CRIMINAL LAW I

CASE DIGESTS

Submitted By:

JOSIAH IMMANUEL P. BALGOS

1B
S.Y. 2017-2018
 LIST OF CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASES FOR STUDY & DIGEST
(106 Cases)

1. People v. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120

2. U.S. v. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94
3. Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)
4. Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
5. U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil 18
6. U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978 (1917)
7. Miquibas v. Commanding General, 80 Phil.262 (1948)
8. Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
9. Tavera v. Valdez, 1 Phil. 463
10. David v. GMA, 489 SCRA 160
11. Pascual v. Board of Examiners
12. People v. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil 353
13. People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 263 (1988)
14. People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)
15. People v. Delos Santos, 403 SCRA 153 (2003)
16. People v. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)
17. People v. Pugay, 167 SCRA 439
18. U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910)
19. People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943)
20. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001)
21. People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181
22. Uy vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al, 30 Phil. 577
23. People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil 15
24. People v. Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967
25. People v. Belbes, G.R. No. 124670 (2000)
26. People v. Bataclan, 102 Phil. 181
27. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 171951 (2009)
28. People v. Balmores, 85 Phil. 493
29. People v. Monleon, G.R. No. L-36282, December 10, 1976
30. People v. Cabagsan and Montano, 57 Phil. 598
31. People v. Canja, 86 Phil. 518
32. People v. Manlapaz, G.R. No. L-41819, February 28, 1979
33. People v. Olaes, 105 Phil. 502
34. People v. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703
35. People v. Sy Pio, 94 Phil. 885
36. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990
37. People v. Hernandez, 54 Phil. 122
38. U.S. vs. Valdes, 39 Phil. 240
39. U.S. v. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754
40. U.S. v. Dominguez, 41 Phil. 408
41. People v. Espiritu, et al., CA-G.R. No. 2107-May 31, 1949
42. People v. Diño, C.A. 45 O.G. 3446
43. People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990
44. U.S. v. Basa, 8 Phil. 89
45. People v. Eriña, 50 Phil. 998
46. People v. Buntag, G.R. No. 123070
47. People v. Dela Cruz, 61 Phil. 344
48. People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174
49. People v. Apolinar, C.A. 38 O.G. 2870
50. Cano v. People, G.R. No. 155258 (2003)
51. People v. Boholst-Caballero, 61 SCRA 180 (1974)
52. Olbinar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76235, January 21, 1991
53. People v. Ancheta, et al., 66 Phil. 638
54. People v. Norma-Hernandez, C.A., 55 O.G. 8465
55. People v. Felipe Delima, 46 Phil. 738
56. People v. Lagata, 83 Phil. 159
57. People v. Margen, et at., 85 Phil. 839
58. People v. Formigones, 87 Phil 658
59. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, June 27, 1990
60. People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, May 12, 2000
61. U.S. v. Tañedo, 15 Phil. 196
62. People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004
63. People v. Lorena, No. L-54414, July 9, 1984
64. People v. Magpantay, C.A. 46 O.G. 1655
65. People v. Abueg, G.R. No. L 54901, November 24, 1986
66. People v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103613, February 23, 2001
67. Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125867, May 31, 2000
68. People v. Gano, et al., G.R. No. 134373, February 28, 2001
69. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 14, 2004
70. U.S. v. Torrida, 23 Phil. 189
71. U.S. v. Dacuycuy, 9 Phil. 84
72. People v. Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77
73. People v. Ducusin, 53 Phil. 280
74. U.S. v. Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164
75. People v. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478
76. U.S. v. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385
77. People v. Timbol, G.R. Nos. 47471-47473, August 4, 1944
78. People v. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11
79. People v. Samano, 77 Phil. 136
80.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19238, July 26, 1966
81. People v. Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil 611
82. People v. Lawas, Nos. L7618-20, July 20,1955
83. People v. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515
84. People v. Dela Cruz, 61 Phil. 162
85. U.S. v. Montano, 3 Phil. 110
86. People v. Billon, C.A., 48 O.G. 1391
87. People v. Carballo, 62 Phil. 651
88.Lagrimas v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 249
89. People v. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 226
90. People v. Rodriguez, G.R. L-13981, April 25, 1960
91. People v. Cano, G.R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966
92. People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015
93. Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015
94. Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015
95. Manansala v. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015
96. People v. Licayan, G.R. No. 203961, July 29, 2015
97. People v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015
98. People v. Misa III, G.R. No. 212336, July 15, 2015
99. People v. P01 De Gracia, G.R. No. 213104, July 29, 2015
100. People v. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066, August 5, 2015
101. People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
102. People v. Dela Cruz, No. L-46397, Nay 16, 1993
103. People v. Limaco, 88 Phil 35, 43
104. People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307
105. People v. Sanidad, G.R. No. 146099, April 30, 2002
106. People v. Ramos, 297 SCRA 618
PEOPLE vs. SANTIAGO
GR 17584 March 8, 1922

Facts: The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an

hour on a highway 6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to
pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and
a heap of stones on the other side where the were two young boys, the
appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by
slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under
the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid
possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his
automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as
the result of the accident.

Issues: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case by virtue of
Act No. 2886 which amended the General Order no. 58

Ruling: Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It was held that the provisions of
sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not
partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the
said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional
provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors
assigned. This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it
introduces in General Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the
Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders
No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have
the character of constitutional law. Since the provisions of this General
Order have the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to
amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on
principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the
subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a
legislative body.
US vs. PABLO
GR No. L- 11676 October 17, 1916

Facts: In compliance to an order to his chief, Andres Pablo, a policeman of

the municipality of Balanga, went to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng
game: but before the said officer arrived thee the players left and ran away .
He was able to recover on this arrival a low table, a tambiolo ( receptacle)
and 37 bolas ( balls). Said officer also saw the men Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo left but only Francisco Dato was arrested . This
information was contained in his report to his chief who immediately filed a
complaint in the court of justice of the peace against Rodrigo, Malicsi and
Dato for illegal gambling in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5
Pablo testified under oath that in a particular date he and a companion
raided jueteng game, that when they arrived in the place they saw Dato and
a low table that made suspect that a jueteng game was being held; that they
find a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi in
the scene not did they see them scamper ; and that only after incident that
they learned of Rodrigo and Malicsi as being ringleaders of the said jueteng
game according to a source. This testimony was acted upon by the court
acquitting the defendants Rodrigo and Malicsi and sentenced only Dato.
The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that
before the case to trial in the justice of the peace court, the policeman Pablo
had conferred with the accused Malicsi and Rodrigo and agreed that would
exclude the involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of
fifteen pesos.
When the court found him guilty and sentenced to suffer year’s
imprisonment, a fine, and disqualification to hold public offices as well as
from testifying n the Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgement.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of
false testimony under art. 318 to 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: Yes, The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to
324 of the penal code since such articles are not expressly repealed by the
Administrative code wheni it repealed Act. No. 1697
LAW 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilation states that, : All laws
..not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed
and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.
Said articles of the Penal code are in force and re properly applicable to
crimes of false testimony. In the presence case, the proven evidence showed
that Andres Pablo falsely testified before the court by perverting the truth
in favour of the alleged bribe from the said accused which aggravated the
crime - proof showed he received P15 in order that he exclude the two
ringleaders in his sworn testimony. The court held that…’ in the
commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the
aggravating circumstances of price or rewards, No. 3 of article 10 of the
Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said
aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum
period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prison
correccional in its medium degree and a fine.”
Comment:

PESIGAN vs. ANGELES

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

Facts: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers,

transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf,
from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command,
respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud,
Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents,
Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr.
Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which
prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another.
Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers
of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages,
against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and
later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause
of action.
Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the
Official Gazette.

Ruling: Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans
on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Comment:

TANADA vs. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioners ( Tanada and Mabini) filed a writ of mandamus to

compel respondent publish officials to publish in the Official Gazette
various presidential decrees, proclamations, executive orders, etc. as the
respondent failed to publish the said decrees at all. The respondent
contended that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
Issue: Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official
Gazette is a requirement of its effectivity.
Ruling: YES, Article 2 of the Civil Code states that all laws must be given
15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted .this
is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to
respect their right to be informed. The Court ordered the respondent to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
US vs. SWEET
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

Facts: Sweet was employed by the united States military who committed
an offense against a POW. His case is filed with CFI, who is given original
jurisdiction inall cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is
imposed. He is now contendcing that the courts are without jurisdiction
because he was “acting in the line of duty.”
Issues:
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI .
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a
prisoner of war is not an offense under the RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offense under the penal code , whether or not
the military character sustained by the person charged with the
offense at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals ?
Ruling:
1. Yes. By the Act. No. 136 of the US-PHIL Commission, the CFI’s are
given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty 6
months imprisonment or a fine greater than US$ 100 may be
imposed. Furthermore, CFI’s have jurisdiction to try offenders
charges with violation of the Penal code within their territorial limits,
regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and
his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to
prove that he was indeed acting the line of duty.
2. Yes, Though assault by military officer against a PW is not in the RPC,
physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.
3. No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of
the tribunal is unaffected by the military or other special character
brought before them for the trial (RA No. 7055). Appellant claims
that the acts was service but this cannot affect the right of the Civil
Court takes jurisdiction of the case.”
Judgment: Judgement thereby affirmed “An offense charged against a
military in consequence of an act done in obedience to an is clearly shown
on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.”- Per Cooper , J.
concurring.
Comment:
U.S vs Ah Sing
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917

Facts: Ah Sing, respondent, was a Chinese fireman aboard the foreign

steamship Shun Chang which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 1917. The
respondent brought 8 cans of opium which was found by the authorities
upon searching the ship. Ah Sing confessed that he was the owner of the
opium but he did not clarify whether he intend to import such items into
the Philippines. No other evidence was introduced to show that it was
intention to import illegally the opium into the country.
Issue: WON the crime of illegal importation of opium was proven
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision made by the trial court
in sentencing Ah Sing of two years imprisonment and a fine of Php300.00
which he can serve as subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
According to SC, it was expressly noted in the Opium Law that any
person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands – when the prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is
within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippines – that person is guilty of
illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise. In the case at hand, it would be absurd to think
that Ah Sing was merely carrying the opium to bring it back to Saigon
where the ship came from. Also, it was too much in quantity to say that it
was only for his personal use. Thus, it was illegally imported to the country.
Comment:
MIQUIABAS vs. COMMANDING GENERAL
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus

Miquiabas against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus
Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under
custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in
connection with an offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.

Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States

Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of
Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of
the 94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that
reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and
found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This
sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.

Issue: Whether or not the General Court- Martial has jurisdiction over the
case filed against a Filipino citizen during the state of war

Ruling: No, General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no

jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him
and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the
petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
This is pursuant to the Base Agreement between Philippines and United
States. In this agreement, only those member of the armed forces of the
United States can be subject to their jurisdiction. As above stated,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States
Army in the Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian
employee cannot be considered as a member of the armed forces of the
United States.

Comment:
GUMABON vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISON
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

Facts: Gumabon, after pleading guilty to the court, was sentenced to

reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with his cohorts: Agapito, Palmares
and Padua). Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13
years by virtue of their convictions. They contended the decision by laying
down the ruling in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime,
a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. In People v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court ruled that the
information against the accused for rebellion complex with murder, arson
and robbery was not acceptable under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a
retroactive effect is applicable in this case.

Ruling: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied

retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the
penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favoured the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of
our legal system. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused
by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

Comment:
TAVERA vs. VALDEZ
G.R. No. L-922 November 8, 1902
DAVID vs. GMA

Facts: Arroyo sensed that there is a threat on her life and that people will
assassinate her in her meeting in Baguio. Arroyo issued PP 1017 and GO 5
declaring a state of national emergency and carry out appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not GO 5 is constitutional.

Ruling: GO 5 is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the

AFP and the PNP should implement PP1017. However, considering that
acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion is declared unconstitutional.

Comment:
PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an

administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At
the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The
Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to
testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower
court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim
of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling
the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board
appealed.

Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in

administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a
witness against himself?

Ruling: Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to
practice medicine while administrative in character possesses a criminal or
penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the
license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse
to take the witness stand.

The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to

answer questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to
forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when
called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self-incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the
accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense
of respect accorded to the human personality.

Comment:
PEOPLE vs. SILVESTRE AND ATIENZA
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1941

Facts: In 1930, Ramona Silvestre cohabited with Martin Atienza in the

town of Masocol, Bulacan while she was still married to her second
husband, Domingo Joaquin. Upon learning of the affair, Domingo filed a
complaint against the two which he later on withdrew when Ramona and
Martin made a promise to discontinue living together and to never live
again in their barrio. The two left Masocol and live in the town of Sto. Nino
where Ramona met her son Nicolas Dela Cruz. She followed him and lived
in his home along with Martin.
One night in November 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, Ramona, and
Martin were all gathered together after supper, Martin asked them to take
all their furniture out of the house because he will set fire to it. The couple
asked him multiple times as to why he would do it and Martin only said
that it is his revenge on the people of Masocol who caused the complaint of
adultery against him and Ramona. Since he was armed with a pistol, no
one, not even Ramona, dared to say anything against him. Nicolas and his
wife then ran outside to get help but it was too late since the fire already
started and consequently, destroyed about forty-eight houses.
Martin was charged with Arson as principal by direct participation while
Ramona was charged as an accomplice to the crime.
Issue: WON Ramona Silvestre should be charged as an accomplice to the
crime committed by Martin.
Ruling: The Supreme Court acquitted Ramona Silvestre as accomplice and
affirmed the guilt of Martin Atienza as principal.
The SC holds that the mere silence of Ramona while Martin was still
threatening to set fire to the house does not constitute her participation to
the crime committed by the latter. The complicity which is penalized
requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the
case of Romana, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and
none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence
and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation,
for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. TEMBLOR
G.R. No. 105964 November 4, 1992

Facts: That about 6 in the afternoon of January 1, 1988, Carlito Mendoza

was on his way to the house of his mother-in-law at de las (Alas) St., Pasay.
That they did not reached his mother-in-law's house as on the way a group
of men armed with bolo, ice pick and other blunt instruments blocked their
way and someone even threw stone on him. They run for cover but the men
in the group identified as Rizalito de Guzman, Ysmael Sembrero, Arturo de
Guzman, Christopher Silva and Virgilio Pupulangas chased and caught up
with them in the alley and Carlito Mendoza was attacked and stabbed first
by Rizalito de Guzman, then Ysmael Sembrero and finally by Virgilio
Pupulangas and afterwards, all the assailants run towards F. Victor St.,
(TSN, Dec. 16/88). Carlito Mendoza died upon arrival at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital where he was brought on the same day. He sustained
body mortal wounds. The respondents were charged with the crime of
murder with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Rizalito de Guzman denies having participated in the senseless killing of
Mendoza by interposing the defense of alibi. he claims that he eloped with
his girlfriend to Imus, Cavite, on the night of December 31, 1987 and stayed
there in his uncle's house until January 26, 1987. He petitioned to be
acquitted from the case.
Issue: Whether or not the alibi of Rizalito de Guzman is sufficient to acquit
his from the crime of murder
Ruling: No, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere other than the site of the commission of
the crime. More importantly, he must also prove that physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the places of crime.Here, the time of travel
between the locus crimini which is Pasay City, Metro Manila and Imus
Cavite where appellant alleged he was at the time of the commission of the
crime is merely a 30-45 minute ride by bus, as found by the trial court. In
other words, it was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at
the situs of the crime at the time of the commission thereof.
Accused/appellant was positively identified by prosecution witness Cora
Mendoza as the one who first stabbed the deceased from behind. It has
been invariably ruled that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of
the accused.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. HASSAN
GR No. 68969 January 22, 1988

Facts: In this case, the accused-appellant, an illiterate 15-year-old pushcart

cargador, Usman Hassan, was accused of murder for stabbing to death
Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24,single, and a resident of Zamboanga City. At
the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as the
manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. During the
investigation of the case, the examining officer brought Hassan to the stand
to be the only eyewitness for identification. Accused-appellant was later
convicted of murder based only on his own testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the rights of the accused was violated in the case at
hand.
Ruling: YES. The accused-appellant was presented alone. Such procedure
is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and hence falls within the same
ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection.
Decision is REVERSED and the accused Hassan is ACQUITTED.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. DELOS SANTOS
PEOPLE vs. GUILLEN
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

Facts: Guillen buried one grenade in a plant pot close to the platform, and
from a distance, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had
just closed his speech. Castaneda saw the hissing grenade and kicked it
away from the platform. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the
middle of a group of persons who were standing close to the platform.
Varela was seriously injured and died while Eva, Fabio, Carillo and
Maglalang were wounded. Guillen was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder and is
sentenced to death penalty, to indemnify Valera and to pay the costs.
Issue: Whether or not the act of Guillen is reckless imprudence
Ruling: No. In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention
of killing him, Guillen acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the
consequences of his wrongful act. In accordance with Art. 4 of the RPC,
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. In order that
an act may be qualified as imprudent it is necessary that neither malice nor
intention to cause injury should intervene. A deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BUAN
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968

Facts: Jose Buan was a driver of a passenger bus owned by La Mallorca

Company. On July 23, 1962 Buan was involved in a vehicular accident with
a passenger jeep owned by Sergio Lumidao. It was alleged that it occurs due
to his recklessness and imprudence injuring nine passengers. Six of it
suffered slight physical injuries and the 3 others suffered serious physical
injuries, while the jeep was damage to the extent of P1, 395.00.
A charge for slight physical injuries was filed against Buan with the
Municipal Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan which he was later acquitted.
Howerver, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed the information for serious
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence for
the same vehicular accident with the Court of First Instance. Buan filed
motion to quash, for the ground that he was acquitted for the same offense,
but the lower court denied.
Issue: Whether or not the second case should be dismissed because it
placed the defendant-appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense?
Ruling: Yes, the court ruled in favor of the defendant. Second case must be
dismissed, once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence; the accused may not be prosecuted again for the same act or
offense. The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes the negligent or careless act not the result thereof. And
the gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty. As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same.
Comment:
US vs. Ah Chong
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

Facts: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at the same place Pascual

Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy. They were roommates
and the only occupants of a detached house about 40 meters from the
nearest building. One night Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his
way into the room. The room was very dark and Ah Chong, fearing that the
intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you
enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the
knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion he thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual.
There had been several robberies around the place not long prior to the
date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which both were employed; and as Ah Chong alleges, it was because of
these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
Ah Chong was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be held criminally liable.
Ruling: Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact
is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching
criminal negligence; and in cases where, one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended
to commit.
Ah Chong was acquitted of the crime - he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal
liability on account of his act; and that he cannot be said to have been guilty
of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake
as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. OANIS
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
Facts: In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan
get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first
sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and
a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed
to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained
in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis
who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of
police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that
he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the
Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to
guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and
failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street
leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. They went to the
suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the
supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and
Galanta simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the
victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an
innocent citizen, Irene’s paramour.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability due to
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official
duties.
2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the
performance of their duty.
Ruling:
 1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar.
“Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect
was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the
real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify
this: (1) the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in a lawful
exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed
be necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first
requisite is present.
Comment:
ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Ombudsman accuses former President Joseph Estrada, together

with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, John Doe, and Delia Rajas, of the crime of Plunder, defined
and penalized under RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659, committed as
follows:
That accused Joseph Estrada in connivance with his co-accused, did amass,
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth in the amount of Php 4, 097, 804,
173.17, thereby unjustly enriching themselves at the expense of the Filipino
People and the Republic of the Philippines through a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts such as illegal gambling, and from commissions,
gifts, shares, kickbacks or any form of pecuniary benefits. Although subject
to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime
are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent
and the prohibited acts.
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659 on constitutional
grounds.
Issue: Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum
prohibitum and WoN the said Act is constitutional.
Ruling: Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se
must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. In the case of plunder, the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of BP Blg, 22 or
of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
The declaration of the Court that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as
a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
The Court holds that RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659, otherwise known
as the Plunder Law, is constitutional. The petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is dismissed for lack of merit.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BAYONA
G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935

Facts: During the General Elections which was held on June 5 1934, the
defendant, Cornelio Bayona was driving his automobile when he was called
by his friend, Jose D. Benliro. The defendant then went out of his vehicle,
took with him his revolver, and went inside the vicinity of the voting
precinct to talk to Jose Benliro. While they were having a conversation a
representative of the Department of Interior named Jose E. Desiderio
confiscated the revolver that the defendant was carrying. The defendant
was charged in violation of Section 416 of the Election Code. The Solicitor-
General argues in favor of the defendant stating that the defendant had no
criminal intent when the defendant brought his revolver.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant was guilty of violating Sec. 416 of the
Election Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the rule the defendant’s intent on
the statutory provision that he violated is immaterial. The act of going
down his vehicle, carried his revolver and entering the vicinity of the polling
precinct on his own accord, the defendant completed the act prohibited by
the Election Law.

Comment:
U.S. vs. SIY CONG BIENG
G.R. No. L-8646 March 31, 1915
PEOPLE vs. BINDOY
G.R NO. L-34665 August 28, 1931

Facts: On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay,

Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused andBindoy threatened to injure her if she
did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife andattempted to take
away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The disturbance attracted the
attention ofEmigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself fromPacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the boloreached
Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that
Bindoy wasguilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that
the death of Omamdam was causedaccidentally and without malicious
intent.
Issue: Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable of a crime of Homicide.
Ruling: No. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article
8, No. 8 of the Revised PenalCode
The court reasons is that there was no evidence to show that Bindoy
deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. Second, no evidence that
Omamdam took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Third, no
evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence. Fourth, no
evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy &
Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew & uncle, & were on good
terms with each other. Lastly, the witness for the defence corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy wereactually struggling for
the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
hadpulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who was therefore
hit in the chest, withoutBindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had
passed behind him. The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by
any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MABUG-AT
G.R. No. 25459 August 10, 1926

Facts: Accused Ramon Mabug-at and Juan Buralo were sweethearts

however Juana had been jealous of Ramon because of his frequently visits
at the house of Carmen. On the night of August 11, 1925, Ramon went to the
threshold of Cirilo’s house where Juana and her niece, Perfecta, had gone to
to take part of their devotion. Ramon, with a revolver in his hand,
requested Francisco to ask Juana to come downstairs and if Francisco
refuses to do so, he will get Juana and kill anyone who tries to defend her.
Ramon waited for Juana and Perfecto to came downstairs, as the two girls
came, Ramon fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta. The
bullet passed through a part of her neck, having entered the posterior
region thereof and coming out of her left eye, which was completely
destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta did not die. The CFI of
Negros Oriental charged him for committing the crime of Frustrated
murder. Ramon appealed from this judgement stating that the trial court
committed an error in holding the crime he committed is frustrated murder
because he committed a crime for a discharge of firearms, and for not
finding proof that Ramon has intention to kill.
Issue: W/N the accused, Ramon Mabug-at, committed frustrated murder
and not discharge of a firearm, with injuries.
Ruling: YES, the fact that a person received the shot which was intended
for another, does not alter his criminal responsibility, although the mere act
of firing a person is not a proof per se of intent to kill, yet when the
surrounding circumstances of the act are such that they leave no room for
doubt that the intention was to kill the person fired upon the crime, is not
simply “discharge of firearm”, but homicide or murder as the case may be.
The crime is frustrated murder because the accused, Ramon, having intent
to kill and performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BELBES
G.R. No. 124670 June 21, 2000

Facts: On February 16, 1990, at 9:00 o’clock in the evening, inside the
campus of Pili National High school Domingo Belbes with treachery, taking
advantage of night time, employing means to insure of afford impunity,
with the used of high power firearm, and intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack
with an armalite rifle Fernando B. Bataller, while the latter was intoxicated,
upon there hitting him with multiple serious and mortal wounds. During
the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, the accused defense was,
that he was at Pili National High School with P/Cpl. Jose Pabon because
the were detailed by their station commander at 9:00pm that somebody
was making trouble at the back of the temporary building. He alleged that,
they were attack by Fernando with a Knife, including Pambon, he was hit at
his shoulder, and Fernando tried to grab his firearm, for the reason that his
armalite was a semi-automatic, during the process of grappling for armalite
he could not recall how many shots came out. During the cross
examination, Jose Pabon belied the fact that the accused fired a warning
shot, he also failed to mention anything about aggression on the Part of the
parties.
Issue: WON the act of the accused is in response of self-defense
Ruling: Thus, appellants claim of self-defense could not prosper. The
evidence on record, however, reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code. A
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. But we must stress there are two
requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.In the
instant case, only the first requisite is present; admittedly appellant acted in
the performance of his duty. However, the second requisite is lacking, for
the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the performance of his
duty. His duty is to maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior
Prom. But he exceeded such duty, in our view, when he fired his armalite
without warning. No doubt, the concept of mitigating circumstances is
founded on leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less perversity in
the commission of an offense.Though his protestation of innocence is
unavailing, his offense could only be characterized as homicide, not
murder, as hereafter shown.
On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to
rule out murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the
same to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must
concur: (a) the employment of means, method or manner of execution
which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or
retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the
latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or
manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. There is no showing that the shooting was premeditated or that
appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack
does not necessarily imply treachery.
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide because the shooting was intentional. Illustrations of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded
revolver to a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought
about by negligent handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the window
of ones house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over
the balcony front; or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his
.45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired
another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander
who died soon thereafter. In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the
victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the
incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance,
the maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the
indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken
from prision mayor.
Comment:
BATACLAN vs. MEDINA
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

Facts: Shortly after midnight on Sept 13, 1952 Juan Bataclan rode the
Medina Transportation bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to
Pasay. On its way to Pasay, the bus driver was driving fast and when he
applied the brakes it caused the bus to be overturned. The driver, the
conductor and some passengers were able to free themselves except for
Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called help from the villagers. As it
was only around 2am in the morning, the villagers brought torches. The
driver and the conductor failed to warn the villagers that the gasoline has
spilled from the bus, which then caused the overturned bus to be engulfed
in flames after the villagers approached the bus. The 4 passengers trapped
inside died and during the trial it was found out that the tires of the bus
were old.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of the passengers
was from the torch that caused the burning.
Ruling: No, the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, which was
caused by the negligence of the driver. There was negligence on the part of
the driver, he operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the
death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the
complete loss and destruction of their goods.
The criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent,
was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses
on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed
or appear or were reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us
shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus, willingly and
unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said driver was
negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should
be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the
safety of passengers on public utility buses.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. 171951 August 28, 2009

Facts: On Sept 26, 1999 the petitioner Fidel Foz and Armando Foz were
having a drinking spree at their apartment when Manuel Chy asked them to
quiet down. Only after the second time did the group quiet down, however
Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that he would lay a
hand on him. A few days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned
by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out of his house and upon
being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry
the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and
phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling and complained of
difficulty in breathing. The police came and knocked but there was no
answer. Josefina arrived 5minutes later, and found Chy unconscious on the
kitchen floor, salivating.The cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia
appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have
caused the death of Chy.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
Ruling: Yes, the emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s
delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion then
surfaces that the heart attack suffered by the victim was the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to
commit.
A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is
different from the one he intended.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without
any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be
in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BALMORES
G.R. No. L-1896 February 16, 1950

Facts: On the 22nd day of September, 1947, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a security directly by overt acts. Then the
accused teared off the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a
genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing
the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing
in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number thus
the said number is a winning ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
draw. But the said accused failed to execute all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of security as a
consequence for the reason of some cause other than his spontaneous
desistance, for the reason that Bayan Miller an employee to whom the
accused presented the ticket, immediately discovered the falsification and
called the police.
Issue: WON the accused should be penalized with reclusion temporal
rather than prision mayor
Ruling: The accused should be sentence of Prision Mayor in its Maximum
Period, for the reason of applying Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of
"treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations arid securities" is
reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
P10,000, if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered
is an obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands.
This being a complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of an
obligation or security of the Philippines, the penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period in accordance with article 48. Taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower
than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to
12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is
correct.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could
cause no harm to anyone and would not constitute a crime were it not for
the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning number. So in
the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit
estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and
legally he has to suffer for the serious crime of falsification of a government
obligation. We realize that the penalty is too severe, considering all the
circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a lower
penalty than that authorized by law. The exercise of clemency is vested by
the Constitution in the Chief Executive and not in this court.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MONLEON
GR no. L-36282 December 10, 1976

Facts: At about 7:00 in the evening of June 1,1970, Accused Cosme

Monleon arrived home drunk and asked his wife, Concordia, whether their
carabao had been fed by their son, Marciano. Concordia assured him but
upon checking by Cosme, it was not adequately fed and he became furious.
When he was about to hit Marciano, Corcordia intervened, thereafter
Cosme placed himself astride Corcodia’s chest, squeezed her neck, pressed
her head against a post and kicked her in the abdomen. The following
morning, Corcordia vomitted blood and thereafter, died due to “acute
abdomen”. On June 18, 1970, Cosme thumbmarked a confession that he
assaulted his wife and that he repented for the wrong act which he had
done to her. The CFI found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and payment of damages. After the judgement was read
to Cosme in open cout, he asked that the penalty be reduced. The court
advise him to appeal if he was not satisfied with the penalty. The Solicitor
General submits that the judgement of conviction should be affirmed but
recommends executive clemency because the penalty of reclusion perpetua
appears to be excessive considering the degree of malic exhibited by Cosme
Monleon.
Issue: W/N there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General to
recommend Cosme Monleon’s case to the Chief Executive for a reduction of
penalty.
Ruling: YES, the criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he is
intended. The maltreatment inflicted by Cosme on Corcordia was the
proximate cause of her death. He was provoked to castigate his wife
because she prevented him from whipping his negligent son. The trial court
did not appreciate any mitigating circumstances in favour of Cosme. The
Solicitor General is correct in finding that the extenuation circumstances of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication which was not
habitual are present in this case. Hence, the penalty imposable is reclusion
perpetua but considering that Cosme had not intention to kill his wife, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive due to lack of
approriate medical attendance. Therefore there is sufficient justification for
the Solicitor General to recommend Cosme’s case to the Chief Executive for
a reduction of penalty.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MONTANO AND CABAGSANG
G.R. No. L-36345 November 25, 1932

Facts: The defendant Wenceslao Cabagsang was the chief of police and the
defendant Pedro Montano was the justice of the peace of the municipality
of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of September, 1930, when
the crimes for which they were convicted occurred. It appears from the
evidence that on September 5, 1930, a criminal complaint against one
Arturo A. Soriano for the crime of qualified seduction was filed with the
said justice of the peace. The justice, apparently to favor Soriano, delayed
the preliminary investigation until the offended woman on September 18,
1930, filed with him a motion demanding immediate action and calling his
attention to the fact that his delay was a violation of the circular of
instructions of the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province. The
case was then set for hearing on September 22, 1930. Thereafter
administrative charges against the justice of the peace were filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, alleging that the delay in the preliminary
investigation was a violation of the circular of the Court of First Instance,
dated November 15, 1928, requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all
preliminary investigations within ten days from the date on which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.lawphil.net
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of
said administrative case, the defendants, in order to make it appear that
there had been no violation of the said instructions to the justices of the
peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the
municipal police blotter and the book of records of arrests and the return of
the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show that
the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the 13th day of
September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed
before said falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and
released on bond on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the defendant
Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his co-defendant in making
said falsifications in order to meet the administrative charges then pending
against him.
Issue: Whether or not Pedro Montano and Wenceslao Casabang are guilty
of the crime of falsification of public documents.
Ruling: Yes, The court below rejected the defense of the accused that said
alterations were made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts of
the case. There is no issue of law raised in the assignment of errors. We
have made a careful review of the evidence and have come to the conclusion
that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs against
the appellants.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MANLAPAZ
G.R. No. L-41819 February 28, 1979

Facts: Therese was a 13 year old girl who was mentally retarded. On
January 1, 1973, her mother Teresita Endencio was cleaning Therese’s room
when the former found two white pills in which the latter described as pills
“were for not having a baby”. Mrs. Endecia the found out that Therese got it
from their neighbor, the defendant Winston Manlapaz. Her mother also
found out that the defendant had sex with her daughter twice. The
defendant was convicted and was penalized with reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not executive punishment can be recommended due to
the severity of the punishment.
Ruling: Yes. Before R.A. 4111 took effect the punishment for rape is
reclusion temporal. Since taking effect however, the penalty has been raised
to reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court believes that the defendant has
already served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of
retributive justice, it recommends an executive clemency may be extended
to Manlapaz at the discretion of the Chief Executive and Prime Minister.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. OLAES
G.R. No. L-11166 April 17, 1959

Facts: Between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. of November 9, 1954, Bus No. 64 of
the Laguna Transportation Company, driven by Limosnero, left the town
plaza of Biñan, Laguna, bound for Manila. Among the passengers were
Inobio, Argame and Loyola. When the bus reached Bo. Almanza, Las Piñas,
a man later identified by passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or
carbine, suddenly appeared on the right side of the road and signalled the
bus to stop. Limosnero, taking him for a prospective passenger, applied
his brakes and slowed down, but before the vehicle could come to a
complete stop, seven other men, also carrying guns emerged from the left
side of the road. Probably convinced that the eight men were net
passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus and robbing the
passengers, Limosnero started the engine and sped away from the place
despite the shouts of the men on both sides of the road for him to stop.
Those men immediately commenced firing at the bus which was riddled
with bullets
During the trial, passenger Inobio told the court that he identified some of
the armed men such as Cosme Isip and defendant-appellant Olaes. Olaes
insisted that he was not in the group of armed men that supposedly tried to
hold up the bus.
The CFI-Rizal decided that the accused is sentenced to life imprisonment,
to indemnify the heirs of Argame in the sum of P6,000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; and should be
credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by
him since January 24, 1955.
Issues: Whether or not Olaes is of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide; and 2) whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the
penalties therefor.
Ruling: The Court fully agreed with the trial court that Olaes is guilty.
However, he may not be convicted of consummated robbery with homicide
as the trial court did. Inasmuch as no overt acts pointing to robbery or
even an attempt thereof have been established, the killing of one passenger
and the wounding of two others should be considered as plain murder,
frustrated murder, and physical injuries respectively. The SC disagreed
with the lower court as to the reason given by it in imposing the penalty in
its medium degree, that the accused was sentenced only to life
imprisonment.
For the crime of frustrated murder, appellant is hereby sentenced to not
less than six years of prision correctional and not more than 14years of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law. As to the physical
injuries, appellant is hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto
mayor.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935

Facts: The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision

finding him guilty of attempted robbery.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, police man Jose Tomambing, who was
patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuente Streets of the City of Iloilo,
caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the
wall of the store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
At the time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who
instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was erroneously declared guilty of
attempted robbery.
Ruling: Yes, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The
accused is then held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by
means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto
mayor.
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessary ripen into a concrete offense. In the accused of
robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, it may only inferred as a logical conclusion that
his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the
will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the
store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
another offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind that in offense not consummated, as the material
damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended can exactly
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts
executed. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation
and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct;
the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the court is of the opinion that
the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but
attempted trespass to dwelling. Again the accused must be taken into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and former
conviction, inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgements for
robbery and theft have been rendered against him and in his favor, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
Comment:
People vs. Sy Pio
G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954
Facts: Sy Pio entered a store in Sta Cruz, Manila one morning and started
firing a .45 caliber pistol. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Then the accused
turned around and shot Tan Siong Kiap on his right shoulder when the
latter asked Sy Pio, "What is the idea?" Thereafter, Kiap ran to a room
behind the store to hide. He heard several gunshots before the accused ran
away.
Sy Pio was found guilty of frustrated murder against the person of Kiap by
the CFI of Manila. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the crime committed against Kiap is frustrated
murder.
Ruling: Sy Pio is only guilty of attempted murder because he did not
perform all the acts of execution (i.e the subjective phase). When he hit
Kiap, he knew that the latter was able to escape. This fact must have
produced in his mind that he was not able to hit his victim at a vital part of
the body. Still, with this knowledge, he did not pursue Kiap and instead
chose to run away.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. ORITA
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
PEOPLE V. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
U.S. vs. VALDES
G.R. No. 14128 December 10, 1918

Facts: Severino Valdes was a servant of Lewin family. Morning of April

28th, Mrs. Auckback noticed the heavy amount of smoke coming from the
lower house of Lewin’s house so she immediately called Mrs. Lewin’s
attention about it. Upon noticing such, she ordered Paulino Banal also
family’s servant to located the fire, as he did, he found, soaked with
kerosene oil placed between a post of the house and a partition of the
entresol, and a piece of jute sack and rag which were only burning. At the
moment, Valdes was in the entresol engaged in his work of cleaning.
The same morning Valdes was arrested and admitted in his written
affidavit that he was the one who set the sack and rag on fire and several
other fires in the said house prior from the last one. He also admitted that
he performed such through inducement of Hugo Labarro, (also servant of
the family) for their resentment against or had trouble with their masters
and due to the promise of Labarro of giving him a peso for each fire he
should start. But, Valdes denied his confessions during the trial in the lower
court and alleges that it was Paulino Banal who had done so. However, the
lower court gave more weigh to witnesses’ testimonies and defendant
affidavit that he really indeed the one who performed such act.
Issue: Whether or not the crime committed by the defendant shall be
considered consummated arson?
Ruling: No, the crime is classified only as frustrated arson. Although
Valdes was able to perform all acts necessary to burn the house, but such
intention was not produced due to act independent of his will. For that
reason it cannot be classified as consummated. Even if the said piece of
sack and rag, soaked in kerosene oil had been place near the partition of the
entresol, no part of the house had yet commenced to burn.
Comment:
U.S. vs. ADIAO
G.R. No. L-13785 October 8, 1918

Facts: Adiao abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a Japanese and
secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House where it was found by
other customs employees. Adiao was charged with the crime of theft. He
was found guilty of frustrated theft by the Municipal Court and appellate
court.
Issue: Whether or not all elements of the crime is present so it is a
completed crime.
Ruling: Yes. Adiao performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the
accomplishment crime of theft. The fact that Adiao was under observation
during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise
out of the Custom House is not decisive. All the elements of the completed
crime of the theft are present.
Comment:
U.S. vs. DOMINGUEZ
G.R. No. L-17021 February 23, 1921
PEOPLE vs. ESPIRITU
G.R. No. 2107-R May 31, 1949

Facts: In the Supply Depot of Quezon City, the accused from the pile nine
(9) pieces of hospital linen and took them to their truck, where they were
found by a corporal of the Military Police (MP) when they tried to pass
through the checkpoint.
Issue: Whether or not the crime was considered theft in its consummated
stage.
Ruling: The court that it was consummated theft. The crime is
consummated the moment the offender gets ahold of the thing taken
and/or is in a position to dispose of it freely.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. DIÑO
G.R. No. L-22345 October 10, 1924

Facts: On June 20, 1946, Roberto Diño was hired as a driver of the US
army at a stationin Quezon City. At above 11:30 in the morning, he brought
a truck load of articlesto manila harbor; the article came from the US army.
At the check point a guard approached the truck and found three boxes,
containing ten caliber 30 army rifles.The guard brought Diño to the
lieutenant of the US army for questioning, Diño pointed to the gang but
later denied. Later Diño confessed that there were four persons who placed
the boxes on board and he was instructed to bring them out of the area.
While they were to meet after the truck passed the checkpoint.
Issue: Whether or not Diño can be convicted of the crime of consummated
theft?
Ruling: It was held that the crime committed was frustrated theft, because
of the timely discovery of the boxes on the truck before it could pass out of
the check point. in order for the crime of theft to be consummated the
article should have passed the checkpoint, so that the thief could have full
control and could dispense of the property
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MARCOS
G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990

Facts: The case is a petition for appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court sentencing respondent, Dante Marcos, of life imprisonment and fine
of Php 20, 000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On December 1985, Dante Marcos – a security guard and part-time student
at the University of Baguio – was caught on a “buy-bust” operation and was
consequently charged of illegal sale and distribution of marijuana. Without
any authority of law, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sold and
distributed dried marijuana leaves weighing about nine (9) kilos which was
stocked in a sack, for P700.00 per kilo or a total of P6,300.00, knowing
fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited drug in violation of
the law.
According to the witnesses presented by the prosecution, a police asset
posed as a buyer of the said illegal marijuana. He was introduced by their
informer to the accused, Dante, who – after being presented with the order
– brought out kilos of marijuana in a light blue sack and gave it to him. He
then signaled for his back-up police officers to entrap Dante which they
have done successfully. However, according to the defense, Dante was
wrongfully accused since it was actually his companion, Roland, who was
selling the illegal leaves. Dante insists that he was at scene of the said crime
since he was asked by Roland to stay and accompany his guests without
having any idea that they were visiting for illegal purposes. During the
entrapment, Roland was able to escape and Dante was immediately
captured.
The RTC favored in the evidences presented by prosecution. Thus, Dante
now appeals his case.
Issue: WON there is instigation or entrapment of the accused.
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld and affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
According to SC, the testimony of the police asset was clear and convincing
and demonstrated that the accused needed no instigation or prodding to
commit a crime he would not otherwise have committed. Noteworthy is the
fact that the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of
marijuana for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked
for the prohibited material. Thus, the acts of the arresting officers here
constituted entrapment.
Moreover, the SC differentiated instigation from entrapment on the
following points:
In instigation, the officers of the law or their agents induce, instigate
or lure an accused into committing an offense, which he otherwise would
not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused cannot be held
liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit
the offense charged originates from the mind of the accused and law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the
accused cannot justify his conduct.
In entrapment, police resorts to ways and means to trap and capture
a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. On the other hand, in
instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is
no bar to prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant
would have to be acquitted
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the
criminal intent. In entrapment, the means originate from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability
while the other does.
SC points out that the mere fact that the asset made Dante believed that
they were interested to buy the illegal drug makes the operation an
entrapment. But the decisive factor that made the case strong against the
respondent was that he was positively identified by the witnesses and thus,
this should prevail over his mere and plain denial.
Comment:
U.S. vs. BASA
G.R. No. L- 3540 March 19, 1907

Facts: The municipality of Gasan in Marinduque advertised a call for

proposals to furnish the city with street lamps. Having heard of the said
bidding, Jose Basa – a member of the municipal council – submitted a
written proposal by which he stated his agreement in providing the street
lamps at a given price.
However, according to Section 28 of the Municipal Code, Jose Basa as
member of the municipal council, cannot pursue business with the
municipality. Thus, the lower court convicted Jose for such violation.
Issue: WON Jose Basa should be made liable.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court.
According to SC, the respondent, Jose, only made an offer to the
municipality which the latter never accepted. He, therefore, never became
interested in any contract work or business with the local government. SC
strongly holds that Section 28 does not sanction an attempt to commit such
crime. Moreover, SC upheld that Article 3 of the RPC does not apply to
crimes defined by laws of a commission such as a municipality.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. ERIÑA
G.R. No. L-26298 January 20, 1927

Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and
the evidence is conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal
intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in
penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention of
the mother and the sister of the child. The physician who examined the
genital organ of the child a few hours after the commission of the crime
found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating
that an effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before the
court he expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. The
mother of the child testified that she found its genital organ covered with a
sticky substance, but that cannot be considered conclusive evidence of
penetration.
Issue: Whether or not there was a consummated rape even though there
was no full penetration
Ruling: No, the judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-
appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime of frustrated rape and is
sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BUNTAG
GR 123070 April 14 2004

Facts: At 2:00 a.m., Mihangos and Guigue, who were at the disco, decided
to call it a night and walked home, with their respective bicycles. At the
crossing they saw Otte, a German national and a tourist who was billeted at
Alona Ville Beach Resort, lying on the road but did not recognize him. They
walked past the prostrate man. When they were about a few meters away
from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their
barrio mates. Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo lunged at them. Afraid for their
lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigue’s
uncle. The police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call
about Otte. The man died due to a stab wound. Mihangos and Guigue
narrated how they found the body, as well as their encounter with Bongo
and Buntag. Buntag gave a statement to a police investigator. He stated that
at 1:00 a.m. that fateful night, he was walking back home from the disco
place where he caught up with Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of
Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo then ordered him
to box Otte but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo
himself then boxed Otte three times on the face. When Otte fell to the
ground, Bongo stabbed him on the chest. Buntag also stated that he then
ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him not to reveal
the incident to anybody or else he would be involved.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that they conspired to kill the victim Otte and that Buntag and Bongo, in
fact, killed him.
Ruling: Based on Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, it provides that
there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy,
and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy can be presumed from
and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. It is
not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the
victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless
of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation
of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellants are found guilty, as
principals, of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Comment:

PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-46397 May 16, 1983

Facts: That on or about the 8th day of March, 1976, in the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, Antonio dela Cruz and others were accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, armed with a deadly weapon with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab one Mabini Garachico, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal stab wounds, which directly caused his death. That
the accused are recidivist-habitual delinquents, they having committed the
above mentioned crime while serving final sentence.
Issue: Whether or not their plea of guilty to the offense charged, and after
the prosecution was required to present evidence to show the
circumstances under which the crime in question had been committed.
Ruling: The crime shown to have been committed beyond reasonable
doubt by the appellants is murder. The killing of the victim took place
inside the New Bilibid Prison where the appellants were serving sentences
for other offenses for which they were previously convicted. It appears that
any of the appellants, except Edgardo Mariño, were death convicts. Under
this circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed on the appellants the
penalty of death.
However, considering the circumstances under which the offense in
question was perpetrated in the light of the deplorable condition existing in
the national penitentiary which had been previously taken cognizance by
this Court, the imposition of the penalty of death is believed unwarranted.
The appellants have averred that the sub-human conditions in the
penitentiary have accounted for the occurrence of the killing in question.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification of the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
Comment:
PEOPLE VS. JAURIGUE
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

Facts: Amado embraced Avelina, kissed her and touched her breasts. From
then on, she carried a long fan knife for self-protection. About midnight,
Amado climbed up her house and entered the room where she was
sleeping. Amado felt her forehead with the intention of abusing her. She
screamed awakening her parents. After few days, Nicolas and Avelina went
to a church where Amado sat beside Avelina and placed his hand on the
upper part of her right thigh. Avelina pulled out with her right hand the fan
knife with the intention of punishing his hand, but she quickly stabbed him
once at the base of the left side of the neck. Amado died. Nicolas was
acquitted but Avelina was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty.
Issue: Whether or not Avelina’s act is self-defense to be exempted from
criminal liability.
Ruling: No. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt from
criminal liability. The means employed by her in the defense of her honor
was evidently excessive. There could be no possibility of being raped under
the circumstances. Nor the aggravating circumstance that the killing was
done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally sustained as
there is no evidence to show that Nicolas and Avelina had murder in her
heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal
by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. APOLINAR
G. R. No. 120646 February 14, 2000

Facts: Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant

Apolinar was the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales
in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan at that time. Defendant was
armed that time looking over the land when he saw that there was a man
carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief, the
defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in
the air and then at the person. The man was identified as Domingo Petras,
and still was able to get back to his house and narrated to Angel Natividad,
the barrio chief, what had happened and that he had been wounded in the
back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds ; one in each side of the
spinal column which wounds were circular in form; and a little bigger than
a quarter of an inch, according tothe medical report of Dr. Mananquil.
Petras died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant surrendered to the
authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement
before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.
Issue: Whether or not the killing of Petras was justified by defense of
property.
Ruling: No, the Supreme Court ruled against defendant that the right to
property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property
can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an
attack on the person of one entrusted with said property as the defendant
failed to show evidence of the deceased aggression.
Comment:
CANO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 155258 October 7, 2003

Facts: The petitioner Conrado Cano y Sampang and his deceased brother
Orlando Cano were rivals in the Rush ID Photo business and had booths
along the sidewalk of Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The fateful
altercation which culminated in the fatal stabbing of Orlando Cano
stemmed out of this rivalry, particularly the incident where Conrado took
the business permit from the booth of Orlando without his permission thus
incurring the latter’s ire.The victim tried to stab petitioner with a balisong
but the latter was able to run and lock himself inside the dark room inside
his booth. The victim followed him and tried to open the door of the dark
room and shouted, "Lumabas ka diyan! Putang ina mo, papatayin kita!"
Petitioner did not come out. The victim tried to force the door open by
kicking it and stabbed the door with his balisong. The door of the dark
room suddenly opened and petitioner emerged carrying a pair of scissors.
The victim and petitioner struck at each other. During the scuffle, the
scissors fell from petitioner’s hand. He then grabbed the knife of the victim
who, in turn, picked up the scissors. They again attacked each other.The
victim fell and his wife rushed to his side. Petitioner fled from the scene.
The victim’s wife asked for assistance from the people in the vicinity. The
victim was then loaded on a jeep and was rushed to a hospital, but he was
dead on arrival. The autopsy report submitted by the medico-legal officer of
the Western Police District, Dr. Manuel Lagonera, shows that the victim
sustained at least thirty (30) stab wounds, six (6) of which were fatal. On
the other hand, petitioner suffered only an incised wound on the right hand
measuring six (6) cm., which required less than nine (9) days of treatment.
Petitioner had a different account of what transpired. He testified that on
May 31, 1993 at around 9:30 a.m. he went to his Rush ID booth in front of
the Philtrust Bank to deliver supplies to his photographer, David Olivario.7
After handing over said supplies to Olivario, petitioner intended to go to the
Manila City Hall to apply for a business permit.
As petitioner was combing his hair and preparing to leave for the Manila
City Hall, the victim, Orlando, suddenly appeared from behind, grabbed
him by the left shoulder and jerked him around so that they were face to
face.13 As they stood face to face, Orlando menacingly said, "Anong gusto
mong mangyari?"14 Petitioner noticed Orlando holding a balisong, and he
ran to the dark room of his stall.15
The victim pursued him and tried to force open the locked dark room door
by kicking it and stabbing it with the fan knife.16 He kept shouting, "Get
out of there! Pakialamero ka! Get out of there and I will kill you!"17 The
door suddenly gave way and, as it opened, the victim charged at petitioner,
but he was able to evade the attack. Snatching a pair of scissors nearby,
petitioner retaliated but the scissors fell from his grasp because it was
parried by the victim.18Petitioner then grabbed the hand of the victim
holding the balisong and they grappled to gain possession thereof. He
eventually wrested control of the knife and as he stood momentarily, the
victim picked up the scissors and again lunged at him.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to invoke the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, considering that what is at stake is not merely
his liberty, but also the distinct possibility that he will bear the stigma of a
convicted felon and be consigned to the fate of being a social pariah for the
rest of his life.
Ruling: YES. petitioner acted in lawful self-defense. Hence, his act of
killing the victim was attended by a justifying circumstance, for which no
criminal and civil liability can attach.Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code expressly provides that anyone who acts in lawful self-defense does
not incur any criminal liability. Likewise, petitioner is not civilly liable for
his lawful act. The only instance when a person who commits a crime with
the attendance of a justifying circumstance incurs civil liability is when he,
in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another, pursuant to subdivision 4 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
Otherwise stated, if a person charged with homicide successfully pleads
self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability.
First, contrary to the findings of both the appellate and trial courts, there
are facts extant on record which clearly shows that it was an armed victim
who initially attacked the petitioner with a balisong. Second, the physical
evidence is more in accord with petitioner’s version of what transpired,
specifically his assertion that it was the victim who was armed and
persisted in his attack on the petitioner even though the latter locked
himself inside the dark room of his stall to protect himself. Third,
circumstances prior to the fatal incident shows that it was the victim who
purposely sought to confront the petitioner because the latter had his
business permit machine copied without his permission. Maria Cano, an
aunt of the victim and petitioner. Fourth, the record reveals that while
indeed numerous wounds were sustained by the victim, the Medico-Legal
Officer who conducted the autopsy admitted that of the thirty-five (35)
wounds supposedly inflicted, thirty-three (33) were scratches and
contusions while only six (6) were penetrating or stab wounds. As regards
the finding that petitioner suffered only one hand wound, it should be
stressed that the superficiality of the nature of the wounds inflicted on the
accused does not, per se, negate self-defense. Indeed, to prove self-defense,
the actual wounding of the person defending himself is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the aggression be attempted so as to give rise to the right to
prevent it. The act of a person armed with a bladed weapon pursuing
another constitutes unlawful aggression because it signifies the pursuer’s
intent to commit an assault with this weapon. Fifth, there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner. When the law speaks of
provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element
of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to
the act committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission.
It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. This
third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was
given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not
sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given
by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was
given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate
to the act of aggression. Sixth, two other notable circumstances on record
tend to show that petitioner was impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation rather than the murderous urge of one bent on killing.
Seventh, while the general policy is for the courts not to attach any
persuasive evidentiary value to the affidavit of retraction of the victim’s
widow, such sworn statement acquires a weightier and more decisive
evidentiary consideration when taken in conjunction with the other
prevailing facts in this case. All told, evidence shows that petitioner acted in
lawful self-defense.
For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.37 Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must
rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.38 In other words in self-defense,
unlawful aggression is a primordial element. It presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor.
Comment:
People vs. Boholst-Caballero
G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
Facts: Cunigunda and Francisco Caballero were married but because the
marriage was not a happy one, they decided to get separated. One evening,
Francisco got drunk with his companions and on their way home, saw
Cunigunda standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad.
Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached her,
Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a knife. His companions
brought him to the hospital. Meanwhile, Cunigunda had gone to the Police
Department, surrendered and informed the police that she stabbed her
husband. Because the facilities of the hospital were inadequate to provide
the necessary treatment, the patient was to be transported but died on the
way to Cebu City.
However, the following events happened according to Cunigunda: She went
out carolling with her friends that night; on her way home, she met her
husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress
and asked her: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a
bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left
us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these words Francisco
retorted: "What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will
kill you all, I will kill you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped
her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep
herself from falling she held on to his waist and as she did so her right hand
grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left side of his body;
because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the
ground; her husband then knelt over her, held her neck, and choked her
saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you"; because
she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the
knife of her husband and thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body
near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally released
herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she
threw the knife; the next morning, she went to town, surrendered to the
police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn by her on the
night of the inciden; Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the
weapon but because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get
any knife, and she did, and she gave a knife to the desk sergeant.
Cunigunda Caballero was convicted with the crime of parricide for having
killed her husband.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted in the legitimate defense of her
person.
Ruling: The accused does not have a motive to kill her husband and
although motive is not indispensable to a conviction, the absence of such is
important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or
versions of the killings.
Next is her conduct shortly after the occurrence. Cunigunda immediately
went to the city and presented herself at the police headquarters where she
reported that she stabbed her husband and surrendered the blood-stained
dress she wore that night.
The element of unlawful aggression has also been clearly established. The
second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is
likewise present. Here we have a woman who being strangled and choked
by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong
pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon
within her reach to save herself from impending death.
The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. Provocation is sufficient when it is
proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to
attack the person claiming self-defense. Undoubtedly Cunigunda did not
give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her
person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for
Francisco to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of
the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with
an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that she did was to provoke
an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is
not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense.
The accused acted in the legitimate defense of her person. The judgment of
conviction is set aside.
Comment:
OLBINAR vs. CA
G.R. No. 76235 January 21, 1991

Facts: The defendant Procerfina Olbinar is on appeal from a decision

finding him guilty of the felony of serious physical injuries committed with
the use of a bolo against the person of Fernando Jimenez on about June 8,
1980 in Barangay Caliclic, Babak, Davao.
Procerfina contended that she had acted in legitimate defense of her
husband and should therefore be exculpated. According to her, from the
kitchen of her home, she heard her husband shouting for help; she ran to
the scene and saw Fernando Jimenez and Romeo Cahilog mauling her
husband who, bloodied, was down on the ground. She tried to stop the
assailants; but not succeeding, she had swiftly run back to her home, taken
a bolo and returned to the scene. Fernando Jimenez intercepted her and
tried to grab the bolo from her; to avoid being disarmed, she wildly
blandished the bolo and in the process hit Jimenez in the right ear and
latter with his left hand. And thus, succeeded in stopping the attack on her
husband.
Issue: Whether or not the Procerfina can claim a complete defense of
spouse under Article 11 paragraph 2.
Ruling: Yes, the fact of the matter is that under the circumstances, she
obviously felt the compelling urgency for swift of action to stop the assault
on her prostrate husband, and there was nothing else she could do towards
this end except to try to hit out of his attackers. She must have been near
panic. She had no time to think. She had to act, and act quickly. The
circumstances certainly afforded her no time to investigate the nature of
her husband's injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the
situation and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which
with her bolo she could stop her husband's mauling—whether she should
use the flat, not the sharp edge of the weapon, should first announce that
she had a bolo and would use it if they did not cease in their nefarious acts.
Thus, the court satisfied in the aforementioned circumstances that
Procerfina had acted in justifiable defense of her husband. In the situation
in which she had found herself, she was justified in believing that her
husband was the victim of an unlawful aggression by two (2) men, who had
gotten the better of him and had already succeeded in bloodying his face
and dropping him to the ground; she had no way of knowing if her husband
had given provocation for the attack; she herself had not given any such
provocation; and the means employed by her were not in the premises
unreasonable considering that without any weapon, she was no match for
either of the assailants, much less both of them.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 143935 June 4, 2004

Facts: Appellants, with twelve others, all members of the constabular, were
charged in the CFI-Palawan with having murdered Guillermo Salazar.
Upon motion of the prosecution, one of the accused, Isaac de Guzman, was
excluded from the information and used as a state witness. After due trial,
the court found the appellants del Rosario and Gaspi guilty of the crime
charged, as principals, and the appellant Ancheta, as accomplice, and
sentenced each of the first two to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and the last the penalty of not less than six years and one day of prision
mayor and not more than twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.
The three appellants were further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Salazar, to suffer the other accessory penalties, and to pay the
costs. The eleven remaining accused were acquitted.
While the information alleged that the fifteen accused conspired to kill
Salazar, the RTC held that there was no proof of such conspiracy. According
to the court, Salazar was shot and killed by Gaspi while the former was
being assaulted by Del Rosario; and although there was no expressed
finding of conspiracy between these two appellants, they were both found
guilty of the alleged crime, as principals. The appellant Ancheta was found
guilty, as accomplice, for having failed to restrain his co-appellants from
the commission of the alleged criminal act.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant herein should be acquitted.
Ruling: The Court held that, in convicting the appellants, the trial court
was unduly influenced, unconsciously no doubt, by the local atmosphere
which seems to have been strongly unfavorable to the appellants. This is
indicated by the facts that the appellants and their codefendants in the
court below were even prosecuted and convicted for the crime of sedition,
which action the Solicitor-General, upon a more calm and careful review of
the evidence, later admitted to have been unwarranted, when he asked for a
reversal of the judgment of conviction for the said crime of sedition. While
it may appear to the mind of the average person that there was an
altogether excessive show of force on the part of the members of the
constabulary involved in this case when they effected the arrest of the
Sanson brothers and Salazar, the Court is dealing here with men trained to
take no chances in an emergency and to uphold their authority by force of
arms. And while the Court may not approve of their conduct in this
particular instance, the Court cannot allow such consideration to affect its
judgment as to their guilt or innocence of the particular crime imputed to
them.
The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the appellants
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. NORMA HERNANDEZ
G.R. 22553-R April 14, 1959

Facts: Vivencio Lacsano, the plaintiff, started courting Maria Norma

Hernandez, the appellant, sometime around August, 1954. On January 6,
1655, Norma Hernandez finally accepted Vivencio. On the said date the
parents of the appellant, Mariano Hernandez and Ramona Martinez, talked
about a marriage between Norma and Vivencio. The following month
Vivencio, together with his parents and his twelve aunts went to Norma’s
House to ask for her hand in marriage. Mariano and Ramona agreed to the
marriage proposal. On the day of the wedding between Vivencio and
Norma, the appellant never showed up but instead went to her cousin in
Mindoro. In a letter sent to her parents, Norma stated that she did not love
Vivencio and that was the reason she left for Mindoro.
Issue: Whether or not Norma is guilty of slander by deed.
Ruling: No. Norma is not guilty of slander by deed because there was no
malice when she changed her mind in marrying Vivencio. Norma was
exercising her right not to give her consent to the marriage. Norma has the
right to avoid herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage pursuant
to Art. 11 Par 4 of the RPC.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. FELIPE DELIMA
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922
PEOPLE vs. LAGATA
G.R. Nos. L-1940-42 March 24, 1949

Facts:
• The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan,
Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano,
Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
• Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not
long afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was
missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look for him.
• Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3
shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already assembled by
the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away
because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions
were also probably scared and that is why they ran.
• Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did
not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata ordered to go look for him in the
mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When
Abria told Lagata of the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for
Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble.
Once they were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace.
Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he
also could have been shot.
• Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from
Lagata though his testimony corroborated those of the other prisoners.
• Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales,
Sanitary Division president, verified the gunshot wound and that the death
of Tipace resulted therein.
• Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the
prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered them to stop.
He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his
custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others.
He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of
the prisoner’s work.
Issue: Whether or not Ignacio Lagata is guilty of Homicide and Serious
Physical injury.
Ruling: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and
serious physical injuries.
It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The
record does not show that Tipace was bent on committing any act of
aggression or that he attempted to escape. According to Lagata himself,
Tipace was running towards and around him. How could anyone intending
to escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to
escape from? Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the
performance of his duties, the circumstances show that there was no
necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to wound them
seriously and even kill one of them. While custodians should take care for
prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize
them to fire against them.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MARGEN
GR No. L-2681 March 30, 1950

Facts: Before 11 March 1944, deceased Diego Testor was asked by one
Ponting to take a quantity of fish to 8 constabulary detachment headed by
Accused Sergeant Margen. Needing for food for his children, Diego traded
the fish for camote, and when he was sent for by Sgt Margen to make him
account for his breach of trust, he brought with him to the barracks a
quantity of fish called Kalapion. Irritated by Diego’s conduct, Sgt Margen
threw the fish into Diego’s face. And then he had Diego’s hand tied behind
his back and gave him fist blows. Thereafter, Sgt Margen forced Diego to
eat up two of the Kalapion. In this he was aided by Tarrayo, who shoved the
fish into Diego’s mouth, and by Midoranda, who held the loose ends of the
rope with which Diego’s hand were tied. After this, Diego was taken to
Calbyagog where he died the following day. For the death of Diego Testor,
Margen, Tarrayo and Midoranda were prosecuted for murder but only
Midoranda was tried because the other two had escape.
Issue: W/N appellant Andres Midoranda should not be charged with the
crime of murder for following an order of Sgt Margen
Ruling: NO, obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption
from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose, in
accordance with Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. Sgt Margen’s order to
have deceased Diego tortured was not of that kind. Although Diego may
have given offense, but it did not give Sgt Magen the right to take the law
into his own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman
punishment. The order was illegal, and Andres Midoranda was not bound
to obey it.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. FORMIGONES
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950

Facts: In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo

Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Limabanan, Municipility of
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife and his five children. From there they
went to live in the house of his Half Brother, Zacarias Formigones, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. About in the months of December, in
the Afternoon, the defendants wife, was sitting at the head of the stairs of
the house, when suddenly Abelardo, gets his bolo and struck his wife at the
back hitting its lungs and cause for the body of her wife to roll and fall to
the ground. The defendant immediately get down to pick the body of her
wife on his arms, lay it on the floor of there house and the defendant lay
beside his wife for hours. He was found by the people who have heard the
shouts of their daughter. The defendant signed a written statement
attached in the Exhibit D, admitted that he killed her wife out of jealousy
because he often saw his wife with his Half Brother and suddenly his wife
has become indifferent to him. During the trial, the defendant entered into
a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony
of two guards regarding the action of the defendant inside the prison, the
appeal was based on the theory that the defendant is an imbecile and
should be exempt from criminal liability under Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue: WON the defendant is an Imbecile, and exempted from Criminal
Liabilities under Article 12 of the RPC.
Ruling: After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of
about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so
as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and
dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family
and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of
his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could
feel the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing
his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in
doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an
imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no
import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and
was not a mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered
mind as that of an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following
effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written
statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in
the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living
with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.. However, after the family
of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said
house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and
even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of
thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of
those unfortunate beings, simple and even feeble minded, whose faculties
have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife
after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on
the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at
having killed his loved one though he thought that she had betrayed him.
Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no
effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his
written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the
trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense
of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find
that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of
the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent on proving it. At
least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either
in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are
inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to
find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the
fact that the accused is feeble minded warrants the finding in his favor of
the mitigating circumstance provided for in either par. 8 or par. 9 of Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense or
communication with his fellow beings", or such illness "as would diminish
the exercise of his will power". To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, that of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. AQUINO
G.R. No. 87084 June 27, 1990

Facts: On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as
member of the Integrated National Police of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan,
received a report that there was a victim of a crime in the clinic of Dr.
Padlan in the poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic and found the victim
lying down with her head bleeding. He asked her how she felt and when she
replied that she was weak, he took her ante-mortem statement. The victim,
Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was raped and struck
with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein. Frias took down her
statement which was duly witnessed by attending physician Dr. Padlan and
Capt. Eddie Ramos.
After the victim gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the
hospital because she was weak. Carmelita Morado was taken to the hospital
in serious condition. Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical
Center, testified that Carmelita Morado sustained serious injuries. She died
the following morning before surgical operations could be performed.
Juanito Aquino was arrested and detained. Appelant pleaded ‘not guilty’
and put up the defense of insanity. He presented Dr. Echavez, a
psychiatrist, to prove insanity. In July 1987, Dr. Echavez conducted
physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him to be
suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder
with psychosis. Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita
Aquino committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind.
The prosecution presented an array of witnesses to prove that appellant was
lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with
discernment.
Issue: Whether or not appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense
has overcome the presumption of sanity.
Ruling:
The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon
his admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic
centimeters of cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana
before the commission of the crime.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some form of
mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence. The presence of
his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any
intimation of insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly
felonies. The annals of crime are replete with documented records, and we
are not without our share in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been
feigned and invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal
prosecution.
The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on appellant. In a
judgment of conviction for a felony, the court should specify the
appropriate name of the penalty, which in this case should be reclusion
perpetua and not life imprisonment, since under the scheme of penalties in
the Revised Penal Code the principal penalty for a felony has its own
specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties, unlike those
generally provided for crimes in special laws.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MADARANG
G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000

Facts: The accused Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for
killing his wife Lilia Madarang. Fernando Madarang and Lilia Mirador were
legally married and were blessed with seven children. The accused worked
as a seaman for 16 years, until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in
Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture
failed and he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting.
In the latter part of July 1993, Lilia and their children were forced to stay in
the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his
family.
On Sept 3, 1993, at about 5pm,the accused Fernando Madarang and Lilia
had a squabble. Madarang was jealous of another man and accused Lilia of
infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the
Madarang stabbed Lilia, and caused her death.
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing
incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did
not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a
coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the
cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH
for treatment.
Dr. Tibayan declared that Madarang was found to be suffering from
insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. A schizophrenic may have
lucid intervals. Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may
have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly
possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his
commission of the crime.
After a year and a half of confinement, his mental condition considerably
improved due to continuous medication. The accused was then
recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to
stand trial.
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the
presumption of sanity at the time he committed the offense.
Issue: Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption
from liability for the crime he committed.
Ruling: In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of
insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on
the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with
the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that
which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a
defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished.
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited
any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately
before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident.
The evidence adduced by the defense was insufficient to establish his claim
of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on
record to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to
or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason
thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty
because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is
tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of
conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had
already admitted committing the crime
Comment:
U.S. VS. TANEDO
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910

Facts: The accused was a landowner, on the morning of 26th of January,

1909, the accused with his workers went to work in the dam on his land.
The defendant took with him a shotgun and few shells, with the intention to
hunt wild chickens. He work for hours with his workers and went a short
distance away and check how the work he made in the dam affected the
flow of the water. On the other side of the stream the accused met with the
deceased with his uncle and his mother, the Accused ask the Uncle for a
good place to hunt wild chickens, but instead the deceased pointed out in
the forest and told the accused where to hunt wild chickens, the deceased
remained on the mangga tree tying something, the accused took his gun,
and started to hunt wild chickens. The accused testified that, he saw one
wild chicken in front of him and shot it, suddenly he heard a human cry, he
picked up the chicken and went to the place near to the noise, after the
accused saw that he have wounded a man, he immediately went back to the
dam and left his shotgun, he then called Bernardino Tagampa, one of his
workers and told him about the occurrence, and when Tagampa heard
about it, they went together to see the dead body. Only one gun shot was
heard that day, and a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound, chicken
feather were found in the place, and the point where the chicken was shot
and where the accident occurred.
After that night, they burried the body of the deceased into a well.
It was proven that there was no unpleasant relations between them. There
appears to have been no motive.
Issue: WON, the accused is guilty of Homicide?
Ruling: The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly
held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance
of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs.
Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec, 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C, 292; U. S. vs. Heather, 37 Fed. Rep., 875;
U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of
the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the
defendant are his concealment and denial.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. FALLORINA
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004

Facts: On 26 September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, accused

Fallorina, with intent to kill by means of treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon Vincent Jorojoro, a minor, by
shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended
party. Upon arraignment, Accused Fallorina pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
the trial ensured and the RTC of Quezon City convicted him of murder for
killing an eleven-year-old child while the latter was flying his kite on top of
a roof.
Issue: W/N Accused Fallorina may invoke par. 4, Art. 12 of the Revised
Penal Code to exempt him from criminal liability.
Ruling: NO, the elements of paragraph 4 of Art. 12 of the Revised Penal
Code are; 1) a person is performing a lawful act; 2) with due care; 3) he
causes an injury to an another by mere accident; and 4) without any fault or
intention of causing it. am accident is an occurrence that “happens outside
the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our
will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.” If the
consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence. There
is no dispute that Accused Fallorina is a policeman and that he used his
service firearm in shooting the victim; however, there is no evidence on
record that he took advantage of his position when he shot the victim. The
shooting occurred only when he saw the victim on the roofdeck playing
with his kite.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. LORENO
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984

Facts: On night of January 7, 1970 in Limbanan,Ilocos Sur, eight men

armed with firearms, six of whom were NPAs, robbed the house of Elias
Monge. A man in black sweater raped Elia’s daughters, Cristina and
Monica. Loreno was armed with short firearm; Marantal served as lookout.
They were able to get P10,619.50 worth of properties Loreno and Marantal
pleaded not guilty of the crime charged.
Issues: Whether or not Loreno and Marantal should be acquitted of
committing robbery with double rape due to exempting circumstance of
irresistible force
Ruling: The decision is affirmed. The accused are guilty of crime of
robbery with double rape, in conspiracy, attended by the aggravating
circumstances of band night time and dwelling. The accused should suffer
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force is inconsistent with the established facts that demonstrated voluntary
participation and conspiracy. As a general rule, person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability.
However, the compulsion must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defence in equal combat. In
this case, the facts show that the appellants contention that they were
threatened by the six NPAs is untenable
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MAGPANTAY
G.R. No. 2353-R August 10, 1948

Facts: On the evening of April 17, 1947, spouses Felix Magpantay and
Sancha Salles were at home when a group of armed men led by the fugitive
Captain Dilim aprroached their house. Capt. Dilim and his gang were
looking for Felix for the purpose of collecting the firearms of Felix in which
the latter told the former to go and not come back. Capt. Dilim responds
that he cannot tell him if they will be back or not. After their encounter
Felix took measures to protect himself and his family by recruiting his
nephew Pedro Magpantay, the accused, to help him guard their house at
night. On the night of May 8, 1947, Felix was saw someone approaching his
house which made him fire in the air to warn the suspicious person. Pedro
heard the gunfire which made him grab his rifle and and fired at the person
which resulted to the death of the person passing by Pedro Pinion, a
member of Capt. Dilim’s Gang. The following morning Pedro Magpantay
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.

Ruling: Yes. The accused is entitled to two mitigating circumstances. After

killing Pedro Pinion, the accused surrendered to the proper authorities
voluntarily which entitled him to his first mitigating circumstance. The
second mitigating circumstance the accused is entitled to is that of grave
fear under par. 1 of Art. 13 of the RPC.
Comment:
PEOPLE VS. CA
G.R. No. 103613 February 23, 2001

Facts: Respondent Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading

south. At the same time, Generoso Miranda, was driving his car in the same
direction with his uncle. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan when
firecrackers were thrown in Generoso’s way causing him to swerve to the
right and cut Tangan’s path. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso,
but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried to overtake
but Tangan kept blocking his lane. Both parties then got out of their
vehicles and exchanged expletives.
According to the prosecution witnesses, the accused shot Generoso. The
shot hit the stomach of Generoso causing the latter to fall and while still
conscious, he told his uncle to get the gun. Rosalia Cruz intervened and
took hold of the gun and then a man in red T-shirt took the gun from her.
His uncle chased the man to get the gun back. On the other hand, the
defense, claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from the car,
the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the
grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun
from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. The
accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and
as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting
Generoso.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. However, it was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed
firearm and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm. On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the
homicide case, but moved to quash the information, which was denied, for
illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court. Said petition was dismissed and the
joint trial of the two cases was ordered.
After the trial, the RTC acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm but
convicted him of homicide. RTC ordered him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim. Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of
judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case. Private complainants
filed a petition for review with this Court, challenging the civil aspect of the
court a quos decision, but the same was dismissed for being premature.
Tangan appealed to CA, which affirmed the RTC’s judgment but increased
the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.
The OSG, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition for certiorari,
naming as respondents the CA and Tangan, where it prayed that the
appellate courts judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant of
homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the OSG’s petition should be dismissed.
2) Whether or not the shooting was accidental.
3) Whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.
Ruling:
1) The OSG’s petition for certiorari, praying that no mitigating
circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the
penalty imposed on him be correspondingly increased, constitutes a
violation of Tangan’s right against double jeopardy and should be
dismissed.
(During the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but claimed
that Generoso was accidentally shot. Although Tangan must prove his
defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence, the burden of
proving the commission of the crime remained in the prosecution. Both the
RTC and CA appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Art. 13 (1), in relation to Art.
11 (1), of the RPC.)
2) The RTC found that when the accused took the gun from his car and
when he tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the accused
already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the possession of the
gun that it went off hitting Generoso at the stomach. The court believes that
he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the
ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding the
same, the trajectory of the bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.
The CA agreed.
3) A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.
Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan
and Generoso, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as
unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. There
being no lawful aggression on the part of their antagonists, the claim of self-
defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the
Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former
had no intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his
gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound, thought the shooter may not have the intention to kill,
does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused the fatal wound,
Tangan is responsible for all the consequences 0of his felonious act. He
brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the
gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled.

By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas, Tangan was in effect the
one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it
was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it
certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as
to incite provocation for the other party to act violently.
The OSG’s petition (GR 103613) is dismissed. The appealed decision (GR
105830) is affirmed with modifications.
Comment:
RIVERA vs. CA
G.R. No. 125867 May 31, 2000

Facts: January 18, 1989 between seven o’clock and eight o’clock in the
evening Renato U. Camacho together with Leonora Rudio, Merle
Fernandez and Rosario Olipas was playing mahjong in a hovel in front of
the house of a certain Tomaso Rivera at West Poblacion, Natividad,
Pangasinan. Suddenly a gun was fired hitting Camacho on the head.
Instantaneously he slumped dead.
During the time that the victim Renato U. Camacho was playing mahjong,
his wife Jenny Camacho was talking with a certain Alejandria Reinoso and
the latter's son in front of their house when Jenny saw petitioner Benjamin
Rivera and a companion known only as Babay pass by. Some fifteen (15)
meters away from where she stood Jenny saw petitioner at the window of
his mother's house aiming a short gun at the mahjong players. About thirty
(30) minutes later, a policeman by the name of Lando Arciaga went to her
house and told her that her husband was shot in the head.
According to Jenny, before the fatal incident her husband had told her that
if anything should happen to him it must be petitioner who should be held
responsible as he (petitioner) suspected him of having stolen his goat.
Petitioner interposed alibi in his defense. He alleged that the whole
morning of 18 January 1989 he was in Barangay Cacandiungan, Natividad,
Pangasinan, three (3) kilometers away from the scene of the crime,
preparing his field to be planted with onions and that in the evening he
watched over his sick daughter whom he brought to the doctor the
following day.
Issue: Whether or Not Rivera may be held liable for the case of murder
against him and can be granted with the mitigating circumstance for
voluntary surrender.
Ruling: Yes, The element of physical impossibility of his presence at the
crime scene at the time of the perpetration of the crime does not obtain. 9
As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner admitted that the distance
between his farm in Barangay Cacandiungan and his own house, which was
only 200 meters away from the scene of the crime, could be travelled by
walking in less than an hour; 10 in fact, it could have been traversed in less
than ten (10) minutes! We have ruled time and again that where the
distance did not render it impossible for the accused to be at the scene of
the crime, the defense of alibi must preclude the possibility that petitioner
could have been physically present at the place of the crime at or about the
time of its commission. Further, the alibi and denial of petitioner cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear
identification of him as having been physically present at the scene of the
crime and killing his victim.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly
appreciated in favor of petitioner. The records show that when the
Information was filed after the preliminary investigation, he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and posted his
bailbond before he could be arrested.
Comment:
People vs. Gano
G.R. No. 134373. February 28, 2001
Facts: Gano was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide after he
hacked his three (3) victims and robbed them in a slaughterhouse.
In imposing the death penalty on the accused, the trial court appreciated
the mitigating circumstance of "admitting the crime" as well as two (2)
aggravating circumstances based on the number of victims killed.
Issue: Whether or not the 3 killings should be appreciated as separate
aggravating circumstances and the admission by the accused of the killings
as a mitigating circumstance.
Ruling:
Aggravating Circumstance
The two other killings should not be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances notwithstanding the viciousness with which he perpetrated
the offense.
Mitigating Circumstance
The accused confessed to the crime of homicide but not to robbery with
homicide. For voluntary confession to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the
accused must admit to the offense charged (i.e robbery with homicide).
Hence, it is not mitigating.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981 September 29, 2000

Facts: That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay

Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose. Appellant alleges
that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about
the means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had
consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge
simply ruled that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of
the occipital bone," which resulted from her admitted act of "smashing"
him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the
evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the body of
the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated
and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial
court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the
surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to
self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she
killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his
hands.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the
cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe.
Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and
imposed the penalty of death. On automatic review before the Supreme
Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-
examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic
Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state
of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of
the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The
Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the
appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered
woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme
Court as part of the records.
Issues:
(1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and reexamined in
order to ascertain the cause of his death
(2) whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or
psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time of the
killing.
Ruling:
(1) Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be
able to determine his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo's
conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather
than shot, as claimed by appellant.Considering that the appellant has
admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with
a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes
that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of
said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no need to exhume the
body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the
purpose.Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have
been made before the trial court. Time and again, we have said that this
Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception
of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the
party during the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer
sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be
granted.
(2) n seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and
psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to
determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman
syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory.
Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the
traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the
"battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-
defense.Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the
woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to
place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life
and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the
abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm
or death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and
will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her
batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and
when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence
and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other
than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or
impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity
beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of
eliminating her sufferings.
The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly

subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and
without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has
been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE
her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Comment:
U.S. vs. TORRIDA
G.R. Nos.7450, 7451, 7452 Sept. 18, 1912

Facts: Torrida was a counsilor in town of Aparri, Province of Cagayan.

Defendant directed his subordinates that the death of large animals must
be reported by the owners and pays 5 pesos to him for each and every
animal, which he will turn these fees to the municipality. These orders were
conveyed and obeyed by the owners because of him being a councilman and
believing that the municipality provided for the payment for such fines.
Santiago and Felipe Rante (complainants) contested, and 3 separate
complaint were filed against defendant, they opposed that there was no
provision made by the municipality or any other entity for the imposition of
such fines and such orders clearly constitute the crime of estafa. It was also
alleged in the information of their complaint 3 aggravating circumstances
as provided under Art. 10 of the Penal Code paragraphs 10, 11 and 18 read
as follows:
10. That the act committed with abuse of confidence.
11. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.
18. That the accused is a recidivist.
The trail court ruled in favor of the complainants also giving consideration
to alleged aggravating circumstances. Thus, the defendant appealed with
the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in its decision; and in imposing
the penalty set forth in Art. 399 of the same code, which provides “ Any
public officer who, taking advantage of his official position, shall commit
any of the crimes enumerated in chapter 4 of section 2 of title 13 of this
book shall, in addition to the penalties therein prescribed, suffers a penalty
raging from temporary special disqualification in its maximum degree to
perpetual special disqualification.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the alleged aggravating circumstances under Art. 10
of Penal Code should be given consideration.
2. Whether or not penalty provided under Art. 399 of the same code
shall also be applied.
Ruling:
1. The court modified the decision of the trail court on considering the
aggravating circumstances present in the alleged information of the case.
Paragraphs 10 and 18 should not be given weight, because the information
clearly shows that the crime committed was nothing to do with abuse of
confidence. There were no confidential relationship between complainant
and the accused and to constitute such, the confidence between parties
must be immediate and personal and such would give the accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act.
With regards to paragraph 18, three cases were filed against defendant and
were tried and rendered the judgements all in the same time. However, it
does not constitute the defendant of being a recidivist. A recidivist is one
who at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been convicted by final
judgement of another crime embraced in the same title of the Penal Code.
At the time the trial court held that the accused was twice a recidivist there
was no final judgement against him. In fact, the judgment imposed could
not have been final until after the expiration of 15 days. While on the other
hand paragraph 11 should be considered to increase the penalty for the
accused. It was found present, the fact that the defendant was a councilman
at the time he committed the crime, constitute the abuse of public position
by taking advantage of it. If he was not a councilman at the time he
committed such act, the parties could have not been induced to pay the
alleged fines.
2. The aggravating circumstance paragraph 11 was present for the
purpose of increasing the penalty; the disqualification mentioned in article
399 is a part of the penalty to be imposed.
Comment:
U.S. vs. DACUYCUY
G.R. No. L-3873 October 18, 1907

Facts: Dacuycuy was the councillor of the municipality and was enjoying a
vacation. The petitioners, upon being informed by Dacuycuy that cedulas
had been received at the municipality, they delivered to him the sum of P39
to buy cedulas but he failed to buy cedulas or return the money to the
residents and misapplied it and converted it to his own use to the prejudice
of the residents.
Issue: Whether or not the Dacuycuy abused his public position
aggravating his act.
Ruling: No. He committed the crime as a private individual. He only
inspired them with confidence that it was an easy matter for him to
purchase cedulas. Neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance is
present.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. MANALINDE
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
PEOPLE vs. DUCUSIN
G.R. No. L-30724 August 8, 1921

Facts: This appeal was taken by the defendant Mariano Ducusin from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of La Union, finding him guilty of
murder in accordance with the information, qualified by the circumstance
of evident premeditation, and with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and the employment of means to weaken the defense, without
any extenuating circumstance to offset them, and sentencing him to the
death penalty, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000,
and to pay the costs.
On the morning of August 12, 1928, Cesareo Tadefa went to the defendant's
house to have his hair cut as usual, free of charge. Cesareo Tadefa returned
home after mid-day, and as it was time to pasture his carabaos, he led them
out to graze in Mariano Ducusin's land.
As Cesareo Tadefa failed to return home that night, his wife went to the
house of her brother-in-law, Eugenio Domondon, which was a few meters
away from her own, and told him that her husband had not returned from
pasturing his carabaos. That same night Eugenio Domondon went in search
of Cesareo Tadefa where Teodora Vergara had pointed out, but failed to
find him. Very early the next morning they informed Cesareo Tadefa's
father of what had happened, and all of them, together with Teodora's
mother, went to the field in search of him. They found Cesareo's dead body
that same morning on a hillside covered with cogon grass on the
defendant's land, a kilometer away from the deceased's house, lying face
downwards under an Adaan tree with a severed piece of vine wound about
his neck with a slipknot at the back. When the vine was untied, it left a
mark on the neck. From one of the branches of the tree, they found a piece
of vine dangling, apparently of the same kind as was found around the
deceased's neck, one end of which was tied to this branch.

Issue: Whether there were any aggravating circumstances present in the

case.
Ruling: There were aggravating circumstances present. In the commission
of the crime, the circumstance of evident premeditation, which qualified
the crime as murder, must be considered, because, according to his own
confession to the court, the defendant three times attempted to take the life
of Cesareo Tadefa in order to be able to marry his widow, with whom he
was in love with. He also purchased cognac in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance defined in article
10, No. 9, of the Penal Code, that is, the employment of means to weaken
the defense, consisting in this case, in having made the deceased
intoxicated, must be taken into account. The aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place is likewise to be taken into account, inasmuch as the
crime was committed in an isolated and unfrequented place overgrown
with weeds.
PETITION IS DENIED, Plaintiff is convicted of murder and is sentenced to
the DEATH PENALTY, indemnifying his heirs for a fine of Php 1000.00
Comment:
U.S. vs. BALAGTAS
GR No. 6432 March 22, 1911

Facts: The two defendants lived in the same house on Calle Lemery,
district of Tondo, city of Manila. About dark on the 4th day of May, 1910,
the deceased, Simeon Flores, visited the house where the defendants were
living and about thirty minutes after arriving the deceased and the two
defendants left the house, going toward Gagalangin. When the deceased
and the two defendants arrived at the place on CalleGagalangin where the
street car track crosses, the three turned and entered a narrow street
(callejon) which leads to the railroad track. They continued some distance
along this street, walking in single file, the deceased being in the center.
When they were about ninety yards from any house and while in an
obscure place on the railroad track, at about eight o'clock at night, the
deceased was knocked down, and while down was struck two or three blows
in the face and rendered practically unconscious. While in this unconscious
condition, but still groaning, the two defendants, one taking him by the
head and the other by the feet, carried him across the embankment, which
was alongside the railroad track, and threw him into a small pond of water,
face downward. The defendants then returned to their house. The
deceased remained in that position until the following day when his body
was found there by the policemen Hartpence and Solis who conducted the
body to the morgue where it was later identified as that of Simeon Flores by
Valentin Franco, a friend and neighbor of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the crime can be qualified to murder by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the proofs fail to show that there
was present treachery, as the knocking down of the deceased, striking him
while on the ground, and throwing him into the water were all done in so
short a time and one movement followed the other in such rapid
succession, constitute one and the same attack. In order that treachery
may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification
of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it
must be shown that the treacherous acts were present at and preceded the
commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of.
After the commencement of such an attack and before its termination an
accused person may have employed means or methods which were of a
treacherous character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute
the circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack, such as the one which
resulted in the death of the deceased Flores, cannot be broken up into two
or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent
attacks so that treachery may be injected therein and considered as a
qualifying" or aggravating circumstance.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. CAÑETE
G.R. No. 19233 February 5, 1923

Facts: On 1922, Narciso Dela Cruz was playing a game called “hantak”
with individuals in the hacienda of Cubay in Negros Occidental. Among
those present during the game was Fortunato Cañete, respondent, who
offered to wager 3 cents against the same amount of Narciso which the
latter refused in consideration of their friendship. Fortunato was agitated
by this and assaulted Narciso with a knife that cut through his thigh. In
order to escape, Narciso fled but was still pursued by the respondent.
Unfortunately, after a short distance of escaping, he fell downwards on the
ground which Fortunato used to his advantage and seized him by the neck
and gave him a fatal thrust in the back with the knife. Narciso was still able
to run away but after 80 meters, he fell down again and died.
Issue: WON the crime was characterized with “alevosia” or treachery in
the sense necessary to constitute murder or the crime was only that of
simple homicide.
Ruling: The court found that the qualifying circumstance of alevosia or
treachery was not present in the case at hand. Fortunato should be found
guilty of simple homicide and be sentenced to undergo reclusion temporal
instead of cadena perpetua.
It can be found based on facts that the original assault begun by a direct
frontal attack that was followed by a momentary struggle between Narciso
and Fortunato. It was only after this that the first knife wound was inflicted
and it was also at this point when Narciso decided to flee and Fortunato
followed him immediately. It is from these facts that we can constitute that
the attack was continuous from the beginning to the end. The fall of Narciso
to the ground was a mere accident which did not materially change the
conditions of the struggle. Fortunato, like others in the same situation,
took advantage of the accidental development that gave him an upper hand
over Narciso. From that it follows that there was no treachery present
when he attacked and gave his final blow.
According to the Court, treachery can be found in a homicide if the method
of assault chosen by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special
view in order to accomplish the act. Also, the Court held that the various
acts in a case of homicide is characterized by such rapid succession that
they all constituted a single transaction which cannot be broken into parts.
The judgement appealed from in the case at hand should be modified and
Fortunato should be sentenced and be made liable only of simple
Homicide.
Comment:
U.S. vs. BALUYOT
G.R. No. 14467 November 6, 1919

Facts: The case is an appeal prosecuted by Jose Baluyot, hereby

respondent, seeking to reverse the judgement of the trial court convicting
him of murder and sentencing him to undergo the penalty of death among
others.
In 1916, a general election was held in the province of Bataan wherein
Conrado Lerma was elected as governor. Among his competitors was Jose
Baluyot, the accused, who finished third in the election. Jose’s loss in the
election developed a certain level of anger against Gov. Conrado by which
even after two years of his loss, he still believes that the Governor was
persecuting him.
By the year 1918, Jose was prosecuted by the Trial Court for the offense of
Estafa in connection with a money loan he negotiated with a bank. Due to
the pendency of his case, Jose was temporarily relieved from his post as a
captain in the National Guard. This misfortune was, again, attributed by
Jose to the machineries of Governor Conrado, thus, severed his ill feelings
toward the official.
On August 1918, Jose went to the office of the governor while carrying with
him a revolver. Upon his arrival, Jose asked from the office staff that he
wants to confer with Gov. Conrado which the latter quickly entertained.
When it was already his turn to see the governor, he was warmly welcomed
by the official but after a few minutes, Antonino Aranjuez heard Jose shout
“Governor!” while a certain Gregorio De Guzman heard that accused was
asking the governor for his revolver. This was not contradicted by Jose
when he testified that his reference to the revolver was intended to
admonish Gov. Conrado to prepare for a mortal combat.
However, the lower court found, based on the testimonies of the other
witnesses, that the first gunshot was fired only a few seconds after Jose
entered the governor’s office. The inference made by the trial court is
conclusive that immediately asking Gov. Conrado of his revolver, and
discovering that the latter was unarmed, Jose drew his own gun and fired at
him. It was also found based on the testimony of Jose that prior to entering
the governor’s office, he already had the idea that the revolver of the official
was not in the office. Thus, the circumstance shows that Jose knew that
Gov. Conrado was unarmed and practically defenseless making it easier to
attack him. After the first shot was fired in the frontal region of the
shoulder of the governor, the second shot was fired towards the side of the
victim. This happened when Gov. Conrado was trying to make good his
escape from Jose’s anguish. But after the second shot, the governor still
continued his flight towards the corridor but opted instead to hide and take
refuge inside a closet. The governor tried to call out for help but Jose
instead made use of his voice as a judgement on where to aim his next shot.
The bullet he fired for the third time passed through the cabinet door and
went straight to the head of the Governor making him unconscious at first,
and eventually dead after three hours of unconsciousness.
Issue: WON the case was properly qualified as murder in which the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery was present.
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision while
modifying the sentence by reducing the capital punishment of death down
to cadena perpetua.
According to the SC, the element of treachery was easily and irrefutably
indicated in the conditions and manner in both of the original attack and
that of the final act by which the crime was consummated by Jose. The
proof presented showed that Jose was able to gain access to Gov. Conrado’s
office by his pretext that he desired only to have a friendly interview with
the official. There was nothing in the situation that could have warned the
governor of the imminent danger that was to come along. The pretentious
interview also made the governor be off on his guard even when Jose
already knew that the official was unarmed. The SC also affirmed the Trial
Court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
was present in the case at hand. It was testified by a couple of Jose’s
friends that said that prior to the said interview, Jose was vocal in airing his
ill-feelings toward the governor and even saying that the official would pay
for the misfortunes that he caused to him.
The case was also strengthened by Jose’s attitude towards the whole
controversy in which instead of exhibiting a feeling of remorse for what he
had done, he was instead stimulating a feeling of gratification over the
successful accomplishment of his purpose.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. TIMBOL
G.R. Nos. 47471-47473 August 4, 1944

Facts: On July 2, 1939, Gregorio Timbol invited Buan Timbol to a

"good time" in Manila. On July 6, Gregorio and Carmelino came together
to Manila. Gregorio bought a teargas gun. He wrote a special delivery
letter inviting Dalmacio to see him without fail on July 8, the same
date indicated to Buan. . On the appointed date, July 8, the four
accused came together to Manila. All of them carried firearms fully
loaded. Together, the four accused occupied one room in the Central
Hotel and threw themselves into an orgy; dancing, drinking, gambling,
and hiring prostitutes, all the expenses having been defrayed by
Gregorio. The four accused, again together, returned to Pampanga on
July 12, and upon reaching San Fernando, together they went to the
Pikes Hotel to embolden themselves with whisky. About half an hour
later and after making a redistribution of firearms among themselves,
all of them together left the hotel, went to the Pasudeco offices, and
entered the office of the President, Jose de Leon. After a discussion
with De Leon and Gonzales, accused Gregorio Timbol ordered them
not to leave the office until his petition for a 60-40 participation shall
have been acted upon favorably. pressing their demand for the
approval of the 60-40 participation in the mill, which had been denied
by the Board of Directors of Pasudeco. Subsequently, Capt. Olivas who
was then present, said that, as peace officer, it was his duty to give
De Leon and Gonzales protection. Gregorio Timbol drew his gun and
shot Capt. Olivas at his back. Gregorio Timbol then shot De Leon.
Buan shot Gonzales. Carmelino with teargas gun planted himself at the
door out of the room to forestall any help that might be attempted on
behalf of the victims. Dalmacio Timbol was not present during the
shooting, because when his confederates were in the threatening
attitude, he left the room. When the three victims were killed, the
three accused fled, again together.

Issue: Whether or not there was a conspiracy among the Timbol

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that evident premeditation may be
considered as present if it is shown that the conspirators were determined
to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a
violent resistance. The conspiracy in the instant case appears
conclusively to have been proved by circumstances described above.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. DELGADO
G.R. No. L-302 August 7, 1946

Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Cebu, convicting the defendants Delgado, Trinidad and Villanueva of
homicide. In Madridejos, Cebu, Bragat and Chavez were occupying a table
in the store of a certain Dolores Macabosque. The three defendants shortly
thereafter arrived and Trinidad suddenly landed a fist blow on Bragat’s
neck and mouth, sending him to the ground. Delgado held Chavez by the
shirt while Villanueva attempted to hit him but failed. Restituto was able to
leave the store and into the street but was boxed and fall face downward,
where the defendants stepped on and pounded him with their army shoes.
Bragat shortly died thereafter and was abandoned by his assailants. While
the appelants admit that the three of them were present at the time of the
attack, they contend that it was Trinidad and Macahilo who actually
participated in the fight that proved fatal to Bragat.
Issues:
1) Was there conspiracy present at the time the crime was committed
2) Was there treachery present at the time the crime was committed
Ruling:
Yes. It was held that the community of criminal purpose on the part of the
appellants is plainly inferable from these circumstances: (1) the appellants
came together to the scene of the occurrence. (2) While Trinidad struck the
first blow, Delgado held Chavez and the other defendant (Villanueva)
unsuccessfully attempted to hit R.B. (3) As the latter tried to run away, he
was pursued by the appellants who trampled on his body after he had been
boxed by Delgado. (4) The appellants together left Bragat unconscious on
the ground and went to a friend’s house (Ybanez)
No. Mere suddenness of attack was not sufficient to make the qualifying
circumstance of treachery present, where the mode adopted by the
appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without
any risk to themselves arising from the defense that Bragat might have
offered.
Ruling:
PEOPLE vs. SAMANO
G.R. No. L-27 August 31, 1946
PEOPLE vs. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-19238 July 26, 1966

Facts: Sometime in October, Vargas slapped Marincho, son of Carlos,

because his cow had gone astray and destroyed some plants of Vargas. Then
on December, while Carlos was holding a gun in his right hand, talking face
to face with Vargas, Marincho came from behind and hacked Vargas on the
head. As Marincho was about to strike the victim a second time, Carlos said
“You kill him”.
Issue: Whether Carlos can be found guilty of murder by inducement.
Ruling: No. He uttered the words “You kill him” only after his son had
already fatally boloed Vargas on the head. It appears that the alleged
inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary to induce his son
to commit the crime.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. KIICHI OMINE
G.R. No. 42476 July 24, 1935

Facts: Omine together with his subordinate Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion
and Agapito Cortesano (defendants) were working on the hemp plantation,
together they also within and which were owned by Angel Pulido
(complainant). Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pulido for permission to open a
new road through the plantation, but the latter refused because there was
already an unfinished road, yet Omine still proceeded on working without
the permission of Angel. Later evening Angel together with his son Hilario
and Saiton Paton and Barabadan returning home from cockpit, noticed
considerable numbers of hemp plants were destroyed due to opening of
new road created by the defendants causing Angel’s anger. Confrontation
happened between complainant and defendant Omine that resulted to
serious physical injury to the complainant. As alleged by the complainant,
Eduardo attempted to intervene with him and Omine but was prevented by
Hilario; and that Eduardo attacked Hilario with his bolo but the former
missed except from a minor wound in Hilario’s left thumb. Also in his
allegation Luis and Agapito held him by the arms and when Eduardo
approached, Omine shouted “pegale y matale” in which Eduardo struck
Angle in the breast because of what Omine shouted. And if it wasn’t of these
words Eduardo wouldn’t struck the complainant.
On the other hand according to the testimonies of the defendant it was the
complainant and his son who are the aggressors and hitting Omine in the
breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo attempt to intervene,
complainant and his son punched him on the right cheek with brass
knuckles and while the incident was happening Luis and Agapito ran away
before complainant was wounded by Eduardo. Lastly that Omine never
uttered words attributed to him or urged Eduardo to strike Angel.
The trial court rendered its decision favoring complainant, convicting
defendant for frustrated homicide and Onime as principal by direct
inducement and Eduardo as principal by direct participation, hence the
reason for the appeal of the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the erred in its decision on convicting the
defendants for the crime of frustrated homicide?
Ruling: Yes, the trial court made reversible error on convicting the
defendants. The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision by
acquitting Omine, Laidon and Cortesano de oficio. While reducing
Eduardo’s conviction from frustrated homicide to serious physical injury.
The court give weigh to the pieces of evidence and circumstances of the
case. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel to enable
Eduardo to strike him or for Omine to induce him. 1. Ladion and Cortesano
did not took any part in the fight and that they ran away before Angel got
wounded. This impression was strengthened by the fact that they were not
included in the original complaint. 2. It did not appear that Omine had any
powerful, great dominance or great influence over Eduardo and to
constitute inducement to commit a crime it is necessary that the
inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime and such inducement be the determining cause of
the commission of the crime. 3. The evidence shows that there was lack of
intention for Eduardo to kill the complainant. If his intention is to kill
Angel it would be easy for him to do such by striking another one but he did
not. When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform
an act which was not realized, the facts from which it is claimed that
intention sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition. When
this intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the
defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than that
which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be
extended beyond that which is actually involved in the material results of
his act. Intention may only be deduced from the external acts performed by
the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite result, the
courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other
result was intended.
Comment:
PEOPLE v. LAWAS
GR Nos. L-7618-20 June 30, 1955

Facts: On July 3, 1042 various Moros (Maranaos) from Barrio Baris,

Municipality of Kolambugan, province of Lanao, raided the barrio of
Malingao, killing 11 Christian residents including men and women,
wounding two of them, and, thereafter, robbing them of their belongings.
This incident was reported to the home guards, an organization composed
of ex-Philippine Constabulary soldiers and civilians whose duty it was to
preserve peace and order among the inhabit ants, protect them, and
prevent the infiltration of the Japanese in their communities. The report
was made to appellant Crispin Lawas, head of the home guards in
Balimbing and to Sgt. Benaojan, also head of home guards in Salong. Upon
learning of the incident, Lawas and Benaojan and some home guards
proceeded to the barrio of Malingao to check up the report. There they
found the asad bodies of the Christian Filipinos killed by the Maranaos and
learned that the Maranaos who had committed the act came from the
barrio of Baris. So they proceeded to the barrio of Baris in the afternoon of
July 10. Upon reaching Baris, they divided themselves into two groups, one
headed by Sgt. Benaojan and the other by Crispin Lawas. That headed by
Sgt. Benaojan gathered the Maranaos around the place of ex-Mayor Gunti,
while that headed by Crispin Lawas, those that live around the house of
Datu Lomangcolob. Some seventy of them, including Manaronsong
Lomangcolob. school teacher, Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, his wife and
children, Gunti Ampaso, his wife and children, Pasintao, his wife and four
children, Laito, his wife and four children, Pacpac, his wife, niece and
nephew, Mainanding Lomangcolob and two children, Dibton and children,
Garagabos and wife, Rutum, his wife and children, Aboli and a child, Adki's
children, and others were brought by the home guards to the barrio of
Salong, where they arrived in the evening of July 10th, between seven and
eight o'clock. When the home guards were in the barrio of Baris, they or
some of them took away three carabaos, two horses, and many personal
belongings, especially of Datu Lomangcolob. This is the basis of the charge
of robbery.
Insofar as the crime of robbery is concerned, principal witness
Manaronsong Lomangcolob, son of. Datu Lomangcolob. Sumala, declared
that the Home guards who gathered them in . the barrio of Baris and later
brought them to the barrio . of. Salong took from them (the Maranaos) 3
carabaos worth P800, 2 horses worth P100, and jewelry and other personal
belongings worth P500. The animals were taken away by the following
home guards: Lawas, 1 horse; Agapito Gumisad, 1 horse; and Clemente
Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, one carabao each. Of the accused,
the following were seen coming down from the houses of the Maranaos,
bringing with them malongs, bracelets and other personal belongings:
Generoso Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon, Agustin Osorio,
Clemente Osorio and Agapito Gumisad.
Of the above-named accused, only Lawas testified, but he made no denial of
the taking by him of one of the horses. None of the briefs or memoranda
filed on behalf of the appellant claims or mentions grounds why appellants
should not be held guilty of robbery, although certain discrepancies appear
in Lomangcolob's testimony as to the manner in which the said horses and
carabaos ware taken. Admitting that there are discrepancies in tho said
testimony as to the details of the taking, the evidence conclusively shows
that the accused designated above took the animals and properties in
question. No denial of this fact was ever made. There is insinuation that
some of the animals may have been some of those taken at the raid of
Malingao, but no satisfactory evidence exists on which a finding to that
effect can be predicated. The evidence also shows that the accused were
armed at the time of the taking of the animals and other personal
properties. The finding of the trial court that the accused are guilty of
robbery as above-indicated is fully supported by the evidence. There is no
evidence, however, of the existence of any conspiracy among the accused in
the commission of tha acts of robbery and each one must respond for his
own individual act.

Issue:
(A) Whether or Not they be held guilty of murder by induction on the
basis of the order given by Lawas to fire at the Moros as the commotion
started.
(B) Whether or Not each one should be considered as having committed
as many crimes as there were persons who were killed, or only for one
complex crime of multiple homicide.
Ruling:
(a) It is true that Lawas was the leader of the home guards in Balimbing
among whom were Agapito Gumisad, Felipe Si-it, Hermenegildo Tabacon
and Patricio Pinos. But the order given was to fire at the Moros (on the
ground), and nothing else; the order was to fire at the Moros who showed
resistance or protest against his order that they be tied. The order could not
have been interpreted to mean that the women and children in the house,
who did not appear to have shown any resistance or hostility at all, should
also be fired at. Lawas clearly did not intend that the women and children
inside the house should also be fired at. He can not be held guilty of the
crime committed, as it has been held that in order to make the inducer
responsible for the crime committed, it is necessary that the inducement is
material land precedes the commission of the act, and that such
inducement was the determining cause thereof.
"The verb 'induce' is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases
where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution
and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime,
together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of
indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently,
almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken
without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to,
crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto
without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation, that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that
it produces a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and
the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime
committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete
cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and
that such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime."
Neither Crisipin Lawas nor Agustin Osorio may, therefore, be held
responsible for the crime of murder in connection with the massacre of the
women and children by inducement, and they must be acquitted of the
charge of murder.
(b) The information is for multiple murder, and no inference can be
made therefrom, that the accused are being charged of as many offenses as
there were victims. Then the evidence positively shows that the killing was
the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader
to fire, and continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing
stopped as soon as the leader gave the order to that effect. There was no
intent on the part of the apellants either to fire at each and everyone of the
victims as separately and distinctly from each other. It has been held that if
the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it
constitutes a single offense (Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it has been held that the act of taking two
roosters belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the
same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent
existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations
nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes (People vs. De
Leon, 49 Phil. 237, citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 2, 1898 and October 4, 1905). And in the case of People vs.
Guillem, 47 0.G. No. 7, 3433, a single act, that of throwing a highly
explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, resulting in the death of one
victim and in physical injuries on others was considered as a single act, also
falling under the first part of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It may
be added that there is absolutely no evidence as to the number of persons
killed by each and every one of the appellants, so even if we were induced to
hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by him, it
is imposible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to ascertain
the individual deaths caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore,
forced to find the appellants guilty of only one offense, that of multiple
homicide for which the penalty to be imposed should be in the maximum
period.
Wherefore, The individual liabilities of each of the persons sentenced for
said crime are hereby also affirmed.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. UBIÑA
G.R. No. 176349 July 10, 2007
Facts: Ubiña, uncle of the offended party AAA (15 years old), went to her
school to inform her that her grandfather was in the hospital and thus
needed her there. AAA went with her uncle but he brought her to a house
where the accused stayed in when they were still young. The accused
sexually abused her five (5) times in the seven (7) days they stayed in that
house. Then he brought her to her grandfather’s house and molested her
twice at that location. AAA’s grandfather brought her home after a few days
with a warning from the accused not to tell anyone what transpired
between them. AAA told her father about the incident and her father
reported the matter to the police.
Ubiña was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The appellate court disregarded the aggravating circumstance of craft and
the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship of the
parties in the imposition of penalty because it noted that they were not
alleged in the information.
Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of craft and the
special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship should be
appreciated
Ruling:
The information only mentioned the accused as AAA’s uncle, without
specifically stating that he is a relative within the third civil degree, either
by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved
that the relationship was within the third civil degree either of
consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because
appellant would thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with
committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and
convicted of rape in its qualified form. The Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
However, the CA erred in disregarding the minority of AAA because such
was properly alleged in the Information and was proven during trial. As
such, complainant’s minority may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935

Facts: In a narrow part of a trail that was dark, after going to a wake, a
man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her
breast and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; she tried to free
herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt
weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a
knife from her pocket. She opened it and stabbed him in defense of her
honor. Man did not say anything, she asked but she did not answer. She
cried for help but no one answered. She scarcely recognized the face
because of darkness. She desisted as soon as he released her. (Illiterate
barrio girl, unable to write her name, 18 years old.
Issue: Whether or Remedios Dela Cruz is exempted from criminal liability.
Ruling: Yes, whether she did in fact cried for help, as claim by her, or
failed to do so because of the suddenness with which the deceased grabbed
her and the fright that which is naturally caused, taking into consideration
the circumstances of the case, she is exempt from criminal liability in the
defense of her honor. Acquitted. Mistake of Fact.
Comment:
U.S. vs. MONTANO
G.R. No. 1345 December 29, 1903

Facts: Montano was charged with being accessory of the crime of robbery
in a gang who carried away as the proceeds thereof eight carabaos. There is
evidence that four of the carabaos were found in the possession of the
defendant with the knowledge that those carabaos had been stolen and that
the credentials of ownership were exhibited to him by the rightful owners.
The defendant, however, stated that if he had known that the carabaos had
been stolen, he would not have bought them, and that he asked to paid one-
half of the price of the carabaos as a condition of delivering them to the
owners.
The owners were not able to recover their carabaos by reason of the
disposal of the same by the defendant after he had been informed that the
carabaos had been taken from the owners through robbery. The defendant
denied all the allegations and produced witnesses whose testimony tended
to prove an alibi.
The court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to serve a term of
four months of arresto mayor, with the corresponding accessories and
indemnification and costs.
Issue: Whether or not Montano is an accessory to the crime of robbery.
Ruling: It is sufficient, to be convicted as an accessory of the crime, to
show that he had knowledge of it, and the proof shows that he acquired
such knowledge when he was told by the owners that these carabaos had
been taken away from the owners by robbery. After having obtained this
knowledge, he disposed of the property or concealed the same so that the
owners were deprived of their property.
The Court ruled that the court below committed an error in sentencing the
defendant. As the punishment provided for the crime of robo en cuadrilla is
that designated in No. 5 of Article 503 of the Penal Code in its maximum
grade, the penalty corresponding to an accessory after the fact is not that of
arresto mayor in its maximum grade – the punishment fixed is for an
accomplice – but a correctional fine. (Arts. 26, 67, and 68 of the Penal
Code.)
Judgment is reversed. Montano is sentenced to pay a fine of 2,500 pesetas,
and that if he fails to pay the said fine, he will be imprisoned until the same
shall be paid, but such imprisonment should not exceed one month.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. BILLON
C.A., 48 O.G. 1391

Facts: Felicismo Billon, alias Guillermo Billon was prosecuted for murder.
Billon testified that it was not him who had killed the De Castro, the
deceased, but instead it was Gorgonio Advincula who had killed the
deceased. Billon then admitted to the court that he harbored Gorgonio at
his house after the murder of the deceased and then assisted him to escape
the authorities. Billon was charged as an accessory to the murder of De
Castro and not as a principal to the crime. Billon appealed that he cannot be
declared as an accessory as Gogornio is still at large, not yet tried and
proved as guilty.
Issue: Whether or not Billon is liable as an accessory to the crime of
murder while the principal of the crime has not yet been tried and proven
guilty.
Ruling: Yes. It is not necessary that the principal should be the first one
proven guilty before the accessory can be made liable to a crime. Billon was
liable as an accessory for helping Gogornio hide and escape according to
Art. 19 Par 3 of the RPC which states “3. By harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory
acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime
is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.”
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. CARBALLO
LAGRIMAS vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. 38046 September 24, 1932

Facts: Estaquio Lagrimas slapped and used offensive language to Mamerta

Alcazar, a teacher in the public school of the town of Laoang, Samar, while
she was performing her official duties.
Estaquio was found guilty of the crime of assault upon a public official as
charged, and sentenced according to article 251 of the old Penal Code, to
the penalty aforementioned. He is detained in Bilibid, and prays that an
order be issued directing that he be set at liberty, invoking article 149 of the
Revised Penal Code, which prescribes a lesser penalty for the crime
penalized by article 251 of the old Penal Code under which he was
sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Samar to two years, eleven
months, and eleven days of prision correccional and a fine of 375 pesetas.
Issue: Whether or not a public-school teacher, like Alcazar whom the
accused assaulted, is or is not an agent of the authorities or a public official;
and the remaining question is whether the petitioner, who was sentenced
by virtue of a provision of the former Penal Code, may be set at liberty on
the ground that the Revised Penal Code provides no penalty for the crime
committed under the former Code.
Ruling: The Petition was denied.
Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "Without prejudice to the
provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and
misdemeanours, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code
shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of
their commission." We understand that the intention of the Legislature in
embodying this provision in the Revised Penal Code was to ensure that the
elimination from this Code of certain crimes penalized by former acts
before the enforcement of this Code should not have the effect of pardoning
guilty persons who were serving their sentences for the commission of such
crimes. By virtue of this provision, we are clearly of the opinion that the
petitioner must serve out the penalty imposed upon him, unless he be
pardoned by the Executive Power.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. TAMAYO
GR no. L-41423 March 23, 1935

Facts: Defendant Tamayo was convicted of a crime in violation of Section 2

of Municipal Ordinance no. 5, series of 1932. However, while his appeal was
still pending at the Court of First Instance, the municipal council have
decided to repeal Section 2 of Municipal Ordinance no. 5, therefore making
a legal act of a once illegal act.
Issue: W/N defendant Tamayo may move to dismiss the case?
Ruling: Yes, the repeal made by the municipal council was absolute, and
not a re-enactment and repeal by implication. The legislative intent shown
by the action of the municipal council is that such conduct, formerly
denounced, is no longer deemed criminal. Therefore, defendant Tamayo
may move to dismiss the case.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. L-13981 April 25, 1960

Facts: On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal
possession of fire arms. The accused filed a motion to quash, in the ground
that, he alleged that the crime being charged of him is a component
element in the crime of rebellion which he is charged with. In the
preliminary investigation, the accused tried to proved that, the said firearm
and ammunition in question did not belong to him and was only left by
another person who had disappeared. The justice of the peace of court
found a probable cause regarding the crime committed and ordered to
transfer the record to Court of First Instance of Laguna for trial on the
merit. When the cased was called for arraignment the accused filed again a
motion to quash alleging the defense of double jeopardy arising from the
fact that an essential element of another crime is being used to file a
separate crime against him.
Issue: WON the crime being alleged which is Illegal Possession of
Firearms, is already absorbed by the charge crime which is Rebellion
Ruling:
Yes. An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused
is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded
guilty and was convicted. Thus, the record (Shows that on August 6, 1951;
the house of the accused in Calamba, Laguna, was raided by a combined
force of military and police agents, and among the articles they found
therein, which they confiscated was one (1) Colt Pistol (Auto) Cal. .45 SN-
413307. This gun, with the confiscated articles, which we assume to be
ammunition, was introduced by the prosecution as evidence in the case of
rebellion. On October 24, 1951, the crime for rebellion was filed which
became Criminal Case No. 16990 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
On the other hand, the record also shows that the information in the
present case was filed on October 80, 1956, which involves the charge of
illegal possession of "one (1) Colt Pistol, Cal .45 Serial No. 413307", and
some ammunitions. Considering that, as held by this Court, "any or all of
the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as a means to or in
furtherance of, the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion, and can not be regarded or penalized as distinct
crimes in themselves * * * and can not be considered as giving, rise to a
separate crime that, under Art. 48 of the code, would constitute a complex
one with that of rebellion" (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz.,
68), the conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so
to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy.
While it is true that in the crime of rebellion there is no allegation that the
firearm in question is one of those used in carrying on the rebellion and
that the same was borne by the accused without a license, the same would
not make the present charge different from the one included in the crime of
rebellion, for it. appears from the record that one of the firearms used in
furtherance thereof is the same pistol with which the accused is now
charged. In fact, that pistol was presented in the rebellion case as evidence.
Nor is the fact that there is no allegation in the rebellion case that the
carrying of the firearm by the accused was without license of any
consequence, for it can be safely assumed that it was so not only because
the accused was a dissident but because the firearm was confiscated from
his possession.
The claim of the prosecution that the trial court erred in not holding that
the ground on which the motion to quash is based is a matter of defense
which the appellee should establish at the trial of the case on the merits is
also of no avail, it appearing that the fact concerning the inclusion of the
same firearm in the crime of rebellion as well as its presentation as
evidence therein has been brought out by the defense in his petition to
quash and that fact was not disputed by the prosecution.
Finally, we find no importance in the claim that in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Justice of the Peace Court of Calamba, after
his motion to quash has been denied, the accused attempted to exculpate
himself by trying to prove that the firearm did not belong to him but to
another person who merely left it with him to be delivered to the
authorities, because that attempt is not incompatible nor can defeat his
defense of double jeopardy.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio.
Comment:
PEOPLE vs. CANO
G.R. No. L-19660 May 24, 1966

Facts: On the Sept 21, 1960, Ambrocio Pineda, the driver and person in
charge of La Mallorca Pambusco Bus operated the bus in a careless,
negligent and imprudent manner, causing the bus to bump a Philippine
Rabbit Bus, driven by Clemente Onia thereby causing damages to the
Philippine Rabbit Bus and serious injuries to its passengers. The passengers
required medical assistance some for months and the other for a few days.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. He then file a motion to quash
the information on the grounds that; the crime charged slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence has already prescribe, ,that the Court had
no jurisdiction, and that the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to property, serious and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. The motion was
denied, hence the current appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence, has already prescribed.
Ruling: Regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be
decided in the affirmative or in the negative the proper procedure for the
lower court was to reserve the resolution thereof until after the case has
been heard on the merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being
no question that the court has jurisdiction and can properly try the
defendant for damage to property and serious or less serious physical
injuries thru reckless negligence. It may not be amiss to add that the
purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several
felonies resulting from a single act, or one which is a necessary means to
commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the imposition of the
penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each one of
the aforesaid crimes which, put together, may be graver than the penalty for
the most serious offense.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits and the rendition of the
judgment that the facts proven and the applicable law may warrant, with
the costs of this instance against the defendant-appellee.
Comment: