RULE 13: FILING
the fifteen-day reglementary period, thus, the RTC should have ordered the
223.) G.R. No. 219260, November 06, 2017
BERNICE JOAN TI, Petitioner, v. MANUEL S. DIÑO, Respondent.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:
The City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an Information against
petitioner and a certain Julieta Fernandez (Fernandez) for falsification of
public documents. The MeTC granted the same and, thus, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and Fernandez for the crime charged.
As such, petitioner and Fernandez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the
RTC, seeking to enjoin the MeTC from proceeding. The RTC rendered a decision
and ruled that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent, thereafter, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) with the RTC.
Thereafter, petitioner and Fernandez filed a Motion to Expunge the MR on the
ground that there was a violation of the 3-day notice rule for motions.
Respondent also filed an Opposition to the motion to expunge the MR.
The RTC denied respondent's MR. It was ruled that the failure of the respondent
movant to comply with the 3-day notice rule on motions rendered the said
motion for reconsideration defective. It was found by the RTC that respondent's
motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner's counsel 3 days after
the hearing. Thereafter, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. RTC disapproved
respondent's Notice of Appeal for not having been perfected within the fifteen-
day reglementary period, and thus, no order was made to transfer the records
of the case to the CA.
Respondent, therefore, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
assailing the Order of the RTC. Respondent contended that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
respondent's motion to transmit the records of the case to the CA despite the
filing of the notice of appeal on time.
The CA granted respondent's petition and reversed and set aside the RTC's
Order and, thus, the notice of appeal of respondent was given due course. The
CA further directed the RTC to transmit the entire records of the case to the
former.
According to the CA, the respondent was able to file the notice of appeal within
transfer of the records of the case with the CA. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner further that respondent violated the three-day notice rule requiring
every movant of a motion required to be heard to ensure the receipt of the said
motion with notice of hearing to the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of the hearing. Petitioner argues that respondent should have
resorted to personal service of the motion because such is not impossible
considering that the counsel of petitioner's office is located in Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, while that of the respondent's counsel is located in Malate, Manila.
Issue: Whether or not, respondent should have resorted to personal service of
the motion
Ruling: Yes.
The notice of hearing on the motion must be directed to the adverse party and
must inform him or her of the time and date of the hearing. Failure to comply
with these mandates renders the motion fatally defective, equivalent to a
useless scrap of paper.
It is indisputable that petitioner was not able to receive respondent's notice of
hearing on time. According to respondent, a notice of hearing was sent to
petitioner through registered mail. However, petitioner was only able to receive
the said notice three days after the scheduled hearing. The Rules of Court
mandates that every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing. In this case,
respondent failed to ensure the receipt by the petitioner of the notice of hearing
at least three days before the date of such hearing. The sending of a registered
mail can hardly be an assurance that such notice will fall under the hands of the
other party on time. Under the circumstances of the case, respondent
should have personally served the notice of hearing since the offices of the
respondent and petitioner's counsels are both located in the National
Capital Region.
A close reading of the provisions of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
clearly shows that the directive to ensure that the receipt by the other party .of
the notice of hearing at least three (3) days before the date of the said hearing is
for the party who filed the motion. Nowhere in the said rule does it state that
the court is obligated to determine whether a copy of the motion had, indeed,
been served on the opposing party. The fault, therefore, is with the respondent
and not with the RTC. It was the respondent who resorted to a mode of
service other than personal service and, thus, he should have been the one
who ensured that such notice was received by the petitioner. Under the
Rules, whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other
papers shall be done personally. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except
with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must
be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be the case to consider the paper as not
filed.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other
modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging
the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance
of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation
introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of
justice.
In this case, the office of petitioner's counsel is located in Ortigas Center,
Pasig City, while that of the respondent's counsel is at Malate, Manila.
Personal service, therefore, is the most practicable considering the close
proximity of the places. Nevertheless, respondent was not able to
satisfactorily explain why he made use of registered mail instead of
personally serving the notice of hearing.
Hence, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that respondent violated the three-day rule as provided in Section 4, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court dated July 31, 2015 of petitioner Bernice Joan Ti is GRANTED.
Consequently, the Decision dated January 10, 2014 and Resolution dated June
30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order
dated May 20, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City in SP.
Civil Action No. Q-09-65933 is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
224.) G.R. No. 200469, January 15, 2018
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner
vs.
JOSEPHINE L. PAPA, Respondent
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
PSB filed before the MeTC a complaint for collection of sum of money against
respondent Josephine L. Papa. PSB alleged that Papa obtained a flexi-loan with a
face amount of ₱207,600.00. For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory
note. PSB later on averred that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to meet
her obligation.
Papa filed her Answer and alleged that PSB had no cause of action against her as
her liability had already been extinguished by the several staggered payments
she made to PSB. During the trial on the merits, PSB introduced in evidence a
photocopy of the promissory note. Meanwhile, Papa chose to forego with the
presentation of her evidence and manifested she would instead file a
memorandum.
MeTC rendered a decision in 2avour of PSB and against Papa. The MeTC was
convinced that PSB was able to establish its cause of action against Papa by
preponderance of evidence.
Papa moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the MeTC.
Aggrieved, Papa elevated an appeal before the RTC.
RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC decision. The trial court ruled that PSB
failed to prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the existence and
due execution of the promissory note. It opined that Papa’s apparent admission
in her Answer could not be taken against her as, in fact, she denied any liability
to PSB, and she never admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note.
PSB filed its motion for reconsideration, wherein it admitted that it received the
copy of the 14 October 2009 RTC decision on 26 October 2009.
Papa, in its opposition to PSB’s motion for reconsideration, posited that the RTC
decision had already attained finality. Papa explained that although PSB filed
the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears that
service of the said motion was made one (1) day late as PSB availed of a
private courier service instead of the modes of service prescribed under
the Rules of Court. As such, PSB’s motion for reconsideration is deemed not to
have been made on the date it was deposited to the private courier for mailing
but rather on 11 November 2009, the date it was actually received by Papa.
The RTC denied PSB’s motion for reconsideration ratiocinating that its 14
October 2009 decision had already attained finality, among others. Aggrieved,
PSB filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court
before the CA.
The CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the R TC
decision had already attained finality due to PSB’s failure to serve on Papa a
copy of its motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period. The
appellate court noted that in its motion for reconsideration, PSB did not offer
any reasonable explanation why it availed of private courier service instead of
resorting to the modes recognized by the Rules of Court.
PSB moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether the appellate court erred when it ruled that the RTC decision
had already attained finality
Ruling: No. PSB contends that the timeliness of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration should not be reckoned from the date of the actual receipt by
the adverse party, but on the actual receipt thereof by the RTC, pointing out that
filing and service of the motion are two different matters.
PSB further argues that, notwithstanding the said deviation, a liberal
construction of the rules is proper under the circumstances and that the Court
has the power to suspend its own rules especially when there appears a good
and efficient cause to warrant such suspension.
These arguments deserve scant consideration.
PSB is correct that filing and service are distinct from each other. Indeed, filing
is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court;
whereas, service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or
paper concerned.
Nevertheless, although they pertain to different acts, filing and service go hand-
in-hand and must be considered together when determining whether the
pleading, motion, or any other paper was filed within the applicable
reglementary period. Precisely, the Rules require every motion set for hearing
to be accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties concerned;
otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it, effectively making such
motion as not filed.
The kind of proof of service required would depend on the mode of service used
by the litigant. Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 13. Proof of Service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a
written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist
of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7
of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return
card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof
the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. [emphasis supplied]
In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as
equivalent to filing by ordinary mail. The Court opines that this pronouncement
equally applies to service of pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by
a private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an affidavit of the
person who mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such affidavit must
show compliance with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made by
depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to
the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if
known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to
return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service
may be done by ordinary mail. [emphasis supplied]
This requirement is logical as service by ordinary mail is allowed only in
instances where no registry service exists either in the locality of the
sender or the addressee. This is the only credible justification why resort
to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be allowed.
In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration
to Papa’s counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not
accompanied by an affidavit of the person who sent it through the said private
messengerial service.
Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13,
Section 7 for an effective service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that
personal service was not effected due to lack of time and personnel constraints,
it did not offer an acceptable reason why it resorted to “private registered
mail” instead of by registered mail. In particular, PSB failed to indicate that
no registry service was available in San Mateo, Rizal, where the office of Papa’s
counsel is situated, or in Makati City, where the office of PSB’s counsel is
located. Consequently, PSB failed to comply with the required proof of service
by ordinary mail. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB’s motion for
reconsideration, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively
considered as not filed.
Since PSB’s motion for reconsideration is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and
considering that PSB’s appeal was filed only after the expiration of the 15-day
period on 10 November 2009, such appeal has not been validly perfected. As
such, the subject 14 October 2009 decision of the RTC had already attained
finality as early as 11 November 2009.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 21 July
2011 Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 112611 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
225.) G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007
MARTIN PEOSO and ELIZABETH PEOSO Petitioners, v. MACROSMAN
DONA, Respondent.
Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance filed with
the MTC by Macrosman Dona (respondent) against the petitioners, which was
tried and decided under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent alleged
that he is the owner of a house and lot located at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro;
that in front of the house and lot is a barangay road where the petitioners
constructed their house against the objections of the respondent; and that the
house of the petitioners constituted a public nuisance.
The petitioners, in their defense, contended that their house was constructed
by the late Praxido Peoso, Martins father and Elizabeths husband, way ahead
before the respondent arrived; that their house constitutes no public nuisance;
that the respondent cannot demand a right of way; that the continued existence
of their house brings no harm to the respondent; and that the respondent is not
authorized to file the instant Complaint.
The MTC rendered its Decision, in 4avour of the petitioners and against the
respondent on the ground that respondent has no cause of action against the
petitioners. It ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
house in question was constructed on a public property which may be abated
only by the Municipal Mayor, unless it is specially injurious to a private
person. Respondent appealed the Decision of the MTC to the RTC.
The RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MTC. The RTC declared the house
erected by the petitioners on a portion of the road fronting the house of the
respondent as a nuisance; ordered the petitioners to immediately remove the
said house at their own expense. The RTC denied the petitioners’ MR.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed the
Petition for failure of the petitioners to include in their petition the
required explanation on why personal service upon the respondent was
not resorted to pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners attaching a
Certification dated from the Postmaster that the pleading in question had been
actually received by the respondent. However, the CA issued denied the petition
for lack of merit and ruled that petitioners’ subsequent compliance with
the rules does not cleanse the petition of its infirmity.
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical
grounds.
Ruling: Yes.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing
was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause
to consider the paper as not filed.
Jurisprudence holds that the rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally is
mandatory.
However, in Ello v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined the circumstances when
the court may exercise its discretionary power under Section 11 of Rule 13, viz:
However, such discretionary power of the court must be
exercised properly and reasonably, taking into account the
following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service; (2)
the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
involved therein; and (3) the prima facie merit of the
pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. x x x[
Considering the prima facie merit of the pleading involving the issues whether
the petitioners house is a public nuisance; whether the subject house is
constructed on an abandoned road; and whether the alleged nuisance is
specially injurious to respondent; and, considering further the fact that the MTC
and the RTC decisions are conflicting, the CA had valid grounds to refrain
from dismissing the appeal solely on technical grounds.
Rules of procedure being designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their
rigid application resulting in technicalities that tend to delay or frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Thus, in view of the foregoing jurisprudential trend to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for a just determination of his case, free from
the severities of technicalities; the prima facie merit of the pleading;
and, especially considering the conflicting rulings of the MTC and the RTC, the
CA erred in dismissing the appeal on mere technical grounds.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals
is directed to REINSTATE the petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
69472, for further proceedings.
226.) G.R. No. 104769 March 3, 2000
AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., INVESTCO, INC., and REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 135016 March 3, 2000
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
INVESTCO, INC., substituted by AFP MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION,
INC., respondent.
Petition: The above cases were consolidated and are appeals via certiorari
Facts:
Investco, Inc. was the owner of 6 parcels of land, located in Quezon City and
Marikina. Investco, Inc. agreed to sell the 6 parcels of land to Solid Homes
payable in 5nstalments. The Register of Deeds of Marikina issued in 5nstal of
Investco, Inc. TCTs covering the Marikina portion of the property. The contract
of sale to Solid Homes was not registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina
nor annotated on the original titles issued in the name of Investco, Inc.
However, after paying the downpayment, Solid Homes made no further
payment to Investco, Inc.. Subsequently, Investco, Inc. filed with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, an action for specific performance and damages
against Solid Homes, Inc.. Solid Homes prayed for dismissal of Investco, Inc.’s
complaint alleging that the purchase price under the contract was “not yet due”.
Solid Homes then filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina a notice of lis
pendens requesting that the same be annotated on the titles in Investco, Inc.’s
name. On the same date, the notice of lis pendens was recorded. However, the
notice of lis pendens was not actually annotated on the titles in the name of
Investco, Inc.
The trial court rendered judgment in 5nstal of Investco, Inc. ordering Solid
Homes to pay plaintiffs. In the meantime, Investco, Inc. offered to sell the
property to AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., payable in 5nstalments.
Investco, Inc. furnished AFP MBAI with certified true copies of the titles
covering the Marikina property.
AFP MBAI verified the titles with the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro
Manila and found that copies of the titles that Investco, Inc. gave were genuine
and faithful reproductions of the original titles on file with the Register of
Deeds. AFP MBAI noted that there were no liens or encumbrances
annotated on the titles.
After determining that the titles covering the Investco property were “clean”
and “genuine,” AFP MBAI agreed to purchase the same from Investco, Inc. The
Register of Deeds of Marikina issued TCTs in the name of AFP MBAI. The titles
issued were “clean” and contained no annotation of any lien, encumbrance, or
adverse claim by a third party.
Solid Homes commenced action before the RTC, Marikina, against the Register
of Deeds, AFP MBAI and Investco, Inc. for “annotation of lis pendens and
damages” with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In its
verified complaint, Solid Homes prayed, among others, that (a) the Register of
Deeds be ordered to annotate on the titles registered in the name of Investco,
Inc. the notice of lis pendens and to carry over the same to the titles in the name
of AFP MBAI; (b) alternatively, to declare AFP MBAI as a buyer in bad faith,
bound by the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 40615
In due time, the trial court rendered decision ordering the Register of Deeds for
Marikina to annotate the Notice of Lis Pendens, on the titles registered in the
name of defendant AFP MBAI, and declaring defendant AFP MBAI as a buyer in
bad faith.
Aggrieved thereby, AFP MBAI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which sustained the decision of the trial court. AFP MBAI filed a motion for
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Solid Homes is entitled to the annotation of its notice of lis
pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc.
Ruling: No.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending
litigation while a notice of lis pendensis an announcement to the whole world
that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who
acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to
the intending buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the
prospect or non-prospect of the litigation succeeding before he forks down his
money.”
A notice of lis pendens is not and cannot be sought as a principal action for
relief. The notice is but an incident to an action, an extra-judicial one to be sure.
It does not affect the merits thereof. The notice of lis pendens — that real
property is involved in an action — is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is pending. As a settled rule, notice
of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in
court which affects title to or possession of real property.
Investco’s complaint was an action for collection of sums of money, damages
and attorney’s fees to recover from Solid Homes unpaid 6nstalments on the
purchase price of the subject property. To emphasize, the case was an action for
collection of unpaid 6nstalments on the purchase price of subject real property. In
such case, the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the titles of the property
was not proper as the action was in personam.
