Ichong v Hernandez- GR No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 LABRADOR, J.

Republic Act No. 1180 "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" nationalizes the retail trade business.
It prohibited persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and associations, partnerships, or corporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents corporations and partnerships attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila
contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival

Was the exercise of police power attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the laws.

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements
of due process and equal protection of the laws.

Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined
in its scope.

Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State but they limit
through due process clause and the equal protection clause. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare. Public
interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade.

the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;

Association of small lot owners v secretary of DAR- 175 SCRA 343 July 14, 1989 CRUZ, J.:

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. P.D. No. 27 provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers. President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27. E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for CARP. R.A. No. 6657 CAR Law of 1998 gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the
same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are
actually cultivating such lands.

cases have been consolidated because they involve challenges to the constitutionality of the several
measures mentioned.

P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657 consti?

R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. The cases
before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.

Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.

to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money. This is
not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be
taken by the State. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners.

Payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further
that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the
landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because
the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes,
which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

SC declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided is not violative of the
Constitution.

Tio v Videogram- G.R. No. 75697

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
G.R. No. L-75697. June 18, 1987.

Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive,
confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy.

Is tax imposition on videograms valid? yes

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has
been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement
of the state's police power.

Lutz v Araneta- 98 Phil 148

REYES, J.B L., J.:

December 22, 1955

Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act.

Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on
a graduated basis “to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of
its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of export taxes.”

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes
alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutionally levied.

Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional. yes

The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry.

The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is
that very enterprise that is being protected.

Gaston v Republic Planters Bank- 158 SCRA 621 March 15, 1988

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM, for short) was formerly the government office tasked
with the function of regulating and supervising the sugar industry .

Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed a MANDAMUS to implement the
privatization of Republic Planters Bank, and for the transfer of the shares in the government bank to
sugar producers and planters.

the said bank isnow held by and still carried in the name of the philippine sugar commission,

the sugar producers, planters and millers, who are the true beneficial owners of shares and
investments. THE SAID INVESTMENT HAVING BEEN FUNDED BY THE DEDUCTION OF Pl.00 per picul
from sugar proceeds

Were investment of the proceeds from the stabilization fund being made on behalf of sugar planters
no

While it is true that the collected fees were used to buy shares in RPB, it did not collect said fees for
the account of sugar producers. The stabilization fees were charged on sugar produced and milled
which ACCRUED TO PHILSUCOM, under PD 338.

The fees collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX.. The collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is
levied not purely for taxation, but for regulation, to provide means TO STABILIZE THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY. The levy is primarily an exercise of police powers.

Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used purely for private purposes or for the exclusive benefit
of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the ENTIRE SUGAR
INDUSTRY