HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No.

163980
ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO
F. APOLINARIO, in his personal
capacity and as President of Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., Present:
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
- versus - PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
in his capacity as Chairman of the CARPIO,
Housing and Urban Development AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), CORONA,
ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, CARPIO MORALES,
in his capacity as General Manager of CALLEJO, SR.,
the National Housing Authority (NHA), AZCUNA,
MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his TINGA,
capacity as Chairman of the Presidential CHICO-NAZARIO,
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), GARCIA, and
MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in VELASCO, JR., JJ.
his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City,
SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE Promulgated:
SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members
of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT August 3, 2006
CENTER ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE,
Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
of 2003.

Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners

association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president,
Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and
on behalf of the association.

Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the
Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo
Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr.
Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP),
Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante
Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
Center (NGC).

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills,Quezon City, covering a
little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC.[1]
 On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.[2]

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by

Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993,
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments
socialized housing program.[3]

On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure
the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon
City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other
purposes.

SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site

to Bona Fide Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by
excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the
east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona
fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the
west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of
the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in
1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all
existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and
actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site

for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational
and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local
government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious
institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those
occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions
this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of
in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis
 therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of
such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to
them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity
of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,[4] the Committee formulated

the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004.
Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND
UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR
BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND
UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003 SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR
BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL.[5]
First, the procedural matters.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association
cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since
it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for
the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC
East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified
beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed
period.[6] Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly
recognized peoples organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as
beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC.[7]

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[8]

Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition,
whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC.
There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are
residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or
injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process
of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner
association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be
unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSGs allegation that the
failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries
effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance
precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly,
petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement
of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection
process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only
and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers
to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections
3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself
or all the lots in the NGC.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The
petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.

There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the

instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an
improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of
a quasi-legislative function.[9] Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207,
the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function,
which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the
OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City[10] and respondent
NHA[11] contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing
the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a

consequence.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and

quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.[12]

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued

by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.[13]

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the
theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it
is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14]
 Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power,
the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15]

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, so warrant.[16] A direct invocation of the Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[17]

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[18] the Court said that it will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.[19] A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no
compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of
the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that
precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR.
Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the

Constitution,[20] the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an implementing

rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the
Regional Trial Court.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse
of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available
in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. [23] Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.

In a number of petitions,[24] the Court adequately resolved them on other

grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no
compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may
be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not
shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy
resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended
in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular
case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be
questioned.[25]

Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome,

however, is just as dismal for petitioners.
 Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:

Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents

3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries

xxxx

(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of Policies and
subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a
minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of
lots.

xxxx

(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated

based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35
sq. m. and 60 sq. m.

xxxx

3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell

(a) Westside

(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within
sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00
per sq. m.

xxxx

(c) for both eastside and westside

(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set
in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after
approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.

The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing
Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be
approved by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).

Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are

constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the
object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.
 First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to
qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to
qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona
fide residents without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.

The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two
groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and
certain government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No.
9207 mandates the allocation of additional property wit
hin the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which
this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on
the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is true
that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall
be based on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity,
this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local
government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which
do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There
is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise
entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.

Petitioners interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207
and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The governments policy to set
aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local
government and various government
institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and

religious purposes.[26] Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of
lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was
declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used
or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the
housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land
use can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although
the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the NGC,
it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but
instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would
not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the
NGC.

In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional

beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the
portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated
for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional
beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents
of the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area
to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.

Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling
rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price.
They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell
within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price
escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they
conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be
nullified. The argument deserves scant consideration.

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained

in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the
statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.[27] All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.[28]
 In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the
areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes objective of urban
poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the
reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the
Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the
sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These
details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the
discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and
technical expertise over these matters.

The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to
the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.[29] In this regard, petitioners do not
even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.

The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a

beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also
within the Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement
R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions
governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and
just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a
contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers
from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in
by several representatives of peoples organizations contrary to the express mandate
of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized peoples
organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is
worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized peoples
organization.

In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had

the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied
with. That there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due
process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190837 March 5, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the BUREAU OF FOOD AND DRUGS (now
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner,
vs.
DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari,1 raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Bureau.of Food and Drugs (BFAD), now
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), assails the Order2dated December 18, 2009 of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 08-124 which: (a) declared BF AD Circular Nos. 1 and 8, series of 1997 (Circular Nos. 1
and 8, s. 1997) null and void; (b) ordered the issuance of writs of permanent injunction and
prohibition against the FDA in implementing the aforesaid circulars; and ( c) directed the FDA to
issue Certificates of Product Registration (CPR) in favor of respondents Drugmaker's Laboratories,
Inc. and Terrarriedic, Inc. (respondents).

The Facts

The FDA3 was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720,4 otherwise known as the "Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act," primarily in order "to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality
measures for foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic product[s]."5 On March 15, 1989, the
Department of Health (DOH), thru then-Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, issued Administrative Order
No. (AO) 67, s. 1989, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical
Products." Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine
products with the FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a
satisfactory bioavailability6/bioequivalence7 (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a
CPR for these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on
hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of Circular
No. 1, s. 19978 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the
establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s.
19979 which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on
drug products.10

Respondents manufacture and trade a "multisource pharmaceutical product"11 with the generic name
of rifampicin12– branded as "Refam 200mg/5mL Suspension" (Refam) – for the treatment of adults
and children suffering from pulmonary and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis.13 On November 15, 1996,
respondents applied for and were issued a CPR for such drug, valid for five (5) years, or until
November 15, 2001.14 At the time of the CPR’s issuance, Refam did not undergo BA/BE testing since
there was still no facility capable of conducting BA/BE testing. Sometime in 2001, respondents
applied for and were granted numerous yearly renewals of their CPR for Refam, which lasted until
November 15, 2006, albeit with the condition that they submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for said
drug.15

Accordingly, respondents engaged the services of the University of the Philippines’ (Manila)
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, College of Medicine to conduct BA/BE testing on
Refam, the results of which were submitted to the FDA.16 In turn, the FDA sent a letter dated July 31,
2006 to respondents, stating that Refam is "not bioequivalent with the reference drug."17 This
notwithstanding, the FDA still revalidated respondents’ CPR for Refam two (2) more times, effective
until November 15, 2008, the second of which came with a warning that no more further
revalidations shall be granted until respondents submit satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam.18

Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for
prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the
DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA
3720. As such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their promulgation
contravened the law and the Constitution.19 They further averred that that the non-renewal of the
CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect Refam, but their
other products as well.20

During the pendency of the case, RA 9711,21 otherwise known as the "Food and Drug Administration
[FDA] Act of 2009," was enacted into law.

The RTC Ruling

In an Order22 dated December 18, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared
Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 null and void, ordered the issuance of writs of permanent injunction
and prohibition against the FDA in implementing the aforesaid circulars, and directed the FDA to
issue CPRs in favor of respondents’ products.

The RTC held that there is nothing in RA 3720 which granted either the FDA the authority to issue
and implement the subject circulars, or the Secretary of Health the authority to delegate his powers
to the FDA. For these reasons, it concluded that the issuance of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s.

1997 constituted an illegal exercise of legislative and administrative powers and, hence, must be
struck down.23

Accordingly, the RTC issued a Writ of Permanent Injunction24 dated January 19, 2010, enjoining the
FDA and all persons acting for and under it from enforcing Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 and
directing them to approve the renewal and revalidation of respondents’ products without submitting
satisfactory BA/BE test results.

Aggrieved, the FDA sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition with an urgent
prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction against the implementation of the RTC’s Order dated December 18, 2009 and Writ of
Permanent Injunction dated January 19, 2010.25 The Court granted FDA’s application and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order26 dated February 24, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular
Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997. In resolving this issue, there is a need to determine whether or not the
aforesaid circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with
the requirements of the law for its issuance.

The FDA contends that it has the authority to issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 as it is the agency
mandated by law to administer and enforce laws, including rules and regulations issued by the DOH,
that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products.27

For their part, respondents maintain that under RA 3720, the power to make rules to implement the
law is lodged with the Secretary of Health, not with the FDA.28 They also argue that the assailed
circulars are void for lack of prior hearing, consultation, and publication.29

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a
law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the
confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but
merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law
itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of
non-delegability of legislative power.30
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a
contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.31 They usually implement existing
law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by
Congress32 and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and
obligations.33 Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing
statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is
merely to construe the statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the
statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in
particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
rules.34 Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.35

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior
notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an
interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature,
its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."36

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175, s.
198737 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products without obtaining
the proper CPR from the FDA.38 In this regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to
accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or reject such
applications.39 To this end, the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the
recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of
pharmaceutical products.40

In accordance with his rule-making power under RA 3720, the Secretary of Health issued AO 67, s.
1989 in order to provide a comprehensive set of guidelines covering the registration of
pharmaceutical products. AO 67, s. 1989, required, among others, that certain pharmaceutical
products undergo BA/BE testing prior to the issuance of CPR, contrary to respondents’ assertion
that it was Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 that required such tests.41

Despite the fact that the BA/BE testing requirement was already in place as early as the date of
effectivity of AO 67, s. 1989, its implementation was indefinitely shelved due to lack of facilities
capable of conducting the same. It was only sometime in 1997 when technological advances in the
country paved the way for the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities, thus allowing the rule’s
enforcement. Owing to these developments, the FDA (then, the BFAD) issued Circular No. 1, s.
1997, the full text of which reads:

In Annex 1 of A.O. 67 s. 1989 which is entitled Requirement for Registration provides that
"Bioavailability/Bioequivalence study for certain drugs as determined by BFAD" is required for [(i)]
Tried and Tested Drug, (ii) Established Drug, and (iii) Pharmaceutical Innovation of Tried and Tested
or Established Drug.

Drugs requiring strict precaution in prescribing and dispensing contained in the List-B (Prime) were
the drugs identified by BFAD in the process of registration that will be required
"Bioavailability/Bioequivalence" studies. However, due to the supervening factor that there had yet
been no bioavailability testing unit in the country when the A.O. 67 s. 1989 became effective, the
Bureau did not strictly enforce the said requirement.

The supervening factor no longer exist [sic] as of date. As a matter of fact, one of the registered
products tested by the Bioavailability Testing Unit at the University of Sto. Tomas under the NDP
Cooperation Project of the Philippines and Australia failed to meet the standard of bioavailability.
This finding brings forth the fact that there may be registered products which do not or may no longer
meet bioavailability standard.

Wherefore, all drugs manufacturers, traders, distributor-importers of products contained or identified

in the list b’ (prime) provided for by BFAD, a copy of which is made part of this circular, are advised
that all pending initial and renewal registration of the products aforementioned, as well as all
applications for initial and renewal registration of the same, shall henceforth be required to submit
bioavailability test with satisfactory results on the products sought to be registered or renewed
conducted by any bioavailability testing units here or abroad, duly recognized by the BFAD under the
Dept. of Health. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
1âwphi1

The FDA then issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 to supplement Circular No. 1, s. 1997 in that it
reiterates the importance of the BA/BE testing requirement originally provided for by AO 67, s.
1989.1âwphi1

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is actually the rule
that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuance of CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in
consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their manufacture
and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the Court deems that
AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to
the presumption of regularity accorded to the government in the exercise of its official duties.42

On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof;
(b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or
(c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720
depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing
requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.43 Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority
to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that
they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place –
no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.

In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding to all
concerned parties, including the respondents in this case.

As a final note, while the proliferation of generic drugs and medicines is indeed a welcome
development as it effectively ensures access to affordable quality drugs and medicines for all
through their lower prices, the State, through the FDA, which is the government instrumentality
tasked on this matter, must nevertheless be vigilant in ensuring that the generic drugs and
medicines released to the market are safe and effective for use.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated December 18, 2009 and the Writ of
Permanent Injunction dated January 19, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
256 in Civil Case No. 08-124 are hereby SET ASIDE. BFAD Circular Nos. 1 and 8, series of 1997
are declared VALID. Accordingly, the Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated February 24, 2010
is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT G.R. No. 157286

SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION
(PSDSA), its officers, to wit: DR.
ANILLA A. CALAMBA, President; Present:
DR. CARMELITA L. PALABAY,
Gen. Vice-President; MS. ESTELITA
R. REYES, Board Secretary; DR. PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
THELMA A. GALANG, Asst. Board PUNO,
Secretary; MR. FERNANDO LAVITA, QUISUMBING,
Treasurer; MS. LITA DIONISIO, Asst. YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
Treasurer; MS. ROSELILY PADRE, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Auditor; MR. ROMAN CALICDAN, CARPIO,
Asst. Auditor; MR. TOMO-AY, MR. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
OSCAR PEAFLORIDA, Bus. CORONA,
Managers; DR. ANTONETTE ANG, CARPIO MORALES,
DR. MAGNITA LABRADOR, P.R.O.S; CALLEJO, SR.,
MR. BONIFACIO MIGUEL (Region I), AZCUNA,
MR. JOSE CALAGUI (Region II), DR. TINGA,
REYNALDO SAGUM (Region III), MR. CHICO-NAZARIO,
RUBEN PANAHON (Region IV), MR. GARCIA, and
OSCAR BARBA (Region V), MS. IRMA VELASCO, JR., JJ.
GANELA (Region VI), DR. ERLINDA
NAPULI (Region VII), DR. PONCIANO
GABIETA (Region VIII), MR.
FEDERICO FIDEL (Region IX), MR.
EMILIANO V. RODRIGUEZ (Region X),
MS. EDWINA ALAG (Region XI), MR.
DOMINADOR ATAM (Region XII), MS.
CONSUELO VELASCO (NCR), MR.
VICTORINO AGMATA (CAR), MS.
NATIVIDAD SALASAB (ARMM-
CARAGA), All PSDSA Vice-Presidents
for their respective Regions: DR. LOLITA
CABANAYAN, MR. CICERO AKLANG,
DR. RUSTICO OCAMPO, MR. ROMEO
SANTOS, MR. EMMANUEL CAMA,
MR. ROMEO TUMAOB, MR. JOVENCIO
MENDOZA, MR. ALEJANDRO BARING,
JR., MS. BERNARDITA APOSTOL, MS.

LORETA MACALUDAS, DR. MYRNA

LYN MARACON, MS. ELIZABETH SAN
DIEGO, SITH HINDRON DAMMANG,
MS. IMMACULADA BRINGAS, and MS.
GLORIA DERECHO, all members of the
PSDSA Board of Directors, in their own
behalf as current District Supervisors and
IN REPRESENTATION OF ALL
DISTRICT SUPERVISORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS,

Department Secretary, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, and
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET Promulgated:
AND MANAGEMENT,
Respondents. June 16, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction filed by the Public Schools District Supervisor
Association (PSDSA) seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3;
Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section
6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. The
petition likewise seeks to compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to upgrade the salary grade level of the district supervisors
from Salary Grade (SG) 19 to SG 24.

The Antecedents

Ever since the Department of Education (DepEd)[1] was founded decades ago, its
management had been so centralized in the Manila office.Schools in the national,
regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the orders and
memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the learning
process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a radical
change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the
management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the
abolition of the office of the district supervisor.

Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on

Education, authored Senate Bill No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the
existing management style and focus on the schools where the teaching-learning
process occurs. The bill was intended to highlight shared governance in the different
levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and
responsibility for achieving higher learning outcomes. While the governance of
basic education would begin at the national level, the field offices (regions,
divisions, schools, and learning centers) would translate the policy into programs,
projects, and services to fit local needs.[2] The national level was likewise to be
tasked to define the roles and responsibilities of, and provide resources to the field
offices which would implement educational programs, projects, and services in
communities they serve.[3] At the forefront would be the DepEd Secretary, vested
with the overall authority and supervision over the operations of the department on
the national, regional, division, and schools district level.[4]

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Governance of Basic

Education Act 2001, became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section
27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have
a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and
support, planning, administrative and fiscal services.[5] The regional director was
given the authority to hire, place and evaluate all employees in the regional office
except for the position of assistant director,[6] as well as the authority, accountability,
and responsibility to determine the organization component of the divisions and
districts, and approve the staffing pattern of all employees therein;[7] evaluate all
division superintendents and assistant division superintendents in the region; [8] and
other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.[9]

A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent

with the following responsibilities, among others: to supervise the operations of all
public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning
centers;[10] to hire, place and evaluate all division supervisors and schools district
supervisors as well as all employees in the divisions, both teaching and non-teaching
personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division
superintendent;[11] and perform other functions as may be assigned by proper
authorities.[12]

The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the
law. Each district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for
program promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor
are limited to the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice and
support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers
in the district or cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such
other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. The schools district
supervisors have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions
over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts.[13]

On the school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as school
head for all public elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal (SSP) for
high schools or a cluster thereof.[14] The ESP and the SSP serve as both instructional
leaders and administrative managers with the following authority, accountability and
responsibility:

(7) Administering and managing all personnel, physical, and fiscal

resources of the school;

(8) Recommending the staffing complement of the school based on its

needs;

(9) Encouraging staff development;

xxxx
(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and
expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the
appropriate district supervisors and division superintendents; and

(12) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper

authorities.[15]

Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the
Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented
within two (2) years after such approval.

Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations,
petitioner sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the
following administrative issues:

1. Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits,

prerogatives, and position level of Public Schools District
Supervisors.

2. Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors

from Salary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM
Circular No. 36, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Rules and Regulation.[16]
In a Letter dated March 1, 2002 addressed to then DepEd Secretary Raul Roco, the
IBP stated that, per its review of the documents submitted by the PSDSA, it found
the latters position valid and legal, to wit:

First: The basis for the abolition of the position of District Supervisors
under the Attrition Law and DECS Department Order No. 110, Series of
1991 is no longer valid and rendered moot and academic due to issuance
of DECS Department Order No. 22, Series of 1996 and the passage by
Congress of the Philippines of Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known
as the Basic Education Governance Act of 2000. Under R.A. 9155, school
districts are mandated to be maintained and responsibilities of Public
Schools Districts Supervisors have been clearly defined.

Second: There is a clear case of discrimination of grant of salaries and

benefits to District Supervisors compared to salaries and benefits received
by the School Principals which position is lower in the hierarchy of
positions as prepared by the Department of Education and the Department
of Budget and Management. School Principals and District Supervisors
enjoy the same level of Salary Grade even if the latter position is
considered as a promotion and enjoys a higher level of position than that
of the position of School Principals.[17]

The PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation
with the district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs
be considered in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the
DepEd. However, the Secretary failed to reply. Thus, the IBP reiterated the concerns
raised by the PSDSA in a Letter[18] to the DepEd dated April 15, 2002.

On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office

Order No. 1, which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9155. Sections 4.1 to 4.3, Rule IV of the IRR provide:

SECTION 4.1. The Schools Division Superintendent. A division shall

consist of a province or city which shall have a schools division
superintendent. There shall be at least one assistant schools division
superintendent and office staff for programs promotion, planning,
administrative, fiscal, legal, ancillary, and other support services.
SECTION 4.2. Authority, Accountability, and Responsibility of the
Schools Division Superintendent. Consistent with the national
educational policies, plans, and standards, the schools division
superintendents shall have authority, accountability, and responsibility for
the following:

1) Developing and implementing division education

development plans;
2) Planning and managing the effective and efficient
performance of all personnel, physical, and fiscal
resources of the division, including professional staff
development;
3) Hiring, placing, and evaluating all division supervisors
and schools district supervisors as well as all employees
in the division, both teaching and non-teaching
personnel, including school heads, except for the
assistant division superintendents;
4) Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the
national government and the local government units to
the schools and learning centers;
5) Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic
education programs and for this purpose strengthening
the role of division supervisors as subject area
specialists;
6) Promoting awareness of, and adherence by, all schools
and learning centers to accreditation standards
prescribed by the Secretary of Education;
7) Supervising the operations of all public and private
elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and
learning centers; and
8) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by
the Secretary and/or Regional Director.

SECTION 4.3. Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the Schools

Division Superintendent. The schools district superintendent shall
appoint the division supervisors and school district supervisors as well as
all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel,
including school heads, except for the assistant schools division
superintendent, subject to the civil service laws, rules and regulations, and
 the policies and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Education for
the purpose.

The schools division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only

over the non-teaching personnel under his jurisdiction.

Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division

superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to the civil
service laws, rules and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be
issued by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter.

The Regional Director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority

over the teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific
and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670).[19]

Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Rule V of the IRR, in turn, provide:

SECTION 5.1. The Schools District Supervisor. A school district shall

have a school district supervisor and office staff for program promotion.

The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and
shall not exercise administrative supervision over school principals,
unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. The main focus of
his/her functions shall be instructional and curricula supervision aimed at
raising academic standards at the school level.

The schools district supervisor shall be specifically responsible for:

1) Providing professional and instructional advice and

support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of
schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
2) Curricula supervision; and
3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by
the Secretary, Regional Directors, and Schools Division
Superintendents where they belong.

The schools district supervisor being mentioned in this section shall refer
to a public schools district supervisor.
 SECTION 5.2. The School District. A school district already existing at
the time of the passage of this Act shall be maintained. However, an
additional school district may be established by the regional director based
on criteria set by the Secretary and on the recommendation of the schools
division superintendent. For this purpose, the Secretary of Education shall
set standards and formulate criteria as basis of the Regional Directors of
the establishment of an additional school district.[20]

On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public
school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed
the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:

I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN

REMOVING PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS
(SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND
CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO
THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE
DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS
VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 THE GOVERNANCE OF
BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF

REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED
ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND
INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY
OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT
LAW.

III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE

PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE
NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL
OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE
PRINCIPALS DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO
RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF
 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND ILLEGAL.[21]

Petitioners maintain that the questioned provisions of the IRR are invalid
because they extended or expanded and modified the provisions of R.A. No.
9155. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other existing
educational laws which it did not specifically repeal, such as Batas Pambansa Blg.
232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, as amended by R.A. No. 7798;
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers;
and R.A. No. 7784 captioned An Act to Strengthen Teacher Education in
the Philippines by Establishing Centers of Excellence, Creating a Teacher Education
Council for the Purpose, Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners assert that under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, the district offices of the
DepEd are intended as field offices where the district supervisors can assist the ESPs
and teachers/learning facilitators within their district as experienced educational
managers. Thus, the district supervisors were not divested of the inherent
administrative functions to manage and oversee the schools within their respective
districts, including their subordinates. They emphasize that the law provides an
office staff for program promotion in the school districts, which would be of no use
if the office has no administrative supervision over schools within its respective
districts.

Petitioners assert that under the IRR, the schools district supervisors primarily
perform staff functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision over school
principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. Thus, under the
IRR, the exercise of administrative supervision over school principals was made
discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices of the proper authorities. The
logical inference of this provision, petitioners aver, is that the administrative
supervisory powers can be withdrawn from a district supervisor without any reason
at all, a provision which has no basis in the enabling law.

Petitioners further contend that the DepEd has no authority to incorporate its plan of
downgrading the position of district supervisor, that is, from being an administrator
of a particular district office to a position performing a staff function, to exercise
administrative supervision over the school principals only when specifically
authorized by proper authorities. Petitioners insist that respondent Education
Secretary was focused on removing the level of management in the district office,
such that the IRR empower school heads (principals) to have administrative and
instructional supervision of school or cluster of schools, while supervision of all
public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning
centers was given to the division office.
Petitioners further insist that respondent Education Secretary failed to consider the
fact that R.A. No. 9155 strengthened the district office as a mid-level administrative
field office of the DepEd. The law even mandates to allow the district supervisor to
have an office staff for program promotion in the district office. Apart from the
current administrative functions inherent in the district office, DECS Service Manual
2000 vested additional specific functions to the district offices, to provide
professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district, as well as
curricula supervision.

Petitioners posit that R.A. No. 9155 did not, in anyway, allow or authorize the
reorganization of the entire DepEd; it never reduced the position, rank, classification,
and salary grade level of district supervisors, nor abolished the district offices which
are responsible for the administration and management of elementary schools within
its jurisdiction. It did not remove from the district supervisors the function of
administrative supervision over schools within their respective areas. In fact,
petitioners insist, what the law did was to give the district supervisor additional
responsibility of providing professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district
or cluster thereof.

Petitioners point out that under Section 4.3, paragraph (b), Rule IV of the IRR, the
schools division superintendent was given the power to appoint the division
supervisors and schools district supervisor and other employees subject to civil
service laws, rules, and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by
the Secretary of Education for the purpose. On the other hand, the school division
superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the non-teaching
personnel under his jurisdiction. Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the
schools division superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to
civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be issued
by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter. The regional director shall
continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel in so far as
the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. 4670).

Petitioners posit that this grant of disciplining authority to the regional director
for teaching personnel who commit violations of laws, rules, and regulations is
definitely not provided for in R.A. No. 9155. The division superintendent was given
the power not only to hire and appoint the division supervisors, district supervisors,
school heads, or principals as well as employees in the division, both teaching and
non-teaching positions. However, when it comes to disciplining officers and
teaching personnel who commit infractions or violations of law, rules, and
regulations of the DepEd, the exercise of such disciplining authority is lodged in the
hands of the regional director. Petitioners point out that the power to hire teachers is
in the hands of the division superintendent; principles of administrative rules and
procedure provide that the authority to hire and appoint carries with it the authority
to discipline and fire the hired and appointed personnel particularly if the law is silent
thereon. Since the division superintendent has the authority to hire teaching
personnel within its division, he/she should also take the responsibility of
disciplining erring teachers and employees. If the set-up of placing the power of
hiring and power to discipline or fire an errant personnel is separated or divided
between two offices of the DepEd, the proliferation of palakasan or bata-
bata system will flourish, to the detriment of the public education system and public
service.

Petitioners also point out that under Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. No. 9155, school heads
are authorized to accept gifts, donations, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and expanding
school facilities and providing instructional materials and equipment, which, in turn,
shall be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and division
superintendents. However, under Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR, on the
authority, accountability, and responsibility of school heads, district supervisors
were deleted as one of the administrative officers to whom such reporting is to be
made. Petitioners conclude that to the extent that the division superintendents are not
mandated to report donations and grants to district supervisors, the IRR is void.
 On their plea for mandamus, petitioners pray that the Court compel the DepEd
and the DBM to upgrade their present salary grade. They claim that the position of
an ESP is already classified as SG 21, which is higher by two grades than that of
district supervisors, SG 19. Considering their higher position in the departments
pecking order, vis--vis that of the ESPs, petitioners opine that to rectify the present
grade-level distortion, their salary grade should be upgraded to SG 24.[22]

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that a perusal of
Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited
responsibilities, and that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the
ESPs is not covered by any of those responsibilities. The Education Secretary is the
disciplining authority in the DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the
disciplining authority in their respective regions.

As to petitioners gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among
those school heads who should report when [a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests,
and grants for the purpose of upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies,
improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
equipment, the OSG avers that this reportorial function is directory and merely for
convenience.

Anent petitioners grievance on their alleged stagnant salary grade level,

the OSG points out that the same is already provided for under FY 2003 GAA,
[thus], petitioners complaint against the non-increase of their
SG level is already moot and academic. The OSG also emphasizes that the upgrading
of the ESPs salary grade over the petitioners is not violative of petitioners right to
equal protection of the law, since district supervisors and ESPs are not similarly
situated.

In reply, petitioners contend that the upgrading of the salary grade level of district
supervisors to SG 21 is an admission by the DepEd and by the DBM of the validity
of their demand to increase their salary grade to a respectable SG 24.

The petition is partially granted.

 It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for
in the legislative enactment.[23] The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the legislature.[24] It bears stressing, however, that administrative
bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details. All that is required is
that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the
regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by
law.[25] Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the
decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and
expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their
jurisdiction.[26] The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of
diverse administrative agencies for addressing and
satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth
of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing
a particular statute.[27]

We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1
and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the
related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has
the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors
and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and
non-teaching personnel, including school heads.[28] A school head is a person
responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or
cluster of schools.[29] The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the
operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and
learning centers.[30]

Administrative supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an

officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or
neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.[31]

A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have
no administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited
to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
 (1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads
and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster
thereof;

(2) Curricula supervision; and

(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.

As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district
supervisors were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and
public high schools. The Senate resolved to vest the same in the division
superintendents, and the Lower House concurred. Senator Rene Cayetano proposed
that the traditional function of the school supervisors of exercising administrative
supervision over the elementary and public high schools be maintained. However,
Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Education and the Sponsor of the Bill, objected to such proposal:

The President:
Why do we not say AND SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED?

Senator Cayetano:
Yes, better yet, Mr. President. I thank the Chair for that amendment.

The President:
All right. Can we approve that? The sponsor accepts the amendment, I assume.

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Yes, Mr. President.

The President:
Is there any objection from the floor? (Silence) There being none, the amendment
is approved.

Senator Cayetano:
Thank you, Mr. President.

In line 17, it ends with the conjunction and. I would like to propose an
amendment by inserting a new paragraph (b). This is, of course, the duties and
responsibilities of schools district supervisors. It is to SUPERVISE SCHOOL
PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT, because right now, this is exactly their job.

Again, the reality is, there are efforts to minimize, if not remove, the principal
function of school supervisors, which is to supervise school principals in the
 district. I just want it to be there to ensure that their primary functions remain
as such.

Therefore, what appears as paragraph (b) in line 18 will now be subparagraph

(c).

The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is for the
academic function and the other is for the administrative function.As such, if
these two supervisors will dictate to the principals, then our thrust in reducing
the level of bureaucracy might not be met. Also, the thrust of this governance
bill really is to flesh out the importance of the school as the heart of education
here. In that heart, we have the teacher, the student, and the school head.

What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In fact,
right now, there is a move in the DECS to do away with the school supervisor
in charge of administrative and leave that function to the principal. If the
principal, the school head will be dictated upon by these two school
supervisors, we might not be able to achieve what we want to do here putting
to the forefront the school itself. Meaning, putting to the forefront the school
head, the teacher, and the student.

Senator Cayetano:
Mr. President, I would like to thank the sponsor for that enlightenment. That is
precisely my point.

Not too long ago, I was a speaker before the school supervisors all over the
land. One of the points that they complained about was, in most cases, their
job to supervise school principals is now being removed or have been removed
simply because and I may be inaccurate here the Japanese government I know
it is a foreign government that funded a study of the organizational setup of the
DECS has recommended the abolition of school supervisors.

This is the reason this representation would like to ensure that the traditional
function of the school supervisors, among which is to supervise school
principals, remain as such. What is good for the Japanese education is not
necessarily good for the Philippines. This representation knows that this is
precisely one of the complaints of the school supervisors.

The lady sponsor admitted that, indeed, there is an effort to phase out the school
supervisors. That is precisely my point, Mr. President. I do not want the school
supervisors to be phased out simply because a foreign government which
funded the study of our education has suggested it.
The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, actually, it is not Japanese. It is an ADB proposal to the DECS. The
DECS had a study made on how to improve the management order of the
DECS. That was one of the proposals. They gave three proposals. One of them
was to take out the school supervisors.

But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them
out. What we are saying is for the school supervisor to focus on the curriculum
because in the administration of the affairs of the school, we are saying that the
principal knows best how to administer or how to run the school better. And
so, we are saying here that school supervisors will be there contrary to the view
of that ADB study. We will maintain them, but the focus of the school
supervisors will be on the curriculum of the schools.

Senator Cayetano:
Mr. President, again I thank the lady senator. But again let us look at who
supervisors of schools are. Supervisors of schools once upon a time were all
school principals. They rose from the ranks, that is why they are fully aware of
the administrative as well as the instructional capability of the principals now
who are under them. To remove their right to supervise, now it is the ADB, I
am correct, the lady senator is correct because as I said I was not sure to remove
this traditional function would really render the supervisors practically without
anything to do. That is why they are now being justified that henceforth there
will be no principals that will be promoted as school supervisors because when
the school supervisors reach the age of retirement and retire, no principals shall
be promoted to that level. But these school supervisors now, Mr. President,
were once upon a time in their professional lives principals, and they know
best how the schools should be run administratively and instructionally. That
is the reason for that, Mr. President.

The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Cayetano:
So, may I ask the sponsor to accept this, Mr. President.

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, what was the amendment?

Senator Cayetano:
To insert a new paragraph, paragraph (b) in line 18, which states: SUPERVISE
SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT.
The President:
May I suggest, THE SUPERVISION OF SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE
DISTRICT, because

Senator Cayetano:
Yes, Mr. President.

The President:
the antecedent for that is, The schools district supervisor shall be responsible
for.

Senator Cayetano:
That is right, Mr. President. Supervision, yes.

The President:
What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
Mr. President, may I have one minute?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Senator Tatad:
Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute.

The President:
Is there any objection? (Silence) There being none, the session is suspended for one
minute.

It was 5:33 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 5:43 p.m., the session was resumed.

The President:
The session is resumed.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 2191

Senator Tatad:
Mr. President, we are still trying to find a way out of these conflicting points of
view on the role of the supervisor. To allow the parties to have a little more
 time to work on this, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No.
2191. (Underscoring supplied)[32]
When the session resumed, Senator Cayetano no longer pursued his proposed
amendment, and moved instead that the same be amended to read Curricula
Supervision. The Senate approved the proposal of the Senator:

The President:
The session is resumed. Senator Cayetano is recognized.

CAYETANO AMENDMENT

Senator Cayetano:
Thank you, Mr. President.

With the permission of the lady senator, after consulting her and the Majority
Leader, I would like to propose an amendment by rewording the original
amendment I was proposing last night. The reworded proposed amendment
would be like this: CURRICULA SUPERVISION.

The President:
That would be on what page?

Senator Cayetano:
That would be on page 10, line 17, as a new paragraph (b).

The President:
And how will it read?

Senator Cayetano:
CURRICULA SUPERVISION.

The President:
Just that?

Senator Cayetano:
Just that, Mr. President.

Senator Tatad:
Put a semicolon (;).

Senator Cayetano:
And because of that, line 18 which is paragraph (b), should now be paragraph (c).

The President:
 What does the sponsor say?

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. (Underscoring supplied)[33]

Thus, under R.A. No. 9155, administrative supervision over school heads is
not one of those responsibilities conferred on district supervisors.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one

person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[34]

It is not surprising that Senator Aquino-Oreta maintained her position that district
supervisors should not have administrative control or even supervision over ESPs
and SSPs. As early as 1990, the DECS had adopted the policy that, effective January
1, 1991, the positions of district supervisors and division supervisors would be
gradually phased out by not filling-up these positions as they become
vacant.[35] On September 17, 1991, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario issued DECS
Order No. 110, Series of 1991, declaring that, to foster better considerations and
articulation of progress in the elementary level, all elementary school principals shall
report directly to the school division superintendents. In his Order dated June 22,
1994, then DECS Secretary Armand V. Fabella declared that DECS Order No. 110
shall remain in effect, with the recommendation that, in order to facilitate the phase-
out of district supervisor positions, incumbent district supervisors were encouraged
to transfer to vacant division supervisor positions, provided they meet the
qualification standards for such positions.[36] For his part, in his DECS Order No. 22,
Series of 1996, DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria restored the district supervisor
positions but only on a selective basis and subject to the following guidelines:

a) Schools superintendents, with the concurrence/approval

of their regional directors, may have the option to restore
the position in selected districts after a careful evaluation
of need. For this purpose, the number of schools and
 their geographical location and distance for effective
monitoring, the availability of regular transportation,
urban-rural setting, etc., should be considered in the
decision.

b) The role of the district supervisor as an instructional

leader and resource for teachers, rather than merely as an
administrative supervisor, should be emphasized in their
functions and duties.

c) In the event of restoration and appointment of the position

in a particular district, the school superintendent shall
ensure that the system of field supervision previous to
the issuance of DECS Orders No. 110, s. 1991 and No.
41, s. 1994 shall, likewise, be restored. Correspondingly,
the designation of coordinating principals in affected
districts shall be withdrawn.

d) Should a division office opt not to restore some or all

district supervisor positions, the funds for such positions
may be used to create new positions or upgrade existing
positions, subject to the approval of the Department of
Budget and Management.

e) Considering that a number of vacated district supervisor

positions in some divisions may have been converted to
other positions and/or otherwise phased out since 1991,
appointments of district supervisors shall be issued by
regional directors only upon verification from the
Department of Budget and Management that the said
position may be filled.

It is enjoined that regional directors and schools superintendents

shall exert special effort to ensure that the implementation of this Order
shall be harmonious and conducive to field supervision.[37]

Under DECS Order No. 36, Series of 1998 issued by DECS Secretary Erlinda C.
Pefianco, the positions of district supervisors were restored to their original status as
a supervisory level in the DECS administrative hierarchy subject to the following
guidelines:
 1.1 The positions of Education and District Supervisors are
hereby restored to their original status as a supervisory
level in the DECS administrative hierarchy, subject to
the following guidelines:

1.1.1 The functions of a district supervisor as an

instructional leader and resource person for
teachers should be emphasized.

In the event of restoration and appointment of public schools district

supervisor, the designation of the coordinating principal shall be
withdrawn.

Appointment of district supervisors shall be issued by regional directors

only upon verification from the Department of Budget and Management
that the positions still exist since a number of vacated district supervisor
positions in some divisions may have been converted to other positions
and/or otherwise phased out since 1991.[38]

However, as already stated, the Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district
supervisors but limited their responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section
7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 to conform to the basic thrust and objectives of the law. Far
from strengthening the office of the district supervisors as a mid-head field office of
the DepEd, the law limited the authority and responsibility attached to such position.

While it is true that the district supervisor is given a support staff for program
promotion, it cannot thereby be implied that he/she likewise has administrative
supervision over ESPs and SSPs. Such a construction has no basis in law and in
fact. Indeed, such a construction of the statute defeats the very purpose of the law.

It is a basic precept that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in
the interpretation of the statute. The particular words, clauses, and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expression, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order
to produce a harmonious whole.[39]
 Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district
supervisor. Congress would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it
had the intention not to restrict or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to
those expressly enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include situations not provided nor intended by
Congress.[40]

The submission of the OSG, that the schools district supervisors have the
administrative supervision over school heads, is more in accord with the law, to wit:

Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently

provides that a school district shall have a school district supervisor and
an office staff for program promotion, and that the schools district
supervisor shall be responsible for: (1) (p)roviding professional and
instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district [or]
cluster thereof; (2) (c)urricula supervision;and, (3) (p)erforming such
other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.

A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has

limited responsibilities, and that the power to exercise administrative
supervision over the ESPs is not covered by responsibility nos. 1 and 2.
Neither is that power covered by the directive that the District Supervisor
shall have an office staff for program promotion. The only logical
conclusion, therefore, that can be derived from the aforesaid enumeration
of responsibilities is that the District Supervisor may only exercise
administrative supervision over ESPs when such function is assigned by
proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically declared
through the IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized,
petitioners cannot complain against the said declaration. On this score, it
is settled that the intent of the statute is the law (Philippine National Bank
v. Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5 [1996]). In the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute
should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning
(Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 [1996]).

Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that

the School Division Superintendent shall have authority, accountability
and responsibility for, among others, (s)upervising the operation of all
 public and private elementary, secondary and integrated schools, and
learning centers. To claim, therefore, that the District Supervisor has
administrative supervision over the ESPs would also violate the above-
quoted provision.[41]

The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR, stating
that the regional director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the
teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive
disciplinary provisions under R.A. No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers) does not contravene R.A. No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely reiterates the
DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS Order No. 33, issued on March 30, 1999 by the
DepEd Secretary, and R.A. No. 4670 which was approved on June 18, 1966, and
pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, which
provides that the DepEd Secretary is empowered to

a. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department

objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs, and projects; and

b. Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient

administration of the offices under the Secretary and for execution of
the laws relative thereto.

Additionally, the IRR was issued by the DepEd Secretary pursuant to Section
7(A)(1) of R.A. No. 9155, which mandates that the Secretary formulate national
educational policies and enhance the employment status, professional competence,
welfare, and working conditions of all the DepEd personnel.[42]

We agree that R.A. No. 9155 does not provide who has disciplinary authority over
the teaching personnel of the DepEd. However, under Section 3, Chapter III of
DECS Order No. 33, Series of 1999, otherwise known as the 1999 DECS Rules of
Procedure, the disciplining authority in the DECS is the DepEd Secretary, with the
regional directors acting as such in their respective regions except those appointed
by the President.[43]

The officers and employees referred to in the Rules of Procedure include teachers
who, under R.A. No. 4670, shall mean:
 x x x all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction,
on full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians,
industrial arts, or vocational instructors, and all other persons performing
supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but
shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and
other school employees.

A division superintendent of schools is not a disciplining authority over teachers,

whether under R.A. No. 4670 or under the DECS Rules of Procedure. In fact, under
Section 2, Chapter VII of such Rules of Procedure, a division superintendent is a
chairperson of the investigating committee over formal complaints filed against such
teachers:

a) When the respondent is an elementary or secondary school teacher,

head teacher, principal, district supervisor/chair/coordinator or
Education Supervisor I

(1) The schools division superintendent or his or her duly

authorized representative, as chairperson;
(2) The duly authorized representative of the school, district, or
division teachers organization, as member; and
(3) The division supervisor for elementary or secondary education
where the respondent belongs, as member.

The foregoing rule is based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 which reads:

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher

shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative
who should, at least, have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.
Anent the issue on reporting of acceptance of donations, Section 7(E)(11) of R.A.
No. 9155 provides:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
upgrading teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and
expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the
appropriate district supervisors and division
superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

However, Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR provides that:

(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with

existing laws and policy of the Department for the purpose of upgrading
teachers/learning facilitators competencies, improving and expanding
school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the division
superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

We agree with petitioners contention that, under the law, donations and grants must
be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and not
only to the division superintendents. The use in the law of the word must is an
expression of the mandatory nature of the reporting of donations and grants to
district supervisors. The reason for the provision is that such grants and donations
which are intended to upgrade teachings/learning facilitators competencies, improve
and expand school facilities, and provide instructional materials and equipment will
assist the school district supervisors in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit appropriate
recommendations to the proper administrative officers.

On petitioners plaint of the failure of respondents to upgrade their salary grade level
to at most SG 21, and for the issuance of the writ of mandamus mandating
respondents to increase their salary grade from SG 19 to 24, the same is premature.

There is no showing in the petition that, before filing their petition, petitioners
sought an adjustment of level of their salary grade from SG 19 to SG 21 before
respondents or the Civil Service Commission. Section 17 of Presidential Decree No.
985, as amended by Section 14 of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law, provides:

Sec. 17. Powers and Functions. The Budget Commission (now

Department of Budget and Management), principally through the OCPC
(now CPCB, Compensation and Position Classification Board) shall, in
addition to those provided under other Sections of this Decree, have the
following powers and functions:

a. Administer the compensation and position classification system

established herein and revise it as necessary;
xxxx
f. Certify classification actions and changes in class or grade of
positions whenever the facts warrant, such certification to be binding on
administrative, certifying, payroll, disbursing, accounting and auditing
officers of the national government and government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions.

Sections 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9155 provide:

SEC. 10. The Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Budget and
Management shall, within ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act,
jointly promulgate the guidelines on the allocation, distribution, and
utilization of resources provided by the national government for the field
offices, taking into consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions
of the teaching service.

The Secretary of the Department of Education shall ensure that resources

appropriated for the field offices are adequate and that resources for school
personnel, school desks, and textbooks and other instructional materials
intended are allocated directly and released immediately by the
Department of Budget and Management to said offices.

SEC. 11. The Secretary of the Department of Education, subject to civil

service laws and regulations, shall issue appropriate personnel policy
rules and regulations that will best meet the requirements of the
 teaching profession taking into consideration the uniqueness of the
working conditions of the teaching service.

And insofar as the salary system for teaching positions is concerned, Section
14 provides:

SEC. 14. The Salary System for Teaching Position. The salary
grade of a teacher shall be determined in accordance with the following:

a. The Teachers Preparation Pay Schedule shall be prepared by the

Commission in consultation with the Department of Education and
Culture. Under this system, the teacher's academic or educational
preparation, teaching experience in both private and public schools, and
extra-curricular activities for professional growth, shall be considered in
pursuance of the principle of 'equal pay for equal training and experience.'
xxxx
d. The Budget Commission, in coordination and consultation with
the Department of Education and Culture and the Civil Service
Commission may, when future needs require, modify, change or otherwise
improve on the salary system herein established for the teaching and
closely related occupations, any change that may be made as provided
herein shall become part of the implementing rules of this Decree to be
issued by the Budget Commission upon prior approval by the President.

Moreover, the issue of whether or not respondents should be compelled to

adjust upwards the salary grade of petitioners to SG 21 has become moot and
academic, because, on November 3, 2003, the DepEd and the DBM issued Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 containing the guidelines in the implementation of the
Salary Upgrading for District and Education Supervisors, to wit:

4.0 GUIDELINES

4.1 To maintain the previous salary grade relationships under RA

No. 6758 among the PSDS and ES I, on the one hand, and
Elementary School Principal (ESP) IV and Secondary School
Principal (SSP) II, on the other hand, and to preserve the
consistency in the salary grade relationships of said positions,
the following are hereby authorized:
 4.1.1 Upgrading of the PSDS and ES I positions from SG-19
to SG-20 in July 2003 and to SG-21 in July 2004;
4.1.2 Upgrading of the ES II positions by two (2) salary
grades from SG-20 to SG-21 in July 2003 and to SG-
22 in July 2004;
4.1.3 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of ES III
positions starting July 2003 and another one-step salary
adjustment starting July 2004;
4.1.4 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of CES
positions starting July 2003 and another one-step salary
adjustment starting July 2004.

4.2 Attached herewith is Annex A containing the summary of the

guidelines for the salary upgrading of positions authorized
herein.

5.0 SALARY RULES

5.1 For purposes of the salary upgrading herein authorized, the

basic salary of the employee concerned shall be adjusted as
follows:

5.1.1 Effective July 1, 2003 at the same salary step of his

assigned salary grade as of June 30, 2003 (Illustrative
Example A) adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed
under National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474
(Annex B);
5.1.2 Effective July 1, 2004 at the same salary step of his
assigned salary grade as of June 30, 2004 (Illustrative
Example A) adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed
under National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 474
(Annex B).

5.2 The transition allowance as defined in 3.2 being received by

the PSDS and ES, if any, shall be considered as advance
entitlement of the salary increase herein
authorized. (Illustrative Examples B and C)

5.3 No step adjustment shall be granted to incumbents of positions

whose salary already falls at or exceeds the maximum step
 (eighth step) of the salary grade allocation of their
positions. (Illustrative Example D)

5.4 The herein salary increases shall be effected through the

issuance of a Notice of Salary Adjustment (NOSA) by the
duly authorized official. (Annex C)

6.0 FUNDING SOURCE

The amounts necessary to implement the salary adjustments

authorized herein shall be charged against the Nationwide lump
sum appropriation for the purpose amounting to fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000) in the DepEds budget in RA 9206, the CY
2003 General Appropriations Act. For CY 2004, the same shall be
charged against the lump sum appropriation for the purpose that
may be included in the 2004 budget.

7.0 POST-AUDIT

Any salary adjustment paid under this Circular shall be subject to

post-audit by the DBM ROs concerned. Any payments thereof
which are not in accordance herewith shall be adjusted
accordingly.

8.0 CONTRIBUTIONS

The salary adjustments authorized herein are subject to the

mandatory requirements for life and retirement premiums, and
health insurance premiums.

9.0 SAVING CLAUSE

Conflicts arising from the implementation of the provisions of this

Circular shall be resolved by the Department of Education, upon
prior consultation with the Department of Budget and
Management.

10.0 EFFECTIVITY

This Circular Letter shall take effect on July 1, 2003.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid,
except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides that donations or grants shall
be reported only to the division superintendents. Such donations or grants must also
be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by Republic
Act No. 9155. Petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 109023. August 12, 1998]

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS M.

POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL
WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in
his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate Auditor respondents.

DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:

The pivotal issue raised in this petition is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
the payment of honoraria which they were receiving prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act
6758.
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior
to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA
Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled An Act Prescribing
A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain
additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation.
Section 12, Rep. Act 6758, reads -

Sec. 12. - Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.- Allowances, except for

representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign services personnel stationed
abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may
be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates
herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized
salary rates shall continue to be authorized.[1] (Underscoring supplied)

To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing
without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits
granted on top of basic salary.
Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides :

Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation

granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, xxx shall be discontinued
effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after
said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. [2]

Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as

corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein
petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and
enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. More specifically, petitioners contend that DBM-CCC
No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to
implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not
published in the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed.
In its decision dated January 29, 1993, the COA upheld the validity and effectivity of
DBM-CCC No. 10 and sanctioned the disallowance of petitioners honoraria.[3]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition, posing
the questions:

(1) Whether or not par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the
express provisions of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement;
and
 (2) Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication
in the Official Gazette. Petitioners are of the view that par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10
prohibiting fringe benefits and allowances effective November 1, 1989, is violative of Sec.
12 of Rep. Act 6758 which authorizes payment of additional compensation not integrated
into the standardized salary which incumbents were enjoying prior to July 1, 1989.
To buttress petitioners stance, the Solicitor General presented a Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment, opining that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being
inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The Solicitor
General theorized, that:

xxx following the settled principle that implementing rules must necessarily
adhere to and not depart from the provisions of the statute it seeks to
implement, it is crystal clear that Section 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a
patent nullity. An implementing rule can only be declared valid if it is in
harmony with the provisions of the legislative act and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. When an implementing rule is
inconsistent or repugnant to the provisions of the statute it seeks to interpret,
the mandate of the statute must prevail and must be followed.[4]

Respondent COA, on the other hand, pointed out that to allow honoraria without
statutory, presidential or DBM authority, as in this case, would run counter to Sec. 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitution which proscribes payment of additional or double
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. Therefore, the grant of honoraria or
like allowances requires a specific legal or statutory authority. And DBM-CCC No. 10
need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a law already
published[5]; COA concluded.
In his Motion for Leave to intervene, the DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria
in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not
listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.
Before resolving the other issue - whether or not Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10
can supplant or negate the pertinent provisions of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to
implement, we have to tackle first the other question whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10
has legal force and effectnotwithstanding the absence of publication thereof in the Official
Gazette. This should take precedence because should we rule that publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines[6] is sine qua
non to the effectiveness or enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10,resolution of the first issue
posited by petitioner would not be necessary.
The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found
in Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
 In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453, 454, this Court succinctly construed the
aforecited provision of law in point, thus:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, deirectly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,

regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that

it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret
but to fill in the details of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce. (Italics ours)

The same ruling was reiterated in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 299 [1992].
On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the
affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-
CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce
or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-
CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
 In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere
interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it
tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation
sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular
under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government
officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of
subject circular in the Official Gazette or in anewspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is
more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.
In light of the foregoing disquisition on the ineffectiveness of DBM-CCC No. 10 due
to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country, as required by law, resolution of the other issue at bar is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decision of
respondent Commission on Audit is SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to pass
on audit the honoraria of petitioners. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO
REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.

Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

AQUINO, J.: têñ .£îhqwâ£

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to
electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca,
equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or
somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed
copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru
electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The
case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is
not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court
further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.

As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in
fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.

It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding
the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+ .£ªw ph!1

SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.£ªw ph!1

OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following
rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are
promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned. ñé+.£ªw ph!1

SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as

follows:

(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and Spain,
dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the
seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes
and other bodies of fresh waters are included.

(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric
current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or
generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.
 (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.

(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.

SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro

fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine
waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be
covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
which shall be carried at all times.

SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order

shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.

SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof

inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.

SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days
after its publication in the Office Gazette.

On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of
the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63
O.G. 9963).

Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers,
lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that
any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject
the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."

That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a
fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems
that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less
than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed
in section 83.

Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of
electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f],
Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,

We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of
electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April
30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital,
the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court
of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs.
Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).

It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its
order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be
treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97
Phil. 67).

In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued
under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an
obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the
Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of
fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries
Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law
and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with
the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec.
4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and
conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries
Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."

As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the
penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in
section 83.

We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act
No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other
violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other
violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the
penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not
the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11
32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that
electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances
strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries
Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No.
704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and
which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh
water and salt water areas.

That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1

SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.
— It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined
in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ...

The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential
Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).

The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition
of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere
executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.

Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the
decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4)
years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or
imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84.

An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro
fishing by means of an administrative order.

Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June
28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).

The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular
statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506;
Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary
because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in

harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs.
Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs.
Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA
660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319,
Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June
27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into
effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on
7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.

Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."

Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have
the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums,
and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and
efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for
the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of
said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof,
except as expressly authorized by law."

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law
(Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc.
vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by
delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound
demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly
exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."

As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to
act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power
before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred
by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974,
58 SCRA 493, 496-8).

"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may
be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to
the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194,
197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law,
the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of
the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).

This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention
of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance
and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid
any possible misunderstanding or confusion.

The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in
conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and
renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).

In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime
punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101
Phil. 1125, 1132).

It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a
power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency"
(1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).

In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly
punish electro fishing.

The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28
of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under
the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and
reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the
United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by
the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the
proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.

Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for
having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary
within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.

This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing
within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is
exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval
authorities concerned.

As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power
which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking
body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the
Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said
provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the
power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or
policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206
Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do
not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).

In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order
will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).

The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt,
promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or
prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.

Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay
or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of
any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof."

Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the
person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For
that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was
the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have
readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence,
the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is
a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The herein respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who
heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled
"Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably
recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy
on increases in school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —

(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than
15 per cent to 20 per cent without the need for the prior approval of the DECS.
Schools that wish to increase school fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the
discretion of the DECS;

(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling,
provided that the total schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in
the elementary and secondary levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral
basis for the collegiate level. 1
The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20%
increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the
ground that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous
Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the
increases. On April 23, 1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the
implementation of Department Order No. 37. 4 No response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the President.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court
and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department
Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned
Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as
the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to
regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the
power to increase school fees. 5

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested
parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In
sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and
procedural due process of law.

Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent Secretary submitted a Comment on
the Petition. 7The respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that the increase in tuition and other
school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in
character. In due time, the petitioner submitted a Reply to the Comment. 8 Thereafter, We
considered the case submitted for resolution.

After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of
merit.

We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always
include the power to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise
known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational
system in the country, to wit:

SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision
and regulation of the educational system in accordance with declared policy.

xxx xxx xxx 9

Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary
to discharge its functions and duties under the law, to wit:

SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education and Culture, charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees.
No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the
power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its
functions and duties under the law.

We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes the due process
clause of the Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department Order. The
petitioner maintains that the due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are
indispensable for the Department Order to be validly issued.

We disagree.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an

adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative
agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may
partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. 9a

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We
believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be
charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice
and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and
convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not
without any justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable
to assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to
allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the
petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of 15% to
20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot
consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.

Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 10 In the
absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official
proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.

We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the public, especially the parents and the
students of the country. Its zeal in advocating the protection of the consumers in its activities should
be lauded rather than discouraged. But a more convincing case should be made out by it if it is to
seek relief from the courts some time in the future. Petitioner must establish that respondent acted
without or in excess of her jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law before the extraordinary
writ of prohibition may issue. 11

This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its judicial imprimatur to future increases in school fees. The increases
must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to an outrageous exercise of government authority and power. In such an
eventuality, this Court will not hesitate to exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.