162

IV.4 Heidegger via Aletheia

Martin Heidegger's thinking has become influential especially in the second half

of the 20th century and not only effected the continental thought in a profound

manner but also his thinking enjoyed an increasing popularity in politics

(controversially though), religion and art in an extensive manner. This influence does

not only owe its success to his masterpiece Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) alone

but also - or may be even more - due to his extensive and detailed investigations on

the origins of the Western Thinking. Heidegger must be considered to be the first

thinker who attempts to recover the roots of Western Thinking not as a historical

investigation of a bygone past but as the very ground of the present thinking as its

determining essence.325 In other words, Heidegger is the first to realise that

"tradition" did not passed away but resides as an encompassing presence in the

present thinking as its very ground and determines it in its changing claims in a

profound and permanent way.

In that sense, we share the same view with Heidegger in considering Platonic

Thinking as belonging to the essence of present thinking not as a past thought but as

an encompassing presence. However, we defend this view in the direct opposition of

the interests of Heidegger to whom the essence of Western Thinking is determined as

metaphysics as the forgetfulness ofSein. on the grounds of Platonism. Thus,

according to Heidegger, Platonism is even more alive then it was in its time since it

325 To be sure, Nietzsche is the forerunner of this "returning to the soil" which he tried to recover as

the "tragiC wisdom" "~ithin his Dionysian notion-of art. In that sense, Heidegge~-could be regarded as

taking up where Nietzsche left undone but still Heidegger is the first to do this recovering attempt in a

systematic and profound manner by way of extending it into the present thinking as to encircle its

future possibilities.
 163

is the prevailing form under the changing content in the history of Western Thinking

as the very ground of metaphysics.

As regards our claim, we will defend that whether Platonic Thought is considered

to be the prevailing essence of the present thinking in a positive way as Whitehead

did - when he declared that "philosophy" is really the various footnotes of Plato's

thinking - or in the negative way as Heidegger did - when he declared that Platonism

is the turning point in the history of thinking insofar the forgetfulness of Sein is

concerned - both considerations takes granted the fact that Plato's thought is

understood in regard to its essence. Nevertheless, since in this work our thesis

implies just the opposite, that is, Platonic thought is not understood in the least sense

with regard to its essence as philosophia, then there is no way in which the Platonic

thought could be regarded either as a long past historical tradition or as a prevailing

presence in the present thinking as its very ground.

In the light of this brief considerations, we must now try to mqUlre into

Heidegger's interpretation of aZetheia as it was exhibited in his essay "Plato's

Doctrine of Truth" alongside with his notioq of art insofar it depends upon his

interpretation of techne. Let us begin with an abstract of this imponant essay in its

sum an substance.

Heidegger states that Plato's allegory of cave must be understood on the grounds

of the essence of aletheia as "unhiddenness" (die Um!erborgenheit) in its authentic

sense. However, according to Heidegger, instead of directing his inquiry into its

essence, Plato rather concentrated on the "whatness" (Gr. Ousia, Lat.Quidditas) of

- the appearing aspect of aletheia in its visible form he called eidos and fixed it as the

very essence of aletheia whereas it is only the outcome and the small part of what

lies deep within as unhiddenness. Hence, this dramatic misapprehension of the

 164

essential nature of aletheia by Plato resulted in the predominance of the visible

aspect over the self-emerging essence in such a way that unhiddenness comes under

the yoke of idea and as a result truth was deprived of its own ground and remained as

groundless (as abysmal) ever since from Plato onwards.

Hence, in order to understand on what grounds Heidegger constitutes this crucial

claims concerning Plato's misinterpretation of the essence of aletheia, we must get to

know in what sense cave allegory is interpreted by Heidegger as an authentic

metaphor for the unhidden nature of aletheia. Apart from the fact that Heidegger's

essay on Plato's notion of truth is solely built on his interpretation of the Plato's

allegory of cave as a metaphor for aletheia, it is also essentials in terms of

understanding in what way Heidegger is conceiving Platonic thought in its essence as

a whole.

The essay begins by translating the relevant part of the allegory of the cave in

Republic that takes place between the Stephanus numbers "514 aT and "517 a7"

and then attempts to evaluate the cave metaphor as a whole. According to Heidegger,

the essential value of the "cave" as a metaphor comes from the fact that it

symbolically represents the unhidden essence of aletheia. 326 The cave is both open

and closed at the same time in such a way that despite the entrance it is covered by a

vault and enclosed by a surrounding earth. In that sense, cave as a metaphor refers to

the outside, the unhidden that is spread out in the light above the ground. 327 Therefore

Heidegger concludes that" allegory of the cave" has no basis for illustration unless

understood on the grounds ofunhiddenness in terms of aletheia. 328

326 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Ed. W. Me Neill, Cambridge Uni. press, 1998. p.ln

327 Ibid.

328 Ibid.
 165

However, according to Heidegger, even though aletheia has priority III this

metaphor nonetheless in place of unhiddenness, another essence of truth pushes to

the fore as a result of Plato's interpretation of aletheia. Heidegger tells us that the

cave allegory takes granted the region almost self-evidently and instead focused on

the story's events get played out. For Heidegger, the illustrative power of the cave

allegory according to Plato does not come from the image of the c10sedness of the

subterranean vault and the imprisonment of people within its confines nor does it

come from the sight open space outside the cave. Rather Plato is concentrated on the

role played by the fire, the fire's glow and the shadows it casts, the brightness of the

day, the sunlight and the sun. In sum everything depends on the shining forth of

whatever appears and on making visibility possible.329 And since Plato's thought

focuses solely on the visible aspect of alerheia, accordingly unhiddenness is

considered simply in terms of how it makes whatever appears be accessible in its

visible form as eidos and in terms of how it makes this visible form, as that which

shows itself as idea. 330 Hence, according- to Heidegger.

-- Plato's retlection on aletheia
~

thereby aims at the idea which is the visible form that that offers a view of what is

present. Subsequently, Heidegger drives the conclusion that since idea comes to

determine the truth as the whatness of the coming into presence, then the gaze as

noesis is the sole means by means of which the idea is apprehended in its essence.

For Heidegger, such an adoption of this kind of orientation determines the essence of
'.
reason (Vernunft) as nous and as a result, philosophy which is firsf considered by

Plato as a specific astuteness (sophia) is defined as a matter of gazing up at the

"ideas" .

329 Ibid.

330 Ibid.
 166

Therefore, the net consequence of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's doctrine

of truth is that aletheia comes under the yoke of idea:33I

"Truth is no longer, as it was qua unhiddenness. the jitndamental trait of being

itself Instead, as a consequence of getting yoked under the idea, truth has become

correctness, and henceforth it will be a characteristic of the knowing of beings." 332

Thus, philosophy that begins \-'lith Plato has, from that point on, the distinguishing

aspect of what is later called "metaphysics" \-vhich is really the Platonism in

disguise. 333

As is obvious from what was said above, Heidegger is claiming that essence of

truth is irreversibly removed by Plato and substituted with its visible aspect and

determined therein. Neveliheless, apart from the fact that Heidegger's claims are far

from the truth in regard to the essence of Platonic thought, his argument at bottom

relies on an illicit shifting of the cave metaphor as to its basic meaning in order to

turn the tables against Plato in his own ground.

In order to expose this modus operandi of Heidegger, we must start with stating

that we also understand aletheia as unhiddenness, more properly, as dis-closing

insofar as this expression is understood verbally rather than in its essential Platonic

sense. Just as in the case of katharsis in Aristotles, a same term or definition could be

understood in radically different senses although both senses might have exhibited a

seeming similarity. In that sense, the real difference does not lie in the verbal

expression of the definition of aletheia as unhiddenness or dis-closing but depends

upon the ground by means of which the term is understood in its essence.

