G.R. No.

139519 January 24, 2001

CONCHITO J. OCLARIT, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE MAXIMO G. W. PADERANGA, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Orietal, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner is a lawyer engaged in the private practice of law. Petitioner was counsel for the
plaintiffs in the case on e case. Judge Maximo G. W. Paderanga was the presiding judge.

Sometime in 1999, the case was scheduled for continuation of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion to
approve compromise agreement entered into by the parties pointing out that the compromise agreement
was reached before a barangay captain. Counsel for the defendants opposed the motion because the
defendants were placed in a disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before the court, not
before the barangay. The court ruled that the compromise agreement was not before the barangay
captain but before the court. The parties settled before the barangay captain. At this point, petitioner
informed the court that the compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further when the court
told him repeatedly to "shut up." Then petitioner requested the court to stop shouting at him. The court
rhetorically asked: "why should the court precisely not cite you for contempt for doing that," that is, for
settling the case before the barangay captain.

Consequently, the presiding judge cited petitioner in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of
P1,000.00. Petitioner remarked that the presiding judge was becoming very arrogant. In reply to that,
respondent judge declared: "I will put you in jail. Get a policeman." At that moment, the court issued a
verbal order holding petitioner for direct contempt of court and sentencing petitioner to serve one (1) day
in jail and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Petitioner indicated that he would challenge the ruling. Then,
respondent judge issued a "detention commitment" to the Jail Warden, committing the person of petitioner
Conchito J. Oclarit for direct contempt.

The next day, with petitioner in jail, he received a copy of the written order declaring him in direct
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and also to serve one (1) day in jail.

ISSUES: Whether (1) petitioner was guilty of direct contempt of court; (2) if guilty, may the respondent
judge declare him guilty by an order without stating the facts on which it is based and imposing upon him
the corresponding penalty; and finally (3) if the court could do so, is the order finding petitioner guilty of
direct contempt of court immediately executory?

HELD: NO. In the first place, there was nothing contumacious in the submission to the court of a motion
for approval of compromise agreement reached before a barangay captain in a case pending before the
court. It is not required that a compromise agreement be executed before the court. It may be executed
before anyone or even among the parties themselves and then submitted to the court for approval.

In the second place, the presiding judge must state expressly in the order the facts constituting the
contemptuous behavior of petitioner and declaring him in direct contempt of court.

In this case, the court did not state the specific cause for declaring petitioner guilty of direct contempt of
court. Indeed, it would seem that the court cited petitioner for direct contempt of court for submitting such
compromise was reached before a barangay captain. As we said, there is nothing contumacious in such
act. However, the impression of lawyers in the courtroom at that time was that the presiding judge was
irked because petitioner shouted back and banged the table as petitioner charged the presiding judge
with arrogance. This incident is not recorded in the transcript, leaving us in doubt if it occurred. It is
apparent, however, that the presiding judge continuously ordered petitioner to "shut up."

Even then, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemner must
be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Thus, in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision granting a remedy to a person
adjudged in direct contempt by any court. Such person may not appeal thereform, but may avail himself
of certiorari or prohibition, In such case, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending
resolution of such petition provided the contemner files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
judgment should the petition be decided against him.

In fact, petitioner asked the court presided over by respondent judge to fix a bail for his temporary liberty
pending the filing of a petition for certiorari. This written motion was filed on the first hour the very next
day. It was timely filed because the written order of contempt was issued only the next day and given to
petitioner when he was in jail. The respondent judge did not act on the motion. By such inaction,
respondent judge deprived petitioner of an effective relief from an order of direct contempt of court. This is
a violation of the Rules on contempt of court.Under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner had sixty (60) days within which to file his petition.

It was the respondent judge who first shouted successively at petitioner to "shut up." When petitioner
persisted in making his explanation, the court declared him in direct contempt, to the extent of stating that
the judge had "absolute power." The lawyer's remarks explaining his position in the case under
consideration do not necessarily assume the level of contumely that justifies the court to exercise the
power of contempt. Courts must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used
sparingly in cases of clearly contumacious behavior in facie curiae. The salutary rule is that the power to
punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment, The Courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise.