Sun Jin Shin Consolidated Consti 2

G.R. No.
184769 October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas
data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company
and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON
ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July
18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice
her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of
due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of
the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on
the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and
threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from
unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to
be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my
transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the
real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me
think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive
one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition 5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible
by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return
containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by
petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return.
And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a
petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only
to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life
and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to
her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative
as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that
"although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her
place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-
employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring
respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-
200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against
public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly
not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or informationregarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty
and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.13
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario 15 that the writs of amparo and habeas
data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal
to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of
her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown
individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes
if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP.
Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law on June 29,
2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a
regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers,
appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners
were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to
the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)
created under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the PRC and
PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners
sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions of this Act and its
rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof
with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
xxxx
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. – No person shall practice or offer to
practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service practitioner, or use the title,
word, letter, figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or
advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to practice the profession, or be appointed as
real property appraiser or assessor in any national government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has
satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder
of a valid certificate of registration, and professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly
issued to him/her by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers,
they have paid the required bond as hereto provided.
xxxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. – (a) No partnership or corporation shall engage in the business
of real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the persons
authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers
or consultants, as the case may be. The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service
practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be
one (1) licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate
development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real estate
brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real estate
broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same shall be reported
by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of the
resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of registered and
licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform real estate services and the latter
shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the
Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the
issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it
violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to
use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646
violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the
exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a "corps of technically competent,
reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real
estate developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous
effects on the real estate industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of
real estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the
real estate industry generates for the government will be a thing of the past.
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision2 denying the petition. The trial court held that the assailed
provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the practice of real estate service in the
country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter’s
supervision. It likewise found no real discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render
nugatory the license to sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license would still subsist. The only
difference is that by virtue of the new law, real estate developers will now be compelled to hire the services of one
licensed real estate broker for every twenty salespersons to guide and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the
employ of the real estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude property owners from
using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still develop and sell their properties except that
they have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall oversee the actions of the unlicensed real
estate practitioners under their employ. Since the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation
of the practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State’s police power. The trial
court further ruled that Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause because the exemption of real estate
developers was anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the rampant
misrepresentations often committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical
real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of consumers in the regular course of business
compared to isolated sale transactions made by private individuals selling their own property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26
(1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate developers,
are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons who
directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause.3
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the existence of an actual
controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution.5 The controversy must be justiciable – definite and concrete – touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law.6 In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive
in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 7 An
actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.8
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by the prohibition
on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing
requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the
mandate of the new law is likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose
of their properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the
respondents defended as a valid legislation pursuant to the State’s police power. The Court thus finds a justiciable
controversy that calls for immediate resolution.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need
not be an abstract or index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title.11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object.12
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect.13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."14
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the
Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service
sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth,
real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service practice
without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents, appraisers,
consultants and salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate
development project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed by full-time, registered and
licensed real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the property rights and business prerogatives of
real estate developers which are not all reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who
are already regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in the social,
political, economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic
activity and enhancing government income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture
through proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and
will promote the growth of the real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of
technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of
practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the
marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions defined
as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme
to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646
and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with P.D. No. 957 which
decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." Such jurisdiction
includes the authority to issue a license to sell to real estate developers and to register real estate dealers, brokers or
salesmen upon their fulfillment of certain requirements under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers’
property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to sell issued by the NHA (now the
HLURB) to real estate developers allowing them to sell subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public.
Because the HLURB has been divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an implied
repeal of P.D. No. 957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal
by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had
been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. 15 Moreover, the failure to
add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 16
There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D. No.
957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree,"17 vested the NHA with exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to
register, approve and monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and
developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and
salesmen engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) and
transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D. 957 to the HSRC. Among these regulatory functions were
the (1) regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects;
(3) issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of performance
bond and the suspension of license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and salesman engaged in the business of
selling subdivision lots or condominium units; and (6) revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. 18
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
and was designated as the regulatory body for housing and land development under the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues to carry out its mandate to register real estate
brokers and salesmen dealing in condominium, memorial parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D.
No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. – No real estate dealer, broker or salesman shall engage
in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules of the
Authority, including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman
upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the Authority conditioned upon his
faithful compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of each year. Renewal of
registration for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefore made not less than thirty nor
more than sixty days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the
necessity of filing further statements or information, unless specifically required by the Authority. All applications filed
beyond said period shall be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of
Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all persons who will engage in
acts constituting real estate service, including advertising in any manner one’s qualifications as a real estate service
practitioner, compliance with licensure examination and other registration requirements including the filing of a bond
for real estate brokers and private appraisers. While Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements
for dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units, Section 29 of
R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real estate service practitioners whether private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks
to supervise brokers and dealers who are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646
aims to regulate the real estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the level of ethical
standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service practitioners engaged in
the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and
not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB’s supervision
of brokers and dealers to effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the
real estate service as a profession. Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB are now further required
to comply with the professional licensure requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32.
Plainly, there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as
amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting laws.19 Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of
R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D. No. 957.
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional
rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now
burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. Despite having
invested a lot of money, time and resources in their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have
less control in managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property
is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new
requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their
properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct
affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and
public morals.20 In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due
process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or professions.21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners by increasing
their competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and
corruption, especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working under an ineffective regulatory system."
The new regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to
our gross domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of
capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting overall national progress." 22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. As we said in another case challenging the
constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing with their own property,
and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real estate
developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this
provision violates the equal protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from
those exempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist
between ordinary property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into
real estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers.1âwphi1 They assail the RTC
decision in citing the reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the
exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial court’s ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).25
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and
applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a corps of highly
respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally
accepted standards and practice of the profession."28 Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires
or employs the largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of products
(lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the ‘70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and obligations to
comply with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage,
water system and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and
manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was
issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the
legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service
practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers.
Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses
and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure
the health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted under Section
28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.29
Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render
it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the
challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted."30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI
"TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P.
SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL
R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA.
KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist
BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of
Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson
of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary
General Gabriela Women's Party, ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of
the Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and
Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO,
GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her
capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau
of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER
FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS,
JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-
to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF
GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN;
JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE;
JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO;
KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS
SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B. LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR
PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA,
in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive
Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his
capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity
as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her
official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive
Director, Information and Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official
capacity as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME,
in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as
President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO
HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN
HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS
EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-
DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA,
MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS
NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA
ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences
like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses,
credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses
to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and
facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will
who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him
that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a
legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and
networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer
systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these
tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the
original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of
libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, 1 useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard
since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing
the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. 4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools
and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical
hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give
instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into
an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.5
Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search,
the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6Since the
ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage
of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it
intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed
freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form
of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is
proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the
state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis
is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate
the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances
will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency
at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly
tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-
philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such
name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his
real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the
difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a
pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in
penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who
are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion
of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage
has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence,
and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 But the Court acknowledged its existence
as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with
liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained
in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of
these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones
arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by
civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches 16 and seizures,
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In
assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact
number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes
those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail
to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence
as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental
right to acquire another’s personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from
accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published.
But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity
information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made
public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender,
and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. 20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or
social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required
by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 21 They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded
as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common
usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of
love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated
trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting
individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a
proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between
and among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The understanding of those
who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal
cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. 25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of the
RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution
as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration. 27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose
than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against
the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise,
engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with
the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity. 30The
Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons
engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
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(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting
persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography
already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one
has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the
cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture
or create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core
offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines
a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the
idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet
could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now
the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
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(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of
computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject
receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam"
surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment
was said to be making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep
saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams
are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of
commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of
computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited
ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters
is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients
always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same
level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall
be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the
RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code 37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law
carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the
higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. 38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from
the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise
good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v.
People39 even where the offended parties happened to be public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that
it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires
a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme
negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required
to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available
where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and
Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly,
the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure.
Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. 44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of
actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were
public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against
complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her
part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as
there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above
case, cinema and television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of ₱6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement.45 For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s obligations
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the
Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that
penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing
defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been
prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court
and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their
official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested
that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR
states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be
provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government
has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since
Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted.
The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world
apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-
click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated
down the line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute
aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal
with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of
any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids
in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting
sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the
internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a
crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times
sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law. 51 The legislature is not required to define every
single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets
another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms
of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea
of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace
use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a
year, translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most
engaged countries for social networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for
example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared
interests use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who
they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their
profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone,
depending on the user’s privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can
react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the program’s screen such as "Like," "Comment,"
or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or
views about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will
appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and
read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice
of posting small pieces of digital content—which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other
media—on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this particular user’s
posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him
to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to the general
public. If a post is available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting
or republishing another person’s tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service
provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have
provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f)
the person who posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com
(blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service
Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair
with a movie star. Linda, one of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so
immoral." Maria’s original post is then multiplied by her friends and the latter’s friends, and down the line to friends of
friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it interesting
and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena’s "Followers" then "Retweet"
the link to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s "Retweet" of Nena’s original tweet and posts this on her
Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting.
A lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds,
thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing"
it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office
bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing
the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and
noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the
statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world
is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or
Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting
libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting
cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting.
Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands
of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who
should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to
cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and
culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation
of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,61 a case involving the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means
of a telecommunications device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive
computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner available to
a person under 18 years of age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech for
being overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. §223, is a matter of special concern for
two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special
U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute.
In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties including
up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain
silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this increased
deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const.
amend. I concerns than those implicated by certain civil regulations.
xxxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that,
in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably
silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it
could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can
spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying
that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental
purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation
and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected
freedoms.62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress
otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should
provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. 64 Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio
explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the
inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these
doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional
ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here,
one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from
assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds
of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating
free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-
protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction
on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the
law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens
are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed,
how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another
comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory
story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published
on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make
no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships
and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or economic groups, races, or
religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography
and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google
and its users aiders and abettors in the commission of child pornography crimes? 68 Byars highlights a feature in the
American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law lacks—the exemption of a provider or notably a plain
user of interactive computer service from civil liability for child pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether
or not such material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or
unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads
the Facebook mobile application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way,
certain information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial communication could be disseminated on
the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution of this communication?
The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet
users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes
such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3)
on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section
4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1)
on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker
may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security
employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames
and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is alerted. 72 If Section 5 that punishes any
person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username and password
could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from
liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent. 73 While this may be true with
respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts
specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section
4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of
such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof
of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by,
through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions
of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor
General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction,
therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation
of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be
prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses
arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 74 With
the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination
of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one
a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to
include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already
covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender
under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this
Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a
fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding
One million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with
the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That
the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed
through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment
of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one
(1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2)
on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate
to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been
connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to
modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. 78
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to
collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying
service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the
above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is
being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will
be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as
tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure
of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the
purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly
drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State
against constitutional guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the
tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government
should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law
enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record
"traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications."83 And this is precisely what Section 12 does. It
empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for
fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit
the crimes of accessing a computer system without right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or
sexual activity for favor or consideration; 86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection and
prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age,
the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide free
internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid
arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified.
There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could
use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is
only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant
that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards
against crossing legal boundaries and invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed,
the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy
wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy.
Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in
making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational privacy—that those who oppose government collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy
must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or
group, petitioners’ challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users,
meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another.
Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general public’s point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider, must
of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user.
For example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with
his cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this information
that creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed,
sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will
read the information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to
parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken
up into packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data:
information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video,
internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits together
with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose
the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol
(IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the
identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service provider’s communication’s system
will put his voice message into packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are refitted together
and heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the
sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone
number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users
in the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a
call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such
expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over
cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for
a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the
expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered
in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of
the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a person’s close
associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the
public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the
procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means
traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and
that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts
that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing
with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests
that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot
draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission
of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a
general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement
agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against
an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that
traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing
can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender
or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this
supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the
target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing
expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is
not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless
search is associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there
is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched
stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that
the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare
assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant
of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free
speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is
unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals
and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of
a technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with
specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from
the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the
order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer
data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such
service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve
the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken
the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property
in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that
essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are
to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely
keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now
requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at
least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt
of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service
provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an
order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant
data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid
complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose
of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a
judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged
in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for
disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly
issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications
network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of
the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable,
the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data
storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On
its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The
exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15
does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer
data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon
the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service provider’s
storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him
in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the
data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in
violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right
mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital
space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that
no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the
freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged
to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates
some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. 100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established
to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present
danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of
any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation
to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law
enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and
every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, 102 Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to
constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a
judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not
struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. 104 This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such
[cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international
levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted
in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard. 106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are
likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice
of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are
committed with the use of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and
subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the
post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography,
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act
10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same
proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho,
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian
Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo
M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido
C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO
BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-
General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity,
and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared
towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that
concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country
as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and
policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures
and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it
is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its
solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together
- the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the
society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve
Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F.
Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-
Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the
Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit
that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law
fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that
the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the
poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives
that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty
of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated
as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them
(the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods
is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients
to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children
in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who
has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included
in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-
in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On
July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive
drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients
or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space
or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component
of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to
be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population
and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women,
" which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women,
including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in
the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still
not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods,
supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that
"the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act
No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by
a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is
the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to
the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal
access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of
a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits
that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution
vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in
particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has
yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating
measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it
is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-
equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon
the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of
government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the
Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited
and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they
were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then,
it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the
RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and
ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial
review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and
a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality
of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was
argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that
could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the
law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary
to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty
to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of
a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of
the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still,
the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals
standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful
of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so
the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its
true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the
RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem,
however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of
the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are
all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related
to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule
is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction
of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed
in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient;
thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies,
medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which
already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify
that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference
and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined
as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws
of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion
of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this
paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles:
"principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not
merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided
to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however,
it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum
by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation"
of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even
a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect
for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting
fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms,
it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei
of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of
the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human
cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific
phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from
the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying
"from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I
was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed
right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of
the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards
the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized
ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be
banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives
are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State
shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question
of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only
to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free
world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time.
Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say
"from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the
oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article
II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion
of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes
in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a
genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred
from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good
outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and
after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being
can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon
fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities
confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience
by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but
also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the
Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn
from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court
has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates
that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete
with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe
travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive
health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether
or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain
the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do
not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device
that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the
way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection
from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying
the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point
of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is,
which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included
or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on
the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot
fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however,
the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with
the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of
the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device,
or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion
of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification
in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy
against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only
be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those
that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with
each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared
void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have
the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life
must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the
risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive
health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p) 178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical
authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development,
and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to
the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed
by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is
by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system
for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not,
is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate
local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget
allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro,
a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for
it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being
the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been
tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third
sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that
contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim
that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms
true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes
on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions
for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against
a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of
the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers.
They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections
9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to
indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor
injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of
the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information,
choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning
and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point
out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice
health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice,
which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the
constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods
and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one
hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information
and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to
freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account
of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely
free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule
of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary
of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of
the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6
of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions
on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or
any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI,
Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship
(U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single
goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot
or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom
of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road
to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with
proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying
the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying
the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should
be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ
it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.
The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of
the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona
test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of
A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and
immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom
of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail
over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear
and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for
the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is
sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order
of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the
"aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests
which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious
liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious
liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not
be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective
in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved
by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural
methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their
religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and
in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with
their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human
rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society,
faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the
marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number
of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of
benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies
of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation
line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the
things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs
in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption
from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened.
As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience
yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction
of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual
to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of
the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of
the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would
be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood
v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under
the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their
labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according
to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced
to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must
be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After
all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is
not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because
it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict
between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to
achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right
not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation
by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is
prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario
of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children
refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product,
method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden
placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which
could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it
to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last
vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater
to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the
right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however,
failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation,
the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women,
they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for
blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by
a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in
grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause
that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives
of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified
to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor
is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles
are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the
doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives
are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted
to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed
upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to
save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court
finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed
provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck
the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor
daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the
ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right
of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses.
In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for
the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage
as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one
of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the
number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively
to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that
they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta
for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v)
of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed
to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute
authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy
was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure,
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame
population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the
right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right
of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming
the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify
a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or
with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to
information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of
her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect
to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child
and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions
to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society;
and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions.
Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably,
it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall
be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual
abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be
developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could
very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at
the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part
of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must
be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention,
diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse
or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker
who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health
board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care
service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions
earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing
of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services.
For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access
to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established
rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide
with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and
safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the
need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives
that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with
the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing
the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State
shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to
target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate
is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the
other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially
with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and
time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of
such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut
of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations
to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30)
days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to
carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and
medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective.
Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy
of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging
the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental
to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already
been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for
the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in
no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and
the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters
of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis
to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the
Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to
man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information
and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is
the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down
by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the
situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted
by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set
of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary
in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function
of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients
and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 ,
is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and
ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their
wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb,
the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children
(VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection orders
from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and
responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection
and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of
a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior.
They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom
private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the
other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience
from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still
catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City,
who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him
about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner
told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves,
petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son
said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7)
days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told
private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in
the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her
and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him,
she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where
all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is
quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the
conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings
Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein)
to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to
the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family
home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger
that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this
suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through
other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine
National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's
firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational
and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from
1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must
submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the
court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt
of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources
of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered
to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty
(30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van
which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex
van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of
support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice
rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used
by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling
or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to
Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in
the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the
three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of
such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for
the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly
no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent
and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with
long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-
Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of
a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent,
armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a
housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners
Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita
Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that
respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay
for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period
from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD
991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another
vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,
Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-
1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall
affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will
be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of
gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended,
or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion
to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a
copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the
TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued
on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for
thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the
court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement
of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to
raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to
resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007,
petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first
tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698)
filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues
that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under
R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several
key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that
Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where
the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that
the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue."
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind
of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify.
It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause
of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of
a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition
in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising
the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need
to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct
of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order
containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible,
within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend
or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise
modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties.
With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief
that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal
of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is
valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the
same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member
of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which
exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from
acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter
of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very
well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father
of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called
a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-
Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as
other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the
female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this
kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by
women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the
family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope
rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe
that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against
their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include
even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already
difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it
is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger,
more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members
have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible
victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses
on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are
almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other
family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less,
addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available
in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use
this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have
an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived
at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men
and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not
sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment
to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake.
At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance
and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence
and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in
this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may
be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people
to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more
power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression
of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is
a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over
and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared
with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments
in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing
Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded
the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat
his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife
is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it.
These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by
their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their
wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates,"
because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude
the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when
the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner
or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes
place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because
they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993,
the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep.
Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show
that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent
54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of
the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester
of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different
VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape
Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape
Acts of
Lasciviousnes 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
s
Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018 1,588
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8
Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment
1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28

RA 9262 218 924 9,974 9,021
9 7 9 5
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29
Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation
6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 4 8
*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18
percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather
and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways,
streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws
as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals
that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that
the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as
a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once
the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later
be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO
under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an
"illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices
and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women.
As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-
men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out
that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights
of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC
as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but
is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the
victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The
acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make
every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed
by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family
or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater
risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence,
and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required
not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ
of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall
order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The
TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped
of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal
of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated
September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as
her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following
reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property
rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his
things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership,
only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the
law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection.
Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement
about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating
the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an
order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed
upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation
of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under
Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If
the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong
Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and
to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the
Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman
and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance
of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would
remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and
order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for
the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows
that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will
not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 2010 3 and September 6,
20104Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The
RTC had dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to
regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent
officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the
records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III
(Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete
the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for
having a second illegitimate son.5
On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. 6Sun
and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered
Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died 8 without knowing about the birth of his son.
Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she
gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the
revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise
the baby.9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10declaring
Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on
February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the
Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced. 11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together. 12
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment
which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum
was noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.
On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA
testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. 14
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter 15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby
Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed
relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to
prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption
process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over
Baby Julian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period
for her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting
Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD
utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as
basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.
On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable
Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file
their verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section 9 19 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the
service of the writ.
The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied
for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.
On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats
of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the
hearing to August 5, 2010.
At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of
the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the
RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments
raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale
narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:
To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the
court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological
mother.
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main
issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further
hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21
In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and
the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.
On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child
Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down
in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If
there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule
on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors. 23
On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration 24 arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of
the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC,
however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.26
On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced
separation" between her and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the
privilege of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28
The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss
Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power
to repeal, alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions
of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.
Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened
by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and
Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother.
Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when
they deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.30
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On
the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as
the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 34 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.1âwphi1
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian
and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody
of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review
on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting
custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is
a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to
life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to
avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson 1 of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation,2 Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47
and JA HOON KU, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 211403
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and
JAHOONKU, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 211590
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Petitioner,
vs.
JA HOON KU, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-
legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously,
lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions
for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.3
For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders dated 28 January 2014, 4 29
January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the Resolution dated 14 March 2014,7 all issued by respondent
Presiding Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No.
14-131282.
The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic
of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon
Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.
Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.10
On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public
interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11This finding was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16
January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order.12
On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena
Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. 13
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. 14
Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies, docketed as
SP PROC. No. 14- 131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo.16
Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22
January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m., 19 while
he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m. 20
In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ.21 He was then notified that a hearing on
the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for resolution.22
Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014. 23
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting
Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine
National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family.24 On 29
January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of
Ku to the PNP-PSPG.25 Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari 26 docketed as
G.R. No. 210759.
On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku,
as well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of misuse
by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the
BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance. 28
Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before the trial court,
petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition. 29On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos
issued the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. 30Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to
the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.
On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the Office of the
President (OP).32
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately released from
[petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner]
and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of
his family by filing cases to legitimize his detention.33
Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with the case. 34
On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved,
whichever came first.35Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to
which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI, given that such was one of the conditions
for the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku.36 In the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely
noted petitioner’s motion for being moot, considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon
the personal request of Ku.37
Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 211590, essentially
assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.
Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions,38 we come to the central question of whether or not the privilege
of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
We rule in the negative.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) 39 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to
the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or where about s of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law."40
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced
disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as
the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851, 43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.44
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not
only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an
‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances
should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
to R.A. No. 9851.45
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the
statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but
there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on
the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law
for a prolonged time.
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights
under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading
to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights
as well as the expiration of his visa.47
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s
arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced
by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After-Mission Report dated 17 January
2014.49
More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in the custody of
the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order. 50
These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to re move Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and
received at the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014, 51 the following day or on 17 January
2014, Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before the
BI,52 thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply guarded and that he was never removed from the protection
of the law.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits, to wit:
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name
is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed
in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time without
any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention.53
According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against
the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the power of the
government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening
situations and the further the violation of his guaranteed rights.54
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their
claims by substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence
that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the
records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump up charges
against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his arrest, deportation charges
against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this
case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were
unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause
the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As
Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo
in the case at bar.
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation
and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.56
Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When
Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he
committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from another tribunal.
In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein file d before the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to
have the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the latter’s release, and where her husband filed
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion seeking to question the summary deportation
order issued against him, the Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.
The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport
aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration
Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order
in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer
, such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. 58
Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies
in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals.
While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them
simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in
two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the
sequence and hierarchical order in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast
and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing
their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.
On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the Court’s directives as regards this
case. The records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the impropriety of the amparo petition, was
received by the RTC on 5 February 2014.60 This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and
restraint in granting the privilege of the writ of amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Court’s
pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded to grant the said privilege.
Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case, was
received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m.61
Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 which granted the privilege of
the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Court’s Resolution dated 18 Marc h 2014 should have forewarned him against
releasing Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and unwillingness to follow the Court’s edicts.
It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely.1âwphi1 Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant
streak in character, but al so disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive. 62
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the
Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed
as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.63
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. 64
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:
a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the
Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC.No. 14131282 before the Regional Trial of
Manila, Branch 47; and
c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino
Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to forthwith submit to the Court its report and
recommendation thereon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance
No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED
IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN
THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in
the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine
of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment
declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null
and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and
violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed
P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any
standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation
of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on
March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's
decision of September 17,1968: 9
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or
revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power
of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of
the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is
a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.
It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide
or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its
grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant
or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of
power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency power
to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of
uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy,
rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes
conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion
to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as
Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal
tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for
P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of
a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board
and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
(Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being
an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is
neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a
customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both
the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the
Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the
Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same
statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one
per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as
a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not
taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from municipal councils the power to impose an export tax.
Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever,
upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or
export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent
the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this
Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter. And
expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will have on
the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until
Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically
the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff,
for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
under protest. No costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent
laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994
rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No.
7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer,
promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels
of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall
be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That
the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed
under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from
the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation,"
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the
most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the
following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and
amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats
the purpose of the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4(emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235,
without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against
low-salaried employees of the BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-
file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity
between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'. 7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which
will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and
(b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced
since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force
and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. 9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand
the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and
administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence
at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws
and policies of the national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal
protection of the laws."12
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the
equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation
is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the
SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives.
It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment
between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a
rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract
from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, 20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained
no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the
challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in
its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication,
is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New
York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential
district, although it was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the
use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The
Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process.
It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance
with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such
power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so
whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably
adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid
when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the
greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.28 (citations omitted,
emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a
consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium
law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power 30 - but also ruled that
the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted
the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its
continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling
states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of
a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved
by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from
the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is
therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors
an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so
as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation
conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war
and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force (Section
1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance
of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors
to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have
to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far
back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and
should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice
is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief,
unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by
justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare
that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and
void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme
Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus
attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of
negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because
they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as
denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a
provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in
the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute,
enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object
the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property…. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days.
The subsequent inauguration and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common
carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger
of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation
are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad
companies for killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55
S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions
to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily
or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida
for many years had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad
companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing
livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in the operation
of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor
vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the
same animal, the owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the
court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though
the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A
law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination,
it is within the constitutional prohibition….. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their
effect in operation…. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional.
….36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal
protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but
the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. 37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-
file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC); 38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this
common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly,
as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. -
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards
approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector
and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly
merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing
laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall however
endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel
as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their
duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical
administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the
rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the
SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the
Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be
subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of
1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority
to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to
and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases
supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and
administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate
compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses,
privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective management, operation and
administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of
officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and
other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties
and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without prejudice to
yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be exempt
from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions
and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the
Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a
compensation and position classification system and qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That
the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and
which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, and
from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and
determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall
be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all
positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other
government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years
without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The Corporation shall
therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles
under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the
exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury,
even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between
the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made
real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstancethat
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the
constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws
- between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions
between persons who are without differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt
other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP
stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the
other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply
because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through
seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the
right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that
arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the
validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a
period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption
(granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily,
if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or
by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are
similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy
of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policytowards the BSP rank-
and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress
in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be
… denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such
denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial
scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history
shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental
entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar
or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But even then, GFIs and
government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among
government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system
established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and
financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions
as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the
principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic
compensation for all personnel in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System
of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the
private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed
by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions
maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed
to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following
factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to
compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL
by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees
whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution
(GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also
explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based
on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC
or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in
the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent
personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent
personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely
incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the
government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency; 50 provide policy
directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-
bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument
that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution's
mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-
and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the
BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be
exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters
of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate
different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'être of the SSL-exemption
was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they
play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's
mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially
below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the
subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the
classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT
intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover,
the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended
to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class
within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring
with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be
rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation
plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],"53then granted a
blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of
the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the
SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It
bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest
facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do
directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in
common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited
is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to
only one group rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there
were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis
for the classification limiting educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to
civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service.
A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces,
on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment…
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively different.
Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life,
the military veteran becomes part of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty.
Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military
servicemen have a special need for readjustment benefits… 55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics
peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not
only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the
BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether
"being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is
Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the
enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a
"preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these
laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured
not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about
by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation,
position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the
rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court
resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in
pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because
the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based
on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the
constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or
deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-
and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per
se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct. 59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v.
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to
law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State
is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears
the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld
from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-
file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the "rational
basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications 63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless
there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights
the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command
of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on
the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the
legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with
identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement
was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence
between means and ends was not required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier
approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren
era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection:
in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as
ever…But the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than
deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the
deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose…. The intensive review
associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to
ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than
the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
"necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal protection became
a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling"
state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the
presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect
classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist
area of racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well:
illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that
proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous….. [Other fundamental interests included voting, criminal
appeals, and the right of interstate travel ….]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established
ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's
equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict
language of the new equal protection…. [Among the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and
access to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable
resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of
justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the
gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose
frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate
the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending, I believe, on the
constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that
the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal
protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court,
an extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead,
several cases, even while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed
to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection
review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal protection, are less demanding than the
strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an "intermediate" level
of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with respect to
both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under the "old"
mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal
protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to
survive the "intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory
legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can
be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds
such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis
of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of
discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while
allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits derogation by
measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour, language, religion or social origin." 67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of
discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level:
discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.69 But over the years, the European
Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification
being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual
orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe.
This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of
sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible
with the Convention."72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in
relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation
to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination,
together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic
principles in the protection of human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions
about equality.75 The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); 77 the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human
Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter
of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the
Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. 81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights,
commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR
requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the
American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate
discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid
down in the ICESCR83 and in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation,
a United Nations body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments have
specific provisions relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition
against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88the issue before
the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the
scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within
the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26
could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field
of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR.
The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights
in other international treaties such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation
with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to
enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant. 89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has
the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may
occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD
and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other
jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major
cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives
in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach. 92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International
School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of
law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable]
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. 94 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should
not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are
not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our
decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live
in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. 96 Our laws must be
construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language
of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to
serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our
public interest is distinct and different from others. 97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our
jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 98 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality"
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice
in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands
to the State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.… [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution
no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality. 100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of
society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests
of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the
obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered
that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity
perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing
the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A
weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant
to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private
person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the
crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What
is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its
basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in
Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of
the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed
that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is
followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court
- speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly
respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15,
1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of
the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is
akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive
with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are
given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent
rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as
a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a
strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress
is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP
rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to
act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to
adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress
his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to
the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against
because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay,
however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
The Facts
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands
five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure
is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration
Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave
from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner’s weight problem recurred.
He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he
was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his
ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the
company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989. 2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight.
He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on
the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight.
After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager
Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31
Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On
January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight
requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding
would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at the
PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt
with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not
report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal
weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part
of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer
and submit controverting evidence.8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed,
instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company"
regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because "the company has not
been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated."
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight
reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and
considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,"
his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive
part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainant’s dismissal illegal, and
ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of
appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at ₱651,000.00;
b. Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.

SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not
hamper the performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to other positions where
his weight would not be a negative factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr.
Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 19
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss
of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our findings
herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainant’s
entitlement to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant’s entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal
until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the
reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the
same shall be deemed as complainant’s reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall
accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake,
is a disease in itself."26 As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to
the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.27
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary
the Labor Arbiter holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite being
overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of
petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.30
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed31 the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and
VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it "looked at wrong and
irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards
of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight
standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation
to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. 35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness
that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally
proper."36 In other words, "the relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the
standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard." 37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. 38 Thus, petitioner
was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. 39 It is obvious that the
issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA
held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies
an employee’s separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN BE A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL FOR
OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE
EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR
REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) 44 of the Labor Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing
qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is
unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were the "prescribed weights"
that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they
were standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to maintain
these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to
be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not
squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes analogous
to the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior
to employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after
hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of
Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether
or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x 45
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or
illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in
subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura’s illness –
occasional attacks of asthma – is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court
said, "illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law
are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Nadura’s illness could be considered as "analogous"
to any of them is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his
own voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at
bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No.
1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third,
in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was
dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue
in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers
on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the
employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four
(4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was
able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner
himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I
can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses." 50 However, petitioner has only himself to
blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. 51 He chose to
ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering
a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,52decided
by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to
1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by
respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent admitted that her performance
met the Center’s legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood 5’2"
tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability
to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in direct
violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 53 which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within
the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose
weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that
respondent discriminated against Cook based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological
appetite – suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory,
and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality
of the limitation flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual
can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island,
Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her
height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here.
At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not
be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically means that the just
cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the
employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification
is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).55 In the United States, there are a few federal and many state
job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of
prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or
enterprise.56
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.57 Further,
there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.58
Both arguments must fail.
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons 62 contain
provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and
Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU),63 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in
determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; 64 (2) the employer must establish that the
standard is reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must
establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove
that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that
there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.67
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid
"provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance." 69
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to pass
upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It
was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the
company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor
Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers it transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the
weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of
being a common carrier.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board
the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It
cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on
their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies,
just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding public,
expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly.
A lesser performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of
the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation
of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly,
airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to
passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of
emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent
that "[w]hether the airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with airworthiness of respondent’s
airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved
there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and
a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60
retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being
overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin
space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly
have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant
occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction
of evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the
aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the
aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers
out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds
are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation
might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not
remote.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior to
his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. 78 In fact, never did he
question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit
fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang
napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both
male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the commission
of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.79 We are
constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in
this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being
overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including
the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondent’s failure to comply." 80It is a basic rule in
evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his
allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment.
Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly
situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential
treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to
indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and
other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of
the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are
accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their
specific and specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts
are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated
evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed.
Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty86 of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. 88 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, 89 which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. 91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is entitled
to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was
reversed by the CA.92
At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.
The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of
execution,93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not
belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to frustrate his "immediate return to his
previous position,"94 there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position
in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on
February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.96
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case 97 that "[t]he unjustified refusal of the
employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution" 98 and ""even if the order of reinstatement
of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court."99 He failed to prove that he complied
with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from
the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on the payment of his full backwages.
In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the
issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law
does not exact compliance with the impossible.100
V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.
Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of
Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act "social justice," 101 or based on
"equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect
on the moral character of the employee.103
Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service.104 It
should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving.105 We are not blind to the fact that he was not
dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that
his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando
G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of
service, which should include his regular allowances.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven
composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth
will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order 1 of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial
Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph
2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The
Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro
and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. 2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate
with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any
inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash 3 on the ground
that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file
their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on police power, Professor
Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted). In fact the person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the
police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the
people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In
the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there
was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where
the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer.
Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice,
both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the author
thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated
that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants
and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime,
and the defense to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,6directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since
the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They
likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates
against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes.
It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome
this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article
202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28,
2004, denying the petitioners’ Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject criminal
cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal
protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal
statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable
to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public or semi-public buildings
or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support" offers too wide
a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when there are
many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by
the high unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot find
gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court
declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal
protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law and
those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual
a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers
no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force
of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy
legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special
application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that
respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the
standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare
in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.
They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal
protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness
doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of
constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.14 However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the
citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness
doctrine which states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."16
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to
criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported
ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate
"as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and
(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law
covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to
be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
conjectural or anticipatory.18
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed by
the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December
31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention,
the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in
Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate
with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any
inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible
means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant"
as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places
under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 case, which in essence declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be informed as
to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the
acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S.
337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the regulatory
schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read
them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to
commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent. "Nightwalking"
is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855,
only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however, from
experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a national virtue in his
Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The
qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served"
would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be "casing"
a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police.
Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving
our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified
the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have
encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may be punished
for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type
proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the
House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate
solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a potential offender,
but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early
student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long
common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.
xxxx
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are
supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule
of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is
too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they
are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its
application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed
administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor
as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. 21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;" and 2) it encourages or
promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give
fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern
and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that
admits of exceptions.23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof, which are
not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 257) provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use juggling or
unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen
property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly
persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame,
gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living
upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court
shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as
nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending
of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children,
which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in
Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – "any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support" – from the
Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose
or object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by "without visible means of support"
while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without any lawful purpose or object," which was held
by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable
cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the
search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents,
echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is
therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but
more than suspicion or possibility.25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for,
absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. 26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms
of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the
most unhappy in some measure agreeable.27
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance
operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our
Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a
source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article
202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe,
a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs,
prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets
and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred
criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed
or mauled – if not killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing
hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit
publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are
stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed,
if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible
victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars
endlessly pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers
and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never say
that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and
restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain
minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be traced all the way back
to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of
life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the "abuse of rights" doctrine embodied in
the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.29 This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to
embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for
the stability of the social order."30
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of
the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force
rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims. 31 Any private person may abate a public nuisance
which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from public indecencies and immoralities, to public
nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities
and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a
bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.33 As a matter of public
policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods,
if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. 34 Thus, public nuisances must be
abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of
a community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but
for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension
in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which
punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such
conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of
the community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their
effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs
work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations,
drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-
sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all
around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting
to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit.
The streets must be made safe once more. Though a man’s house is his castle, 35 outside on the streets, the king is fair
game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with
grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions
and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. 37
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its
scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional
light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special
Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,
CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY
OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF
TAGUM,petitioners-in-intervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to
restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure
a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. 6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution
of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting
a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood
Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities
of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the
"primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities,
have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared
constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has
sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue
Allotment to political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component
city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices,
and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau;
or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement
on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers,
and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from
the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income
requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the
11thCongress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into
law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on
30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which
became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This
basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively
but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even
the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities
and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood
bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of
RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair
and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair
and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. 20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption
from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending
when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no
exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a
city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11 th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of
respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe
such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law
that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in
a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a
special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps
of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. These hearings
and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus
officioupon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress.
When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from
square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the
approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration
shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the
commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all
Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during
the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no
legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the
ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional
because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should
be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection
clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the
11thCongress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not
entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable
to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with
pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress − is
not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting
into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been
informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they
have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less
than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the
time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten
Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price
lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may
except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the
act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such
laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of,
the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary
date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification
bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was
aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and
denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based
on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert
into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood
Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo.
Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers.
Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. 1 It is in this light that
we should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary events, the petition begs for immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR
LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall contain the
titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite.
Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using
the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature
to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to
participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: - Provided, That,
any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the
campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well as petitions for
registration and/or manifestation to participate in the Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the
deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized citizens'
arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be
impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other
technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct. 2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN
ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO
USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY,
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS
AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the size and
form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted
upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present
the names of all candidates for the same position in the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must
be constructed to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter
sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and
change all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the names
of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The
maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each
proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the
official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the
day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official candidates within thirty (30) days before the
start of the period for filing a certificate of candidacy.
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office
and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security
measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon
certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements.
Accredited political parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing, storage
and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards,
such as, but not limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from
November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run
in the coming elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-
quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
The Petitioners' Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver
that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official
ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the
CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a candidate only at the start of the campaign
period. Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government
offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law,
already considered as candidates.6
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. 7
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their
CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. 8
The Respondent's Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC,
argues that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they
are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the petition is
premature or unripe for judicial determination." Petitioners have admitted that they are merely planning to file their
CoCs for the coming 2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent
upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are
questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule
65 is then an improper remedy.9
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees with petitioners that
there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no
basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to vacate their positions on the same
day that they file their CoCs, because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this - deemed
resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election
laws with the innovations brought about by the automated system. 10
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a
resolution issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners
actually seek from the Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights
thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for declaratory relief, 12 over which this Court does not exercise original
jurisdiction.13
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of both the COMELEC
resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in
their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil
servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable
damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpowerfurther dictate that
the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication
of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice or technicalities of procedure and resolve
the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to
provide guidelines for the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the
courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. 14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the brief history of the assailed provision. Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the
day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso
was lifted from Section 66 of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code,
contained a similar provision, thus'
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of
certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise stated in its Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or employee in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which he may have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code approved on June 21, 1947, also provided
that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees who are candidates. - Every person holding a
public appointive office or position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT
ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946,
contained, in the last paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies or
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective, shall be considered to
have resigned from such office from the moment of the filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June 22, 1941, the
precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August 22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same
verbatim provision as Section 26 of R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the Election Law enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, the last paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds
said public office to election, at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position
which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer
or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any
manner or take any part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his
office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term of five years: Provided, however, That the
foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any
election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369- that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed
forces, and officers, and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy- traces its roots to the period of the American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and
enacted as R.A. No. 9369, Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged that the said proviso
in the proposed legislative measure is an old provision which was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus'
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion of the good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY
PERSON HOLDING [means currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO
RESIGNED- [which means that the prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"- This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman
of SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee amendment.
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.- I see.
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmeña.- All right.16
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago expressed her concern over the inclusion of
the said provision in the new law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to potential candidates
holding appointive positions, while it grants a consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus'
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause, so I make this point more as a matter of
record than of any feasible hope that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the House, it
will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC
APPOINTIVE OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM HIS/HER OFFICE."
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for
exempting elective officials from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law.- If we are going to consider
appointive officers of the government, including AFP members and officers of government-owned and controlled
corporations, or any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why should it not apply to the elective
sector for, after all, even senators and congressmen are members of the civil service as well
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to give an exception to itself which is not
available to other similarly situated officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are special is
that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on all other government officials except ourselves, I think,
it is the better part of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as senators, we wait until our
term expires. But if we want to run for some other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered
resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor,
because of sensitivity to the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.- It is a good policy.- However, this is something
that is already in the old law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the rider was not upheld
and that it was valid.17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic resignation of appointive civil servants must have
been the reason why Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of amendments: "ANY
PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A
CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso seems to
mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as
candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive
positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by
law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar
provision on automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office other than that which
they hold in a permanent capacity or for President or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006,
or the Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of the said act. There was, thus, created
a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices
upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fari᳠v. The Executive Secretary21 when it ruled that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.- If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials,
as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote.- Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them.- Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳠/i>, was intently focused on the main issue of whether the
repealing clause in the Fair Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly failed to ascertain
with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive
positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-୶is the equal protection clause.- Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳠/i> was
shrouded by the fact that petitioners therein, Fari᳠et al., never posed a direct challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 66 of the OEC. Fari᳠et al. rather merely questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section
14 of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari᳠/i> may then very well be considered as an
obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge advanced by
petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back
to the American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the issues on legal standing and on the existence
of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 23 In this case, petitioners allege that
they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications,
to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they
are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds
of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights. 25
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. 27 The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or
controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very
acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given
that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it
presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the Court now delves into the constitutional
challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of
expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft, 29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out
in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of
grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly
defined concept of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy
the individual wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the
public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in
time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote
additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective expression
changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the newspaper.
At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention
of an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most
appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by
filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter
instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views of the elected
public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends
beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee,
may not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for
public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely
that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to associate. In
Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually
impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First Amendment protected the
freedom to associate by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state
effectively denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects
associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization
or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his
supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the
electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done
is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept of making
expression effective. Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery
to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or associational
effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may open
previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may
be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his
candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views.
In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most
diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest
protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the
preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment
right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must be
subjected to strict equal protection review.30
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the
Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for the Court to
strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently.
As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 31 a real and substantial
distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable
and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement if it is not germane
to the purpose of the law. Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law, explains,
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the
law. To illustrate, the accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will justify the prohibition of
the latter from employment as miners or stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this same
classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing average for women in the bar examinations because
physical strength is not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than
locally assembled automobiles for the protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no justification
for treating them differently when it comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has
no relation to the observance of these rules.32
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. 33
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one's
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. 34 The restriction is
also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued
on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented
by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could
wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past,
elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification
to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period
and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven
by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic resignation, which restricts the rights of civil
servants to run for officea right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is not reasonably
necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso
succinctly declares'
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review, however, we do see some contemporary relevance
of the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for the Cranston charter provision to withstand
strict scrutiny, the city must show that the exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest. And, as stated in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its
civil service. It is obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service would be seriously jeopardized
if people in positions of authority used their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions rather than the public
welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow employees to engage in corrupt practices in return for
promises of post-election reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking to extract special
favors from his superiors, the civil service would be done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-
employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the candidate or might improperly adjust their own
official behavior towards him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of their occurrence might
seriously erode the public's confidence in its public employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial
as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board
has access to confidential files which could provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless
of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed
has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all
kinds by all kinds of public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this state interest. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in Dunn v. Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with precision. For three
sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner
and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic
rule-may be unnecessary to fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort of prophylactic rule may
be required, the provision here prohibits candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would pose
none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision excludes the candidacies of all types of public
employees, without any attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them vulnerable to
corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply
fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second
proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy
high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can
use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who occupy relatively
high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek
public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the
Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest
participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is
the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. 36
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms
of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates from them.
Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the device of the leave of absence. Some system
of leaves of absence would permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while assuring him his
old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover, a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the
opportunities for engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to prevent. While campaigning,
the candidate would feel no conflict between his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any conflict
between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to confidential documents. But instead of adopting a
reasonable leave of absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public employee cast off the
security of hard-won public employment should he desire to compete for elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or
criminal prosecution, rules or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official corruption. By thus
attacking the problem directly, instead of using a broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without
unduly burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v.
Blumstein, the Supreme Court faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that the interest of
ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and three month residency requirements before a citizen could
vote. Justice Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of criminal statutes that could be used
to punish voter fraud without unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it appears from the
record in this case that the Cranston charter contains some provisions that might be used against opportunistic public
employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a
narrow provision that attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a Cranston public
employee from running for any office, anywhere. The prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but
rather extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for us to see that a public employee
running for the United States Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee if
he were running for a local office where the contacts and information provided by his job related directly to the position
he was seeking, and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater. Nor does the Cranston charter except
the public employee who works in Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably his town of
residence. Here again the charter precludes candidacies which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service. Finally,
the charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but sterilizes also those public employees who would
seek nonpartisan elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan political activity, and since that
time other courts have found the partisan-nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin State
Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by
systems whose true characters are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it seems clear that the concerns
of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed
from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment in a charter of this sort.
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the Cranston charter relates not to the type of office
sought, but to the type of employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S.
at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on administrative employees who either participate in decision-making or at
least have some access to information concerning policy matters are much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial
employees, who, but for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for purposes of access to official
information, identically situated to all other industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be
distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools
of Cranston be distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second line of distinction that focuses on
the type of employee is illustrated by the cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these cases a civil service
deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The courts in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in
question were much too broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to justify a flat rule was
one in which an inferior in a public office electorally challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations,
we think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with
the specific kinds of conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee
to the extent that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable on-the-job campaigning and
discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling
interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the
city could fire the individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts the work of others. Also, the
efficiency rationale common to both arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a number of
non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between
after-hours campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a public employee would be able to
campaign aggressively and still continue to do his job well.38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing39 sustained as constitutional a provision on the automatic resignation of District Clerks,
County Clerks, County Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and
Animals, County Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes, District Attorneys,
County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in
any general, special or primary election.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating differently particular officials, as distinguished from
all others, under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp of approval from American
courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid
classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had
already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too, should follow suit and,
thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old, but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50905 September 23, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUMAWAN alias "KIKO", CESARIO JUMAWAN alias "SARIO", MANUEL JUMAWAN alias "OWEL"
and PRESENTACION JUMAWAN-MAGNAYE alias "ESEN" accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit executed by
Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on
July 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan,
Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The affidavit of Trinidad Alcantara clearly states that her son Rodolfo Magnaye was married to Presentacion Jumawan
albeit they had been living separately from each other. (During the trial Presentacion admitted her marriage to Rodolfo.
See t.s.n., pp. 811-812.) The Station Commander can perhaps be excused for not accusing Presentacion of parricide
but when the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Quezon where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
1408, the Provincial Fiscal perpetuated the mistake by filing an information for murder against all the accused. The
information reads:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CESARIO JUMAWAN alias 'Sario,' MANUEL JUMAWAN alias 'Owel',
FRANCISCO JUMAWAN alias 'Kiko' and PRESENTACION JUMAWAN alias 'ESEN', of the crime of murder, defined and
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June 1976, in the Municipality of Sariaya, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo (gulukan), conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with the said bolo one Rodolfo Magnaye alias 'Digo', thereby inflicting upon the latter a stab wound
on the chest, which directly caused his death.
After a long trial and 1,211 pages of stenographic transcript, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
Wherefore, the Court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco
Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to
indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.
The case is now before this Court on appeal.
The brief of the appellants gives the following:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Accused:
Francisco Jumawan is the father of his co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion
Jumawan.
Presentacion Jumawan was married to Rodolfo Magnaye.
Death of Rodolfo Magnaye:
As described by the lower court, '... when Rodolfo Magnaye did not return home in (that) evening of 19 June 1976, his
mother (Trinidad Alcantara) went to the public market to look for him on the following day. She met four (4) children
who told her that they saw a man near the water. They accompanied her to the place and she recognized the dead
man as her son Rodolfo Magnaye. She then proceeded to the police headquarters to report the matter. ...' (page 5,
Judgment).
For the death of Rodolfo Magnaye, the accused stand charged of the crime of MURDER.
The People's brief, on the other hand, merely reproduces the trial court's findings of facts as follows:
It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to
Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left
the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and
stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.
The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo
Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry
again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.
On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo Magnaye and his mother
to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in securing a
separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.
Between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 while Trinidad Alcantara was in her house, her son
Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told her that he was going to the public market because his wife asked him to
fetch her. He asked his mother to prepare food because they are going to talk about their lives. He left home at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening.
At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of 19 June 1976 one Mr. Vicente Recepeda came from the Aglipayan fiesta in
Sariaya, Quezon and after eating at the Sariling Atin eating place he went to the former BLTB station at Sariaya,
Quezon. While he was infront of the public market on the way to the former BLTB station he heard the noise of pigs
being butchered and being in the business of buying pigs and chicken he went to the direction of [the] slaughter house
to inquire about the prices of pigs and chicken.
Before reaching the slaughter house he heard the noise (sic) of a person being attacked by three (3) persons and a
woman inside a store which was lighted. He saw accused Francisco Jumawan holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye
while accused Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye while
Cesario Jumawan was infront of Rodolfo Magnaye with his left hand holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and in his
right hand he was holding a small pointed bolo with which he stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye below the right nipple.
At about 11:00 o'clock in that evening a certain Mr. Policarpio Trinidad who also came from the Aglipayan fiesta in
Sariaya, Quezon was waiting infront of a gasoline station across the old station of the BLTB waiting for a ride home
when he saw Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan with Rodolfo Magnaye between them while they were crossing
the national highway towards the south to a road opposite the Emil Welding Shop. They went on walking after crossing
the highway. At that time the head of Rodolfo Magnaye was bowed infront while his two (2) arms were on the shoulder
of Cesario and Manuel Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye was not walking.
At about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of 19 June 1976 Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye reported to Patrolman Marcial
Baera and Patrolman Albufera that the store of Bastiana (Sebastiana) Jumawan where she works is threatened to be
robbed by Rodolfo Magnaye. When asked by Patrolman Baera Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye denied being
related to Rodolfo Magnaye. He went to investigate the reported attempt to rob the store of Sebastiana Jumawan
and he saw one of the panels used to close the store was destroyed but nothing appears to have been taken from the
store.
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye and her companions Tita Dañez and Anabelle Jumawan told Patrolman Baera that
they will file charges against Rodolfo Magnaye. Patrolman Baera entered the report of Presentacion Jumawan-
Magnaye in the police record book.
When Rodolfo Magnaye did not return home in that evening of 19 June 1976, his mother (Trinidad Alcantara) went to
the public market to look for him on the following day. She met four (4) children who told her that they saw a man near
the water. They accompanied her to the place and she recognized the dead man as her son Rodolfo Magnaye. She
then proceeded to the police headquarters to report the matter.
The two Patrolmen Baera and Albufera went to the place and they saw the dead man without a shirt and wearing
black pants with white shoes. They noticed a stab wound on the lower portion of the right breast. The dead man was
lying face up.
In the afternoon of the same day Patrolman Loreto Galeon went to the store of Sebastiana Jumawan located at the
public market of Sariaya to follow up the investigation of the reported attempted robbery case against Magnaye. He
asked the storekeeper for permission to look at the wood panels which are used to close the store. He found traces of
blood in one of the wooden panels. He reported what he saw to Sgt. Labitigan when he returned to the police
headquarters.
The following day he was ordered by the chief of police to look again at the wooden panel with traces of blood but
he saw that the wooden panels were already planed ('kinatam') and the traces of blood could no longer be seen.
On 23 June 1976, Patrolman Rodrigo Cedonio was ordered to look for Tita Dañez in Barrio Mamala Sariaya, Quezon
because Tita Dañez was allegedly in the store at the time of the alleged attempted robbery and at the time Rodolfo
Magnaye was allegedly killed.
Patrolman Cedonio was informed by the mother of Tita Dañez that she had not gone to her home at barrio Mamala.
She accompanied Patrolman Cedonio in trying to locate Tita Danez. They first went to the store of Sebastiana Jumawan
which turned out to be closed on that day. They then went at Muntingbayan, Tayabas, Quezon where they were able
to find Tita Danez together with Francisco Jumawan, Bienvenido Jumawan and Rosita Abratiga.
Mr. Cesario Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case and a brother-in-law of the victim, set up
the defense of alibi when he testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 he was at
Barrio Sampaloc, Sariaya, Quezon which is more or less three (3) kilometers away from the poblacion of Sariaya,
Quezon. He went home to Barrio Pili of the same town early in the afternoon of the following day. He did not go
anywhere else since 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 up to and until he returned to Barrio Pili.
Mr. Manuel Jumawan, another accused in the above entitled criminal case who is also a brother-in-law of the victim,
likewise set up the defense of alibi when he testified that on 19 June 1976 he was in his house at Barrio Pili, Sariaya,
Quezon which is about five (5) kilometers from the poblacion of Sariaya, Quezon. He went to bed at about 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of 19 June 1976. He woke up at about 6:30 o'clock in the morning.
He further claims that he suffers from an abnormality of the left arm which he cannot raise in a normal way and that
he was suffering from said disability since childhood when he fell from a cow continuously up to the present.
Said accused presented a medical certificate, Exhibit 7, issued by Dr. Concepcion dela Merced, a radiologist of the
National Orthopedic Hospital certifying to the fact that Manuel Jumawan is negative for fracture dislocation and that
he suffers from a deformity of the proximal and left humerous probably from a previous fracture. There is no showing
that Manuel Jumawan is incapable of raising his left arm around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye whose actual height
was not established by the evidence nor was Dr. Concepcion dela Merced presented to testify on her findings.
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye claims that in the evening of 19 June 1976 she was in the store of Sebastiana
Jumawan together with Anabelle Jumawan and Tita Dañez when she heard a person who wanted to enter the store.
She shouted 'thieves' ('magnanakaw'). In response to her shouts several people arrived and chased the person who
wanted to enter the store. She then went to the house of Sebastiana Jumawan where hats are being made and where
her father Francisco Jumawan was staying that night.
While she was in the house where her father was staying, their adjoining neighbor, a certain Mateo Diamante informed
her that the person being chased by several men was Rodolfo Magnaye. She, however, did not talk with any of the
person who chased her husband nor does she know any of them. She then went with her father, Francisco Jumawan, to
report the matter to the police whom they met at the Filipina Restaurant.
While Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye gave the name of Rodolfo Magnaye as the suspect in the attempted robbery,
she did not reveal to the investigating policemen that he was her husband even if she was asked why they knew his
name, neither did she inform the police that her husband was chased by several persons nor did she give the direction
where her husband supposedly ran.
The two policemen, Patrolmen Baera and Albufera, actually went to the store of Sebastiana Jumawan and after looking
at the store, these two patrolmen told Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye that because nothing happened they will
continue the investigation on the next day.
None of those who allegedly chased her husband that evening was even presented as a witness.
Mr. Francisco Jumawan, who is the father of his three (3) other co-accused, likewise set up the defense of alibi when he
testified that in the evening of 19 June 1976 at about 8:00 o'clock more or less he was alone in the house of Sebastiana
Jumawan situated near the former garage of the BLTB in Sariaya, Quezon and that he was awakened only when his
daughter Presentacion woke him up to ten him that someone was trying to enter the store of Sebastiana Jumawan.
In a brief which is more noteworthy for legal rhetoric rather than a critical analysis of the evidence, the appellants
claim that the trial court committed the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FOCUSING OBJECTIVELY AND IMPARTIALLY THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION EVEN AS IT FOCUSED SUBJECTIVELY AND UNFAIRLY ON SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE DEFENSE.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE THAT THE ACCUSED ARE PRESUMED INNOCENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND
ARE ENTITLED TO A RIGHT TO A DAY IN COURT CANNOT BE OVERTURNED BY THE DOCTRINE THAT APPELLATE
COURTS ARE NOT PRONE TO DISTURB THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND TAKING INTO SERIOUS ACCOUNT THE FATAL WEAKNESSES OF
THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IN TERMS OF IMPROBABILITIES, GROSS INCONSISTENCIES AND
IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE STAR PROSECUTION
WITNESS CONSIDERING THE GLARING WEAKNESS THEREOF, EVEN AS THE LOWER COURT CONVENIENTLY DENIED
THE DEFENSE REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS ERRONEOUS APPROACH TO AND APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI IN THE CASE AT BAR. SPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO POSITIVE
IdENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED AND ALSO THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY REBUT THE DEFENSES OF
ALIBI WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY TO DO IF SUCH DEFENSES WERE REALLY CONCOCTIONS.
The foregoing assignment of errors can be reduced to the simple proposition whether the evidence against the accused,
independent of their alibis, has overcome the presumption of innocence in their favor and created a moral certainty as
to their guilt.
Except for Vicente Recepeda and Policarpio Trinidad, the appellants do not question the credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. Hence, the testimony of these witnesses deserves scrutiny.
Vicente Recepeda was 67 years old, jobless and a resident of Lucena City when he first testified on April 29, 1977.
He testified that on June 19, 1976, he went to Sariaya, Quezon, to attend the Aglipayan fiesta; he arrived there at
about 5:00 o'clock and thereafter did the following: listened to the music and singing, went to the Aglipayan church
and the "perya," ate at a restaurant, and walked to the public market where there was a former BLTB station. While
he was waiting for a trip to Lucena, he heard the shriek of pigs being killed so he walked toward the butchers for the
purpose of asking the price of pigs since he was then engaged in the business of buying and selling pigs. In fact, at one
time Rodolfo Magnaye, the deceased, tied the feet of a pig which he had bought. He was not able to talk to the
butchers because an unusual event intervened which in his own words was:
Q. At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of June 19, 1976, do you remember where were you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Where were you on that particular date and hour?
A. I was in the public market of Sariaya, Quezon, sir.
Q. While you were in the market of Sariaya, Quezon, on that particular date and hour, do you remember if there was
any unusual incident that you witnessed?
A. There was, sir.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened on that particular place and hour?
A. I saw a person being attacked by three persons, sir.
Q. What else did you see there on that particular occasion, aside from a person being attacked by three persons?
A. There was a woman who ordered the three persons to stab and kill the person being attacked by these three persons,
sir.
Q. Where in particular in the public market of Sariaya, Quezon did you see this incident happen?
A. Inside the store within the public market of Sariaya, Quezon, sir.
Q. Did you recognize, or did you come to know these three persons whom you said were inside the store within the
public market of Sariaya, Quezon at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of June 19, 1976?
A. I recognize their faces, sir.
Q. Did you come to know their names later on?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What is the name of the woman whom you said was there on that particular occasion?
A. Presentacion Jumawan, sir.
Q. If you will see that Presentacion Jumawan again, will you be able to Identify her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please look around the courtroom and point to Presentacion Jumawan if she is here.
A. She is here sir.
Q. Please point her out to this Honorable Court.
A. That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we respectfully ask if your honor please that the person pointed to by the witness Identify herself.
COURT:
Ask the person to Identify herself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Presentacion Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness your honor, Identified herself as Presentacion Jumawan.
ATTY. ALCALA:
And what is the name of the person whom you said was being attacked by the three men on that particular occasion
inside the store?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. And what are the names of the three persons attacking Rodolfo Magnaye, will you please state it before this
Honorable Court?
A. Yes, sir, one is Francisco Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and the other one is Cesario Jumawan.
Q. That Francisco Jumawan whom you said was one of the persons attacking Rodolfo Magnaye, on that particular
occasion, will you be able to recognize him if you will see him again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If this Francisco Jumawan is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out before this Honorable Court?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please do so.
A. That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
Your honor please may we ask that the person pointed to by the witness Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the Identity of the person pointed to by the witness.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Francisco Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness your honor Identify himself as Francisco Jumawan.
Q. And that person whom you said the name as Manuel Jumawan will you be able to recognize him if you will see him
again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around the courtroom and point out to this Honorable Court if Manuel Jumawan is here inside the
courtroom.
A. Yes, sir, that one.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we ask Your Honor that the person pointed to by the witness be made to Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the person pointed to by the witness to Identify himself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Manuel Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness Your Honor Identified himself as Manuel Jumawan.
Q. And that person whom you mentioned is named Cesario Jumawan, will you be able to Identify him if you will him
again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around the courtroom and point to this Honorable Court the person whom you said is Cesario Jumawan.
That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we request your honor that the person pointed to by the witness Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the person pointed to by the witness to Identify himself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Cesario Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness Identify himself as Cesario Jumawan Your Honor.
Q. On that occasion what was Francisco Jumawan doing at that time you saw him?
A. He was standing besides Rodolfo Magnaye and holding his hands.
Q. Who was holding his hands?
A. Francisco Jumawan was holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. How about Manuel Jumawan, what was he doing?
A. Manuel Jumawan was at the back of Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. How about Cesario Jumawan what was he doing on that particular occasion?
A. He was in front of Rodolfo Magnaye, his left hand is holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and his right hand
holding a bolo, sir.
Q. How about Presentacion Jumawan, what was she doing on that particular occasion?
A. She was standing inside the store ordering the three persons to stab and kill Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. What happened when Presentacion Jumawan give that order?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye was stabbed, sir.
Q. Who stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye on that occasion?
A. Cesario Jumawan, sir.
Q. At that time that Cesario Jumawan stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye on that particular occasion, what were Francisco
Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan doing.?
A. Francisco Jumawan was holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye with his arms around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye,
sir.
Q. What happened to Rodolfo Magnaye when he was stabbed by Cesario Jumawan on that occasion?
A. He was hit by the stab, sir.
Q. Where was Rodolfo Magnaye hit by the stab of Cesario Jumawan on that occasion?
A. Under the right nipple, sir. Below the right nipple.
Q. What did Rodolfo Magnaye do on that particular occasion after he was hit?
A. He said, why did you stab me.
Q. What did you do after that?
A. I left, sir.
Q. While you were walking away did you hear anything?
.A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you hear?
A. A voice of a woman shouting, thief, thief.
Q. What did you do when you heard the shout of a woman?
A. I hurriedly walked away, sir.
Q. Did you finally came to know what happened to Rodolfo Magnaye as a result of that incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened to him?
A. He died, sir. (t.s.n., pp. 494-509.)
Policarpio Trinidad was 28 years old and a laborer at the time he first testified on June 27, 1977. He testified that he
knew Manuel Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan and Rodolfo Magnaye; that on June 19, 1976, at about 11:00 p.m., he was
in Sariaya, Quezon, near the old station of the BLTB; and on that occasion he saw the aforesaid persons thus:
Q. Will you please describe before this Honorable Court their position when you saw them?
A. Their hands were on the shoulders of each other.
Q. And who was in the middle?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. Will you please tell this Honorable Court the appearance of Rodolfo Magnaye when you saw him being in the
middle of Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan on that occasion?
A. His head falls and his two hands were on the shoulder of Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan.
Q. Did you see where these persons were going on that particular occasion when you said you saw them?
ATTY. CUARTOY
Objection Your Honor, that has already been answered, that they are going out of the old BLTB station.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A. They cross the highway, sir.
Q. In what particular place did they go when they cross the highway?
A.. They went to the road opposite the Emil Welding Shop, sir.
Q. Did you see on that particular occasion whether Rodolfo Magnaye was walking?
A. He was not walking and he cannot step his feet, sir.
Q. When they went to that place, near the Emil Welding Shop, did they go any further?
A. They proceeded walking, sir.
Q. Where did you go upon seeing them?
A. I went directly to my house, sir.
(t.s.n., pp. 628-631.)
The testimony of Vicente Recepeda linked to that of Trinidad Alcantara and Policarpio Trinidad shows that the four
appellants conspired and cooperated in the assassination of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The victim and his wife had a rendezvous in the evening of June 19, 1976, in order to discuss the fate of their marriage.
While it is not known if they actually conversed, the purpose of the rendezvous was in fact accomplished; the marriage
was terminated by the murder of the husband.
The report to the police by Presentacion that Rodolfo Magnaye had attempted to rob the store of Sebastiana Jumawan
was a crude diversionary tactic to enable Cesario and Manuel to transfer the cadaver to another place.
The alibis of Francisco, Cesario and Manuela are for naught.
Francisco claimed that in the evening of June 19, 1976, he was in the house of Sebastiana Jumawan, not in her store.
Cesario said that while his residence was Barrio Pili, Sariaya, on the night of June 19, 1976, he and his wife were in
Barrio Sampaloc, Sariaya, visiting his brother Benigno Jumawan and they did not return to Pili until the next day.
Manuel said that on the night of June 19, 1976, he was in his house at Barrio Pili.
These alibi cannot prevail for the following reasons: (a) Francisco, Cesario and Manuel were positively Identified to be
at the scene of the crime by Vicente Recepeda and Cesario and Manuel were similarly Identified by Policarpio Trinidad;
and (b) the places where they claimed to be were not far from the scene of the crimeso that it was not impossible fro
them to be there. Sebastiana Jumawan's house where Francisco was supposed to be is within walking distance from the
former's store. Barrio Sampaloc, where Cesario claimed he was, is only about three kilometers from the poblacion of
Sariaya. Barrio Pili, where Manuel said he slept that night, is about five kilometers from the same poblacion.
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in
the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the
appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others,
the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime. (Aquino, Penal Code, Vol. I. p. 406 [1976].)
The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary votes, the penalty
is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the jugment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46963 March 14, 1994
GLORIA A. FERRER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, MARIANO BALANAG, AND MAGDALENA DOMONDON, respondents.
Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for petitioner.
Agaton D. Yaranon, Jr., for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the order, dated 11 December 1976, of the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of La Union, Branch III, dismissing petitioner's complaint for Quieting of Title
to Real Property, as well as its order of 03 May 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution, dated 19 August 1977 (p. 4, Rollo), petitioner was allowed to file the instant petition
under Republic Act No. 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised.
On 03 August 1978, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to
submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition (p. 58, Rollo). In a Resolution, dated 28 September 1978
(p. 63, Rollo), however, the Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition.
Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims
its ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately
north of the land in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on
account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena
Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 (p. 29, Rollo).
On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La
Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The
case was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.
Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint
for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against private respondents. Herein respondent
Judge, who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground
that the court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis
of a mere collateral attack (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
On 11 March 1976, private respondents also moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 514-A on the following grounds,
to wit:
1) Gloria A. Ferrer's lack of personality to file and prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;
2) Civil Case 514-A is barred by prior judgment;
3) Lack of sufficient averments to constitute a cause of action; and
4) Civil Case No. 514-A, is a collateral attack on the Free Patent Decree No. 309504 and O.C. of Title No. F-168
(Annex "B," pp. 17-21). (p. 66, Rollo.)
On 07 December 1976, Judge Antonio G. Bautista issued an order
(pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal), dismissing petitioner's complaint, ratiocinating, thus —
This has reference to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, through counsel. The plaintiff filed an Answer to the
Motion to Dismiss also through counsel.
The subject of the present action for Quieting of Title to Real Property, is covered by Free Patent No. 309504 and
Original Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the names of the defendants. However, the plaintiff alleged in her Complaint
that said Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title were secured through fraud, etc., on January 24, 1966, for which
reason, they are null and void. In view thereof, while the plaintiff filed the present action ostensibly to Quiet Title of
her alleged real property, it is in reality for the annulment or revocation of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title of the defendants. The observation of the Court is clinched by prayer (a) of the plaintiff's complaint, i.e., "That
Patent Title No. 168 be declared revoked and cancelled as null and void from the Records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of San Fernando, La Union, etc." Consequently, the present action is untenable because it constitute a collateral
or indirect attach on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants. That is so, because it was held
in the case of Samonte, et al. vs. Sambelon, et al., L-12964, February 29, 1960, that like a decree, a Patent cannot be
attacked collaterally.
Furthermore, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants because the Patent title issued in favor of the
Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the lapse of one year
following the entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds (Firmalos vs. Tutaan, No. L-
35408, October 27, 1973).
WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to order dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. There is no pronouncement as to
damages and costs. (p. 33, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of 03 May 1977 (p. 38, Record on Appeal).
Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of respondent judge:
I. In not finding and declaring that Gloria A. Ferrer has legal personality to prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;
II. In not finding and declaring that Civil Case No. 514-A has stated sufficient cause of action;
III. In not finding and declaring that petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer's title to the land is beclouded by the contrary claim of
the private respondents thereto; and
IV. In outright dismissing Civil Case No. 514-A on the ground of collateral attack on Free Patent Decree No. 309504
being an abuse of judicial discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction. (p. 13, Rollo.)
The petition has merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code, under which petitioner claims ownership over the dispute parcel of land, provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters.
Undoubtedly, plaintiff is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins
the alluvial property. Parenthetically, the same finding has also been made by the trial court in Civil Case No. A-86 (p.
29, Rollo).
Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received
from the effects of the current of waters (Art. 457, Civil Code; Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37; Cureg vs.
IAC, 177 SCRA 313). The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually
exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements (Agustin vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 218; Binalay
vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).
The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which
has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Court
of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and
not those that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793).
Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent
since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the
public domain.
Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does
not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne
vs. Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack (Estoesta, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 203).
Private respondents contend that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period
is applicable to an action for reconveyance if, indeed, it is based on an implied or constructive trust. Article 1456 of
the Civil Code, upon which a constructive trust can be predicated, cannot be invoked, however, since the public grant
and the title correspondingly issued to private respondents that can create that juridical relationship is a patent nullity.
Even assuming, nonetheless, that a constructive trust did arise, the running of the prescriptive period is to be deemed
interrupted when an action is filed in court (Art. 1155, Civil Code) or, obviously, when one is already there pending.
Here, to recall, the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in the Registration
Book of La Union on 08 February 1966 (pp. 38-39, Rollo). At that time, Civil Case No. A-86 for reivindicacion between
the parties was still pending in court. After Civil Case No. A-86 was dismissed, without prejudice, on 10 February 1976
(p. 32, Rollo), petitioner, on 22 March 1976 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), promptly filed Civil Case No. A-514 (now on
appeal in this instance).
Neither can private respondents claim ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Ownership and
other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years if the
adverse possession is with a just title and the possession is in good faith. Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this time without need of
title or of good faith. (See Art. 1134, Civil Code.)
Given the settings in this case at bench, the applicable period of acquisitive prescription, if at all, would be thirty years.
Even assuming, then, that private respondents were in adverse possession of the property from 1966 when the free
patent was obtained, or even at the inception of their alleged adverse possession in 1954 ("Comment on Petition for
Review," p. 35, Rollo), that possession, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, was deemed interrupted upon their
receipt of summons (Art. 1123, Civil Code) in Civil Case No. A-86 pending since 1965, as well as Civil Case No. A-
514 filed in 1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case No. A-86. The prescriptive period of
prescription may not be held to commence anew during the pendency of said cases.
The instant petition has merely prayed that respondent court be directed to continue hearing Civil Case No. 514-A.
We have repeatedly ruled, however, that where the determinative facts are before this Court, and it is in a position to
finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of the case and
thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial court (Heirs of
Crisanta Almoradie, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994; Lianga Bay Logging Co., et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158, SCRA 69). Clearly, the records support the finding
that herein petitioner is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent issued to private respondents. The court
then, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. may, instead of remanding the case to the trial court, direct the owner to
reconvey the disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 855; Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra).
Considering, moreover, the length of time that this case has been pending between the parties, not counting petitioner's
original action for reivindicacion in Civil Case No.
A-86 filed on 25 November 1956, an order from this Court requiring such reconveyance can certainly be just and
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 514-A is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING petitioner to be the owner of the disputed parcel of land and ORDERING
private respondents to reconvey the same to said petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981

UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by the UNIDO, a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1973 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, from the resolutions of the respondent
Commission on Elections dated March 18 and March 22, 1981.
As alleged in the petition:
3. Respondent COMELEC issued three (3) Resolutions all dated March 5, 1981, to wit:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for 'equal opportunity' on public discussions and debates
on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on April 7, 1981;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio and television) in the plebiscite
campaign"; and
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite of April 7, 1981".
The pertinent portions of said Resolutions Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469 are attached to this Petition as Annexes "A", "A-
l" and "A-2" respectively; (P. 2, Petition.)
The questioned resolutions are as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 1467
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS AND
DEBATES ON THE PLEBISCITE QUESTIONS
The Commission on Elections, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and pertinent
enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to promulgate the following rules and regulations governing free
discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on April 7, 1981. (Annex "A", Petition.)
xxx xxx xxx
RESOLUTION NO. 1468
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and
pertinent enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following
rules and regulations to govern the use of broadcast media in the 1981 plebiscite.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Policy. – (1) These rules and regulations are intended to insure that broadcast time for campaign purposes
equal as to duration and quality shall be available to all supporters or oppositors, political parties, groups or
aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge.
(2) Radio and television stations shall not be allowed to schedule any non-political program or permit any sponsor to
manifestly favor or oppose any side of the 1981 plebiscite issues or to unduly or repeatedly refer to or include in the
program or broadcast any supporter or oppositor and/or political party, group or aggrupation favoring or opposing
any side of the 1981 plebiscite issues.
(3) In all instances, the right of radio and television stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy events
and views on matters of public interest shall not be unpaired. (Annex "A-1", Petition.)
xxx xxx xxx
RESOLUTION NO. 1469
The Commission on Elections, pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code, and pertinent
enactments of the Batasang Pambansa, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the use of the print media, the printing and dissemination of printed political propaganda in the
campaign for or against the 1981 plebiscite questions.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Policy – The policy herein is to enable individual supporters, oppositors, political parties, groups or
aggrupations when they so desire, to purchase or avail of advertising space for campaign purposes under the following
rules and regulations which assure that available advertising space in the print media shall be, as far as practicable,
equitably allocated.
SECTION 2. Comelec Supervision. – The Commission on Elections shall recognize the principle of self-regulation in the
print media and shall exercise as far as practicable only minimal supervision over the print media leaving the
enforcement of these rules and regulations largely to the Ministry of Public Information. (Annex "A-2", Petition.)
4. Petitioner UNIDO addressed a letter dated 10 March 1981 to respondent COMELEC, which reads:
Your Resolutions Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469, all promulgated on March 5, 1981, provided for equal opportunity "on
public discussion and debates on the plebiscite", equal time "on the use of the broadcast media in the plebiscite
campaign" and equal space "on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite".
The newspapers this morning have announced that President Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes on the
proposed constitutional amendments in the April 7 plebiscite in his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-
television program on Thursday, March 12, from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., which will be carried live by 26 television and
248 radio stations throughout the country.
The undersigned, in behalf of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), hereby demand exactly the same number of
TV and radio stations all over the country at the earliest possible date, to campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming
plebiscite.
Likewise, on 17 March 1981, petitioner thru its undersigned legal counsel addressed its second letter to respondent
Commission on Elections, which reads:
Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO dated 10 March 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same prime time and
number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30
to 11:30 P.M., we wish to state that on Saturday, March 21, the UNIDO will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda,
Quiapo, Manila, and we hereby request that the same be covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M.
We trust that the radio and. television facilities win be directed to comply with this request.
5. Respondent COMELEC issued its Resolution of March 18, 1981 quoting the above letters of petitioner UNIDO, but
held that they "cannot be granted and the same is hereby denied." Said COMELEC Resolution appears as Excerpts from
the Minutes of the Session of the Commission Held on March 19, 1981', a copy of which is hereto attached to form an
integral part of this Petition as Annex "B"; (Pp. 2-3, Petition.) Said Annex "B" reads thus:
EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF
THE COMMISSION HELD ON MARCH 18,1981
(UNDER THE SAME QUORUM)
xxx xxx xxx
81-54. In the matter of the letter-request of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) for free coverage by "TV and
Radio Stations all over the country" of its campaign for "No" votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.
Before the Commission is a "demand" of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) for coverage by 'TV and radio
stations all over the country' of its campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming plebiscite. This 'demand' is contained in a
letter dated 10 March 1981, received by the Commission on Elections on March 11, 1981, signed by Gerardo Roxas
and J.B. Laurel, Jr., quoted in full as follows:
10 March 1981
The Commission on Elections
Manila
Gentlemen:
Your Resolution Nos. 1467, 1468 and 1469, all promulgated on March 5, 1981, provide for equal opportunity "on
public discussion and debate on the plebiscite", equal time on the use of the broadcast media in the plebiscite campaign
and equal space on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite
The newspapers this morning have announced that President Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes on the
proposed constitutional amendments in the April 7 plebiscite in his nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio
television program on Thursday, March 12, from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., which will be carried five by 26 television and
248 radio stations throughout the country.
The undersigned, in behalf of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), hereby demand exactly the same
opportunity, the same prime tune and the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country at the earliest
possible date, to campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) GERARDO ROXAS
(SGD.) J. B. LAUREL, JR.
Subsequently, on 17 March 1981, the Legal Counsel of the UNIDO, Ambrosio Padilla, reiterated the UNIDO desire for
coverage by media, "the same prime time and number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized
by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M." In this letter, the legal counsel manifested that the UNIDO
wants media coverage for its projected "public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila . . . . from 9:30 to 11:30
P.M." on Saturday, March 21.
The letter of the UNIDO Legal Counsel reads
17 March 1981
Manila
Attention: CHAIRMAN VICENTE M. SANTIAGO, JR.
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO dated 10 March 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same prime time and
number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30
to 11:30 P.M., we wish to state that on Saturday, March 21, the UNIDO will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda,
Quiapo, Manila, and we hereby request that the same be covered by radio television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M.
We trust that the radio and television facilities will be directed to comply with this request.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) AMBROSIO PADILLA
Legal Counsel, UNIDO
After due and careful deliberation, this Commission holds, and hereby rules, that the demand of the UNIDO cannot be
granted and the same is hereby denied.
It is the considered view of this Commission that when President Marcos conducted his 'pulong-pulong' or consultation
with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as
the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the 'Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . .
for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy' (Art. IX, Sec. 2 ). 'This Commission
takes judicial notice of the fact that the proposed amendments, subject of the President's remarks in the 'Pulong-Pulong
Pambansa' last March 12, 1981, were initiated under the leadership of Mr. Marcos as President/Prime Minister in the
exercise of his constitutional prerogative aforecited. In fact, it was President/Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos who
issued the special call for the Batasang Pambansa to convene as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution (Proclamation No. 2040 dated December 5, 1980).
It cannot be denied that seeking constitutional changes through the means sanctioned by the Constitution constitutes a
program of government imbued with the nature of highest importance. The President/Prime Minister initiated this
program of constitutional remaking. It is, therefore, his corrollary prerogative to enlighten the people on the sense,
significance, necessity and nuance of the constitutional amendments which he wanted the people to support. It would be
an Idle, if not absurd proposition, to declare that the President/Prime Minister is 'responsible for the program of
government and the guidelines of policy' and yet deprive him of the right and opportunity to inform and enlighten the
people of the rationale of such initiatives without at the same time granting the same right to the opposition.
Under our Constitution the President/Prime Minister has no counter-part, not even the Opposition still waiting in the
uncertain wings of power.
This, precisely, was what President Marcos sought to accomplish through the "Pulong-Pulong Pambansa" last March 12,
1981. In the letter dated March 10, 1981 by Messrs. Roxas and Laurel, it was claimed that the program was the
nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" (Emphasis supplied). This is an admission that the "Pulong-Pulong" was for the
"Pangulo", not as head of a political party but as President/Prime Minister.
This program "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" is of long standing and has been used by President/Prime Minister Marcos
to bring to the attention of the people certain matters that need to be understood by them. For instance, the President
used this program once to explain to the people the increase in the price of gasoline and other petroleum products.
The program 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of participatory
democracy where the President as leader of the nation enunciates certain programs or policies and thereafter subjected
to interrogation by panelists (common men and women) in various strategic places. This is why the title is 'Pulong-Pulong'.
It is not a one way arrangements; its format is intended to result in effective multi-way consultation between the leader
of the nation and the people.
The UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime
Minister as above discussed. As such, it has no right to 'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos.
The UNIDO, however, is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned. This Commission,
however, cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities. First of all, the Comelec cannot assume dictatorial
powers and secondly, the rule of equal time for campaigning as to duration and quality is not applicable under the
circumstances of this case, for the reasons above-stated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "demand" of the UNIDO is hereby denied.
Let the Executive Director cause the implementation of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the foregoing is a true and correct excerpt from the minutes of the Session of the Commission held
on March 18, 1981.
(Sgd). RUPERTO P. EVANGELISTA
Secretary of the Commission.
6. Petitioner UNIDO thru its undersigned counsel addressed its letter dated March 20, 1981 as its "motion for
reconsideration" of the COMELEC Resolution of March 18, 1981 (Annex "B") and submitted six (6) reasons why said
Resolution should be reconsidered, and the request or demand of petitioner should be granted for nationwide
coverage of its public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Saturday, March 21, 1981, similar or equal to the nationwide
coverage of the "Pulong-Pulong" of March 12, 1981. A copy of said letter of March 20, 1981 as petitioner's motion
for reconsideration is hereto attached to form an integral part of this Petition as Annex 'C';
Annex "C" follows:
March 20, 1981
Manila
Gentlemen:
UNIDO respectfully submits this Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution of March 18, 1981, which
denied the letters of UNIDO dated March 10 and 17, 1981 on the following considerations:
1. The Resolution states that the coverage of the "Pulong-Pulong" on March 12, 1981 was extended to Pres. Marcos
"in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political party", who is "responsible ... for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy". But the radio and television coverage
on March 12th, did not deal with any "program of government" nor any 'guideline of national policy". The subject
matter of said "Pulong-Pulong" were a campaign for the approval of the constitutional amendments proposed by
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, for ratification of the people with their "YES" votes.
2. As announced by President Marcos himself and as stated in the letter of UNIDO of March 10, "President Marcos will
lead the campaign for "YES" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments in the April 7 plebiscite". The radio and
television facilities throughout the country on March 12 was used by President Marcos in his capacity as political leader
of the KBL political party, and not in his capacity as President/Prime Minister.
3. The Resolution states that Mr. Marcos 'initiated the amendments, he convened the Batasang Pambansa as a constituent
assembly, and he initiated this program of constitutional remaking'. When the proposed amendments were passed by
the Batasan under his leadership, his function as President/Prime Minister was completed. His campaign for the
ratification by the people of said amendments was no longer President/Prime Minister, but as the political leader of
KBL as the dominant political party in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
4. The Resolution states that the name "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" is an admission that the television and radio coverage
of said program on March 12, was utilized by Mr. Marcos 'not as head of a political party but as President/Prime
Minister. The nature of said program is not determined by its name but by the subject matter thereof. In fact, it may be
considered as a misuse of said program as political campaign for the purpose of inducing "YES" votes.
5. The Resolution states that COMELEC "cannot direct these media to grant free use of their facilities", but UNIDO "is
free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned". But Pres. Marcos campaigning for
"YES" votes did not enter into such contracts, but had "free use" of said facilities. For the Resolution to require UNIDO
to pay for time in a national radio and TV coverage is to impose an "impossible" financial condition.
6. The Resolution states that "COMELEC can not assume dictatorial powers". The COMELEC as a constitutional body has
the constitutional right and power to have its Resolutions Nos. 1497, 1498 and 1499 on equal opportunity, equal space
and equal time respected and obeyed by all. Otherwise, said Resolutions will be only in form without any substance.
In view of the foregoing, UNIDO respectfully prays that the Resolution of March 19, 1981 denying the request and
demand of UNIDO for equal time, be reconsidered.
It is likewise prayed that the letter requests of UNIDO be granted for nationwide coverage of its public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on Saturday, March 21, 1981.
Very truly yours,
SGD.) AMBROSIO PADILLA
Legal Counsel, UNIDO
7. Respondent COMELEC RESOLVED TO DENY for lack of merit' the letter-motion for reconsideration (Annex "C") in its
Resolution of March 22, 1981 as per its "Excerpts from the Minutes of the Session of the Commission Held on March 21,
1981". A copy of said Excerpt-Resolution of March 21, 1981 is hereto attached to form an integral part of this Petition
as Annex "D";
Annex "D" reads thus:
EXCERPT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE COMMISSION HELD ON MARCH 21, 1981
(UNDER THE SAME QUORUM)
xxx xxx xxx
81.56. Considering the allegations in the letter-motion for reconsideration, dated and filed on March 20, 1981, by the
UNIDO thru counsel, and there being no strong or cogent reasons to disturb the findings and conclusions in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY the said letter-motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Let the Executive Director inform the parties concerned of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the foregoing is a true and correct excerpt from the minutes of the session of the Commission held
on March 21, 1981.
(SGD.) RUPERTO P. EVANGELISTA
Secretary of the Commission
The basic grounds of the present appeal are stated in the petition thus:
9. Said COMELEC Resolutions. Annexes "B" and "D", are also contrary to the Constitution and the law, and moreover,
are unjust, unfair and inequitable, for said Resolutions violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play,
and they are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections;
10. The request and/or demand of petitioner for equal broadcast media of its public meeting or rally at the Plaza
Miranda last Saturday, March 21, 1981 (ante par. 4) was arbitrarily denied by respondent COMELEC in its Resolutions
(Annexes "B" and "D"). As the political campaign of the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for "YES" votes used all the
radios and televisions in the Pulong Pulong of its political leader, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the political campaign
for "NO" votes of petitioner UNIDO should and must be granted the same right and equal use of the same facilities for
the remaining days of the political campaign for "NO" votes up to the plebiscite on April 7, 1981;
These grounds were eloquently expanded by distinguished counsel for petitioner, Senator Ambrosio Padilla, during the
hearing held in the afternoon of Tuesday, March 31, 1981.
Much as it is indeed desirable and idealistic that the widest and fullest opportunity to be heard and explain their side
should be given to those opposed to the proposed constitutional amendments, there are certain inexorable rules and
principles that govern the situation at hand which, no matter in what direction one's sympathies may be inclined, have
to be observed in the best interests of all concerned as this Court sees them. Indubitably, the proposed changes of the
Charter are of deep and transcendental importance, since they will affect not only the structure of government and the
democratic institutions and ideals vis-a-vis the presidential and parliamentary systems to which our people have been
exposed up to the present, and they could outlast most of us and our children and our children's children. Quite a
number of those Ideals and institutions are fondly cherished and enshrined as sacred by some respectable elements in
the country, admittedly as knowledgeable and patriotic as those who are advocating their alteration or modification.
It is obvious that the proposed constitutional changes are purported to establish rather drastic innovations in the
distribution of at least the executive and legislative powers of the national government, in an avowedly indigenous
manner more responsive and attuned not only to the mores, modes and idiosyncracies of our people and the prevailing
national and international circumstances, which evidently require unusual means to preserve and defend the state and
the territorial integrity of the country, albeit such proposed reforms maintain fundamentally the republican and
democratic character of our system of government. Thus, We reiterate, that the more the people are adequately
informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better. Herein lies the
apparent plausibility of petitioner's pose.
There are, however, certain norms which even petitioner and those that compose it know very well that this Court, all
the amplitude of its prerogatives notwithstanding cannot disregard. Denial of due process is considered generally as
the first and the most valued right of everyone under the Bill of Rights. For this Court to mandate the Comelec, assuming
We had such power, having in view the constriction of the Supreme Court's authority over the actuations of the Comelec
under the new constitution as discoursed by Us in Aratuc vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979, 88
SCRA 251, petitioner evidently overlooks the fact that the television and radio stations they refer to in their petition
who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon Our orders are not parties to this case. It is
elementary, to state the obvious, that in the premises, We would be over-reaching the bounds of our constitutional
powers if We acceded to petitioner request, absent such indispensable parties. In fact, petitioner has not shown, for
apparently they have not done so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to give them the same time and
style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded the President on March 21, 1981 and that their request has been
denied. No doubt the Constitution and the Election Code provisions as well as the general Comelec resolution cited by
petitioner's counsel may be availed of, but since, We have not been informed of the circumstances under which the
President was accorded the privilege which petitioner wants to be equally granted to them, We are not even in a
position to determine under what definite terms the order prayed for should be issued by Us, considering there are
other groups and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner who would also want
to be heard. We are afraid We would be expecting from the TV and radio networks more than what conceivably the
Charter, the law and the Comelec resolutions contemplate, if We granted what UNIDO wants and did less for those
other oppositors to the amendments who may come to Us.
Anent the equal time, equal space and equal quality of exposure claimed by petitioner, it should be informative to
quote the pertinent constitutional provisions, laws and Comelec resolutions:
Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution circumscribes the relevant powers of the Comelec this wise:
SEC. 5. The enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, may
be supervised or regulated by the Commission during the election period for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and
honest elections.
Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978 pertinently reads as follows:
SEC. 41. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. – (a) The Commission shall promulgate rules and
regulations regarding the sale of air time for political purposes during the campaign period to insure that time equal
as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office or political parties, groups or aggrupations
at the same rates or given free of charge; that such rates are reasonable and not higher than those charged other buyers
or users of air time for non-political purposes; that the provisions of this Code regarding the limitation of expenditures
by candidates and contributions by private persons and certain classes of corporations, entities and institutions are
effectively enforced; that said radio broadcasting and television stations shall not be allowed to schedule any program
or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party, group or aggrupation by unduly
or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party, group or aggrupation respecting, however
in all instances the right of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy events and views on matters of
public interest.
Sections 7 and 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 1468 read thus:
SEC. 7. Free air time. – Any radio broadcasting or television station that grants free of charge the use of air time to any
supporter, oppositors political party, group or aggritpution shall also give similar air time free of charge to other
supporters, oppositors, political party group or aggrupations except when such use of air -time is part of a news program
or coverage involving a newsworthy event.
A radio, television station giving air time free of charge to any supporter, oppositor, political party/group for campaign
purposes shall inform the Commission of such fact within two days from the use of such free time.
SEC. 8. Failure to agree on equal time. – In case the supporter, oppositor, political party group and the radio-television
station, despite mediation by the Ministry of Public Information, cannot agree on the equal time to be sold or given free,
the controversy shall be referred to the Commission whose decision on the matter shall be final and immediately
executory.
To begin with, We cannot agree with the restrictive literal interpretation the Solicitor General would want to give to
the "free orderly and honest elections" clause of Section 5, Article XII- C above-quoted. Government Counsel posits
that the said clause refers exclusively to the manner in which the elections are conducted, that is to say, with the manner
in which the voters are supposed to be allowed to vote. Perhaps, such a theory may hold insofar as ordinary elections
of officials are concerned. But the Court views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative
to constitutional amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most steadfast rulings of this Court in
connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be fair submission – by
which is meant that the voters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to
cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. We are of the firm conviction that the charter's
reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in a plebiscite. It cannot be otherwise, for then the importance of
suffrage for the election of officials would be more significantly valued than voting on the ratification of the constitution
or any amendment thereof. We cannot yield to such an unorthodox constitutional concept that relegates the fundamental
law of the land which is the source of all powers of the government to a level less valued than the men who would run
the same. When a voter either gives or denies his assent to a change of the existing charter of his rights and liberties
and the existing governmental form as well as the powers of those who are to govern him, he virtually contributes his
little grain of sand to the building of the nation and renders his share in shaping the future of its people, including
himself, his family and those to come after them. Indeed, nothing can be of more transcerdental importance than to
vote in a constitutional plebiscite.
In consequence of the foregoing considerations, We opine and so hold that the provisions of all election laws regulating
propaganda through the mass media, for example, Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978, must be deemed
applicable to plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio
stations insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office or political
parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge.
We cannot share the Solicitor General's submission that the above view would subvert or curtail correspondingly the
freedom of speech and of the press to which the TV and radio station owners are entitled. Rather, it is Our considered
opinion and We so hold that if such be the effect of the Comelec regulations, it is because they must have been
contemplated to precisely constitute an exception to freedom of speech and press clause, on account of considerations
more paramount for the general welfare and public interest, which exceptions after all would operate only during
limited periods, that is, during the duration of the election Campaign fixed in the charter itself and/or by law.
The Solicitor General points, however, to the explicit proviso in Section 41 to the effect that the equal-time-equal-space
privilege must "respect, – in all instances the right of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy
events and views on matters of public interest", and suggests that the TV and radio stations may not be blamed for
considering the "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" as coming within said proviso. In other words, it is contended that such
choice by them may not then be subjected to the equal time equal space regulations. On the other hand, counsel for
petitioner maintains that it is not fair to deem the President's "Pulong-Pulong" as a "significant and noteworthy (an)
events and views on matters of public interest" just because the President campaigned for "Yes" votes, while a "Pulong-
Pulong" by those who would appeal for "No" votes cannot be similarly characterized.
Our holding in respect to such conflicting contentions is that, while it may not be exactly proper to say, as the Comelec
resolution in question puts it, that "(u)nder our Constitution, the President-Prime Minister has no counterpart, not even the
Opposition still waiting in the uncertain wings of power", it is undeniable and but natural that the head of state of every
country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to
those who are opposed to him in the sense that, since the head of state has the grave and tremendous responsibility of
planning and implementing the plan of government itself, either by virtue of the popular mandate given to him under
the corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the laws or any other duly recognized grant of power and
authority, the opposition cannot be placed at par with him, since logically the opposition can only fiscalize the
administration and punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the duly scheduled time for the people
to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the opposition may have the chance to make them accept
the alternative they can offer.
Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon him to communicate
and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan of government or any other matter of public interest,
no office or entity of the government is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which its contrary views
may be ventilated. lf the opposition leaders feel any sense of responsibility in the premises to counter the administration,
it is up to them – and they are free – to avail of their own resources to accomplish their purpose. But surely, it is not for
the administration to hand them on a silver platter the weapon they need. We are not aware that there is any existing
system of government anywhere in the world which is mandated to be so accommodating and generous to the opponents
of the current administrators of the national affairs.
In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not
necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. Unquestionably, there are
matters of vital public interest wherein partisan considerations could in some degree be involved, but then such partisan
interest would be purely secondary. The President/Prime Minister of the Philippines is the political head of all the
people. His is the sacred responsibility to protect and defend the security of all the people, the stability of the
government and the integrity of the national territory, not only for the tenure to which he has been elected but for all
times. When, as in the instant situation, he deems it warranted by the circumstances to present to them a plan of
government which includes the modification of the existing structure of government together with its concomitant
allocation of governmental powers, it is not only his right but his duty to take the people directly into his confidence
and impart to them to the fullest measure of his capacity and by all available adequate means the reasons therefor
and the corrollarily advantages thereof to their welfare. The opposition, if it opines otherwise, has naturally the
indisputable right to make every effort to thwart his objective. But, surely, this is far from saying that it is the duty of
the administration to generously grant to them the means to wage their campaign against it.
The long and short of the foregoing is that it is not true that in speaking as he did in the "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" on
March 21, 1981, he spoke not only as President-Prime Minister but also as head of the KBL, the political party now in
power. It was in the former capacity that he did so. If in any way, what he said would induce the people to accept the
proposed amendments, his exposition of the advantages thereof was not to promote the interest of that party but to
improve the quality of the government thereby to enable him or anyone who may be chosen by the people to take his
place to better serve the welfare not only of the KBL but of all of us, including those who are minded, for reasons of
their own, to oppose the amendments.
In any event, petitioner has failed to persuade Us that the grant of the prayer in its petition compellingly pertains to it
under the provisions of the Constitution, the Election Code of 1978 and the general resolutions and regulations of
respondent Comelec regarding equal opportunity among contending political parties, groups, aggrupations or
individuals. The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media in such respect, but such
authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or
person the right to which it or he is entitled. What is more, there are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner.
To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties should also be granted. As already
indicated earlier, that would be too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to earn its wherewithal.
But most importantly, the Comelec is not supposed to dictate to the media when its prerogatives in the premises is not
invoked in the proper manner, that is, after denial to the petitioner by the media is shown. And then, it is an inalienable
right of the sector or member of the media concerned to be duly heard as an indispensable party.
Thus, for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than
what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to
directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing
circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among other reasons which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the
instant petition cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal herein is dismissed, without costs.
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
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G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
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G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or
by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine
the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work
rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive
for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
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(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates
they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates,
the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug
testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates
who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC]
shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x
xx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self -
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions. 2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which
involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may
refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite
standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 6 There is no doubt
that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite
standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations.
Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental
importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates
for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate
the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates,
a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, 7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean,
are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter,
and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution
is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or
not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug -
testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly
state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate
of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular
section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only
refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect
whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that
electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby
rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public
and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out
illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved
via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous
drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies,
programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from
criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear
on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent
or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x
x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the
Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency.
If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by
the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
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Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
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School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects
of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to
drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. 15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has
long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion
through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among
school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions
following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in
the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools
stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal
undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves
to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the
dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non -
athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the
basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non -
athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and
duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing
policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting
in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being
of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless
a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring
drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against
the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested
school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. 22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same
reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug
testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has
failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates
the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory
drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are
quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function
of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C.
Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. 29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. 30 And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees-
-and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search
in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness
of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining
unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass
the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a
narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained
in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible
the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ
two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. 33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; 34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably,
RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug
testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well -
being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve
this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that
the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state
that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were
it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the
martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with
respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by
random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough
means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote
a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required
to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. 38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power
hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as
to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides
how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should
be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other
agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers
have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the
increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the
power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness
a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g)of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty
of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing
him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errors assigned by counsel
for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the
illegality of the John Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known
as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine
Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling
house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified
this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied
for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted
to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors
to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a
telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso
read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to
search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if
it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes
was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and
Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his
resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured
the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey
and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him
downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol
wagon. 1awph!l.net
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them were
eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found
guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced
to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that he stresses certain points
as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the contention
that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used,
Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set forth further
facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the search
warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR (G)
SEARCH WARRANT
Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.
Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47 Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C., City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the best of my information the house is
occupied by John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been reported to me by a person whom
I consider to be reliable that in said premises there are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards,
dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been reported to me by a
person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid
premises are known as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house
and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of
drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions and answers and that
I find the same to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court
The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant alone. This
document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT (G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and
does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control,
namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects
used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils
used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices
and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this
date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part
thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the
present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right
to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides "that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally entering more
into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause
and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to
be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is satisfied of
the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of ............................, or in the house
situated ...................................... (describing it or any other place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the
case may be) for the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with a crime
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime.
(Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it
is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known
to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense
feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without,
however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid
of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J.
Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are material differences
between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose to take into
consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal
([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In
that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown
there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx xxx xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended is void,
except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential requirements of
warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of
a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not
justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be
obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and
peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be
identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the apprehension will
not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have
been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court, is the
case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee had made a
complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your
complainant unknown," had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issued
against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing
complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of identification of the
person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow,
as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant at the
time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain the name of the defendant, nor any
description or designation by which he could be known and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was
in effect a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as being included in
the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to elementary principles, and in direct violation
of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14, which declares that every
subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all warrants,
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons
or to seize their property be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or
seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name
or give some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and
without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane
Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In
such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient
to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the
place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted
to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to
resist by force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in question, if they were guilty
of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful
means, and so could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional and statutory,
requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A
failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process
must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law was summarized
by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth certain points of paramount force
and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched
as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele
vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were
accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called
Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited
game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence
or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi
[1909], 12 Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit,
and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search
warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his
control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act
requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized, and that the
warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a
description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the
warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a description personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper
person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus
in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was
Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not
the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a
club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead
the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly
be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling, a man has a
right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the person
sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the
officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearly manifest.
Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's
idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3
Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified therein. Mention
was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be
inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that
the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We find it unnecessary to
comment on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe the place
to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be
hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by
superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant
was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of
the agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the House of
Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating
circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender
of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use of the prestige
of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the
police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within the medium of that
provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial judge, and
concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the judgment appealed from
must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to
two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the corresponding
order to carry this judgment into effect issue.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total
of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives
to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things
and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution
dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized
from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b)
those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did
it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any
one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear
that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such
a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511.
It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . .
(A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether
the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used
in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause,
for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records
of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule,
that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an
illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies
as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired,
is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is
of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts
of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons
as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the
Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in
Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we
have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence
seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which
its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right
to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In
short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on
which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence
to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging
to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority
usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact
that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in
said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts
of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent
allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the
contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and
other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967

CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST MUTUAL SAVING AND LOAN ORGANIZATION,
INC.,respondents.
Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Mariano Abaya for petitioner.
Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction, against an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction bond in the amount of P3,000.00, let a writ of preliminary
preventive and/or mandatory injunction issue, restraining the respondents, their agents or representatives, from further
searching the premises and properties and from taking custody of the various documents and papers of the petitioner
corporation, whether in its main office or in any of its branches; and ordering the respondent Central Bank and/or its
co-respondents to return to the petitioner within five (5) days from service on respondents of the writ of preventive
and/or mandatory injunction, all the books, documents, and papers so far seized from the petitioner pursuant to the
aforesaid search warrant.1äwphï1.ñët
Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the requisite bond, we issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining and prohibiting respondents herein from enforcing the order above quoted.
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the
Organization — is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of which, according to its Articles of
Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its members,
and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of
"members,"1 namely: (a) founder members — who originally joined the organization and have signed the pre-
incorporation papers — with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members — with "no right
to vote or be voted for" — to which category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members, so made by the
board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion" thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in
the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization — without any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary
members.
On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Bank of the Philippines — hereinafter referred to as the
Bank — rendered an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of similar nature are banking institutions,
falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be published in
the newspapers the following:
ANNOUNCEMENT
To correct any wrong impression which recent newspaper reports on "savings and loan associations" may have created
in the minds of the public and other interested parties, as well as to answer numerous inquiries from the public, the
Central Bank of the Philippines wishes to announce that all "savings and loan associations" now in operation and other
organizations using different corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE
NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT
DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY
BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending
of funds obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any
kind" without authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations are not supervised by the
Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing with such institutions do so at their risk.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the coordination of "the investigation and gathering
of evidence on the activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating contrary to law." Soon thereafter,
or on May 18, 1962, a member of the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a
verified application for a search warrant against the Organization, alleging that "after close observation and personal
investigation, the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" — in which the offices of the Organization were housed
— "are being used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in banking activities, "by receiving
deposits of money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of a savings and
mortgage bank and/or building and loan association . . . without having first complied with the provisions of Republic
Act No. 337" and that the articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a list attached to said application, as Annex A
thereof.3 are kept in said premises, and "being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony, to wit:
violation of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic Act No. 337."4 Said articles, papers or effects are described in the
aforementioned Annex A, as follows:
I. BOOKS OF ORIGINAL ENTRY
(1) General Journal
(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book
(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book
(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement Book
II. BOOKS OF FINAL ENTRY
(1) General Ledger
(2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers
(3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers
III. OTHER ACCOUNTING RECORDS
(1) Application for Membership
(2) Signature Card
(3) Deposit Slip
(4) Passbook Slip
(5) Withdrawal Slip
(6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report
(7) Application for Loan Credit Statement
(8) Credit Report
(9) Solicitor's Report
(10) Promissory Note
(11) I n d o r s e m e n t
(12) Co-makers' Statements
(13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts
(14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts
(15) Trial Balance
(16) Minutes Book — Board of Directors
IV. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(1) Income and Expenses Statements
(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and Liabilities
V. OTHERS
(1) Articles of Incorporation
(2) By-Laws
(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.
(4) And other documents and articles which are being used or intended to be used in unauthorized banking activities
and operations contrary to law.
Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal court, issued
the warrant above referred to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,
and the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon examination, under
oath, of a detective of the Manila Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank — that the Organization
has under its control, in the address given, the aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense adverted
to above or intended to be used as means for the commission of said off offense.
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction," against said municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and the Bank,
to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted
"with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant
is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits
the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;"
and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation . . ."
The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending hearing of the case on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued ex parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the alternative, if the acts complained of have
been partially performed, that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte, ordering the
preservation of the status quo of the parties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the documents and
papers so far seized under, the search warrant in question. After due hearing, on the petition for said injunction,
respondent, Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila to which
said Case No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on July 2, 1962, the order complained of.
Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied on August 7,
1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge Morfe and the
Organization, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction
in issuing the order in question.
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to be made
and the articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that the Organization was illegally engaged
in banking — by receiving money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise, or transacting the business of
a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan association, — without first complying with the provisions of
R.A. No. 337, and that the order complained of assumes that the Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said
Act.6 Yet respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to be unreasonable, through the following
process of reasoning: the deposition given in support of the application for a search warrant states that the deponent
personally knows that the premises of the Organization, at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,7 were being used unlawfully
for banking and purposes. Respondent judge deduce, from this premise, that the deponent " knows specific banking
transactions of the petitioner with specific persons," and, then concluded that said deponent ". . . could have, if he really
knew of actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to search and seize only books" or records:
covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the petitioner with specific persons who are the
supposed victims of said illegal banking transactions according to his knowledge. To authorize and seize all the records
listed in Annex A to said application for search warrant, without reference to specific alleged victims of the purported
illegal banking transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and its officers with a roving commission or fishing
expedition for evidence which could be discovered by normal intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of
books and records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No 337 . . ."
The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the civil liberty involved is, certainly, in line with the function of courts,
as ramparts of justice and liberty and deserves the greatest encouragement and warmest commendation. It lives up to
the highest traditions of the Philippine Bench, which underlies the people's faith in and adherence to the Rule of Law
and the democratic principle in this part of the World.
At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks
to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones. Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the
very nature of things, a condition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding each case, in much the same way as
the question whether or not "probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations.
Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order complained of whether respondent Judge opined
that the above mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that the Organization was engaged in the
transactions mentioned in his deposition — deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however, a mere disagreement
with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that
said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, the failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove
that he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the Organization, for the witness might be
acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the individuals concerned were unknown to him.
Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the kind contemplated
in the contested action of the officers of the Bank, must always connote the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to
denote a party whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is not necessarily justified. The law
requiring compliance with certain requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to protect the
public against actual, as well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of warrants
to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise.
The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the Organization consisted
of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it
may be necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure
be limited to the records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest clearly
that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the Organization. Indeed,
the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its
members," with funds deposited by them.
It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws — as their "savings." and
that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursory examination of said documents will
readily show that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization
is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization.
Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and
"participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any,
being limited to those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to time. As a consequence,
the "membership" of the "participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the
very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of
said Act, before the transactions in question could be undertaken.
It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of
the Bank is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned
transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are
satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and
6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court
of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be unreasonable.
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2, 1962, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued
in compliance therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on August 14,
1962, accordingly, made permanent, with costs against respondent First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It
is so ordered.
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,
MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON,
GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and
Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing the
same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax
assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents,
papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not
issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon;
an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished
but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge
was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read
to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition,
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners
at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant
be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the
search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally,
damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the
petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself
and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion
in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757)
is enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el
registro inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria que causaria cierta demora el
procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señoria
encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo
en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por la siguiente razon: el
que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez
sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro puede
ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en
esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion sino que el juez
examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre requeriria algun
tiempo?.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones
injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el
menor.
x x x
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution
something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be under the
obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may
produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the
judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal
of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent
De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s application for search warrant
and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask
either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the
matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well to
recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken
at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales,
Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes
thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent
Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness
Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk
Gonzales testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them, requested
Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and without legal basis, he
can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained
in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.

"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70
was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a
personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted
by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge.
It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the
issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the
proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up
questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important
in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation
to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question is: Was the said
search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above. Thus
we find the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information required
under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article subject to a
specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling,
rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case
of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be
responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output removed, or to pay
the tax due thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation
of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation
of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross
value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned
provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs.
208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable,
because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the National
Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill
incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court
amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the
sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we
said in Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.’"
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of
sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs;
records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970."cralaw virtua1aw library
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records
of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the
language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if
seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the
requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant —
to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures’ may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation
of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion
of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent
of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform
to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles
subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other
pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes,
deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances,
among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first place, when the questions raised
before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing
of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite.
(Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence
in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against
petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’
fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but
also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with
a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as
holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal
entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed.
652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to a
corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation
against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful
way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were
searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong,
and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands
on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners — at least
partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure
on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments. Those
assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge
is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents,
papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in
Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized
under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other
proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON.
LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE
DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and
JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process
when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights
of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process
of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose
a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of
her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain
the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution
dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and
MAYOR ANTONIO KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE, respondents.
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57.
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, Ballicid & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
94266-69.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the certification
or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of
the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and
Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary
examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez,
Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho,
Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of P200,000.00 as
bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of bail which was granted by the
court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest
of the accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the
petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be
charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four
victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment
of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente
Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional Trial Court
of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:
Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813, and 5814 from the
Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court
Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII,
Section 5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to
transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for raffling among the
other branches of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from further taking
cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally resolved.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations which in
substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted
by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence
of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate
shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be allowed to file a
motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists aprima
facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and
issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate
which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused
are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom
such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form
and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's
certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990 Order.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly
authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrant of arrest without
bail issued against the petitioners in his Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering and directing the respondent judge to
recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest without bail issued against and served upon
herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from
confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly
authorized representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the warrants of arrest
without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely
upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the
"search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce . . .
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part
of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by
the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order
of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification
and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this
evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July
13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing
practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases
for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the
required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he was satisfied that
probable cause existed.
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
We stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990), reiterated the above
interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor
for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the
determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the
Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on
the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective
on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said
Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain
other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but)
part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the
fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988
Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges
of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to
conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary
examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest
(or search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power –– has been and remains vested in
every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing
the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule
or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct
preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts,
with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize
the function to be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature.
It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . .
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990) there is a statement
that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be
submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest."
(Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that
the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification
or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength
of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by the
inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors
are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer
terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no duplication
of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or
highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the
Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for
arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . . probable cause
to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation
are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have
known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied
the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation
of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However,
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be
before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each
case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The
Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go
beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant
and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent Judge documents of
recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general
rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial
(Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA
298 [1972]) the respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over
the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now presented by the
concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized
the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are affidavits of recantation
subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano,
father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written
statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the existence of a prima facie case
against petitioners and accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same written
statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were not
yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the
petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation
of this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless
and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-
201)
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him,
he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and
issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix
of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist.
He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch
the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took
a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer
of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs.2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at
the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who
was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a
gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped
to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the
same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of
his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that
the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom
he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge
of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other Identification papers,
he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport,
return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside
the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get
off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence
to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such
defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform
the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months
after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.3 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La
Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances.6
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a
17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence
of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to
Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at
Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer
was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spot information,
the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused
was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the officers
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his
passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse
the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man,
who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession,
plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers
to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of
the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in
opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the
two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's
own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members
of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two
(2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In
the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court , finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
It appearing that the accuse d was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68,
par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court
is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City. 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure,
the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest
without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a,
17a)
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers
and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents
were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant
by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to
a violation of his light against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula
but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities
of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and
an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part
of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:
. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus
in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot
be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely
a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks
to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man.
This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behaviour of the men indicated that they
were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked them for their
names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him. Finding
a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States
Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach
a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make
an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime
to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain thestatus quo while obtaining
more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.
BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following resolutions of the
Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and Resolution No.
92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the
"Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly
weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. 1 Subsequently, on 26
December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints.2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives,
wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2)
firearms3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by
his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at
Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by
Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away
from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano
as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was
ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of
Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not
include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered
the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious.4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's
sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but
also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms
ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was
petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that
the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause
why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in
relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881.8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings as
well as the filing of the information in court.9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and regulations of an
administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code provides for the
disqualification of any person/candidate from running for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either
been declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other
acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the resolution did
away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a
presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal charge is still
pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all
contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the
Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327
violates the fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections
that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run
for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly prosecuted for
instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him
on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According to him, without a
warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms were
not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and
wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution
was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation before
the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal
information would violate his constitutional right to due process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for public office
during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of security personnel or
bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to
him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically, petitioner further argues, Arellano was instructed to return
to Congress, as he did, the firearms in compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban,"
thus, no law was in fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the
petition13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC and prayed
instead to be excused from filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881
which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be
criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the
firearms in question outside petitioner's residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was
invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms. Petitioner
also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since this
petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However,
this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of
moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view,17 as well as the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were
neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this
claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it
contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction
from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation,
the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The existence of
probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case.20 Thus, we upheld the validity
of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,
or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential
information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted and appellants
were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence
information, there were reports by an undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited
drugs into the country; 23 where the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was
strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce his passport and
other identification papers;24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the description given in the
confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying a bulging black leather
bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier
was already established by police authorities who received confidential information about the probable arrival of
accused on board one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan
Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report
leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was
there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could
not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his
property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's
right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's
right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines shall be made
to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation of this authority," and that "the
places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban
and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint
at about five o'clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes
later. It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for
the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon
carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have
any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search
passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to
turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to
conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by
COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation,29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled
the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the
search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-
disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative
of due process which requires that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City
Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn
letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which
is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due
process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it
the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 we held
that —
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact
been established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's
explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written
explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously
contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised
that he was himself a respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be
considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion itself expresses
petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the
charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so
since the prohibition against carrying firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more
than six (6) years without probation and with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right
to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police on
13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence
in any proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being
violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997

SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, 2 as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license
and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," 4 while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time
they arrested petitioner.5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting
officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station
No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon
Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast."6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The
police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase,
Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked
inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu
placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was
going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former
were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the
corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion,
since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt
for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner. 9
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were
brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing
them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapio's advice,
petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio
then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner
admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of
petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of
the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things, the
examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from
Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on
the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination
of the grenade, he "[f]ound that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present,"
and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification stating
his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the
Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch
a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen
searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others,
brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed
the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then
inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me." Petitioner denied the
charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him,
hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the
grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a
"warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 15 Probable cause was
not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions
were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously,
considering the time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search,
the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation
without fear of violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug
Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However,
the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued
a notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand
grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision
be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner
abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and
second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as
an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized
from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that
there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other
suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been
enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not
mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of political
upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too
preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two
days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the
"accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be
committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention
of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while
maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed
probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a
situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life
on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied upon, was
inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street
[would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put
a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb
threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about seven
days to observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal
knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here,
PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally
succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES
ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest and
search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the
evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally,
petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the
Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision..
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial
court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum,
and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum,
is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been
to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg.
129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution 29 and
Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the
Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2)
of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's decision to this Court, yet the trial
court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the
appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the
comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties
as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's
guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over
to his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate
this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what
the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but
nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade
passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify
the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from
petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in
cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to detonate
an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that
Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural
and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu
observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner's
eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police
officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and
Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid
as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid,
as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34and
(6) a "stop and frisk."35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the
grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature
of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed.37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise
diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish
the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being
apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police
officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion
other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly
declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was
tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. 43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and
12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is
SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10
February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y
MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention is
justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at
times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched
constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the
clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams
of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are prohibited
drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos.1
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quo found the
following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa"
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting
on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial,
Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988
and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant
posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back
bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females
and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying
a traveling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the
former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak."
The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature.
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was
prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj.
Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results
for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the prosecution
rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality of the search and
seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident differed from
that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where
she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder
bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM
Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred that the
old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown
to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or Objection to Prosecution's
Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-appellant
of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation
of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.2
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a
passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be
searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM agents, still
no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general search warrant
which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated
the latter's constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the prosecution
is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search
warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that
searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of
arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police
must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.4
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to
the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects,
and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield
against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against
unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.6
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement
of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases
specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back
a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.7
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;9
6. Stop and Frisk;10 and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.11
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the
constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The
essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched.12
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the
calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in
determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial
evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items
will be found in the place to be searched.13
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable
cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed
or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,14 acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also
on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a
person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his
bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana
leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his
arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged
activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the
Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was
acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben
is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his
person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be
readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that
in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without
a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers had
reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta
was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception
to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north
to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in
the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a
search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,17 the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan
Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chancedupon a
man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and
asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court
held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on
drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless
search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information,
constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of
the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers
received information from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City
on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of
marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus
carrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement
officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the
contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana
leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the arrival of
Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was
held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the day before at
4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V
Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity,
the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for
the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular
No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to
secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It
was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellant's
bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not
incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce
operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-
appellant for these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of
the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search
of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced
by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. 18
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin19 where, this Court observed that:
. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused-
appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view" under the second exception. The
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request
accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There
was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals.21In
said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant
case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause
them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when
apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM
agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause
that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency circumstances, as
applied in People v. De
Gracia.22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM
during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of
explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed.
The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to
effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be consent given by
the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor
General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citing People
v.Malasugui23 where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from
complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our informant and asked
her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. 24
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the instant case.
In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected
immediately thereafter equally lawful.25 On the contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as expounded
above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the
search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from
the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to
the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable
search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,26 where this Court held:
[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the
arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's
testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do
next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that
appellant — based on the transcript quoted above — did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his
belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that
the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the
presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:27
. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest "simply because he failed to object" —
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."28 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated in People
v. Omaweng,29 where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q — When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
A — When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.
Q — And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A — He said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings" (sic).
Q — When he said that, what did you do?
A — We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q — When you said that, what did he tell you?
A — He said "you can see it".
Q — And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you do?
A — When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q — And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A — When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod
and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first to
condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties
and privileges of the Court." He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted
on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would
have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if accused-appellant's name was
known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers
had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant
so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.30
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too much difficulty,
contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been particularized and
the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December 14,
1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where
Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the
vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have
already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.31 (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the trial, accused-
appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility
of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and
participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active
participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects
of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto
during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,33 which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a
warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an
unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for
and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality
of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of
the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former — an argument that the Solicitor General
appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and
seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected
on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was
made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be
reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering that they had
more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.34
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable,
the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge
Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."35
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.36
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate
a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for
some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109125 December 2, 1994

ANG YU ASUNCION, ARTHUR GO AND KEH TIONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BUEN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Antonio M. Albano for petitioners.
Umali, Soriano & Associates for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Assailed, in this petition for review, is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 04 December 1991, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 26345 setting aside and declaring without force and effect the orders of execution of the trial court, dated 30
August 1991 and 27 September 1991, in Civil Case No. 87-41058.
The antecedents are recited in good detail by the appellate court thusly:
On July 29, 1987 a Second Amended Complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ang Yu Asuncion and Keh
Tiong, et al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng, Rose Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31,
Manila in Civil Case No. 87-41058, alleging, among others, that plaintiffs are tenants or lessees of residential and
commercial spaces owned by defendants described as Nos. 630-638 Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila; that they have
occupied said spaces since 1935 and have been religiously paying the rental and complying with all the conditions of
the lease contract; that on several occasions before October 9, 1986, defendants informed plaintiffs that they are
offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same; that during the negotiations, Bobby Cu
Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while plaintiffs made a counter offer of P5-million; that plaintiffs thereafter asked
the defendants to put their offer in writing to which request defendants acceded; that in reply to defendant's letter,
plaintiffs wrote them on October 24, 1986 asking that they specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell; that
when plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter dated January 28, 1987 with the same request; that
since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received that
defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to
sell the property to them.
Defendants filed their answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing a special defense of
lack of cause of action.
After the issues were joined, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the lower court.
The trial court found that defendants' offer to sell was never accepted by the plaintiffs for the reason that the parties
did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all.
Nonetheless, the lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for sale at a price of
P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal. Thus the dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs summarily dismissing
the complaint subject to the aforementioned condition that if the defendants subsequently decide to offer their property
for sale for a purchase price of Eleven Million Pesos or lower, then the plaintiffs has the option to purchase the property
or of first refusal, otherwise, defendants need not offer the property to the plaintiffs if the purchase price is higher than
Eleven Million Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision, plaintiffs appealed to this Court in
CA-G.R. CV No. 21123. In a decision promulgated on September 21, 1990 (penned by Justice Segundino G. Chua
and concurred in by Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Fernando A. Santiago), this Court affirmed with modification the
lower court's judgment, holding:
In resume, there was no meeting of the minds between the parties concerning the sale of the property. Absent such
requirement, the claim for specific performance will not lie. Appellants' demand for actual, moral and exemplary
damages will likewise fail as there exists no justifiable ground for its award. Summary judgment for defendants was
properly granted. Courts may render summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 815). All
requisites obtaining, the decision of the court a quo is legally justifiable.
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal unmeritorious, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, but subject to the
following modification: The court a quo in the aforestated decision gave the plaintiffs-appellants the right of first refusal
only if the property is sold for a purchase price of Eleven Million pesos or lower; however, considering the mercurial
and uncertain forces in our market economy today. We find no reason not to grant the same right of first refusal to
herein appellants in the event that the subject property is sold for a price in excess of Eleven Million pesos. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The decision of this Court was brought to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court
denied the appeal on May 6, 1991 "for insufficiency in form and substances" (Annex H, Petition).
On November 15, 1990, while CA-G.R. CV No. 21123 was pending consideration by this Court, the Cu Unjieng spouses
executed a Deed of Sale (Annex D, Petition) transferring the property in question to herein petitioner Buen Realty and
Development Corporation, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. That for and in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, the VENDORS hereby sells, transfers and conveys for and in favor of the VENDEE, his heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns, the above-described property with all the improvements found therein including
all the rights and interest in the said property free from all liens and encumbrances of whatever nature, except the
pending ejectment proceeding;
2. That the VENDEE shall pay the Documentary Stamp Tax, registration fees for the transfer of title in his favor and
other expenses incidental to the sale of above-described property including capital gains tax and accrued real estate
taxes.
As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 105254/T-881 in the name of the Cu Unjieng spouses was cancelled and, in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 195816 was issued in the name of petitioner on December 3, 1990.
On July 1, 1991, petitioner as the new owner of the subject property wrote a letter to the lessees demanding that the
latter vacate the premises.
On July 16, 1991, the lessees wrote a reply to petitioner stating that petitioner brought the property subject to the
notice of lis pendens regarding Civil Case No. 87-41058 annotated on TCT No. 105254/T-881 in the name of the Cu
Unjiengs.
The lessees filed a Motion for Execution dated August 27, 1991 of the Decision in Civil Case No. 87-41058 as modified
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21123.
On August 30, 1991, respondent Judge issued an order (Annex A, Petition) quoted as follows:
Presented before the Court is a Motion for Execution filed by plaintiff represented by Atty. Antonio Albano. Both
defendants Bobby Cu Unjieng and Rose Cu Unjieng represented by Atty. Vicente Sison and Atty. Anacleto Magno
respectively were duly notified in today's consideration of the motion as evidenced by the rubber stamp and signatures
upon the copy of the Motion for Execution.
The gist of the motion is that the Decision of the Court dated September 21, 1990 as modified by the Court of Appeals
in its decision in CA G.R. CV-21123, and elevated to the Supreme Court upon the petition for review and that the same
was denied by the highest tribunal in its resolution dated May 6, 1991 in G.R. No.
L-97276, had now become final and executory. As a consequence, there was an Entry of Judgment by the Supreme
Court as of June 6, 1991, stating that the aforesaid modified decision had already become final and executory.
It is the observation of the Court that this property in dispute was the subject of the Notice of Lis Pendens and that the
modified decision of this Court promulgated by the Court of Appeals which had become final to the effect that should
the defendants decide to offer the property for sale for a price of P11 Million or lower, and considering the mercurial
and uncertain forces in our market economy today, the same right of first refusal to herein plaintiffs/appellants in the
event that the subject property is sold for a price in excess of Eleven Million pesos or more.
WHEREFORE, defendants are hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in
favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the consideration of P15 Million pesos in recognition
of plaintiffs' right of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer.
All previous transactions involving the same property notwithstanding the issuance of another title to Buen Realty
Corporation, is hereby set aside as having been executed in bad faith.
SO ORDERED.
On September 22, 1991 respondent Judge issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, let there be Writ of Execution issue in the above-entitled case directing the Deputy Sheriff Ramon
Enriquez of this Court to implement said Writ of Execution ordering the defendants among others to comply with the
aforesaid Order of this Court within a period of one (1) week from receipt of this Order and for defendants to execute
the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of the plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur
Go for the consideration of P15,000,000.00 and ordering the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, to cancel and
set aside the title already issued in favor of Buen Realty Corporation which was previously executed between the latter
and defendants and to register the new title in favor of the aforesaid plaintiffs Ang Yu Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur
Go.
SO ORDERED.
On the same day, September 27, 1991 the corresponding writ of execution (Annex C, Petition) was issued.1
On 04 December 1991, the appellate court, on appeal to it by private respondent, set aside and declared without
force and effect the above questioned orders of the court a quo.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that Buen Realty can be held bound by the writ of execution
by virtue of the notice of lis pendens, carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time
of the latter's purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs.
We affirm the decision of the appellate court.
A not too recent development in real estate transactions is the adoption of such arrangements as the right of first refusal,
a purchase option and a contract to sell. For ready reference, we might point out some fundamental precepts that may
find some relevance to this discussion.
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is constituted
upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient
cause established by the various sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b)
the object which is the prestation or conduct; required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-
persons who, viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor)
subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), which is a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service (Art. 1305,
Civil Code). A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally,
its consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the
contract to the time the contract is concluded (perfected). The perfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence
of the essential elements thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere meeting
of minds, i.e., the concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the cause thereof. A contract which requires,
in addition to the above, the delivery of the object of the agreement, as in a pledge or commodatum, is commonly
referred to as a real contract. In a solemn contract, compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a
donation of real property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form being thereby an essential
element thereof. The stage of consummation begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the
contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation.
In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs, the contract is perfected when
a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right
to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees. Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
When the sale is not absolute but conditional, such as in a "Contract to Sell" where invariably the ownership of the thing
sold is retained until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition (normally, the full payment of the purchase price),
the breach of the condition will prevent the obligation to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. 2 In Dignos vs.
Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 375), we have said that, although denominated a "Deed of Conditional Sale," a sale is
still absolute where the contract is devoid of any proviso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally rescind is
stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid. Ownership will then be transferred to the buyer upon actual or
constructive delivery (e.g., by the execution of a public document) of the property sold. Where the condition is imposed
upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of the condition would prevent such perfection. 3 If the condition is
imposed on the obligation of a party which is not fulfilled, the other party may either waive the condition or refuse to
proceed with the sale (Art. 1545, Civil Code).4
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can
be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted. 5
An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable
consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This
contract is legally binding, and in sales, it conforms with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1479. . . .
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor
if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (1451a) 6
Observe, however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself.7 The optionee has the right, but not the obligation,
to buy. Once the option is exercised timely, i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise
to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings. 8
Let us elucidate a little. A negotiation is formally initiated by an offer. An imperfect promise (policitacion) is merely an
offer. Public advertisements or solicitations and the like are ordinarily construed as mere invitations to make offers or
only as proposals. These relations, until a contract is perfected, are not considered binding commitments. Thus, at any
time prior to the perfection of the contract, either negotiating party may stop the negotiation. The offer, at this stage,
may be withdrawn; the withdrawal is effective immediately after its manifestation, such as by its mailing and not
necessarily when the offeree learns of the withdrawal (Laudico vs. Arias, 43 Phil. 270). Where a period is given to the
offeree within which to accept the offer, the following rules generally govern:
(1) If the period is not itself founded upon or supported by a consideration, the offeror is still free and has the right to
withdraw the offer before its acceptance, or, if an acceptance has been made, before the offeror's coming to know of
such fact, by communicating that withdrawal to the offeree (see Art. 1324, Civil Code; see also Atkins, Kroll & Co. vs.
Cua, 102 Phil. 948, holding that this rule is applicable to a unilateral promise to sell under Art. 1479, modifying the
previous decision in South Western Sugar vs. Atlantic Gulf, 97 Phil. 249; see also Art. 1319, Civil Code; Rural Bank of
Parañaque, Inc., vs. Remolado, 135 SCRA 409; Sanchez vs. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368). The right to withdraw, however, must
not be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily; otherwise, it could give rise to a damage claim under Article 19 of the Civil
Code which ordains that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
(2) If the period has a separate consideration, a contract of "option" is deemed perfected, and it would be a breach
of that contract to withdraw the offer during the agreed period. The option, however, is an independent contract by
itself, and it is to be distinguished from the projected main agreement (subject matter of the option) which is obviously
yet to be concluded. If, in fact, the optioner-offeror withdraws the offer before its acceptance (exercise of the option)
by the optionee-offeree, the latter may not sue for specific performance on the proposed contract ("object" of the
option) since it has failed to reach its own stage of perfection. The optioner-offeror, however, renders himself liable for
damages for breach of the option. In these cases, care should be taken of the real nature of the consideration given,
for if, in fact, it has been intended to be part of the consideration for the main contract with a right of withdrawal on
the part of the optionee, the main contract could be deemed perfected; a similar instance would be an "earnest money"
in a contract of sale that can evidence its perfection (Art. 1482, Civil Code).
In the law on sales, the so-called "right of first refusal" is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot
be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first refusal,
understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of
Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 9 of the same Code. An option or an offer would
require, among other things,10 a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned
contract. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however,
would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another
but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so
described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential
elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general
application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.
Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot
justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor
would it sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality
in the perfection of contracts.11 It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal would be inconsequential for, such
as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given, for instance, the circumstances expressed in Article
1912 of the Civil Code, can warrant a recovery for damages.
The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely accorded a "right of first refusal" in
favor of petitioners. The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has heretofore been said. In fine,
if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of
first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is none to execute, but an action for
damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development Corporation, the alleged purchaser of the property,
has acted in good faith or bad faith and whether or not it should, in any case, be considered bound to respect the
registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No. 87-41058 are matters that must be independently addressed in
appropriate proceedings. Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject
to the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the property,
without first being duly afforded its day in court.
We are also unable to agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals has erred in holding that the writ of execution
varies the terms of the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, later affirmed in CA-G.R. CV-21123. The Court of
Appeals, in this regard, has observed:
Finally, the questioned writ of execution is in variance with the decision of the trial court as modified by this Court. As
already stated, there was nothing in said decision 13 that decreed the execution of a deed of sale between the Cu
Unjiengs and respondent lessees, or the fixing of the price of the sale, or the cancellation of title in the name of petitioner
(Limpin vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 516; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 311; De Guzman vs. CA, 137
SCRA 730; Pastor vs. CA, 122 SCRA 885).
It is likewise quite obvious to us that the decision in Civil Case No. 87-41058 could not have decreed at the time the
execution of any deed of sale between the Cu Unjiengs and petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we UPHOLD the Court of Appeals in ultimately setting aside the questioned Orders, dated 30 August
1991 and 27 September 1991, of the court a quo. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, under
an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and
SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc
recalled to be presented as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. 2 When she passed
through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee
of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her
attention, saying "Excuse me ma’am, can I search you?"3 Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her
abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed
that the package contained what felt like rice granules. 4 When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in
front of SUSAN’s genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said:
"Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty. 5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a
thorough physical examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room, Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN’s
sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered
three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to
them.6 The first was taken from SUSAN’s abdominal area; the second, from in front of her genital area; and the third,
from her right thigh.7 Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes.8 The latter forthwith informed his superior
officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic
packs to the customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances9 which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation
was ever conducted on SUSAN.11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the following articles seized from her: (1) three
bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American passport bearing
Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two
panty girdles.12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but admitted that she did not have a
counsel when she signed the receipt.13 Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the receipt. 14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the circumstances surrounding the arrest and search
of SUSAN and the seizure of the prohibited items found on her person.15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision 16 finding SUSAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, 17 alleging therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving
weight to the medical certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it was not presented in
court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not even a police officer; (3) making
statements which gave the impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4) deliberately ignoring
the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured. SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without
warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain view. Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the
part of the trial judge, SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial.18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
as well as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order 19 on 26 November 2001 denying the motions.
According to the trial judge (1) he explained to SUSAN’s counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
but the latter chose to magnify the judge’s statement which was uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN’s conviction was not based
on the medical report which was not presented in court; (3) there was no violation of SUSAN’s constitutional rights
because she was never interrogated during her detention without counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were
found after a routine frisk at the airport and were therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably appealed to us, imputing to the trial court the
following errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of probable cause;
(2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest;
(3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was
under custodial investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in justifying
under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in
applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was
constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest could not be said to have been made
before the search because at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could not have known what was inside
the plastic containers hidden on her body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that point then, they
could not have determined whether SUSAN was actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but
a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search
was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,21 such stop and frisk
search should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in order to determine whether she was armed or
dangerous and therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area,
started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to submit her to a strip search in the ladies’
room, she was under custodial investigation without counsel, which was violative of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of the admission of the medical report executed by Dr.
Ma. Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson 22 because of its sweeping statement allowing searches
and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the gravity of the safety interests involved. She stresses that
the pertinent case should have been Katz v. United States, 23 which upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States
of America that "protects people and not places."
In its Appellant’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in
possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within the exception,
being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search
and seizure when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further inspection by airport
security personnel. It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the routine
frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSAN’s
conviction was not solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she was caught flagrante delicto
in possession of a regulated drug without being authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSAN’s conviction but
recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSAN’s conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of
SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
…
Sec. 3….
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular case is a judicial question, determinable from
a consideration of the circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by
jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure conducted in this case were incidental
to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was
passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter
felt a bulge on SUSAN’s abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSAN’s body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint
did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense."lawphi1.ñet
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no
knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances
inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said
to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the
"Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police officer approaches a person who is
acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section
9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of,
prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which
shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN
and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at
the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the
Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of
packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the
packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement
that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal.
It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by
appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and issues, finds application to the present case. That case
involves accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then the frisker on duty, whose task was to frisk departing passengers,
employees and crew to check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and explosives. When Olivia
frisked Leila, the former felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained that she
needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not
satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her superior, who then directed her to take Leila to the
nearest women’s room for inspection. In the comfort room, Leila was asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She
acceded and brought out three plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. This Court ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized during the routine
frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore admissible in
evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified, since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public
in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking
and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely
pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSAN’s reliance on Katz v. U.S.29 is misplaced. The facts and circumstances of that case are entirely different from the
case at bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California of transmitting wagering information by telephone. During the trial, the government was permitted, over the
accused’s objection, to introduce evidence of accused’s end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from
which he placed his calls. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States of America reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial authorization,
which was not given in the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved.
It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
The maxim – stare decisis et non quieta movere – invokes adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle things
which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. 30 There being
a disparity in the factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in
the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure
were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was
justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a
person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody interrogation." 31 Custodial investigation refers to the
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way."32 This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime
and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. 33And the right to counsel attaches upon
the start of such investigation. 34 The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights. 35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was
conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she
did so, she was told that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages was
not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her.36 Hence, her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the admission of the medical report on the physical and
medical examination conducted upon appellant’s request, which contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative. She related that she was an illegitimate
daughter, married, but divorced in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was young and I
lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost control, I want my money back. I owe other people lots of money.
I lost all the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the money." She denied having any morbid
thoughts and perceptual disturbances. (Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document was erroneous because it was not properly
identified. Nevertheless, even without the medical report, appellant’s conviction will stand, as the court’s finding of guilt
was not based on that document.
VII. SUSAN’s conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to rule that that
the three packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in evidence against her. Supported by this evidence
and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, her conviction must inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
…
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.--The penalties
for offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities:
…
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride….
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law. For possession of regulated drugs,
the law fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of the net weight of methamphetamine
hydrochloride found in the possession of SUSAN, the trial court’s imposition of fine in the amount of P1 million is well
within the range prescribed by law.
VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the confiscation of the following:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
,
Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision.
They, therefore, have to be returned to her.37
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal
Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appellant’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
DISINI v. SEC. OF JUSTICE 203335 (SEARCH NALANG SA FILE)

G.R. No. L-1716 June 28, 1949
MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.), INC., and HARRY LYONS, petitioner,
vs.
FELIPE NATIVIDAD, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LOPE SARREAL, respondents.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent Lope Sarreal.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
PERFECTO, J.:
On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a
money judgment against petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30.
On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of the following documents:
I. Books or Papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.:
1. Cash Receipts Journal
2. Cash Payments Journal
3. All Individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities
(a) British-American Engineering Corporation
(b) Philippine Refinery
(c) Felipe Buencamino
(d) Luzon Stevedoring
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company
(h) Filipino Businessmen's Syndicate
(i) Material Distributors Inc., Wichita, Kansas
(j) Harry Lyons
4. All letters exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc., Material Distributors, Inc. of Wichita, Kansas and
Harry Lyons, between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
5. All cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas,
between October 9, 1946 to March 31, 1947.
II. Books and Papers of the defendant Harry Lyons.
1. Letters exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas between September 14,
1946 and March 24, 1947.
2. Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., Wichita, Kansas, between September
14, 1946 and March 24, 1947.
3. Cash Receipts Journal.
4. Cash Payments Journal.
On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A
and B of the complaint.
On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to Sarreal's above mentioned original and
supplemental motion on the ground that he failed to show good cause and that the motion were evidently filed for the
purpose of fishing evidence.
On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions, required petitioners to produce the documents and annexes
in question on July 24, 1947.
On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons, petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights they have
under the Rules of Court, to postpone the inspection of the documents and annexes in question and accordingly
respondent judge postponed it to August 15, 1947.
On August 13, 1947, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 16, on the following grounds:
"(a) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits the delivery, communication and general examination of the
correspondence of merchants, a substantial right, as well as the petitioners' right to the inviolability of their
correspondence as guaranteed by the Constitution would be violated by the order requiring the production of the
following documents:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF DEFENDANT HARRY LYONS
(1) Letters exchange between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between Sept. 14, 1946
and March 24,1947;
(2) Cablegrams exchanged between Harry Lyons and Material Distributors, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, between
September 14, 1946 and March 24, 1947.
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
(4-5) All letters and cablegrams exchanged between Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., Material Distributors, Inc., of
Wichita, Kansas, and Harry Lyons between October 9, 1946 and March 31, 1947.
"(b) That the production for the plaintiff's inspection of all the foregoing documents above enumerated, as well as of
the following documents, would constitute a "fishing expedition," not allowed by Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, since
their materiality or probable materiality is not shown by the pleadings of the parties except by movant's bare
allegation which are disputed by your petitioners:
BOOKS AND PAPERS OF MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS (PHIL.) INC.
1-2. Cash Receipts Journal and Cash Payments Journal.
3. All individual Ledgers, specially of the following persons or entities.
(b) Philippine Refinery.
(c) Felipe Buencamino.
(d) Luzon Stevedoring.
(e) Standard Oil Company of New York.
(f) Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
(g) Manila Laundry Company.
"(c) That plaintiff is not entitled to the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B because his only
purpose, as stated in his supplemental motion, Exhibit D, was to find out if a case of falsification has been made; that
the issue between the parties in this regard is material only to your petitioners' affirmative defense, and if the plaintiff's
purpose was as stated in said supplemental motion, then your petitioners claimed their privilege against self-
incrimination. That this letter privilege was also claimed insofar as the production and inspection of the other documents
were concerned by your petitioners in view of counsel for respondent Lope Sarreal's charge to the Honorable City
Fiscal for the City of Manila that your petitioners were violating our Corporation Law."
On September 27, 1947, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and September 27, 1947, as were issued by the respondent
judge in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the annulment or modification
of the order of July 16, 1947.
Respondent Sarreal advanced the following reasons to show that the orders complained of were not issued in excess
of the trial court's jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion:
(a) The motions of the respondent Lope Sarreal of May 27, 1947 and June 4, 1947 contain allegations of the ultimate
fact that the books and papers mentioned in said motions constitute or contain evidence material to the matters involved
in the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the petitioners herein, and allegation to this effect is adequate
showing of good cause for the production and inspection of the documents mentioned therein, being an allegation in
the very words used in Form 11 of the Appendix Forms of our Rules of Court, and therefore a sufficient compliance
with said Rule (Go Tianco vs. Judge Diaz, G. R. L-7, January 22, 1946, reported in the June 1946 issue of the official
Gazette).
(b) Article 46 of the Code of Commerce invoked by the petitioners does not apply to cases of production and inspection
of books and papers belonging to a party to the action in which such production and inspection are sought(Decision of
Supreme Court of Spain of March 30, 1894). At any rate, said Article of the Code of Commerce has been impliedly
repealed by Act No. 190, pertinent portions of which are now embodied in our Rules of Court (3 Op. of Atty. Gen.,
380).
(c) Neither would the inspection of books and papers of the petitioners amount to a violation of the inviolability of the
correspondence under Sec. 1, No. 5, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines, considering that the inspection of
said books and papers are sought through proper order of the trial court, and the Constitutional provision invoked by
the petitioners precisely allows inspection of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of the court.
Moreover, this provision of our Constitution creates no new right, being merely a re-enforcement of the Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures (Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th Edition, p.
632), and when the inspection of such books and papers was allowed "upon lawful order of the court" made through
the respondent Judge, such inspection cannot be considered as unreasonable although such books and papers are
private in character (First National Bank vs. Hughes, 6 Fed., C 737, 741, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction in
106 U.S., 523, 27 Law ed., 268, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489; Johnson Steel Street-Rail Co. vs. North Branch Steel Co., 48 Fed.,
191; Victor G. Beede Co. vs. Joseph Bancroft and Sons Co., 98 Fed., 175, affirmed in 52 L. R. A., 734, 45 C. C. A.,
354, 106 Fed., 396, where this question was not involved; Burnham vs. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226, 74 A. Dec., 676;
United States vs. Terminal R. Assoc., 148 Fed., 486; Re Dunn, 9 Mo. App., 225; Elder and Bogardus, 1 Edm. Sel Cas.,
110; Boston and M. R. Co. vs. States [N. H.], 77 Atl., 996; Hopkinson vs. Burghley, L. R. 2ch., 447; Groker-Wheeler
Co. vs. Bullock [C. C.], 134 Fed., 241; Re Bolster, 110 Pac., 547.).
(d) The inspection of the said documents is not for the purpose of "fishing evidence" but with a view to enabling the
respondent Lope Sarreal to designate with the particularity of the subpoena duces tecum to be obtained in connection
with trial of the case on its merits the specific books and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments made
by the petitioners, such books and papers being material to the case in view, among others, of the allegation in the
amended complaint that the defendants, the petitioners herein, had been remitting all or the greater volume of the
proceeds from the sales of equipment and materials of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2059 outside the jurisdiction
of the trial court and had been disposing of their properties with the intention of defrauding their creditors. At any
rate, "fishing expedition" is allowed and is precisely contemplated in Rule 21 of our Rules of Court as a weapon of
discovery (XXVI Am. Bar. Ass. Jur. No. 1, Jan. 1940, 48; Golden vs. Arcadia Mutual Casualty Company, D. C. III., 1942,
3 F. R. D., 26; Leach vs. Griff Bros. Coop. Corp., D. C. Miss, 1942 2 F. R. D., 444; Civil Aeronautics Board of Aeronautics
Authority vs. Canadian Colonial Airways, D. C., 1941, 41 F. S., 1006; Quemus Theatre Co. vs. Warner Bros. Pictures,
D. C. N. J., 1940, 35 F. S., 949; United Mercantile Agency vs. Silver Fleet Motor Express, D. C. Ky., 1941, F. R. D., 709;
Walling vs. Richmon Screw Anchor Company, D. C. N. Y., 1943,4 F. R. D., 265; Monarch Liquor Corp. vs. Schenley
Distillers Corp., D. C. N.Y., 1941, 2 F. R. D., 51; Walsh vs. Comm. Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.
[1939], 26 F. Supp., 556; Olson Transportation Company vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Company, 7 F. R. D., 234).
(e) The originals of Annexes A and B are relevant not only to the case of the defendants but also to that of the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 2059 here involved, in view of the issue of fact raised by the pleadings of the parties as to whether
the originals of Annexes A and B have been falsified by the insertion therein of the names of Gil J. Puyat and Raymond
Lehmann after said Annexes were signed by respondent Lope Sarreal and delivered to the petitioner Harry Lysons, in
view of which respondent Lope Sarreal is entitled to the production and inspection thereof under the provisions of Rule
21 of our Rules of Court.
(f) Even if ocular inspection of said Annexes A and B may reveal falsification thereof by the petitioners amounting to a
violation of the applicable provisions of our Revised Penal Code, the petitioners cannot exempt themselves from the
production of said exhibits for mere inspection and copying, inasmuch as the Constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination has been extended in specific case only to the production of documents as evidence, and only when the
person producing them is made to take the witness stand and identify them under oath, and not to the production of
such documents for mere inspection (Comm. vs. Southern Express Co., 1914, 160 Ky., 1, 169 SW., 517, annotated cases
1916A, 373, L. R. A., 1915B, 913; U. S. vs. Hughes, 12 Blatchff, 553); the reason being that the Constitutional
prohibition is one against compelling a person to be a "witness against himself", and this has been held to
mean testimonial compulsion or extraction of admission form the person's own lips (4 Wigmore, 865, 2263; Wilson vs.
U. S., 55 Law, ed., 776, citing cases).
(g) Moreover, the corporate records sought to be inspected are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition against
self-incrimination, even though such documents may contain evidence tending to subject any or all of the officers of a
corporation to a criminal indictment (Wilson vs. U. S., 221 U. S., 361, 51 Law. ed., 771; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. vs.
Walling, 327 U. S.,186, 90 Law. ed., 614, 627-629; U. S. vs. Baunch & Lamp Optical Co., 321U. S., 707, 88 Law. ed.,
1024, 1037 [1944]; U. S. vs. White, 88 Law. ed., 1547).
(h) Production and inspection of documents have been allowed and sustained in decided cases, under Orders which
were broader than those here assailed, for the production and inspection of all books of accounts, all memoranda and
records, stocks book, ledger, journal, cash book, bank book, bank deposit slip, check book, voucher, contract, income
tax return, booking record and correspondence (U. S. vs. Duoder, 1 F. R. S., 466, U. S. D. C. June 16, 1939; Orange
Country Theater Corp. vs. League, 1 F. R. S., 448).
(i) The respondent Judge, before issuing the Orders complained of, gave the parties full opportunity, not only to discuss
the question involved by repeated oral arguments but also by written memoranda, and in the exercise of his discretion
issued the Orders complained of only after full consideration of all the questions of fact and law involved.
The production and inspection of documents and books here in question call for the interpretation and application of
section 1 of Rule 21, which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order
any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation
thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and
photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Petitioners contend that in filling his original and supplemental motions, Sarreal has failed to show good cause for the
issuance of the requested order. It appears, however, in the original motion of May 27, 1947, that the books and
papers therein mentioned "constitute or contain the evidence material to the matters involved in the above entitled
case."
In the supplemental motion of June 4, 1947, it is alleged that there is direct conflict between the allegations of the
complaint and amended complaint and those of the answer and amended answer as to whether or not the names of
Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W. Lehmann appear in any part of the originals of Annexes A and B of the complaint, and
plaintiff Sarreal wanted the production and inspection of said originals to show that they did not contain the names of
Gil J. Puyat and Raymond W. Lehmann, and that if said names should appear now typed in said Annexes A and B,
said additional names must have been typed by direction of Harry Lysons without the knowledge or consent of Sarreal
and after said originals were delivered by Harry Lysons and filed by the latter and that the changes so introduced
are a forgery.
With these allegations in the original and supplemental motions Sarreal has fulfilled the requirements of showing good
cause for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question under Rule 21.
Petitioners contained that the order of the trial judge violated petitioner's constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
We have considered carefully persons advanced by petitioners and memoranda in support of this allegation and we
found nothing in them to show how, without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the complaint, petitioners may
incriminate themselves. We have, therefore, to dismiss such contention.
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the
Philippines.)
(5) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when
public safety and order require otherwise. (Sec. 1. Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines.)
The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified
or confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the
production and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined
by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches.
There is no question that, upon the pleadings in the case, Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question,
that they are material and important to the issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better served if all
the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court.
The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated, because the trial
court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in
question in virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice.
After a careful consideration of the legal question raised by petitioners, this Court has arrived at the conclusion that
the trial judge, in issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Petition denied with costs against petitioner.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco
No. 92
Argued February 15, 1967
Decided June 5, 1967
387 U.S. 523
Syllabus
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing, after three efforts by city housing
inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and
residential use of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance
unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior
Court for a writ of prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and similar cases,
the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State
Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing.
Held:
1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code enforcement
inspection of his personal residence. Frank v. Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S. 528-534.
(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through
its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S. 528.
(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable."
Pp. 387 U. S. 528-529.
(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral"
where municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence
of physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal
process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U. S. 529-531.
(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on
occupants;
Page 387 U. S. 524
that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function under reasonable search
warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S. 531-533.
2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code enforcement inspections is not
dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the
enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the
issuance of such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S. 534-
539.
3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations should normally be sought only after entry is refused.
Pp. 387 U. S. 539-540.
4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387
U. S. 540.
237 Cal.App.2d 128, 46 Cal.Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.
G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and ADRIAAN
VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of
close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988,
seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was
released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working
visa. Thus, of the original twenty two (22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes
shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes.
The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated:
xxx xxx xxx
ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.
RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room.
In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part:
Noted:
There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite
sometime.
On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia:
Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles,
are inimical to public morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45
and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of
Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners.
On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being
seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were
healthy.
On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification
by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the
CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting
them to and from the CID where trial was on-going.
On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-
deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of
Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed
provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the
aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.
On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of
the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A
Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination
of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said
provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are
pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest
and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any
Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs.
People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
is that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to
rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer
or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the
seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28,
1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in
CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were
issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69
of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against
their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed
(Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue
of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas
corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental
rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys
in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion
involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children
are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's
Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals
and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-
being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-
24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any
other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation
as charged against the alien;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation
proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated.
Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific
constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions
essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is
not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken
the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The
deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and
need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155).
It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against
him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte
Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to
be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F.
[2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be admitted, provided the alien is given
the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang
Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).
The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest
by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is
issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not
invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to
appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37,
45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation
proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step
preliminary to their possible deportation.
Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of
overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated
the condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562).
To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State.
The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives authority to the Commissioner of
Immigration to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new
bonds required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.
xxx xxx xxx
... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al
of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.
(Ng Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).
"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings."
(Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both
judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings.
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R. No. 10280, September
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution
(the 1935 Constitution), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the
warrants of arrest were issued.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that
a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be
substantiated by competent evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides:
Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be
deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such
action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and
he shall be allowed not less than 3 days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because
in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides
that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions
as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that
the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power
is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442).
"Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing
deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs. Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not
be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport
aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil.
41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534
[1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting
deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty
of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced
him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in
the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by
name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying.
It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who
testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a
jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged
to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room
of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo
City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00
for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below
his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate
access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone
or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the
lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact
amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really
beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair
or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been
allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and
searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him
under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this
after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of
the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant
when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with
marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration
of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer, prior to
June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon
9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal
gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily
report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we cannot
Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days
before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time
when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he
was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information to
the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence
report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme
Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was
not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft
are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has
always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations
of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in
the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not
a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship,
when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only
ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution
and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying,
that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he
will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That
evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search
was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our
law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for
the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers
with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao
del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance
of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the
offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22,
1972, and General Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No. 885, and
considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof,
applying the provision of indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and
Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in
accordance with law. Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered disposed
of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of
subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or
authority issued by the proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep,
possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and
Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization
organized for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and
violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the performance
of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection of contributions from the
members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent
information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one
Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao
del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the
NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as
his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed
by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del
Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or
less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused,
who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as
reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded
by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun
was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm,
Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept
in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified
beneath said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook colored maroon with spiral bound,
Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled
Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao
qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa
sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the
prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him
by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New
People's Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological movement, an
example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN,
pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was presented, who declared that on
March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called
him downstair. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He
was also warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family,
Cesar Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982.
Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being
only about two (2) meters away from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit
"A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and
Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben
Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions,
to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those
who attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be
victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the
prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions
about the NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection
of the contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription
of th extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion
of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his
having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to
counsel and right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without
the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while
waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of
firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and
testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused Ruben
Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in
evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos,
Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening,
he was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14
1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to the subject firearm, which
the investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled,
hitting him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed
solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment, described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was
subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit
and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and
physical agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his eyes. He was
undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and over his private parts, making his entire body,
particularly his penis and testicle, terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was
repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again
repeated after recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will
still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any
further the pain and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E"
for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages
141-148, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details,
and going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to
those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his person and family, as a result of
unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able
to obtain his admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support his denial to the truth
of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with
qqqs answers to those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata Arellano appeared
and declared categorically, that the above-questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial
confession of accused, involving her to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on
the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she
meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with subversion in
the Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed
in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain
his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador
qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused,
being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to his good character and
reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-
May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in his barrio
involving subversive activities but they were released and were not formally charged in Court because they publicly
took their oath of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified
that the subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night
time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind, temporarily for
them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in their house at
that time and that she did not inform him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for
fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still
Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in support of accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal
possession of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the
manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT
TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime
charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of
arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New
People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14,
1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a
citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this
right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition
of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United
States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to
his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome
but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access
except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd
v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept:
the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach
of government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of the instances
when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the
exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an
urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would
become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came
in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither
was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the
arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is
a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest
is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test
of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable
ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That
a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only
to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make
the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or
is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused.
We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts
of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required
to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of
criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a
search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his
field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be
deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply
because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed
to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80
Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is evident from
the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt.
Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution considering that he was purposely
under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as
evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two
arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the
place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place
where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time
of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the
subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence.
Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used
against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated
that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree measures may
not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation
gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed as
stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial
interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when
he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot
cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against
the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of
Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial
court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility
which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled
to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and
deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there
would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record
discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how much credence can be
accorded to him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who
testified on the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended upon how much he cooperated
with the authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus,
whose testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally
unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the
military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83,
January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free
from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e.,
Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who could have
corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or
actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after stressing that
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126;
People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador,
76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA
1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be a well-
organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a
foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate levels of violence
and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving
citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also
remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with an the
means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the
framework of our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and
protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant
is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221)
and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration
of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the
following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as
many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a
valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual
situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection,
if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of
the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying
on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests
violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
The writ of habeas

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3
corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of
the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee
may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized
The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
by law. 6
states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it
can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested
because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where
membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing
offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply
because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons
who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their
patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder,
arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological
base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in
the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of
Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid
arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
A
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information
which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed
that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about
12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital.
The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by
five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando
Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their
believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then
motion for reconsideration, 13
being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in
compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make
the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good
faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the
arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule
113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos.
84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched
pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or
ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without
warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after
their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within
judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to
this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the
CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of
this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted
he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and
he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque;17 that, at
the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening
of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be
the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was
the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for
their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military
agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued
to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP,
and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or
subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their
former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The
records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not
appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent
an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and
a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an

acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section
5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which
they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even
But if they do not strictly comply with the said

if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of
certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he
said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense,"
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28
but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits,
that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But,
the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it
be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before
arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this development,
the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal
Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed
by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December
1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one
of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye
II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail,
earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were
based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque,
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30
she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her
arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as
well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these
admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were
probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon
which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no
compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security
and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is
that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly
look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the
detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to
languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the
least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive
is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the
questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts
and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is
important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was
driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson
St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson
and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they
were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of
the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for
petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness
to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same
day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the
presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the
victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information,
the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful
and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that
he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on
the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a
cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date,
approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same
day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner
had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12
July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was
recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11
July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension
of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied
by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August
1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit
petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of
his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case
for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view
of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than
a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment
on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on
the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
"freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police
station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to
preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the
inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial
Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a
Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders
from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest
had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly
arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had
been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a
majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in
connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even
without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had
been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case,
misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of
petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such
offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like
the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense
which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that
the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
an offense;
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest"
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been
committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge"
of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted
had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of
Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within
five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same
right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state
that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon
Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor
proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This
was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been
accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he
was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note that
petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed
out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner
should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of
petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary
investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing
of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not
clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with
the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification
is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
[such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
. . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation
(Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th
day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his
motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the
information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of
the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section
7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory
rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due
process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial
for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation,
humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps,
to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive
him the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case
considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case,
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely
asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go
asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner
and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation
on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while
constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent
to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and
requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that
no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that
could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has
already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right
to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled
to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to
be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary
investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in
abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view
of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable
cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of
procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without
preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the
proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because
of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and
objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him
with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his
"continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge
the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. 30 If he did not
walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to
be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also
his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of
the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be
up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion
for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail
were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation
of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to
dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a
ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather,
it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation
and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated
17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991
hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge
of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days
from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED
to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen
pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous
tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because
its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone
call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side
to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a
.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified
the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987.
He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles
stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or
that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his
arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction
for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal
seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a
lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The
defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should
also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor
General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and
search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
an offense;
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of
this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-
appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense
could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place
not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been different
if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened
alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light
of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from
side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that
there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard.
The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was
a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind
the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously
examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure
that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from
these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted
in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the
other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution
has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of
the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for
the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion)
that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within
his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a
crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to
the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed,
being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification.
Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his
abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person
with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This
simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal
malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to
sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which
is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the
brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights
of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her
representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution
of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better
of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the
vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons
who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by
those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered
released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is
no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-
frisk" — which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to
respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search
and seizure.
The Case
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994
in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City
Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:2
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and
knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 3 With the agreement of the
public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. 4 After trial in due course, the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a
decision5convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:6
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of
Marijuana residue), and hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY;
and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of
Appeal8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court 9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the
appeal and affirming the trial court:10
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against
appellant.
Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:
ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was
driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being
made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male
person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and
to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him
and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his
hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person
had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned
over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated
wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same
with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote "Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was
marked as Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit "E-4").
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical
analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D"). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat.
Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit "D".
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40
o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit "D".
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen which she identified.
(Exhibit
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in her Certification dated April 11,
1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also found that
the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her
examinations (Exhibit "G").
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit
"E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit "E-1").
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong.
Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit
"C")
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery
when he was apprehended.15
Version of the Defense
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:16
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A.
Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver
of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The
policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why
he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was
found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought
the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the latter to follow him. The neighbor
thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to
remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the
accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt
and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The
accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his
pants.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and was led to the
Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who
led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman
who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents
did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an inquest Fiscal.
There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say
anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were stopped by
policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on
his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants at
the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing that tricycles were
allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.17
The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting
officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were "neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what
transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found to be in
possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped up," because the appellant neither
took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of
Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled
that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It further found
petitioner's contention — that he could not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue — to be without
merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had
been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
material and substantial and not minor.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the purpose of extorting
money.
V
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with both innocence
and guilt.
VI
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in evidence.
Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of
prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
During a Stop-and-Frisk
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were products of
an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for
respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this
issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case
of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop
a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.19
In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This
was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached
petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended
period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred
with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to
investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the
limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. 20 Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to
the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure."22 In People vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes
exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of
the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They
found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-
cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police
officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioner's possession:25
FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front
of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what
happened, if any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his attention, he
tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of
any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver
of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the
following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the
failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right
for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary
appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors
assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. 27
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained"
contradictions which did not support petitioner's conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially affect
the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this rule. 28
We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:
(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila,
it was held that — "As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of
the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.
However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the bestowal of full
credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory
testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit 29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question of
whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that
petitioner did not deny possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that
marijuana was found in petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not destroy Espiritu's
credibility.30
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.31
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed
marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was
undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted when
asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was
holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion
angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or present
any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering
that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988.32 Since then, he could have made
the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 33
The Proper Penalty
The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by
sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of
six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:
Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to
those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of
marijuana:
Sec. 8. . . . .
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand
to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian
hemp.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.34
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced
to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of
SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Sun Jin Shin Consolidated Consti 2

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4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas

An arrest is therefore in the nature of an

But if they do not strictly comply with the said

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