331 Ibid. p.176

332 Ibid. p.179

333 Ibid. p.180

 167

And this essence could be enlightened only if we can explicate in which sense the

metaphorical meaning of 'cave allegory' is evaluated by Heidegger as to its essential

value which he claims should be even unbeknownst· to Plato himself. Thus,

Heidegger begins rather with a simple decision and take the image of the "cave"

itself metaphorically as the essence of aletheia in so far this essence is determined as

unhiddenness. After all, cave is a subterranean expanse which is "hidden" from the

surface of the earth but still bearing an access to this outside with its entrance. Hence,

according to Heidegger, this image of "cave" which bears an access to "openness"

despite its" closedness" is a perfect metaphor for" un-hiddenness" .

However, Heidegger is unfounded in restricting the essential meaning of the cave

allegory to a spatial imagery since the whole setting and imagery of the cave is

constituted not haphazardly but in order to make room for the essential act to take

place which was to show what Socrates means by paideia. Hence the cave cannot be

taken in itself apart from the very act of "turning" of the prisoner as a liberating act

which is paideia in the essential Platonic sense. Therefore, the cave could only be the

representation of the total conditions of an imprisonment in which one is perpetually

kept as a result of one's amathia (unlearning aletheia) and agnoia (excessive

amathia due to lack of noesis). Accordingly, in the 'cave allegory'! aletheia as

unhiddenness or dis-closing in the authentic Platonic sense inheres not in the

"spatial" imagery but solely in the "mimetic" act. Consequently alerheia is nowhere

to be found outside this mimetic "turning" (periag6ges) and cannot be achieved via

cognitive or rational process of any kind except a "total conversion" that takes place

within one's psuche. Hence, the act of "turning" (periag6ges) is the keystone of the

'cave allegory' without which no "alerheia could possibly take place in the least sense

as a dis-closure. In that sense, the "closedness" of cave which Heidegger has taken
 168

as the unhidden essence of aletheia in fact corresponds to doxa in the obvious

Platonic usage of the imagery. And since Heidegger insistently takes granted the

metaphorical significance of the cave in a 'spatial', picturesque fashion, he is totally

blind to the 'mimetic' value of the "turning act" by relegating it to a mere role

playing. Here Heidegger takes the "mimetic" value of the "act" in the most

superficial sense as a role playing in order to degrade the essential value of the

allegory to a mere illusory display by avoiding its significance as" the story of events

get played out" .33-1

As we can see, Heidegger attains the desired conclusion from the very start by

substituting aletheia with doxa in fixing the essential value of cave allegory upon the

'spatial' imagery. Thus, Heidegger is unaware that the whole cave imagery is

nothing but a 'stage', that is, a setting solely designed for "acting" without which has

no meaning whatsoever in and by itself. Therefore, incapable of seeing the mimetic

significance of the cave allegory in its essence as an 'act', Heidegger resorts to the

'spatial' aspect of the cave metaphor and reads it into the essence of allegory in order

to determine its essence against the apparent intentions of its author. 335

This illicit approach to the metaphorical meaning of the 'cave allegory' shows that

Heidegger is taking 'cave' imagery more in the fashion of a mere skenegraphia

(scene painting) rather than the' stage' of a mimetic act. Hence, he freezes the cave

334 Ibid. p.l72

.335 This spatial undE!rstanding of aletheia is not restricted to this essay. Heidegger insists on

conceiving aletheia in a spatial metaphors continuously. See. "An Introduction to Metaphysics" Yale

Uni. Press. p.183. Also in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" he wrote: "No outward

appearance without light - Plato already knew this. But there is no light and no brightness without the

opening. ". "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking", Basic Writings, Routledge and Kegan

Paul, p.386.
 169

metaphor in its spatial aspect and evades its essence as a 'stage' which is only there

to make room for the mimetic act to take place. The result, then, is obvious;

-Heidegger splits the 'stage' from the 'act' and annuls the mimetic significance of the

whole play. Therefore, we must strictly differentiate between two 'caves'; that of

Heidegger's and the Plato's. Hence, only depending on his own 'cave' that

Heidegger could possibly arrive at the desired conclusions. And one of these

conclusion is the elimination of philosophia in the Platonic sense insofar its essence

depends upon "turning" from genesis towards to on.

However, this doesn't mean that Heidegger is oblivious to this 'turning' which is,

after ali, all too obvious to avoid in the part he had translated from Republic. Just the

contrary, in his essay we find Heidegger emphasising the role of the "total

conversion of psuche" (periag6ge holes tes psuches) with regard to paideia and

seems to be recognising the association of aletheia with liberation in terms of

shifting one's gaze from shadows to the source of light. 336 However, what he does not

see is that, this" shifting of the gaze" as noesis accompanies the "turning about"

(periag6ges) in such a way that aletheia originally emerges as a 'dis-closure' at the

very first time in from this act. Thus, although Heidegger seems to associate the act

of "turning" and the liberation from the fetters on the basis of aletheia, his spatial

portrayal of aletheia as a "region" blinds him from seeing the apparent fact that,

except the "total conversion" that takes place within one's psuche one can neither

talk about aletheia nor freedom.

Let us, then, be specific in what Heidegger does here: he mis-takes the ground of

periag6ges (the act of turning) as aletheia insofar he apprehends its essence as

336 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Ed. W. Me Neill, Cambridge Uni. press, 1998. P.170
 170

unhiddenness in the spatial sense 337 as if aletheia could possibly be separated from a

"dis-closive acf' insofar this act is agentive, that is, depends upon psuche alone to be

performed. Hence, it is the essential nature of the "turning" (periag6ges) to be a dis-

c10sive occurrence or else it is not a "total conversion of psuche" (periag6ge holes

tes psuches). Therefore, the ground of this "turning act" is not aletheia understood

spatially but psuche without \vhich neither the "act of turning" (periag6ges /

periakteon / trepo) nor dis-closure can take place among and in themselves. Thus,

Heidegger's mis-take is to think of aletheia as a dis-closure per se existing

independently from the agentive dis-closive act which takes place solely in virtue of

psuche. As a result, what Heidegger does is to disconnect the dis-closure (aletheia)

from the dis-closive act (the act of "turning" -periag6ges - and" seeing" - noesis -)

in order to deprive the dis-closive act of its agentive essence. This drastic misreading

of what takes place within the" cave" , to be sure, depends on Heidegger's insistence

of thinking the essence of aletheia in terms of spatial metaphors such as openness,

emplacement, appropriation etc. And their common feature is to be bereft of an

agentive essence as auto-disc1osiye 338 'events'.

The misapprehension of the ground of the "turning act" and the understanding of

aletheia in terms of spatial expressions also lies at the bottom of Heidegger's

misinterpretation of the liberating 'act' of prisoner in terms of a "movement of

passage" from one place (shado'ws) to another (to the things themselves) insofar this

337 In that "spatial" sense aletheia could also be defined in an auto-disclosive essence since

"openness" itself is considered by Heidegger as a self-emergence.

338 Auto here means the opposite of what was meant by the auto in Ancient Greek. Auto-disclosive is

rather automaton (happening in and by itself) not an agentive dis-closive event.

 171

process is understood as the" correctness" of vision in the sense of orthotes and the

fixation of the direct alignment with the highest idea as homoi6sis. 339

Here Heidegger is talking about a transformation in the essence of truth as

aletheia concurrently with a change of its locus:

"As unhiddenness, truth is still a Jundemnatal trait oj beings themselves. But as

the correctness oj the "gaze ", it becomes a human comportment toward beings." 340

Thus, according to Heidegger, Plato's doctrine of truth necessarily contains an

ambiguity within. For Heidegger, this is clear from the fact where as aletheia is

named therewith orthotes is meant. With this change of the locus of truth, Heidegger

also seems to hold responsible Plato for the subject/object dichotomy since he

conceives of the Platonic nous as "reason" (VernunJt) and its activity noesis as the

super sensuous 'gaze', that is, cognition as opposed to perception (aisthesis) and

thereby understands the Platonic idea in the exact manner of any other thinker that

comes after Plato in the Western thinking; as a universal that partakes in its particular

instantiation.341

As we can see, Heidegger arnves at the exact conclusion that he so desires

inasmuch as he appropriates Plato's metaphor from the very start. Thus, when

Heidegger is prepared to prove what he had already set out with his appropriation of

the" allegory of the cave" he has already" satisfied" us to a degree of what the cave

"really" means.

339 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Ed. W. Mc Neill, Cambridge Uni. press, 1998. P.I77

340 Ibid. p.l77

341 An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger, R. Menheim, Yale uni., 1987, p.184. "The idea now
becomes a paradeigma, a model.. .. The copy actually" is" not; it merely partakes of being, it is a

methexis."
 172

But even we take granted his appropriation of the cave allegory, Heidegger is still

at a loss to justify his claims in what he quotes from dialogues. According to

Heidegger, the expression that" Good (agathon) is the "cause" (aitia) of everything

that is "correcf' (orthan) and "beautiful" (kalan)" creates ambiguity when

understood with the expression that the" good" (agathon) also" is the mistress who

bestows (paraschomene) unhiddenness (aletheia) as well as apprehension (now;)."

Here, in order to show that these two expression is not consistent with each other,

Heidegger matches kalas with aletheia and orthates with nous and he tries to justify

this claim he points to the term" ekphanestaton" (shining in from itself) in Phaedrus.

Thus, Heidegger enables himself to show that while Plato did preserve the authentic

notion of aletheia within the expression of ekphanestaton (shining in from itself) as

of kalas, by understanding nous as the "correction" (orthates) of the "gaze"(noesis)

upon idea, he thereby puts the authentic sense of aletheia under idea and necessarily

come up with an inconsistency with regard to the original ground of his doctrine of

truth.

While we must appreciate Heidegger's art to turn tables on Plato in every word he

has said we must not forget to take Plato's words for themselves. And when we look

at the matter from Platonic point of view we see nothing of the sort that Heidegger

asserts.

Only because there exists in psuche a dunamis (faculty) called nous (power of

seeing -noesis -) that kalas is dis-closed in regard to aletheia and only if this" seeing"

is directed in the" correct" (ortha) mamler that aletheia as a dis-closure" reveals"

kalas in the sufficient clarity. Thus, agathon, as a source which is even "beyond the

essence" (epekeina tes ouszas) not only bestows (paraschomene) psuche with a

"power of seeing" (nous) but also aletheia in order to provide anthropos with the
 173

possibility of a dis-closing activity by means of which he might have the chance to

escape from his prison. Therefore, agathon also is the sole cause (aUia) of ka16s the

essence of which is only revealed in virtue of aletheia as well as everything that is

correct (ortha) insofar this correction is understood in from the dis-closive essence of

aletheia as degree of clarity that one attains in his dis-closive activity.

And since we see nothing of the sort in Plato's two expressions which Heidegger

claims as being ambiguous as well as inconsistent, the portrayal of the cave of Plato

by Heidegger does not give us 'Plato's doctrine of truth' in the least sense. But from

his modus operandi we can learn a lot on his way of 'philosophising'. Heidegger

almost accepts the appropriation of another thinker's essential thought even against

himself as a general principle. He openly expresses in Plato's Sophise~2 his right to

determine a thinker's thought absolutely in this or that manner in so far he is

understood better than himself. And as a justification of his hermeneutic

interpretation of Plato via Aristotles, Heidegger says that every thinker is understood

better than himself in his own thoughts by successors. 343 This, of course, must be

granted as a general principle, but only if provided that who claims to understand a

thinker better than he himself did must do so in concreto. Or else, lacking any

sufficient grounds for justification, th~ appropriation of Plato's metaphor as the very

premise to be assumed in the conclusion as an ambiguity in his doctrine of truth turns

out to be a petitio principi in the entirety of Heidegger' s essay.

However, not until we see the importance of this appropriation of the cave

metaphor by Heidegger that we can understand why and how aletheia has become

342 Plato's Sophist, Trans. Rojvewicz, Schuwer, Indiana Uni. press, 1997. p.8

343 Ibid.
 174

something like a keystone for his entire thought. And his thoughts on techne

especially bears witness to this in a clear way.

In his essay "Origin of the Artwork,,344 Heidegger begins by criticising the

traditional form (eidos) and matter (hule) distinction that underlies the all aesthetics

and art theories in which representational aspect necessarily gains the upper hand. 345

Then he goes on to say that since this conceptual pair - form-matter - is not sufficient

to explain the "thing-being"346 then there must be something else that resides in the

nature of the thingness in such a \-'lay that it enables the thing to arise as a work and

preserved therein as a happening of truth in the sense of disclosure. This disclosure

is, of course, aletheia as unhiddenness. 347 From this point, Heidegger moves further

in his investigation to discover the deeper origins of form-matter distinction and he

finds it in the world-earth ((Welt-Erde) pairs with this difference that the first pair is

governed by adaequatio intellectus et rei (the agreement of the intellect with its

object) and hence the result of a representational thinking whereas the second pair

takes place on the basis of a self-emergence (phusis) as unhiddenness (aletheia) in its

basic nature and the work is precisely the accomplishment of the strife between

them. 348 In sum, "art then is the becoming and happening of truth" 349 and "beauty is

one way truth occurs as unhiddenness" .350

344 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, i 971.

345 Ibid, p.26, 27

346 Ibid, p.30, 31

347 Ibid, p.36

348 Ibid, p.49

349 Ibid, p.71

350 Ibid, p.56

 175

Here we see Heidegger as establishing a notion of art on the grounds of his own

notion of alerheia. And his notion of art closely follows his basic premises and he

clearly states that an artwork is the where the truth happens as aletheia. But this

happening according to Heidegger takes place in virtue of a wresting away which

steals the unhiddenness from hiddenness. Heidegger also thinks that "allegory is

cave" is the exposition of this in the form life-and-death struggle in terms of

liberation. 351

Thus, according to Heidegger, techne is a kind of bringing forth that as a mode of

knowing 352 makes visible the act of tearing away CRiss) by fixing it in a Gestalt in

such away that openness of beings is thereupon accomplished. 353 But still the

originality and essential character of creativity according to Heidegger lies in the

degree of the work's self-subsistence. And this must be considered to be the essence

of his notion of techne:

"The most solitarily the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the more

cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does the thrust come

into the Open that such a work is, and the more essentially is the extraordinary

thrusts to the surface and the long-familiar is thrust dmvn."354

At the tirst look the paragraph seems to tell us the necessary traits that every work

of art must bear somehow in an original way. In fact the independent look of a work

as the sign of an accomplishment of its aesthetic aims is needed insofar the unity and

singularity qualifies an art work positively in terms of its creative value. However,

Heidegger is taking this independence to the point of "cutting off all ties to human

351 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Cambridge, 1998. P.l71

352 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971. P. 59

353 Ibid. P. 64

354 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971, p.66
 176

beings". To be sure his aim is not to deny the obvious fact that there is a maker and a

spectator of every artwork.. Here, rather the problem lies in the way artwork is

defined in terms of techne as bearing no relation whatsoever with human being

which means that Heidegger is thinking techne more in the manner of a grand

overpowering process in which the humans only participate in a very limited but

necessarily manner as they at best can manage to adjust themselves to its ways. This

grand process Heidegger names after the another Ancient Greek term phusis as a

self-placement which he identifies with aletheia in every sense. 355 In other words, the

work's self-subsistence lies deep in its nature insofar this nature is understood on the

basis of phusis as self-emergence and self-placement.

We find the clear exposition of this self-occurrent nature In his essay "The

Thing" .356 Here Heidegger takes a jug as an example and defines it in terms of a

"thing" the nature of which he determines as self-supporting. 357 According to

Heidegger, although the outward form must surely be crucial for anything to come

into being, the essential nature of a jug as a thing can never be attained from its

outward appearance, that is, for Heidegger, its idea. 358 Therefore, Heidegger

concludes:

"Plato who conceives of the presence of what is present in terms of its ouf1,vard

appearance, had no more understanding of the nature of the thing than did Aristotles

' kers. " 359

an d su bsequent th In

355 Heidegger, Pathmarks, Ed. McNeill, Cambridge, 1998, p.183-231. ""On the Essence and Concept

of Phusis in Aristoteles' Physics E, I".

356 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971, p.165-186

357 Ibid. p.168

358 Ibid.

359 Ibid.
 177

Rather, Plato, according to Heidegger, conceives of the present beings as an

object of making. What then Heidegger's means with the "thing"? This expressed in

the following sentence in the same essay:

"The jug is a thing insofar it things. The presence of something present such as'

the jug comes into its own, appropriatively manifests and determines itself only from

the thinging of the thing." 360

Thus, the "thing" is phusis made visible, since" appropriatively manifests and

determines itself' is the Heideggerian notion o.f phusis par excellence. However,

what we see here is nothing but the same old same story with a different names.

Heideggerian notion of thing in reality reiterates the Aristotles ontological format in

a new content he calls appropriation w·hich he terms as Ere ignis. What is at stake

here in this Heideggerian setting is nothing but the Aristotelian energeia and

dunamis pair get played out. Heidegger only seems to mystify in trying to deepen the

Aristotelian ontology as an attempt to get beyond it but he falls back on the same old

notion of nature. According to this view of nature, phusis with regard to genesis

(becoming) is a process per se which must be understood in an automaton (self..

occurrent) essence. That is why Heidegger verbalises his basic notions such as world,

thing, nothing etc as "thing things", "nothing nothings" and "world worlds". These

odd expressions which were considered by his 'analytic' contemporaries as mere

tautologies are in fact the direct outcome of his method of interpretation he calls

"Hermeneutic circle" or" tautological thinking".

Furthermore, the notion of world by Heidegger as is in close relation with the

Nietzschean notion of the world. In fact Nietzschean world which "feeds on its own

excrement" shares the same essence with the Heideggerian world that "worlds".

360 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971, p.l77
 178

Nonetheless, we must not restrict this view of the world to these two thinkers.

From Aristotles onwards this 'world view' dominated the Western thinking in its

essence. When Hume attempts to establish the change within time and space in terms

of the chain of cause and effect and thereby assumes his theory of causation, he also

participated the same 'world view'. The whole difference lies in the way Nietzsche

and Heidegger elevated the same view in order to bring some depth to the otherwise

flat picture of the world with their illustrious" Ere ignis" and" eternal recurrence".

From a Platonic point of view, the principle of the dynamics of this skenegraphia

lies in its automaton nature which has been defended from Aristotles onwards in a

series of insistent attempts to constitute the essence of genesis within genesis. 361

Therefore, Heidegger falls into the very picture of the' Western thinking' that he had

tried to portray which he wanted to provide with a base by establishing a turning

point or a fundamental crisis via scape-goating Plato's thought.

Thus, we must rather determine Heidegger's thinking as a vam attempt to

establish a ground (Sein) or an event (Ere ignis) which suppose to describe the

essence of phusis within the conditions of genesis. Accordingly, no attempt could

possibly go beyond doxa by using the tools obtained or developed therein. Hence, it

seems almost natural that the final phase of such extreme attempts ends in an

abysmal (abgrund) nature whether it be in the form of the" eternal recurrence of the

same" or the "appropriating mirror-play of the fourfold (earth, mortals, sky,

divinities) in a round dance in which the world presences as the world"362

However, according to Platonic thought, since it is impossible to exceed the limits

of doxa in from genesis, such an attempt is only possible in an act of "turning"

361 Phaedo 99c, Laws 892c, Sophist 265 a-b-c-d-e

362 Heidegger, Poetry Language and Thought, Trans. Hofstadter, Harper and Row, 1971, p.179, 180
 179

(periag6ges) from genesis to to on as a result of which philosophos is liberated from

his fetters in virtue of some guide who himself is "unfettered" in the first place. Thus,

sophos is a sine qua non in the act of "turning" since he alone is the guide and the

pivot by means of which philosophos "changes scenes" (periakteon) in the act of

"turning about" (periag6ges) with the whole of his psuche.

To be sure, Heidegger is not unaware of sophos and he already names it when he

regards sophia in his essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" as a certain astuteness. 363

But his erroneous appropriation of cave metaphor misleads him once again when he

arrives at the incredible conclusion that outside the 'cave' sophia is philosophia364

whereas it is all too obvious from \vhat Socrates tells us in the rele"vant part of

Republic that sophia precisely lies 'outside' the 'cave'. Heidegger in fact thinks of

cave as the unhidden essence of aletheia by taking Plato's metaphor in the literal

sense as a closedness whereas cave is apparently nothing but the 'representation' of

the total conditions of doxa insofar these conditions are determined by amathia and

agnoia.

This prejudicial approach by Heidegger on Plato's thought finds its culmination

when Heidegger declared that the essential harmony with sophon in the form of hen

panta (every1hing is one) which finds its expression in Heraclitus (or in P armenides

to mention another favourite thinker of Heidegger) is relegated to oblivion when a

step - which was already prepared by Sophism - is taken by Plato and Socrates

towards 'philosophy' .365

}G3 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Cambridge, 1998. P. i 80

364 Ibid.

365 Was ist das-die Philosophie?, Trans. Neske Verlag, 1956. p.24
 180

I
As is clear from his expressions, Heidegger's limitation of sophia to a pre- I.

Socratic period exhibits the same nostalgia of Nietzsche's" tragische Weisheit" to

such an extend that he too considers only few (namely, Heraclitus and Parmenides)

as possessing astuteness (sophia).366 But we can only see what he really has in mind

when we put the above words beside the ones as follows:

"If everything turns for the best, an author on paths of thinking can only point the

way [weisenJ without being himself a wise man [ein Weiser] in {he sense of

sophos. "367

Here Heidegger is talking about himself as an author on the path of thinking. His

words are reminiscent of Nietzsche's declaration that he has the right to declare

himself as the" tragischen Philosophen" 368 but with such difference that Heidegger

has his own sober way of reminding us who he really is. What Heidegger means with

these carefully selected words is that since sophos who is in "harmony with hen

pantd' and as such "perdures within the region of sophia" is no\v a mere history,

some other thinker who has also discovered the meaning of "harmony with hen

pantd' (sophia) long after that bygone age cannot be called sophos because he

himself is a wayfarer in the first place and is aware that he does not" inhere within

an abode that everywhere and primarily has a hold on what perdures·' .369 Yet, "if

everything turns for the best" he can "signal the way" as he ever strolls on the path of

thinking.

366 Nietzsche also thinks that "tragic wisdom" is lacking even in the pre-Socratic period except

Heraclitus and considers himself to be the only "tragic philosoper" beside him. See. Nietzsche,

Friedrich, Ecce homo, Alfred Kroner Verlag/Leipzig, MCMXXVII. p. 286

367 Early Greek Thinking, Trans. Krell, Capuzzi, Harper San Fransisco 1984. s.4

368 Was ist das-die Philosophie?, Trans. Neske Verlag, 1956. p.24

369 Pathmarks, Heidegger, Cambridge, 1998. P .180

 181

But what does that mean if not that Heidegger is pointing to himself as the sole

substitute of sophos in the absence of a better alternative? After all, how can it be

possible to "point the way" unless one is on the way [weisen] as a wayfarer rein

Weiser]? Although Heidegger is cautious not to declare himself to be a sophos he

means the approximate by declaring that he is on the path of thinking. In that sense,

to be on the path of thinking is to be ein Weiser and it is obvious that no one can be a

wayfarer unless one knows what it means to be on a woodpath,370 that is, unless one

knows what it means to be in harmony with hen panta though he might have lacked

the very abode.

However, still in another sense, these cautious words when read on behalf their

author's real intention bring us back to the court of Athens: the execution of Socrates

as the very symbol of relegating sophos to oblivion is a sine qua non initiative for

any sophistic claim to appropriate sophia in varying degrees.

370 Early Greek Thinking, Trans. Krell, Capuzzi, Harper San Fransisco 1984. sA