AFF SEP/OCT SOUTH KOREA

Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.

 Intercepts NoKo nuke
THAAD is the best chance of intercepting North Korean attacks (100% success rate)
Bruce Klingner, 9-1-2015, "THE IMPORTANCE OF THAAD MISSILE DEFENSE.: EBSCOhost," No
Publication,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40f0c29c-3dcb-49ce-
aa2b-a4fc5cf254c8%40sessionmgr4002&vid=1&hid=4112(Bruce Klingner specializes in
Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage
Foundation's Asian Studies Center.)
A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”- having sufficient interceptors from
different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another
system. South Korea’s insistence on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors will result in smaller
protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer Korean citizens protected, and minimal time to
intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully
destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target.
The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. Seoul’s
insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players
except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is
designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles
trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system,
THAAD would create a multilayered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population
centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range
than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is
unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example,
the THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has
already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts),
and deployed.

The deployment of THAAD in South Korea is necessary to deter North Korean missiles
Bruce Klingner, 9-1-2015, "THE IMPORTANCE OF THAAD MISSILE DEFENSE.: EBSCOhost," No
Publication,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=40f0c29c-3dcb-49ce-
aa2b-a4fc5cf254c8%40sessionmgr4002&vid=1&hid=4112

(Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for
Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.)
Pyongyang has made emphatically clear that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and has declared
the Six-Party Talks “null and void.” The U.S. and its allies therefore need to deploy sufficient defenses
to deter and defend against the growing North Korean missile and nuclear threats. Washington, Seoul,
and Tokyo need a comprehensive, interoperable, and multilayered ballistic missile defense (BMD)
system. Multiple systems providing complementary capabilities improve the likelihood of successful
defense against missile attack. Yet South Korea persists in resisting both deployment of more effective
interceptors and incorporating its independent system into a comprehensive allied network. Even the
potential U.S. deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to strengthen alliance BMD
on the Korean Peninsula has been controversial due to Chinese pressure on Seoul. The Park Geun-hye
administration is pursuing a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in order to postpone public discussion on
THAAD deployment. South Korea should instead articulate to its citizens— and the Chinese and Russian
leaderships— the need for a more effective missile defense system to protect the country better. Seoul
should rebuff Chinese interference and exercise its sovereign right to defend itself against the North
Korean threat brought on, in part, by Beijing’s unwillingness to confront its belligerent ally.

THAAD key to neutralizing global tensions

Amanda Macias 16 Amanda is Business Insider's military and defense editor. Before moving to New York,
she worked as a field producer for Reuters in Brussels covering NATO and EU political institutions. Amanda
grew up in the US Army and graduated from the University of Missouri-School of Journalism. July 9, 2016.
North Korea will now have America's most advanced missile system in its backyard
(http://www.businessinsider.com/thaad-missile-defense-south-korea-north-2016) July 13, 2016

The most advanced missile system on the planet can hunt and blast incoming missiles right out of the
sky with a 100% success rate — and it appears to be headed to North Korea's backyard. On the heels of
bilateral sanctions by Seoul and Washington, plus layers of UN sanctions, the Pentagon agreed to equip
South Korea with the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system. "North
Korea's continued development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction require the
alliance to take this prudent, protective measure to bolster our layered and effective missile defense,"
US Army Gen. Vincent Brooks, commander of US forces in South Korea, said in a statement. The
pressure to deploy THAAD began after North Korea tested its fourth nuclear bomb on January 6 and
then launched a long-range rocket on February 7. "Oh, it's going to happen. It's a necessary thing," US
Defense Secretary Ash Carter said during a discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in
April. "We need to defend our own people. We need to defend our own allies. And we're going to do
that." "We are aware of the open source announcement regarding THAAD to Korea," US Army Col.
Shana Peck, who, as commander of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, oversees all five THAAD
batteries as well as four Patriot missile defense battalions, told Business Insider. "If directed by our
higher headquarters, we are postured to execute and meet deployment and mission requirements,"
Peck added. With its unmatched precision, Lockheed Martin's $800 million THAAD system can equalize
tensions around the world with its mobility and strategic battery-unit placement. "It is the most
technically advanced missile-defense system in the world," US Army Col. Alan Wiernicki, who previously
led the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, told Business Insider. "Combatant commanders and our allies
know this, which puts our THAAD Batteries in very high global demand," Wiernicki added. And that
demand seems poised to rise. The THAAD interceptor does not carry a warhead. Instead, the interceptor
missile uses pure kinetic energy to deliver "hit to kill" strikes to incoming ballistic threats inside or
outside the atmosphere. Each launcher carries up to eight missiles and can send multiple kill vehicles at
once, depending on the severity of the threat. Lockheed Martin's missile launcher is just one element of
the four-part antimissile system. Martin THAAD's first line of defense is its radar system. "We have one
of the most powerful radars in the world," US Army Capt. Kyle Terza, of Space and Missile Defense
Command and a former THAAD battery commander, told Business Insider. Raytheon's AN/TPY-2 radar is
used to detect, track, and discriminate ballistic missiles in the terminal (or descent) phase of flight. The
mobile radar is about the size of a bus and is so powerful that it can scan areas the size of entire
countries, according to Raytheon. Once an enemy threat has been identified, THAAD's Fire Control and
Communications (TFCC) support team kicks in. If there is a decision to engage the incoming missile, the
launcher fires an interceptor to hunt for its target.
 Discourages SoKo pre-emptive
THAAD calms South Korea and discourages pre-emptive strikes- any increase in
coverage- no matter how small- could save millions and prevent paranoia
Kelly 15 Dr. Robert E. Kelly is an associate professor of international relations in the Department of
Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea. (Kelly, Robert E. “South
Korea’s THAAD Decision.” The Diplomat. April 13, 2015.) DD
For perspective, it is worth nothing that South Korea does already have some local missile defense coverage from Patriot missiles (PAC-2 and -
3), but these only provide narrow and low altitude defense. Similarly, Korea has tried on and off for years to develop its own Korean Air and
Missile Defense (KAMD), but it has never really panned out. It would cost a great deal and likely simply replicate most of what the Americans
are offering right now for almost nothing. Meanwhile the case for high altitude defense grows more obvious with each
day that North Korea’s programs continue. Whereas the PAC-3s would provide some defense just as the inbound missile
approached its target, THAAD would reach higher up, giving South Korean defenders more chances to shoot
down the missile. Technologically this is extraordinarily difficult. Missile defense is often likened to “hitting a bullet with another bullet,”
and neither THAAD, PAC-3, nor Israel’s Iron Dome provide anything close to absolute coverage. But given the obvious destructive
power of nuclear weapons, even 50/50 coverage would be a massive improvement in South Korean
security and reduce the paranoia that might encourage preemptive airstrikes. (For technical details on THAAD, try
here and here.)

THAAD will help resolve instability in Asia

Bennett, Bruce W., 4-5-2016, "THAAD's Effect on South Korea's Neighbors," No Publication,
http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-effect-on-south-koreas-neighbors.html

(Bruce Bennett is the Senior Defense Analyst and Professor at Pardee RAND Graduate School)

Butthere are several inconsistencies in the Chinese position. Most notably, China often does not
practice what it preaches. For example, it has provided no explanation to its neighbors regarding recent
deployment of air/missile defense systems like the S-300 in the South China Sea or continued
development and deployment of offensive missile systems like the DF-21 on the Chinese mainland.
China has also provided no convincing security rationale for its own objections to THAAD system
deployment in South Korea. After all, the only Chinese offensive missiles that the THAAD missiles could
intercept would be ones fired at Korea, and it would seem clear that Korea has the right to defend itself against
such threats. In contrast, China's silence on Russian S-400 missile defense system deployments (or even South
Korea production of offensive cruise missiles that can reach China) is puzzling. Some Chinese commentators raise
concerns regarding the THAAD radar's range, which reaches well into China, but this is a modest addition to other
observational means already deployed on satellites, aircraft, and ships. More broadly, there
are logical security
arguments for China to favor THAAD deployment to South Korea. THAAD should enhance deterrence of
North Korean provocations, including limited attacks, thereby helping to stop threats to regional
instability from North Korea that China does not seek. Overall, China's objections appear to be
motivated more by politics than meaningful military security concerns.
 Cyber Attacks
Cyber Attacks on NK missiles have had a near 90% success rate in the past
Waddel 17 (Kaveh, Mar. 15, “Is It Wise to Foil North Korea’s Nuclear Tests With Cyberattacks?”
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/north-korea-cyberattack-nuclear-
program/518634/)

Last year, North Korea’s missile tests started having major problems: Tests of the Musudan, a medium-
range missile, failed nearly nine times out of ten, surprising some experts. The country had pushed its
nuclear program forward relatively quickly, and avoided some key errors. What had changed?
According to a detailed new report from The New York Times, creaky parts and bad engineering
probably played a role—but those problems may have been compounded by an American
campaign of cyberattacks on the missile launches, ramped up under President Obama.

Experts and empirics conclude the US is able to infiltrate NK missile systems

Pickrel 17 (Ryan, April 25, National Interest, “Is the Pentagon Hacking North Korea's
Missiles?” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-pentagon-hacking-north-koreas-
missiles-20338)

While some observers are skeptical, others assert that the U.S. definitely has the ability to infiltrate North
Korean systems. North Korea’s failed missiles “could absolutely have been compromised by cyber
means,” Steve Bucci, a former Pentagon official who is now a cybersecurity and defense expert at the Heritage
Foundation, told The Hill, “America has offensive capabilities to mess [up] people’s high-tech toys.” “It is 100

percent possible” that the U.S. could prevent a nuclear strike by hacking a North Korean missile, David
Kennedy, a cyber warfare and intelligence expert, told Business Insider. The New York Times argues that
not only are cyberattacks possible, but the U.S. is actively using such approaches to derail North Korea’s developing

missile program. The Times points to the failures of the Musudan intermediate-range missile as evidence

for its hacking claims. North Korea tested this particular weapon eight times last year with only one
success. A failure rate of approximately 88 percent is abysmal, especially compared to the 13 percent
failure rate of the Soviet-era platform on which the missile is based.
 Leverage
Despite the passage of recent sanctions banning NK iron and seafood, China is not
doing as much as it can and should be doing. As
Shepp 2017 (Jonah Shepp, Journalist, August 9 2017, "Don’t Count on China or Russia to Resolve the North Korea Crisis", New York Magazine,
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/08/dont-count-on-china-or-russia-to-end-the-north-korea-crisis.html, Accessed 08/19/2017) explains

Controlling 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, the Chinese certainly have

substantial leverage over the Kim regime, but as Dartmouth professor Jennifer Lind explained in a recent op-ed for
CNN, they are unlikely to use it to help curb Kim’s nuclear ambitions, because their
assessment of the security challenges in Korea is fundamentally different from ours.

However there is according to VOA 16 an

VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 25, 2016, U.S. China Agree on Proposed Sanction Against North Korea, Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from
http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/us-china-agree-on-proposed-sanction-against-north-korea/3208250.html

increased popular support in

China’s Foreign Ministry said it does not know of these developments. However, experts say there is

China to cut off possible funding for North Korea’s nuclear program. “China has
been intensively discussing how to internally block oil and cash from flowing into
North Korea,” said Woo Su-keun, a professor
Despite support for sanctions against North Korea, China wants South Korea to stop the
deployment of THAAD in order for its help against the North Korean problem. Soon-do
16 explains
Hong Soon-do, 7/10/2016 (Huffington Post, “Anti-Korea Sentiment Growing in China Due to THAAD,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asiatoday/anti-korea-sentiment-
grow_b_10913538.html, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi[‘s] recently made his

Chinese authorities are unlikely to keeping a level head. When
official visit to Colombo in Sri Lanka, he made incredibly strong statements to the reporters. According to the July 10th report of leading Beijing newspaper Beijing
Times, the minister clearly stated the state’s stance, stating, “We hope friends of South Korea will think calmly that whether the THAAD system is conducive to their national

statement sounds[ed]
security, to the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and to the solution of the nuclear issue of the peninsula.” His

like if the THAAD deployment is [was] not cancelled, China won’t cooperate to the
peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and to the solution of the nuclear
issue of the peninsula. What’s important is that the minister called Korea as ‘friends’. The overall nuance is not positive at all.

This interpretation is supported by Chang 16

Gordon Chang, Could a Missile Defense Plan Turn China on North Korea? 2-19-16 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/could-missile-defense-plan-turn-
china-north-korea
THAAD,
The Obama administration, however, is about to make it so. It is now persuading Seoul to accept and deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system.

stationed in China’s neighborhood, will give the US the ability shoot down North Korean
missiles—and help knock down Chinese ones. Beijing summoned the South Korean ambassador over the missile-defense
discussions with the US, and a senior diplomat said THAAD makes China “furious”.¶ Now that the South Koreans appear amenable

to accepting THAAD, Beijing is beginning to reconsider its refusal to apply pressure on

Pyongyang. Although China is still trying to deflect responsibility, American
policymakers may have found the key to bringing Beijing around.
Padden 16 further
Padden 2/26/16 (Brian Padden – staff writer for Voice of America, a multimedia news source and the official external broadcasting institution of the United States – “UN
Sanctions on North Korea Could Put China Back in Control” – 2/26/16 - https://www.voanews.com/a/un-sanctions-on-north-korea-could-put-china-back-in-control/3209101.html
SEOUL—¶ China could reassert power and influence over North Korea by supporting tougher than expected international sanctions against the Kim Jong Un government.¶
Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January and a rocket launch this month, there had been a growing perception that Pyongyang was forcing Beijing to close ranks
with its strategic and economically dependent ally or risk massive instability, war, or even worse, U.S. domination of the Korean peninsula.¶ Dealing with North Korea¶ Many
Chinese saw Pyongyang’s disregard for Beijing’s repeated calls for restraint and dialogue as humiliating. And the Xi Jinping government has been criticized as being
increasingly impotent and unable to exert any influence over its ally.¶ In supporting the draft resolution submitted to the U.N. Security Council Thursday, Beijing has chosen to
side with Washington and its allies to impose tough new sanctions on Pyongyang.¶ “That’s not good news for North Korea trying to drive a wedge between China and United
States and China and South Korea,” said Bong Young-shik, a national security analyst with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul.¶ And it could put Beijing in a stronger
position in dealing with Pyongyang.¶ Liu Jieyi, China's U.N. ambassador, takes questions during a break inSecurity Council consultations, Feb. 25, 2016. A U.N. resolution
proposed against North Korea after its recent nuclear test and rocket launch will affect exchanges with its traditional a¶ “China has been patient, but its level of patience has
reached its limit,” said Woo Su-keun, a professor of international relations at Donghua University in Shanghai.¶ How far China will go to implement and enforce the sanctions
remains to be seen.¶ China’s state run Global Times newspaper said in an editorial North Korea "deserves the punishment" of new sanctions, but China should also "cushion
Washington's harsh sanctions to some extent."¶ The new U.N. resolution seeks to cut off the trade and funding of North Korea’s nuclear program and its military, and to target
the North Korean leadership and officials directly involved in these illicit activities. These include:¶ *A total arms embargo enforced through a mandatory inspection of all cargo;
even food that transits into or out of North Korea via land, sea or air.¶ *Requiring member states to expel North Korean diplomats, companies and representatives involved in
aiding or funding the banned nuclear and missile programs.¶ *Banning imports of highly refined aviation fuel, used for both civilian planes and rockets with no exemption for civil
aviation.¶ *Limiting, and in some case banning, exports of North Korean coal, iron, gold, titanium and rare earth minerals.¶ *Requiring states to close North Korean bank
accounts and prohibiting engagement with North Korean banks.¶ *Expanding banned luxury items for import into North Korea, prohibiting expensive watches, personal
watercraft and snowmobiles valued over $2,000.¶ The resolution is unlikely to meet any significant resistance in the council since China, Pyongyang’s closest ally, has agreed

There has been speculation that Beijing’s support for U.N.

to the language.¶ Dealing with South Korea¶

sanctions might have come in exchange for Washington’s agreement to drop the
controversial deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system in South Korea.¶ The United States and South Korea
agreed earlier this month to start talks about deploying the THAAD system to South
Korea to counter the growing threat of North Korea's weapons capabilities after its Feb. 7 launch of a long-range satellite.¶ However,
while meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi this week, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said the U.S. is “not hungry or
anxious or looking for an opportunity to be able to deploy THAAD.Ӧ Secretary of State John Kerry talks with with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi as they wrap up their news
conference at the State Department in Washington, Feb. 23, 2016.¶ Wang had objected to a THAAD deployment in Korea, saying the system’s extended radar capability can
potentially be used against Chinese military forces in the region. Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong also said this week that China could possibly sever ties with
South Korea over the THAAD issue.¶ South Korean officials criticized any attempt by China to exert influence over its national security concerns. ¶ On Thursday, Admiral Harry
Harris, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific reaffirmed that a decision over THAAD will be made by South Korea and the United States, and that if China wanted to
prevent its deployment, it “should exert that influence on North Korea.”
Hun and Wong 16 explain that
Choe Sang-Hun and Edward Wong 2016 (Pulitzer Prize-winning South Korean journalist, & American journalist and a foreign correspondent for The New York Times) BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 23, 2016 from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/26/doubts-asia-over-whether-new-sanctions-against-north-korea-can-
work/ptfdGOiberUkznz4FI1IxI/story.html

Beijing’s approval of the sanctions proposed by the United States was

Analysts in China said

the result of a complex calculus by Communist Party leaders. A factor that has
loomed large for them in recent weeks is plans by Washington to deploy an anti-
ballistic missile system, called Thaad, in South Korea. Chinese officials are
seeking ways to prevent that from happening. “If it was not for the Thaad issue,
there might not be such cooperation between China and the U.S.,” said Shen Dingli, a
professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. “By doing this, it is still possible for China to dissuade the
Americans from deploying Thaad at China’s doorstep

Empirically deploying missile defense systems as leverage has worked as

Sa 16 explains
Harry H. Sa, is a research analyst with the United States Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies (RSIS) based in the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.. The Diplomat, 3-9-2016, "Could THAAD Encourage Negotiations With North Korea?," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/could-thaad-encourage-negotiations-with-north-korea/

Finally, THAAD adds value to the negotiation process as a future bargaining chip.
Some analysts suggest deploying THAAD to shape China’s behavior. Alternatively, once
deployed, the prospective removal of THAAD may be useful at the negotiating table with Pyongyang . Bargaining and
sending messages through the deployment and withdrawal of weapons systems
is by no means unprecedented. During August 2015, the United States and
Germany announced the withdrawal of Patriot missiles from Turkey. The official explanation
behind the decision cited the diminished threat of missile attacks by the Syrian Army and “critical modernization upgrades.” Further analysis revealed

that Germany and the United States may also have been interested in expressing
their displeasure at the divergence of Turkish attitudes regarding the Syrian
conflict. Ankara had been targeting Kurdish forces on the same day it announced
its intention to combat the Islamic State. Given the extremely limited channels of communication that the United States has with
North Korea, THAAD deployment could be a novel way to “speak” to Pyongyang. Sending THAAD to the Korean peninsula most obviously bolsters South Korean defenses.
However, simply dismissing the looming deployment of the missile defense system as a mere exercise in antagonism can result in overlooking THAAD’s potential value to the
peace process.

The impact of Chinese Sanctions is a weaker North Korea. As Kim 16 explains

Sarah Kim, 2016 (staff writer), KOREA JOONGANG DAILY, China vows to take sanctions on North seriously, Mar. 4, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com /news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015792
This resolution would for the first time subject all cargo going in and out of North Korea to mandatory inspection. It banned the export of coal, iron, gold, titanium and other rare
earth minerals being used to fund North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It also limits aviation and rocket fuel exports to North Korea. However, North Korea can
export coal as long as the transactions are not used to generate revenue for its nuclear or missile weapons program, which provides a loophole. Russia also insisted on easing
the ban on aviation fuel exports to allow for North Korean commercial airliners refueling at Russian airports to receive jet fuel so that they can return to Pyongyang. A prohibition
will be set on the sale and transfer of small arms and other conventional weapons to and from Pyongyang, as well as a ban on the export of luxury goods to North Korea. North
Korean diplomats engaging in illicit activities will be expelled from the country in which they are stationed. The resolution blacklisted 16 North Korean individuals and 12 entities
linked to its nuclear program, including Office 39, a secretive bureau that manages slush funds and generates revenue for the leadership, and the Reconnaissance General
Bureau, its intelligence agency. Some entities overlap with the U.S. Treasury’s blacklist, such as the Academy of National Defense, which is said to be involved in nuclear and
missile weapons programs, and the National Aerospace Development Administration, for its involvement in rocket launches. It also blacklisted 31 vessels owned by North
 Beijing’s cooperation is instrumental because North
Korean shipping firm Ocean Maritime Management Company.

Korea depends heavily on China economically. The world is watching to see if China enforces the sanctions.

A weaker North Korea would result in a weaker North Korean military. As Eberstadt 16
explains
Nicholas Eberstadt, 2/15/2016 (American Enterprise Institute, “Wishful thinking has prevented effective threat reduction in North Korea,” https://www.aei.org/publication/seeing-
north-korea/, Accessed 7/17/2016, rwg)
As for weakening the DPRK’s military economy, which is the foundation of all its offensive
capabilities, a good place to start would be reinvigorating current counter-proliferation efforts, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Missile Technology
Control Regime. But that would be only a start. Given the “military first” disposition of the North Korean economy, restricting its overall potential is necessary as well. South
Korea’s subsidized trade with the North, for example, should come to an end. And put Pyongyang back on the State Department’s terror-sponsors list — it never should have
been taken off. Sanctions with a genuine bite should be implemented: The dysfunctional DPRK economy is uniquely susceptible
to these, and, amazing as this may sound, the current sanctions strictures for North Korea are weaker than, say, those enforced until recently for Iran. (We can enforce such
sanctions unilaterally, by the way.) And not least important: Revive such efforts as the Illicit Activities Initiative, the brief but tremendously successful Dubya-era task force for
tracking and freezing North Korea’s dirty money abroad. Then there is the China question. Received wisdom in some quarters notwithstanding, it is by no means impossible for
America and her allies to pressure the DPRK if China does not cooperate (see previous paragraph). That said, China has been allowed to play a double game with North Korea
for far too long, and it is time for Beijing to pay a penalty for all its support for the most odious regime on the planet today. We can begin by exacting it in diplomatic venues all
around the world, starting with the U.N. Non-governmental organizations can train a spotlight on Beijing’s complicity in the North Korean regime’s crimes. And international
humanitarian action should shame China into opening a safe transit route to the free world for North Korean refugees attempting to escape their oppressors.
 US-SK Alliance Stability

Donald Trump has aggravated South Korea by trying to change pre-existing trade
deals, weakening the alliance. Noah Bierman explains in 2017, writing that:
Noah Bierman, 6-30-2017, "President Trump delivers tough trade talk during visit by South
Korea's new leader," latimes, http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-korea-trade-
20170630-story.html

President Trump opened his meeting Friday with newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-
in with tough trade talk, announcing he is renegotiating a 5-year-old trade deal between [with south
korea] their two countries that was a joint legacy of Presidents George W. Bush and Obama. Yet it was
unclear from his and administration aides’ remarks how significant a break Trump was making with a free-trade agreement that had broad
support when it was approved in Congress. Trump’s
announcement could be seen as a provocation of an ally
during a delicate time, when the administration is looking to South Korea to help contain North
Korea’s nuclear program. “It’s been a rough deal for the United States, but I think that it will be much different and it will be good
for both parties,” Trump said during a joint appearance with Moon in the Oval Office. “We want something that’s going to be good for the
American worker,” Trump added. Moon said nothing publicly to confirm that a full-scale renegotiation was underway. He said that the agreement
benefits both countries, and they can address specific concerns if necessary. Trump’s
public criticism of South Korea’s
trade surplus with the United States could cause Moon embarrassment at home, and stoke
pressure against U.S. demands for a harder line against North Korea. Congressional approval would likely be
required for major changes. White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders said that the U.S. trade representative, Robert E. Lighthizer, is
calling a joint committee meeting with his Korean counterparts that would start an amendment process. She dismissed questions about the impact
on the U.S. security relationship with South Korea. Its embassy did not respond to a request for comment. “It sounds like the president got ahead
of himself,” said Wendy Cutler, a former career trade official who served as the lead negotiator on the deal for Bush and Obama. Cutler, vice
president of the Asia Society Policy Institute, said Trump does not appear to have gotten buy-in from South Korea and would need close
consultation with Congress. “It seems to me this was kind of a one-sided announcement,” Cutler said in a phone interview from Tokyo before a
scheduled visit to South Korea on Monday. Trump has complained bitterly about the trade deficit with South Korea, which was $17 billion for
goods and services in 2016, according to the U.S. trade office. In April, he told the Washington Post that he would consider ending or amending
the trade agreement with Seoul. But the trade relationship is an important one. South Korea is America’s sixth-largest goods trading partner, with
$112.2 billion exchanged between the two countries last year. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement was negotiated and signed by Bush in 2007
and then renegotiated and finally implemented under Obama in 2012. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said that the trade imbalance between
the countries has doubled since the agreement, and he blamed South Korea for restricting imports of U.S. cars through strict regulations. Obama,
during a meeting with Moon’s predecessor, South Korean President Park Geun-hye, in 2015, praised the deal, pointing to increased overall trade
between the countries, including exports of American cars, in the first three years. “We do still have work to do,” Obama said then about
compliance with the agreement. When issues arise, he added: “We need to resolve them quickly.” Myron Brilliant, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s executive vice president and head of international affairs, said in a column published this week in “Business Insider” that even as
American exports to South Korea have not risen as much as expected, scrapping the deal completely would be a "rash move" and a
"mistake.” The deal, he wrote, “puts American exporters on a level playing field against competitors from Europe, China and Australia, which
also have free trade agreements with Korea.” But Trump’s sharp trade rhetoric, arguing that America was getting a raw deal on the world stage,
helped win him the election. "The United States has many, many trade deficits with many countries and we cannot allow that,” Trump told Moon
during a public moment in the cabinet room. “We will start with South Korea right now.”

Despite this fracture in the alliance and spread of anti-americanism, the deployment
of a missile defense system called THAAD would preserve the alliance. Sarah Kim
writes in 2017 that:

The deployment of THAAD is key to fix the alliance. Kim writes in 2017 that
Sarah Kim, 6-27-2017, "Thaad is elephant in room at U.S. summit," Korea JoongAng Daily,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3035101
This is the first of a three-part series discussing key issues between South Korea and the United States ahead of the first bilateral summit between presidents Moon
Jae-in and Donald Trump in Washington on June 29 and 30. Analysts believe the deployment of the Thaad antimissile system, coordination on North Korea policy
and possible renegotiation of the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) are the key items on the agenda for the meeting between the two leaders. Trump has
touted an “America First” approach and is keen on renegotiating trade and security arrangements. Moon has been emphasizing the need for future engagement with
North Korea along with pressure such as sanctions. The summit, being observed closely by regional players, is the first test of the Moon administration’s foreign
policy ability. It also expected to set the direction of the South Korea-U.S. alliance under the two new leaders. The first components of the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (Thaad) battery arrived on a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III cargo plane at the Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi on March 6. It was Day One in the
delicate process of physically deploying the controversial American antimissile system to South Korea. More than a month later, in the wee hours of April 26, the U.S.
Forces Korea began installing key components of the Thaad battery - including a radar system and two missile launchers - on a golf course in Seongju County, North
Gyeongsang. Military trucks and trailers hauled the components into the rural town. They were greeted by protests by hundreds of suspicious local farmers and
activists, tipped off to the overnight operation. Scuffles broke out between police and protesters. A dozen people were injured. Nearly one year ago, on July 8, 2016,
Seoul and Washington abruptly announced their joint decision to deploy the Thaad system to Korea after five months of official negotiations. Its stated purpose: to
defend parts of South Korea against Pyongyang’s growing ballistic missile threats. The governments in both Seoul and Washington have changed since. The
countries’ new leaders - President Moon Jae-in, a human rights lawyer who is South Korea’s first liberal leader in a decade, and U.S. President Donald Trump, the
real-estate mogul who has touted an “America First” approach - are scheduled to hold their first summit on June 29 and 30 in Washington. Such summits are usually
occasions to confirm the two sides’ faith in the South Korea-U.S. alliance, coordinate North Korea policies and discuss overarching security and trade issues. This
summit, the Thaad deployment will be the elephant in the room - the most sensitive issue and a “litmus test” of the future direction of the alliance. “The first
divergence in opinion could be on how talks with North Korea could proceed, and the second could be over the Thaad issue,” said Kim Hyun-wook, an associate
professor of American Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Ifans). Since the North Korea issue
can’t be resolved overnight, Thaad is essentially the most “pivotal” and “worrying” pending issue for this summit. Key regional players are also paying close attention
to the summit. China has loudly protested the deployment of the Thaad system and retaliated economically against Seoul. South Korea’s ultimate decision to deploy,
delay or withdraw the Thaad system is seen by some analysts as having an impact on the overarching struggle between China and the United States for influence in
the Asia-Pacific amid Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region. “Beijing’s opposition to the Thaad deployment, I believe, has more of a strategic aspect than a
military aspect,” said China expert Chung Jae-hung, a research fellow with the Seoul-based think tank Sejong Institute’s Security Strategy Studies Department. “And
that is why China is retaliating so strongly on the Thaad issue, because it is linked to China-U.S. dynamics, and also its strategic future in this region.” “In my view,”
former Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo, a professor emeritus of Korea University, said, “ the
Thaad deployment is a litmus test - in the
United States’ mind - of the firmness of the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance.” Moon’s delay order When the initial
components of the Thaad battery were stealthily installed on the southern golf course, four more launchers for the system were brought into Korea and moved to a
U.S. military base. After taking office, Moon apparently was not informed of the four additional launchers. He ordered an investigation into whether top security
officials from the previous administration intentionally withheld that information from the new government. And at the beginning of this month, he ordered a full-
scale study into the environmental impact of the Thaad battery, which could take up to a year. While the battery has initial operational capability, it is not fully
functional yet. The move has been called by some a stalling tactic or bargaining stance. Moon has called it a part of the “due process” of following domestic
procedures. The undeniably stealthy installation of the Thaad battery was met by protests domestically, including by Seongju residents, who have expressed worries
about risks to their health and agricultural produce from the electromagnetic waves of the X-band radar of the battery. They also worried they could be targets of
physical retaliation by the North. The military’s installing of the Thaad components in Seongju came less than two weeks before the liberal Democratic Party’s Moon
came into office on May 9, after a snap election following the impeachment and removal from office of former President Park Geun-hye over a corruption and abuse
of power scandal. The Thaad unit reached initial operational capability - able to intercept North Korean missiles - at the beginning of May. Seoul also has felt a strong
backlash from China and Russia, who have protested that the deployment of the Thaad system goes against their national security interests. They fear that the
powerful X-band radar will be used to monitor military activities in parts of their countries. Moon’s order of an environmental impact assessment has prompted
concerns in Washington over a possible delay in the full deployment of the Thaad system, initially expected to be completed this year, or its removal altogether. As a
presidential candidate, Moon had called for the Thaad deployment to be decided upon by the next administration. Moon told the Washington Post in an interview
published June 20, “Getting the environmental impact assessment does not mean that we will postpone or reverse the decision to deploy” the Thaad system to Korea.
In another interview with Reuters on Thursday, however, Moon said the original agreement was to deploy one launcher by the end of 2017 and the remaining five
launchers the following year and that for unknown reasons “this entire Thaad process was accelerated.” A Thaad battery, produced by U.S. arms manufacturer
Lockheed Martin, typically consists of six truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptor missiles, a fire control and communications unit and the powerful X-band or
AN/TPY-2 radar. “Holding an environmental impact assessment could essentially be seen as a means to earn time,” said Sejong Institute’s Chung. “It can signify that
depending on the result, Thaad can be withdrawn. And during this time, the variable is that the Korean Peninsula is a volatile region where anything can happen. The
Moon government may, for example, determine that the Thaad deployment is not needed if inter-Korean relations improve.” Security expert Bruce Bennett, a senior
researcher at the RAND Corporation, a California-based think tank, argues for the necessity of installing the remaining four launchers to protect U.S. troops and South
Koreans in case of a North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile attack. “There were many issues leading to the deployment of Thaad in Seongju,” Bennett said.
“Probably the leading issue was that in a wartime situation with North Korea, over time tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel would deploy to Korea largely
through the Busan area,” which is the site of the U.S. Naval Forces Korea headquarters. “The United States concluded that it would be irresponsible if it did not
protect those personnel against the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons threat.” The Thaad interceptors have a range of 200 kilometers (124 miles),
meaning the south of the country is defended but not the Seoul area. Bennett further pointed out, “Given the large number of North Korean ballistic missiles ,
limiting Thaad to two interceptor launchers (capable of firing a total of 16 interceptors) would likely force
the United States to limit protection to the Busan area, leaving Gwangju and other urban areas in southern
Korea vulnerable to nuclear attack. Deploying the other four launchers would allow Thaad to protect far more Koreans.” U.S. Secretary of State
Rex Tillerson told new South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha in their first phone call last week that he “respects” the “diplomatic process” underway in
Seoul concerning the deployment of Thaad. But there is mounting pressure on Seoul to accept the deployment. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators sent a letter to
Trump Friday asking him to find a way with Moon to “expedite the procedural review that is currently hindering the full deployment.” “In my view, Trump may call
for the speedy deployment of Thaad, as soon as possible, during the summit,” Ifans Prof. Kim said, “while our side would put forward a view that the Thaad
deployment would be possible after we follow domestic procedures including the environmental impact appraisal and seeking approval by the National Assembly. But
how these two viewpoints will be mediated bears some watching.” Bennett points out that one Thaad system alone is not enough to cover all of Korea, indicating the
United States may press for more batteries to be deployed in the future. “The interceptors that Thaad uses have only a 200 kilometer range,” said Bennett. “That
means that one Thaad battery cannot defend all of Korea-at least two are required, and having three or four Thaad batteries would be even better to defend all of
Korea.” China’s pressure intensifies Very recently, China has been pressing Seoul to be bolder - to make a “political decision” on the Thaad issue. After South Korean
First Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam visited Beijing last week for high-level strategic talks, the Chinese Foreign Ministry on June 20 urged the Korean
government to “demonstrate political will and resolution.” On Beijing’s retaliations against South Korea, Bennett pointed out, “China has complained that Thaad
disrupts regional security, and yet China deploys a missile defense system very similar to Thaad, referred to as the Russian S-400 or Chinese HQ-19. These systems
are designed to intercept adversaries’ missiles of roughly the Rodong and Musudan classes, just like Thaad, and they have interceptors of the same range as Thaad.
“While China often complains about Thaad’s over-the-horizon radar,” he continued, “China has reportedly deployed three similar radars in the area surrounding the
Korean Peninsula. Why is it okay for China to have these systems, but seriously destabilizing if South Korea deploys but one Thaad battery?” “Beijing is pressuring
Seoul to come up with a political decision, because we are providing it pretext to do so,” said Chung Jae-hung of Sejong Institute. Chung pointed out,
“[specifically] Thaadis a linchpin in the Korea-U.S. alliance, an important stage in the United States’
missile defense (MD) system. So in China’s position, Seoul withdrawing from Thaad will be a considerable
strategic blow to the trilateral security cooperation between South Korea-U.S.-Japan and the MD
system being pushed for by the United States.” Should Korea decide to scrap the deployment of
Thaad, he pointed out, “U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region cannot help but decrease, and
Beijing, from its viewpoint, would then be able to expand its influence in this region, enabling
China to exercise its influence in this area much more assertively.” The Moon administration also aims to revive inter-
Korean talks, and China’s support would play an important role in that process. Chung pointed out that if Seoul withdraws the Thaad system, China could propose to
help mediate an inter-Korean leaders’ summit, back trilateral cooperation projects with the North, and also give a nudge to Moon’s plans to revitalize the economy and
create jobs, which could be bolstered by the return of Chinese tourists and business. “China has been saying such things to South Korea: that there is a ‘gift basket’ if
it does so,” continued Chung. “But China’s prerequisite is that for Chinese and South Korean relations to improve, Thaad has to be withdrawn.” Moon is expected to
hold a summit as early as next month with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Group of 20, or G-20, summit in Hamburg, Germany. Moon told
Reuters Thursday, “If I have the chance to meet President Xi, I will ask for him to lift these measures,” referring to China’s unofficial economic retaliations. “This is
the agenda that we cannot evade.” Former Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo said, “China does not have a strong case opposing Thaad - which is a defensive system -
and arguing that it is a threat to China, as the radar can monitor only high-altitude activity and the range is limited. It seems to be looking for a face-saving way to
relieve the pressure.” He continued, “Much will depend upon how gingerly South Korea and the United States give China assurances and some justification for
relaxing its opposition.” Litmus test of the alliance Analysts warn that indecisiveness
on the Thaad issue could be damaging to
South Korea-U.S. relations, possibly threatening the soundness of the alliance; thus the upcoming summit is an
important occasion for Moon and Trump to build mutual trust and understanding. And Seoul, caught between its closest ally (the United States) and its leading trading
partner (China) has been trying to maintain a delicate diplomatic balance. But it may have to take a clear stance on Thaad. “The Korea-U.S. alliance won’t fall apart
because of the Thaad issue, and there won’t be a situation such as the U.S. Forces Korea withdrawing from the peninsula,” said Ifans’ Kim Hyun-wook. “But the
alliance could be considerably impacted because of it.” Kim continued, “Then, we could return to the state during the so-called crisis of the Korea-U.S. alliance back
in the Roh Moo-hyun era, where there was even talk of an amicable divorce of the alliance at that time.” The late President Roh Moo-hyun’s term spanned between
2003 and 2008. “The Korea-U.S. alliance could lose its cohesive edge and become considerably weakened.” “It is fortunate that both Moon and National Security
Council Adviser Chung Eui-yong stated clearly that the Thaad deployment will be done,” said Han. “As for possible delay, there is room for understanding -
considering the haste with which the decision and deployment were carried out - by the United States that the new Korean administration would like to abide by the
law and proper procedures as long as there is not an undue delay, such as more than a year.” Chung, head of the Blue House National Security Office, made a trip in
early June to Washington to meet with his U.S. counterparts to discuss the upcoming summit and quell concerns over the Thaad issue. However, some analysts
emphasize that a clearer consensus about the deployment of the Thaad system needs to be reached during the summit in order to assuage Washington’s concerns and
put a halt to China’s mounting pressure. “Using
the Thaad card as a means of making a deal with the U.S. and China, in
my opinion, is very dangerous,” Sejong Institute’s Chung Jae-hung said, “as it could signify that the U.S.-
Korea alliance is not prioritized.” This could lead to Beijing gaining confidence and becoming more
assertive in its strategic interests in the region such as over territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Others warn that in a worst-case scenario - that Seoul’s relations with Washington sour considerably over
the Thaad issue - the United States may determine that Korea is no longer strategically important in its
Asia policymaking and that only a shell of the alliance would be kept. “In reality, if the United States
determines that South Korea is not a strategically important ally in its Asia strategy, then it could decrease
the number of U.S. troops here, or avoid discussions with Korea on important issues,” said Kim. “So while the
framework of an alliance may be maintained, the actual content and substance of the alliance would be considerably weakened.” An example of this would be
Washington “strengthening discussions with Japan, rather than South Korea, on important issues such as the North Korea nuclear issue,” he pointed out, or a so-called
“Korea passing,” a situation diplomatic isolation of Seoul by the Trump government. Chung advised: “The Thaad issue should be resolved quickly and not be dragged
out any longer: a political decision has to be reached. The Korea-U.S. summit should come up with a joint statement, or legally binding agreement, which shows
China and others that the Thaad deployment issue is over with. “This is not just a domestic issue but about U.S. relations and mutual trust. We can appropriately
respond to the problems incurred afterward, such as with China, based on the changed situation.”

A lack of a strong U.S ROK alliance in the absence of THAAD causes 2 impacts.

First is the expansion of North Korean Aggression. According to Mercy Kuo in 2017
Mercy A. Kuo, The Diplomat, 6-22-2017, "South Korea Stops THAAD: Strategic Misstep?," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/south-korea-stops-
thaad-strategic-misstep/

Assess the consequences of THAAD’s termination on South Korea’s security policy and implications for U.S.-ROK relations. THAAD’s termination sends a powerful
yet undesirable message about South Korea’s security policy and prioritization of alliances. In creating a vacuum in Seoul’s defensive preparations against North
Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, it perpetuates the perception of ROK vulnerability to the DPRK. In addition, the THAAD symbolizes a joint U.S.-South Korea
resolve against a shared adversary – removing
[missile defense systems] this emblematic defense system could thus send the
message that Seoul no longer views Washington as its most important alliance partner. From a long-term
security perspective, this makes South Korea more susceptible and vulnerable to North Korea’s incursions and
provocations, as it essentially gives Pyongyang greater reign to force Seoul, no longer buttressed by its American
ally, to make concessions and accommodate the DPRK.

Sohn agrees that a weak alliance brings war, writing in 2017 that:
Hanbyeol Sohn, The Diplomat, Hanbyeol Sohn is currently an assistant professor at department of Military Strategy, Korea National Defense University (KNDU).
His research areas include the ROK-U.S. alliance, Northeast Asian security, and nuclear strategy., 6-27-2017, "3 Obstacles to US-South Korea Cooperation on the
North Korea Issue," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/3-obstacles-to-us-south-korea-cooperation-on-the-north-korea-issue/
With the ever worsening nuclear and missile threats from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as North Korea), the
Republic
of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and the United States, as allies, are standing at an important crossroad. Although both South
Korea and the United States share a history of working together to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, they [the U.S and Korea] have been criticized for failing to
act in a synchronized manner during times of heightened tensions, due to the differing perceptions and policy options in the face of North Korean nuclear threat. The
upcoming summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in holds great meaning in that it will serve as a first bridgehead for the two allies to resolve the
North Korean issue together. There are also worrisome echoes recollecting the history of disconnect between the Roh and Bush administrations, with some observers
concerned that the Trump administration’s “America First” policy and the Moon government’s overall foreign
policy stance of self-reliance might cause conflict at the summit. Added to this are domestic frictions in South
Korea regarding the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the
media reporting on the infuriated U.S. president as he is briefed on the situation. Remembering past experiences and
lessons learned, both countries must overcome three hurdles at this summit if they are to resolve the nuclear
crisis. Segmented Domestic Preferences Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. The first hurdle for the
alliance to overcome is the discord between national preferences. The conflicts that arise due to different policy preferences on
North Korea are more visible at the domestic level. In this era of the third North Korean nuclear crisis, which has continued under North Korean leader Kim Jong-un,
Pyongyang is persistently testing its nuclear and missile capabilities. However, the alliance has been
unable to hold a firm and balanced response due to domestic political divisions. The United States has taken a cautious
stance on military intervention after 15-plus years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and lacks the decisive power to break through the thorny dynamics of the Six-Party
Talks, which is now further complicated by the rise of China, Japan’s “military normalization,” and an increasingly assertive Russia. On the other hand, South
Korea has its own difficulties in pursuing a consistent policy toward North Korea due to the ideological
discord between the conservative and progressive camps. It is hard to say that the two countries’ policies are set in stone as they
prepare for the presidential summit this week. There are still plenty of vacancies in the diplomatic security teams on both sides. After the historic impeachment of
former President Park Geun-hye, South Korea is confronted with new hurdles to overcome, such as garnering
domestic political consensus and establishing a financial base in order to build a new policy toward North
Korea. Meanwhile, the four main pillars of the Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea are not contradictory to preexisting policies, but could change
at any time because of China’s economic and military rise and the increasingly bold stance taken by North Korea. The controversial option of a surgical strike has
even been debated in the United States. Therefore, at this summit, the two leaders need to be prudent in approaching the agenda as they have not had enough time to
draw up domestic consensus on their North Korean policies. Since this is an important first meeting that will determine the future framework of U.S.-ROK relations
going forward, coming to an agreement on the basic principles of policy direction will suffice. Discrepancies in Threat Perceptions The second hurdle is the different
threat perceptions in the alliance. Although
North Korea is increasing the intensity of its blackmail and intimidation,
the sense of urgency felt by South Korea and the United States can hardly be compared. This is not a new problem.
In May 2003, for example, the United States demanded a hardline policy against North Korea, which the Bush administration referred to as part of the “axis of evil,”
but South Korea advocated for a more careful approach. This revealed the differences between the two sides. In particular, then-President Roh Moo-hyun sent a false
signal to the United States in 2005 when he announced that “South Korea needs to be at the center of balance in Northeast Asia.” During
that tumultuous
time for the alliance, [in the past] South Korea criticized the United States for only pursuing hardline
policies, and Washington denounced Seoul for its heavy reliance on conciliatory gestures toward the
North. As a result, North Korea was able to take advantage of the fissures in the alliance. Although the 13
rounds of the Six-Party Talks initially suggested a path to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang demonstrated its capability and determination
to possess nukes by conducting two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. At this summit, there is a possibility that the stark difference in
threat perceptions by the two countries will be accentuated. Moon Chung-in, the special adviser to
President Moon, ruffled feathers when he argued for the possibility of discussing the reduction of U.S.
strategic assets in South Korea and scaling down joint military exercises if Pyongyang halts its nuclear
and missile activities. Although the Korean Blue House quickly came to distance the administration from the special envoy, the White House still holds
doubts about the possibility of the South pursuing its own North Korean policy without prior coordination with Washington . Media reports of
President Donald Trump’s outrage over South Korea’s decision to suspend THAAD deployment,
which will inevitably delay the time when the THAAD battery can achieve full operational
capability, fleshes out concerns that Trump might come to a shocking decision to withdraw the
THAAD system and/or change the deployment of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).///However, the alliance was
established and maintained to jointly respond to common threats. Koreans should not forget the missile threats pointing at USFK
and targeting the U.S. homeland, and Americans should be mindful of Seoul’s vulnerable defense
environment and the all-out pressure coming from China. The key of the alliance is credibility. And the key to
credibility is not about claiming one’s own position, but beginning to understand the counterpart’s circumstance. The Asymmetric Alliance Dilemma The third hurdle
Any asymmetric alliance will involve trade-
is the dilemma of the asymmetric alliance, which emerges during the alliance’s interactions.
offs between “entrapment/abandonment” and “security/autonomy” as well as balancing alliance burden-
sharing. If the alliance’s preferred countermeasures diverge, and the alliance is only loosely connected in an institutional or behavioral manner, it cannot respond
appropriately to the common threat. For instance, during the 1993 ROK-U.S. summit, President Kim Young-sam criticized the United States as an ally for failing to
maintain South Korea’s confidence. In particulate, Kim expressed his dissatisfaction with “the United States merely informing already ‘decided’ policy to South
Korea.” In 1994, moreover, South Korea feared being implicated in the U.S.-planned surgical air raid on North Korea; at the same time, Seoul was worried about
being pushed aside in the U.S. dialogue with North Korea. After the Agreed Framework was inked, the alliance suffered conflicts over cost-sharing, including funding
the promised light-water reactor, which ultimately allowed Pyongyang to buy time to develop its own nuclear weapons. The inevitable dilemma intrinsic in the
asymmetric alliance structure must be overcome with the credibility of the alliance, and the key goal to be achieved at this summit should be restoring that credibility.
First of all, South
Korea needs to attend to U.S. concerns by addressing its position on THAAD deployment
and its North Korean policy. Ultimately, Seoul should be willing to bargain, sacrificing a certain level of
autonomy for safeguarding national security. The United States, on the other hand, needs to understand the worries of its counterpart, such as
the drive to keep South Korea’s autonomy, fears over possible entrapment and abandonment, and the need for reassurance about U.S. extended deterrence. South
Korea plays a key role in eliminating North Korea’s nuclear threat and managing the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. For the United States, having a close ally such as
South Korea in the Asian region is essential to containing the rise of China and sustaining the U.S. presence in Asia. The alliance has successfully deterred a North
Korean invasion and its thirst for reunification under communist rule for more than 60 years, since the end of Korean War. Of course, there have been noticeable
conflicts, such as Washington’s lukewarm response to North Korea’s attack on the Blue House in 1968, the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea during
the Nixon and Carter administrations, and South Korea’s independent nuclear development under President Park Chung-hee. Regardless of the past hiccups and the
the North Korean
internal struggle within the alliance, it was able to withstand those challenges for the betterment of the Korean Peninsula. Now
nuclear crisis puts the ROK-U.S. alliance to the test once again. If the three hurdles listed above are
overcome, the alliance will come out stronger and be able to contribute to the security and prosperity of
both countries. This first summit between Moon and Trump should be a process of overcoming hurdles, through these three steps: garnering domestic
consensus on North Korea policy, reaching a shared threat perception in the alliance, and restoring credibility to overcome the dilemma of the asymmetric alliance.
Auslin furthers on the impact of a weak alliance, writing in 2017 that:

Michael Auslin, 6-29-2017, "Is It Time to Reassess the U.S.-South Korea Alliance?," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-
trump/532113/

When South Korea’s President Moon Jae In greets President Donald Trump at the White House today, their warm smiles will do little to mask the fact that they

The failure of a quarter-century of

meet at perhaps the most dangerous moment in the six-decade old U.S.-South Korean alliance.

diplomacy has left the North Korean dictatorship on the cusp of possessing a nuclear-
armed intercontinental ballistic missile. For the first time since 1953, when the United States committed to protecting the South
from another invasion from the North, the American homeland will soon come under direct threat from one of the world’s most ruthless regimes. Of course, the
United States is at loggerheads with the Kim regime because of its commitment to the South—the alliance is not a symptom of today’s crisis between Washington
and Pyongyang, but the cause. Not only does the United States station well over 20,000 troops on the Korean peninsula; the two militaries are well-integrated and
jointly trained. The United States went so far as to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea until 1991, and continues to extend the so-called “nuclear
umbrella” to protect the South. South Korea, in turn, provided the largest contingent of allied troops during the Vietnam War, and 3,000 of its troops fought in Iraq.
South Korea also supported Obama-era initiatives such as the G20 and Nuclear Security Summits, and participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative, the
International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, making it a leader in anti-proliferation activities. While
few believe Kim Jong Un would launch an unprovoked nuclear strike, most seasoned Korea watchers believe that he would no doubt use his arsenal once it became
clear he was about to lose any war that broke out. As this risk increases, Washington will find it increasingly difficult to avoid reassessing the country’s multi-decade
alliance with South Korea. The threat to American civilians will be magnified to grotesque proportions, simply because Washington continues to promise to help
South Korea. At stake is not just Washington’s commitment to Seoul, but, quite possibly, America’s larger global standing. The arguments for maintaining a strong
South Korean alliance rest on its deterrent effect against North Korea. The Kim regime has repeatedly struck out at the South—see the 2010 sinking of the Korean

the North has refrained from large-scale

navy vessel Cheonan that killed 46 sailors and the shelling of Yongpyong Island. Yet

attacks against either South Korea or Japan, another target of Pyongyang’s ire, despite its significant
missile capability and larger military. Washington interprets this as due, at least in part,
to the assumption by all parties that a major attack, or full-scale war, would immediately trigger
the self-defense clause of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and
South Korea. If that is the case, then the U.S. commitment will be even more important: Only a firm U.S. promise to
defend the South will deter the North. But if, on the other hand, the United States decided that the risk to its interests was
prohibitively high, abrogating or scaling back the alliance would potentially destabilize Asia and

beyond. It would hand the Kim regime a major strategic victory, removing the single
greatest deterrent to its aggression. Pyongyang would be emboldened to continue
trying to blackmail the United States, South Korea, and Japan, leading to future crises.
Stripped of the assurance provided by America’s support, South Korea might wind up
capitulating to the North’s demands for open-ended economic assistance, or even stand
down some of its forces.

Second is massive nuclear proliferation across East Asia, leading to an arms race.
Michael Auslin writes in June of 2017 that:
Michael Auslin, 6-29-2017, "Is It Time to Reassess the U.S.-South Korea Alliance?," Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-
trump/532113/Japan would worry that it may be the next to be abandoned by America. Even worse, in the face of a U.S.
withdrawal, both Seoul and Tokyo would immediately begin considering developing their own
nuclear and missile programs, instigating a nuclear-arms race that would spill over to China,
Taiwan, and possibly beyond. In the event of a reduced American presence in northeast Asia, China would emerge the big winner. Beijing
almost certainly would offer Seoul an alliance of its own, further undermining America’s regional web of alliances, likely tipping the Philippines and
Malaysia fully into the Chinese camp. Japanese government officials I spoke to expressed their fears that, in the event of the collapse of
the U.S.-South Korea alliance, Beijing may even base Chinese warships in Busan, the southern port
closest to Japan, giving China a foothold on the territory closest to the Japanese home islands—
historically, Japan’s major geopolitical fear. Access to the southern Korean coastline would enhance China’s ability to control the
strategic waterways from the South China Sea through the East China Sea and into the Sea of Japan. The Japanese would consider this a grave threat. In
U.S. resources diverted from the Korean peninsula might be redeployed to blunt China’s
response, the
expansion, including a beefing-up of the U.S. Navy in Japan, which would increase Sino-U.S.
tensions and the potential for a maritime confrontation in the narrow, strategic Tsushima Strait.
Cutting South Korea adrift would likely also have global repercussions for America. Other nuclear or potential nuclear states would learn from
Pyongyang’s success, opening America up to future nuclear blackmail. Just as significantly, walking away from a long-term ally would make the United
States seem capricious and untrustworthy; attempting to maintain America’s worldwide alliance system might become impossible, as no reassurances would
be sufficient for jittery partners. Such fears explain the criticism of Donald Trump, precisely for his questioning of the value of Washington’s long-standing
alliances with South Korea and other nations, during the 2016 presidential campaign. Experts cautioned that ending U.S. alliance commitments would
“unravel the entire post-World War II order,” while seasoned diplomats warned that America was not engaged in an alliance “protection racket,” but
rather benefitted from the global stability that engendered trade and globalization since 1945. Despite his campaign rhetoric, Trump appeared to
acknowledge the importance of the South Korean alliance once in office. His administration walked back his more radical suggestions, mollifying the
national-security establishment. Both Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reaffirmed support for the U.S.-South Korea
alliance. Even more strikingly, the administration soon made North Korea a critical national-security issue, even claiming that it was the “most urgent”
threat facing the United States, and that “all options are on the table” for dealing with the rogue nation. Yet even if Trump has decided to embrace the South
Korean alliance, there are numerous reasons to be worried about the liabilities that come with it. North Korea, to be clear, poses no existential threat to the
United States. This is not the Cold War; Pyongyang is not Moscow. Accepting Mutual Assured Destruction with the Soviets may have seemed the only way
to ensure the ultimate survival of the West; that is not the case with North Korea. Putting America’s cities in the bull’s eye of nuclear nations for anything
less than a truly existential threat would be foolish. Another risk of sticking with the alliance is that the long-term strategy of waiting out the Kim regime
seems increasingly unrealistic. Not only has Kim Jong Un ruthlessly secured his power since taking over from his father in 2011—the North Korean
economy is actually improving, or at least stabilizing. It makes little sense to keep hoping for the regime’s collapse and doubling down on a failed policy. The
situation is further complicated by the tensions currently roiling the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Even as America steels itself for a nuclear North Korea,
South Korea’s newly elected President Moon comes from the progressive Democratic Party of Korea, and appears to have a predilection for moving towards
both North Korea and China. Just weeks after taking office, he froze the full deployment of the U.S.-provided Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system. Days before Moon’s arrival in Washington, his special advisor on national security publicly hinted that U.S.-South Korean
military exercises could be scaled back if Pyongyang made another promise to freeze its nuclear-weapons development, a move that no U.S. security analyst
supports. Why, it surely will be asked, should America put not only its servicemen and women at risk, but its cities, for an ally that hedges on America’s
security assistance? Even if the Trump administration works out its differences with the Moon government, the repeated unwillingness under Democratic
and Republican presidents alike to impose any serious costs on North Korea for its illicit activity and aggressions may ultimately wind up undermining U.S.
credibility as much as walking away would. So far, the Trump administration has followed form, doing little in the face of Pyongyang’s multiple missile
launches and worldwide cyberattacks in 2017. If Asian partners and adversaries believe that America’s behavior towards Pyongyang indicates that it is
unwilling to risk a real confrontation, they may begin hedging against a perceived U.S. impotence. Where the Korean peninsula is concerned, America’s
national security policy stands at a crossroads. Its commitment to Seoul cannot simply be asserted as an ordinary foreign policy, or upheld solely on the
account of tradition. Policymakers will have to convince the American public why they should be put at risk, if their involvement in the intra-Korean dispute
is what puts them in that position. As the naval (and soon-to-be nuclear) strategist Bernard Brodie said upon reading of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima,
“everything I have written is obsolete.” The same may be said for America’s Korea policy.

Any chance of an arms race poses significant harms to South Korea because Toby
Rider writes in 2011 that :
Rider, Toby J., Michael G. Findley, and Paul F. Diehl. "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War." Journal of Peace Research 48.1 (2011): 85-100. Web.
As should be clear from the results reported in Model 7, the phase in which the arms race occurs matters when predicting war onset.11 The arms race component
term is negative, suggesting that arms races that occur early in the life of the rivalry are unlikely to be followed by war; the relationship does not reach conventional
levels of statistical significance though. Yet, the probability of war is 78% lower for an infant rivalry that has experienced an arms race as compared to rivalry in the
same phase without an arms race.12 In addition, rivalry phase alone appears to be a poor predictor of war. The interactions between arms race and the latter two,
however, are both positive and statistically significant.13 Arms races that occur in those phases are much more likely to go to war than those occurring in the first
phase. An adolescent rivalry that has experienced an arms race has a 68% greater probability of war onset over the baseline; a mature rivalry has a 222% increase in
the probability of war over the baseline.14 Furthermore, later phase rivalries that have experienced an arms race have a greater risk of war than similar rivalries
that have not experienced an arms race. The probability of war increases by 147% when moving from an adolescent stage rivalry without an arms race to one with
an arms race; a similar change from [moving
from] a mature rivalry without an arms race to one with an arms race
increases the probability of war by 331%
 Joint US-Sino Missile Defense
The United States should engage in transparenct dialogue with China clarifying future
limits on missile defense deployment and that its missile defense is not targeted
against China. The United States federal government should establish an advance
launch notification agreement and joint ballistic missile defense Data exchange center
with China
--- Solvency ---
Public declaration of BMD policies solves- demonstrates commitment and credibility
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013(A public policy research institution
dedicated to analysis and policy impact, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations A Way Forward,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf, 21,22,23)JS

To minimize Chinese reactions to U.S. BMD programs, the United States should seek to quell China’s
concerns as much as possible by making its BMD program as transparent as prudence and security
requirements allow. The Working Group recommends that the United States make the following explicit
statements regarding its ballistic missile defense capabilities and policies in the region: ■ For the
foreseeable future, U.S. missile defense technology will only be able to provide a very limited capability
against sophisticated long-range missile attacks by an advanced adversary. ■ U.S. missile defense
technology does, however, offer real promise in intercepting, and ideally deterring, attacks from less
sophisticated and capable powers such as Iran and North Korea. ■ U.S. national missile defenses are
therefore oriented toward the important challenge of dealing with attacks from North Korea and Iran.
The United States should size and scope its missile defense capabilities oriented against ICBMs
accordingly.12 ■ The United States and its allies benefit from China maintaining a smaller nuclear force.
■ The United States has no intention of developing its ballistic missile defenses in order to negate
China’s long-range nuclear deterrent capability. ■ China’s significant shorter-range missile capability,
especially those missiles that threaten U.S. military forces in the region as well as U.S. allies and
partners, are, however, a legitimate and necessary target for U.S. theater missile defenses. ■ The
United States will make reasonable efforts to maintain or develop a clear distinction between its theater
and national missile defenses. In making these national policy statements, the United States would
make clear that its national missile defenses are designed to counter states such as North Korea and
Iran—and are not designed to block a significant Chinese long-range missile attack. Rather, Washington
should publicly tie its national missile defense development and deployment to the threats on which it is
actually focused: Iran and North Korea. Such a public pronouncement will demonstrate the seriousness
of the U.S. commitment and increase the cost of changing course, thereby increasing the credibility of
this commitment. Publicly tying U.S. national missile defense to the threat from North Korean and
Iranian nuclear missiles would have several clear benefits. For one thing, the United States gains little
from ambiguity in this area—it cannot make a strategically significant and sustainable dent in defending
against China’s nuclear force, and seeking to do so would engage the United States in a losing
investment competition because it would be far easier and cheaper for the Chinese to produce
penetrating missiles than for the United States to produce an effective interception network. Moreover,
such a competition would very likely produce a much larger and more sophisticated Chinese nuclear
arsenal—exactly what the United States seeks to avoid. In addition, it could undermine prospects for
cooperation in other areas of the U.S.-China relationship. If Beijing’s concerns about U.S. BMD programs
are genuine, a public U.S. commitment should also reduce or eliminate China’s incentive to expand its
missile forces beyond their current trajectory (assuming Beijing viewed the U.S. commitment as credible
and lasting). Regardless, such a step would provide the basis for assessing the extent to which the
increase in China’s nuclear forces is being driven by U.S. BMD. If Beijing continued to build up its nuclear
capabilities beyond what is needed for the “lean and effective” force it says it needs for China’s security,
even in the face of a credible U.S. commitment, Washington and its allies would know more about
China’s intentions (though U.S. conventional strategic strike capabilities could introduce a complicating
factor). In addition, if China is genuinely concerned about U.S. BMD, explicitly tying expanded
deployments to a growing threat would have the added benefit of encouraging China to do whatever it
can to limit the expansion and modernization of North Korea’s missile program. Indeed, China’s best
chance to limit U.S. BMD capable of intercepting ICBMs launched from Asia is to help the United States
to mitigate the threat from North Korea.13 Such a policy would also demonstrate to China the
importance of clearly delineating between its nuclear and conventional missile capabilities

Testing Notifications and Limited Data Exchange will decrease BMD Nuclear Tension
Macdonald 13 (Bruce Macdonald is a retired US Navy Vise Admiral, Nov 5 2013, Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation Project, “China, US and Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications/Opportunities for Nuclear
Stability”, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/attachments/131104_Session6_BMacDonald.pdf)
6 Chinese Perceptions of Current U.S. BMD Intentions and Capabilities  “It’s not for me to say,” and is important to distinguish between public
rhetoric and internal thinking, but there is clearly Chinese uneasiness. • BMD work with Japan also likely creates tensions  China
should not worry under current U.S. strategic BMD planning, but plans could change, as they have in past  Even if U.S. BMD deployments
increased, China can take steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent credibility  Isolated U.S. voices calling for building enough BMD to counter
China should not be taken seriously. Support in U.S. is not there, especially given budget tightness.  China likely sees U.S. capabilities as
modest but some capability growth likely, especially at tactical level.  George Bush only sought 40 interceptors, which should allay Chinese
anxieties 7 U.S. Views of Chinese BMD Policies and Intentions  “China is proceeding with the research and development of a missile defense
umbrella consisting of kinetic energy interceptors at exo-atmospheric altitudes (>80km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other
aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere  “In January 2010, and again in January 2013, China successfully intercepted a ballistic missile
at mid-course, using a ground-based missile.”  At a minimum, China appears to be preserving the option of deploying a BMD system.  India’s
Agni-5 and Agni-6 programs must be at least influencing China’s BMD thinking – India deploying Agni-5 in 2015, Agni-6 testing to begin as early
as 2017  India developing BMD as well, could increase Chinese interest 8 BMD Perceptions and Deterrence Dynamics  Key to understanding
BMD and deterrence dynamics is to recognize that confidence in BMD is not a zero-sum game  To the extent U.S. confidence in its BMD falls
short of perfection, adversary confidence in its ability to penetrate U.S. missile defenses does not increase by a corresponding amount, or
anywhere near it  Perceptions of possible BMD performance are at least as, if not more, important to deterrence than real capability 9 The Key
Role of Risk Aversion in Crisis Stability  When considering nuclear weapons employment issues, countries are usually strongly risk averse 
Other countries may, but U.S. does not see its BMD as an attack shield, to mop up after a U.S. first strike – U.S. is risk averse, too  This nuclear
risk aversion inhibits escalation in a crisis, giving rise to a “missile defense hysteresis” phenomenon 10 What is Missile Defense Hysteresis? 
Facing a threat from a small nuclear power like DPRK or Iran -- and aware of its BMD limitations -- the U.S. cannot count on its BMD working
reasonably well  Facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD not working reasonably well  Each side may
be deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisis 
This hysteresis is not robust, but it’s not trivial, and it should not be ignored 11 Observations on “Thin Strategic” BMD  The deterrent
endurance of thin strategic BMD has elements of both fragility and robustness: • Not affected by small changes in either offense or defense • Is
affected by large offense increases • Could be affected by technology changes • Could be eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what have
I got to lose?”)  More robust against technological change against a DPRK than an Iran – Iran can bring far more resources to the “game” than
DPRK  No need for BMD to be a contentious U.S.-China issue if handled correctly What Forms of Transparency
Would Be Valuable For/Acceptable to Both Sides?  China has long followed a policy of strategic opacity based on its
perception that it is a weaker power, and that transparency would be harmful. But China is now a much stronger power.  While perhaps
useful in the past, opacity is increasingly harmful to China’s longer-run security interests: • Improved
understanding of China BMD objectives would avoid possibly destabilizing steps that either side might make as it hedges its security position,
e.g., deploying more warheads, penaids, etc. • Would not require detailed release of technical data, just broad program plans and objectives, as
the U.S. does; also would not bar changing plans over time – U.S. does this all the time  Other confidence
building measures such
as testing notifications, limited data exchanges, could help build confidence  U.S. has offered multiple
measures to Russia, could be considered with China under proper circumstances 13 Observations on “Thin
Strategic” BMD  The deterrent endurance of thin strategic BMD has elements of both fragility and robustness: • Not affected by small changes
in either offense or defense • Is affected by large offense increases • Could be affected by technology changes or perceptions of regime survival
(“what have I got to lose?”)  More robust against technological change against a DPRK than an Iran – Iran can bring far more resources to bear
than DPRK  Neither the U.S. nor China will allow its nuclear deterrent capability to be eroded and will take whatever steps are necessary to
preserve it

Establishing a Joint BMD system and Data Exchange center solves relations and
nuclear escalation.
Dynkin 10 (Alexander, Economist, “Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear disarmament” available:
http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/uploads/publications/NON_NUCLEARFACTORSOFNUCLEARDISARMAMENT_062210.pdf Nuclear
Security Project, accessed: 6/20/16) KAB

To overcome the persisting mutual distrust, it would be reasonable to begin with restoring the
elements of the cooperation that have been lost over the recent years. Before everything else, it means
urgently reviving the project of the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) to monitor the launches
of missiles and space vehicles. As an option, the parties may implement the proposal on creating a so-
called virtual data exchange centre. In this respect, there are quite a number of complementary
areas offering opportunities for cooperation between the US, the European members of NATO and
Russia in terms of organization and technology that may be realized in the context of the current
outlook for US-Russia strategic partnership. In the expert and political community there is an
increasingly popular opinion that cooperation on BMD may become a key element that will
contribute to the enhancement of mutual effort in nuclear arms reduction, strengthening the
regimes of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and ensuring international security at large.
The principal recommendation of the participants of the IMEMO-NTI conference is to proceed without
delay with the most simple and obviously doable first steps mentioned above, instead of trying to
foresee and elaborate problems and solutions for dec- 11 ades ahead (i.e. joint deployment and
operating TMD and strategic BMD, abandoning mutual nuclear deterrence, constructively engaging
China, India etc.). Moving ahead with obvious initial steps may gain the momentum of its own
and make resolution of more complex issues much easier in the long run

Launch notification defuses tensions

Cosmas et al 14 ( Nicholas Cosmas is a Foreign Area Officer for the US Army, Meicen Sun is doctoral
student, John Warden is a WSD-Handa Fellow, 10-27-2014, “US-China need a Missile Launch Notification
Deal”, US-China Perception Monitor, http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/10/05/us-china-need-a-
missile-launch-notification-deal-2/)

The United States and China should establish an advance launch notification agreement for long-range
missile systems. In his July call with Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Barack Obama again called for an improved U.S.-China
relationship defined by “increased practical cooperation and constructive management of differences.” But between territorial issues, cyber
espionage, air-to-air standoffs, and countless other flare ups, there are few reasons to be optimistic about U.S.-China relations in the short or
medium-term. One area where progress has been particularly slow is the strategic relationship. Throughout the Obama administration,
Washington has called for an official, Track-I discussion centered on nuclear weapons and strategic capabilities—to include nuclear weapon
posture, missile defense, and long-range conventional strike—but Beijing has declined. Chinese interlocutors maintain that China, as the weaker
power, has not reached the point where such discussions with the United States are appropriate. Yet both sides acknowledge that the
United
States and China have a shared interest in improving strategic communication. In April, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Chuck Hagel and Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan proposed a “military notification
mechanism of major military activities.” Advance notification would allow the two countries to avoid
misperception, miscalculation, and inadvertent escalation in times of crises. Under the broader military
notification umbrella, the United States and China should establish a reciprocal advance launch notification
agreement for long-range missile systems. Such an agreement would serve two purposes. First, it would establish the foundation
for a broader military notification mechanism. Second, it would serve as a test case for informal arms control arrangements. Fortunately, both the
United States and China have experience with launch notification agreements. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the first such
agreement, the Accident Measures Agreement, as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1971. At the 1988 Moscow Summit,
they signed the more expansive Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, which for the first time required prior notification for all
strategic ballistic missile launches. China and Russia negotiated a separate bilateral ballistic missile launch notification agreement in 2009. This
was the first time that China agreed to share information about its ballistic missile launches. However, despite these parallel agreements, the
United States and China have been unwilling to share information with each other about strategic capabilities. To
improve
communication and build trust, the United States and China should develop a launch notification
agreement that includes not only intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, but also long-range conventional strike and ballistic missile defense interceptors. Each
country should submit to notifying the other at least twenty-four hours in advance of the planned date,
launch location, and area of impact of launches for any of the included systems. Because live-tests of strategic
systems are infrequent, the agreement would likely cover only a handful of launches each year. A U.S.-China advance launch
notification agreement would have a number of benefits. First, it would ensure that launches are not
misinterpreted as attacks. Mistaken retaliation is a low-risk, but potentially catastrophic scenario. An
advance notification mechanism would ensure that each country can easily inform the other when it
carries out a test or launches a missile at a third-party. Second, it would reduce misunderstanding
about capabilities and each country’s testing regime. Both sides would, in particular, be interested to
learn about the parameters of the other’s ballistic missile defense testing program, hypersonic capabilities,
and the development of new long-range missiles. With this information at their disposal, military planners
in both countries could avoid worst-case assumptions. Third, it would improve both sides’ early
warning capabilities. Advance notification would aid efforts to identify characteristics of particular
missiles via national technical means and potentially offer a way to distinguish between conventional and
nuclear-armed missiles. Finally, a launch notification agreement would lay the groundwork for future
confidence-building measures. The agreement would demonstrate the benefits of increased transparency
and build the mechanisms and expertise for future steps to enhance strategic stability. These benefits would be
amplified if the United States and China went further and included a provision requiring the exchange of telemetry (technical data that a missile
sends to operators during flight) for each test. The United States and Russia agreed to exchange such data in START I and continue to do so in a
more limited fashion under New START. Exchanging this data would give both sides a better picture of the types of capabilities that the other is
developing and fielding and, perhaps most important, show that neither has anything to hide. There would, of course, be obstacles, but these can
be managed. For example, both sides might worry about asymmetric benefits. The United States has a far more advanced capability than China to
detect and predict launches of ballistic missiles around the world. As a result, some U.S. analysts might argue that the United States is giving up a
lot of information for little benefit. Chinese analysts, on the other hand, might argue that the United States would gain greater insight from data
provided. A well-crafted agreement, however, would allow each to demonstrate that, even if somewhat asymmetrical, the benefits outweigh the
costs. Namely, that the reduced risk of miscalculation outweighs the cost of more accurate military planning. A second obstacle is the security of
information. China would be most concerned with Japan’s access to Chinese launch information. Japan has a close alliance relationship with the
United States, and China is suspicious of its expanding defense capabilities. The United States would be most concerned with the transfer of
intelligence to North Korea. The United States has been critical of China’s stance toward North Korea’s nuclear program and would worry that
information about its strategic systems would improve North Korean military planning. To allay such fears, the two sides must exclude the most
sensitive information and provide reliable guarantees that shared information will not be passed to third parties. To
begin to
operationalize such an agreement, the United States and China should gather technical and policy
experts in a Track-II working group dedicated exclusively to launch notification. U.S. and Chinese experts
have experience working together through informal mechanisms such as the Pacific Forum CSIS-Naval Postgraduate School U.S.-China Strategic
 A well-implemented Track-II
Dialogue and could take those discussions to the next level by addressing a specific policy challenge.
framework would elucidate the benefits and obstacles of a launch notification agreement, while
providing each side with timely information about relevant technological and policy developments—a confidence-building measure in and of
itself. In service of eventual government adoption, the working group could answer a number of relevant questions. First, would a U.S.-China
launch notification agreement enhance strategic stability and improve the U.S.-China relationship? Second, for the purposes of this agreement,
what should constitute a “long-range missile system?” Third, are there any lessons from the U.S.-Soviet or China-Russia agreements that should
inform the U.S.-China agreement? Finally, should the agreement be extended beyond notifications to include on-site monitoring or the exchange
of telemetry data? As the Track-II group begins to hammer out the details,
the governments could establish trust and build
momentum for the proposal by providing post-launch notifications for long-range missile and interceptor
tests. As an interim step, this would allow both countries to become comfortable with sharing launch information and start to reduce
misunderstanding. There is no panacea for U.S.-China relations, but small, incremental steps can have an important
impact. Even as the relationship remains rocky, mechanisms for strategic dialogue and communication can prevent
inevitable crises from spiraling out of control.

Increasing the transparency of the BMD program solves Chinese arms expansion
escalation
Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013(A public policy research institution
dedicated to analysis and policy impact, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations A Way Forward,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf, 7)JS
Ballistic missile defenses, linkage to North Korea. The United States should specifically and publicly tie the development and deployment of its
national missile defenses oriented to East Asia to the North Korean threat, as it has tied its missile defense programs in the Euro-Atlantic area
to the Iranian threat. The United States is building up its national missile defenses to guard against the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
threat from North Korea, Iran, and other rogue states. The Obama administration has consistently described the current U.S. national missile
defenses as designed for Iran and North Korea, but it has been unable to allay China’s concerns about the future development of the program.
To minimize China’s reactions to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, the United States should seek to
quell China’s concerns as much as possible by making the U.S. BMD program as transparent as prudence and
security allow and by making it clear that the United States has no intention of using its ballistic missile
defenses to negate China’s long-range nuclear deterrent capability. The Working Group therefore recommends that the
United States make it clear to Beijing that it will continue to adjust the size and scope of its national
missile defenses in accordance with the development of the North Korean and Iranian ICBM threats, not
China’s long-range nuclear forces. The Working Group notes, however, that China’s significant shorter-range conventional missile
capability, especially those ballistic and cruise missiles that threaten U.S. military forces in the region as well as U.S. allies and partners, are a
legitimate and necessary target for the development of U.S. theater missile defenses. Yet the reality that China’s conventional and nuclear
missile forces are often collocated challenges the ability of regional militaries to differentiate between them. Such a
public
pronouncement will demonstrate the seriousness of U.S. assurances and increase the cost of changing
course, thereby increasing the credibility of the U.S. commitment. If Beijing’s concerns about U.S. BMD programs are
genuine, a public U.S. commitment should reduce or eliminate China’s incentive to expand its missile forces
beyond the current trajectory (assuming Beijing views the U.S. commitment as credible and lasting). Regardless, such a step would
provide the basis for assessing the extent to which the increase in China’s nuclear forces is being driven by U.S. BMD. If Beijing continues to
build up its nuclear capabilities beyond what is needed for the “lean and effective” force it says it needs to protect its security, even in the face
of a credible U.S. commitment, Washington and its allies will learn more about China’s intentions. In addition, if China is genuinely concerned
about U.S. BMD, explicitly tying expanded U.S. missile defense deployments to a growing North Korean threat would have the added benefit of
encouraging China to do whatever it can to limit the expansion and modernization of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and curtail its
belligerence. Without a doubt, China’s best chance to limit a U.S. BMD system capable of intercepting ICBMs launched from Asia is to help the
United States mitigate the threat from North Korea.
BMD launch notifications diminishes the chance of accidental attacks and enhances
strategic stability
Cosmas, Sun, and Warden, October 2014(Nicholas, Meicen, and John K, Military Scholar, PhD
student of international relations and comparative politics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a
senior fellow for national security policy at the Pacific Forum CSIS, US-China Need a Missile Launch
Notification Deal, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/us-china-need-a-missile-launch-notification-deal/)JS

Yet both sides acknowledge that the United States and China have a shared interest in improving strategic
communication. In April, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Chinese Minister of Defense Chang
Wanquan proposed a “military notification mechanism of major military activities.” Advance notification
would allow the two countries to avoid misperception, miscalculation, and inadvertent escalation in
times of crises. Under the broader military notification umbrella, the United States and China should
establish a reciprocal advance launch notification agreement for long-range missile systems. Such an
agreement would serve two purposes. First, it would establish the foundation for a broader military notification
mechanism. Second, it would serve as a test case for informal arms control arrangements. Fortunately, both the
United States and China have experience with launch notification agreements. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the first such
agreement, the Accident Measures Agreement, as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1971. At the 1988 Moscow Summit, they
signed the more expansive Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, which for the first time required prior notification for all strategic
ballistic missile launches. China and Russia negotiated a separate bilateral ballistic missile launch notification agreement in 2009. This was the
first time that China agreed to share information about its ballistic missile launches. However, despite these parallel agreements, the United
States and China have been unwilling to share information with each other about strategic capabilities. To improve communication
and build trust, the United States and China should develop a launch notification agreement that
includes not only intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but also
long-range conventional strike and ballistic missile defense interceptors. Each country should submit to
notifying the other at least twenty-four hours in advance of the planned date, launch location, and area
of impact of launches for any of the included systems. Because live-tests of strategic systems are infrequent, the
agreement would likely cover only a handful of launches each year. A U.S.-China advance launch notification agreement
would have a number of benefits. First, it would ensure that launches are not misinterpreted as attacks.
Mistaken retaliation is a low-risk, but potentially catastrophic scenario. An advance notification mechanism would
ensure that each country can easily inform the other when it carries out a test or launches a missile at a third-party. Second, it would
reduce misunderstanding about capabilities and each country’s testing regime. Both sides would, in particular, be
interested to learn about the parameters of the other’s ballistic missile defense testing program, hypersonic capabilities, and the development
of new long-range missiles. With
this information at their disposal, military planners in both countries could
avoid worst-case assumptions. Third, it would improve both sides’ early warning capabilities. Advance
notification would aid efforts to identify characteristics of particular missiles via national technical
means and potentially offer a way to distinguish between conventional and nuclear-armed missiles.
Finally, a launch notification agreement would lay the groundwork for future confidence-building
measures. The agreement would demonstrate the benefits of increased transparency and build the
mechanisms and expertise for future steps to enhance strategic stability. These benefits would be amplified if the
United States and China went further and included a provision requiring the exchange of telemetry (technical data that a missile sends to
operators during flight) for each test. The United States and Russia agreed to exchange such data in START I and continue to do so in a more
limited fashion under New START. Exchanging this data would give both sides a better picture of the types of capabilities that the other is
developing and fielding and, perhaps most important, show that neither has anything to hide. There would, of course, be obstacles, but these
can be managed. For example, both sides might worry about asymmetric benefits. The United States has a far more advanced capability than
China to detect and predict launches of ballistic missiles around the world. As a result, some U.S. analysts might argue that the United States is
giving up a lot of information for little benefit. Chinese analysts, on the other hand, might argue that the United States would gain greater
insight from data provided. A well-crafted agreement, however, would allow each to demonstrate that, even if somewhat asymmetrical, the
benefits outweigh the costs. Namely, that the reduced risk of miscalculation outweighs the cost of more accurate military planning. A second
obstacle is the security of information. China would be most concerned with Japan’s access to Chinese launch information. Japan has a close
alliance relationship with the United States, and China is suspicious of its expanding defense capabilities. The United States would be most
concerned with the transfer of intelligence to North Korea. The United States has been critical of China’s stance toward North Korea’s nuclear
program and would worry that information about its strategic systems would improve North Korean military planning. To allay such fears, the
two sides must exclude the most sensitive information and provide reliable guarantees that shared information will not be passed to third
parties.

China currently has a misunderstanding about THAAD. Dialogue will solve.

South China Morning Post 03/30, (SCMP International, “U.S offers to brief china on over deployment of THAAD missile
system in South Korea” , SCMP, available: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1931667/us-offers-brief-china-over-
deployment-thaad-missile accessed: 6/22/2016 ) KAB

A senior United States diplomat said on Tuesday he hopes China will accept an offer for a technical
briefing on a new missile defence system the US wants to deploy in South Korea – a prospect Beijing sees as a threat to its national security. US Deputy
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence ( THAAD) system was necessary for the US to protect itself and regional
allies from North Korean missile attacks. “We realise China may not believe us and also proposed to go
through the technology and specifications with them ... and we are prepared to explain [about] what the technology does
and what it doesn’t do and hopefully they will take us up on that proposal,” Blinken told Washington’s Brookings
Institution. The Chinese foreign ministry did not say whether China would join the meeting, but said THAAD would affect stability in North and East Asia. “Installing
the THAAD system has extended far beyond the defence need against North Korea, and will cause direct harm to China’s strategic and security interests, as well as
the regional balance,” Hong Lei, the ministry’s spokesman said at a regular press conference yesterday. Hong said the situation in the Korean peninsula was
complicated and sensitive, and China hoped all countries coulc “act with caution and be responsible”. The US wants its THAAD missile system in Asia because of
this mobile North Korean weapon. The offer by Washington came ahead of a visit by President Xi Jinping to Washington on Thursday for
a nuclear security summit that will have concerns about North Korea high on the agenda. Xi
Jinping to attend US nuclear security summit amid tensions over North Korea’s claim to have tested hydrogen bomb The US and South Korea agreed
to begin talks on possible THAAD deployment last month after North Korea tested its fourth nuclear
bomb on January 6 and launched a long-range rocket on February 7. China backed tough new sanctions on North Korea following the tests, but has
voiced opposition to THAAD as its radar has a range that would extend far beyond the Korean peninsula and into China. Why does China react
so strongly over the South Korea-based anti-missile system? Blinken said THAAD deployment was a necessary step until
Pyongyang’s behaviour changed. “None of these steps are directed against China, but we have also been very clear that as long as this
persists ... we will have to take steps,” he said. Jin Canrong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, said the offer by the
US was a positive move to ease mistrust. “What China is worried about is the political
intentions behind the US installing such a system,” said Jin. “This will deepen the mistrust
between China and the US, as well as create cracks in relations between China and South
Korea,” he added. “But the US and South Korea have yet to reach conclusion on details of the plan, such as how the two countries will divide the cost of
installing such system,” Jin said, noting that the talk between China and the US would take place only after conclusions were reached between the US and South
Korea.gm

--- Modernization ---

Engaging China is key to global non-proliferation – a provocative posture undermines it

Bowen et al 13, Bowen is professor of nonproliferation and international security and the director of
the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King's College in
London, Salisbury is a researcher at Project Alpha, an effort funded by the British government to build
proliferation resistance within the British private sector and abroad, Stewart runs Project Alpha at King's
College London, which works to understand and counter illicit trade. Through Project Alpha, he has
written extensively on export controls and illicit proliferation-related technologies, Engaging China in
proliferation prevention, thebulletin.org/engaging-china-proliferation-prevention
China continues to be the key source of goods and technology for the prohibited nuclear and missile programs
of Iran and North Korea , with some officials estimating that China is used as a transit route for up to 90
percent of goods destined for those programs. The alleged serial Chinese proliferator Li Fang Wei (aka Karl
Lee) reportedly was able to earn more than $10 million from the sale of missile-related items to Iran
after the United States indicted him in 2009 on more than 100 criminal counts of falsifying business
records related to illicit trade with subsidiaries of an Iranian military agency. Meanwhile, the Chinese
service sector provides many of the financial and transport services through which the strategic
programs of North Korea, in particular, are sustained. Today, Chinese industry is on the cusp of attaining
production capability for a wide variety of strategic commodities that are high on the list of
procurement priorities for nuclear and missile programs of concern. Simply stated: Nuclear proliferation
from or through China may pose the single biggest risk to the international community's nonproliferation
efforts . Nonetheless , over the past two decades, China has slowly expanded its commitments to and
implementation of nonproliferation measures. The latest such step was the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s
announcement that it will implement UN sanctions on all trade with North Korea. Though China has
previously prohibited the export of proliferation-sensitive goods to North Korea, the buy-in to the
sanctions marks a turning point in global efforts to prevent proliferation . The international community must now carefully calculate how best to encourage Beijing to take further action in curbing

proliferation. There appear to be three basic options: inclusion, exclusion, or maintaining the status quo. The ministry’s recent announcement on North Korea, as well as our fieldwork in China and discussions with officials involved in interdiction operations all suggest that Beijing is ready to travel the path of inclusion and engagement with international nonproliferation regimes. The
international community should respond positively but not naïvely. China’s nonproliferation commitments have expanded, and its record has improved, but—if China is to claim a place as a fully responsible strategic technology holder—the Chinese government must invest more resources in government agencies responsible for nonproliferation and outreach efforts to industry.
China’s nonproliferation record. Although Chinese entities have clearly played an important role in illicit trade, the type of entities involved in proliferation and the level of government complicity have changed significantly over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of China’s large state-owned defense enterprises sold large quantities of conventional arms and missiles, complete
nuclear and missile facilities, and dual-use and unfinished technologies to Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. More recently, the involvement of large state-owned strategic and defense companies has subsided. Today, the primary source of goods for prohibited programs is China’s private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises that often act as
distributors or middlemen in trade with western manufacturers. Setting aside the questionable transfer of reactor technology to Pakistan over the past two decades, state-authorized transfers of complete missile systems and nuclear or missile production facilities have ceased. Instead, proliferation most often involves goods that are dual-use in nature or are below control-list
thresholds—that is, just below the point when a specific controlled item or technology becomes subject to export licensing requirements. It is clear that large state-owned enterprises in China are determined to protect their international business by, at least publicly, demonstrating their nonproliferation compliance policies and practices. It is true that subsidiaries of Chinese state-
owned enterprises may be less well-informed than their parent companies, but the trend is clear. Smaller firms, often without a presence in Beijing, are frequently less aware of nonproliferation issues. Even though state-owned enterprises show signs of improved compliance, vast numbers of dual-use manufacturers and traders are not being similarly engaged on trade control
issues. The broad positive changes in China’s approach are illustrated by a number of developments. It has signed up to international supplier regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and voluntarily adheres to the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines (albeit only the 2002 lists), even though the regime has so far refused to grant China membership. Moreover,
China’s domestic export licensing system is said to use the control lists and guidelines of both these regimes as well as the Australia Group, which seeks to control the trade in sensitive chemical and biological materials and technologies. Such involvement goes beyond use of the guidelines and lists, as China also actively participates in the maintenance of both. In this context, China’s
active participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s recent fundamental review of its control lists should be looked upon positively. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has supported a range of relevant UN resolutions on both export controls and sanctions on North Korea and Iran, even actively participating in industry awareness activities in this area. The
Chinese government has also undertaken prosecutions of a small number of companies for breaching export controls, publicizing their details and imposing fines. Given China's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, some observers view decisions in recent years to sell commercial nuclear power reactors to Pakistan under a so-called “grandfather arrangement” as a significant
indicator of the country's lack of commitment to nonproliferation principles. But such a view may be oversimplified. First, the reactors would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Before joining the group, China had already sold several reactors to Pakistan, and the commercial light water reactors involved are at best sub-optimal for use in supporting the
country’s weapons program. Moreover, the reactor sale also must be understood in the context of the US-India nuclear deal that many believe was, in part, designed to strengthen America’s relationship with India to counterbalance the rising regional influence of China. Indeed, it was only through intense US diplomacy that the Nuclear Suppliers Group exempted India from its full-
scope safeguards requirement, which previously had prohibited sales of the most sensitive nuclear technologies to countries such as India and Pakistan. Because the reactors will be under safeguards, one could therefore view the sale as a way for China to respond to US-led nuclear trade relations with India without directly assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The issue is
enforcement. While no country can expect every company under its jurisdiction to comply completely with export control laws, the ratio of potentially sensitive exports to prosecutions in China does raise significant concerns. It is not clear how diligently and with what resources China monitors proliferation by Chinese companies and investigates breaches. Concerns are heightened
by China’s response to Western requests for interdiction of proliferation-related trade. China is not a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, an international mechanism for interdicting shipments of materials related to weapons of mass destruction, but Western governments frequently pass intelligence tips to their Chinese counterparts. China is known to have taken action
to prevent illicit transactions in some cases, but too often there is insufficient transparency regarding the actions that have, or have not, been taken. The Karl Li case is a stark example. A 2009 US indictment alleged that Li repeatedly sold prohibited missile-related technology to Iran. According to open sources, his activity was allowed to continue despite US requests for Chinese
intervention. There is little evidence that the Chinese government undertook substantial investigative action with any consequence in this case. China has investigated other potential breaches identified on the basis of Western intelligence tips. But Chinese officials often state that such intelligence-derived information is incomplete, and protest against what are seen as illegitimate

and unfair sanctions imposed on Chinese entities for their role in proliferation. Engaging China on nonproliferation. It is apparent that the scale of the challenge
facing Chinese nonproliferation officials is immense and growing . There are purportedly thousands of
exporters of dual-use technologies in China, and this number is only going to grow . The Chinese
manufacturing base for proliferation-sensitive goods is expanding, as the government has authorized
strategic investment in the nuclear, semiconductor, composites, and alloys sectors through multiple
five-year plans. Technology from each of these sectors appears in the lists of the international export-
control regimes; in fact, the listing of these technologies may be one reason that China is seeking an
indigenous capability to produce them. Despite China’s significant progress to date, Chinese authorities will have to adopt a comprehensive approach to overcome the multiple challenges associated with meeting the country’s nonproliferation obligations. Other states face many

of these same challenges, although they are perhaps more acute in China. There are clearly many ways in which Western states and China could learn from each other and better meet nonproliferation objectives. Before they can do so, however, the international community must decide how it will engage China in curbing illicit trade: through including, excluding, or maintaining the

Sufficient progress has been made in China to warrant pursuit of an inclusive approach to engaging China
nonproliferation status quo?

in implementing nonproliferation controls. Opting for any other strategy will risk missing a great opportunity to
assist with capacity building as China’s industry continues to grow. Practically speaking, this option would entail the Missile Technology Control Regime member states laying out clear expectations as to what China must be

required to do to join the regime. The international community should also be prepared to work with, and potentially provide resources to, China to help it implement a national strategy to prevent illicit trade. Such a strategy should cover all aspects of trade-control implementation. Under this approach, relevant Western governments would continue to develop intelligence
exchanges with China on proliferation issues. And the government should expand outreach programs to the private sector, perhaps through the adoption of a formal industry engagement strategy. The principal objective would be to encourage China to resource its own outreach and enforcement activities in the medium-to-long term, so that China would eventually become a true
non-proliferation partner on an equal footing with other states. What should China do? While China has adopted domestic legislation to comply with its international obligations, both this legislation and its implementation could be improved. The main body of China’s dedicated export-control legislation was put in place in 2002, before the UN Security Council’s adoption of a 2004
resolution requiring countries to implement an “effective” system of export controls. That resolution aside, there are specific export-control improvements China should seek to implement. Though not consolidated in a single law, China’s export-control legislation appears to provide a solid basis for Chinese officials to act when there is a need to do so. Nonetheless, the Chinese
export laws do appear to lack certain controls—particularly, transshipment controls to prevent the passage through China of sensitive goods from other countries to destinations of concern. China should ensure that all necessary elements of an effective control system are included in its export-control legislation. Although there is no specific need for China to place its legislation in a
single consolidated export control act, Chinese officials may nonetheless wish to explore this in the medium-to-long term. The implementation and enforcement of export controls present a significant inter-agency challenge for all countries, requiring foreign ministries, licensing authorities, technologists, enforcement agencies, prosecution bodies and intelligence agencies to
collaborate. There is growing evidence that China’s government departments and agencies are working together. Even so, there is also evidence that the inter-agency process in China still suffers from a lack of transparency and coherence. China has become increasingly responsive in recent years to information about proliferation activities, but many suspected proliferators continue
to appear to go unpunished. Chinese authorities should make its interdepartmental process more transparent, among other things including providing details to international partners on what action has been taken, if any, in response to intelligence tips. Chinese officials should also consider making a statement on what investigative action was taken against Karl Li. China also needs
to ensure that relevant agencies and departments at the provincial level place the same priorities on nonproliferation as does Beijing. Beyond the challenges of deepening inter-agency cooperation, China clearly lacks the capacity to enforce nonproliferation measures across the country’s growing industries. As the number of businesses in China explodes, Chinese transport nodes are
also growing in size and capacity. Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai are all now among the 20 largest airports in the world. Similarly, China hosts six of the eight busiest seaports in the world, and nine out of the top 20. China’s enforcement capacity must grow to reflect the prominence of its transportation nodes in the global economy, and more central government and provincial
staff must be assigned to enforce laws and conduct outreach to the private sector. Finally, China must do more to engage exporters in nonproliferation programs. By allowing government ministries to work with international partners and hold a number of outreach events in recent years, the Chinese government has demonstrated a growing appreciation of the value of engaging
export business. Workshops have been well attended, both by state-owned enterprises and by other businesses. But true nonproliferation success requires that all exporters know the risks associated with trading in sensitive goods and technologies. Chinese authorities at both the central and provincial levels must, therefore, develop an industry-engagement strategy that includes
workshops and other mechanisms to raise awareness of export controls across Chinese industry. Chinese authorities should also create a strategy to engage the international academic and research community in implementing trade-control obligations. Though face-to-face training can be effective, new tools, such as e-learning and other web-based resources, may be required to

Clear progress, with remaining challenges. China has made notable strides in its
meet the growing scale of the challenge posed by industrial expansion in China.

international nonproliferation commitments and domestic efforts to ensure they are met. Significant challenges
remain and, given China’s expanding capacity to manufacture sensitive technologies, efforts to engage China on
nonproliferation should be coordinated, so that resources can be put to best use at this crucial time . The
international community should respond positively to China’s demonstrated intenti on to work toward
nonproliferation objectives, and international partners should work with Beijing to implement a
comprehensive strategy that includes industry engagement. Pursuing an alternative course of action to
engagement risks overlooking China’s gradual progress and alienating the Chinese leadership. Not only could this
result in China’s commitment waning , but it could also undermine broader nonproliferation efforts around the
world.

--- Sino-SK Relations ---

The plan solves – showing China that BMD doesn’t threaten them assauges their
concerns about THAAD
Guy Taylor February 25, 2016( Guy Taylor is the National Security Team Leader at The Washington
Times, overseeing the paper's State Department, Pentagon and intelligence community coverage ,China
says it might accept U.S. missile shield in South Korea
,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/25/thaad-china-says-it-might-accept-us-missile-
shield/)/JS

China’s top diplomat says Beijing has “legitimate national security” concerns over the potential deployment of
an advanced U.S. missile shield to South Korea in response to growing nuclear provocations from North Korea — but Chinese
leaders also respect that it will be up to Seoul to “make a final decision” on the matter. The comments by
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Washington on Thursday were a departure from Beijing’s long-held
and aggressive resistance to the idea that Seoul might allow the U.S. to position the so-called Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. “The United States is likely to deploy THAAD in the [South
Korea],” Mr. Wang said. “Of course, it’s up to the [South Korean] government to make a final decision. To some extent, it’s their
internal affair and China does not interfere in internal affairs of other countries.” His remarks came a day after
South Korean officials warned Beijing not to try and bully Seoul out of accepting the missile system. “This is a matter we will decided upon
according to our own security and national interests,” Jung Youn-kuk, a spokesman for South Korean President Park Geun-hye said on
Wednesday. “The Chinese had better recognize that.” Friction over the issue has risen since early February, when Washington and Seoul
announced the formalization of talks toward deploying THAAD in response to North Korea’s recent nuclear test and long-range rocket launch —
moves by Pyongyang that U.S. officials say were aimed at developing ballistic nuclear weapons. The talk of THAAD has also drawn the ire of
Russia, where officials say it would be an unnecessarily aggressive U.S. military move in North Asia. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, who held
talks with Mr. Wang at the State Department this week, has treaded carefully on the issue while also appearing unapologetic about about
Washington’s intentions. “Russia and China have obviously both expressed concerns,” Mr. Kerry said during a joint news conference with the
Chinese foreign minister on Tuesday. “We
have made it very clear that we are not hungry or anxious or looking for
an opportunity to be able to deploy THAAD.” “THAAD is a purely defensive mechanism,” the secretary of state
added. “It’s not an offensive weapon [and] doesn’t have offensive capability. It is purely capable of shooting down a ballistic missile that it
intercepts, and it is there for the protection of Korea and the protection of the United States — if it were to be there.” While
debate over
the missile shield’s potential deployment has gone behind the scenes for years, U.S. and South Korean
officials have long held off on taking action, mainly out of concern that the shield would anger China.
Chinese state media outlets have carried articles during recent years accusing Washington of stoking tensions with North Korea purely to create
a pretext for expanding America’s military footprint in the region. With some 30,000 U.S. troops already stationed in South Korea and roughly
60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s active assets deployed in the Pacific theater, analysts say, the Chinese believe Washington is bent on doing
whatever it takes to position advanced missile systems across Asia. The Chinese Foreign Ministry initially reacted to the U.S.-South Korean
announcement on THAAD by asserting that the system’s deployment would only escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula and damage
regional peace and stability. The issue has been unquestionably sticky for the Park government in Seoul, which has sought to promote an era of
warm relations with China despite Beijing’s ongoing economic support for North Korea. Chinese officials have for years warned that a South
Korean embrace of THAAD could damage the growing economic and diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing. But on Wednesday,
Mr. Wang suggested Chinese leaders may be willing to accept THAAD’s deployment if Washington can
clearly convince them the missile shield will not threaten China’s own national security. “We understand
that in a very complex environment, the United States and [South Korea] want to ensure their own
security,” he said in remarks at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington. “But I must point out that the X-band
radar associated with the THAAD system has a radius that goes far beyond the Korean peninsula and
reaches into the interior of China,” he said. “In other words, China’s legitimate national security
interests may be jeopardized or threatened.” “We believe China’s legitimate security concerns must be taken into
account and a convincing explanation must be provided to China,” Mr. Wang added. “I don’t think it’s
too much to ask. It’s a reasonable position.” Some analysts say the Chinese believe the U.S. is engaged in a
kind of deception — seeking to position THAAD in South Korea not only as a deterrent to Pyongyang, but also to contain China’s
own intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. But the reality, according to Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow with the
Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center in Washington, is that the system’s technical design would limit its effectiveness against such
capabilities. “Chinese criticism of THAAD is not based on any legitimate security concerns,” Mr. Klingner said during a recent interview with The
Washington Times. “The Chinese security concerns are red herrings. What China is really trying to do is divide the U.S. and its allies from
upgrading their security capabilities in the region.” “China,” he said, “perceives anything related to U.S. military development in the Pacific as a
dagger aimed at the heart of China.”

Flourishing ROK/China relations being used to combat air pollution

PTI 13 (Peoples times india, “China, Japan, South Korea joint combat pollution” PTI, available:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/pollution/China-Japan-South-Korea-to-jointly-combat-air-
pollution/articleshow/27430401.cms accessed: 6/22/16) KAB
China, Japan and South Korea on Sunday agreed to jointly combat air pollution, a common challenge to
East Asia, to boost sustainable development for greater ecological improvement. At the end of a two-
day summit in Xianghe, a county about one hour's drive east of Beijing, representatives from the three countries said that they
will to join hands to boost sustainable development. Wang Chunzheng, vice chairman of the China Centre for
International Economic Exchanges, said that the northeastern Asian nations of China, Japan and South
Korea share common benefits as well as common responsibilities in joint air pollution control ,
state-run Xinhua news agency reported. Wang pointed out that Japan and South Korea have advanced technologies and
experience in energy saving, environmental protection and air pollution treatment. He added the three nations have great potential
for cooperation in the environmental protection industry as the Chinese leadership has vowed greater efforts for ecological
improvement. Japanese Ambassador to China Masato Kitera said that environmental issues including climate
change, as well as air, water and soil pollution, are shaking the foundations for human life , a
situation which requires all nations to join hands in seeking solutions. Kitera said the pollution is a common
challenge to East Asia and that cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea is essential.
Cheong Young Rok, minister of economic affairs at the South Korean embassy in Beijing, said that the East Asian nations
should learn from each other and build a mechanism for smog mitigation. He called on these countries to use
environmental pollution as a spur to boost the green industry and create new job opportunities. Lingering smog covering large parts
of China for about the past month have caused traffic jams and school closures. The bad air has also led to an increase in patients
visiting hospitals due to respiratory problems. Experts blame over-dependence on coal, an unreasonable industrial structure, as well
as surging numbers of cars on the roads for the worsening air quality.
AT:
 Decoys
Decoys are lighter than warheads and can be distinguished from each other in the
Terminal Phase
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 2009 (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Independent,
nonpartisan research organization specializing in national security, foreign policy, and defense
planning issues, 2009, "Frequently Asked Questions about Ballistic Missile Defense", ifpa.org,
http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/FAQ-bmd.pdf, Accessed 07/11/2017) SEO
Missile defense systems can be deployed on the ground, in the air, at sea, or in space and destroy missiles and their payloads
during their three stages of flight: i.e., the boost, midcourse, and terminal phase. In the boost phase just after launch, the missile is
especially vulnerable because it is relatively slow moving and it emits bright exhaust gases that are comparatively easy for sensors
to detect and track. Interception during the boost phase has the advantage of destroying the missile before it disperses its payload,
which may consist of one or more warheads and countermeasures in the form of decoys. Intercepting a missile in boost phase has
the additional advantage that the debris, including warheads, may, depending on how early interdiction occurs, fall on the country
launching the missile—a reality that could have a deterrent effect if the launching state is faced with the likelihood of serious
damage to its own territory. The duration of the boost phase for medium- and short-range missiles is a couple of minutes; for
intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) it is three to five minutes. In general, space-based interceptors provide the best
opportunities for boost-phase intercepts. The midcourse phase provides a longer timeframe for interception. This phase accounts for
as much as eighty percent of the payload’s flight time — some twenty minutes for the longest-range missiles—therefore offering
multiple intercept opportunities. Midcourse interception may require that the missile defense system distinguish between warheads
and decoys, the latter being released in order to confuse sensors and waste interceptors against a false target. During
the
terminal phase the payload reenters the Earth’s atmosphere creating a bright infrared
signature and the decoys slow down considerably because they are likely to be lighter
than warheads. Under these conditions, warheads may be distinguished more easily
permitting the defense to launch interceptors against the exposed warheads.
 Chinese Sanctions
South Korea preparing for sanctions - South Korea is taking measures to ensure that the
sanctions won’t have an effect on them economically.
Hyon-Hee Shin (Times Of News. "Seoul, Washington slam China over THAAD retaliation - Times of News." Times of News. 3 Mar.
2017. Web. 10 Jul. 2017. http://south-korea.timesofnews.com/seoul-washington-slam-china-over-thaad-retaliation.html) SK
“As THAAD is a prudent and limited self-defense measure designed to respond to a clear, reckless and unlawful North Korean military threat,
criticism or pressure on the ROK to abandon its self-defense would be unreasonable and inappropriate,” a department spokesperson said in a
statement provided to Yonhap News Agency. Earlier in the day, the issue came to the fore during a government-party policy consultation,
presided over by acting President and Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn and participated by top Cabinet economic policymakers. The sides agreed
to actively appeal to China about its “unfair” interference in the private sector trade and sociocultural affairs through upcoming high- and
working-level meetings, ruling Liberty Korea Party spokesperson Rep. Kim Myung-yeon told reporters. While
reaffirming the
deployment plan, the prime minister pledged to craft countermeasures to minimize the losses of
South Korean businesses, considering the two countries’ multifaceted economic ties. The deployment
process is set to kick into high gear now that Seoul’s Defense Ministry has secured land for the battery in Seongju, South Gyeongsang Province,
through a pact struck Tuesday with Lotte Group. “As the THAAD deployment is expected to pick up (and) China’s resistance to grow fiercer, we
strengthen communications with China and draw up necessary steps in time, while continuing monitoring of the measures from the Chinese side,”
Hwang said at the meeting. “The deployment is a self-defensive measure vital for us to defend national security and people’s lives from North
Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and I’d like to emphasize once again that it is not aimed at any third country.” The latest tour ban sparked
heated responses from both conservative and liberal camps, as well as attacks on rival presidential candidates over their stances on THAAD.
Liberty Korea Party Floor Leader Rep. Chung Woo-taik lambasted what he called “petty and arrogant behavior and a great power’s tyranny,”
saying China’s meddling is “going way too far.” “The root cause behind the THAAD deployment is North Korea’s nuclear and missile
development, and China bears the first and foremost responsibility as it has been conniving and sitting on its hands,” he said at an internal party
meeting. “It’s
clear that China won’t be able to win international respect as long as it continues to
press and intimidate neighbor countries like an emperor.”
China won’t formalize sanctions - China has a heavy reliance on South Korea’s
intermediate goods.
Jong-Wha 2017 (Lee Jong-Wha, March 26 2017, professor of economics and director of the
th

Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University, " The China-South Korea trade war must end", The
Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/26/commentary/world-commentary/china-south-korea-
trade-war-must-end/#.WWQfadPytZo. DoA: July 10 2017) TG th

Chinese travel agencies have suspended the sale of group tours to South Korea. And China has temporarily closed the 55 discount stores owned
by the Lotte Group — South Korea’s fifth-largest conglomerate and the supplier of the land for the THAAD system — for supposed safety
violations. Chinese media have issued threats that sanctions could be extended to other South Korean companies, like Samsung and Hyundai.
China is eager to take advantage of its position as South Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly one-quarter of its external trade,
and main source of foreign tourism. (Chinese tourists accounted for half the total number of foreign visitors to South Korea last year — more
it is hardly a one-sided relationship. South Korea is China’s fourth-largest
than eight million people.) But
trading partner, providing key intermediate inputs on which many Chinese firms rely. Indeed,
intermediate and capital goods comprised more than 70 percent of South Korea’s exports to China
last year, including key inputs such as semiconductors (20 percent) and display panels (11 percent). South Korea is also the number
one source of foreign tourists to China

Chinese sanctions are likely all talk, and despite talk of sanctions, Chinese imports
reached a 6-year high in February
Chang 2017 (Gordon Chang, March 5 2017, Contributor to Forbes, " China Trying To
th

Crush South Korea's Economy", Forbes,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2017/03/05/china-trying-to-crush-south-
koreas-economy/2/#6704311b69ea. DoA: July 10 2017) TG th

Beijing has, over the course of months, upped the pressure against Lotte and other South Korean businesses, but it is not clear how much further
it is willing to go.
As a practical matter, officials are unlikely to block components Chinese
manufacturers need. “Economists say the THAAD-related backlash is not expected to significantly harm exports to China in the short
term as a bulk of the shipments are intermediate goods, which China uses to manufacture finished products and ships to other countries,” writes
In fact, South Korea’s exports to China, driven by
the South China Morning Post in connection with the Lotte dispute.
sales of semiconductors and display panels, hit a six-year high last month.
China is still working together with SK to curb NK despite THAAD’s announced
implementation
Laura Zhou of Business Insider in April 2017
<http://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-south-korea-threaten-north-korea-with-
potential-new-sanctions-2017-4>
China and South Korea have agreed to impose “strong” new sanctions on North Korea if it
carries out further nuclear or long-range missile tests, a senior official in Seoul said on Monday. The
commitment comes as pressure on Pyongyang mounts after last week’s summit between US President Donald Trump and
President Xi Jinping. Monday’s meeting in Seoul between China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei
and his South Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun also came as a US naval strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson
headed to the region in a show of force.
 Chinese Build Up/ Arms Race
China Spying Concerns are non unique, similar systems already exist- We should
already be seeing the impact to the arms race, but we haven’t
Jung-yeop, W., & Block, E. (2015, August 11). “Misinformation Hinders Debate on
THAAD deployment in Korea”. Asia Pacific Bulletin.

One argument behind China’s opposition to THAAD deployment in South Korea is the AN/TPY‐
2 X‐Band radar needed in the THAAD system. China worries that the radar can be easily
converted from a short to long detection range that could track Chinese military movements.
However, two AN/TPY‐2 radars with similar specifications have already been installed in
Japan and the UHF long‐range EWR based on AN/FPS‐115 Pave Paws, known as the world’s
strongest radar, was constructed in Taiwan in 2009. Despite the installation of those radars in
Japan and Taiwan, China has had a much stronger response to their deployment in South
Korea. Over the past months, Chinese officials have repeatedly voiced their concerns and
stressed that although the deployment of THAAD is intended to protect the 28,000 American
troops, South Korea should exercise its right as a sovereign state and express opposition.

Missile Defense Systems Empirically increase the likelihood of deterrence, prefer

empirics over analytics
Quackenbush, S. L. (2006). National Missile Defense and Deterrence. Political Research
Quarterly, 59(4), 533–541. http://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900403
The baseline analysis demonstrates that as long as Defender's threat is credible, national missile
defense is superfluous. However, if Defender prefers to back down rather than fight a nuclear
conflict, then national missile defense has an important stabilizing effect. Furthermore, the
potential for missile defense to increase Challenger's dissatisfaction with the status quo presents
the greatest threat that national missile defense will undermine deterrence stability, although
even then deterrence almost always succeeds as long as Defender's threat is credible. Finally, the
analysis shows that national missile defense has an important stabilizing effect when Challenger is
risk-acceptant, as rogue states are often assumed to be. These results demonstrate that national
missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence. In particular, if classical
deterrence theorists (e.g., Brams and Kilgour 1988; Powell 2003) are correct to assume that the high costs of
nuclear war make conflict the worst possible outcome, then effective national missile defense is
the only way to achieve successful deterrence. Nonetheless, perfect deterrence theory's
conclusion that threat credibility is an important determinant of deterrence success is well
supported here (Zagare and Kilgour 2000; Zagare 2004). National missile defense is stabilizing
precisely because it makes Defender's retaliatory threat more credible.

China won’t increase military spending in response to THAAD

Ross, Robert [Professor of Political Science at Boston College]. "Robert Ross behind the THAAD
controversy: analysis of a veteran China watcher." April 6, 2017 https://www.cmc.edu/keck-center/blog/robert-ross-behind-thaad-controversy-
analysis-of-veteran-china-watche
It is hard to imagine an arms race. China clearly has a secure second-strike capability and is
not interested in building a large stockpile of nuclear warheads. [China] China’s ministry of foreign
affairs has used
the threat of an arms race as political rhetoric. China may produce more
missiles in response to THAAD, but there will not be an arms race.

This is also explained by Melissa Hanham who states

Hanham, Melissa. "China's Happy to Sit Out the Nuclear Arms Race." Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy, 30 Jan. 2017. Web. 12
July 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/30/chinas-happy-to-sit-out-the-nuclear-arms-race/>.
For China, it’s not the size of the arsenal that counts, it’s how you use it. About 200 nuclear warheads are “enough.”
China’s primary goal has always been to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them. Beijing figured
out that you don’t need 30,000 nuclear warheads to achieve that end — you only need enough that the risk of losing a major city in retaliation holds your opponents back. They have

enough for escalation control, they have enough for deterrence, and they only need to mate their warheads to
delivery vehicles to signal.

And, Even if China increases military spending, other Asian countries won’t, thus no
arms race
Kang, David [professor of international relations and business and director of the Korean Studies Institute at the
University of Southern California] “A Looming Arms Race in East Asia” 14 May, 2014. The National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/looming-arms-race-east-asia-10461?page=3
The real question is not whether China is rapidly increasing its military spending, but
whether other East Asian countries are responding in kind. The only exception is China, where
increases in military spending continue to far outpace economic growth. The real
takeaway, however, is the lack of response by China’s regional neighbors. South Korea and
Australia may be [are] not be ready to shift gears [fund an arms race] yet.

There is no correlation between Arms Races and conflict

Diehl, Paul [University of Michigan] “Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look,” 1983,
(https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68822/10.1177_002234338302000301.pdf;sequence=2) This study
retested Wallace’s (1979) findings that a mutual military buildup between major powers increased the probability of a serious dispute escalating to war. Using a modified set of assumptions and
it was discovered that only one-fourth (25%) of the disputes preceded by mutual military buildups
indicators,

resulted in war, while ten of thirteen (77%) of wars occurred in the absence of joint arms [races] increases
by the dispute participants. Therefore, it was concluded that mutual military buildups did not exercise
any general impact on the initiation of war under the limited conditions studied. This lack of a relationship between military spending and dispute
escalation remained 211 unchanged when controls were instituted for inter-century differences and when retested to ascertain the influence of a unilateral military buildup. In considering
 Chinese Diplo
1. China still working with SK against NK despite THAAD
Laura Zhou of Business Insider in April 2017
<http://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-south-korea-threaten-north-korea-
with-potential-new-sanctions-2017-4>
China and South Korea have agreed to impose “strong” new sanctions on North Korea if it
carries out further nuclear or long-range missile tests, a senior official in Seoul said on Monday. The
commitment comes as pressure on Pyongyang mounts after last week’s summit between US President Donald Trump and
President Xi Jinping. Monday’s meeting in Seoul between China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs Wu Dawei
and his South Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun also came as a US naval strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson
headed to the region in a show of force.

2. China won’t pressure North Korea to the point of destabilization

< https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-07/morning-after-
korea%E2%80%99s-icbm-test>
Admiral James A. Winnefeld of The U.S. Naval Institute in July 2017
Moreover,it is foolish to expect China to pressure North Korea enough to willingly end its program.
Even if provided enormous inducements, China will only provide lip service, and will not take
actions that would destabilize the North and result in a flood of refugees and a democratic, U.S.-backed state on its
border. Rather, China will pressure the United States to make its own concessions, such as ceasing exercises and reversing the
deployment of the THAAD missile system, in exchange for a freeze on the North’s program. These actions must be non-starters.

3. TURN Superpower Diplomacy is bad- empirics prove

Gurses of Florida Atlantic University in 2008 writes that superpower negotiation is often harmful
because the superpower wants superficial agreements to prove it did something, while regional
powers are interested in actual peace. That’s why he finds that superpower settlements are
actually counterproductive - 219% increase in the chance of peace failure.
Three of the mediation variables are found to significantly impact the duration of peace across both models—and two of them
reduce the duration of peace. Mediated agreements increase the probability of a new war. The coefficient for this variable suggests
that it increases the odds of peace failure by more than 200%. This finding underlines the differences between shortterm and long-
term mediation success and the necessity to distinguish between these two aspects conceptually. Possibly, powerful mediators
sometimes drive the antagonists into concluding an agreement without them being sufficiently committed to peace . In line with
this, superpower mediation is found to reduce the duration of peace (superpower involvement as a
mediator increases the odds of peace failure by 219% and 352% in the Cox and Weibull models, respectively).
Superpowers, with their greater political, military, and economic resources, but also their own interests, might drive the
fighting parties into concluding a relatively superficial peace agreement that only holds in the
short run but does not address core issues of the conflict—neither those related to greed nor to grievances. An
alternative explanation would be that antagonists sometimes do have “devious objectives” (Richmond, 1998) and use mediation to
gain time or international recognition.

This is especially true in Korea as Business Insider in 2017 contends that both the United States
and China want the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, but
North Korea has stated on multiple occasions that denuclearization of the North is not up for
bargaining, until there is a shift in paradigm among the superpowers or Kim Jun-Un, North
Korea won’t even come to the negotiation table.
<http://www.businessinsider.com/r-china-us-agree-aim-of-complete-irreversible-korean-denuclearization-2017-6>
China and the United States agreed that efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula should be "complete, verifiable and
irreversible", Chinese state media said on Saturday, reporting the results of high level talks in Washington this week. "Both
sides reaffirm that they will strive for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula," a consensus document released by the official Xinhua news agency said.