Consequently, the doctrine of lis pendens is inapplicable to this case. The
Register of Deeds of Marikina correctly denied the annotation of the
notice of lis pendens on the titles of Investco, Inc. and the AFP MBAI.
Even on the basis of Solid Homes’ counterclaim, which is disregarded in
determining the nature of the action, notice of lis pendens is improper as the
counterclaim was also for sums of money — alleged excess payment and for
damages — not one affecting title to or possession of real property. Such
counterclaim did not convert the nature of the action into a real action involving
title to or possession of subject property.
The rule that “all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens Certificate
of Title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
title” applies herein with full vigor. In the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, the buyer is not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate
the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate.
“Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part
of a possessor rests the burden of proof.” Here, Solid Homes alleged that
Investco, Inc. and AFP MBAI “confederated with each other in entering into the
aforementioned sale in order to deprive herein plaintiff (Solid Homes) of its
rights over subject properties under the Contract to Sell and to Buy. .
.” However, Solid Homes adduced no evidence to
In the absence of a valid notice of lis pendens annotated in the titles, AFP MBAI is
a buyer in good faith and for value, and thus acquired clean and valid titles to
the property in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
(1) In G. R. No. 104769, GRANTS the petition, and SETS ASIDE the Court of
Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27398 and, in lieu thereof, renders
judgment:
(a) dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 52999 of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig Branch 165;
(b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Marikina to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-104941, N-
 104942, N-104943, N-104944, N-104945 and N-104946 of the Register
of Deeds for Marikina, Metro Manila;
© Ordering respondent Solid Homes, Inc. to pay AFP MBAI P300,000.00
as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and costs.
(2) In G.R. No. 135016, DENIES the petition, for lack of merit.
With costs against Solid Homes, Inc.
227.) G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
Petition:
This is a petition for review to reverse the Decision dated 29 November
2000 of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration
of title before RTC of Pasig City (land registration court) which was granted.
Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion
L. Psinakis, heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC. The motion alleged
that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners prayed that the court consider in the land
registration case the Deed of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval
and Ozaeta and their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Petitioners
also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the
successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. The land registration court gave due
course to the motion and conducted hearings.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses, hence, petitioners
filed another motion to declare the same void.
Petitioners questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to
recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an
application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration
court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 void. In a letter, the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the notice
of lis pendens.
Three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to
the LRA. In its resolution, the LRA stated that the sole question for resolution is
whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based on a motion to declare void
the decrees and titles. The LRA agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice
of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the
legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case. The
LRA declared that petitioners are not parties but mere movants whose
personality the court has not admitted.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of
the LRAs decision. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The appellate court reiterated the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the
legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Petitioners have no legal
personality because they failed to file a motion to lift the order of general default
in the land registration case.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ motion to declare void the decrees issued by the land
registration authority is a proper basis for filing the notice of lis pendens
Ruling: NO. The petition has no merit.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative
relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds
of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or
encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties
designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be recorded.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate,
or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for
partition or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment,
and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon
registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a
memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and
the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall
have been filed and registered.
Notice of Lis Pendens
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a
suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.
The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the
registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or
contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the
result of the pending litigation.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations.
Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation
to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. However,
the filing of a notice of lis pendens does not create a right or lien that previously
did not exist.
Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after
relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such
third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is
not bound by the property owners undertakings not annotated in the transfer
certificate of title. Thus, we have consistently held that
The notice of lis pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of
the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action,
an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is
intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the
results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be
ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or
possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. The
litigation must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected
by the judgment. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals enumerated the cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the
title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings
thereon.
On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the
following cases:
a) Preliminary attachments;
b) Proceedings for the probate of wills;
c) Levies on execution;
d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money
judgment.[27]
The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens
because the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon
which this office will base its action.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis
pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC
No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in
Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register
of Deeds of Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the
application for a notice of lis pendens.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave.