US v.

Dorr

Facts

Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No.
292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or
circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the Government".
The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom
criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de
Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as
"rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as
"rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292.

Held

No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In
addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi

N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to
produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the
same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system,
as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the
Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific
government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its individual members,
not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292.
People vs Marti

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine
and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars,
and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar
odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have
contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the
illegality of search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs People’s Court

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter
transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search
and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much
less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against
whom, protection against the STATE.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in
fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of
speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their
business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that
the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause
of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held:

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights
is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right
to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
Serrano v NLRC [G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000]

Labels: Case Digests, Labor Law

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend
shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its security section engage
the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner was then terminated prompting him to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-
out of the security section was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent was denied the right
to be given written notice before termination of his employment.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of violation of the notice requirement when termination is based on an authorized
cause?

HELD:

The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an employee if,
although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The remedy was to order the
payment to the employees of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the
dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is
because the dismissal is ineffectual. In termination of employment under Art. 283, the violation of notice
requirements is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to afford the employee an opportunity
to be heard on any charge against him for there is none. The purpose is to give him time to prepare for
the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
termination of his employment. With respect to Art. 283, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice
requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.

If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be
reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he should be paid full
backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. With respect to
dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just causes in 282, he should not be reinstated.
However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined
that the termination is for a just cause because the failure to hear him renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al
vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN

FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;

(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and

(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it
did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known
as the general welfare clause.

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.

The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values
of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere
likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for
these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental
right to liberty and property. Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months from
its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The directive
to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of
property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate
an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering
dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent
violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as
the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does
not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the community,” “annoy the
inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in
the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair
relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.

The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate
them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and
prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into
a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE
STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Facts:

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said
that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet vs.
Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, resp.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the petitioner to compel Natividad to issue a certificate
of Philippine registry in favor of the former for its motor vessel Bato.

Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A
majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built
for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in
the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands.
Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate
of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the
stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands. The instant action is the result.
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because
it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations
based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives
the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law company
was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked
title to a boat it could not use .

Issue:
Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel
in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders

Ruling:
Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be
approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or
destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is
defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than
fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be
optional with the owner.
While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded
by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &.
Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious
species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions,
notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional
provision.
Harry Stonehill,Robert Brooks, John Brooks and Karl Beck, petitioner
vs.
Hon. Jose Diokno as Sec of Justice, Prosecutors and Judges, respondents
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to restrain the respondent-
Prosecutors, their agents and/or representatives from using the effects seized by the police officers from
the petitioners’ offices and residences by virtue of search warrants.

Facts:
Upon application of the Respondent-Prosecutors and Respondent-Judges, a total of 42 search warrants
were issued on different dates against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
directing any peace officer to search the petitioners and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences and to seize and take possession of records to all business transactions.
Petitioners questioned the validity of the search warrants and alleged that they are null and void, mainly,
because they do not describe with particularity the books and things to be seized.
Respondents alleged that the said search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law, that the
defects, if any, were cured by petitioners’ consent

Issue:
Whether the petitioners can assail the legality of the search warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof

Ruling:
No. The petitioners herein and the corporations of which they are officers have personalities separate
and distinct from each other.
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Moreover, the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights
of the other defendants.

Mambulao Lumber Company, plaintiff-appellant

vs.
Philippine Natl. Bank and Anacleto Heraldo, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cam-Norte, def-appellees

This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Manila dismissing the complaint against both defendants
and sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P3,582.52 with interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum from Dec. 22,1961 until fully paid and the costs of the suit.

Facts:
In seeking the reversal of the decision, the plaintiff contended that its total indebtedness to the PNB has
been paid by the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of its real property and the additional amount remitted
by it to the Bank.
On the belief that the proceeds of the above-stated sale is insufficient to cover the Plaintiff’s debt, PNB
sent a letter to the Provincial Sheriff of Cam-Norte requesting him to take possession of the chattels
mortgaged to it by the plaintiff and sell them at public auction.
Plaintiff alleged that the auction sale of the chattels mortgaged is void for being violative of the agreement
provided in the mortgage contract:
“in cases of both judicial and extra-judicial foreclosure under Act 1508, as amended, the
corresponding complaint for foreclosure or the petition for sale should be filed with the courts or the Sheriff
of Manila, as the case may be”
Herein appellant claims moral damages on account of the said violation.

Issue:
Whether Mambulao can validly claim for moral damages

Ruling:
No. An artificial person like herein appellant corporation cannot experience physical sufferings, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or social humiliation which are basis of
moral damages
A corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of
moral damages. The same cannot be considered under the facts of this case, however, not only because
it is admitted that herein appellant had already ceased in its business operation at the time of the
foreclosure sale of the chattels, but also for the reason that whatever adverse effects of the foreclosure
sale of the chattels could have upon its reputation or business standing would undoubtedly be the same
whether the sale was conducted at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, or in Manila which is the place
agreed upon by the parties in the mortgage contract.

Jose Maglutac, pet. vs. NLRC

These petitions for Certiorari seek to review the Decision of respondent NLRC, affirming the finding of the
Labor Arbiter that complainant was illegally dismissed by Commart but deleting the award for moral and
exemplary damages in favor of the complainant and absolving Jesus Maglutac from any personal liability.

Facts:
Jose Maglutac was employed by Commart (Phils.) Inc. in 1980 as Manager of Energy Equipment Sales. In
1984, he received a notice of termination signed by the VP-Gen Mgr, and Corporate Sec of CMS Intl., a
Corp controlled by Commart.
Jose Maglutac filed a case for illegal dismissal against Commart and Jesus Maglutac, pres and Chairman of
the BD of Commart. Jose alleged that his dismissal was part of a vendetta drive against his parents who
dared to expose the massive and fraudulent diversion of company funds to the company president’s
private accounts.
In this petition, Jose Maglutac raised the issue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and
contravened existing laws and jurisprudence in holding that resp. Jesus should not have been held liable
in solidum with the resp. Corp

Issue:
Whether Jesus Maglutac should be held jointly and severally liable with Commart

Ruling:
Yes. The president or presidents of the corporation may be held liable for the corporations’ obligations
to its workers. Since a Corp is an artificial being, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the
employer being the person acting in the interest of the employer, otherwise, any decision that may be
rendered against the latter would be useless and ineffective for there would be no one against whom it
can be enforced.
The same circumstance is obtaining in the instant case in the light of the manifestation of Commar that it
had become insolvent and that It had suspended operations.
The Labor Arbiter therefore correctly ruled that Jesus T. Maglutac was jointly and severally liable with
Commart not only because he was the most ranking officer of Commart at the time of the termination of
the complainant, it was likewise found that he had a direct hand in the latter’s dismissal..

Northwest Airlines- petitioner

v.
CA and C.F. Sharp & Company-respondents

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a Japanese court.

Facts:
Northwest Air and Sharp through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency
Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit
the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement,
plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with
claim for damages.

A writ of summons was issued by the District Court of Japan. After the two attempts of service were
unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of
summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila through diplomatic channels.
Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not having appealed
the judgment, the same became final and executory.

Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was
filed by plaintiff before the RTC of Manila.

Issue:
Whether a Japanese court can acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan
by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in
Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.

Ruling:
Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the
contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due
notice therein.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural
law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service
of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.

Andaya v. Abadia et al

This is an appeal praying for the reversal of the orders of the RTC Q.C. Maintaining that the RTC and not
the SEChas jurisdiction over his complaint, petitioner argues that the court a quo should not have
dismissed Civil Case filed by him against the respondents.. He asserts that the complaint is based not so
much on plaintiff's attempted removal but rather on the manner of his removal and the consequent
effects thereof.

Facts:
Before the RTC of Q.C., Andaya filed an action for Injunction and Damages with Restraining Orders and/or
Preliminary Injunction against Abadia et al, alleging that the latter acting in concerts and pursuant to an
illegal and nefarious scheme to oust petitioner from his then positions as President and General Manager
of the AFPSLAI, with grave abuse of authority and in gross and deliberate violation of the norms of human
relations and of petitioner's right to due process, illegally, maliciously and with evident bad faith,
convened a meeting of the AFPSLAI Board of Directors and illegally reorganized the management of
AFPSLAI by ousting and removing, without just and lawful cause, petitioner from his positions therein,
causing petitioner moral and exemplary damages.

The Court ruled that it has no jurisdiction on corporate matters. Hence this appeal

Issue:
Whether the RTC and not the SEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s complaint

Ruling:
The allegations against herein respondents in the amended complaint unquestionably reveal intra-
corporate controversies cleverly concealed, although unsuccessfully, by use of civil law terms and phrases.
The amended complaint impleads herein respondents who, in their capacity as directors of AFPSLAI,
allegedly convened an illegal meeting and voted for the reorganization of management resulting in
petitioner's ouster as corporate officer. While it may be said that the same corporate acts also give rise to
civil liability for damages, it does not follow that the case is necessarily taken out of the jurisdiction of the
SEC as it may award damages which can be considered consequential in the exercise of its adjudicative
powers. Besides, incidental issues that properly fall within the authority of a tribunal may also be
considered by it to avoid multiplicity of actions. Consequently, in intra-corporate matters such as those
affecting the corporation, its directors, trustees, officers, shareholders, the issue of consequential
damages may just as well be resolved and adjudicated by the SEC.

Moreover, mere allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations do not
necessarily call for the application of the provisions of the Civil Code in place of AFPSLAI By-Laws.

Good Earth Emporium Inc and Lim Ka Ping, petitioners

v.
CA and Roces-Reyes Realty Inc., respondents

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision CA reversing the decision of respondent Judge
RTC of Manila, which reversed the resolution of the Metropolitan Trial Court Of Manila denying herein
GEE’s motion to quash the alias writ of execution issued against them.
Facts:
A lease contract was entered into between ROCES and GEE. A five-storey building was the subject of
which, upon failure of the latter to pay its rentals, ROCES filed an ejectment case against the petitioner.
The MTC of Mla rendered a decision ordering GEE and all persons under him to vacate the premises and
surrender the same to ROCES and pay the plaintiffs the rental.

GEE filed a motion to quash the writ of execution but the same was denied by the MTC for lack of merit.
In 1987 the RTC of Manila reversed the decision of the MTC finding that the amount of P1 million
evidenced by Exhibit "I" and another P1 million evidenced by the pacto de retro sale instrument were in
full satisfaction of the judgment obligation.

On further appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the Resolution of the MTC of
Manila. GEE’s m/r was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was full satisfaction of the judgment debt in favor of respondent corporation which
would justify the quashing of the Writ of Execution

Ruling:
The fact that at the time payment was made to the two Roces brothers, GEE was also indebted to
respondent corporation for a larger amount, is not supportive of the Regional Trial Court's conclusions
that the payment was in favor of the latter, especially where the amount was not receipted for by
respondent corporation and there is absolutely no indication in the receipt from which it can be
reasonably inferred, that said payment was in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Likewise, no such
inference can be made from the execution of the pacto de retro sale which was not made in favor of
respondent corporation but in favor of the two Roces brothers in their individual capacities without any
reference to the judgment obligation in favor of respondent corporation.

Respondent court was correct in stating that it "cannot go beyond what appears in the documents
submitted by petitioners themselves in the absence of clear and convincing evidence" that would support
its claim that the judgment obligation has indeed been fully satisfied which would warrant the quashal of
the Alias Writ of Execution.

It has been an established rule that when the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence
(which has been done in this case), the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment
devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the plaintiff creditor.

Pabalan and Lagdameo, petitioners

vs.
NLRC, LA and the Sheriff of the NLRC, respondents

This is a petition for certiorari on the decision of the NLRC affirming the ruling of the LA which ordered
the petitioners to pay jointly and severally with the Philippine Inter-Fashion Inc.

Facts:
Eighty-four (84) workers of the PIF filed a complaint against the latter for illegal transfer simultaneous
with illegal dismissal without justifiable cause and in violation of the provision of the Labor Code on
security of tenure as well as the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130. Complainants demanded
reinstatement with full backwages, living allowance, 13th month pay and other benefits under existing
laws and/or separation pay. The LA ruled in its favor.

In a M/R, the NLRC affirmed the appealed decision. Hence, this petition alleging lack of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of jurisdiction in adjudging herein petitioners as jointly and severally liable with the PIF

Issue:
(1) Whether the respondents acquired jurisdiction over the peitioners
(2) Whether the officers of the PIF could be held jointly and severally liable with the corporation for its
liablility

Ruling:
1. Yes. Record shows that while originally it was PIF which was impleaded as respondent before the LA,
petitioners also appeared in their behalf through counsel. Thereafter when the supplemental position
paper was filed by complainants, petitioners were impleaded as respondents to which they filed an
opposition inasmuch as they filed their own supplemental position papers. They were therefore properly
served with summons and they were not deprived of due process.

2. No. The settled rule is that the corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from the persons composing it, including its officers as well as from that of any other legal entity to which
it may be related. Thus, a company manager acting in good faith within the scope of his authority in
terminating the services of certain employees cannot be held personally liable for damages.

Here, complainants did not allege or show that petitioners, as officers of the corporation deliberately and
maliciously designed to evade the financial obligation of the corporation to its employees, or used the
transfer of the employees as a means to perpetrate an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of existing
obligations, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse the legitimate issues. Hence petitioners can not
be held jointly and severally liable with the PIF corporation
Remo Jr., petitioner
vs
IAC and E.B> Marcha Transport Company Inc., respondents

This is a petition for review of a resolution of the IAC seeking the reversal and the reinstatement of its
earlier decision which set aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal ordering the defendants (B/D of Akron) to
pay jointly and severally with Akron Coprada (later changed to Akron Transport Intl. Inc.)

Facts:
Feliciano Coprada, as President and Chairman of Akron, purchased thirteen trucks from private
respondent on January 25, 1978 for and in consideration of P525,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. After the lapse of 90 days, private respondent tried to collect from Coprada but the latter
promised to pay only upon the release of the DBP loan. Private respondent sent Coprada a letter of
demand. In his reply to the said letter, Coprada reiterated that he was applying for a loan from the DBP
from the proceeds of which payment of the obligation shall be made. Upon inquiry, private respondent
found that no loan application was ever filed by Akron with DBP.

After an ex parte reception of the evidence, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants ordering them to pay jointly and severally.

Issue:
Whether the IAC erred in disregarding the corporate fiction and in holding the petitioner personally liable
for the obligation of the Corporation

Ruling:
Yes. The environmental facts of this case show that there is no cogent basis to pierce the corporate veil
of Akron and hold petitioner personally liable for its obligation to private respondent. While it is true that
petitioner was still a member of the board of directors of Akron and that he participated in the adoption
of a resolution authorizing the purchase of 13 trucks for the use in the brokerage business of Akron to be
paid out of a loan to be secured from a lending institution, it does not appear that said resolution was
intended to defraud anyone and more particularly private respondent. It was Coprada, President and
Chairman of Akron, who negotiated with said respondent for the purchase of 13 cargo trucks. It was
Coprada who signed a promissory note to guarantee the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price out of the proceeds of a loan he supposedly sought from the DBP. The word "WE' in the said
promissory note must refer to the corporation which Coprada represented in the execution of the note
and not its stockholders or directors. Petitioner did not sign the said promissory note so he cannot be
personally bound thereby.

It has not been clearly shown that petitioner had any part or participation in the perpetration of the same.
Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the
diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government
and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty
for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.

Issue:

Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.

Held:

The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens
who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to
consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time,
rank-and-file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]