Not long after completing payments, the said war
begun.
xxx xxx xxx
This state of facts was known to the plaintiff Feliciano Felipe. He
knew the defendants very well as they have been neighbors in San
Francisco del Monte since boyhood; they had been co-workers in
San Francisco del Monte Subdivision and they have been co-
members in the association "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid". He knew also
very well the two lots in question; he knew that the said lots have
been purchased and fully paid for by the defendants. But he knew
very well too that the said defendants have not as yet acquired their
respective certificates of title over their respective lots.
His knowledge of all these facts nurtured in him a selfish desire to
appropriate the said lots for his own benefit. He devised fraudulent
means to accomplish his knave purpose. How did he do it?
For Lot 3, Block 159, which belongs to the defendant Felipe
Raymundo, the plaintiff-appellee employed the following devise:
He gathered a group of his close relatives and friends, such as his
own wife Faustina Contreras, his sister Ana Salonga, brother-in-
law Ernesto Salonga, his nephews and trusted friend who willingly
connived with him and all of them made it appear in public
instrument denominated "Deed of Quitclaim" that the were all pre-
war members — even if they were not — of the association
"Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" and in that instrument they allegedly
quitclaimed to and in favor of the plaintiff Felicia Felipe their
supposed rights, interests, and participation in the said Lot 3, Block
159.
xxx xxx xxx
For Lot 2, Block 159, which belongs to the defendant Pedro
Garcia, the herein plaintiff contrived a different cunning scheme as
follows: In another public instrument captioned "Deed
Assignment" the said plaintiff allegedly as President of the
association "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" allegedly assigned to his willing
tool Alfredo G. Villanueva, the said Lot 2, Block 159.
xxx xxx xxx
Armed with the "Deed of Assignment" and the "Deed Quitclaim",
Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo G. Villanueva, as
plaintiffs, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch IV) an action for specific performance, docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-6882, of the said Court, against the San
Francisco del Monte, Inc., wherein the title to the two lots in
question then still resided, to compel the said corporation to
convey to the first (Feliciano Felipe) Lot 3, Block 159; and to the
second (Alfredo G. Villanueva) Lot 2, the same block;
The defendants in the present ease, Felipe Raymundo and Pedro
Garcia owners, of Lots 3 and 2, respectively, were not parties in
that action despite the fact that the plaintiff therein well knew that
those lots are owned by the said Raymundo and Garcia and knew
well that they have been in possession of their respective lots for
more than 30 years already to the present; nor did these two ever
acquire edge of the institution and prosecution of the said action
until they have been brought to Court in the present case; they
were thus never in a position to protect their respective rights in
that action;
The decision rendered in the said case ordered the defendant
therein, San Francisco del Monte, Inc. to convey Lot 3, Block 159
to the plaintiff Feliciano Felipe and Lot 2, same block, to the
plaintiff Alfredo G. Villanueva, the dispositive portion of the
decision reading as follows: (N.B. — this decision was rendered on
March 14, 1963; p. 6, Petition for Review)
WHEREFORE, this Court finding that all the
material allegations of the complaint have been
substantiated, hereby orders the defendant (a) to
execute the necessary final deeds of sale for Lot
No. 20, Block 82, and Lot No. 3, Block 159, of
the San Francisco del Monte Subdivision for the
consideration of 1 peso per square meter leading
to the issuance of separate titles in favor of
plaintiff Feliciano Felipe ... (b) another final
deed of sale and title for the same consideration
of 1 peso per square meter for Lot No. 2, Block
159, in favor of plaintiff Alfredo G. Villanueva,
married to Pura C. Villanueva, 2226-A Narra,
Manila upon payment of the amount of P25.00
for each lot and without pronouncement as to
costs.
The required deeds of conveyance were executed by the defendant
San Francisco del Monte, Inc., as ordered in the decision. Pursuant
to the said deeds, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No: 68207 to Feliciano Felipe for Lot
3, Block 159, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 68296 to
Alfredo G. Villanueva for Lot 2, same block.
Feliciano Felipe then mortgaged Lot 3, Block 159, to the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Rizal for P3,500.00, which mortgage is still in
full force and effect to this day;
Felipe's tool, Alfredo G. Villanueva, transferred back to the said
Felipe Lot 2, Block 159 and the Register of Deeds for Quezon City
issued Transfer Certificate No. 70981 for the said lot, in the name
of the said Feliciano Felipe, who, in turn sold same to the spouses
Simeon B. Samson and Brigida V. Samson who bought the same
 from Felipe even if they knew that the said lot belongs to the
herein defendant Pedro Garcia who is in possession of the same for
over thirty years already;
Then after the lapse of 104 days from the sale of Lot 2, Block 159
to the spouses Samsons, Feliciano Felipe, who was no longer the
owner of the said Lot 2, if the sale to the Samsons were genuine
and true, nevertheless, instituted the present action for the recovery
of the possession of the said lot from the herein defendant Pedro
Garcia, on the theory that he is still the owner of the said Lot 2, ...
(pp. 11-29, Brief of Defendants-Appellants in CA G.R. No. 35640;
p. 28, rec., L-30887, emphasis supplied).
G.R. No. L-30887
This is a petition for review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
35640-R, affirming in toto the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance Of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch IV) in Civil Case No. Q-7668.
After securing titles in his name pursuant to the decision of the trial judge of Branch
IV of the Quezon City Court First Instance as above intimated, respondent-appellee
defendant-appellee Feliciano Felipe filed on November 27, 1963 a complaint for the
recovery of possession (accion publiciana of two parcels of land with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IV (Civil Case Q-7668), and prayed,
among others, that herein petitioner appellants (defendants in the lower court), who
have been illegally occupying since 1953 and 1955, be ordered to vacate, Lots Nos. 2
and 3, Block 159, San Francisco Subdivision, covered by transfer certificates of title
nos. 70981 and 68207, respectively, of the Office of the Register Deeds of Quezon
City (pp. 1-5, rec. on appeal).
On December 19, 1963, defendants filed their answer denying the material
allegations of the complaint, and alleging that they are the true owners of the lots
respectively occupied by them (lot No. 2 by defendant Pedro Garcia and lot No. 3 by
defendant Felipe Raymundo), having bought the same from "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid,"
its former owner, and that in 1963 they entered into the possession of the same
peacefully and with the full knowledge and consent of "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" (pp. 6-
8, rec. on appeal).
On July 3, 1964, defendants filed a motion for leave amend their answer alleging that
plaintiff perpetrated fraud in securing the certificates of title covering said lots, and
as the answer does not allege the fraud with suffice fullness and particularity, said
answer needs to be amended.
Also on the same day, July 3, 1964, defendant Pedro Garcia filed a motion for leave
to file a third-party complaint against one Simeon B. Samson as a buyer in bad faith
of lot no. 2, attaching to said motion a true copy the deed of sale of August 15, 1963,
executed by vendors spouses Feliciano Felipe and Faustina Contreras in favor of
vendees-spouses Simeon Samson and Brigida Samson (pp. 12-19, rec. on appeal).
On July 6, 1964, the defendants' two motions hereinabove mentioned were both
orally and simultaneously denied, the trial court ruling that the certificates of title
being relied upon by the plaintiff cannot be attacked collaterally but only by means
of a separate action to that effect. The court directed that the trial proceed at that very
moment as scheduled, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration of the ruling met
the same fate. As trial could not be finished that day, continuance thereof was set for
the next day, July 7, 1964, despite defendants' plea for postponement of the trial to a
later date to afford them time to file a separate action for annulment of title or
reconveyance as ruled (pp. 19-20, rec. on appeal).
On July 7, 1964, defendants instituted their separate action, Civil Case No. Q-8114
of the same court, for annulment of title or reconveyance of the lots in question.
When the continuation of the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-7668 was called that
morning, defendants moved that said hearing be held in abeyance, to be consolidated
with the action just instituted. This motion for consolidation of trial was denied, trial
proceeded as scheduled, and was continued on July 8, 1964, when said trial was
terminated and Civil Case No. 7668 was submitted for decision (p. 20, rec. on
appeal).
On July 20, 1964, defendants filed a motion to hold the instant case in abeyance until
after the action for annulment or reconveyance should have been terminated and
disposed of, alleging that "... there is therefore that necessity ... because, should the
defendants be now ordered to vacate the premises in question but will later succeed
in annulling plaintiff's title or in having the lots reconveyed to them, irreparable
injuries would have been unnecessarily inflicted upon them ..." (pp. 21-23, rec. on
appeal).
On July 25, 1964, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to hold in abeyance,
alleging that said motion is merely dilatory, that the claim of defendants over the lots
in question is without any legal or factual basis, and that it is contrary to the
constitutional precept of speedy administration registration of justice (pp. 24-31, rec.
on appeal).
On July 27, 1964, defendants filed their rejoinder plaintiff's opposition to their
motion to hold in abeyance (pp. 31-26, rec. on appeal).
On August 12, 1964, defendants filed a motion to drop defendant Pedro Garcia from
the case on the ground plaintiff does not have any cause of action against him
because plaintiff had already sold lot No. 2 and, consequently that cannot be
prejudiced anymore by the possession of said lot by defendant Pedro Garcia (pp. 36-
37, rec. on appeal; Exhibit D).
Finally, on October 18, 1964, the trial court rendered the following decision:
xxx xxx xxx
The defense interposed by the defendants, particularly Felipe
Raymundo and Pedro Garcia, is that they, on the contrary and not
the plaintiff, are the respective owners of Lots 3 and 2 of the San
Francisco del Monte Subdivision, having been purchased from the
mutual loan and savings association "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid"
composed exclusively of employees of the said Francisco del
Monte Subdivision, and to this effect they exhibited the receipts
for installment payment (Exhs. 1, 1-A and 1-B) issued by "Tiyaga
at Pagtitipid" in favor of defendant Felipe Raymundo as well as the
tax declaration and a certificate of tax payment of Lot 3; that said
defendants have been in possession openly, continuously and in
concept of owner for more than 30 years, and that all these fact
were known to the plaintiff as he was their co-employee in the
"Tiyaga at Pagtitipid", reason which they were never asked by him
to vacate the premises in question until he filed the present action.
This being an ejectment case, the Court believes and so hold, that
the only question to be determined is whether the plaintiff is the
registered owner of the lots under litigation whether the defendants
unlawfully entered into possession of said lots. While on one hand,
the plaintiff presented Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 70981
and 68207, which shows that he is the absolute owner of the land
in litigation, the defendants on their part failed to introduce any
evidence or document with color of title. The possession of the
plaintiff is an attribute ownership, and the contention of the
defendants that they purchased said lots from "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid" without having been issued any valid title to the
property, cannot in any way operate to legalize the occupation and
enjoyment thereafter of the premises by said defendants who are
mere intruders in the land. Hence, conformably with an owner's
right to possess his property, plaintiff, as the registered owner, has
the right to possess and enjoy subject land to the exclusion of the
defendants. Their efforts to amend the answer to allege that said
titles were obtained thru fraud, cannot be brought up as an issue in
the present case, this being a mere action for ejectment. That issue
would be brought in an independent action.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants Felipe Raymundo, Cesar
Obligacion and Pedro Garcia, and all persons claiming under them,
ordering said defendants to vacate their respective lots in question
and to remove their houses and other construction therefrom;
ordering the aforesaid defendants to pay such to the plaintiff the
sum of P20.00 per month by way of rentals from the date of their
respective occupation above-fated until the plaintiff is restored to
the possession thereof, plus the amount of P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs ... . (pp. 39-42, rec. on appeal.)
Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, and contended, among sixteen (16)
errors assigned, that the trial court erred in not declaring them to be the true owners
of the disputed lots and "in turning down the repeated requests of the defendants-
appellants for the suspension of the proceedings in the present case in order to
consolidate the trial thereof with that of Civil Case No. Q-8114 of the same court for
the annulment of plaintiff's title over the lots in question, or for reconveyance, the
parties and the subject matter in both cases being the same"
In its decision of May 22, 1969, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court in toto thus:
xxx xxx xxx
From the aforesaid decision, defendants appealed to this Court
assigning several errors. One of the error raises the issue as to
whether or not the lower court was right in turning down the
repeated requests of the defendants-appellants for the suspension
of the proceedings in the present case in order to consolidate with
it the trial of Civil Case No. Q-8114 for the annulment of plaintiff's
title over the lots in question, or for reconveyance.
Essentially the present case is one of ejectment. And so the only
issue here is whether the plaintiff is the registered owner of the lots
in litigation and whether the defendants unlawfully, entered into
the possession of said lots. Plaintiff's ownership of the lots in
dispute is amply proven by Transfer Certificate Title Nos. 70981
and 68207 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
Defendants have nothing to offer and show any color of title on
their part over the disputed lots. They claim they have purchased
said lots from the mutual loan and savings association known as
"Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" but they could not present any Deed of Sale
in their favor. All they have shown to the court are the supposed
receipts for installment payment (Exhs. 1, 1-A and 1-B) issued by
the "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" in favor of the defendant Felipe
Raymundo and the tax declarations and certificate of payment of
tax for Lot No. 3. All these documents are hopelessly inadequate to
defeat the title and right of ownership of plaintiff over the lots
under litigation as evidenced by his certificates of title over the
disputed lots. As registered owner of the same their right to the
possession and enjoyment of the property to the exclusion of all
other persons cannot be questioned. And so even the claim of
defendants that they have been in possession of the lots for a
period of (30) years will prove unavailing to the title of ownership
plaintiff over the lots in dispute. (Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 53 O.G.
No. 2, 373.) For by express provision of Sec. 46 of Act No. 496 no
title to register land in derogation to that of the registered owner
can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
(Corporacion de PP. Recoleto vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil., 427.) It
was therefore no mistake for the lower court to rule out defendants'
claim that their possession of the property for over 30 years has
ripened into title of ownership over the said lots.
But defendants-appellants want to dispute the title of plaintiff-
appellee on the ground of fraud. Note must be taken of the manner
by which the latter acquired his title over the lots under litigation.
In their own brief, defendants-appellants narrated: (as quoted on
pp. 1-5 hereof) ... From defendants-appellants' own brief we can
gather that plaintiff-appellee's acquisition of the lots in question
was pursuant to a judicial decision. If there was anything irregular
or illegal in the manner by which plaintiff-appellee was able to
acquire said lots defendants-appellants should have ventilated the
matter with the court in the same proceedings. It is too late for
them now to question the decision of the court ordering the San
Francisco del Monte, Inc. the former owner of the lots in question,
to convey lot 3, Block 159 to the plaintiff-appellee and Lot 2 of the
same Block to one Alfredo G. Villanueva. Even on the ground of
fraud, they a given a limited period within which to attack the
judgment which defendants-appellants did not take advantage of.
We are not a bit surprised therefore that the lower court refused to
allow defendants-appellants to amend their answer to the plaintiff
appellee's complaint so as to seek the annulment of the title of the
latter to the lots in question.
Defendants-appellants also blame the lower court for denying the
motion of defendant-appellant Pedro Garcia to be dropped from
the action. He claims that no cause of action exists against him
anymore because the plaintiff-appellee had no more title over Lot
No. 2 at the time he instituted the present action. An examination
of the Deed of Sale of Lot 2, Block 159 in favor of Simeon B.
Samson and his wife show that plaintiff-appellee warrants that the
lot is free from all liens and encumbrances, and guarantees the free
and peaceful possession of the same by the vendees. He even
agreed to bear the expenses for the ejectment, removal, and
demolition of any construction whatsoever on the lot, including the
expenses and costs of litigation. With the above-warranty, the
plaintiff-appellee has every right to institute the present action for
ejectment against whoever occupies the lot he said to Simeon B.
Samson and his wife. The lower court therefore committed no
error in not allowing defendant Pedro Garcia to be dropped from
the action of the plaintiff ... (pp. 12-16 and 20-24, rec., L-30887).
Hence, this present appeal by certiorari to this Court.
G.R. No. L-29754
This is an appeal from the order dated June 22, 1967 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch IX) dismissing the complaint of herein plaintiffs-
appellants in Civil Case No. Q-8114.
As heretofore stated, a complaint for annulment of title or reconveyance was filed by
herein appellants (plaintiffs in the lower court) Felipe Raymundo and Pedro Garcia
against herein appellee (defendant in the lower court) Feliciano Felipe on July 7,
1964, which was assigned to Branch IX (pp. 1-9, rec. on appeal).
On August 8, 1964, defendant Feliciano Felipe, on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, filed a motion to dismiss the same (pp. 10-11, rec. on
appeal). An opposition thereto was interposed by plaintiffs on August 15, 1964 (pp.
12-13, rec. on appeal), and on September 28, 1964, the trial court issued an order
denying said motion to dismiss (p. 13, rec. on appeal).
Defendant Feliciano Felipe filed his answer on October 3, 1964 (pp. 14-16, rec. on
appeal), denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting that his
certificates of title over the lots in question were not secured through fraud but
pursuant to court order.
On February 2, 1965, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (pp. 16-40, rec. on
appeal), alleging that they are the true and lawful owners of their respective lots,
having acquired the same from the San Francisco del Monte, Inc., the registered
owner thereof, through their pre-war mutual savings and loan association "Tiyaga at
Pagtitipid", as evidenced by various receipts issued in their favor by said association;
that defendant Feliciano Felipe obtained certificates of title covering said lots in his
own name by two false quit-claim deeds as evidence in obtaining a favorable
decision in Civil Case No. Q-6882 of the Court First Instance of Rizal, entitled
"Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo Villanueva vs. San Francisco del Monte, Inc.", an
action to compel the latter to convey lot No. 3 to Felipe a lot No. 2 to Villanueva;
that afterwards, Alfredo Villanueva transferred back lot Not. 2 to Felipe, who in turn
sold the same to the spouses Simeon and Brigida Samson; and that they were not
made parties and were therefore unaware of and cannot be bound by said Civil Case
No. Q-6882.
On March 27, 1965, defendant Alfredo Villanueva filed his answer denying the
material allegations of the complaint and praying for the dismissal of the same (pp.
41-45, rec. on appeal).
On March 31, 1965, defendants Simeon and Brigida Samson filed their answer,
likewise denying the material delegations of the complaint, and alleging that no
cause of action exists against them (pp. 45-48, rec. on appeal).
On April 3, 1965, defendant San Francisco del Monte, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the complain states no cause of action against it, and the alleged cause
of action is barred by the statute of limitations (pp. 48-54, rec. on appeal).
On April 5, 1965, defendant Conrado Faustino filed his answer denying the material
allegations of the complain and his alleged complicity with defendant Feliciano
Felipe in consummating the alleged fraud (pp. 54-62, rec. appeal).
On April 8, 1965, plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss interposed
by defendant San Francisco del Monte, Inc. (pp. 62-65, rec. on appeal). The trial
court denied said motion in an order dated July 10, 1965 (pp. 65-66, rec. on appeal).
On August 18, 1965, defendant San Francisco del Monte Inc. filed its answer,
alleging affirmative and special defenses, and stating, among other things, that "even
before the Pacific War, in 1934, the said lots were already sold to, and fully paid by,
the "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid" (pp., 66-69, rec. on appeal).
On January 26, 1966, plaintiffs filed a motion to declare defendants Faustina
Contreras, Ana Salonga, Ernesto Salonga, Matias Santos, Ambrocio Cruz, and
Gabriel Dionisio in default for having failed to answer within the reglamentary
period. Accordingly, said defendants were declared in default in an order of the trial
court dated January 28, 1966 (pp. 70-71, rec. on appeal).
Then on June 22, 1967, after a pre-trial but without any trial on the merits, the trial
court issued an order dismissing the complaint, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
When this case was called for pre-trial, counsel for plaintiffs,
inviting the attention of the Court to an order of default against
defendant Feliciano Felipe and several others, manifests that the
only defendants left who now have a standing in Court are
Conrado Faustino, Brigida V. Samson, Simeon B. Samson, San
Francisco del Monte, Inc., and Alfredo Villanueva, all of whom are
represented by counsel today with the exception of Villanueva.
Counsel for San Francisco del Monte, Inc. then manifested that the
subject-matter of this suit has already been the object of a final
judgment by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IV
requiring and ordering the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. to
transfer the property to Feliciano Felipe, and that in consonance
therewith the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. executed a deed of
sale, as a result of which a TCT was issued in the names of
Feliciano Felipe and Alfredo Villanueva. It is also manifested now
that after the title was issued in the names of these two persons,
both of whom are now defendants in this case, Feliciano Felipe
filed a suit of recovery of possession against herein plaintiffs who
were then and still are in possession of the land; that a decision
was rendered in favor of Felipe, and that Felipe Raymundo and the
other defendants in that case have appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and that this appeal is still pending.
In view of these circumstances and facts about which all of the
parties are agreed, the Court feels that it has no jurisdiction to hear
this case it having been decided not only once but twice, by a court
of equal jurisdiction and it being at present the subject of an appeal
(pp. 71-73, rec. on appeal).
A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by plaintiffs on August 7,
1967, was denied by the trial court in an order dated December 8, 1967 (pp. 73-91,
rec. on appeal).
Hence, this present appeal direct to this Court.
1. The trial judge in Civil Case No. Q-7668 grossly exceeded his authority when he
denied the motion of the petitioners or the plaintiffs-appellants to amend their answer
in said case for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) in order to allege with
particularity and precision the defense of fraud in addition to their claim of
ownership over the two lots in question. These defenses of ownership and fraud are
compulsory counter-claims against the pretension of respondent or defendant-
appellee Feliciano Felipe that he owns the two disputed lots as the basis of his right
to recover possession (Gojo vs. Goyala et al., L-26768, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 557,
563-564; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Sanvictores, L-16836, Jan. 30, 1962, 4 SCRA
123).
Counter-claims, other than money claims — which were not permitted by the old
Code of Civil Procedure — are allowed under the rules of court (Sec. 1, Rule 10,
Rules of Court of 1940, Sec. 6, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court of 1964; Matela vs.
Chua Tay, L-16407, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 163, 168-169; Pongos vs. Hidalgo etc.
et al., 47 O.G. 733; Vol. 1, Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 2-
64).
"The object of a counterclaim is to prevent multiplicity of suits by allowing the
determination in one action of the entire controversy between the parties, thus
avoiding inconvenience, expense, waste of the court's time and injustice. A
counterclaim also enables a defendant to make his defense more complete and
effectual than it would be if he stood on one answer alone" (Vol. 1, Martin, Rules of
Court, 1969 ed., p. 274-citing 80 C.J.S. 22; 47 Am. Jur. 712; Merchant's Nat. Bank
vs. Clark Parker Co., 215 Cal. 296; 9 P. (2d.) 826, 81 ALR 778; Hoffman vs.
Maloratsky, 164-A. 260; 112 NJ Eq. 333). The herein petitioners or plaintiffs-
appellants could have been spared so much expense, anxiety and anguish and the
delay in the disposition of the two cases could have been averted if the lower court in
said Civil Case No. Q-7668 correctly appreciated the nature and purpose of the
counter-claims interposed therein as envisioned by the Rules of Court.
In ordering the petitioners to file a separate action for annulment of title or
reconveyance, the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-7668, committed a grave error;
because under the rules the compulsory counterclaim would be barred if not
interposed in the answer (Sec. 4, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court).
2. The grave error committed by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-7668 was
compounded by its refusal to consolidate Civil Case No. Q-7668 with Civil Case No.
Q-8114, which consolidation should have been ordered as allowed under section 1 of
Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court and controlling jurisprudence, immediately
after the institution of Civil Case No. Q-8114 pursuant to the ruling of said trial
court.
Although consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject-
matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes
a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even if filed
with the different branches of the same court of first instance, provided one of such
cases has not been partially tried (PAL et al. vs. Teodoro, et al., G.R. No. L-6698,
Aug. 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 461).
True it is that on July 6, 1964, the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-7668 was commenced
in Branch IV, while Civil Case No. Q-8114 was filed the following day, July 7,
1964, when the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7668 was continued. Although the latter
was assigned to Branch IV of the Rizal Court of First Instance, Quezon City, the trial
judge presiding Branch IV of the same court and trying Civil Case No. Q-7668
should have granted the motion of the counsel for petitioners Felipe Raymundo,
Pedro Garcia and Cesar Obligacion, for a joint hearing by him of the two cases;
because both cases involve the same parties, the same subject-matter (the two
disputed lots), and the same issues of ownership and possession of the two
questioned lots, and are handled by the same lawyers. There can therefore be no
confusion in the presentation of the evidence or in the appreciation of such evidence
or of the witnesses by the same trial Judge hearing both cases. The trial judge
presiding over Branch IX will have no reason to object to such consolidation of the
hearing of the two cases in Branch IV. Such a consolidation of the two cases will
achieve the purpose or rationale of a joint hearing authorized by Rule 31 of the Rules
of Court, namely, to avoid duplication of suits, guard against oppression or abuse,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save
unnecessary costs and expenses, thus attaining justice with maximum speed and with
the least expense and vexation to the litigants. (Palanca vs. Querubin, G.R. No. L-
29510-31, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 739, 745.)
The fact that Civil Case No. Q-7668 was already partly tried on July 6, 1964, should
not justify the refusal of the trial judge in consolidating the same with Civil Case No.
Q-8114, which was filed on July 7, 1964; because the evidence already submitted by
the plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second
case, without further need of retaking the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of the
fact that both cases involve as herein before stated the same parties, the same
subject-matter and the same issues. Pursuant to section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the rules of consolidation should be liberally construed to achieve the
object of the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases. (Palanca vs. Querubin, supra; Sideco vs. Paredes, 74 Phil. 6, 7.)
Consolidation of the two cases might not be proper, if the joint hearing were to be,
conducted by the judge presiding over Branch IX to which Civil Case No. Q-8114
was assigned, under the principle enunciated in the case of PAL vs. Teodoro (supra.);
because the judge presiding over Branch IX was not the one who partly tried Civil
Case No. Q-7668 and therefore did not observe the witnesses who testified on July 6,
1964 in Civil Case No. Q-7668 before the trial judge of Branch IV. But that is not so
in these two cases where precisely Civil Case No. Q-8114 was to be transferred to
Branch IV and consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-7668, which was then already
partly tried by the trial judge presiding over Branch IV of the same Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City.
3. After denying the separate motions of Feliciano Felipe and San Francisco del
Monte, Inc., to dismiss the complaint filed by Felipe Raymundo, Pedro Garcia and
Crispulo D. Felipe in Civil Case No. Q-8114, the trial judge presiding over Branch
IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), after conducting a pre-trial
of said Civil Case No. Q-8114 and without a hearing on the merits, erred in
dismissing said Civil Case No. Q-8114 thru the order dated June 22, 1967 on the
ground that "it has no jurisdiction to hear this case it having been decided not only
once but twice, by a court of equal jurisdiction and it being the subject of an appeal"
referring to Civil Cases Nos. Q-6882 and Q-7668, which are both decided by the trial
judge presiding over Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, with
Civil Case No. Q-7668 having been appealed to the Court of Appeals (now L-30887
before US) by Felipe Raymundo, Pedro Garcia and Cesar Obligacion. It seems that
the trial judge of Branch IX misapprehended the nature and purpose of the complaint
filed by herein appellants Felipe Raymundo, Pedro Garcia and Crispulo Felipe in
Civil Case No. Q-8114. Pursuant to the ruling of the trial judge in Case No. Q-7668
that the herein plaintiffs-appellants should institute a separate action for annulment
or reconveyance, Civil Case No. 8114 was precisely filed by said plaintiffs-
appellants to annul the titles over the two disputed lots, issued in the name of the
defendant Feliciano Felipe and his successors-in-interest Alfredo G. Villanueva,
Simeon B. Samson and Brigida V. Samson on the ground that said titles were
secured fraudulently by said defendant Feliciano Felipe in Civil Case No. Q-6882, in
which the aforesaid plaintiffs were not parties and were not even notified of the
pendency of said Civil Case No. Q-6882. The herein plaintiffs-appellants (in L-
29754) were again denied their day in Court in Civil Case No. Q-8114, for the
simply reason that their complaint was dismissed without giving them the
opportunity to submit evidence to demonstrate their claim of ownership and of fraud
allegedly perpetrated by the herein defendant-appellee Feliciano Felipe in securing
the titles to the two disputed lots, which they allegedly have been possessing since
1933, when they purchased the same from the defendant-appellee San Francisco del
Monte, Inc. thru their association known as "Tiyaga at Pagtitipid," which was their
pre-war mutual savings and loan association composed of employees of the San
Francisco del Monte Subdivision, Inc. The plaintiffs-appellants were vexed by and
exposed to a long and expensive litigation; because thru deceit, Feliciano Felipe
despoiled them of their lots in Civil Case No. Q-6882 in which they were not parties
and about which they were not notified, aggravated by the unjust refusal of the trial
judge presiding over Branch IV to consolidate the hearing of the two Civil Cases
Nos. Q-7668 and Q-8114, with the latter case precisely having been filed pursuant to
the order of said trial judge that any claim for the annulment of the titles of Feliciano
Felipe and for the conveyance of the lots and of the said titles to plaintiffs-appellants
should be thru a separate action. And the unkindest cut of all was the dismissal
without a trial on the merits of said separate action in Civil Case No. Q-8114 by the
presiding judge of Branch IX of the same Court of First substance of Rizal (Quezon
City).

Consequently, the decision dated May 22, 1969 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-7668 (L-30887) should be
reversed, the order dated June 22, 1967 of the trial judge in Civil Case No. Q-8114
(L-29754) should be set aside, and the records of both cases nos. Q-7668 and Q-8114
should be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, if justice were not
to be denied to herein plaintiffs-appellants in G.R. No. L-29754 or petitioners in
G.R. No. L-30887.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 22, 1969 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed; the judgment dated October 18, 1964 of the trial lower court in Civil Case
No. Q-7668 (G.R. No. L-30887) and the order dated June 22, 1967 of the trial court
in Civil Case No. Q-8114 (G.R. No. L-29754) are hereby set aside as null and void;
the records of both civil cases Nos. Q-7668 and Q-8114 are hereby consolidated and
remanded to Branch IV of the Quezon City Court of First Instance; and the trial
judge presiding over said Branch IV is hereby directed to try on the merits Civil Case
No. Q-8114 and to render only one judgment in both Civil Cases Nos. Q-7668 and
Q-8114 to the basis of the evidence submitted in both cases. Costs against
respondent in L-30887 and defendants-appellees in L-29754. So ordered.
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.
MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO
REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that
the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of
said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the
testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is
legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30,
2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in
Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for
probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit,
the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of
PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED. 5 properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6 which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the
Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament
entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" 7 (Will) in the
Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired
Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the
end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested
to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation
clause10 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of
Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties
to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their
children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present
by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby
BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5
unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children,
LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R.
Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio
Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and
KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their
parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the
giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two
children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul
and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with
respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the
wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my
testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s
family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since
his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with
Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an
Order on June 13, 200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On
said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981. 16 The
Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of
two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin positively identified the
Will and her signatures on all its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the
signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding
Judge Limpin’s present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a
stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no
longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her
father can no longer testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed
an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of
Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. 23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores,
Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a
Supplemental Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void
because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to
Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. 27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition 28 asking
the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will
was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that
Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she
was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature of
Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to
be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and
Recommendation29 reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his
stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both
Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and
resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of
the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra.
Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the
age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living
arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the
witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According
to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A
medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in
April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia;
in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death
in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a
mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an
adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without brothers and
sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder
and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of
Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino;
and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo
positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in
the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencia’s signature because he
accompanied her in her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having
used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the
Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-
examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly
after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death. 36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May
21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. 37 She
claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby
allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of
her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his children were staying in the
same house.38 She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s departure
for the USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for
Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see
what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope. 41 However, she
remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs
them.42 A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of
Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. 43 Upon going home,
however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. 44 Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes
leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.45 On cross
examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist,
that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on her personal
assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court. 47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. 48 He identified
the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia
brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with another
document on September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were
shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought
that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, 51 and it was he who
explained that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and
sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will
which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her
death.52 Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why
will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the
only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties.
Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the
documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know
nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign
them."54 After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the
unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981. 55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56 denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b)
disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded
that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient
reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. 58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of
Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that
Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the
state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render
[Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." 59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate
proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound
mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the
allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will. 60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari
ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL
DESPITE RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL
WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will
was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face
of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in
probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its
due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will.
Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of
the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature
of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind
when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution
of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or
forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They
likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that
Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article
799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will.
On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to
the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s house
and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are
truthful and intelligent."69 More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies
on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one
month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that
Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and
as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the
same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the
testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties
from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of
the will and was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper
influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate
of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or
testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon
his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation
between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former
purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated
Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children.
This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for
old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them
as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has
resulted in many family discords between those favored by the testamentary
disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with
Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very
fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad,
even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights the special
bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the
devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners’
allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence,
pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not
supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth
stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and
substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said
allegations.71Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be
shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x
x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those
interested in [the estate of the deceased]." 72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly
executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. –
If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of
wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines
and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity
of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has
been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due
execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of
doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied
from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the
will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will
and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any
competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if
legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby."75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship
with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as
opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-
serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the
Will and its allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the
Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 are AFFIRMED.

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been SO ORDERED.
presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before
the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to
by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer
talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented
the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her
father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At
that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember his
daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father
could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity,
petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor
challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and
purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of
the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of
this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s
testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the
proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be
disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by
evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must
testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by
law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the

parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is
the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that]
ought to be before it that is controlling." 74 "The very existence of [the Will] is in
G.R. No. 173008 February 22, 2012
NENITA GONZALES, SPOUSES GENEROSA GONZALES and RODOLFO
FERRER, SPOUSES FELIPE GONZALES and CAROLINA SANTIAGO,
SPOUSES LOLITA GONZALES and GERMOGENES GARLITOS,
SPOUSES DOLORES GONZALES and FRANCISCO COSTIN, SPOUSES
CONCHITA GONZALES and JONATHAN CLAVE, and SPOUSES
BEATRIZ GONZALES and ROMY CORTES, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT and CO-PETITIONER NENITA
GONZALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO BUGAAY AND LUCY BUGAAY, SPOUSES ALICIA BUGAAY
AND FELIPE BARCELONA, CONEY "CONIE" BUGAAY, JOEY GATAN,
LYDIA BUGAAY, SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA BUGAAY AND REY
PAGATPATAN AND BELEN BUGAAY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 23, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91381 as well
as the Resolution2 dated June 2, 2006 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed Orders3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, dated April 13, 2005 and
August 8, 2005, respectively, in Civil Case No. 16815, denying the demurrer to
evidence filed by herein respondents and instead dismissed petitioners' complaint.
The Facts
The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and Marcelina Tejada ("Spouses Ayad") had
five (5) children: Enrico, Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The
latter, who was single, predeceased his parents on December 4, 1943. Marcelina died
in September 1950 followed by Bartolome much later on February 17, 1964.
Enrico has remained single. Encarnacion died on April 8, 1966 and is survived by
her children, Nenita Gonzales, Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita
Gonzales, Dolores Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married to the late Imigdio
Bugaay. Their children are Mariano Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay, Amelita Bugaay,
Rodolfo Bugaay, Letecia Bugaay, Lydia Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen
Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano died single and without issue on August 20,
1986. The spouses of petitioners, except Nenita, a widow, and those of the
respondents, except Lydia and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.
In their Amended Complaint4 for Partition and Annulment of Documents with
Damages dated February 5, 1991 against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents,
petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children of the Spouses Ayad
are Enrico and Consolacion, and that during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned
several agricultural as well as residential properties.
Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents covering all
the properties owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents,
completely disregarding their rights. Thus, they prayed, among others, for the
partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate, the nullification of the documents executed by
Enrico, and the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees.
As affirmative defenses5 , Enrico, Consolacion and respondents claimed that
petitioners had long obtained their advance inheritance from the estate of the
Spouses Ayad, and that the properties sought to be partitioned are now individually
titled in respondents' names.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision6 dated November 24, 1995,
awarding one-fourth (¼) pro-indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano,
Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses Ayad, excluding Mariano
who predeceased them. It likewise declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition executed by Enrico and respondents, as well as all other documents and
muniments of title in their names, as null and void. It also directed the parties to
submit a project of partition within 30 days from finality of the Decision.
On December, 13, 1995,7 respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial from the said Decision. On November 7, 1996, the RTC, through Judge Eugenio
Ramos, issued an Order which reads: "in the event that within a period of one (1)
month from today, they have not yet settled the case, it is understood that the motion
for reconsideration and/or new trial is submitted for resolution without any further
hearing."8
Without resolving the foregoing motion, the RTC, noting the failure of the parties to
submit a project of partition, issued a writ of execution9 on February 17, 2003 giving
them a period of 15 days within which to submit their nominees for commissioner,
who will partition the subject estate.
Subsequently, the RTC, through then Acting Presiding Judge Emilio V. Angeles,
discovered the pendency of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and set
the same for hearing. In the Order10 dated August 29, 2003, Judge Angeles granted
respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for the specific "purpose of
receiving and offering for admission the documents referred to by the
[respondents]."11
However, instead of presenting the documents adverted to, consisting of the
documents sought to be annulled, respondents demurred 12 to petitioners' evidence on
December 6, 2004 which the RTC, this time through Presiding Judge Dionisio C.
Sison, denied in the Order13 dated April 13, 2005 as well as respondents' motion for
reconsideration in the August 8, 2005 Order.14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated their case to the CA through a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their
demurrer notwithstanding petitioners' failure to present the documents sought to be
annulled. On March 23, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing and
setting aside the Orders of the RTC disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Orders of the trial court dated April 13, 2006 and August 8, 2005 are hereby both
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, another Order is hereby issued DISMISSING the
Complaint, as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."15
In dismissing the Amended Complaint, the appellate court ratiocinated in the
following manner:
"In the light of the foregoing where no sufficient evidence was presented to grant the
reliefs being prayed for in the complaint, more particularly the absence of the
documents sought to be annulled as well as the properties sought to be partitioned,
common sense dictates that the case should have been dismissed outright by the trial
court to avoid unnecessary waste of time, money and efforts." 16
Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution17 dated June 2, 2006.
The Issues
In this petition for review, petitioners question whether the CA's dismissal of the
Amended Complaint was in accordance with law, rules of procedure and
jurisprudence.
The Ruling of the Court
The RTC Orders assailed before the CA basically involved the propriety of filing a
demurrer to evidence after a Decision had been rendered in the case.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion
is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal was reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence."
The Court has previously explained the nature of a demurrer to evidence in the case
of Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago18 as follows:
"A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced
is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to
the merits of the case."
In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the judgment.19 Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence
must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC
promulgated its Decision.1âwphi1 While respondents' motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering for
admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be
deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.
Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and
dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The
demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and
should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CA are SET ASIDE and the Orders of the RTC denying respondents' demurrer
are REINSTATED. The Decision of the RTC dated November 24, 1995 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132102 May 19, 1999 properties in favor of the plaintiff Nellie
Manzano;
SPS. AMADO & MILAGROS TINIO and ROLANDO TINIO, petitioners,
vs. 3. AUTHORIZING the defendant Rolando Tinio
NELLIE MANZANO, respondent. to withdraw the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) which was
deposited by the plaintiff representing the
redemption price of the properties;
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
So Ordered. 2
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48567 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional On appeal, the aforesaid judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Trial Court, Branch XXI, Santiago City, Isabela, in an action by private respondent With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant for
against petitioners for legal redemption of real property pursuant to Articles 1620 review, on the grounds that the Court of Appeals:
and 1621 of the New Civil Code (Civil Case No. 21-0948).
1. (Has) Decided Question of Substance Not
The material antecedents as taken from the decision of the respondent Court of Heretofore Been Decided By The Honorable
Appeals are: Supreme Court And Decided It On Mere
Technicality By Declaring That Petitioners
Could Not Raise The Issue That There Is No
Private respondent Nellie A. Manzano is a co-owner, together with her brothers and
Legal Redemption Over A Land Of The Public
sisters Ernesto Manzano, Roland Manzano, Pamela Manzano and Edna Manzano of
Lot No. 113, CCs-167, situated in Victory Norte, Santiago, Isabela. On or about Domain Because It Was Raised For The First
April 12, 1988, while private respondent was abroad, her brothers and sisters sold the Time On Appeal;
aforesaid property to petitioner Rolando Tinio, the son of the other petitioners,
spouses Amado and Milagros Tinio, for the price of P100,000.00. In a forged 2. Gravely Erred In Not Considering The Letters
"Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, Claim and Interest", private respondent was made to Of Respondent Nellie Manzano, Exhibits 1,2 and
appear as having waived her rights over Lot No. 113 in favor of Rolando Tinio. 3, Which Patently Prove That She Is Fully
Subsequently, on April 19, 1991, Rolando Tinio obtained a Miscellaneous Sales Aware Of The Sale Of The Land;
Patent over a portion of Lot No. 113, denominated as Lot No. 113-B, with an area of
105 square meters, from the Bureau of Lands. The patent was registered in the 3. Grievously Erred In Not Admitting The
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Isabela, which issued Original Certificate of RECEIPT, Annex 2 of the Motion for
Title No. P-55907 in the name of Rolando Tinio. Upon private respondent's return to Reconsideration, As Newly Discovered Evidence
the Philippines in 1994, the plaintiff-appellee offered to redeem the shares of her co- Proving The Full Awareness of Nellie Manzano
owners pursuant to Articles 1620 and 1621 of the New Civil Code. Receiving no Of The Sale Of The Subject Land And Having
reply, private respondent filed an action for legal redemption before the trial court. Benefited Therefrom Is Estopped From
Asserting He Alleged Right Of Legal
After trial, a decision war rendered by the court a quo in favor of private respondent, Redemption;
to wit;
4. Gravely Erred In Ruling That The Trial Court
1. DECLARING that the plaintiff has the right of Had Jurisdiction Over The Subject Land Which
redemption over the shares of her co-owners to Under Existing Jurisprudence Lie Within The
the properties which they sold to the defendants; Exclusive Authority Of The Director Of Lands
Under the Executive Department. 3
2. ORDERING the defendant Rolando Tinio to
execute the necessary deed of sale of the The petition is not impressed with merit.
In the interrelated first and fourth grounds, petitioners fault the respondent court for
its refusal to resolve the issue that the subject property is part of the public domain,
hence, under the exclusive authority of the Director of Lands. Further, petitioners
contend that a finding that the subject property is part of the public domain would
negate co-ownership; sale by a private individual; and the right of legal redemption.
The Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
The argument that the land involved is land of the public domain is
an issue being raised for the first time. Section 18, Rule 46 of the
Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 15, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil procedure) provides that the "appellant may include in his
assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been
raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by
the parties." It is well-settled that issues not raised and/or
ventilated in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal (Redodos v. WCC, 6 SCRA 7171, DBP v. CA, 116 SCRA
636, Galicia v. Polo, 179 SCRA 372). A look at the issues agreed
upon by the parties in the lower court (supra) readily shows that
the character of the land, whether of public domain or private
ownership, is not among such issues.
Besides, having purchased the land from the brothers and sisters of
the plaintiff-appellate, Rolando Tinio is now stopped from
claiming that the latter had no rights over it. 4
We note that at the pre-trial of the case, the parties agreed among other matters that
"the plaintiff is co-owner in equal shares with her brothers Ernesto Manzano and
Roland Manzano and sisters Pamela Manzano and Edna Manzano of the properties
enumerated in paragraph 2 of the second amended complainant"; and that "the co-
owners of the plaintiff sold their share of the properties in favor of Rolando Tinio."
Likewise, the following issues were agreed upon during the pre-trial:
1. Whether or not the plaintiff
can exercise her right of legal
redemption of the properties of
her co-owner under Article
1619 and 1620 of the New
Civil Code;
2. Whether or not plaintiff's
right to redeem expired;
3. Whether or not the plaintiff
is in estoppel;
4. Whether there was a valid
tender of payment;
5. Damages and attorney's
fees. 5
Evidently, the petitioners having admitted that respondent Nellie Manzano along
Manzano along with her brothers and sisters were co-owners of the subject property;
and that the former acquired it by sale from the brothers and sisters, banked on the
lapse of the prescriptive period to exercise the right of legal redemption and the
alleged knowledge and participation by respondent Nellie Manzano in the
consummation of the sale including receipt of partial payment, as precluding her
from exercising said right. Petitioners cannot now be allowed to escape the adverse
effects of their defense by belatedly raising a new theory that the land is part of the
public domain as this would be offensive to the fundamental tenets of fair play.
It is worthy of mention that:
A pre-trial is meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down
the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the facts relative
to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and
thus prevent that said trial are carried on in the dark. Pre-trial is
primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the
disposition of a case are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the
element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a pre-trial
conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at
the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching
matters. The determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars
the consideration of other questions on appeal. 6
Further, the applicable and well-settled principle is that "a party is bound by the
theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted
after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt
another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on
appeal." 7 This is in essence putting petitioners in estoppel to question the judgment.
As for the question of jurisdiction, we agree with the appellate court that what is
involved in this case is not jurisdiction to dispose public lands which is exclusively
vested with the Director of the Bureau of Lands, but the right of legal redemption
given to a co-owner of a parcel of land. Jurisdiction is determinable on the basis of
the allegations in the complaint. 8 The character of the land as being part of the
public domain could not be impliedly included nor could it be inferred, as contended
by petitioners, on the first issue of "whether plaintiff can exercise her right of legal
redemption of the properties of her co-owners under Articles 1619 and 1620 of the
New Civil Code." Neither could statements and/or references in the pleadings and
subsequently in the judgments of the lower courts that "Rolando Tinio obtained a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent" over the subject property be sufficient to consider the
issue as having been raised, or that such fact was already within the knowledge of
the courts which should have been adjudicated upon. Verily, herein petitioners as
defendants in the court a quo stipulated on the co-ownership by the Manzano
siblings and the acquisition by sale of the subject property from the raid co-owners.
Now that petitioner Rolando Tinio had acquired a certificate of title of the subject
property in his name, the same has become private property beyond the control or
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. 9
As regards the second ground, the issue as to whether Nellie Manzano was fully
aware of the sale of the land is a factual matter. In this regard, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the following findings of the court a quo:
It is clear that the plaintiff was not apprised of the consummated
sale. In fact, she did not even know the actual vendee until after
she filed the complaint. Concededly, the plaintiff was aware of the
negotiations for the sale of the properties by her co-owners for
which reason she asked the prospective vendees to wait for her
arrival in order that they could talk about the sale. But her
awareness of the intention to sell by her co-owners cannot take the
place of actual knowledge because it was not shown that she had
anything to do with the negotiations and the consummation of the
sale. On the contrary what was shown is that the defendants tried
to conceal the sale and even attempted to deprive the plaintiff of
her share in the property by causing the preparation of a falsified
affidavit of assignment of rights and then obtain a sales patent and
a certificate of title over the land to the exclusion of the plaintiff
even though they knew very well that she did not sell her share of
the property to them. It was not only the right of the plaintiff to
redeem which the defendants suppressed but even her very right to
the property. (pp. 38-39, Rollo). 10
It is axiomatic that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before
the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 11 This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the
court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence.
Manzano in which she acknowledges receipt of P3,000.00 as part payment of the
subject property. This is to support their argument that no legal redemption can be
exercised by respondent Manzano because she participated in the sale as vendor and
is therefore estopped.
Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the 1964 Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 1. Petition. — Before a final order or judgment rendered by
the Court of Appeals becomes executory, a motion for new trial
may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below
by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such a character as
would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the
grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration and merely attaching thereto an alleged
"newly discovered evidence", petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence in accordance with the aforequoted Rule 53
of the 1964 Rules of Court. 12 Petitioners failed to support their motion with
affidavits and to show compliance with the following requisites for newly discovered
evidence as a ground for new trial: (a) the evidence was discovered and after the
trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative
or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted ill probably change the
judgment. 13
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the letter-receipt does not
identify the house and lot referred to therein, and that assuming it is signed by
respondent Nellie Manzano, it does not show that she received P3,000.00 as payment
for her share of the subject property, but the amount was to be given to Mrs. Edna M.
Perez.
In fine, we find no reversible error in the judgment appealed from.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DENIED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

As regards the third ground, petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not admitting
the receipt attached to their motion for reconsideration filed before the same court as
"newly discovered evidence" — an alleged letter of private respondent Nellie
G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986
MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOB. B.
MADAYAG in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, of Branch CXLV, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, et al., respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for petitioner.
Fernandez, Oliva, Umali & Associates and Vicente C. Ramirez, Jr. for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now renamed
Court of Appeals) which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
against respondent Judge Job B. Madayag of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and
respondent First Interstate Bank of California. Petitioner sought to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge denying her motion to dismiss the complaint
based on res adjudicata.
On June 15, 1983, respondent Bank filed a Complaint against petitioner to recover
the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency which, due to a
computer error, it had overpaid to her on October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged
that on September 30, 1981, petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company which was the remitting bank of respondent
Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los Angeles Office
erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of US-$500.00, and as a
consequence respondent Bank issued and delivered to petitioner Cashier Check No.
1217681 amounting to US-$8,500.00 dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner
deposited to her account and subsequently withdrew.
In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-stated
allegations in the Complaint and alleged that immediately after receipt of a formal
demand letter to return the overpayment, she offered to pay respondent Bank through
its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a month but the offer was unreasonably
rejected.
It is significant to note that no copy of said Answer was attached to the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner with the Intermediate Appellate Court, nor was any copy
thereof attached to the petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. It was
only in the Comment of respondents' counsel filed with this Court that a copy of said
Answer was attached thereto.
On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 141, sent the following "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" to the
parties through their respective lawyers.
G R E E T I N G S:
Please take notice that cases where issues have been joined will be
scheduled for pre-trial conference only after Rules 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, and 29-where applicable, necessary and or feasible have been
resorted to by the parties.
If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable,
necessary or feasible with respect to him, he shall file a
manifestation to that effect.
The pre-trial conference, shall be scheduled as soon as the
respective manifestations of having resorted to, or of dispensing
with, those modes of discovery have been filed by the parties.
The party, who has dispensed with those modes of discovery shall
be deemed to have waived resort thereto, and, unless for good
cause shown, motion to resort thereto, after termination of the pre-
trial, shall not be grantee. The costs entailed the waiving party in
presenting evidence during trial that could have been obtained
through any of those modes of discovery which were waived, shall
not be assessed against the adverse party nor awarded as part of the
litigation expenses.
If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation
has been filed, the case shall be archived or dismissed as the case
may be.
Upon Order of the Court, this 19th day of August 1983.
Makati, Metro Manila.
(SGD.) E.R. BELEN
Officer-in-Charge
No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the
presiding Judge (not respondent Judge), issued the following order:
 For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case Status) dated
August 19, 1983, more particularly the last paragraph thereof, this
case is hereby dismissed.
This order was received by respondent Bank's counsel on December 28, 1983.
On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint
which was assigned to Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati presided
over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res adjudicata, as well as a supplement thereto, which was opposed by
respondent Bank.
On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on
November 27, 1984, he denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, on the
following grounds:
(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its
day in court.
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with said notice
of case status (above quoted), the court (Branch 141) should have set the case for
pre-trial conference since the last pleading had been filed and there are no other
conditions to be complied with before any case is calendared for pre-trial under
Section 1 of Rule 20.
(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut decision as to
her liability or non-liability, instead of winning a case on a technicality.
On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate
Appellate Court praying that the orders denying the motion to dismiss and the
motion for reconsideration be set aside as null and void and that the complaint be
ordered dismissed. On May 21, 1985, the appellate court, finding no merit to the
petition, resolved not to give it due course. In its decision, the appellate court ruled
as follows:
We concur with the above reasoning of respondent Judge. We
should add to that our observation that the order of dismissal of
Judge Elbiñas in Civil Case No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void
for lack of legal basis. The 'notice of case status' (Annex D) was
not an order' of the court. I t was, as its title indicated, only a
'notice,' not an order. The warning in the last paragraph of the
notice advising the parties that-
'If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation
has been filed, the case shall be archived or dismiss as the case
may be.'
was not an order of the court. It was a warning emanating from
E.R. Belen, the officer-in-charge (of civil cases). The failure of the
parties to heed the warning was not tantamount to disobedience of
a lawful order of the court, for the 'officer-in-charge' was not the
court or judge.
Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the
force of a judgment. It did not constitute a bar to the refiling of the
bank's complaint. Respondent Judge did not err, or abuse his
discretion, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
7765. (pp. 35-36, Record)
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court. We are constrained to affirm
Indeed, with the admission in petitioner's Answer of the allegations in the Complaint
that due to computer error there was an overpayment to her of the amount of US-
$8,000.00, coupled with her offer to pay respondent Bank the amount of the
overpayment in installments of $100.00 a month, we cannot find any justification for
ruling that the order dismissing the first complaint operated as an adjudication on the
merits or constituted a bar to the second complaint. In fact, the trial court could have,
on motion, rendered a judgment on the pleadings in the first case in favor of
respondent Bank.
True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should have taken the precaution of
complying with the instructions contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" if
only to avoid the consequent delay resulting from non-compliance; that respondent
Bank's counsel was negligent in not seeking a reconsideration or clarification of the
order of dismissal or appealing therefrom. But, fortunately for respondent Bank, the
omissions of its counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective procedure
which culminated in the dismissal of the first complaint.
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Revised Rules of
Court) are intended to enable a party to obtain knowledge of material facts within the
knowledge of the adverse party or of third parties through depositions to obtain
knowledge of material facts or admissions from the adverse party through written
interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the
genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for
admission; to inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other property in
the possession or control of the adverse party; and to determine the physical or
mental condition of a party when such is in controversy. This mutual discovery
enables a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitates an
amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the case. All the parties are required to 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the Court on motion and notice may
lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case. dismiss the action or render judgment by default.

Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the proper utilization of the rules on
discovery. However, recourse to discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the
parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the pre-trial conference should be
set pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.
Petitioner argues that respondent Judge was wrong in stating that a pre-trial order
should have been issued since the last pleading had been filed, because the "notice of
case status" was issued on August 19, 1983, while the last pleading or the answer to
petitioner's counterclaim was filed much later. Although, ordinarily, the last pleading
which has to be filed before the court shall set the case for pre-trial under Section 1
of Rule 20 is the answer to the counterclaim (Itchon vs. Baligod, 17 SCRA 268;
Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447), in the case at bar,
petitioner's counterclaim for damages resulting from the filing of the complaint did
not require an answer (Navarro vs. Bello, 102 Phil. 1019; Gojo vs. Goyola, 35 SCRA
557). Since the counterclaim was the last pleading, the court should have issued a
pre-trial order after its submission and it was the duty of the clerk of court to place
the case in the pre-trial calendar under Section 5 of Rule 20.
Petitioner further contends that if the ruling of the appellate court regarding the
legality of the notice signed by the officer-in-charge were sustained, then court
processes such as summons, notices of pre-trial, writs of execution and the like can
be merely disregarded by lawyers. This contention is without merit. Section 1 of
Rule 14 expressly provides that upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court
shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendant. Sections 1 and 5
of Rule 20 authorize the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date of the pre-trial
and Section 2 of Rule 22 authorizes the clerk of court to issue the notice of the date
of the trial. A writ of execution may be issued by the clerk of court pursuant to an
order of execution signed by the judge. There is no rule authorizing the issuance of
the "notice of case status" in question signed by an officer-in-charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed, with costs against
petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 17 which reads as follows:

Failure to prosecute.-If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any
order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

This provision is not applicable to the case at bar. As the appellate court correctly
held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of the court. It was signed by Mr.
E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such
manifestation has been filed after 30 days from receipt the case shall be archived or
dismissed as the case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of the parties to heed the
warning did not constitute disobedience of a lawful order of the court. Consequently,
the order of dismissal could not have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits.
Neither could respondent Bank be considered to have failed to prosecute its action
for an unreasonable length of time, inasmuch as petitioner's Answer was dated
August 17, 1983 and the order of dismissal was dated November 29, 1983.

Petitioner cites the case of Arellano vs. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon (65
SCRA 45) in support of her stand. However, in said case, the Court upheld the order
of dismissal for failure of respondent Barreta to serve any answer to petitioner
Arellano's interrogatories. The dismissal was based on Section 5 of Rule 29 which
provides that if a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents.
Sobreviñas, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for petitioner.
Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American
President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US
$53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply
Dasmariñas) specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL),
and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.
The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL
presented its first witness whose testimony was completed on November 12, 1988.
The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2) more
witnesses in APL's behalf.
At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a
motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang
Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters
rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended
motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up
by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia
Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary — and it therefore prayed — "that
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces,
Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112
Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral
deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ."
The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that (a) the motion was
"fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person
within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the
witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be
taken orally in open court and not by deposition."
Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings
filed by the parties, in the course of which APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the
letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take
deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this
being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts
or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign
Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei,
Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the
mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged
copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained.
By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of
APL, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's
Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by
deposition (upon written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED.
The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces is
hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition.
Compliance with the Rules on the taking of testimony by
deposition upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of
Rule 24, Rules of Court is enjoined.
Let this Order be coursed through the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 4 dated April 6, 1987.
The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized
Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses
residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-
examination."
Dasmariñas sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following
grounds: (1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions
has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of
Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show
that it is not vested with any such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by
commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken
constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4) depositions by written
interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on
the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most
satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to
the rights and liberties of citizens."
By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied because
"filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. In the
same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order
authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this
month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to
adduce additional evidence by deposition."
Dasmariñas instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to
nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. Said Appellate Court restrained
enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain
the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the
petitioner."
After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on
September 23, 1992 denying Dasmariñas petition for certiorari and upholding the
challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmariñas sought reconsideration
of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December
11, 1992.
Once again Dasmariñas has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this
Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's Decision of September 23,
1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.
Dasmariñas ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case,
present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witnesses in a
foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to
take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court
considering that:
a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial
discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial;
b) no urgent or compelling reason has been
shown to justify the departure from the accepted
and usual judicial proceedings of examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor
could be observed by the trial judge;"
2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing
private respondent, a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to
present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from
the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is
obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to
the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;" and
3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in
Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the
Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a
private entity not authorized by law to take depositions."
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are
relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of
discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party;
production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not
only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and
the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for
all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may
have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer
from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant
to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or
hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or
hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be
opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his
testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was
afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-
examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is
actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a
motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
be used against any party who was present or represented at the
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a
witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of
taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of
a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is
a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the
witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at
a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial
or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3)
that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering
the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the
witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the
adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is
relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any
other parts.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out
of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with
another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify,
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may
be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his
deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10,
Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be
taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec.
11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a
secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already
been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be
accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or
contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being
that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . .
(stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of
each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party
moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon
notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose
conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the
taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers
or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being
conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no
"secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 provides as
follows:
Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. — A commission or
letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or convenient,
on application and notice, and on such terms and with such
directions as are just and appropriate. Officers may be designated
in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and
letters rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate Judicial
Authority in (here name the country)."
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or
other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other
act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p.
415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand,
may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge
or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon
interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the
jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op.
cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted
states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name
or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate
judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the
indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a
commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is apparent from Form 21 of the
"Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the
inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of
______, 19__, to take the testimony of (here name the witness or
witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the
testimony is to be taken), before _________________ (name of
officer), was returned unexecuted by __________________ on the
ground that ____________, all of which more fully appears from
the certificate of said __________ to said commission and made a
part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show
commission is inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis
supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . .
Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . .
." It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now
Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of
Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other
public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department
of Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N
of the petition for review on certiorari) — a prima facie showing not rebutted by
petitioner.
It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of
Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign
Affairs — directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS"
"to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad
through the Department of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign
Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;"
this, "in the interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.
Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission on various
grounds.
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not
recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy.'" This is
inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine
official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in
virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is
pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of
Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be
fully accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial
discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may
be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-
trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.
Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an
appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their
testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134,
Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory
judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
Dasmariñas further claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a Trial Court reached this conclusion because, as the record discloses, the motion for
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses reconsideration was filed by Dasmariñas on June 25, 1991, twenty-five (25) days
in open court where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is after notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991 sought to be
"inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a ground is incorrect. In the first place, it
present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating appears that there was a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its reconsideration, ending on June 25, 1991 which was however not acted on or granted
witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the by the Court. More importantly, the order sought to be reconsidered is
Judge." an interlocutory order, in respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the
time within which reconsideration thereof should be sought.
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted
and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that on certiorari. Costs against petitioner.
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely
falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use SO ORDERED.
of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open
court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the
Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the
exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at
a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or
is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis
supplied) — is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754).

The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the
witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's
option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and observations
of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation,
and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the Court's
discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition — that
the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" — is "so as to give
defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving
cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will
not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral
examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be
taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to
cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there
conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination
merely by serving cross-interrogatories.

One other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 — denying Dasmariñas motion for
reconsideration of the earlier order dated March 15, 1991 (allowing the taking of
deposition by commission) — one of the reasons adduced by the Regional Trial
Court for the denial was that the motion had been "filed out of time." Evidently, the
G.R. No. 158857 November 11, 2005
PFEGER R. DULAY, GODOFREDO S. DULAY, SR., ROWENA R. DULAY,
ENDZELIUS R. DULAY, GODOFREDO R. DULAY, JR., JIMPSEY R.
DULAY, SHERYL R. DULAY, FLORDELIZA R. DULAY, BENITA R.
DULAY, and MARICOR L. DULAY, represented by their Attorney-In-Fact,
PFEGER R. DULAY, Petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO S. DULAY, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
1
The instant petition seeks the review of the Decision dated 30 May
2002 and Resolution2 dated 28 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66993 entitled "Pfeger R. Dulay v. Hon. Alicia B. Gonzales-Decano, etc. and
Rodrigo S. Dulay."
In a complaint3 for recovery of his bank deposit with prayer for a writ of attachment
and damages, Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, alleged that upon
his petition sometime in October of 1996, his brother Godofredo S. Dulay, Sr. and
nephew Pfeger R. Dulay immigrated to the United States of America. The two stayed
with him in his house at Claremont, Massachusetts. Godofredo, however, decided to
return to the Philippines because he could not endure the weather. Pfeger stayed
behind to take care of Rodrigo. Having nurtured affection, love and trust for his
nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trust account with the Bank of Boston on 27
January 1997 with a deposit of Two Hundred Thirty Thousand U.S. Dollars
($230,000.00), naming Pfeger as trustee thereof. Five months later, Pfeger left
Rodrigo’s house allegedly to join his girlfriend in California. Rodrigo learned only
later that Pfeger actually went back to the Philippines. Pfeger returned to the United
States in November of 1997, but after a brief stay returned again to the Philippines
where he went on a spending binge. Upon knowing this, Rodrigo verified the status
of his account with the Bank of Boston, and to his shock and dismay discovered that
Pfeger had already emptied the account. Rodrigo additionally claimed that Pfeger
used the money from said account to buy several vehicles, loan money to several
people, open bank accounts for his siblings, and buy a house and lot and jewelry for
his wife. Whatever was left of the account was allegedly transferred to Pfeger’s
father, Godofredo.4
Denying the accusations, respondent claimed that the money deposited in the name
of Pfeger was his own money and not Rodrigo’s. They assailed the admissibility of
the Statement of Account and the supporting Affidavit attached to the Complaint.
For his part, Pfeger asserted that he spent his own money.5
Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the
depositions of several witnesses residing abroad.6 Petitioners, on the other hand,
moved to be allowed to file cross-examination questions to respondent’s written
interrogatories, which the trial court granted.7 In an order dated 1 December 1999,
the trial court stated:
These are petitions for letters Rogatory dated November 11, 1999 and November 22,
1999 respectively praying that this Court order the Clerk of Court to issue any order
requiring the Clerk of Court in Boston Ma., USA to conduct the examination of the
following parties:
1. Mr. Rodrigo S. Dulay of 38 Claremont St. Malden, Ma., USA, and
2. Manager or authorized representative of the Bank of Boston, Ma., USA and for
the above-named persons to answer the attached questions (direct and cross) attached
to each petition, and for the Clerk of Court of Boston to forward the same questions
and answers as soon as the same were already properly answered.
SO ORDERED.8
Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
failure to prosecute.9 This was however denied by the trial court, which instead
allowed Rodrigo to complete his depositions.10 As it turned out, however, the
depositions could not be taken before the Clerk of Court of Massachusetts, but were
taken instead before a notary public in New York.
On 2 February 2000, Rodrigo submitted to the trial court his answers to the
interrogatories and cross interrogatories of petitioners given before a notary public in
the United States. Thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion Reiterating Motion to
Dismiss Dated July 10, 2000,11 which the trial court denied in its 28 September
2000 Order.12 In the same Order, the trial court directed respondent to have the
written and cross interrogatories taken by the notary public authenticated by the
consulate. Thus, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the answers so that he could
have them authenticated by a Philippine consul in the United States.13
On 10 January 2001, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion,14 praying that the written
interrogatories be declared inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal
of the complaint. The lower court denied the motion on 20 February 2001, at the
same time directing the archival of the case while waiting for the documents from
the United States.15 According to the trial court, the dismissal of the case is improper
considering that Rodrigo had already commenced presenting his evidence and that it
is mandated to hear the evidence on the counterclaims of the petitioners. Anent the
objection to the admission of the answers to the written interrogatories, the trial court
stated that the deposition taken before the Notary Public from New York, whose
authority was duly certified by the Philippine Consul in New York, substantially
complied with the Rules of Court.16 Thus, on 31 August 2001, the trial court ordered
the admission of the assailed documents. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration
of the order but the motion was denied.17
Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, petitioners filed
before the Court of Appeals an original action for certiorari on 7 October 2001. The
appellate court dismissed the petition, finding that the questioned depositions were
accomplished in substantial compliance with the Rules of Court. 18 According to the
Court of Appeals, Rodrigo could not be faulted for the incidental delays in the
proceedings, which were after all caused by the refusal of the American tribunal
which brushed aside the letters rogatory issued by the trial court. Putting premium on
merit rather than on technicality, the Court of Appeals held that "laxity in the
application of the procedure is not
tantamount to laxity in the rendition of justice when equitable circumstances exist to
warrant the same."19Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to no avail as it
was denied by the Court of Appeals.20
In the present petition for review, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred
when it refused to dismiss the case at the trial court level despite respondent’s failure
to prosecute his case with reasonable diligence. According to petitioners, the major
delays in the litigation of the case were caused by respondent’s failure to send on
time the needed documents to the trial court.21 In addition, petitioners allege that
contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals the documents submitted by
respondent were not taken in substantial compliance with the directive of the trial
court itself but in violation of Sections 11, 12, and 14, Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court.22
The Court is not persuaded.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial. It may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave,
after an answer has been served. A party’s right to avail itself of this procedure is
"well-nigh unrestricted" if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not
privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the
law. 23 Nevertheless, the use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound
discretion of the trial courts,24 which, in general, are given wide latitude in granting
motions for discovery in order to enable the parties to prepare for trial or otherwise
to settle the controversy prior thereto.25
While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk of
Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible to
follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and
refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought
about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the
admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor
for directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated. Obviously, it was
not within the trial court’s power, much less the respondent’s to force the Clerk of
Court of Boston to have the deposition taken before it. It would be illogical and
unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the letters rogatory without the
cooperation of the very institution or personality named in the letters rogatory and
requested to examine the witnesses. After all, while a court had the authority to
entertain a discovery request, it is not required to provide judicial assistance
thereto.26 This reality was recognized by the trial court when it ordered respondent to
have the questioned depositions authenticated by the Philippine consulate. Indeed,
refusing the allowance of the depositions in issue would be going directly against the
purpose of taking the depositions in the first place, that is, the disclosure of facts
which are relevant to the proceedings in court.
More importantly, the Court finds that respondent substantially complied with the
requirements for depositions taken in foreign countries.
In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a) on notice
before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any person
authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. 27 While letters
rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of
the issuing jurisdiction.28
Generally, a commission is an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or to an
individual by name, authorizing him to take the depositions of the witnesses named
therein, while a letter rogatory is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed
by its
power, to secure desired information.29 Commissions are taken in accordance with
the rules laid down by the court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the
methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal. 30
Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines and the defendant’s answer has already been
served.31 However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the
Philippines has no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as may
be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. 32
In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the
authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition
was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through letters
rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trial court by
virtue of its Orderdated 28 September 2000.33 With the ratification of the depositions
in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.

Besides, the allowance of the deposition can not be said to have caused any prejudice
to the adverse party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the deponents.
Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point
out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial court’s action.

The ends of justice are reached not only through the speedy disposal of cases, but
more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits
of the case. The parties’ right to be given full opportunity to ventilate their cases
should not be hindered by a strict adherence to technicalities. After all, as this Court
has so often enunciated, rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 34 A strict and
rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided.35

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Costs against

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA
AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA,
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of
Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a party not served
with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give
testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks
to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the April 15, 2008
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 which dismissed
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit and its October 2, 2008
Resolution4 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 5
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint6 for
nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.
(Metrobank) and Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 and
assigned to Branch 7.
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while
Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial,
petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum7 to require Metrobank’s officers8 to appear and testify as the
petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation
of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with
Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners’ 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20411 (M). The Motion contained a notice of hearing written
as follows:
NOTICE
The Branch Clerk of Court
Regional Trial Court
Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion for the consideration and approval of the Hon.
Court immediately upon receipt hereof.
(signed)
Vicente C. Angeles9
Metrobank filed an Opposition10 arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing,
the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to
set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that
pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who
are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories;
that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents
sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
Petitioners submitted a Reply12 to Metrobank’s Opposition, stating that the lack of a
proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that
applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is
not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s officers’ depositions; that for their case,
the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive, but instead favorable
to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the same
during the presentation of its own evidence; that the documents sought to be
produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners have paid their obligations
to Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of
the foreclosure proceedings; and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from
presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 19, 2006, the trial court issued an Order13 denying petitioners’ Motion
for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum, thus:
The motion lacks merit.
As pointed out by the defendant bank in its opposition, the motion under
consideration is a mere scrap of paper by reason of its failure to comply with the
requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15
of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, the defendant bank and its officers are
adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are
first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
In view of the foregoing, and for lack of merit, the motion under consideration is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 pleading for leniency in the
application of the Rules and claiming that the defective notice was cured by the
filing of Metrobank’s Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They
further argued that Metrobank’s officers – who are the subject of the subpoena – are
not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise the adverse party; they are
individuals separate and distinct from Metrobank, the defendant corporation being
sued in the case.
In an Opposition16 to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank insisted on the
procedural defect of improper notice of hearing, arguing that the rule relative to
motions and the requirement of a valid notice of hearing are mandatory and must be
strictly observed. It added that the same rigid treatment must be accorded to Rule 25,
in that none of its officers may be summoned to testify for petitioners unless written
interrogatories are first served upon them. Finally, it said that since a corporation
may act only through its officers and employees, they are to be considered as adverse
parties in a case against the corporation itself.
In another Order17 dated April 17, 2007, the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. The trial court held, thus:
Even if the motion is given consideration by relaxing Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, no such laxity could be accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25
of the Revised Rules of Court which require prior service of written interrogatories
to adverse parties before any material and relevant facts may be elicited from them
more so if the party is a private corporation who could be represented by its officers
as in this case. In other words, as the persons sought to be subpoenaed by the
plaintiffs-movants are officers of the defendant bank, they are in effect the very
persons who represent the interest of the latter and necessarily fall within the
coverage of Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari19 with the CA asserting this time that their
Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated
motion; it does not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. For these
reasons, the Motion need not be heard. They likewise insisted on liberality, and the
disposition of the case on its merits and not on mere technicalities. 20 They added that
Rule 2121 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing only with respect to the
taking of depositions; since their Motion sought to require Metrobank’s officers to
appear and testify in court and not to obtain their depositions, the requirement of
notice and hearing may be dispensed with. Finally, petitioners claimed that the Rules
– particularly Section 10,22 Rule 132 – do not prohibit a party from presenting the
adverse party as its own witness.
On April 15, 2008, the CA issued the questioned Decision, which contained the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders
dated October 19, 2006 and April 17, 2007 in Civil Case No. 336-M-2004 issued by
the RTC, Branch 7, Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Orders; petitioners’ Motion is a litigated motion, especially as it seeks to
require the adverse party, Metrobank’s officers, to appear and testify in court as
petitioners’ witnesses. It held that a proper notice of hearing, addressed to the parties
and specifying the date and time of the hearing, was required, consistent with
Sections 4 and 5,24 Rule 15 of the Rules.
The CA held further that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners’ Motion to
secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite
clear in providing that the consequence of a party’s failure to serve written
interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not be compelled by the
former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal. By failing to serve
written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their right to present
the bank’s officers as their witnesses.
The CA declared that the justification for the rule laid down in Section 6 is that by
failing to seize the opportunity to inquire upon the facts through means available
under the Rules, petitioners should not be allowed to later on burden Metrobank with
court hearings or other processes. Thus, it held:
x x x Where a party unjustifiedly refuses to elicit facts material and relevant to his
case by addressing written interrogatories to the adverse party to elicit those facts,
the latter may not thereafter be compelled to testify thereon in court or give a
deposition pending appeal. The justification for this is that the party in need of said
facts having foregone the opportunity to inquire into the same from the other party
through means available to him, he should not thereafter be permitted to unduly
burden the latter with courtroom appearances or other cumbersome processes. The
sanction adopted by the Rules is not one of compulsion in the sense that the party is
being directly compelled to avail of the discovery mechanics, but one of negation by
depriving him of evidentiary sources which would otherwise have been accessible to
him.25
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,26 which the CA denied in its
assailed October 2, 2008 Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:
I of hearing renders it useless and a mere scrap of paper. It adds that being its officers,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN
REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE 15, RULES OF
COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S
OFFICERS WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION
UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED (REVERSIBLE) ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MUST FIRST SERVE WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES TO RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS BEFORE THEY
CAN BE SUBPOENAED.27
Petitioners’ Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the Court allow the
issuance of the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum, petitioners assert that the
questioned Motion is not a litigated motion, since it seeks not a relief, but the
issuance of process. They insist that a motion which is subject to notice and hearing
under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is an application for relief other than a pleading;
since no relief is sought but just the process of subpoena, the hearing and notice
requirements may be done away with. They cite the case of Adorio v. Hon.
Bersamin,28 which held that –
Requests by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other
parties to the action.1âwphi1 No violation of due process results by such lack of
notice since the other parties would have ample opportunity to examine the witnesses
and documents subpoenaed once they are presented in court. 29
Petitioners add that the Rules should have been liberally construed in their favor, and
that Metrobank’s filing of its Opposition be considered to have cured whatever
defect the Motion suffered from.
Petitioners likewise persist in the view that Metrobank’s officers – the subject of the
Motion – do not comprise the adverse party covered by the rule; they insist that these
bank officers are mere employees of the bank who may be called to testify for them.
Respondents’ Arguments
Metrobank essentially argues in its Comment30 that the subject Motion for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum is a litigated motion, especially
as it is directed toward its officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence
would affect it as the adverse party in the civil case. Thus, the lack of a proper notice
the persons sought to be called to the stand are themselves adverse parties who may
not be compelled to testify in the absence of prior written interrogatories; they are
not ordinary witnesses whose presence in court may be required by petitioners at any
time and for any reason.
Finally, Metrobank insists on the correctness of the CA Decision, adding that since
petitioners failed up to this time to pay the witnesses’ fees and kilometrage as
required by the Rules,31 the issuance of a subpoena should be denied.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion
for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely
Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured
by the filing of the Opposition.32
Nonetheless, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the case of Adorio cannot apply
squarely to this case. In Adorio, the request for subpoena duces tecum was sought
against bank officials who were not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. The situation is different here, as officers of the adverse party
Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s main witnesses;
likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the
petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant consequences that
affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness
stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by
the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be
treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces
no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s
testimony,33 compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the
calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or
information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other
mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could
only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by
the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental
to the calling party’s cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing
expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the
court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties
perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or
altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only
constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand
as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s
possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper.
Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered
adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through
their officers and duly authorized agents34 – as their main witnesses; nor may they be
allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the
evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners,
not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence,
then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own
defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who
has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very
principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very
evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may
not be allowed to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a
move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners
claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan
agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while it was
outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these
documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they
were never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly
not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these
documents, Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners
with these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the loan
was outstanding, in violation of the law.
With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to further address the
other issues raised by the parties, which are irrelevant and would not materially alter
the conclusions arrived at.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed April 15, 2008 Decision and
October 2, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99535 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101682 December 14, 1992
SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA,
married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-ISA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 17 October 1991, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, * in CA-G.R. SP No. 20114 dated 13 August 1990 as well as its resolution
dated 9 September 1991 denying the petitioner's for reconsideration.
Acting upon the petition, the Court required the private respondents to comment
thereon. After the private respondents had filed their comment, the Court resolved to
consider the comment as answer and to give due course to the petition and the case
was deemed submitted for decision. 1
The antecedents are as follows:
On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a
complaint 2 for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes
B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 55961, alleginginter alia that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the
registered owners (of) a parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam
Street Provident Village, J. de la Peña, Marikina, Metro-Manila,
covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Copy
attached herewith as Annex A) more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land . . . situated in the Municipality
of Marikina, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon .
. . containing an area of THREE HUNDRED
(300) SQUARE METERS, more or less, . . .
Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's
residential house where his wife and children used to stay until
they migrated to the United States.
3. The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the
residential house was constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned
salaries and benefits from his employment abroad.
4. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, has declared the above-
described parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes
under P.D. No. 464, copies of Declaration of Real Property
attached herewith as Annexes B and B-1.
5. Of late, plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A.
Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, copy attached herewith as Annex C, the
abovementioned house and lot.
6. Plaintiff, as the duly registered owner, never authorized or
empowered Nonita A. Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf,
stead or representation to enter into any transaction regarding the
sale, transfer or conveyance of the abovedescribed house and lot.
7. Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall
be for his family, particularly his children.
8. As a result of the unauthorized sale, plaintiff was denied the use
and enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-
isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had
prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises.
9. By reason of the unlawful deprivation from him of his
properties, plaintiff suffered serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish
and wounded feelings and further subjected him to social
humiliation and embarassment, particularly considering that the
abovementioned properties came from his hard-earned salaries and
emoluments from his employment abroad, for which defendants
Mag-isa must be adjudged liable for moral damages in an amount
not less than ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) or as may
be equitably determined by this Honorable Court.
10. In order to serve as an example or correction for the public
good, defendants Mag-isa should likewise be adjudged liable for
examplary damages in an amount not less than ONE HUNDRED
 THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) or as may be equitably
determined by this Honorable Court.
11. Plaintiff, in protection of his legitimate right and interests
prejudiced by defendants — Mag-isa, was constrained to engage
the services of undersigned counsel for P50,000.00, exclusive of
appearance fees and expenses.
Plaintiff adopts the foregoing.
12. The next move of defendants — Mag-isa is to consolidate
ownership over the properties by means of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Annex C herein) which is inceptually void.
13. Defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina would have no other
alternative but to give due course to the consolidation of ownership
over the properties in the name of defendants — Mag-isa which
eventually causes grave and irreparable injury, untold injustice and
undue prejudice to plaintiff unless — a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, or at least a Temporary Restraining Order is
immediately issued by this Honorable Court enjoining or
restraining defendant Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro-Manila
or any person acting on his behalf from consolidating ownership of
the house and lot covered under TCT No. N-29895 of the Registry
of Deeds for the province of Rizal in the name of defendants —
Mag-isa or their heirs or successor-in-interest.
14. Plaintiff is ready and willing to post a bond in such amount as
this Honorable Court may equitable determine subject to such
conditions and terms as may be appropriately imposed thereon.
In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her
answer 3 alleging as follows:
1. Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1,
the age of plaintiff but denies the rest of the allegations therein for
lack of knowledge and/or information sufficient to form a
judgment as to the truths thereof.
2. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 2 that pursuant to
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29859 (Annex "A"), plaintiff
together with his wife appears to be the registered owners of the
subject parcel of land but that is more apparent and (sic) real
considering that defendants have admittedly bought the land and
the improvements thereon and defendants were purchasers in good
faith and for value.
3. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 3 for lack of
knowledge and information to form a judgment as to the truths,
and granting arguendo that the acquisition of the land and the
construction of the house came from the salaries and benefits of
the plaintiff, said salaries and benefits are considered conjugal.
4. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 4 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a judgment as to the
truth thereof although it may be of judicial notice that the Office of
the Provincial/Municipal Assessor motu proprio accomplishes (sic)
Annexes "B" and "B-1" and all tax declarations for that matter
based on existing records in said office.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 in so far as the
transaction of absolute sale between them and defendant's
(plaintiff's) wife who acted not only in her behalf but also as
attorney-in-fact of her husband, plaintiff in the instant case, which
transaction was actually known by and with the consent of or
should at least have been known to and with the consent of
plaintiff as evidenced by a letter of plaintiff to his wife, a xerox
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an
integral part hereof.
6. Defendants deny the allegation in paragraph 6, the truth and fact
being that plaintiff's wife was duly authorized by a Special Power
of Attorney to transact on and sell the subject house and lot, a
xerox copy of which marked Annex "2" is hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof.
7. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 7 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficiento (sic) form a judgment as to
the truths thereof.
8. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 8 to the effect that
he was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties for the
reason that as the owners of the property, defendants have the
absolute rights of use and enjoyment over said properties with the
prerogative to lease the same to any party of their choice, the
lessee with the right to exclude others from the use and enjoyment
of the premises.
 9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 not
only for lack of knowledge and information to form a judgment as
to the truths thereof but also because said allegations have no
factual and legal basis.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 in so far as
the prospective registration of Annex "C" is concerned but deny
the rest of the allegations for reasons stated earlier to the effect that
Annex "C" is a valid and binding sale, with defendants as the
purchasers in good faith and for value.
11. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 13 in so far as
the ministerial functions of defendant Register of Deeds but deny
the rest of the allegations the same being without any factual and
legal basis for reasons essayed earlier.
12. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 14 for lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a judgment as to the
truths thereof aside from the fact that plaintiff's alleged readiness
and willingness to post a bond will simply be exercises in futility.
On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on
the private respondent Mag-isa a request for admission 4 reading as follows:
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO
Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa
Balaga-Luna Building
Malolos, Bulacan
Greeting:
Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests your admission
within ten (10) days from service hereof pursuant to Rule 26, Rules
of Court of the following:
The Material facts
1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land together with the
improvements thereon covered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-29895 (Annex A-Complaint) located at 59 Amsterdam
Street, Provident Village, Marikina, Metro-Manila.
2. That plaintiff, as the duly registered owner had declared for the
year 1988 the parcel of land and residential house for tax purposes
under P.D. 464.
3. That plaintiff's family used to live at the said residential house.
4. That defendant Mag-isa actually lives near the location address
of plaintiff's properties.
5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but
he (plaintiff) regularly comes home and stays with his family at
their residential house abovementioned.
6. That the abovementioned house and lot were acquired through
plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment
abroad.
7. That plaintiff has reserved the house and lot as a place to stay to
(sic) with his family upon his retirement from his employment.
8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that
matter to sell or to dispose of the property covered under TCT No.
N-29895.
9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of
Attorney dated November 14, 1984 appended as Annex 2 —
Answer.
10. That the alleged Special Power of Attorney mentions "Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-29995 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal."
11. That plaintiff never personally appeared before Notary Public
Jose Constantino upon whom the acknowledgment of said Special
Power of Attorney was made.
12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never consented to
the sale or disposition of properties covered under TCT No. N-
29995.
13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the alleged
sale, and he never benefited therefrom in any manner.
 14. That defendant Mag-isa never confirmed with plaintiff
notwithstanding their being neighbors, the authenticity of the
alleged Special Power of Attorney and the validity of the alleged
Deed of Absolute Sale particularly considering that the subject
matter thereof involves plaintiff's properties.
15. That plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his
properties since defendant Mag-isa had even leased the premises to
another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the
premises.
The Material Documents
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-29895 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, copy attached to the Complaint as Annex A.
2. The Declarations of Real Property filed by Salvador D.
Briboneria pursuant to P.D. 464 for the year 1988, copies attached
to the Complaint as Annexes B and B-1.
On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their
Answer to Request for Admission, 5alleging that most if not all the matters subject of
petitioner's request for admission had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their
verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that the other matters not admitted, denied
and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.
On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary
Judgment, 6 claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private
respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer
was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have
admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The private respondents filed an
opposition 7 to the motion for summary judgment, while the petitioner filed a
reply 8 to said opposition.
On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order 9 denying
the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration 10 which the court granted in its order dated 20 July 1989, setting
aside the order of 28 December 1988. 11 The private respondents, in turn, filed a
Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, to which the petitioner filed an
opposition. 12 On 1 February 1989, the trial court issued another order 13 this time
setting aside its order of 20 July 1989 and set the pre-trial conference on 22 February
1989.
The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order dated 1 February 1989 of
the court a quo, alleging that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision, 14 dismissing the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, 15 he is now before us in the present petition.
Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that the matters of fact
and the documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or
reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He claims that the material facts and
documents described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters
supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that the private respondents have
impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for
admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the
period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.
The petition can not be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for
admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the material
matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set
forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their
answer." 16The respondent court therefore correctly held that this case falls under the
rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals. 17 wherein this Court held:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already
admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue
(Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor
should he be required to make a second denial of those already
denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is
not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary
matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the
request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action
or defense. . . .
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, 18 the request for
admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the
request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any
relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set
forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission. 19
In one case, namely, CA-G.R. No. 20561-R, entitled "Jose Ledesma, Jr., Plaintiff-
Appellee, versus Guillermo Locsin, Defendant-Appellant", 20 the Court of Appeals in
favorably resolving the defendant-appellant's motion for reconsideration of its earlier
decision (wherein it affirmed the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in favor of plaintiff Jose Ledesma, Jr. upon failure of defendant
Guillermo Locsin to answer a request for admission served upon his counsel by the
plaintiff) held in its Resolution dated 1 June 1963, as follows:
The issue raised by the first two assigned errors is whether or not a
request for admission must be served directly on a party, and not
his counsel, in order that said request can be considered as validly
served. In our decision which is sought to be reconsidered, we held
that a request for admission may be validly served upon party's
counsel. After a further review of the facts of the case and the
circumstances surrounding the same, we are now fully convinced
that it should not be so.
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now
Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be
served upon counsel and not upon party. This is so because the
attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one
responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects;
hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule
is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in
competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's case
(Chainani v. Judge Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952;
Capili v. Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962). However,
the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that
notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service
must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and
upon no other in order that the notice be valid.
Whenever notice is necessary, it must appear that
it was served on the proper person, and there
must be strict compliance with a statute requiring
service on a particular person, so that service on
another person is not sufficient.
In general, service of notice of a modal or formal
step in a proceeding on the attorney of record is
sufficient, if not otherwise specifically provided
by statute or rule of court. (66 C.J.S. 658)
Thus, we see that section 7 of Rule 40, with regard to notice of
pendency of an appeal from an inferior court to a Court of First
Instance, provides that "it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court
to notify the parties of that fact by registered mail", and the
Supreme Court construing said section held, in Ortiz v.Mania, G.R.
No. L-5147, June 2, 1953, that the notice of the pendency of the
appeal must be served upon the parties for said section being
express and specific cannot be interpreted to mean that the notice
can be given to the lawyer alone.
Similarly, section 1 of Rule 20 (now Section 1, Rule 25) provides
that "any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories", and Chief Justice Moran commenting on this rule
states that "the written interrogatories referred to in the instant
provision should be delivered directly to the adverse party." We
see no valid reason why a different rule should govern request for
admission inasmuch as written interrogatories and request for
admissions are both modes of discovery.
Section 1 of Rule 23 (now Section 1, Rule 26) of the Rules of
Court which expressly states that "a party may serve upon any
other party a written request" should receive no other construction
than that the request for admission must be served directly on the
party and not on his counsel. Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2,
Rule 13) of the Rules of Court does not control the mode of service
of request for admission. It should be observed that the orders,
motions and other papers mentioned in said section have this
property in common: they have to be filed with the court. A
request for admission, on the other hand, need not be filed with the
court; it was intended to operate extra-judicially and courts are not
burdened with the duty to determine the propriety or impropriety
of the request for admission (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1957 ed., 372-73; I Francisco's Rules of Court, Part 2, p.
282).
. . . Permission of the court is not required to
make such a request or demand, or to file it, or
serve it on the adverse party; but service must be
made in the manner specified by the statute or
rule. (27 C.J.C. 277)
And the answer to the request for admission is likewise not a
matter of record and would require another step in procedure to
bring it on record (Seranton Lackawanna Trust Co. vs.
McDermont, 1 Pa. Dist. & Co. 2nd 539, 55 Lack. Jur. 265, cited in
27 C.J.S. 277, fn 19). Section 2 of Rule 27 governs only those
papers that have to be filed in court and does not govern papers
which, by the rules of procedure, do not have to be filed in court.
 In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the
request for admission made by plaintiff was not validly served and
that, therefore, defendant cannot be deemed to have admitted the
truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested and,
consequently, the summary judgment rendered by the court a
quo has no legal basis to support it. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.

The plaintiff-appellee Jose Ledesma, Jr. filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari of the aforesaid resolution, docketed as G.R. No.
L-21715. On 2 October 1963, this Court denied the petition, thus —

After a consideration of the allegations of the petition filed in case

L-21715 (Jose Ledesma, Jr. vs. Guillermo Locsin), for review of
the decision of the Court of Appeals referred to therein, THE
COURT RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served
upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto.
Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts
and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her
answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.