G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994 Ruling: NO. Gambling is not illegal per se.
Ruling: NO. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,
PETITIONERS, VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
Facts: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations, religious elements, women as
well as youth’s groups angrily denounced the project. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of
the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and
hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the
issuance of business permit and cancelling exiting business permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premised or portion thereof
for the operation of casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
casino and providing penalty for violation thereof.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, which declared ordinances invalid.
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor then filed a petition for review.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Whereas Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause (Section 16, RA 7160).
Arguments of Petitioners:
(1) The Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because
they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people;
(2) Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and
roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction;
(3) Assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on
P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with
the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units (Sec. 5, RA 7160);
(4) Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice.
Issue: W/N the Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid
to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is
left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
It is observed that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are
less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to
only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another
in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of
a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between
P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other
but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the
Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute
is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress
as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Notes:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO AND THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants therein."
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is
towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare
(Section 5, ibid) social justice (Section 10, ibid) as well as human dignity and respect
for human rights (Section 11, ibid)." (Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the
poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
common good.

Facts: Petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
confirming and/or ratifying the ongoing Burial Assistance Program initiated by the
office of the Mayor, or extending financial assistance of five hundred pesos to a
bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in
the municipal treasury. Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program,
are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month.
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement fund of four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. Resolution
No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected
allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary finding, respondent COA disapproved
Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social
justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay "those who have less
in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is
hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET
ASIDE.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause

Ruling: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations
(Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare

clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances
and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper
to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections
91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as
to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain
 Ruling: To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing
them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the
issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to
minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of
passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder;
and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would
be ultra vires.

Regulation is a fact of life in any well-ordered community. As society becomes more

and more complex, the police power becomes correspondingly ubiquitous. This has
to be so for the individual must subordinate his interests to the common good, on the
time-honored justification of Salus populi est suprema lex.

Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must
not be deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, "to do his
thing." As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must
not be unduly curtailed.

We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it
deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the
G.R. No. L-31249, August 19, 1986 individual. The so-called "general welfare" is too amorphous and convenient an
SALVADOR VILLACORTA AS CITY ENGINEER OF DAGUPAN CITY, AND JUAN excuse for official arbitrariness.
S. CAGUIOA AS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAGUPAN CITY, PETITIONERS, VS.
GREGORIO BERNARDO AND HON. MACARIO OFILADA AS JUDGE OF THE Let it always be remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the rights
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the
public.
Facts: In declaring the Ordinance 22, regulating subdivision plans over parcels of
land in Dagupan City, null and void, the court a quo declared: This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the
police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under
"From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the
enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts additional defect of violating this authority for legislating in contravention of the
with Section 44 of Act 496 (An Act To Provide For The Adjudication And Registration national law by adding to its requirements.
Of Titles To Lands In The Philippine Islands), because the (1) latter law does not
require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is
submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or
by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. (2) Section 2 of
the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of
such subdivision application; (3) Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts
with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification
to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of
the subdivision plan; and (4) the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for
its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words,
Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional
conditions. xxx the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance
cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general
law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.”

Issue: W/N the questioned Ordinance 22 is valid


GR No. L-42571-72, Jul 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et al. v. EDGARDO L. PARAS, et al
Facts: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates
their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed underwent through periodic
medical check-ups, not infected with venereal disease, and are not allowed to
engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted
the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ordinance
84 is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”.
Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs,
and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
Ruling: NO. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific
provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code. The general welfare
clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first
paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan.
It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law,
and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein; . . .."[26] There are in addition provisions that
may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang
bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist
transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international
standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the
Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the
taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools,
public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the
establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and
other forms of entertainment; . . .."[27]
It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would
be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All
that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night
clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open,
would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a
period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it
should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less
than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation
of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable
consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness
enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due
process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY
vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon City which approved the regulation
of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance,
6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang
Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the
exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the promotion of the public
welfare.
Issue: W/N Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police
power
Ruling: NO. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in
Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of
his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been
said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most
insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby
vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957).
This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan,
10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in
scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed
or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it
is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential
insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the
state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez,
L-7995, May 31, 1957).
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a
person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to
set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal
any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision
granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power
granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as
statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and
liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover,
the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating.
The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the
permits to commence operations.
G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FEATI
BANK AND TRUST CO.
Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles.
The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of
payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the
lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Ortigas claims that the
restrictions annotated on TCTs were imposed as part of its general building scheme
designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision
which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and
industrial sites are also designated or established. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly
from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati
started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but
could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction
but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to
the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along
the West part of EDSA (including the Lots in question) to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the
commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building
restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question.
Ruling: NO. In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted, at
least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the
same. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court was ". . . whether or not
the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong x x xwhich declared Lots
Nos. 5 and 6 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots
in question."[31] Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if
impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to
raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the
opinion that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act,[32] empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"[33] for the municipality. Clearly, the
law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore,
granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory
measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the
provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists
"(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding x xx."
An examination of Section 12 of the same law[34] which prescribes the rules for its
interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be
"liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it
shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general
welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract between a "a province, city or
municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original
terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not
apply in the case at bar.
GR Nos. 60549, Oct 26, 1983
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA, et al v. JUAN Y. REYES, et al
the defendant-appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds
of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of
contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of the First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land
Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, The defendants filed their
the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration, manifestation
and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced. adopting the answer.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public
use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that
limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant;
and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the
expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National
Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. The lower court issued separate orders
authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the
issuance of writs of possession.

Issue: W/N the expropriation of their properties are constitutionally infirm given that
nowhere in the Constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of
private property for the promotion of tourism

Ruling: NO. Petitioners have failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately
accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions
of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent
Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings
any private land within and without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons:
(a) consolidation of lands for tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of
land speculation in areas declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to
the zones, (d) protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value,
and (e) for any other purpose expressly authorized under this Decree and
accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain under its own name, which
shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on
condemnation proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it
may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners: Provided, That in case
bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III,
Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.

The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as
social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national
patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to
achieve these objectives vary from time to time and according to place. To freeze
specific programs like tourism into express constitutional provisions would make the
Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a prescience
beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian
reform and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership
merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these
programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs.
The public respondents have stressed that the development of the 808 hectares
includes plans that would give the petitioners and other displaced persons productive
employment, higher incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better
living standards. Our dismissing this petition is, in part, predicated on those
assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282
hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote
tourism is, therefore, sustained.