REPUBLIC VS KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
[G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006]
Keywords: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of
paper; Adoptive
admission constituting judicial admission
Principles:
● By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
becomes the admission of the party embracing or
espousing it.
● Only the signature of either the party himself or
his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that
is
unsigned to one that is signed.
Facts:
Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around
parcels of land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger
Center of the Air Transportation Office. As a result of
this, ATO was dispossessed of huge tracts of land.
Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that the land
was theirs, showing a TCT issued in its name which
was sold to it by Alfonso
Concepcion.
The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT
nor of its ascendant TCT. ATO verified the
authenticity of Kenrick's titles with the Land
Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report.
Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of the
TCT and its ascendant title. The land allegedly
covered by Kenrick's titles was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for
revocation, annulment and cancellation of
certificates of title against Kenrick and an Answer
was filed by the latter which was purportedly signed
by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee conducted a hearing in aid of
legislation on the matter of land registration and
titling. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos (former
counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared
Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft
to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated
that the signature in the answer was not his and he
authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did
not know who signed the answer.
When the Republic found out about this, they
promptly filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick
in default for failure to file a valid answer since it
was an unsigned pleading which in effect is a mere
scrap of paper and produced no legal effect pursuant
to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found
Kenrick's answer to
be sham, false and intended to defeat the purpose
of the rules. It
ordered the answer stricken from the records,
respondent in default
and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex
parte.
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and
directed the
lifting of the order of default against respondent and
ordered the
trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It found
that Atty.
Garlitos' statements in the legislative hearing were
unreliable since
they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also
scrutinized
Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing of the answer and
concluded that
he assented to the signing of the answer by
somebody in his stead
which supposedly cured whatever defect the answer
may have had.
Issue:
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default
Held: YES
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer
was invalid and
of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was
properly declared in default and the Republic was
rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily
adopt or ratify
another's statement. Where it appears that a party
clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the
statements of another,
evidence of those statements is admissible against
him. This is the
essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a
statement or action
by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party's reaction
as an admission of something stated or implied by
the other person.
By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
becomes the
admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
This may occur
when a party:
a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral
statement made
by another
b) Hears a statement and later on essentially repeats
it
c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertions
of
another
d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points
raised
by another but ignores further points which he or
she has
heard the other maker
e) Reads and signs a written statement made by
another
Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
Garlitos and built itscase on them. At no instance did
it ever deny or contradict its former counsel's
statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
Garlitos' testimony as well as its implications, as
follows:
1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer,
the fact
was that the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading
could not be considered invalid for being an
unsigned
pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was
neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically
authorized by him was immaterial. The important
thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2) While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading
must be
signed by the party or his counsel, it does not
prohibit a
counsel from giving a general authority for any
person to
sign the answer for him which was what Atty.
Garlitos did.
The person who actually signed the pleading was of
no
moment as long as counsel knew that it would be
signed
by another, similar to addressing an authorization
letter
"to whom it may concern" such that any person
could act
on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the
answer; he
never disowned its contents and he resumed acting
as
counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing.
These
circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to
or
ratified the signing of the answer by another.
Kenrick completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as
its own. The
adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission
which was
conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading
is one that is
signed either by the party himself or his counsel.
(Section 3, Rule 7)
Only the signature of either the party himself or his
counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that
is unsigned to
one that is signed. Counsel's authority and duty to
sign a pleading
are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just
any person. The
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him
that he has
read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information
and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
that it is not
interposed for delay.
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters. The
preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the
legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to
another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who
is not. The
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law
may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer
amounts to signing by
unqualified persons something the law strongly
proscribes.
The blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
Garlitos entrusted to
just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was
likewise void. There was no way it could have been
cured or ratified
by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998
Senate hearing
shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of
the answer by
another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We
give no value
whatsoever to such self-serving statement. No
doubt, Atty. Garlitos
could not have validly given blanket authority for
just anyone to sign
the answer.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the
rules. It
maintains that even if it were true that its answer
was supposedly
an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere
technicality that could
be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been
disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid
raison d' etre in
the orderly administration of justice. To summarily
brush them aside
may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may
be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed
procedure. Respondent failed to show any
persuasive reason why it
should be exempted from strictly abiding by the
rules.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal
profession. Thus, he
should be made to account for his possible
misconduct. Decision is
furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the commencement of
disbarment proceedings
against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his possible
unprofessional
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V ALLYSON BELAGAN
Doctrine:
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be
impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary
that the reputation shown should be that which
existed before the occurrence of the circumstances
out of which the litigation arose, or at the time of the
trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. This is because
a person of derogatory character or reputation can
still change or reform himself.
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate
complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz,
founder/directress of the "Mother and Child
Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school
teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged
respondent with sexual indignities and harassment,
while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances
MAGDALENA:
Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS
Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a pre-
school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the
permit was the inspection of the school premises by
the DECS Division Office. Respondent and
complainant visited the school. In the course of
inspection, while both descending the stairs,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around
complainant's shoulders and kissed her cheek.
Fearful that her application might be
jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the
DECS Division Office and asked respondent about
the status of her permit. His reply was "Mag-date
muna tayo." She declined, explaining that she is
married. She then left and reported the matter to
DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that
which requires a high degree of moral uprightness
Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has
never been charged of any offense in his thirty-
seven years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was
charged with several offenses before the MTC of
Baguio City. (Respondent listed all the cases; there
were A LOT)
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed
against Magdalena cast doubt on her character,
integrity, and credibility, MR was denied
CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an
unreliable witness, her character being questionable

Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena , is
read from a local newspaper that certain female Credible
employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging
a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. RULING:
Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being
complained of was respondent. She then wrote a Generally, the character of a party is
letter-complaint for sexual indignities and regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria. controversy. 15 One statutory exception is that
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed relied upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a) 3, Rule
under suspension. 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we
quote here:
LIGAYAN:
"SEC. 51. Character
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched evidence not generally
her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, admissible; exceptions. —
embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him (a) In Criminal Cases:
with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this,
Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries, xxx xxx xxx
failing to release differentials to substitutes, refusing (3) The good or bad
to release teachers' uniforms and allowances, and moral
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion character of
Board, as required by the DECS rules and the offended
regulations. party may be
proved if it
tends to
establish in any
DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities reasonable
and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges degree the
of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty probability or
improbability
of the offense
charged."
 It will be readily observed that the above
provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this
technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still,
we cannot sustain respondent's posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of
the offended party may be proved under this
provision. Only those which would establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
This means that the character evidence must be
limited to the traits and characteristics involved in
the type of offense charged. Thus, on a charge of
rape — character for chastity, on a charge of assault
— character for peaceableness or violence, and on a
charge of embezzlement — character for
honesty. In one rape case, where it was established
that the alleged victim was morally loose and
apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found
the conviction of the accused doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual
harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that
has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries,
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly,
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the
above provision because they do not establish the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Credibility means the disposition and
intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a person's integrity, and to the fact that he
is worthy of belief. 19A witness may be discredited
by evidence attacking his general reputation for
truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11, Rule
132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
or the record of the judgment,
that he has been convicted of an
offense."
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of
Appeals is correct in holding that the character or
reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual
charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to
the ultimate question — is Magdalena's derogatory
record sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a
negative answer.
1)Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to
discredit her credibility. Evidence of one's character
or reputation must be confined to a time not too
remote from the time in question. What is to be
determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but
not at a period remote from the commencement of
the suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with
the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in
the 70s and 80s and one was in 1994. Surely, those
cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalenas character or reputation. Every person
can change
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was
convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested
or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose
of impairing his credibility

"SEC. 11. Impeachment

of adverse party's witness. — A
witness may be impeached by
the party against whom he was
called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by
evidence that he has made at
other times statements
inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness,