SPOUSES LANSANG v.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 76028, April 6, 1990

Facts:
 Private respondent Salangsang filed an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident against Spouses
Salangsang in RTC of South Cotabato.
 At the hearing, neither the spouses nor their counsel appeared. Thereafter, the case was submitted for
resolution.
 The Spouses explained that the reason for their absence was because their counsel, who was then a member
of parliament, was busy with an urgent work at the Batasang Pambansa; and Jose Salangsang was still in
Manila since his mother died.
 RTC of South Cotabato rendered a decision against the Spouses Salangsang and was ordered to pay
P19,000.00 as costs of repairs and P250.00 per day until the car is returned, as unrealized income.
 RTC approved the appeal filed by the Spouses and ordered the records of the case forwarded to the
Intermediate Appellate Court.
 The Spouses filed in the appellate court a petition for certiorari directed against the order of the trial court dated
March 11, 1985 which denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and which in effect is one for a new trial.
In the petition, it is alleged that petitioners have perfected their appeal and that they are not abandoning it, but
the same is not an adequate, speedy and plain remedy because of the P250.00 daily penalty mentioned in the
award.
 The appellate court denied due course to and dismissed the petition.

Issues:
1. Is appeal inconsistent with the remedy of certiorari?

2. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, was the appeal taken by the petitioners from the decision
of the trial court deemed abandoned when they filed a petition for certiorari contesting the order denying their
motion for reconsideration and to allow them to present evidence which in effect is for new trial?

Held:
SC GRANTED THE PETITION.

The purpose of an appeal is to bring up for review a final judgment or order of the lower court. The remedy of certiorari
is to correct certain acts of any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions performed without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A certiorari proceeding may be instituted during the pendency of a case or even
after judgment.

If after judgment, the petition for certiorari is availed of when appeal is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, then the
petition must fail as certiorari may not be resorted to as a substitute for appeal much less for a lost one. In such a case,
the right to appeal is deemed abandoned.

However, after a judgment had been rendered and an appeal therefrom had been perfected, a petition for certiorari
relating to certain incidents therein may prosper where the appeal does not appear to be a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. Hence, appeal and certiorari are not remedies that exclude each other.

In De Vera vs. Santos, this Court held that:

Although the petitioner Mercy Amonidovar had already perfected an appeal from the judgment of the
respondent court, she is not barred from applying for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari since appeal is not
an adequate remedy to correct lack or excess of jurisdiction because appeal cannot promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of an invalid order.

Indeed, there are instances when this Court relaxed the application of Rule 65 on certiorari and allowed the writ to issue
even while appeal was available in the interest of justice, 8 or due to the dictates of public welfare and for the
advancement of public policy.
DENNIS FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010

Facts:
 PGMA appointed Maria Elena Bautista as Undersecretary of DOTC on October 4, 2006. She was also
designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department on October 23, 2006.
 MARINA Administrator Suazo resigned and Bautista was designated as OIC of the MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
 Dennis Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria
Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
 During the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed as Administrator of the MARINA.
 Funa argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union
that the prohibition does not apply to those positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA
Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary. He urther contends that even if Bautistas
appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation
must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition.
 On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In
fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of
respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic.
Respondents also submit that the petition should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious considering that
Bautistas concurrent designation as MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was constitutional. There was no
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent Bautista was merely designated
acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not appointed MARINA
Administrator. With the resignation of Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., the position of MARINA Administrator was left
vacant, and pending the appointment of permanent Administrator, respondent Bautista was designated OIC in
a temporary capacity for the purpose of preventing a hiatus in the discharge of official functions. Her case thus
falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule against multiple offices, i.e., without additional compensation
(she did not receive any emolument as MARINA OIC) and as required by the primary functions of the office.
Besides, Bautista held the position for four (4) months only, as in fact when she was appointed MARINA
Administrator on February 2, 2009, she relinquished her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport,
in acknowledgment of the proscription on the holding of multiple offices.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Held:
SC GRANTED THE PETITION.

Requisites for Judicial Review

The courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.

Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, we held that taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

 (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen
sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.

However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. In
the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the
Presidents appointment or designation of a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-charge of an attached agency will
arise in every such appointment.

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she
designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The
reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.

Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents theory that being just a designation, and temporary at that, respondent
Bautista was never really appointed as OIC Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we
distinguished between the terms appointment and designation, as follows:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where
the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person
named.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words
hold the office were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or
multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2,
Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
UY KIAO ENG v. NIXON LEE
G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

Facts:
 Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus to compel his mother, petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, to produce
the holographic will of his deceased father so that probate proceedings could be instituted. Allegedly,
respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the
legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
 Petitioner Uy denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts.
 The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred,
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she
asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial
and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station,
for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.
 RTC GRANTED the demurrer to evidence upon the MR filed by petitioner Uy.
 CA upon MR of the respondent Nixon issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment
of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother
had in her possession the holographic will.

Issue:
Whether the issuance of the writ of mandamus is proper. - NO.

Held:
SC GRANTED THE PETITION.

The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ.

The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or
from operation of law.

This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to
for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.

The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public
duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.

As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which
it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.

Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists,
although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:

[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.

The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.

The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and,
regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.
To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters
relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.

In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief.

Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles.

Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe production of
the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will,
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his
petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
HILARION HENARES, JR., ET AL., v. LTFRB and DOTC
G.R. No. 158290, October 23, 2006

Facts:
 Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
 To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG.
According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it
produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to
gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits
60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only
drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.
 Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to
order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as
the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
 In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be
issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when
he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
 The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the
LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 of Rep. Act
No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel
compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 21 of the cited
Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein
respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court
should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
 Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very
same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.

Issue:
Whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents. - NO.

Held:
SC DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases:
(1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty;
(2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and
(3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said,

…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course
of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may
not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of
mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only
to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No.
290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises
to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason
that neither is inferior to the other.

The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court,
especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate
that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems
raised in this petition.

We must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY v. PRIMEX COCO PRODUCTS, INC.
G.R. No. 163088, July 20, 2006

Facts:
 On August 28, 1982, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 826 was issued by the President of the Philippines. Section 1
thereof reads:

Section 1. Prohibition. Except as herein provided, no government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter
authorize, approve, or grant any permit or license for the establishment or operations of new desiccated
coconut processing plants, including the importation of machinery or equipment for the purpose. In the event
of a need to establish a new plant, or expand the capacity, relocate or upgrade the efficiencies of any
existing desiccated plant, the Philippine Coconut Authority may, upon proper determination of such need
and evaluation of the condition relating to:
a. the existing market demand;

b. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality;

c. the level and flow of raw materials; and

d. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned.

may authorize or grant the application for the establishment or expansion of capacity, relocation or
upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut processing plant, subject to the approval of the
President.

 Primex Coco Products, Inc. (Primex, for brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
desiccated coconut.
 On September 25, 1990, it filed an application for registration with the PCA as a new
exporter/trader/manufacturer of DCN and paid the sum of P600.00 as registration fee.
 However, PCA did not immediately issue the corresponding certificate of registration. This prompted Primex to
file a petition for mandamus against the PCA and its then Administrator Charles Avila before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 59.
 RTC rendered judgment in favor of Primex and ordered the PCA to act on the application.
 However, seven (7) PCA processing companies belonging to the Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators
(APCD) filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition with a plea for injunctive relief to enjoin the PCA from
processing and issuing a license to Primex.
 On November 25, 1992, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the PCA. The latter complied
and refrained from processing and issuing a license to Primex.
 The PCA Governing Board issued Resolution No. 018-93 entitled Policy Declaration Deregulating the
Establishment of New Coconut Processing Plants. It is provided therein that, henceforth, PCA shall no longer
require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut
fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any
form of license or permit as a condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants. It stated further
that PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the
purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding
service fees/charges.
 The PCA issued Certificate of Registration No. 014254 to Primex.
 The APCD filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the PCA in this Court to nullify Resolution No.
018-93.
 While the case was pending in this court, the PCA renewed the registration of Primex as a coconut product
processor every year from 1994 until 1998.
 The Court rendered a decision declaring PCA Board Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration
issued under it null and void for having been issued in excess of the power of PCA.
 The PCA issued Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 1999, providing guidelines for the issuance of
provisional licenses for the registration of qualified DCN exporters/traders/manufacturers.
 Conformably, the PCA issued on January 27, 1999, Provisional Certificate of Registration No. 040805-99-P to
Primex effective until June 30, 1999 only.
 On February 8, 1999, Primex moved for reconsideration. It maintained that it was entitled to a certificate of
registration for one year considering that it had been operating as an exporter/trader/manufacturer of DCN since
September 28, 1990.
 Primex was prompted to file a petition for mandamus against the PCA and its Administrator Eduardo Escueta
before the RTC of Quezon City. Primex alleged, inter alia, that it has established beyond doubt that there was
a final and executory decision issued by the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 69 ordering the PCA to take action on
its application for registration dated September 25, 1990, and that the said application has been approved by
the PCA Governing Board on October 20, 1992, per Resolution No. 044-92. There is also no doubt that the
certificate of registration was issued not by virtue of Resolution No. 018-93 which was declared null and void by
 the Supreme Court but by virtue of Resolution No. 044-92. PCA had absolutely no reason to issue only a
provisional certificate of registration valid only for six (6) months or until June 30, 1999, since it (Primex) has
been operating as DCN since September 28, 1990. As a result of the issuance of only a provisional certificate
of registration, it would suffer damages in its domestic and export business of at least P5 million per month
starting July 1, 1999.
 RTC rendered a decision in favor of Primex and ordered PCA to issue to Primex a regular certificate of
registration not only for the calendar year 1999 but also annually thereafter upon its compliance with all the legal
requirements for registration. The court a quo ratiocinated that the PCA may be compelled by mandamus to
renew the certificate of registration of Primex valid for one year. The trial court declared that while it is true that
Primex is not entitled to a certificate of registration as a matter of right, the PCA is mandated by law, specifically
E.O. No. 826, to determine if there is a need for a new desiccated coconut plant and evaluate the circumstances
prevailing in the locality. The fact that the grant of a permit to Primex was authorized and approved by the PCA
Governing Board on October 20, 1992 per Resolution No. 044-92 is a clear indication that the PCA has already
made such a determination so that the subsequent issuance of a certificate of registration becomes purely
ministerial on its part and which, therefore, may be compelled by mandamus.
 The CA affirmed the ruling of the court a quo that Primex was able to establish its legal right to a permit as
exporter/trader/manufacturer of desiccated coconut by virtue of PCA Resolution No. 044-92.
 The appellate court ruled that the PCA cannot invoke its failure to make the necessary recommendation to the
President under Section 1, E.O. No. 826 as a legal justification for the non-issuance of a license to Primex. It
agreed with the RTC that the fact that Primex had been issued certificates of registration for 1993 up to 1998
presupposes that the required approval of the President had been obtained.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of mandamus is proper. - NO

Held:
SC GRANTED THE PETITION FILED BY PCA. THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS IS DISMISSED.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the
act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

When an official is required and authorized to do a prescribed act upon a prescribed contingency, his functions are
ministerial only, and mandamus may be issued to control his action upon the happening of the contingency.

For a writ of mandamus to be issued, it is essential that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The writ neither confers powers nor
imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. The
writ will not be granted where its issuance would be unavailing, nugatory, or useless.

If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

There is no doubt that under E.O. No. 826, Administrative Order No. 003, Series of 1981, and Administrative Order No.
002, Series of 1991, petitioner is vested with discretion on whether or not to grant an application for the establishment
of a new plant, the expansion of capacity, the relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut
processing plant. Relative to the renewal of a certificate of registration, petitioner may refuse a registration unless the
applicant has complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for renewal. However, once the requirements
are complied with, the renewal of registration becomes a ministerial function of petitioner.

Petitioner is not mandated to approve an original application for a certificate of registration or a renewal thereof on an
annual basis merely based on the allegations contained in the application and the payment of the registration fees
therefor. The PCA is tasked to first inquire into and ascertain, after an investigation, whether the applicant has complied
with the a priori procedural and substantive conditions to the approval of said application as provided in E.O. No. 826;
Administrative Order No. 003, Series of 1981; and Administrative Order No. 002, Series of 1991.

Respondent is not entitled as a matter of right to an annual registration or renewal of its certificate of registration merely
and solely based on Resolution No. 044-92 which the PCA Governing Board approved on October 20, 1992. The
resolution specifically provides that the opening of respondents new desiccated coconut plant shall be subject to the
final approval of the President of the Philippines, and compliance with the necessary requirements and pertinent
regulations of the PCA. The resolution is not and should not be construed to vest in the respondent a right to a certificate
of registration or renewal of its certificate of registration without prior examination or investigation by the PCA of the
merits of the application.

When the RTC rendered judgment on January 18, 2000, the period for which the renewal certificate was sought had
already expired. Case law is that mandamus will not be issued to compel the renewal of a license for a period which
has expired. If the right sought to be enforced by writ of mandamus is or has become a mere abstract right, enforcement
of which will be of no substantial or practical benefit to the plaintiff, the writ will not issue though the applicant would
otherwise be entitled to it. To warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus, it must appear that the writ will be effectual
as a remedy, it should be denied where it would be useless by reason of events occurring subsequent to commencement
proceedings.

In this case, respondent had no cause of action to compel petitioner to issue a renewal certificate of registration for
every year from 1999 at the time it filed the petition for mandamus. At that time, respondent had no right to demand and
the petitioner had no correlative duty, to issue a renewal certificate for the years following the filing of the petition, hence,
there could not have been any default on the part of petitioner. Where a person or entity has not yet failed to perform a
duty, action for mandamus is premature.

Mandamus is never granted to compel the performance of an act until there has been an actual, as distinguished from
an anticipated, refusal to act.
This is true even if there is a strong presumption that the persons whom it is sought to coerce by the writ will refuse to
perform their duty when the proper time arrives.

Its function is to compel the performance of a present existing duty as to which there is default. It is not granted to take
effect prospectively, and it contemplates the performance of an act which is incumbent on respondent when the
application for a writ is made.